

DIASPORIC POLICIES AND PROGRAMMES OF MEXICO,  
1988-2008

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DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled “**DIASPORIC POLICIES AND PROGRAMMES OF MEXICO, 1988-2008**”, submitted by me in fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY** of this University is my own work and has not been previously submitted for any degree of this or any other university.

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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that the thesis be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

ACH	Automated Clearing House
AJC	American Jewish Committee
APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BC	Before Christ
BHW	Bi-national Health Week
BHW	Border Health Week
BWG	Bilateral Working Group
CID	Consular Identification Cards
CMHI	California-Mexico Health Initiative
CNDH	National Human Rights Commission
COFIPE	Federal Code of Institutions and Electoral Procedures
COMEXUS	US-Mexico Commission for Educational and Cultural Exchange
CONACULTA	National Council for Culture and Arts
CONACYT	National Council for Science and Technology
CONADE	Mexican National Sports Commission
CUNY	City University of New York
CYO	Catholic Youth Organisation
DDI	Diaspora Direct Investment
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DFI	Foreign Direct Investment
DGMCA	General Directorate for Mexican Communities Abroad
ECLAC	Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
EPVCA	El Paso Valley Cotton Association
ESL	English as second language
EU	European Union
EZLN	Zapatistas National Liberation Army

FDC	First Data Corporation
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
FUMEC	Mexico-US Foundation
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GCIM	Global Commission on International Migration
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GED	General Education Development
GFMD	Global Forum on Migration and Development
GOPIO	Global Organisation of People of Indian Origin
HLCG	High Level Contact Group for Drug Control
HRST	Human Resources in Science and Technology
HTAs	Hometown Associations
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IFE	Federal Electoral Institute (Spanish: Instituto Federal Electoral)
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IME	Institute for Mexicans Abroad
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INAH	Archaeological and Historical Institute
INBA	Fine Arts National Institute
INEA	National Council for Adult Education
INGO	International Nongovernmental Organisation
INM	National Migration Institute
INS	Immigration and Naturalisation Service
IEE	<i>Instituto Espanol de la Emigracion</i> (Spanish Institute of Emigration)
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IRCA	Immigration Reform and Control Act
ISI	Import Substitution Industrialisation

JMUSDC	Joint Mexico-US Defence Commission
MCAS	High Security Consular Registration ( <i>Matricula Consular de Alta Seguridad</i> )
MCLAP	Mexican Capital Legal Assistance Programme
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
NABE	National Association for Bilingual Education
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NASDME	National Association of State Directors for Bilingual Education
NCPCS	National Commission of Physical Culture and Sports
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NHW	National Health Week
NLU	National-Luis University
NMRA	Mexican Restaurateurs Association
NRI	Non-Resident Indians
OAS	Organisation of American States
OBH	Office of Border Health
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OFAOS	State Offices for Attention to Natives
OPME	Presidential Office for Mexicans Abroad
PAN	National Action Party or Partido de Accion Nacional
PANAL	New Alliance Party
PCME	<i>Programa par alas Comunidades Mexicanos en el Extranjero or</i> Programme for Mexican Communities Abroad
PD	Public Diplomacy
PECYT	Special Programme for Science and Technology
PEMEX	<i>Petroleos Mexicanos</i>
PIO	Persons of Indian Origin
PLCDMA	Programme of Legal Consultation and Defence for Mexicans Abroad

POMA	Presidential Office for Mexicans Abroad
PRD	Democratic Revolutionary Party
PRI	Institutional Revolutionary Party
PROMESAN	Programme for Student Mobility in North America
PRONASOL	<i>Programa Nacional de Solidaridad</i> (Programme of National Solidarity)
PT	Labour Party
PVEM	Green Ecologist Party of Mexico
RTM	Network of Mexican Talents Abroad
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programmes
SDFP	Social-Democratic and Farmers Party
SECOFI	<i>Secretaría de Comercio y Fomento Industrial</i>
SEP	<i>Secretaria de Educacion Publica</i> or Public Education Secretariat
SOS	Save Our State
SPP	Security and Prosperity Partnership
SRE	<i>Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores</i>
TelMex	<i>Telefonos de Mexico</i>
UK	United Kingdom
UNESCO	United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHRC	United Nations Human Rights Commission
UN	United Nations
UPN	<i>Universidad Pedagogica Nacional</i>
US	United States
USMBHC	US-Mexico Border Health Commission
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VCCR	Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
VDS	health stations or <i>Ventanillas de Salud</i>
WTO	World Trade Organisation



## Preface

In the post-Cold War period, world politics has witnessed many changes—moving from alliances to shunning dependence; forming global or regional groupings; emergence of new non-state actors and newer forms of conflict based on race, religion, ethnicity, culture—which have compelled most sending countries to mobilise their diaspora in order to maintain social, political and economic interactions with the receiving countries. Amongst all these, the issue of remittances from diaspora is of considerable importance and often the guiding factor in inter-state relations. This importance emanates from the fact that as per the United Nations estimates the annual financial global remittance to migrant sending countries is as high as \$232 billion in 2005. As an outcome of these increasing remittances, many insignificant, small and underdeveloped countries have become essentially ‘high remittance economies’. The economic gains coupled with the obligation to look after the welfare and interests of their diaspora has compelled various governments to institute policies, programmes and institutions responsible for looking into diasporic issues. The establishment of diasporic ministries and departments in many countries marked the change in the approaches of the governments from complete apathy to accountability towards diasporic population and from the changing perceptions of them from being looked down upon as traitors to pronouncing them as heroes and important agents of economic development.

The reasons for the sending countries to taking keen interest in the well-being of its nationals living abroad and looking upon them favourably are numerous: many look towards their nationals abroad as competent investors or as means to develop their technologies or even as productive human resources. For instance, in this regard the example of Israel that looks upon its diaspora as the main agent of economic and human development as well as rational actor to influence the policy-makers in the countries where they settle is noteworthy. In similar ways, countries like India, Philippines and Mexico look up to their diasporas as major assets to boost their economic growth.

Diasporic policies and programmes, which are the key subjects of academic inquiry in the thesis, are defined as ministries, departments and practices of home state dealing with its nationals who have settled abroad. These include home state-patronized festivities and laurels for

diasporas; ministry or department devoted to its nationals abroad; absentee voting rights for diasporic populations; accords with host countries on social insurance and transfer of retirement benefits; and established mechanisms to acquire finances, expertise and influence from their nationals abroad. In short, diasporic policies and programmes encompass all state machinery which protrudes beyond its territory and sovereign domestic jurisdiction; and no gainsaying this has implications for national sovereignty and norms of sovereign territoriality. Therefore, diasporic policies and programmes are always described as aspects of ‘nation beyond state’ or of ‘extra-territorial membership’ by integrating the diasporic population into its home country. Admittedly, these policies alter the meaning and nature of membership of ‘national society’.

Generally speaking, the migrant-sending countries’ interests are served by better diasporic policies because these are their own population; and even the home or receiving countries have responsibilities, in return for whatever service that is rendered towards that country by the diaspora, to treat them fairly and remove arbitrary, discriminatory and preferential policies.

The genesis of diasporic policies and programmes in Mexico is rooted in the concept of organic community which is on the mission of claiming their own lost land. Those who live in the southern states of US are still believed to be living in the territories that justifiably were and are Mexican so the justification given is that those millions who seek to cross the present borders are still going to territories which supposedly belong to Mexico and the borders had been drawn recently and artificially.

Tracing the evolution of Mexico’s diasporic policies and programmes towards its diaspora in the US, it can be established that it began as early as 1848, became more intensive and comprehensive only in the 1990s and diversified and intensified in the twenty first century. The process of comprehensive policy making has increasingly involved federal, state and municipal governments as well as NGOs as the new immigrants and the Mexican-Americans became forthcoming and pro-active to engage with officials. Recognising the contribution of the diaspora and to reward its reliance on them, in 1990, Mexico expanded the definition of nation to include a “cultural entity” not constrained by its territorial borders. It became a nation that had an organic entity with those of its nationals in the US and it is the task of the state to maintain this

newly perceived unity of its people within and beyond its physical borders. This perception has subsequently led to a host of initiatives which includes the formation of *Grupo Beta* in 1989, establishment of PCME in 1990, granting of dual nationality in 1996, establishment of Presidential Office for Mexicans Abroad in 2000, constitution of National Council for Mexicans Abroad in 2002, and reintroduction of *matricula* consular in 2002 and finally the establishment of the Institute for Mexicans Abroad in 2003.

The fundamental aim of Mexico's diasporic policies and programmes has been to prevent the illegal border crossing by migrants, promote their safe returns and provide necessary consular services. Essentially it has three targets: firstly, to enhance the worthiness and importance of its diaspora in the US. President Vicente Fox had declared them as national heroes, worthy of respect and admiration; secondly, to promote the human rights and dignity of its diaspora and to offer necessary assistance to its diasporic businessmen through pooling in matching funds into diasporas' developmental projects in their hometowns and organising cultural events for its diasporic population in their host countries; and finally, to entice its diaspora back to its roots. Dual nationality law (1996) was one such initiative that catered to the principle of "boundedness that Mexican diaspora sustain with their roots, culture, values and national traditions". Summing up, the aim of the Mexican diasporic policies or programmes is to restore social, cultural, political and economic rights to the diaspora.

# CONTENTS

<b>Acknowledgements</b>	<b>I-II</b>
<b>List of Abbreviations</b>	<b>III-VI</b>
<b>Preface</b>	<b>VII-IX</b>
<b>CHAPTER ONE: THEORISING DIASPORA, FORMATION OF MEXICAN DIASPORA IN UNITED STATES AND INTERPRETING MEXICAN IMMIGRATION</b>	<b>1-44</b>
Meaning of Diasporic Policy	
A Brief History of Mexican Diasporic Policy	
Research Methodology	
Hypotheses	
Theorising Diaspora	
<i>Diaspora: A Product of Complex Triadic Relationship</i>	
<i>Diaspora: A Transnational Subject of State</i>	
<i>Diaspora: A Product of State Rescaling Process</i>	
Formation of Mexican Diaspora in the United States	
<i>Bracero Programme: A Step towards Immigration</i>	
<i>Maquiladoras: An Open Door for Immigration</i>	
<i>NAFTA: A Wider Gate for Immigration</i>	
Interpreting Mexican Immigration	
<i>Push-Supply Interpretation</i>	
<i>Pull-Demand Interpretation</i>	
<b>CHAPTER TWO: IMMIGRATION AND DIASPORIC POLICIES IN THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL DEBATE AND PARTISAN CONTESTATION SINCE THE 1990S</b>	<b>45-86</b>
Logic of Integration with Diaspora	

The Emergence of Diasporic Policies and Programmes  
Mexican Public Opinion  
Mexican Catholic Church's Policies  
Role of Mexican NGOs and Immigrants' Human Rights Groups  
Domestic Political Debate

*Free Trade*

*Dual Nationality*

*Presidential Election of 2000*

*Fox's Relations with the Congress*

*Presidential Election of 2006*

*Calderon's Relationship with the Congress*

Contribution towards Democratisation

**CHAPTER THREE: DIASPORIC POLICY AND NEOLIBERAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MODEL** **87-126**

Assertive Diasporic Policy

*Bureaucratic Reform*

*Investment Policy*

*Consular Services*

*Dual Nationality*

*Symbolic Policy*

Neoliberal Model of Economic Development

Neoliberal Model of Economic Development in Mexico

Linkages Between Diasporic Policy and Neoliberal Economic Model

Mexico's Developmental Approach through Diaspora

*Diaspora Strategy of Salinas*

*Ernesto Zedillo's Policy*

*Vicente Fox's Diaspora-Economic Development Mantra*

*Felipe Calderon's Policy*

**CHAPTER FOUR: DUAL NATIONALITY AND ITS IMPLICATOPMS FOR MEXICO'S SECURITY AND CULTURAL RELATIONS WITH US 127-164**

Meaning of Dual Citizenship

Mexican Dual Citizenship

Rights and Privileges

Expansion of Consular Protection

Mexico's Security Relations with United States

*Security Relations in the 21 Century*

Mexico's Cultural Relations with United States

**CHAPTER FIVE: DIASPORIC ASSOCIATIONS AND MEXICAN CULTURAL PROGRAMMES AND POLICIES 165-204**

Meaning of Diasporic Association

Mexican Hometown Associations

HTAs as Agents of Economic Development

*2x1 Programme*

*2 3x1 Programme*

*4x1 Programme*

HTAs as Transmitter of Culture

Conceptualising Culture

Mexican Cultural Policies

Mexican Cultural Policies and Programmes Towards its Diasporas

*Cultural Policy under PRI*

**CHAPTER SIX: PROGRAMMES AND POLICIES UNDER NATIONAL ACTION PARTY (PAN) 205-244**

Brief History of the National Action Party (PAN)

PAN's Diasporic Policy and Programmes

Fox's Model of NAFTA

Presidential Office for Mexicans Abroad (POMA) (2000)

National Council for Mexicans Abroad (2002)

Reorganisation of *Grupo Beta* (2001)

Reintroduction of *Matricula Consular* (2002)

Institute for Mexicans Abroad (2003)

*Advisory Council*

*Health Programme*

*Education Programme*

*Communication Programme*

Reinforcement of *Paisano* Programme

Institutional Development under Calderon

**CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION: 245-260**

**References 261-297**

**List of Tables**

Table 1.1 Contract Labour under *Bracero* Programme 30

Table 1.2 Number of Undocumented Person Arrested, 1951-1964 32

Table 1.3 Total and Mexican Immigrant Populations, 1960-2006 36

Table 2.1: Annual Proposal and Bills Approved in Senate, 1997-2005 70

Table 2.2: Annual proposal and Bills Approved in Chamber of Deputies, 1997-2005 70

Table 2.3 Initial distribution of seats in 60 <sup>th</sup> Mexican Congress	77
Table 3.1 Mexico’s Free Trade Agreements	104
Table 4.1 Acceptance of Dual Nationality in Western Hemisphere	139
Table 5.1 Geographic Distribution of Mexican HTAs in the US (1998 & 2003)	173
Table 5.2 Geographic Distribution of Origins of Mexican HTAs (1998–2003)	173
Table 5.3 Mexican Migrant Clubs and Federations in Los Angeles (1998 & 2003)	174
Table 5.4 Remittances Flow into Mexico, 1988-2008	178
Table 5.5 Remittances received in Americas, by countries, 2004	178-179
Table 6.1 Government’s Protection to Migrants through <i>Grupo Beta</i> , 2002-2003	219
Table 6.2 Number of Foreigners Detained and Returned, 2002 & 2003	220
Table 6.3 Eleven (11) Areas and its objectives of “Healthy Border 2010”	243
<b>List of Figures</b>	
Figure 1.1 Geographical Distribution of People of Mexican Origin in the US	37
Figure 2.1 Seats in Mexican Senate as of 2000	69
Figure 2.2 Party representation Among top 42 appointees	72
Figure 4.1 Restriction and Tolerance toward Dual Citizenship around the World	131
Figure 5.1 Top ten Remittance Recipients among the Developing Countries 2001	179



## CHAPTER ONE

### THEORISING DIASPORA, FORMATION OF MEXICAN DIASPORA IN UNITED STATES AND INTERPRETING MEXICAN IMMIGRATION

Mexico's diasporic policy is one example of how many migrant sending countries are now attempting to manage rather than block migrant flows, revealing the extended nature of the modern state for many developing countries. Most Mexican diasporas argued '*they didn't cross the border, but the border them*'.<sup>1</sup> In response to this statement and their supplement to national economic development efforts (Goldring 2004: 808; Massey and Parrado 1994: 23), over the last twenty and twenty five years, successive Mexican governments have initiated several diasporic programmes and policies. It aims to deepen relations with and attempts to empower its diaspora in general and US in particular. These programmes include diverse initiatives—educational centres for Mexican immigrants; sponsoring cultural trips for children; and developing *matricula* card for immigrants in order to secure their rights, dignity and interests in the country they have migrated to (Bruno and Storrs 2005: 5). These intensified programmes and policies began with the administration of Salinas (1988-1994) and Zedillo (1994-2000); it reached its zenith under the presidency of Fox (2000-2006) and continued under the administration of Felipe Calderon Hinojosa (2006-2012). These policies and programmes are administered through Mexico's vast network of consulates in the US; these programmes have created the infrastructure for an enduring relationship between Mexico and its diaspora. Many analysts of these initiatives have argued Mexico's efforts to reach out to its diaspora are more than symbolic overtures geared towards acknowledging an increasingly powerful interest group<sup>2</sup>.

As such, diasporic studies have gained academic currency especially in the disciplines of sociology, cultural studies, political science and international relations (IR). This broadening of the field of enquiry has compounded definitional problems. Sociological studies used to focus on

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<sup>1</sup> Rinderle (2005: 297) argues that in American invasion, Mexico lost half of its territory and some of its population under the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo in 1848. Citing to this consequence, Mexican diaspora often argued that they did not cross the border, the border crossed them. This signifies they did not go physically to US, but Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo placed them in new nation.

<sup>2</sup> Newland (2010: 7) argues that diaspora are interest groups and use several methods to regulate the host and their home governments, international agencies, mass media and potential groups, associations, union, etc. Mexico develops proper relations with them to ease its burden as well as to achieve its national interests.

aspects of some, real or imagined, common origin; scattering beyond the geographic and cultural bounds of the 'homeland'; and a hope someday to return to the 'homeland' to live a blissful national life (Baumann 2007: 71). In international relations and political science, the studies focus on conflicts and cooperation between nation states on many issues, such as security, process of regional integration and notion of sovereignty and citizenship. It also focuses on how diaspora impacts domestic politics and foreign policy of both sending and receiving countries (Delano 2011: 15). These renewed academic focuses on diaspora have gained from varieties of disciplines in the last two decades or so, immigrant groups, transnational communities and other categories of population, such as political refugees<sup>3</sup>, economic migrants and expatriate labour living beyond the limit of nation-states are being described as diaspora (Tololian 1991: 45). This broadening of the term could be part of the 'identity politics' that has bloomed since the end of Cold War; it could be on account of the process of economic and technological globalisation that is eliciting the desire to return to the 'roots'.

Diaspora today refers to various categories of people of a particular national origin who live outside of their traditional homelands. It is formed as a result of either voluntary<sup>4</sup> or forced<sup>5</sup> migration and they maintain regular contacts with its homeland (Sheffer 2003: 9). However, some transnational communities, such as the Kurds who are spread across several nation-states, pose a definitional challenge. Similarly, using the term 'African diaspora' to describe, the African Caribbeans or African Americans demand inclusion of ethnic and racial dimensions to the definition. When diaspora are based on ethnic or racial dimension, home countries may not always look positively towards their diasporic communities (Heisler 1985: 579). As diaspora and its fans fund ethnic conflicts in their countries of origin, for instance, the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora is considered as a source of inimical activities by the Sri Lankan state. Home countries

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<sup>3</sup> Sinha (1971: 95-96) defines political refugees as persons who are forced to flee from their home countries for political reason. The nature of political conflict between them and state make them impossible to stay at home and take refuge in other state. In the same way, Mexicans who fled during the Mexican Revolution were refugees and formed the core foundation of Mexican diaspora.

<sup>4</sup> Bookman (2002: 8) opines that voluntary migration result from a personal cost/benefit analysis. It is motivated by better economic conditions in host country. Some of them are sponsored by family members who were already there in host country. Whatever may be the impulse, the migrant uses his/her own decision and bears the consequences.

<sup>5</sup> In forced migration, Bookman (2002: 8) reveals the desire to leave homeland is imposed. It involves both man-made and non-manmade. The former includes war or political refugees and displacement of peasant due to economic development. While latter includes natural disasters. Mexican diaspora are resulted from both voluntary and forced migration.

may treat their diasporic communities differently for whatever be the reasons; persons of Indian origin (PIOs) living in developed Western countries are celebrated, while PIOs who had migrated involuntarily to the sugar colonies of Great Britain in the nineteenth century are not. Diasporas originating in multiethnic nation-state while may unify around the idea of their common national origin, nevertheless, they may also get divided along caste, linguistic and religious lines. Indian or South Asian diaspora in Canada does not hesitate to project itself as Punjabi diaspora (or even as Sikh diaspora), insisting on common cultural traits of '*Punjabeyat*' (Bhardwaj 2012).

Be that as it may, looking at the issues from within, diaspora, generally speaking, maintain sympathy with the members of their group and their entire home countries; they are actively promoting cultural, social, economic and political developments for their home countries. Among their various activities, they launch trans-state linkages that create convoluted relationships among them, their countries of origin, the homelands and international and regional actors (Sheffer 2003: 10).

Sovereign states (sending countries) are taking, as never before, interest in the wellbeing of its nationals living abroad and look upon them favourably. Varieties of reasons are cited: some countries look to their national residents abroad as competent investors and a means to develop their technologies and human resources. Israel is widely known in this regard, whose diaspora is the main source of population replacement, national income, rational outsourcing and influence the policy-makers in the countries where they settle. In the same way, countries like India, Philippines and Mexico look upon their diasporas as a major resource to boost their economic growth (Smith 2003: 111). The rationality of such changing perception about their diaspora is indicated by the fact that during the 1990s, international remittances exceed the total amount of overseas development aid to the developing world. As per the United Nations (UN), the annual international remittance is \$232 billion (Donaghy 2006: 17). Several small countries, for instance, El Salvador and Haiti, have become essentially 'remittance economies'. These large sums have prompted various national governments to institute ministries and special departments to address diasporic issues. International organisations and agencies like IOM, GCIM, World

Bank and IMF are earnestly reckoning the perspective of diasporic resources in the economic development of 'homelands', especially in the case of low income countries.

### **Meaning of Diasporic Policy**

Diasporic policies and programmes, which is the subject of academic inquiry here, are defined as home states' ministries or departments and its practices that deal with its nationals who settle abroad. These include home state-patronised festivities and laurels for diasporas; ministry or department devoted to its nationals abroad, absentee voting rights for diasporic populations; accords with host countries on social insurance and transfer of retirement benefits; and home states established host of mechanisms to acquire finances, expertise and influence from their nationals abroad (Gamlen 2008: 5). In short, diasporic policies and programmes comprise of all state machinery which bulges beyond its territory and sovereign domestic jurisdiction; and no gainsaying this has implications for national sovereignty and norms of sovereign territoriality, inviolability and non-transference. Therefore, diasporic policies and programmes are always described as aspects of 'nation beyond state' or 'extra-territorial membership' by integrating the diasporic population into home state (Smith 2008: 712; these policies also alter and change the meaning and nature of membership of 'national society' (Gamlen 2008: 5).

Generally speaking, diasporic policies and programmes are important to policymakers everywhere. It is often believed that home countries' interests are well promoted by better and dedicated diasporic policies and programmes; and that the home countries have responsibility to address their diasporas decently, which implies that home governments' inevitable interactions with diasporas are not discretionary, volatile and discriminatory (Gamlen 2008: 7). Sending countries or 'home' governments often have both developmental and security considerations in formulating comprehensive approaches towards diasporas. The argument is diasporic policies and programmes are a window for sending countries to boost their national interests can be sum up in just two phases: 'diaspora and development' and 'diaspora and security' as many diasporas are involved in funding ethnic wars. Be that as it may, scores of examples testify to states' formulating comprehensive engagement policies for their diaspora. For instance, Italian government has developed an impressive network of organisations, institutions and agencies which are directly or indirectly tied to the ministry of foreign affairs which has made Italian

consular offices responsible for diasporic education, employment and social security related problems (Heisler 1985: 478). Spanish government established *Instituto Espanol de la Emigracion* (IEE, Spanish Institute of Emigration), which is in charge of protecting Spanish diaspora abroad; and under law, Spanish government is required to encourage creation of diasporic associations so as to strengthen Spanish identity and to maintain their strong ties with the home country. Algerian government sponsors language courses, religious observances and cultural programmes for its diaspora. Yugoslavia's diasporic policy is to control outmigration of skilled labour; and to this end, it maintains extensive cultural clubs and educational centres to persuade them to return home (Heisler 1985: 480).

In Mexico, it is the combination of all the above mentioned policies and programmes, and much more. The idea of an organic nation or community is rooted in the Iberian and Catholic philosophical traditions of the medieval times. These philosophical traditions have underwritten the idea of society and state since the Iberian rule and have survived to modern times, occasionally coming into conflict with the Anglo-Saxon liberal idea of nation comprising of individuals and groups who share some common ancestry or experience. In the 1990s, the Mexican state defined its nation as a "cultural entity", not confined by its territorial borders. Mexican nation is an organic entity and it is the task of the state to maintain the organic unity of its people within and beyond its physical borders. This perception led to the establishment of PCME in 1990 (Figueroa-Aramoni 1990: 538-539) and the Institute for Mexicans Abroad in 2003.

In Mexico case, diasporic policies and programmes are directed to protect migrants' clandestine border crossing; encourage safe and sound returns to Mexico; and cater effective consular services to all Mexican nationals residing abroad. These policies and programmes include like *Grupo Beta*, PCME, the *Paisano* Programme, IME, consular registration documents and expansion of consular networks, which promotes education and health programmes for Mexicans abroad. It also granted dual nationality through constitutional reform in 1996. At the same time, it also implements developmental programmes at hometown such as 2x1, 3x1 and 4x1 for the welfare of common people (Garcia-Acevedo 2003: 546).

## **A Brief History of Mexican Diasporic Policy**

Mexico's diasporic policy towards its nationals in the US is long-lived; more long-lived is the memory of lost of Mexican territory and population in 1848. Recovery of the lost lands and people, though never realistically entertained, has been profusely imagined at the philosophical and popular levels. Those who live in the southern states of US are still believed to be living in the territories that justifiably were and are Mexicans; those millions who seek to cross the present borders are still going to territories which belong(ed) to Mexico. Mexicans have been living and moving in areas for centuries but where borders were drawn only recently. In short, nationalism is a complex phenomenon in Mexico and can play havoc with the imagination. In 1972, Octavio Paz had written his famous book entitled the *Other Mexico*, denoting organic unity of Mexicans living on both sides of Rio Grande (Paz 1972: 15). At realistic levels, migration and immigration is a complex subject in Mexico-US relations; and, moreover, it is closely intertwined with bilateral trade, environment, security and stability. Suffice to say here, Mexico has been dealing with its diaspora since 1848; and today, this diaspora is responsible for the second largest national income after oil. Under NAFTA, Mexico is integrated with US and Canada and wants to spread its culture and values through its diaspora. It also wants its diaspora to invest in Mexico; and lobby for Mexico at Capitol Hill and in state capitals (Dominguez and de Castro 2009: 197).

Mexico's diasporic policy to those in the US began in 1848, but more active and comprehensive policies and programmes were developed by 1990s, continuing and intensifying in the 21 century. The process of comprehensive ties involves central, state and municipal governments and NGOs; they develop new policies and programmes almost every year. Mexican immigrants and Mexican-Americans are more forthcoming and actively engage with official and unofficial Mexico and their interaction becomes more complex each year. The Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo instituted the formation of Mexico's diasporic policies and programmes in which Mexican state attempts to reach out to its co-nationals in the US (Garcia-Acevedo 2003: 535). The government of Benito Juarez (1858-1861 and 1861-1872) instituted contacts with *Juntas Patroticas* in the US which aided Mexico during French invasion of 1861. During the

Mexican Revolution of 1920, initiatives like the *Clubes Liberales* and the *Juntas Constitucionaristas* emerged (Garcia-Acevedo 2003: 535).

After the revolution, Mexico demonstrated its concern towards its nationals abroad and intimately worked with Mexican-American associations like *Comisiones Honorificas*, which later on, became important agents of Mexico's diasporic policies and programmes. Some organisations that originated in the 1930s, however, opposed the PRI government's policies and programmes and backed the opposition parties (Garcia-Acevedo 2003: 535-536). In the early 1970s, President Luis Echevarria (1970-1976) not only introduced new schemes to the existing programmes but also attempted to reach out to new generation of leaders. He expressed his concern for them and directed the education department and secretariat to establish cultural and educational programmes for diaspora. President Lopez (1976-1982) and Madrid (1982-1988) recognised and enlarged the agenda of "Two Mexico"<sup>6</sup> (Calderon 2004: 23).

The 1988 presidential elections added more strength to Mexican overseas organisations. Mexican diaspora had a more political colour; they believed that 1988 presidential election was electoral fraud; and they felt guilty and angry as many of them were prospering economically and were well educated. In response, they established many new organisations to assist Cardenas, but he lost in 1988 (Garcia-Acevedo 2003: 536). To win their support as well as recognising their growing economic and political prospect, President Salinas launched the Programme for Mexican Communities Abroad (PCME) in January 1990, which was the first permanent agency in charge of Mexico's diasporic policies and programmes. The programme enjoyed extensive resources and aimed to increase ties with its nationals abroad (Garcia-Acevedo 2003: 537) and roped in other departments of the government to include diasporic issues. President Zedillo (1994-2000) resumed and accelerated the programmes and policies in his National Development Plan of 1995 and declared that the Mexican community abroad are an integral part of "Mexican Global Nation" (Garcia-Acevedo 2003: 537). In addition to this, the Mexican Congress in 1996 commenced a serious discussion to amend its constitution so as to make Mexican diaspora retain a non-voting Mexican cultural nationality as well as acquire

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<sup>6</sup> The concept refers to facts to be understood in the world of things. One Mexico—the real one, in the platonic as well as in the ordinary sense—is found within the boundaries of the Mexican Republic. The second one—the Mexican *de Afuera* (Mexican Abroad) as Mexicans call it—is composed of all persons of Mexicans origin in the US (Baumann 1993: 3).

property rights in certain areas. Mexican Congress approved the same in December 1996, which became official in March 1998 after approved by two-third of its states (Castaneda 2006: 107).

Fox had, in many ways, pledged to the idea of Mexican global nation during his campaign as he declared he would govern 118 million Mexicans including 18 million in the US (Nafey 2007: 179). In his campaigns and speeches, he often opened his address by saying “All Mexicans” which included those settled abroad. After assuming office, he established a new agency in his office, known as Presidential Office for Mexicans Abroad (OPME) in 2000 (Fitzgerald 2009: 59). He reorganised the *Grupo Beta* in 2001 in order to protect and defend the human rights of immigrants (INM 2009). He established the National Council for Mexicans Abroad in 2002 aiming to promote commercial, cultural and tourist policies as well as strengthen the unity between Mexico and its communities abroad (Garcia-Acevedo 2003: 538). Mexican *de Afuera* (Mexican Abroad) as Mexicans called it—was composed of all persons of Mexicans origin in the US (Baumann 1993: 3). Fox also reintroduced *matricula* consular card in 2002 in order to facilitate the diaspora’s access to various social services, obtain driving and business licenses, open bank accounts, register children in schools and send remittance securely (Allatson 2007: 156). The Institute for Mexicans Abroad was established in 2003 to facilitate this.

A glance at the chronology of Mexico’s diasporic policies towards its overseas nationals shows many changing trends. First, the policies and programmes want to promote the worthiness and importance of its diaspora in the US. The word ‘*pochos*’ was delineated to mean dignified and worthy Mexicans who lived beyond Mexico’s territory. In fact, Fox declared them as “National Heroes”, worthy citizens, worthy of national esteem and admiration. Second, its diasporic policies and programmes are increasingly plenary bringing Mexican diaspora to Mexico for studies; it offers resources and support to Mexican overseas businessmen; and it sponsors a host of cultural events in the US (Figueroa-Aramoni 1999: 539). Finally, diasporic policies and programmes increasingly make policymaking process more democratic and representative, showing Mexico’s domestic progress towards democratic political system (Garcia-Acevedo 2003: 538).

The logic of having such an extensive and comprehensive diasporic policy is: Mexico has the third largest overseas population in the world. Out of which Mexican diaspora are settled in



the US. With the subject of diaspora becoming as important, the thesis has focus on: (i) the policies and programmes set up by Mexican government to regularise diaspora for its own interests. (ii) Besides, as diaspora develops institutional and legal bases and mechanisms, the thesis has also examined the place and functions of diaspora in the cultural and political developmental policies of Mexico. (iii) Diasporic issue has come to shape the domestic electoral and political debate in Mexico; and this requires the deliberation of the views of political parties, pressure and interest groups including civil society actors like church, academia and media. (iv) Finally, diasporic issues like social, economic, political and cultural justice are dependent on the effectiveness of Mexican foreign policy.

Mexicans, by and large, live and work in several countries but it is in the next-door of US where they are concentrated in large numbers. Several peculiar characteristics of Mexican diaspora are notable and justify a doctoral level study of Mexico's diasporic policies and programmes: (i) Mexico's diaspora lives literally next-door across the three thousand kilometres border that is difficult to man and, much more, to seal. (ii) Mexican diaspora is concentrated in four major southern states where scores of entire towns and cities are Mexican majority areas where local economies are owned by Mexicans and other Latinos and education is imparted in Spanish language. (iii) Ever since the 1848 US-Mexican War in which the US grabbed half of Mexico's territory, the descendants of Mexican population, the Chicanos, have retained their national identity demanding occasionally even right to self-determination. (iv) The four southern states are to varying degrees dependent on Mexico for their exports and needed imports, for meeting their labour needs particularly in agricultural sector, and for controlling and regulating the flow of Mexican migrants—both legal<sup>7</sup> and illegal.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Durand and Massey (1992: 22) argue that legal immigrants are those who enter another country with legal visas. Mexican legal immigration, during the 1960s and 1970s, were mainly consisted of wives and children of ex-braceros.

<sup>8</sup> Passel (1985: 187) defines illegal immigrants are those who does not admit for either temporary or permanent stay but enter in such a manner as to avoid inspections. Immigrants who enter without any sort of legal visa are called Enter Without Inspection (EWI) and person who enters with legal visa but remains beyond the authorised time limit one called "visa over-stayers".

## **Research Methodology**

The proposed study has followed both historical and descriptive methods to trace the true picture of Mexico's diasporic policies and programmes. In order to explore the objectives of the proposed study, this thesis has relied on available primary and secondary sources. For primary sources, the proposed study has relied chiefly on official publications, documents, press released and official statements of Mexico. An international organisation such as United Nations (UN), International Labour Organisation (ILO), International Organisation for Migration (IOM), United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) and International Nongovernmental Organisation (INGO) publications, which concerns with the diasporic issues have been considered as primary sources and, to the extent if needed, foreign policies of US, Canada and so on, where Mexican diasporas exist in large numbers, have been considered as primary sources. For secondary sources, material in the form of books, journals and newspaper articles have been extensively consulted and used. The internet-based source materials have also been used.

## **Research Questions and Problems**

1. How diaspora has been conceptualised in social science? What are the casual explanations that lead to formation of diaspora as resources for both sending and host countries?
2. How diasporic policies and programmes became eminent in the understanding of diasporic management and how it has been conceptualised in international politics? What are the conditions that lead to 'brain gain' from 'brain drain'?
3. How diasporic policies and programmes regularise diaspora and promote sending countries' interests in host countries?
4. How diasporic groups develop its institutions and promote home countries' cultural, social and political identity in host countries?
5. How diasporic issue becomes eminent factor to shape the domestic electoral and political debate in home countries? How far diasporic social, economic, political and cultural justice depends on effectiveness of home countries' foreign policy?
6. What application can be drawn from the study of Mexico's diasporic policies and programmes?

## **Hypotheses**

The study is based on three hypotheses. First, a large size of diasporic populations has shaped the domestic political discourse and presidential-congressional relationship since the 1990s, more so since the 2000 elections. Second, Mexico's neoliberal model of economic development benefits from the diasporic policies and programmes. Third, conferment of dual nationality provides Mexico with leverage in dealing with US.

## **Structure of the Chapters**

Chapter two explores the conditions that lead to formation of diasporic policies and programmes in Mexico and also its contribution to democratisation. Chapter three examines the linkage, or their absence in case, between an assertive diasporic policy and the adoption of neoliberal model of economic development since 1988. It also identifies the developmental thinking and imperatives for courting the diaspora by successive Mexican governments. Chapter fourth analyses Mexican dual nationality and its implications for Mexico's security and cultural relations with its diaspora as well as with the US. Chapter fifth examines Mexican hometown associations and its role in promoting Mexico's interests and image in the US. It also highlights Mexico's strategy to link with these associations. Chapter six examines various policies and programmes initiated and implemented by National Action Party (PAN) for Mexican diaspora. Chapter seven gives the summary of the thesis and outline the future course of action by identifying suitable variables.

## **Theorising Diaspora**

Although globalisation has fundamentally altered the practices that comprise statehood, states retain many tools and powers inherited from the Westphalian era. In this case, the Mexican state retains many of the institutional powers that enable it to distribute its capabilities and maintain link with its diaspora. It also illustrates how the Mexican state both responded to and became a guiding agent behind the geo-economic integration and accelerating its policies and programmes towards its diaspora. More specifically, the studies of diaspora are more or less a transnational subject associated with migrant sending countries. This thesis analyses the transnational practices associated with the Mexican state's programme of *acercamiento* (closer relations) with its

populations abroad, scrutinising the ways in which these policies and programmes helped the Mexican state articulate and formulate a new interest for a new global order. This thesis engages multiple disciplines, all of which are multidisciplinary themselves, including transnational studies, globalisation and cultural geography. While we frequently employ theoretical concepts from one discipline to another, one of the principle aims of this thesis is to trace the true character of Mexico's diasporic policies and programmes on the agenda of each of these disciplines.

The term diaspora, according to Anthias (1998: 560), denotes the scattering seeds and it derives from Greek terms "*speiro*" (to sow) and "*dia*" (over). The term was initially used for migration and colonisation and gained the general meaning of people settled outside their ancestral homelands. Diaspora, in its simplest form, is referred to people who live outside their traditional or original homelands (Bulter 2001: 189). However, the classical definition of diaspora is primarily based on the experience of the Jewish diaspora provide the model: forced ejection and dispersion, oppression, a feeling of loss and dream of return to their original home (Vertovec 2005). The term originated in 587 BC, right after the Bible was translated into Greek. According to Cohen (2008: 1), in social science, diaspora has four phases 1) Jewish experienced to 1970s covering Greek, Africans, Armenians and Irish; 2) 1980s onwards covering immigrants, exiles, political refugees, alien residents, ethnic and racial minorities; 3) mid-1990s shifts in the homeland-diasporic nexus; and 4) mobilising diaspora. Thus, perspective change on diaspora in social science allow us to refocus the debate on causal factors, functions and the main players in developing diasporic politics. As such, it slowly found itself as a key word in social science and moved away from its original meaning, which applied only to Jewish.

According to the widely cited definition put forwarded by Safran (1991: 83-84), the key components of his classical diaspora paradigm are: (1) dispersal from a homeland to at least two places; (2) a collective representation of the homeland; (3) absent of integration into host society; (4) a hope of return which is not possible; (5) a continual connect with their homeland. Safran's argument shows diasporic groups posses transnational character and symbol. He also argued that notion about diaspora is of a homeland and a vision of eventual return, and marginal classes in host country (Tsagarousianou 2004: 54). While Safran's criteria are generally accepted as one of

the first systematic work to define diaspora, others, like Cohen developed other criteria emphasis on group's self-consciousness. According to Cohen (2008: 17), a diasporic group must have the following characteristics: (1) traumatically dispersal from a native land; (2) a collective representation of their homeland; (3) a collective hope of return to their original homeland; (4) ethnic consciousness based on distinctiveness, common history, common culture and religious heritage; (5) a rejected relationship from the host societies; (6) a sense understanding with co-ethnic members in other countries; and (7) a potential for contribution to the host countries if pluralism exist. Cohen emphasises on group's self-awareness and the relations between the members of the group. No matter where they are, the diasporic populations continue to identify with their homelands as well as their co-ethnic member in other places. Thus, Cohen not only re-emphasised the transnational character of diaspora but also stressed on their important role in international relations (Tsagarousianou 2004: 55).

In other perspective, Butler (2001: 192) gives four features of diaspora, which are: (1) dispersal to at least two places as diaspora requires a scattering, not a transfer; (2) some relationship with real or imaginary homeland and identifying that place as their common homeland; (3) self-awareness of the group's identity that includes scattered groups as well as the homeland; and (4) existence at least two generations which gives them a certain degree of permanency.

The above arguments show the term diaspora was not pleasant—diasporic group not only originated from traumatic events where large numbers of people suffered and were forced to flee their homelands, but also sustained an existence that was uneasy for them and the host societies. As Cohen (1996: 507) pointed out even the Bible (Deuteronomy 28: 25) warned that separated from homeland and scattered to other nations symbolised the punishment for those who had deserted the righteous paths and gave up the old ways. Intrinsically, the number of groups that identify themselves as diasporas were very few and limited to classical examples of the phenomenon such as Jewish, Greek and more recently Armenian diasporas (Anthias 1998: 562). However, Tololian (1991: 45) argued the term diaspora once focused on Jewish, Greek and Armenian diffusion now acquires meaning with immigrants, expatriates, guest-workers, exile, refugee and overseas community. Similarly, Clifford (1994: 311) argues that diaspora is

increasingly evoked by displaced people who sense connection with their original home and it is placing minority discourse.

Over the last few decades, diasporic recognition seemed to change as more and more groups identified themselves as diaspora and began to make the necessary efforts to organise accordingly. In addition to the simple fact that more and more people migrate away from their homelands today than earlier (Butler 2001: 190); two main reasons for this change of identification can be mentioned. First, many members of these groups concluded that even if they assimilated to their host country, they would always be considered as foreigners. Many, instead of leaving their native culture for the sake of their host country's culture chose to organise around their common identity and mobilise, in some cases, with the support of their home country, to achieve their rights and status they deserved. Second, the advances in technology and globalisation make easier for these groups to remain in touch with their homeland. This connection helped them nurture their culture and identity even when they were far from their ancestral land. In support to the above statement, Rouse (1991: 14) argues that distance locations become single place "through the continuous circulation of people, money, goods and information". Tsagarousianou (2004: 52) added that the new usage of the word is the result of its changing meaning—shifted from displacement to connectivity. This, of course, was not the only thing globalisation brought forth; but it also limited nation-states' sovereignty and increased the importance of ethnic identities; internationalised domestic politics; and created a bond between domestic and international politics which foster diasporic policy for homeland.

This shift in identification was also the outcome of changing perception of these groups in their homeland. These groups were seen as simple, and in some cases unwanted, diaspora now are perceived as a potential resource. Thus, diaspora became the unofficial representatives of their homeland in foreign countries; their contribution towards homeland depended on the position they occupied; and the level of organisation they achieved in their adopted country (Turan 2010: 11). As a result, the term diaspora started to represent an ability to mobilise support and influence in homeland as well as in adopted country (Butler 2001: 190). On the other hand, diaspora acted as lobby groups for their homeland in the country they reside in (Demmers 2002:

86). Under these circumstances, many countries reversed their old perceptions and started efforts to develop and organise their citizens.

Therefore, diaspora, here, is defined as an ascertainable ethnic group settling beyond their original homeland that not only went through physical deracination (Cohen 1997: ix) but also dual culture; strongly hope for the homeland (Safran 1991: 83-84); alienation from host societies; intricate relationship with homeland, host land and co-ethnic group in other countries; and a common identity (Rinderle 2005: 295). These six criteria is a combination of several existing definition of diaspora, and also elegantly apply to Mexican descents in the US as diaspora. Although Mexican descents in the US are a diverse group comprising exiles, refugees, guest-workers and immigrants. According to Safran (1991: 83-84), immigrants can be diasporas if they possess four characteristics: first, aware of its common ethnic identity; second, an active connective life; third, links with homelands in several ways; and fourth, maintain relations with co-ethnic group settle in various countries. Therefore, to argue Mexican immigrants as diaspora, let's examine them with the four conditions given by Safran. All Mexican immigrants are diaspora; first, they still observe Mexican holidays, valued Mexican traditions and customs, constantly aimed to hold back Mexican identity and nationalism (de la Garcia and Desipio 1998: 403). Second, they are actively associated in hometown associations (Garza and Lowell 2002: 22). Third, they contact homeland regularly through hometown associations and Institute for Mexicans Abroad (IME) (Bada 2011). Fourth, they also develop relationship with Mexican Canadians on various occasions (IME 2011). Thus, assimilating all factors discussed above, all Mexicans including exiles, refugees and immigrants are diaspora.

### ***Diaspora: A Product of Complex Triadic Relationship***

Many scholars emphasised the transnational character of diaspora and also considered them as an important non-state actor in international relations or world politics (Shain and Barth 2003: 451). To examine how diasporic group becomes an important actor in international relations, it would be appropriate to analyse the role of diasporic group, the host country and homeland. These three actors are pertinent to the understanding of any diasporic theory. When diasporic group faces elision in an adopted country, be it limited opportunity for development, or political and social discrimination, a diasporic knowledge helps them to preserve a sense of community and

belonging to a more pleasing and recognising social entity. This fulfilled by preferably preserving and retrieving traditions so as to maintain recognition with far-reaching historic, cultural and political process, gives them a sense of community and attachment (Shuval 2007: 35). As such, diasporic consciousness is always conditioned by host country's policy and by the international system especially since the collapse of the Cold War global regime in Eastern bloc and the Soviet Union. The new political freedom and economic conditions following communication and transportation revolution has facilitated the rapid spread of news, fashion, social trends, openness and tolerance ultimately leading to increase diasporic consciousness (Sheffer 2007: 46-47). Interestingly, many developed countries have enhanced racial and ethnic tolerance that increases the ability of immigrant groups to establish their organisations.

These ethnic organisations have further developed diasporic consciousness as they have multiple-interests. According Sheffer (2003: 173-174), diasporic organisation operates at five levels of politics: (1) the domestic level in the host countries—diasporic organisations deal with issues related to their internal affairs and their relations with host countries' political and economic institutions. Mexican diasporic associations have played a significant role in defending their rights and dignity as well as promoting Mexican national interests in the US. (2) The regional level—diasporic organisations have mainly been involved in economic matters, but today increasingly entered in political arena. (3) The trans-state level—diasporic organisations interact with international organisations and its agencies that show interest in the affairs of diaspora. (4) The level of the entire diaspora—it interacts with very similar or sister organisations. (5) The level of homeland politics—their interactions are mainly with governmental and public organisations (Sheffer 2007: 174). Mexican diaspora in the US interact with federal, state and municipal government and various agencies through hometown associations (Garcia-Acevedo 2003: 544). Many diasporic organisations advocate for fair treatment and at the same time, demand absentee voting right and dual citizenship. As a result, today, around 115 countries grant absentee voting rights and 11 countries allot seats in their legislature for them (Newland 2010: 13).

Sheffer (2007: 174-175) further argues that at each level, diasporic organisations function for the maintenance, defence and promotion of their interest. The maintenance functions include



fundraising for cultural, economic and social functions. In defence functions, the organisations provide physical protection to their members, for example, they played a vital role in clash between Vietnamese and South Koreans in California. The defence of their members' interest aims to secure the rights to education, right to work and welfare for their members. The promotional functions mainly deal with issues such as recruiting new members and persuading them to become activist members ready to contribute intellectual, cultural, political and financial resources for their activities. Thus, diaspora becomes organised to promote their own wellbeing, ensure the continuity of their communities in the host countries and increase their ability to support their homelands and other diasporic communities of the same national origin elsewhere.

On the other hand, diasporic consciousness is at times underscored by host countries' policies towards immigrants. Most of the host countries have declared multiculturalism<sup>9</sup> as national policy. The multicultural policies, in many ways, influence diaspora in various ways, be it the decision to immigrate; prospect to grab opportunity; and social, educational, cultural, economic and political experiences of the diasporic groups. Therefore, diasporic consciousness that has emerged out within this designated policy is indicative of immigrants' interests as well as state's policy and relations with diasporic communities. Stratton and Ang (1998: 157) argued multiculturalism, as a national policy, is aimed to foster cultural diversity. Although the policy is aimed to include ethnic minorities into national culture, this also signifies clearly different 'others'; marginalized and inhibited by the hegemonic host culture by making it invisible (Stratton and Ang 1998: 158). From diasporic point of view, the question of national identification gets problematic when one's identity is defined on the basis of ethnic and excluded from national definition. As such, Taylor (1994: 38) argues that the policy of multiculturalism is at odd, as it has recognised every individual and group by their unique identity, thus making them distinct from everyone else.

Diasporic consciousness is also determined by the relationship of home countries to its nationals beyond its boundaries and this provides cultural and emotional support and security. In order to cultivate closer relations with them, most of the sending countries changed their

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<sup>9</sup> Multiculturalism, as a state policy in many countries, acknowledges, tolerates, celebrates and honours cultural diversity. It encompasses the heritage of all people including immigrants and indigenous people. It gives rights to all its citizens to express and share their cultural heritage (Jamozik et al. 1995: 99). Thus, differentiate people based on race, ethnicity, culture, religion, language, gender or place of birth from others.

perception about these groups. These groups were seen as simple, and in some cases unwanted, are now considered as potential resource. Thus, diasporic groups became the informal representatives of their homeland in foreign countries (Turan 2010: 11). Shuval (2007: 35) argues most of the sending countries use its diasporic groups to gain political, material or other support from host countries. Similarly, Gutierrez (1997: 55) also argues that there are several reasons for the home countries to engage with them—they formed an overseas market to export home products and are a source of national revenue. In addition to this, they are also a source of lobbying group, which influence the host countries' policies related to bilateral relations. For Mexican case, Gutierrez added that the deepening of interactions between the civil societies of both countries; the rapid growth of interest groups attempting to mould policy in two countries; the urge of public opinion; and the need to resolve binational social problems add extra reasons for Mexican government to establish diasporic policies and programmes. Such engagement policy of home countries enhances diasporic consciousness to engage within themselves, which later on lead to the formation of hometown associations (HTAs). Based on Mexico's experiences, Goldring (1998) argues that Mexican HTAs have significantly expanded in term of volumes, areas and members since the early 1990s and this trend continued to accelerate in the 1990s and 21st century is the result of the Mexican governments' outreach programmes such as *Programa par alas Comunidades Mexicanos en el Extranjero* (PCME) in 1990 and Institute for Mexicans Abroad in 2003 (Viramontes 2008: 359).

### ***Diaspora: A Transnational Subject of State***

This section will examine and critique how some literatures on globalisation studies have denied the role of state in managing diasporic populations as highlighted in some of the literature. A critique of transnational studies arguably must begin with the concept of nation. In this context, Appadurai (1996: 159) argues that the nation has historically operated as the ideological account of the territorial state. Similarly, Hardt and Negri (2000: 95-97) argue that the modern state's very interest was derived from its duty to secure, within a clearly delineated territory, the sovereign right of its people or nation. Collins (1990: 108) argues that ideologies of nationalism, therefore, posit the normative congruence of the political, the economic and the culture of the nation-state. In other words, nationalism is prefaced upon the centralised state's ability to exert a

degree of command over its territory and the loyalties of its people within its territory. Traditional approach on nationalism, therefore, has considered state as a central actor in forging the territorial nation, producing its subject and imposing its culture from centre to peripheral through various networks of power such as bureaucracies, schools and mass media (Gellner 1983: 456). However, in an era of rapid geo-economic integration, nationalist ideologies have declined and increasingly become obsolete. Global economic and cultural flows propelled by technological advances and the needs of capital have left national borders increasingly open to transnational and supranational influences. The flow of monies, people, products, ideas, mass mediated messages and communications traverse national borders, destabilising the state's capacity to manage the imaginations and loyalties of its people around territorial nations.

With the nation-state in crisis, many works on diasporic studies have explored the dynamics of identity formation and argued that nation-states have limited role to play. Reflecting upon the experiences of passage, migration or exile, scholars have used concepts such as 'diasporas', 'hybridity' 'borderland', and the 'third space' to explain the term as per their assumption in an ever changing world. It argues that centred and stable identities are replaced by flexible identity making through boundary-crossing. Based on this perspective, Said (1984: 160) argues that exile and dispossession, although horrific, often lead individual to avoid authoritarian acts of conquest, reject nationalist ideologies and abandon rigid forms of identity. Other scholars have celebrated the vital hybridity that arises from diaspora. Gilroy, in his historical studies of the black transatlantic diaspora, argues that the African diaspora is a phenomenon that cannot be captured by national compartments. Furthermore, Gilroy (1993) argues that diasporic populations without doubt transform the places through which they pass, unsettling wherever they settle. In the same vein, Stuart Hall emphasises the productive dimensions of hate and difference in the diasporic experience. For Hall (1990: 240),

diaspora is defined, not by essence or purity, but...by hybridity. Diaspora identities are those which are constantly producing and reproducing themselves anew, through transformation and differences.

Other theories who explore 'postcolonial' or 'post-national' perspective emphasise on alternative cultural and intellectual spaces that have opened up to deterritorialised or delocalised subjects. Bhabha (1994: 312) has argued that the collision between the global and the national produces an

interstitial space where the negotiation of immeasurable differences creates a tension peculiar to borderline existences. For Bhabha, self or group consciousness produced in ‘third space’ often dismisses nationalist narratives of order and progress. Similarly, Anzaldúa (1999) considers borders as conflictive spaces where two or more cultures encounter each other and they are neither side of it. For Mexican diaspora, Ritzer (2005: 16) argues that Chicanos are amalgamation of Indian, Spanish, black and Mexican heritage but they deliberately chose to adopt only their Mexican and Spanish heritage.

Postcolonial scholars argue that the nation-state fail to account for the complex processes of identity formation at borderlands or in global flows and interactions. For instance, Bhabha (1990: 300) argues that trans-migrant practices and identities constitute counter-narratives of the nation. However, others perspectives suggest that national affiliations remain a powerful marker of identity. In social science, these perspectives are commonly known as ‘transnationalism’. It has been defined in the work of Basch et al. (1994: 7) as “the processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement”. This and other works in transnational studies suggest that although nation-state is in peril, ‘deterritorialised’ forms of a nation are thriving beneath or above the state. In other words, in a globalised world, it is possible for subject to envision themselves inside the nation yet outside of the state. In the same vein, Kearney (1995: 554) argues a deterritorialised nation-state would broaden its policy over its overseas populations. Consequently, diasporic policies and programmes are described as features of ‘nation beyond state’ or ‘extra-territorial membership’ by integrating the overseas population into the home state (Smith 2008: 712), which redefines and reconfigures the meaning nature of citizenship of a country.

More importantly, the recognition that nations need not be grounded in territorial state has originated in Benedict Anderson’s (1991: 35) historical account of the ways in which ‘print capitalism’ fostered ‘imagined community’. Anderson’s work ‘Imagine Communities’ suggests that nations are necessarily territorial. Yet, his concept of nations as imagined suggests that they are socially constructed and located in historical human practices. As such, modern nations are not attached to the essential characteristics such as shared ties of blood, religion, language and

territory but by collective practices such as reading, religious worship and language. This perspective shows that nations need not be territorially bounded.

Social scientists who study 'transnationalism' often argue that nations have gone global, is a salient view amongst scholars who study the case of Mexican diaspora and Mexican identity affiliations that cross the Rio Grande. Goldring (1996: 84) highlights the multilayered dimensions of transnational identity formation among the Mexican diaspora—adopt different degrees of identity with a locality of origin, region, nation and ethnic or racialised grouping. Goldring's studies make us understand the ways in which identity formation is linked to the circulation of social capital at the various scales of interaction. However, Goldring treats diasporic identity formation as autonomous from the state identity. The accounts on transnationalism claim that migrants have avoided the state's ability to inscribe nationalist identities upon them. Rodriguez (1996) highlights how the cross-border activities of transnational migrants often violate international and national laws of immigration of the host countries. Rodriguez describes Mexican diasporic communities as 'state free' since they pay little heed to the nation-state divide as they create and use of their own institutional networks. Based on Mexican diasporic experiences, Bartra (2002: 14) argues

Fragmented Mexico—the Mexico of 'Here and There'—and the constant transgression of all borders, political and cultural is one of the most stimulating signs...this lived experience has on the contrary opened up new vistas. One of the most refreshing effects of...the 'borderisation' of the world is proof that it is possible, we could say, to be Mexican without being subject to a state and a territory.

The above review on diasporic identity formation suggests that the role of nation-state has increasingly expired. However, Mexico's diasporic policies and programmes, such as PCME, IME, dual nationality, teacher exchange programme, cultural trip for children of immigrants, children drawing competition, distribution of free Spanish text books and various educational programmes have proved that Mexican state is the main actor in the identity formation of its diaspora. Goldring (2001: 515) argues that the PCME has succeeded in sowing the seed of Mexican history, traditions and culture among the Mexican overseas populations. In this regard, Mexico considers education as a central and key factor to fulfill its diasporic policies. It has promoted bilingual education, adult education and distance education. Laglagaron (2010: 6) opines that IME has gone beyond its traditional consular protection and began to initiate cultural

activities, such as education, financial literacy, leadership and health care. The dual nationality law of 1996 carries a firm and clear message as it has permitted the recovery of the original identity or belongingness to its diaspora. Similarly, Castaneda (2006: 102) argues that the dual nationality law means the “boundedness that Mexican immigrants sustain with respect to their roots, culture, values and national traditions”. Viramontes (2008: 359) also argues well that Mexican diasporic associations have accelerated formation in the 1990s and 2000s as a result of Mexico’s outreach policies especially PCME and IME. Therefore, it can be effectively argued that diaspora is a transnational subject of state.

### ***Diaspora: A Product of State Rescaling Process***

The process of contemporary globalisation is the extensive redistribution of power ‘above’ and ‘below’ the state; however, it considered state as one of the primary institutions through which power is reproduced and circulated. As Sassen (1999: 29) has rightly argued the nation-state is the major actor in the implementation of global process. In order to examine the state’s role of governance and managing its subjects in a globalised world, we will highlight how space is being transformed and rescaled in the contemporary era. Globalisation is a naturally geographic concept; its discourses generally employ geographic prefixes, such as ‘sub’, ‘trans’, and ‘supra’. As Brenner (2004: 28) argues that globalisation process is operating either below, above or beyond entrenched geographical boundaries. Discourses of globalisation have attempted to complicate the nationalist ideologies that have long been internalised. As such, many scholars of globalisation conclude that nation-states can no longer be understood as the absolute gatekeepers between the national and the global, mediating the links between internal and external forces. Kearney (1995: 5523) argues that politics and identity formations in the age of globalisation detached from local places.

However, Schiller (2007: 122) argues that globalisation also facilitated diaspora to maintain some type of home ties or other trans-border connection and organised their lives around these connections. Brenner (2004: 60) also argues that geo-economic transformation has not eroded or weakened the state power, and instead states have adopted a pivotal role and become key institutions in managing its populations beyond its geographical boundary. In order to understand the state’s continuing role in managing subjects, we will highlight the concept of

spatial dimensions of subject formation. Disciplinary power often takes place within contained spaces. In fact, Foucault (1995: 228) associates disciplinary power with overtly limited and partitioned spaces, such as prisons and asylums, through which human beings are distributed in order to facilitate techniques of control. For Foucault, ideal form of disciplinary power is Bentham's Panopticon, where subjects are actually sequestered around a central surveillance station (Gutting 2005: 82). This conceptualisation of space as contained has subsequently applied on governmentality (Barnett 1999: 378). In addition, given media and social environment can no longer be understood as spatially contained, the processes of identity formation are now stretched across various networks and spatial scales (Barnett 1999: 375). As such, scholar in cultural geography argues that it is more productive to conceive of geographical scale as produced in social relations. In this regard, Smith (1995: 60-61) argues

Geographic scale is traditionally treated as a neutral metric of physical space: specific scales of social activity are assumed to be largely given as in the distinction between urban, regional, national and global events and process...Far from neutral and fixed; therefore, geographical scales are the product of economic, political and social activities and relationship; as such they are as changeable as those relationships themselves.

From this perspective, the production of space not depends on territory and physical boundaries but on the socio-political-economic practices of state connects its diasporic population beyond its territory. In other words, concepts such as space and territory should be thought of as dynamic process that endure perpetual challenges and undergo constant recalibration. Levitt and Schiller (2007: 173) argue that many states have formulated a host of policies that indicate who they are and redefined the meaning and nature of its membership. Some states developed "global nations" statecraft that urges lasting links with its diaspora to ascertain they upheld national membership and loyalty. As such, the art of government should not be conceived as securing areal space but as managing social space. A key understanding from political geography suggests that the art of governing has become a fundamentally geographic endeavour. Governmentality in the current era means managing and producing subjects within spaces that cannot be conceived as territorially contained. Modern state practices of governance, thus, include process of delinking, rearticulating and rescaling the socio-political-economic connections that link subjects to global flows and networks (Dean 1999: 16-20).

The production of subjects is similar to neoliberal methods of economic production—capacities to distribute its products across the world and exploiting new spaces for production and accumulation. The core to governing a population, therefore, is the ability to articulate subjects to new webs of production and to channel their productive capacities onto new planes. A new web of Mexico is the diasporic policies and programmes, which go beyond its boundaries. These new webs were alerted by the initiatives of immigrant entrepreneurs, which Portes (1996: 165) called globalisation from below. Thus, a brief theoretical analysis of diaspora shows that state is the main actor in mobilising its nationals abroad for its own purpose to meet certain needs. It also makes diasporic populations to realize its roots. However, a successful mobilisation of diaspora needs the cooperation of immigrants and, to some extent, the host countries.

### **Formation of Mexican Diaspora**

The Accord of Guadalupe-Hidalgo set the formation of Mexican diaspora in the US. During the Mexican-American War (1846-1847), there were perhaps eighty thousand Mexicans living in the territory that Mexico lost to the US. The Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo (1848), which ended war, gave those (Mexicans) living in the territory taken from Mexico the right to stay or go to Mexico. Those who chose to become American citizens were promised “the rights of citizens of the US according to the constitution” (Roger 1992: 308). Many Mexicans chose to stay and become American citizens, which marked the beginning of transnational social network between the two countries. On top of that, immigration from Mexico continued, therefore, Mexican diaspora is old as well as new.

Following the footsteps of Tololian (1991: 45), who argues that immigrants, political refugees, exiles, guest-worker, overseas community and ethnic community are the main components of diasporic formation. In the same way, Mexican diaspora in the US are also include immigrants, expatriates, refugees (those who flee from revolution), guest-workers (*Bracero* Programme), exile community, overseas community and ethnic community. Among this, immigration is the chief agent of Mexican diaspora in the US. To support the above mentioned argument, we would examine the meaning, reasons and factors that influence immigration between the two countries.



Immigration is a complex phenomenon with many aspects. In its general sense, immigration is understood as the comparatively permanent movement from homeland to another country. In other words, a person who resides in another country and stays there for his/her whole life is, so to say, an immigrant. With respect to international migration, the UN defines immigration as a movement for a year or more permanent (Petersen 1968: 286). As it is, immigration may emerge from various factors—an attempt to live better life; a desire to increase household income; a programme of recruitment; a deracination of indigenous people by market penetration into their regions, etc. (Oberai and Mohan 1983: 49). Today, immigration occurs more rapidly than earlier due to spread of technological networks, institutional support and favourable conditions in both sending and receiving countries (Descloitres 1961: 40).

The modern history of immigration traced back to 1492 with the European expansion into America and Oceania (Cole 2000: 25). The history of immigration shows that different countries adopt migration for its own need: the high density of population, surplus of births and its limited natural resources forced Dutch to migrate to other countries (Hofstee 1958: 248). Polish migration was inspired by the desire to find better economic opportunities and security and a high standard of living (Zubrzycki 1958: 86). Egypt, Morocco, Lesotho, Malawi, Turkey, Pakistan, Philippines and Mexico encourage skilled and unskilled labour migration, mainly for remittances (Parwell 1993: 52). However, in most cases, immigration is purely based on individuals' decision and therefore, it can be divided into four categories—voluntary, involuntary (forced migration), legal<sup>10</sup> and illegal<sup>11</sup> immigrants.

Mexican labour immigration to US is not a recent development. As immigration from Mexico started even before Mexico got its independence and can be traced back to 1773. This process was reinforced by the American labour recruiters during the 1880s and 1890s, when Chinese workers were being excluded, in an effort to replenish the dwindling work force in the Western territories. Recruiters continued to import Mexican labourers to work on railroads, in

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<sup>10</sup> Durand and Massey (1992: 22) argue that legal immigrants are those who enter another country with legal visas. Mexican legal immigration, during the 1960s and 1970s, were mainly consisted of wives and children of ex-braceros.

<sup>11</sup> Passel (1985: 187) defines illegal immigrants are those who does not admit for either temporary or permanent stay but enter in such a manner as to avoid inspections. Immigrants who enter without any sort of legal visa are called Enter Without Inspection (EWI) and person who enters with legal visa but remains beyond the authorised time limit one called “visa over-stayers”.

mines and in agriculture between 1900 and 1910 (White 1989: 9). The Mexican leaders had also favoured labour immigration to US and argued that the workers would bring not only money but also valuable skills and improved techniques (Grayson 1984: 159). In addition, the Mexican Revolution of 1910 sent hundreds of thousands displaced persons across borders (Bean and Stevens 2003: 55) particularly in California and Texas. Roger (1992: 307) estimated that 720000 persons entered US pushed by the danger and disorder of the conflict. Beyond this, there has been a significant Mexico-US immigration in the early decade of the twentieth century; during the First World War, they signed a bilateral agreement, where American recruited a large number of Mexican labours for agriculture. During that time, the American farmers used the motto “Food to Win War” to persuade the Department of Labour, which allowed 70000 contracted workers to enter US.

Indeed, the US gave preferential treatment to Mexican workers under the Immigration Exclusion Act of 1917. Under a provision allowing for the admission of temporary immigrant labour, the US Secretary of Labour exempted Mexicans from the literacy requirement, the head tax and the anti-contract labour clause of the 1917 Immigration Act (White 1989: 9). In later development, Mexican immigrants were exempted from Emergency Quota Law of 1921. On top of that, the demand for cheap labour was still high, so long as the jobs were there to be done, American employers were happy to hire labour at the most advantageous rates (Cohen 1987: 47).

The 1924 law created the US Border Patrol, whose primary mission was to restrict the surreptitious flows of undesirable European and Asian immigrants to coastal cities in the East and West. But the Border Patrol profoundly affected the southern border by creating a category of illegal immigrants out of a “preexisting, established flow” (White 1989: 9). Although Mexican workers enjoyed exemption from immigrant quotas, they were still subject to exclusionary provisions and visa requirements. Consequently, many Mexican workers chose to simply bypass increasingly cumbersome regulations and cross the border without visa. Between the years 1930 and 1940 Mexicans were laid off from their jobs and deported them (Flores 1983: 294). This period also marked the beginning of a cycle of encouraging Mexican immigration in times of labour shortage and then deporting them in time of economic and social upheaval (White 1989: 9). However, in 1940, the American growers petitioned the Secretaries of States, Labour and

Agriculture to allow them to recruit Mexican labour in the interest of national defence (Craig 1971: 37). As such, by 1940, an estimated one million Mexican citizens were living in the US (White 1989: 9).

### ***Bracero Programme: A Step towards Immigration***

In the twentieth century, the *Bracero* Programme (1942-1964) was arguably the most significant and historical condition that influenced Mexicans' decision to work in the US. During World War II, American farms experienced a serious labour shortage as farm labourers joined the armed forces. As such, American farmers recruited school boys and girls and college women to harvest crops. However, by late 1942, farmers complained that they needed better skilled and more experienced workers. They requested Mexican labourers, stating that they were "the only solution" to compensate the problems that American farmers faced. Thus, in 1942, American government approached Mexican government (Cohen 2001: 111) with a request to have temporary labour programme between the two countries, which would allow Mexican labourers to work on American farms and railroads on temporary basis.

During Avila Camacho's term (1940-1946), the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) experienced significant change.<sup>12</sup> Under Avila Camacho's administration, the Mexican government had few incentives to approve the *Bracero* Programme as it feared that such programme with US would symbolise its incapacity to provide employment to its citizens and consequently, destabilise its political image and popularity (Cohen 2001: 111). As such, Mexico's Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, Jaime Torres Bodet, dismissed the request and claimed that "Mexico was gearing up for an unprecedented industrialisation and modernisation of its agricultural sector. The country...would soon need all those working arms" (Cohen 2001: 111). Also Mexico was still haunted by the mass deportation of Mexican origin people during the Great Depression of 1930s.<sup>13</sup> In addition, the Catholic church of Mexico also opposed the

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<sup>12</sup> Its original name was National Revolutionary Party (PNR) coined by President Plutarco Calles in 1928 and renamed as Revolutionary Mexican Party (PRM) under Cardenas (1934-1940). President Camacho restructured and renamed as Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Needler (1995: 817) argues the restructured PRI under Avila Camacho was a party of "consensus, moderation and stability".

<sup>13</sup> The Great Depression of 1930s left many white Americans without jobs, while non-white immigrants remained employed in agricultural works. Since Mexicans were regarded as "aliens", they were forced to leave through repatriation. Between 1929 and 1932, more than 365000 Mexican immigrants and Mexican Americans were forced to leave the US (Guerin-Gonzales 1994: 94-98).

migration of *braceros* for several reasons: it would disrupt family life; it would expose to immoral life; and it would force *braceros* to non-Catholic religious temptation during their tour (Craig 1971: 19-20). The National Farmer Confederation, industrialists and agricultural entrepreneurs also opposed to *Bracero* Programme (Craig 1971: 21).

However, such perception began to change, when Mexico announced its support for the allies in 1942. Word spread through newspapers that Mexicans were willing to take up job in the US (Lorey 1999: 112). Some Mexican politicians also suggested that the Mexicans should work in the “technologically superior” US in order to learn modern agricultural skill and modernise Mexican agricultural sector (Lorey 1999: 133). As a result, on August 6, 1942, *Bracero* Programme was signed between Mexico and US, which allowed Mexican labourers to work temporarily on American farms and railroads.

Therefore, *Bracero* Programme was proposed by the US in order to meet the demand of World War II and renewed it during the Korean War (Fitzgerald 1996: 217). This demand pushed Mexico to have a joint cooperation with US in 1942. Mexico accepted this programme with a special consideration on domestic needs that it would not create serious loss to national producing capacity due to their presence in the US and their absence from Mexican fields did not cut product (Howard 1961: 381). However, it did not allow the location of recruiting centres in the borders as a means to prevent illegal entry into US. As per the agreement, the US government awarded or allotted the *braceros* the following guarantees: *braceros* would not be used in military activities; *braceros* would be paid as per the prevailing area wage; they would be provided sufficient and healthful free housing; they would be given adequate meals at fair prices; occupational indemnity at the cost of employers; and once the contract was over, they would be freely transported back to their places (Craig 1971: 90). The *braceros* were composed of only young male, and very few female and their duration of stay was sixth month only. The programme lasted for 22 years (1942-1964).

During the *bracero* period (1942-1964), an estimated five million or more Mexican workers entered the US (see table 1.1 below). The close connection between the demands of the growers and the flow of immigrants is shown by the fact that the peak of admission under *Bracero* Programme coincides with the boom years of the 1950s (Fitzgerald 1996: 95). The

programme enforced certain rules under which Mexican labourers could be hired. American employers were postulated to arrange free transportation for *braceros* from recruiting centres, render them housing and pay wages equivalent to native workers for the same jobs. Simultaneously, Mexican labourers were required to sign up and had to wait to be hired legally.

**Table 1.1 Contract Labour under *Bracero* Programme**

<b>Year</b>	<b>No. of <i>Bracero</i></b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>No. of <i>Bracero</i></b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>No. of <i>Bracero</i></b>
1946	32043	1953	198424	1960	4271490
1947	19632	1954	310476	1961	294149
1948	33288	1955	390846	1962	282556
1949	143455	1956	444581	1963	195450
1950	76519	1957	450411	1964	181738
1951	211098	1958	418885		
1952	187894	1959	447535		

*Source: Samora and Simon 1977: 140*

The inauguration of the programme also coincided with an influx of illegal immigration to the US. The Mexicans who were not able to secure labourer contracts with the American government travelled to the border and other sneaked across the border illegally (Cohen 2001: 115). By 1952, approximately 1.5 million illegal Mexican labourers were working in the US. The Immigration and Naturalisation Service's (INS) strategy also promoted illegal immigration during the *Bracero* Programme as the border patrol, on many occasions, failed to detain and deport illegal immigrant workers, particularly during the harvest time and acted according to the demand of labour in the US (Cohen 2001: 224). Again, US adopted official policy of encouraging illegal immigration, INS district directors were advised not to check illegal immigrants during the harvest time. As a result, thousands of undocumented workers crossed the border as well, which was welcomed by American employers (Djajic 2001: 161). On top of that, INS legalised illegal workers according to the demand of farmers even without formal permission from the American Labour Department. As such, between 1947 and 1954, many *braceros* were undocumented workers who had been legalised by INS once they crossed the

border. During the summer of 1947, when only 331331 *braceros* were formally imported, INS legalised 55000 undocumented workers in Texas alone (Calavita 1992: 24).

Throughout the duration, *Bracero* Programme encouraged illegal immigration to the US. There was a conflict of interest between them when it came to the location of the recruiting centres in Mexico. The Mexican government's policy of signing the programme was to offer job to the poorest and neediest interior populations, so Mexico wanted to establish recruiting centres in poorest states and not in border areas. However, American farmers favoured recruiting centres at the border in order to reduce transportation costs and unnecessary delays in hiring workers. Despite the objection raised by Mexican officials, both initially agreed to allow border recruitment. The recruitment centres in the border facilitated illegal immigration to the US (Basok 2000: 223). As the programme continued, American farmers began to hire Mexican workers with or without documents, thus encouraged illegal immigration. The *Bracero* Programme underwent periods of cyclical migration, since *braceros* were contracted for six month only under American government sponsorship (Craig 1971: 177). After every six month, workers returned home and reapplied the contract. Given that the programme did not guarantee for workers to return to the US to work upon termination of their contracts, this compelled many *braceros* to stay without legal documents (Basok 2000: 223).

The programme maintained its wartime status till 1947; in 1948, the programme's regulations switched to individual growers. Under the new arrangement, contract abuse was more common and legal protections were rarely enforced (Craig 1971: 68). Mexican government grew weary of the new arrangement and in order to reduce abuses of the contract, it pressed for a return to the government-to-government contracting (Craig 1971: 68). Finally, in 1951, the American Congress passed Public Law 78, and the US and Mexico revived government-to-government agreements. The new agreement removed recruiting centres from border and all recruiting was done according to the instruction of Mexican government i.e. interior and impoverished area. One of the key weaknesses of the new agreement was it did not stipulate any times or punishment against farmers who employed undocumented workers (Calavita 1992: 44). Thus, the new agreement also encouraged employers to hire illegal immigration. As such, El Paso Valley Cotton Association (EPVCA) boycotted *bracero* agreement and they intended to

hire illegal immigrants. Their boycotted, indeed, increased the rate of illegal immigration. In response to increase illegal immigration, in 1953, the American government began “Operation Wetback”<sup>14</sup> in an effort to drive out all illegal immigrants; by 1955, they had deported 2 million Mexicans (many of whom were American citizens of Mexican heritage) (Lorey 1999: 121). As such, numerous scholars have consequently criticised the *Bracero* Programme for encouraging undocumented entry and subsequent abuse of Mexican workers (Bustamante 1978: 194). Table 1.2 below shows the year and the number of undocumented immigrants during the *Bracero* Programme.

**Table 1.2 Number of Undocumented Person Arrested, 1951-1964**

<b>Year</b>	<b>No. of Arrested</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>No. of Arrested</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>No. of Arrested</b>
1951	500628	1956	72442	1961	29877
1952	543538	1957	44451	1962	30272
1953	875318	1958	37242	1963	399124
1954	1075168	1959	30196	1964	43844
1955	242608	1960	29651		

*Source: Garcia 1980: 236*

The *Bracero* Programme was, thus, represented the institutionalisation of the “revolving door” policy on Mexican immigrants: Mexican labour is being imported, while illegal immigrants are simultaneously being deported. This policy created exacerbated tension between employers and employees. The primary objective of employers is to keep the highest profit possible. In contrast, employees sought higher wages, better working conditions and job security (White 1989: 10). The undocumented workers caught in the middle and were used as strike breakers to diffuse labour demands. Their illegal status leaves them open to exploitation and abuse by employers and they live in constant fear of deportation. Therefore, the programme was a story of exploitation and discrimination in the hand of employers and INS officers, who often termed

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<sup>14</sup> Stacy (2003: 609) argues Operation Wetback was the INS response to dangerous level of illegal Mexican immigration. According to INS, illegal workers threatened to take jobs from native workers; Mexican culture threatened to swamp American communities in Texas and the Southwest. Those seized were deported by bus, truck or train and later by ships to Mexico interior to discourage their return.

Mexicans as “second class citizens” and they became the victims of “legalised slavery” in a country which proclaimed the virtues of democracy and equality for all (Dominguez and de Castro 2001). The programme came to end in 1964 because of heavy opposition by organised labour. Most labour unions argued that immigrants pushed wages downward and in the process contributing to poor working conditions and set as strike breakers (White 1989: 12). Thus, the programme served as a vehicle for immigration, which was the main root of Mexican diaspora in the US.

### ***Maquiladoras: An Open Door for Immigration***

When *Bracero* Programme ended in 1964, hundreds of thousands of *braceros* suddenly found themselves unemployed. While many *braceros* stayed back in the US to work, large number returned to home (Mexico) (Bustamante 1983: 233). Some flocked to border towns, while others returned to their native places. Many of them felt unneeded when they went home and also found that family farms were taken over by their brothers. As such, returned *braceros* had very few opportunities and consequently opted to return to the border region in search of job. The border region experienced mass unemployment as thousands of *braceros* migrated to border towns. In order to resolve this problem, Mexico and US launched the Border Industrialisation Programme in 1965 (Martin 2001: 94). Both countries modified their trade and investment laws so that American investors could create jobs in the border areas. At the same time, Mexico granted foreign ownership of *maquiladoras* and allowed the duty-free importation of element and any machinery required to manufacture and assemble *maquiladora* products. Its goods are supposed to be exported to the US; the American tariff was modified to limit the duty on its products (Grunwald 1985: 111).

The *maquiladora* programme grown slowly. In 1965, there were 12 factories employing 3000 Mexican workers; 600 factories in 1980, which employed around 120000 workers. In 1990, the number of *maquiladoras* reached 2000 and employed 472000 workers; and in 1999 it increased to 4000 and employed 1.1 million Mexican workers (Martin 2001: 94). Most of the foreign direct investment went to *maquiladoras* and it provided almost 10 per cent of formal job, 30 per cent of manufacturing jobs in 1999. It accounted 44 per cent of all Mexican exports in 1998 (Spencer 2000: 123).



It has been a leading job creation in Mexico; it gave job to 1.1 million workers and paid wages double of Mexico's minimum wages; its job growth has been averaging 125000 a year. However, it did not prefer *ex-braceros*; the workers employed by them were young women. Instead of giving job to *ex-braceros* and men who have come to border in search of job, the plants recruited young women from the remote region of Mexico (Martin 2001: 95). The young women who are the main workforce of the plants tend not to immigrate to the US, but their husbands, uncles or brothers who accompany them do so. Hence, it serves as an indirect stepping stone for migration between the two countries. It is, therefore, clear that:

(1) The plants did not accomplish its original goal of giving jobs to *ex-braceros* who had been depending on American labour market for their livelihood.

(2) It encouraged population and economic growth in the border areas and opened the flow of information across the border might indeed intensified immigration (Martin 2001: 95).

Therefore, *maquiladoras* served as an open door for immigration, as it brought massive interior population to the border. Later, these interior populations who came to border for work in *maquiladoras*, became the main stream of US immigration (Grunwald 1985: 131). On top of that, *maquiladora* plants open the flow of information between US and Mexico had, indeed, intensified the flow of immigration. It did not create sufficient jobs to encourage *ex-braceros* and Mexicans to stay at home (Zabin and Hughes 1995: 396). Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, recession developed in the US, which means *maquila* depressed and produced more immigration to US (Landau 2003: 75). Over 25000 workers have lost their jobs in Mexico and some plants were compelled to lower wages. Again, in the 1990s some foreign owned *maquiladoras* in Mexico's border moved to other countries (Landau 2003: 76-77).

Thus, it is clear that the *maquiladoras* did not provide jobs to *ex-braceros*. This gives new type of immigration since 1965; some *ex-braceros* were sponsored by their American employers as "needed workers". When the so-called "needed workers" reached certain age or out of seasonal work, their employers employed them to be their foremen and assigned them to recruit seasonal workers. These foremen visited Mexico in winter, recruited workers and came illegally the next summer. This process of network recruitment associated particular Mexican villages or regions to American labour market (Martin 2001: 92).

### *NAFTA: A Wider Gate for Immigration*

The primary purpose of free trade is to increase social and economic prosperity. This assumption made everyone believe that NAFTA would be a means to resolve bilateral problems and pursue an idea of “give for exchange” (Bruber 2001: 705). These assertions were based on the assumption that NAFTA would bring more investment, increase economic growth in Mexico and reduce potential immigrants by provide greater employment opportunities and higher wages (Zabin and Hughes 1995: 395). However, it did not happen and immigration not only continued but has increased in terms of volume and diversifies its destination and occupation. The implementation of deregulated and liberalised economy through NAFTA disrupted and dislocated labour in Mexico.

When Mexico was fully integrated with US under NAFTA, American corn imports glutted Mexican market. Hard to compete with American farmers, most of the small scale Mexican farmers and workers lost their sustenance. As argued earlier, *maquila* jobs in the border were not sufficient to provide job to all. These and other economic-related issues compelled rural workers to immigrate in search of jobs. Instead of keeping economic security to all workers, NAFTA has deepened economic crisis to all vulnerable working class and rural communities in Mexico (Rosenblum 2007).

NAFTA lowered trade tariffs, maize farmers were steadily dispelled out of business by American competitors. Since 1995 crisis, farmers were not allowed to lend much from banks. The government has terminated its guarantees for crops, and on top of that, few farmers know how and where to merchandise their products. Even if they know how to market their products; it is extremely tough to match American farmers. Moreover, Mexican farmers get very few subsidies; face higher interest rates, higher prices for fuel than American farmers; and agricultural infrastructures are very poor (The Economist 2000a: 37). Many of the manufacturing sectors also became vulnerable as tariffs were lowered as per NAFTA’s rules, engendering Mexican merchandises to lose their markets (Rus and Tinker 2006: 9). Thus, trade liberalisation favours only business classes, who can establish cross-border support, while workers face irresistible problems in establishing cross-border alliances (Sanchez-Anochea 2006: 177). As such, most of the Mexicans believe that neoliberal policies means a retrogressive in the arena of

education, health, social security, wages, employment and sovereignty (Alvarez 2006: 22). Therefore, Cohen (2001: 116) strongly argues that Mexico-US migration would increase in the 1990s because NAFTA displaced many Mexican farmers and reinforced the existing migration process. He added that a very small scale corn and bean farmers cannot compete with the American farmers and unless jobs are created for them, most of them would head for the US.

In short, the process of immigration started in 1773 and its continuation (through *Bracero* Programme, *Maquiladoras* and NAFTA) made Mexican the largest diasporic group in the US since 1980 till today (see table 1.3 below). As of 2006, Mexican immigrants accounted 30.7 per cent of all US immigrants i.e. more than 11.5 million and one-tenth of Mexico's population (Batalova 2008).

**Table 1.3 Total and Mexican Immigrant Populations, 1960-2006**


<b>Year</b>	<b>All Immigrants</b>	<b>Rank</b>	<b>Share of Mexican Immigrants</b>	<b>Mexican Immigrants</b>
1960	9738100	7	5.9	575900
1970	9619300	4	7.9	759700
1980	14079900	1	15.6	2199200
1990	19797300	1	21.7	4298000
2000	31107900	1	29.5	9177500
2006	37547400	1	30.7	11541400

*Source: Batalova 2008*

Even though they are still residing in their traditional destination states like California, Texas, Illinois and Arizona, over the last 20 years, they have been moving to non-traditional settlement areas as well (see figure 1.1 below). Mexican immigrants are now settling in southeastern states like Alabama, Kentucky, Georgia, Arkansas, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina and Tennessee. They also have started settling in Midwest states like Iowa, Nebraska, Minnesota and Wisconsin. Moreover, they are settling in southern states like Delaware and Maryland and the western states such as Colorado and Utah between 1990 and 2000 (Passel 2004). One of the unique features of Mexican immigrants is more than 83 per cent resided in just 10 states. California has the largest number (4,396,435) of Mexican immigrants in 2006, followed by Texas (2,339,715) and Illinois (724,845). The other states are Arizona

(608,645), Florida (303,345), Georgia (276,494), Colorado (254,844), North Carolina (254,830), Nevada (230,314) and New York (230,299). Mexican immigrants share 72.8 in New Mexico, 65.5 in Arizona, 62.5 in Texas and 57.6 per cent of all immigrants. The number of Mexican immigrants in South Dakota, Louisiana, Alaska and Ohio increased more than doubled between 2000 and 2006 (Batalova 2008).

**Figure 1.1 Geographical Distribution of People of Mexican Origin in the US**



**Source: Laglagaron 2010: 4**

According to Batalova (2008), Mexican immigrants residing in the US, 78.3 per cent were adult of working age (between 18 and 54), 10.1 per cent were minor (below 18 year), and 11.6 per cent or the rest were seniors (age 55 and above). Men constituted 55.9 per cent and while women accounted 44.1 per cent. More than 4.9 million male are engaging in civilian labour, 40.2 per cent are actively engaging in occupations construction, extraction, etc. (Batalova 2008). Mexican immigrant men as well as women are substantial less engaged as managers, scientists, etc. but they are more in service or farming occupations.

Batalova (2008) also pointed out that more than half of all illegal immigrants are Mexicans. Passel (2004: 4) also indicated Mexican constitutes about 5.3 million or 57 per cent of illegal immigrants. As a result, US stepped up its border enforcement and apprehended many Mexicans in 1990s. The number of arrests waned to about one-sixth in 2007 and 2008. In 2008,

the Border Patrol apprehended 662,000 Mexican illegal immigrants, the lowest level since 1973 (see table 1.5 below). The reason could be weakened American economy and increased border enforcement (Passel and Cohn 2012: 5). Based on above argument, Passel and Cohn (2012a) opined that sharp decline in immigration begun in 2005 and the main factor for this was opportunities of employment in both countries. On American side, it was the continued weakness of its economy and border enforcement. Developments on the Mexican side, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew at higher rates than US, which keeps Mexicans at home and others to return. Another important factor that affects immigration between the two countries is decline birth rate in Mexico. As a result, between 1995 and 2003, 3 million Mexicans immigrated and about 700,000 including American born returned home. Between 2005 and 2010 about 1.4 million Mexicans immigrated and the same number including American born children went home (Cohen 2012a).

**Table 1.5 US Border Patrol Apprehension by Nationality, 1992-2008**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Total Apprehended</b>	<b>Mexican</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>Total Apprehended</b>	<b>Mexican</b>
1992	1,200,000	1,169,000	2001	1,266,000	1,224,000
1993	1,263,000	1,230,000	2002	955,000	918,000
1994	1,032,000	1,000,000	2003	932,000	882,000
1995	1,324,000	1,294,000	2004	1,160,000	1,085,000
1996	1,550,000	1,523,000	2005	1,189,000	1,024,000
1997	1,413,000	1,388,000	2006	1,089,000	981,000
1998	1,556,000	1,523,000	2007	877,000	809,000
1999	1,579,000	1,535,000	2008	724,000	662,000
2000	1,676,00	1,637,000			

*Source: Passel and Cohn 2009: 6*

Therefore, logically it can be interpreted that the Mexican American war (1846-1847), its subsequent Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo (1848) and immigration are the main factors responsible for the formation of Mexican diaspora in the US. Immigration is promoted by

*Bracero* Programme (1946-1964), *maquiladoras* (borderland development project, started in 1964) and NAFTA (1994).

### **Interpreting Mexican Immigration**

This section is going to interpret Mexican immigration to the US. For many years, international migration comes within the studies of economic, demography, human geography and sociology. However, since 1990s, the theme has also entered to the area of high politics, rendering the main for politicians and strategic thinkers. Strategic discussions on immigration are concerned about how to manage and contain global immigration flows based on security issues. Many western countries accepted the strategic thinkers' argument and adopted a very restrictive immigration laws (Castles 2002: 1143). While the sending countries try to secure the rights of its diaspora, and in the process, a coalition of immigrants and sending countries gave rise to new policy, what Smith (2005: 105) categorised as extraterritorial conduct of politics. As such, international migration process increases in volume; move beyond the traditional destinations; change its occupations; and become important in sending countries' political and economic development. The home countries also mobilise its diaspora for its own interests and benefits as far as foreign policy is concerned with that receiving country (Esman 1986: 342).

On the other hand, the demand for cheap Mexican labours is facilitated through mass media such as newspapers, radio and word of mouth (Driscoll 1998: 22). Under such widely open demand, the pattern of Mexican immigration shift from temporary to permanent, rural to urban, unskilled to skilled immigrants, thus in turn, affected both Mexico and US. The factors that influence immigration between Mexico and US can be categorised into two: supply-push factors from Mexico and demand-pull factors from US. The push and pull theory suggests there are many conditions favourable for immigration to flourish between the two countries. The interpretation of immigration between them will be based on above mentioned two factors.

#### ***Push-Supply Interpretation***

The conditions that motivate immigration between the two countries have been evolving for over century. Base on push perspective, Raul Fernandez (1977: 97-98) lists three factors that influenced the beginning of immigration between them: the development of the agrarian sector

during the Porfiriato (1886-1911); the penetration of railroads into Mexico's interior, which facilitated the recruitment and transporting immigrant labour during the same period; and the Mexican Revolution of 1920. Alba (1978: 504) observes that Mexico's development strategy and the spread of American styles of consumption and culture have become the primary factors in modern day outmigration from Mexico. Since 1940, Mexico's strategy of import substitution industrialisation (ISI) has coincided with the dislocation of the agrarian population and reallocation of farmlands. The usage of capital-intensive technology in Mexico's industrialisation programme has limited the number of manufacturing jobs available for the displaced rural population, thereby swelling the ranks of a reserved army of labour lacking job (Cockcroft 1986: 129). Other negative consequences of ISI include scientific and technological dependency on advanced core nations, a huge foreign debt and a balance of payments deficit, concentration of domestic income and regional imbalances in population and resources (Alba 1978: 504). Alba concludes that the penetration of modern styles of consumption and American culture, combined with Mexico's attempt to emulate modernisation and development patterns of advanced industrialised countries, has resulted in marginalising a significant portion of population. For many Mexicans, immigration into the US has become the only alternative.

In addition to its ISI policy, Mexico promoted capitalist agriculture between 1940 and 1960. The government reversed previous policies that had promoted technology and financial supports, resulting in the recreation of a landless proletariat (White 1989: 36). Rural reform of the early 1970s did little to absorb the landless rural labour force. Subsequently, the Lopez Portillo administration (1976-1982) rejected rural reform strategies and promoted economic development through agricultural export earnings increased immigration to the US. Mexican outmigration was induced by economic stress such as inequalities in land tenure and landholding (Shaw 1976: 103). Many scholars argued that the main cause of Mexican immigration includes *latifundism*, land-hunger, peonage conditions, static wages, rural misery and agricultural reform failures (Corwin 1987: 129). Mexico's labour law is both restrictive and overregulated; in order to get better work and income opportunities, immigration to US is the only alternative (Buscaglia 1994: 201). The Mexican Revolution of 1920, the *Bracero* Programme, the *maquiladoras*, the debt crisis of 1982 and economic crisis of 1995 also contributed to outmigration from Mexico. Another push factor from Mexico is when it fully integrated with the US through NAFTA;

American corn imports flooded the Mexican market; and it took away the livelihood of many small scale farmers and workers.

On top of that, *maquila* jobs in the border are not sufficient to provide job to all displaced peasants. The Mexican government has stopped its guarantees for crops and very few people know how and where to market their products (The Economist 2000a: 37). Therefore, Cohen (2006: 116) strongly opines NAFTA would displace many farmers and reinforce the existing immigration process and networks. He further argues that a very small scale corn and bean farmers cannot compete with American farmers and unless jobs are created for them, most of them would immigrate to US. More importantly, the Mexican officials also suggested that the labourers working in “technologically superior” US would acquire modern agricultural skills, return home and this would modernise Mexican agricultural sector (Lorey 1999: 112).

### ***Pull-Demand Interpretation***

In term of demand-pull, the American employers often used Mexican workers as a means of keeping labour costs down. The rapid industrialisation and technical improvements in the US in 19 and 20 centuries created an urgent need for Mexican labour. As the drive for accumulation, expanded markets and resources pushed capitalist penetration westward in the US, Mexican labour became the most attractive source of immigrant labour in the US (Sassen-Koob 1981: 65). During the First World War, the American farmers used the motto “Food to Win War” to persuade the Department of Labour to recruit Mexican labours in agricultural sectors. In Immigration Exclusion Act of 1917, the US gave special preferential treatment to Mexican workers. Under a provision allowing for the admission of temporary immigrant labour, the US Secretary of Labour also exempted Mexicans from literacy requirement, the head tax and anti-contract clause of the 1917 Immigration Act (White 1989: 9).

Another important pull factors was *Bracero* Programme, which was initiated by the US in order to meet the labour shortage engendered by World War II (Fitzgerald 1996: 217). It imposed strict rules under which Mexican workers could be employed. American employers were postulated to provide free transportation from recruitment centres, furnish sanitary housing and pay their wages not lower than native workers. Simultaneously, Mexican workers were required to sign up and wait to be hired legally. The US employers found the *Bracero* rules



excessively rigid. To be relaxed, US adopted official policies of encouraging illegal immigration, INS district directors were advised not to check illegal immigration during the harvest time. As a result, thousands of undocumented workers crossed the border as well, which were welcomed by American employers (Djajic 2001: 161). The *Bracero* Programme came to an end in 1964 marked the beginning of another pull factors in the border—*maquiladora*—a border development project set up by two countries in 1965. The programme aimed to create jobs for massive unemployment, especially for *ex-braceros*. Instead of giving employment to *ex-braceros*, the plants preferred young women, who also brought their husbands and their brothers to the border. Their husbands and brothers often immigrate into the US illegally (Martin 2001: 95). Recession developed in the US, followed the 9/11 attacks, which means *maquila* depressed and produced more immigration to US (Landau 2003: 75). *Maquiladoras* served as a pull factor for immigration, as it brought massive interior population to the border. Later on, these interior populations who came to work in *maquiladoras* became the mainstream of US immigration (Grunwald 1985: 131). It also opened the flows of information across the border; it did not create sufficient jobs to encourage *ex-beaceros* and unemployed Mexicans to stay at home (Zabin and Hughes 1995: 396).

The pull factor was and is stronger than push factor as indicated by the American current (i.e. during the 1990s and 2000s) debate on immigration. There are three main actors interested in American immigration policy and sometime form alliance with each other on certain interests. Advocates—this group prefers generous immigration policy and want full inclusion of immigrants. They want family reunification, a special provision to admit both skilled and unskilled workers and significant admission of refugees. They favour full citizenship rights for immigrants. According to them, admission of large number of immigrants means ability to maintain economic growth and control global economy. They also endorse policies that would legalise those illegal immigrants if they meet certain criteria (Martin 2003: 135). Free Marketers also prefers generous level of immigration; however, on the contrary, the laws have restricted rights for them. The slogan they used during the 1990s was: “Immigration Yes, Welfare No”. They want admission of foreign workers on temporary basis and send them home if their services are no longer required. They argue that business should be allowed to recruit the best labour abroad at the lowest cost. Ascertaining immigration as an essential component of

economic growth, they tend to ignore the concerns of native workers and communities (Martin 2003: 135). Restrictionist was one group that wanted quantitative restrictions on legal immigration and limits them to access social benefits and legal rights. This group considers immigration as a parasite for society and wants strong and effective steps to contain illegal migration (Martin 2003: 136). In almost all the debates, the advocates and free marketers' views won public support proved that US still wants immigrants for economic growth. Mexico being the closest neighbour and shares international border with the US is favoured by advocates and free marketers.

The above discussion of theorising diaspora, the formation of Mexican diaspora and interpretation of Mexican immigration to US shows that diasporic issues are very complex—conditioned by internal and external factors and would continue to be the key issue in Mexican domestic politics as well as in foreign policy, particularly with respect to the US. It is clear from the theoretical analysis that the term diaspora refers to various categories of people who live outside their traditional homelands; maintain solidarity with their group; and are also actively promoting their countries' interests in the host countries. Sending countries are taking populations, as never before, look upon their diasporas as a means to overcome their deficiencies (Smith 2003: 734).

Diasporic formation and its identity consciousness are conditioned by three elements (1) diaspora itself, (2) host society, and (3) home country. Among them, home country is the main actor regulating and managing diasporic population in a globalised world. Sassen (1999: 29) has argued “the state itself has been a key agent in the implementation of global processes, and it has emerged quite altered by this participation”. This is possible through governmentality in current era, which calls for managing and producing subjects within spaces that cannot be conceived as territorially contained. Modern practices of governance, thus, include processes of delinking, rearticulating and rescaling the socio-political-economic connections that link subjects to global flows and networks.

The Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo (1848) set the formation of Mexican diaspora in the US. In 1848, there were many Mexicans living in that territory and became American citizens. However, Mexico considers them as Mexicans and immigration between the two countries make

Mexican diaspora is both old and new (Roger 1992: 308). Immigration between the two countries is conditioned by internal and external factors and would continue to be the key issue between the two countries. It is important to note that Mexico's diasporic policies and programmes need not only the collective will of all Mexico's political parties, but also the support from public, NGOs, church and community on both sides of the borders. This is required as Mexico alone cannot address diasporic issue and diaspora is the key element of social, political, cultural and economic development in Mexico. The effective implementation of diasporic policies and programmes will not only address the problems that immigrants face in the US but also promote the Mexican cultural identity abroad and could lay the foundation of Mexico's economic progress in the long run. Having understood the nature of diaspora, formation of Mexican diaspora in the US and various factors related to it, the next chapter will discuss the formation of diasporic policies and programmes as well as its impact on domestic politics since 1988.

## CHAPTER TWO

### IMMIGRATION AND DIASPORIC POLICIES IN THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL DEBATE AND PARTISAN CONTESTATION SINCE THE 1990S

It is clear from the previous chapter that for the successive governments, immigration and Mexican diaspora in the US was a major concern. Gutierrez (1999: 454) reveals that there are more than 19 million people in the US who place themselves as Mexican ancestry. Esman (1986: 333) argues that Mexican origin people who are settled in the US constitute a minority ethnic group of immigrant who maintain sentimental and material links with Mexico. The presence of large number of diasporic population compels every Mexican political party to consider diasporic issue as an important agenda in domestic and foreign policy. As such, the protection of Mexicans abroad becomes the main agenda of foreign policy since 1848. However, prior to 1980s, Mexican government engagement with its diaspora lacked administrative bureaucracy, financial capacity and cooperation with American official. Laglagaron (2010: 7) argues that Mexican government's engagement policies with its nationals in the US have been determined largely by its economy, leadership and political situation. During these periods, Mexico's policy concentrated on repatriation, encouraging cultural activities, formation of Mexican cultural centres and limited consular protection. Based on above arguments, Goldring (2002: 65) reiterates that Mexico's diasporic policy was "a policy of having no policy". Its poor connection with its diasporas was clearly revealed from the fact that Mexican government did not officially response to 1983 Simpson-Mazzoli immigration bill and the 1986 IRCA,<sup>15</sup> which legalised more than 3 million Mexican illegal immigrants. It even imposed penalty on American employers for knowingly hiring undocumented workers (Laglagaron 2010: 7). The government's non-interference in American immigration reforms and Mexicans' affair outside Mexico was supported by nationalist thinkers who declared that immigrants and their children were disloyal to Mexico and were more than eager to assimilate themselves into American society (Gutierrez 1999: 545).

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<sup>15</sup> Delano (2011: 127) argues the 1986 IRCA was the product of the struggle on the unauthorised immigration and earlier immigration reform. It was the first and almost comprehensive immigration policy included measures for the regularization of undocumented migrants who had arrived before 1982, a special programme for agricultural workers, stronger enforcement mechanism to prevent new entries and a reinforcement of employer sanctions.

It was only, when its diasporic population began to grow, Mexican academics, politicians and businessmen developed more interest in the affairs of their citizens abroad. In addition, accounts of discrimination and labour rights infringements to its nationals added concern about diasporic quality of life. In order to address the above mentioned problems, Mexican government supported ‘Chicano Movement’<sup>16</sup> and initiated policy such as scholarships for immigrants to study in Mexico, the formation of Mexican cultural institutes and the distribution of Mexican text books free of cost in American educational institutions (Laglagaron 2010: 8). These policies and programmes aimed at Mexican immigrants and their descendents to learn about Mexican culture and retain their loyalty towards Mexico. At the same time, this also can be explained as a strategic to maintain the flow of remittances and political support as diasporas got the absentee voting right in 2005. The legalisation of 3 million of its illegal immigrants established a constant presence of Mexicans in the US and this would boost Mexico’s national interests as far as US is concerned. This call for Mexico to have proactive policies in defending anti-immigrant attacks on its citizens abroad such as California’s “Proposition 187”<sup>17</sup> that attempted to bar undocumented immigrants’ rights to access public education, welfare and non-emergency health services in California (Laglagaron 2010: 8).

Mexican states initiated official engagement with their overseas populations ahead of federal government. Zacatecan origin people in the US formed its hometown association (HTA) in 1972, the first Mexican HTA in the US (Somerville et al. 2008). In 1986, the governor of Zacatecas visited California; met hometown association leaders; formed a formal engagement programme; and established 1x1 programme (Delano 2011: 149). Through this hometown association, Zacatecan in the US are working with the local and state governments on infrastructure and political mobilisation projects (Laglagaron 2010: 9). At the federal level, the official and comprehensive relations began in January 1990. President Salinas not only strengthened and expanded consular offices but also established PMCE in January 1990. This

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<sup>16</sup> The Chicano Movement was an uprising of Mexican diaspora against economic, education, social and political discrimination. It has three objectives—the restoration of their land; rights for all farm workers; and education reform to end segregation. It threatened to resort to violence if their demands were not met. The major gains have been the election of Mexican American governors in Arizona and New Mexico (Stacy 2002 269-270).

<sup>17</sup> Proposition 187, also known as Save Our State (SOS), was a citizen initiative introduced in California in 1994. This initiative, base on Wilson’s proposal, was aimed to eliminate migrants’ rights to access public education, welfare and nonemergency health services and impose measures for verification of their migratory status at the local level. This initiative was approved in California in 1995 (Delano 2011: 141).

marked the beginning of Mexico's comprehensive diasporic policy and it coordinates various government agencies that aim to strengthen the relations with the people of Mexican ancestry. Its primary mandates are to make awareness among Mexicans abroad that the "Mexican nation extends beyond its territorial borders" and to execute Mexico's diasporic policies and programmes (Gutierrez 1999: 545).

The establishment of PCME increases Mexico's cooperation with its diasporas and its programmes and policies consist a host of projects officiated by its consulates in the US. Many of its programmes support and promote sports, health, culture, business, tourism, formal education<sup>18</sup> and community organisation.<sup>19</sup> Federal and state level diasporic policies and programmes enabled Mexican state to work together with its diaspora and established a new mechanism for its diaspora to remain connected to their hometown. PCME directly works with consulates and hometown associations; it fostered the formation of HTAs and encouraged Mexican diasporic populations to maintain ties with communities of origin or HTAs (Laglagaron 2010: 9). Thus, PCME brought its diasporas in the US closer to Mexico and increased its role in domestic politics. In support of this, Fitzgerald (2006a: 278) argues that both Mexicans and its diasporic populations share equal weight in Mexican politics through the creation of dual nationality in 1996. Again, the remittances sent by Mexican immigrants became the primary source of income in Mexico's economic development especially during the 1990s when Mexico faced economic crisis. It received US\$16.6 million in 2004 and the highest recipient of remittances in the world (Goldring 2004: 801). Therefore, the subject of immigration and diaspora is an important issue in Mexican domestic politics. Based on the above argument, this chapter is going to examine the reasons behind the rise of diasporic issue in public and partisan debate since 1988 in Mexican domestic politics.

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<sup>18</sup> Every summer Mexican government sends teachers to help schools in US that face shortage of bilingual teachers; distributes Spanish books free of cost to schools and libraries across the US; bids training for bilingual teachers; supports literacy programmes for adult immigrants; and sponsors strategy to encourage the enrolment of diasporic children in Mexican schools (Gutierrez 1999: 545).

<sup>19</sup> The Mexican government sponsors diasporic representatives to visit Mexico; co-ordinates meetings between diasporic clubs and organisations' leaders and leaders of their hometowns; organises local, regional and national levels sports in the US; and organises youth encounters for diaspora in Mexico. The government also organises health campaign and offers training for health professionals (Gutierrez 1999: 545).

There are several reasons for Mexico to cultivate a close and lasting relationship with its diaspora in the US. They form an extra market to export Mexican products and are significant sources revenue. They are also a source of lobbying group, which influence American policies related to bilateral issues and promote Mexico's national interests as well (Dominguez and de Castro 2009: 197). Gutierrez (1997: 55) added that the deepening of interactions between the civil societies of both countries; the rapid growth of interest groups attempting to mould domestic and foreign policy in two countries; the urge of public opinion; and the need to resolve binational social problems add extra reasons for Mexican government to establish diasporic policies and programmes.

### **Logic of Integration with Diaspora**

The end of the Cold War and intensification of neoliberalism through globalisation in the 1980s marked the emergence of diasporic issue in many migrant sending countries. This process was strengthened by 9/11 terrorist attacks, after which most of the migrant receiving countries strengthened their security measures, particularly, in the international borders, where often many immigrants are mistreated (IOM 2010: 69). On top of that, in the post-Cold War era, national identity emerged as one of the important factors in national and international agenda (Demmers 2002: 87). According to US census (1997), there are 29 million Hispanics, out of which around 19 million were Mexican-origin people living in the US (Gutierrez 1999: 454). This has now become the greatest concern for Mexican foreign policy as well as for domestic politics. There are several factors which are responsible for the rising importance of diasporic issue in Mexican domestic politics.

Mexican government historically considered immigration as an "escape valve" for diverting domestic ills. Indeed, Mexico did benefit from it as labour migration to the US as this release some pressure from overpopulation and unemployment within the country. More importantly, Mexico received an estimated one billion dollars per year in remittances from its workers in the US in 1984 (White 1989: 35). However, these benefits also entail certain costs. Because more and more educated Mexicans are migrating to the US. Mexico now perceived what was once considered as "escape valve" as a drain on its qualified human resources. In fact, one Mexican senator even argued in 1985 that immigration was an obstacle to economic growth

in Mexico (White 1989: 35). In response to this, Mexico's diasporic policy in the 1990s changes completely and established many new policies and programmes, which encouraged diaspora to get involved in Mexico's economic development. In fact, in 2000 president Fox encouraged Mexican diaspora to return Mexico and join domestic jobs (Fitzgerald 2006a: 279).

If one examines the financial aspect of immigration then the top most remittances receiving region in the world is Latin America. Within the region, Mexico is by far the single largest migration sender and remittance receiver in the world. In 2007, around US\$28 billion worth of remittance were officially registered; with that, Mexico surpassed India and China (Lopez 2009: 6). Zamora (2005: 8) argues that these remittances ameliorated living standard of thousands and thousands of poor people; has multiplier effects in national economy; and financed a large number of community projects. For Mexico, remittances are a significant source of foreign exchange and the second largest source of national income after oil (Delano 2011: 30). It is the main funding source of setting up business in Mexico; Guanajuato, it is invested in workshops; in Michoacán, it was invested in farming, cattle raising, handicraft and manufacture (Durand et al. 1996: 426). Therefore, Mexican government could not ignore diasporic issues in domestic as well as in international politics.

Over the decades, the diasporas have increasingly become important actors and pressure groups in international politics. The illustrious politically active and strongest lobbying communities in the US are the Jewish, Greek, Cuban and Armenian diaspora. Vertovec (2005) argues that Iraqi diaspora played vital role in stimulating American military intercession in Iraq in 2003. Consequently, many countries look upon their diaspora as strategically vital political and economic assets. Mexico developed a very close relationship with its diasporas in the US aiming to empower them as a source of economic and political assets in order to lure them to invest in Mexico and lobby in the US on any issue which could hurt Mexico's interests (Dominguez and de Castro 2009: 197).

On top of that, Mexicans and its diasporas are so interlaced—they are reliable neighbours, they often work together, celebrate the important festivals together, intermarry and are often indistinguishable. The diaspora observes Mexican holidays—honouring the Virgin of Guadalupe, Mexican independence, Moctezumz, Benito Juarez and Emilano Zapata (de la Garza



and Desipio 1998: 403). Their hometown associations are the main centres of collective remittances, donations and other assistances for local development and for entering into new era of understanding Mexico's problems. They value Spanish language, Mexican traditions and customs, as well as strive to preserve Mexican identity and nationalism. To respond positively to its nationals who are living abroad, the Mexican government must integrate them through the establishment of proper institutions (de la Garza and Desipio 1998: 403).

Sheffer argues that homeland governments and political actors prefer their diasporas to have close relations with them. They also encourage them to retain their original citizenship and accept only temporary status in host countries. The immigrant sending countries believe that retention of the homeland citizenship will allow them to have some control over their diasporas. Governments desire that those newly migrated should continue to maintain close contact, be ready for the service of homeland and must remit money back home (Sheffer 2003: 123). Therefore, Sheffer concludes that those homeland governments which support migrant politically and culturally have defined fairly clear goals, designed proper strategies for achieving those goals and acted accordingly. One way to do this is to encourage the establishment of hometown associations in host countries and the sending country continues to influence the diasporas' behaviours and activities. In the same vein, Mexico's diasporic policies and programmes are also designated as a means to control the behaviours and activities of its diasporas in order to attain its national interests.

### **The Emergence of Diasporic Policies and Programmes**

Focusing on Mexico, the IRCA of 1986 set the formation of comprehensive and extensive diasporic policies. This act regularised more than 2.3 million illegal Mexican immigrants and led to the increase into number of Mexican immigrants from 2.2 million in the 1980s to 4.4 million in the 1990s. The extension of stay and growth of immigration also resulted in increased remittances and by 1980, remittances represent US\$1.8 billion; by 1990 it was \$3 billion and by 2008 it was estimated at \$28 billion (Lopez 2009: 6). Migrants also constitute an extra market to export Mexican products and a main source of lobbying for Mexico, which influenced the American policies related to Mexico-US relations (Gutierrez 1999: 546). They are a special agency to overcome financial, human resource deficit, national revenue, investment,

technological, population replenishment and intellectual sourcing (Smith 2003: 734). All these factors gradually changed Mexico's perception of its immigrants from *pochos*<sup>20</sup> to national hero (Slocum-Bradley 2008: 132). This called for Mexico to increase its services towards diasporas and subsequently, the consular network began to expand from 42 in 1990s to 53 in 2008.

Increasingly the Mexican government through its consulates started fostering stronger tie-up with hometown association (HTAs), stimulating their formation and refreshing their interactions with local and state officials (Goldring 2002: 63). Mexico granted dual nationality in 1996 as well as absentee voting rights in 2005 (Castaneda 2006: 115), and began countering actively the American legislation that had only impact on its nationals (Delano 2011: 39). It launched an active campaign against Proposition 187 and militarisation of international borders that led to mistreatment and migrant death in the border (Migration News 1994). These episodes completely change its policy orientation from "policy of having no policy" to assertive policy for the protection of its diasporic rights and dignity, and responding to harsh American anti-immigrants' policies at three levels.

At the domestic level, Mexico had witnessed widespread economic and political reforms since 1988. Mexico officially began its trade liberation in 1983 and joined GATT in 1986 (Robert 2001: 4). Mexico signed Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Chile in 1992; became part of NAFTA in 1994; also signed FTA with Colombia, Venezuela, Bolivia and Costa Rica in 1995 and Nicaragua in 1998 (Robert 2001: 10). Further, beyond the hemisphere, it signed FTA with Israel and EU in 2000 and Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador in 2001 (Robert 2001: 10), in addition to the various trade and investment agreements with other countries. Trade reforms were adopted with an aim to promote investment in Mexico. Mexico became a member of APEC in 1993, OECD in 1994 and also one of the founding members of WTO in 1995. Delano (2011: 139) argues that FTA particularly NAFTA was a strategy to retain Mexicans in Mexico; to mitigate negative trade; and to attract foreign direct investment. At the political level, Mexico established PCME in 1990; granted dual nationality in 1996; changed regime in 2000; and

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<sup>20</sup> The word '*pochos*' is generally used to describe a fruit that is rotten. It is a negative term used to refer to Mexicans who migrated to US. Migrants were perceived as traitors as they lacked patriotism and worked for the development of other nations. Migrants were also visualized as a symbol of sin or illness. The term also refers to Mexican migrants who were neither real Mexican nor real American, who adopted the American way of life (Kunz 2008: 11).

granted absentee voting right in 2005 (Castaneda 2006: 115). Thus, this system of democratic and economic reforms in Mexico not only widened and made adoptable to its regional and international frameworks but also called for greater recognition of diasporic rights and dignity. It also welcomed the opinions of public, church, NGOs and domestic and international media to deal with the infringement of immigrants' rights, deaths at the border and anti-immigrant policies in the US. Thus, Mexico changed its international image, attracted foreign capital and avoided the internationalisation of domestic security problems.

At the transnational level, democratisation of domestic politics and economic reforms gave space to new actors, who demanded recognition of their political rights and became actively involved in the debate over Mexico's foreign and domestic policies. Mexican hometown associations and their leaders began increasingly participating in political, economic and social developments in their places of origin. Gradually, they were effectively able to influence the federal government in demanding the recognition of their political rights and absentee voting rights. Subsequently, Mexico accepted dual citizenship in 1996 and granted absentee voting right in 2005 (Castaneda 2006: 122). The increasing recognition of diaspora and its associations through diasporic policies and programmes influenced Mexico's domestic and foreign policies with consequences on both sides of the border. Social and economic interaction between US and Mexico and all bilateral agendas became intermestic by having international and domestic components (Selee 2005: 2). It was, in all senses, the growing economic and political power of Mexican diasporas, which influenced both the countries along with the establishment of PMCE in 1990 and Institute for Mexican Abroad (IME) in 2003. The effort to defend and promote the rights and dignity of Mexicans abroad has, in many ways, further transnationalised diasporic issues.

At the international level, after Mexico decided to liberalise its economy in the 1980s, its foreign policy discourse and priorities also began to change. Mexico's foreign policy towards US was defensive and reactive and its foreign policy discourse was strongly based on principles of non-intervention and defense of sovereignty. However, 1990s onwards Mexico moved towards a more pragmatic model that involved a closer friendship with the US. A closer tie with the US through economic liberalisation policies and economic integration (NAFTA) "prompted a new

attitude among Mexican officials to institutionalise bilateral affairs, that is, to engage with the American government and formalise bilateral affairs” (Dominguez and de Castro 2001: 154). In fact, Mexico’s decision to abandon its old foreign policy discourse towards the US, enabled it to redefine its relationship with its diasporas and redefine concepts and nature of citizenship (Smith 2003: 308-309). Additionally, this change led to greater activism in Mexico’s defence of its diasporic rights and in placing migration issue as a priority in bilateral agenda.

Rising migration as one of the highest priorities in the bilateral agenda during the Fox administration symbolised a great divergence from Mexican government’s habitual attitude of “having no policy”. Fox’s promise to govern for 120 million Mexicans, including the diaspora ‘national heroes’ and to implement policies and programmes to improve their situation was a result of the historical evolution of their relationship (Delano 2011: 166). Beyond the proposal for a migration agreement, Mexico also increased its activism through the establishment of President Office for Mexicans Abroad (2000) and Institute for Mexicans Abroad (2003). Through these institutions Mexican consuls become more actively involved in promoting migrants’ political participation in Mexico and empowering community leaders to promote the diasporic agenda in Mexico as well as in the US.

### **Mexican Public Opinion**

Besides governmental efforts, in a democratic country, public opinion is one of the important pillars of policy-making and agenda setting. Its role has increased with the improvement of science and technology. In the case of Mexico, during the decades of PRI rule, public opinion was weakened due to government controls. During these periods, mass communication had only limited rights and public debates were censored through media control acts. These controls, however, changed with the coming of PAN government in 2000 (Foster 2010: ix). Acknowledging the importance of public opinion, Fox tried to govern the nation by ‘going public’ and instead of mobilisation via political parties, he appealed to the media. Therefore, Dresser (2003) argues that Fox was one leader who changed the presidency into public affairs.

In contrast to all expectations, Mexicans are outwardly fascinated by what happens outside Mexico. The Mexican public is highly concerned about the affair of their diasporas and the course policies are taking. They want their voice to be exceedingly heard foreign policy-

making. They rejected responsive policy of Mexico in diasporic affairs and wanted assertive and proactive diasporic policy. Consequently, Mexican public demand of protection of the interests of Mexicans abroad had to be the first concern of foreign policy. The public also believed that its diasporas should have equal rights and obligations as Mexicans who live in Mexico that the loyalty of Mexican diasporas should be towards Mexico (Global Views 2004: 9). To realise this goal, the Mexican public believe that Mexico should have its own policy rather than depending on US. At the same time, they also favour that Mexico should cooperate with US on certain issues to achieve the rights and dignity of its diasporas living in the US (Global Views 2004: 9).

They also portrayed Mexican immigrants and Mexican diasporas as hard worker who sacrificed their families and community back home and remitted money home for many purposes probably to support diasporic policies and programmes (Global Views 2004: 30). This argument has not only economic component but also a democratic one i.e. it is the state obligation to look after its citizens. They also advocate that human rights should be priority of foreign policy. More than sixty per cent of Mexicans say that furthering and defending human rights of diasporas should be one of Mexico's primary issue (Global Views 2004: 17). Therefore, we can argue public opinion connected with defending its diasporic economic interests and promoting human rights abroad is actually referred to the US as majority of its diasporas are living there and majority of its foreign trade is with that country. On top of that, based on their nature of being hard working, the Mexican public opinion argues that many American employers prefer Mexican immigrants than others who maintain Mexican culture. Thus, Mexican cultural identity is becoming popular in the US (Garcia 2004: 72) and protecting and promoting Mexican diasporas' interests should be one of the key issues in foreign policy making.

### **Mexican Catholic Church's Policies**

Mexican Catholic Church was one of the important groups that opposed immigration during the 1910s and 1920s. The church argued that returned immigrants brought foreign ideas, which threatened Mexican culture and even the existence of sovereign state. It further argued that immigration caused family disintegration—husbands returned home to find their family in ruin with “wife or daughter dishonoured and sons having abandoned their responsibilities and were prepared for crime” (Fitzgerald 2009). Church also argued that it threatened nationalist as well as

gendered obligations and caused religious conversion. Based on these ideologies, the Archbishop of Guadalajara carried out a holy campaign against immigration in 1920. The following year, a conference was organised where it was argued “immigration is a demolishing act, a devouring act, an act that everyday rips shreds of flesh and soul from the motherland”. In response to *Bracero* Programme, the Archbishop of Guadalajara advised his priests to warn all prospective migrants about the risks they would face in the US, “so that they would not sacrifice their homes, families, works and motherland for this venture” (Fitzgerald 2009).

The end of *Bracero* Programme in 1964 marked the rise of illegal immigration. It raised significant concern from the church towards the human rights of undocumented immigrants. It changed its policy from dissuasion to teaching moral threats they would meet in the US. In this policy, the church brought out a “Manual for *Braceros*”, conducted special mass, opened charity at the labour recruiting centres in Mexico-US border and launched radio programme called “*Braceros* Hour” to highlight the dangers and temptations they would face in the US (Fitzgerald 2009). It also collaborated with religious institutions, organisations and workers in neighbouring countries and in 1990, they diluted the US and Mexico border enforcement policies. They argued that when poor and landless workers could not get job to sustain their families, they have right to immigrate into any countries including US in search of job. They would seek immigration policies that did not abuse immigrants, or put them in danger or infringed their rights or confined them indefinitely (Hagan 2008: 88).

In response to 9/11 border enforcement policy, the Mexican Conference of Catholic Bishops and US Conference of Catholic Bishops in 2003 collectively aided more than 150 million illegal immigrants and petitioned a joint pastoral letter to immigration authority in the US, entitled “Strangers No Longer: Together on the Journey of Hope”. They argued that the outcomes of the present immigration system linking the two nations—family separation, increased danger for journeying immigrants and the exploitation of immigrant labour—were contrary to Catholic social teachings as it defies the fundamental rights of immigrants (Hagan 2008: 89). During the 2000s, the Catholic Church in Mexico and US had sought to strengthen diasporas’ ties with their hometown associations as well as with host society. The church promoted cross-border ties and hometown associations. As many hometown associations

sponsored charity back home, priest in hometown always acted as work coordinator (Fitzgerald 2009). Therefore, the church was supporting the diasporic policies and programmes initiated by Mexican government to a great extent.

### **Role of NGOs and Immigrants' Human Rights Groups**

Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) can play important role in bringing diasporas closer to their countries, improving their conditions and advocating their rights in both sending and receiving countries. These organisations not only focus on the organised groups but also on the ordinary immigrants. These organisations also develop networks that cross international borders to help immigrants, particularly those who are undocumented; by providing food, shelter and fulfil some other basic needs.

The involvement of the NGOs in migratory matters is not new in Mexico. Traditionally, their role was limited to assisting immigrants in cases of emergency or need and to provide them with information regarding the networks of help they can find in their journey. Nowadays, NGOs help immigrants with legal counselling, job training and among other things. They are also involved in the formation of public policy and legislature on immigration (Zamudio 2004: 140). One important part of their recent participation has been lobbying for the legislative changes on migratory policy in Mexico. In Mexico which is a nation of immigration, transit and emigration, the NGOs can play a very important part in policy formation. They ensure to Mexican state and municipal authorities get involved in the provision of essential welfare work like health, education, justice, working training, etc. to immigrants (Zamudio 2004: 141).

Mexican NGOs together with immigrant rights advocate groups on both sides of the borders are calling for an integrated strategy for change, including a bilateral migration accord to ensure protections of immigrants under Immigration and Naturalisation Service (INS) authority; strengthening of consular protections; implementation of employment programme in Mexico to deter immigration; and permanent campaign to inform and educate immigrants about the risks of crossing into the US without documents (Carrillo 2004: 118). In 2011, Mexican diasporic leaders, an immigrant support groups based in US petitioned President Barak Obama to issue an official order pausing deportation of illegal immigrants until a long promised immigration renovation is approved. Angela Sanbrano, one of the leaders, argues that "If there's not going to

be immigration reform, then halt the deportations and stop separating our families”. She further criticised the Secure Communities Programme, established by American Immigration and Customs Enforcement in 2008, which aimed to identify illegal aliens in American jails and forcefully deport to their countries, arguing such policy makes illegal immigrants to be considered as “criminal” and a “threat” (Fox News 2011). In 2010, 400000 people were deported under this programme and that figure is likely to increase because 33 states have accepted the law and introduced that seek to criminalise undocumented immigrants (Fox News 2011). Jose Luis Gutierrez, NALACC’s associate director for transnational initiatives, argues Mexican government should pressure US to legislate comprehensive immigration reform including a provision to legalise many illegal immigrants as well as to erase negative perception of many Americans about them (Fox News 2011). Thus, the Mexicans as well as Mexican American NGOs are not only supporting the government diasporic policies and programmes but also highlighting some of the important issues the government should consider while formulating law. They also help some of the government initiatives for the welfare of immigrants.

### **Domestic Political Debate**

Immigration and diaspora have special implication for Mexico’s economic, social and political development. In the context of economic development, Mexico wants its diaspora to have close relations with it, remit more monies and invest in Mexico for economic development and poverty reduction. On the political front, it wants its diaspora to lobby American policies related to Mexico-US relations and Mexico would upgrade their welfare. On social issue, it wants its diasporas to maintain and market Mexican identity abroad. To this effect, Mexico claimed “it does not count as intervention in another country’s affairs when we are going to protect the rights of our own citizens” (Rosenblum 2004: 108). Therefore, the debate about diaspora during the 1990s was how to strengthen ties with them and promote their welfare. However, different political parties have different means and ways to cultivate close relations as well as protecting and promoting their rights and dignity in Mexico and abroad. Keeping the above arguments in mind, this section is going to examine Mexico’s views towards diaspora focusing on free trade, dual nationality, presidential elections 2000 and 2006.



### *Free Trade Agreement*

The debt crisis of 1982 and the acceptance of Brady Plan in 1989 forced PRI government to liberalise Mexican economy. However, PRI's argument was if Mexico did not liberalise its economy and have no free trade agreement with other countries, it would be left out in world scenario (Purcell 1992: 55). To avoid this, Mexico had no alternative but to pursue its own interests within NAFTA. Therefore, for PRI, NAFTA was critical turning point to stimulate economic recovery as well as survival of its political regime. As such, to support free trade agreement (FTA) including NAFTA, PRI under the leadership of Salinas forged multiple bargains with powerful groups. The strategy he employed for this purpose was the *Programa Nacional de Solidaridad* (Programme of National Solidarity) or its acronym, PRONASOL,<sup>21</sup> launched in December 1988. This is how Salinas won the popular support of labour and peasant sector to achieve his foreign policy—economic liberalisation. He also relied on the various departments and ministries for assistance and promotion of free trade. SECOFI Minister Jaime Serra Puche served as his right hand in the free trade negotiations and he was aided by a distinguished team of economists. Other ministries such as bank, financial institutions and development banks were the core supporters of free trade. Once he got the support of such important ministries and institutions, he introduced the free trade bill on 22 November 1993, and after 12 hours of debate, the Senate ratified the NAFTA. The opposition parties, especially, the PAN and PRD opposed the move but could not do much as president still controlled both the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, which was dominated by PRI (Poitras and Robinson 1994: 13).

PRI also argued that NAFTA was a means to retain Mexicans in Mexico, to mitigate negative trade and to attract foreign direct investment. Salinas has stated in relation to NAFTA that Mexico wants to export more goods, not people (Delano 2011: 139). He further argues that “Today Mexicans have to migrate to where jobs are being created, the northern part of Mexico, with NAFTA, employment opportunities will move towards where people live, reducing drastically migration within and outside the country” (Wu 1999). Similarly, President Zedillo argued that NAFTA is an instrument to address, improve and expand economic situations for

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<sup>21</sup> It is a federal fund available directly to local communities. In 1989, the government allocated some \$65 million to this project; by 1991, this total had risen to \$1.7 billion. It was a critical factor in obtaining the confidence of and support from the less privileged elements within the liberal coalition. Indeed, it was political astute for a number of reasons. It was a “multifaceted, multipurpose populist social programme” to reform economy (Morris 1992: 32).

migrant workers (Rodriguez-Scott 2002). It predicts that Mexico reduces its protection of capital intensive importable sector through NAFTA would produce more labour intensive exportable, in turn, its real wages would rise and migration would naturally fall (Schiff 1996: 25). It also means that NAFTA would help Mexico to export tomatoes, rather than tomato pickers (Andres 2002: 47). Jaime Serra Puche, who represents Mexico in the NAFTA negotiation, pointed one reason, “A free trade arrangement with the US would mitigate the negative trade and investment discrimination that Mexico might otherwise experience exclusion from the large regional trading blocs that were cropped up in Asia, Europe and America” (Gruber 2000: 128). Similarly, Salinas also asserted, “the changes in Europe and Asia and an apparent reliance on blocs convinced me that we should also try to be part of an economic bloc with the US and Canada” (Gruber 2000: 129). Adding to the above statements, Hyland (1996: 68) argues that NAFTA would reduce poverty through foreign direct investment, once poverty is alleviated, illegal immigration and organised crimes would dry up.

During the free trade (NAFTA) negotiation, the National Action Party (PAN or Partido de Accion Nacional) remained the PRI's traditional rival on the Right. However, PAN had long advocated for free trade programme now being initiated by Salinas. PAN supported NAFTA; its leaders like Diego Fernandez, Carlos Castillo Peraza and Gabriel Jemenez Remus openly supported in the Congress. The PAN argued that the agreement would improve the lot of the Mexican consumer, increase foreign investment, increase domestic product and improve salaries. In addition, they believed free trade would encourage more liberalisation of the economy and thus continue to break down the PRI's economic control. However, there were many issues, which PAN opposed to NAFTA. The president of the congressional International Affairs Committee of the party explained that the party wanted to include migratory affairs within the NAFTA (Rosenblum 2004: 109). They criticised the lack of a national debate and public information tending the government's negotiation of the agreement. Felipe Calderon considered the fault of the Constitution that there was no provision to offer a referendum before the public on such important issue (Ard 2003: 137). The PAN also pointed out the dangers of negotiating such a historic agreement without ensuring that it contained sufficient guarantees of not only the rights of workers but also the principles of national sovereignty (Poitras and Robinson 1994: 21). The party also accused PRI's strategy of trade as a way to cement its control over the political

system. It was also openly and vocally critical of the PRI's unwillingness to consult other sections of population of NAFTA and termed it as impartial agreement (Rosenblum 2004: 120).

The emergence of PRD as a national party established direct linkages to diasporic groups. PRD mobilised transnational members and vote movement since 1987. The PRD advocated immigrants' to have absentee voting rights in presidential elections. Consequently, the Mexican Congress started discussing about political and economic rights of its diaspora within the country. The PRD along with other political parties campaigned for "no loss of Mexican nationality". This idea finally led to the constitutional reforms of 1996 which allowed immigrants to have dual nationality. This process led the immigrants to gain recognition in Mexico's political and economic development (Godoy 1999). In the 1990s, it forced PRI to accept the 1996 constitutional reforms, which allowed legal and illegal Mexicans residing in the US to vote in 2000 presidential election (Smith 2008: 732). The PRD opposed NAFTA and instead proposed a "Continental Development Treaty" (Botz 1995: 234). In their view, the original text of the agreement ignored the externalities of border environmental cleanup, workers rights and employment. In the Mexican Senate, the PRD leader Porfirio Munoz Ledo described the agreement as a colonial pact and a platform for the expansion of American capitalism and control of Latin America (O'Toole 2010: 174). Most of the state recognized business associations supported free trade with minor reservations.

### ***Dual Nationality***

The history of demand for immigrant vote can be traced back to 20 century, notably in the 1920s, and mostly comprised of those exiled from Mexican Revolution. The contemporary movement for the same began in the 1980s, which was led by left activists and it cropped up during the 1988 presidential election, when Cardenas deserted PRI and formed PRD. During the 1994 presidential election, he actively campaigned in American cities such as Los Angeles, Chicago and others. In 1994 presidential election all the major political party candidates visited immigrants in the US (Smith 2008: 716). Subsequently, PRI introduced dual citizenship in 1996 as a strategy to gain its political stand, to curb the opposition's transnational political activities and to control the immigrants' resources.

The agenda of dual citizenship was included in the National Development Plan of 1995-2000. The nationality law that came into effect on 20 March 1998 was the result of a constitutional amendment approved unanimously by the Mexican Congress in December 1996. The constitutional amendments were made to articles 30, 32 and 37. This law declares that anyone born in Mexican territory or born to Mexican nationals living outside of Mexico can claim Mexican nationality (Brown 2009: 108).

Mexican political leaders used dual nationality as a means to cultivate closer relationship with its diasporas especially its communities' leaders and business persons. Similarly, Carrillo (2004: 108) argues that Mexico had recognised the importance and influence of its diasporas not only in the financial remittances but also in knowledge, ideas, investments, and prosperity of their families and hometowns and were the main factors responsible for Mexico to accept dual citizenship. Zedillo, in the 'National Development Plan 1995-2000', asserted that Mexican nation extended beyond its territorial border (Delano 2011: 150). After Proposition 187 sailed through, Zedillo pledged to "promote legal and constitutional reform so that Mexicans could preserve their nationality independent of the citizenship or residence they adopted" (Delano 2011: 136) and responded to a longstanding request of Mexican Americans organisers that Mexico allowed dual nationality, thus enabling immigrants and naturalised American citizens to maintain their Mexican nationality. However, Iskander (2010: 234) argues for PRI, by saying that the dual nationality means transferred of responsibility of dealing with the problems of immigrants onto immigrants themselves and onto Mexican American organisations that could enlist the newly naturalised voters in election drives. In the same vein, Smith (2005: 112) argues that dual nationality was PRI's strategy to eliminate a barrier to become American citizens for immigrants, so that immigrants would be able to defend their own rights and interests as American citizens against anti-immigrant policies like Proposition 187.

The dual citizenship as a transnational strategy developed by PRI has been an outcome of four factors. First, the changes in immigration patterns from poor rural to urban as well as economically and politically significant population to US. Second, the changes in the Mexican development model to a neoliberal one and the integration with North America. Third, the growing opposition to the regime that results from the deepening of social and economic

inequalities brought about by the new neoliberal mode. Fourth, the strong anti-immigration movement of the 1980s in the US against Mexican immigrants forced PRI to seek alternative policy (Escobar 2003: 13). Beyond this, the PRI used dual citizenship as a means to neutralise a growing influence of the Cardenista opposition movement (PRD) in the US. More importantly, PRI argues that dual citizenship would benefit Mexico by encouraging Mexican immigrants to participate in American politics, which would serve as an ethnic lobbying in support of the Mexico's interests. It further argues that dual citizenship would maintain the flow of remittances, investment and development assistance from its diasporas to Mexico (Fitzgerald 2000: 23). However, it rejects the right to vote from abroad as its leaders knew that immigrants would go against them and they would be thrown out of power. As such, it argues that absentee voting rights would open domestic politics to fraud. This, in turn, strengthens the position of opposition in the Mexican Congress, civil society and immigrants. Thus, in April 1999, opposition parties (PAN and PAN) proposed Mexican electoral reform that aspires to enable immigrants to vote from abroad. The immigrant organisations used public forums, press conferences and sought greater inclusion like absentee voting rights as well as the right to contest in domestic elections. This process led to the formation of *Comite Pro Voto Mexico 2000* (Mexican Pro Vote 2000 Committee).<sup>22</sup>

PRD often views immigration as a nation problem and to address this, it became a transnational party from its origin—installed enduring relations with Mexican immigrants in the US. As such, it embodied the demand for dual nationality in its official agenda. Its representatives and immigrant activists worked together to increase their transnational venture. This coalition functioned throughout the US; established in California and extending to Illinois and other states while in Mexico it is concentrated in Mexico City. During the 1988 presidential election, its candidate Cardenas actively campaigned in the US. Therefore, the PRD started its support for dual citizenship before the bill was introduced in Mexican Congress in 1996. In 1996, dual nationality debate, PRD Senator Porfirio Munoz Ledo openly argues that legislation

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<sup>22</sup> Mexican Pro Vote 2000 Committee (*Comite Pro Voto Mexico 2000*) is an organisation of various social organisations of Mexican diasporas such as the *Frente Zacatecano Civico*, the Michoacán cultural association and migrant business groups sent two delegations to Mexico City in 1999 to lobby Congress and President Zedillo. They also organised protests during Zedillo's visit to California that year (Schatz 2000: 91).

should make all Mexican diasporas to vote in presidential election 2000 (Smith 2005: 112). PRD officials have argued that the party's promotion of voting right is guided by the desire to empower disenfranchised group that are "citizens of nowhere" (Dresser 1993: 107). The PRD also stated that it is not seeking Mexican or Chicano power but *Raza* power. The idea of PRD argument is "in favour of democracy for the right of all to vote and be voters, just like the advances in the past such as giving vote to youth and women, now Mexicans living abroad" (Schatz 2000: 90). Chicanos also support the PRD's position and have spoken forcefully in favour of dual citizenship that would allow them to participate in both US and Mexican elections (Dresser 1993: 108). The dual citizenship bill of 1996 does not grant political rights to its diasporas and the demand for it continues, especially, the absentee voting rights. In response to this demand, the PRD along with immigrant rights advocates pushed for absentee balloting (Carrillo 2004: 110). Under this pressure, the Mexican Congress overwhelmingly approved absentee voting for immigrants on 28 June, 2005 (Castaneda 2006: 122).

PAN would naturally support the legislation. However, it does not agree with the ruling party on absentee vote. It argues in favour of extending rights to vote from abroad so as to make Mexicans abroad an integral part of Mexico's economic and social development. However, the PRI rejected its argument in 1996 and again in 1998. Therefore, the PAN along with PRD in April 1999, introduced a wide range of electoral reform aiming to enable immigrants to vote from abroad. The PRI rejected it again, this move made PAN a popular party among the immigrants, migrant sending states and immigrants' right workers (Smith 2008: 716). Immigrants' right to vote became the most important agenda in 2000 election campaign for PAN and PRD.

Therefore, the road to dual national in Mexico is characterised not only by immigrants but also a key role played by party politics. During 1998 presidential elections, California and Texas were unceasing places for almost political parties. In 2000 presidential election, Fox, the PAN presidential candidate, campaigned more extensively among the immigrants in the US than his opponents and heralded immigrants as the "heroes of Mexico"<sup>23</sup>, "cultural ambassador"<sup>24</sup> and

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<sup>23</sup> President Vicente Fox calls immigrants as "heroes of Mexico", in contrast to the longstanding position in Mexico that immigrants are national traitors who abandoned their home country for greener pasture. This shift in rhetoric

“Mexico’s gift to the world”. During his campaign, Fox promised he would govern 118 million Mexicans, including the immigrants “heroes of Mexico” in the US (Nafey 2007: 179). He also put two issues on his agenda: the absentee voting right and a new immigration agreement—temporary workers or guest worker programme with the US (Hamann 2007: 68). As a result, all immigrants’ organisations that are seeking political inclusion in their place of origin helped Fox to get elected in 2000. Governors of Mexican state frequently met its diasporas for consultations, support and contributions (Gutierrez 1993: 229).

### ***Presidential Election 2000***

The IFE’s announcement of 2000 presidential election included the fact that 1.5 Mexican diasporas residing in the US could cast their votes either in their respective hometowns or at special polling stations set up for them. All presidential candidates campaigned aiming to attract them, campaign tactics including television and newspapers ads, leaflets and direct mailing. All the leading candidates were concerned about the issue of eliminating government corruption, wanted guaranteed economic development and job generation that could lessen poverty and immigration.

Fox, the PAN candidate for 2000 election, campaigned to open Mexico-US border for free transit of people and trade. He spoke about migration with Mexican perspective that temporary legal work permit and employment agreement is possible with US (Rural Migration News 2001). At the same time, he also asserted that Mexican diasporas, especially those in the US would play a key role in rebuilding Mexico. He also strongly advocated freedom of movement, and argued that North America should follow European-norms while dealing with immigrant labour. Attacking the American immigration policy, he said PAN would never accept any condition that sought to convert Mexican immigrants into servants (Migration News 2000). During his campaign, Fox proclaimed to govern 118 million Mexicans, including 18 million immigrants in the US (Nafey 2007: 179). He pledged negotiations to ensure that the migration of

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appears to make a new realization of how critical these immigrants’ remittances are to the Mexican economy (Maher 2004: 133).

<sup>24</sup> Fox in his first trip to US after assuming office, delivered his vehement message to Mexican diasporas and their leaders in Fresno and heralded them “permanent ambassador” of Mexico. It signified they could enjoy all rights in Mexico and Mexico has obligations to look after them. To enjoy all these rights, he said his government would enact absentee voting right for them (Thompson 2001).

his countrymen would be 'safe, dignified, legal and orderly', as well as 'free from police persecution'. At the same time, he expected that Mexican diaspora would function as a lobbying force on behalf of Mexican state interests. Standing on his promises in the 2000 presidential election Fox, on his visit to US in August 2000, called for a new 'North American Community', resembling to European Union policy. This would, in turn, remove all restrictive laws on migration, adopt a common currency, and he expected Ottawa and Washington to contribute billion of dollars to Mexico's development. He advocated an increased numbers of permanent visas for Mexicans, a guest-workers programme and regularisation or a modified amnesty for several million Mexicans living illegally in the US (Grayson 2002a: 5601).

In his visit to Mexico-US border, Fox strengthened one of his diasporic policy goals—to protect and promote the rights of Mexican immigrants regardless about their status. He said he would ask Mexican and American authorities to respect immigrants' rights and if elected his government would not tolerate and kind of abuse (Lares 2000). According to him, *Paisano* Programme was the main attack for two ambitious goals—an encyclopedic programme of temporary American visas for Mexican workers and free movement of people across the border. On question of illegal immigrants, he said he would maintain them through Mexican consulates in the US and argued consulates' obligations cover free legal defence to Mexicans in American courts (Lares 2000).

Talking on domestic policy to stop immigration and bring back home those talents and experts abroad to rebuild Mexico. He promised he would spend an extra 3 per cent GDP on education, implement *progresas* programme reasonably for the benefit of poor families. He said he would give more autonomy to states and municipalities and allow mayors and legislators to contest election for consecutive term. He also promised that he would cleanup PRI's centralised policy of police and judiciary through reform (Migration News 2000). Fox also said that he would streamline the subsidy system and motivate some farmers to shift to more productive crops or other jobs (The Economist 2000: 46).

Francisco Labastida, the candidate of PRI, argued if elected he would aim at job generation in region with high out migration to reduce potential migrants who were compelled to leave their families in search of well-paid jobs (Migration News 2000). He added that job



creation was the only way to reduce illegal immigration: “The real solution will come when Mexico’s economy grows at a faster pace and create more jobs with better wages in Mexico...If the economy grows at a six per cent annual rate, and we can create 1.25 million jobs a year, and these jobs pay about five points above inflation, then we could see a significant reduction in the immigration of Mexicans to the US. That would benefit not only US, but Mexico, because, right now, we are losing our greatest asset, the Mexican people” (Migration News 2000a). At the same time, he declared if elected he could arrange new *Bracero* Programme or enhances NAFTA to cover the programme so that Mexicans can work legally in the US (Migration News 2000a). For domestic, he said creating jobs, reforming education—lengthening the school day, providing lunch at school and promised to give an extra 1.5 per cent of GDP for educational development (The Economist 2000a: 37). In short, his priority was creating jobs, reforming education and reducing crime. He also promised that he would address rural poverty by doubling existing aids to poor farmers and peasants (The Economist 2000: 46).

Cardenas, the founder of PRD and former mayor of Mexico City, said about 12 million Mexican illegal immigrants are residing in the US and added that it would not be possible to bring all of them home. He argues that “Mexicans immigrate to US, in a way, they are forced to leave, because there are no opportunities, there are no possibilities of working, of staying with their families, of improving the living standards of themselves and their families” (Burbach 2012). The factor that forced Mexicans to immigrate, according to him, was NAFTA as it threw out Mexican industrial and agricultural goods out of markets; this meant many workers lost their jobs and livelihood (Burbach 2012). In this regard, he argues his party first and last duty is to defend the rights of Mexican immigrants; provide them all the assistance the party could; and promote their interest and welfare as well. He also promised that the party would help their attempts to keep alive their Mexican identity (Migration News 2000).

The result of 2000 presidential election broke seven decades of PRI rule and Fox, the PAN candidate, won that election. His victory, however, occurred in an institutional vacancy as no party seize majority in the Congress. In Mexico, for seven decades, the executive and legislative had worked as single branch, but after 2000 presidential election, both branches had to work according to constitution. Almost every proposal (bill) would require two-third majority

in the Congress to become law. However, this new power structure would not sacrifice diasporic policies and programmes at the altar of party politics.

### *Fox's Relations with the Congress*

There were lot of explanations on why and who voted for Fox to power in 2000 presidential election. Fox promised that he would work for naturalisation of millions of Mexican illegal immigrants, the rights to vote from abroad and open border between US and Mexico, where Mexicans would be free to go to the US to seek jobs (Goering 2001). According to Smith (2007: 8), when PRI totally rejected the absentee voting right, Fox grabbed more opportunity as many immigrants and immigrant organisations were supported and voted him to power. Therefore, Vicente Fox presidency was unexpected; however, it marked many things in Mexico. First, it ended one party dominant system<sup>25</sup>. Second, it marked the beginning of competitive politics<sup>26</sup> in Mexico. Third, it makes Mexico an open society. Fourth, Mexico granted absentee voting right to its diasporas on June 28, 2005 (Castaneda 2006: 122).


Fox administration institutionalised relations with diasporas through establishment of diasporic institutions and extraterritorial bureaucracies that promote their rights and interests within and beyond Mexico. However, on many issues, he could not fulfil all his promises because he was agonising with various parties in the Congress, Mexico's conventionally strong presidential power had gradually broken and power moved towards the legislature. The majority of seats in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate (see figure 2.1 below) were captured by opposition parties. Accordingly, Fox inherited a decisively weaker presidency in relations to legislature than Mexico had ever witnessed. Therefore, executive-legislative deadlock was high during his tenure (Yu 2007: 152).

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<sup>25</sup> The PRI, which ruled Mexico from 1929 to 2000, was founded by its main leader Plutarco Calles. The goal of the party was to overcome the military factionalism, which divided Mexico into two, and unite a heterogeneous revolutionary family. Its objectives were achieved by Cardenas, who unite the peasants, workers, middle class and soldiers with the party and ruled Mexico for 71 years (Rincon 2009: 394).

<sup>26</sup> Levy et al (2006: 87) argued 2000 presidential election created more solid condition for competitive politics. Mexico witnessed the participation of business, labour, peasants, indigenous and civil society in political arena. The media are more critical, which increased the public debate and dialogue on important issues. All major political parties face competition in all regions; electoral reform placed equal conditions for them; and protect against fraud.

The executive-legislative impasse was especially obvious in congressional defiance to Fox's three most significant legislative proposals: a tax reform, electricity and Indigenous Rights (it was Fox's promised during his campaign to enact but passed after massively revised) (Yu 2007: 152). The growing conflict between president and Congress in these particular bills and in various legislative processes brought new political challenges for divided government.<sup>27</sup> In divided government, executive, legislators and party relationship in Congress are the major actors involving in legislative processes and party mutual actions (Sinclair 1992: 666).



Source: CIA 2016

In Mexico, for seven decades, the PRI controlled both national and local politics; the party and state stayed intertwined and indivisible. As such, executive-legislative relationship in Mexico between 1929 and 1997 was typified by dictatorial presidency and a very weak Congress (Yu 2007: 157). President controls the whole process of decision-making and country's main decision-making and implementation technique. Therefore, divided government between 1929 and 1997, almost all presidential proposals were approved. The approval rate of presidential

<sup>27</sup> Divided government implies the chief executive's party can in no manner form majority to lead the legislative branch of government. Its study focuses on the separation of powers in government. In Mexico, divided government started in 1997, with the president facing congressional majority from other parties (Weintraub 2010: 99).

legislative bills decreased since the emergence of divided government in Mexico in 1997 (see table 2.1 and 2.2 below).

**Table 2.1: Annual Proposal and Bills Approved in Senate, 1997-2005**

<b>Legislative year</b>	<b>No. of Bills</b>	<b>No. of approved</b>	<b>Report approved</b>	<b>Percent approved</b>
1997-1998	101	71	69	70.3
1998-1999	130	91	89	70
1999-2000	158	124	117	78.5
2000-2001	134	67	67	50
2001-2002	282	101	95	35.8
2002-2003	311	174	161	55.9
2003-2004	313	150	131	47.9
2004-2005	432	213	193	49.3

*Source: Weldon 2006: 28*

**Table 2.2: Annual proposal and Bills Approved in Chamber of Deputies, 1997-2005**


<b>Legislative year</b>	<b>No. of Bills</b>	<b>No. of approved</b>	<b>Report approved</b>	<b>Percent approved</b>
1997-1998	161	33	28	20.5
1998-1999	285	96	64	33.7
1999-2000	261	87	70	33.3
2000-2001	207	54	41	26.1
2001-2002	495	102	71	20.6
2002-2003	625	199	109	31.8
2003-2004	624	148	83	23.7
2004-2005	1279	301	172	23.5

*Source: Weldon, 2006: 29*

The tables above show that the number of presidential bills approved decreased yearly, which reveals stalemate in the tie-up between Fox and Congress. However, on the legislative proposals introduced by the president, it is important to comment that a good number of bills

were approved under Fox's presidency. In the 58<sup>th</sup> and 59<sup>th</sup> legislative sessions, the upper as well as lower houses were very active. Additionally, 301 proposals were approved by the Chamber of Deputies between 2004 and 2005. However, most deadlock legislations were on the rights to vote from abroad, which PRI totally opposed to. In such state of affair, Fox often jumped to the public through media to popularise his idea or agenda. This, in turn, forced immigrants' organisations and public to mobilise the issue at the state and local politics, and also through political parties and other avenues (Smith 2007: 7). Therefore, Fox got support from immigrant rights advocates, immigrants' organisations and PRD, and approved absentee voting on 28 June, 2005 (Castaneda 2006: 122). Therefore, some scholars argued that there was no deadlock, while other contended that absence of deadlock happens only on noncontroversial legislation (Yu 2007: 167).

In addition to institutional reviews, Fox weakened his relationship with the Congress and was not able to impel forward his major proposals. The limited representation of PAN in his government was a role the very independent nature of his presidential campaign, which was functionally based on his personal status rather than on party organisation and regulation. In fact, in his fifty-two cabinet post, he chose qualified team regardless of party affiliations and took only four PAN members. This signifies he discarded his administration as an instrument of PAN patronage (Shirk 2005: 189). Moreover, the PRI forbade high-profile party members to accept cabinet posts in his administration and PRD did the same to its party members. Consequently, most of his cabinet members hailed from his campaign team (Yu 2007: 172). As such, PAN members were remarkably under-represented his cabinet posts, accounted only 19 per cent (see figure 2.2). Political commentators pointed out that Fox had all the characteristics to be an outstanding leader but short of aptitude needed for ideal public administration (Shirk 2005: 201).



*Source: Shirk 2005: 204*

### ***Presidential Election 2006***

Campaign for July 2, 2006 presidential elections officially announced in January 2006 and the three leading presidential candidates immediately criticised American immigration policy. They denounced a bill approved by American House of Representatives to build 700 miles walls in California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas. To bring matter closer to 2006 presidential election, Fox declared Mexico needs a presidential candidate who can bring home an immigration agreement with US (Weissert 2006). As such, presidential election was focusing on millions of Mexican diasporas, and promised to generate better opportunities in Mexico while fulminating against American immigration policy. Again, as per the 2005 absentee voting right bill, Mexican government declared that all Mexican diasporas could cast their vote through Mexican embassies from their respective host countries. Therefore, the campaign for the 2006 elections turned its special attention to Mexicans abroad. There were five candidates contested for the office: Felipe Calderon, Manuel Lopez Obrador and Roberto Madrazo were from major political parties, PAN, PRD and PRI respectively. The other two candidates were Patricia Mercado of Social-Democratic and Farmers Party (SDFP) and Roberto Campa of the New Alliance, which defected from the PRI. All the candidates have rendered the same promises: to generate more jobs, to wipe out corruption and to sign immigration pact with the US (Murphy 2006). Nevertheless, the strategy they employed to deal with all these issues were different from

candidates to candidates, therefore, this section is going to deal mainly on candidates' policies towards Mexicans diasporas.

Calderon, a Harvard-trained economist, has been devoted to PAN since his youth. He was elected to the Chamber of Deputies twice (1991-1994 & 2000-2003), served as party president (1996-1999) and Energy Minister (2003-2004). Winning the party nomination, he surprised many, as many observers foresee that former Interior Minister Santiago Creel would be the PAN's candidate for presidential election. Though, he was comparatively unknown to electorate till 2005, by June 2005 polls revealed he was well-matched with Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (Cook 2006: 3).

He used, "Felipe Calderon: Jobs President", as his or party campaign slogan and argued that Mexico's fundamental problem was a deficiency of well-paid jobs, which compelled many well-educated and skilled workers to immigrate to the US. He emphasised that investment and competitiveness were solutions for economic growth and job generation (Murphy 2006). To fulfill the above arguments, he promised to create appropriate investment policy by engaging sound macro-economic policies, healthy and sustainable budgets and social investment; reinforcing the rule of law; and establishing funds to support social investment in times of economic crises. He expressed and supported the development of NAFTA similar to European Union model where poor economic nations are funded by the EU and argued that Mexico could create more and well-paid jobs funded by NAFTA to reduce immigration (Cook 2006: 3). He promised to build new oil refineries, increase health care, establish migration agreement with the US and create more educational facilities for the poor. He argued that his administration would be transparent; to be, he further argues PAN would outline a complete plan to maintain corruption-free. He also pledged to promote the positive outcome of Fox's administration such as the growth of middle class and the homeownership (Murphy 2006).

He is the supporter of immigrants and promotes their rights and expressed his solidarity with Mexican diasporas, particularly those who are working in the US. He further argues that immigrants are not criminals but people who seek better living conditions, and also contribute to the American economy (Notimex 2006). He called on the US Congressmen to stop

“irrationality” of the Sensenbrenner bill,<sup>28</sup> which goes against the rights of immigrants. He said he supported Mexicans abroad especially in the US who are fighting for their rights. He also argued that immigration is not solved by fence, and joked that “we’ll jump over it anyway” (Wall 2006). To achieve all his promises to Mexicans abroad, he argued that he was a pro-NAFTA and wanted to expand it. He highlighted his vision that within two decades the whole North American region would develop into single free market for goods, services, investment and labours as well like European Union (Hing 2010: 52).

Manuel Lopez Obrador emerged as a talented young politician of PRI, but disappointed with the party’s incapability to bring about changes, he left the party in 1988 and associated with Cardenas, the founder of PRD. A year later, he was appointed party president of Tabasco in 1989 and promoted to national party president in 1996 and served till 1999. In 2000, with the support of PRD, he became chief magistrate of Mexico City and fulfilled his full term (Cook 2006: 4). As a mayor, he became popular in the Mexico City by furnishing financial allowances to single mother and the elderly; solved city traffic problems and transportation system (Murphy 2006). As a popular politician, many expected that he would comfortably win the 2006 presidential election (Cook 2006: 4).

His campaign slogan for 2006 election was “For the good of all, the poor first”. His campaign promises concentrated on reduction of poverty, job generation, indigenous rights and infrastructure investment. As argued earlier, based on his popularity and generosity he proposed policies such as providing a pension to all Mexicans who were above 70 years of age; preserving the rights and promoting the welfare of indigenous people; broadening access and improving the quality of education; maximising access to health care; formulating incentives for *maquila* owners to remain in Mexico; and constructing high speed rail lines (Cook 2006: 5). However, his pro-poor campaign distracted many upper and business communities, and considered as a misstep taken by him. Like other candidates, he also argues that immigration accord with the US would be the key component of his administration if elected.

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<sup>28</sup> This bill was approved in the House of Representative on December 16, 2005 but pending in the Senate. It sought to build wall in Mexico-US border; to verify the status of all foreign workers; and prohibits aid to illegal people; etc. If passed, it would further divide families, criminalize and drive undocumented workers deeper underground (Lopez 2007: 85).



He further argued that building a wall in Mexico-US border was not possible solution and promised to focus on generating good jobs to keep Mexicans at home (Murphy 2006). He said he resisted walls or any kind of stiff immigration policies in the US. PRD called upon American immigration authorities to remove all threats, arrests, apprehensions, raids and other abuses against illegal Mexican workers. The party expressed its solidarity with Mexican workers working in foreign countries; he said he would not only work but also pressurise the US to legalise all Mexican illegal immigrants; and seek a migratory agreement with the US (Wall 2006). He criticised Fox for not being able to oppose American immigration policy. He promised he would convert Mexican consulates in the US to proponent offices to safeguard Mexicans from maltreatment, discrimination and infringement of their human rights. He was against the NAFTA for allowing the entry of heavily subsidised American maize into Mexican market, which threw out most of the Mexican products (The Economist 2006). To provide equal opportunity under NAFTA, he argues NAFTA should be renegotiated; the new NAFTA would include economic development, security, labour and immigration. He believed that international trade agreements should contain strong labour protections, including fair wages and decent working conditions (Wall 2006).

Roberto Madrazo Pintado, PRI candidate, was also from Tabasco. He worked as a federal deputy (1976 and 1991-1993), served as senator (1991-1993), Governor of Tabasco (1994-2000) and party president (2002-2005). Despite his experiences within the party, opinion polls regularly put him in third place. As a result, many PRI leaders supported his opponents and asked their supporters to do the same. In reaction to this event, the PRI kicked out 28 leaders from party for supporting the opponents (Cook 2006: 5). Like other leftist leaders, he turned down “neo-liberal model” and exhorted greater social developments through regional lines. He has suggested a special grant for the development of poor southern states. He also promised to create nine million jobs in the coming six years and proposed special grants to low-income students (Murphy 2006).

In his campaign, he promised to generate more jobs, enrich security, encourage remittances to Mexico from its diasporas, overhaul energy sector by allowing private companies to operate joint ventures with PEMEX and enhance the number of middle class. He pledged to

invest more in agricultural sector; foster tourism in rustic areas; install more wind and solar power; permit private companies to invest in electrical sector; and eliminate inequality in indigenous communities (Cook 2006: 6). He also pledged to move public investment to infrastructure and public works and enriching connection between the export sector and domestic market. For public security, he said he would put federal police forces under a single authority and enhance the power and function of “preventive police” (Cook 2006: 6). On immigration, he pledged a robust and persistent protection of the rights of immigrants regardless of status. As such, he was also against the construction of wall in the US-Mexico border. To resolve immigration issue, he supported a migratory agreement with the US and proposed to create a cabinet sub-secretary to address the rights of migrants (Wall 2006).

Patricia Mercado, candidate of Social-Democratic and Farmer Party, highlights the influential inequality in society and suggests means and ways to overcome it. She promised, if elected, she would create policies for all social classes to advance their interests as well as dignity. Based on her gender, she supports abortion rights and publicly criticises Catholic Church for functioning against women (Murphy 2006). Roberto Campa, candidate of New Alliance, emphasises his campaign on improving all level of education, which would make Mexico to attain First World class. He condemned NAFTA for benefiting only a small section of society. Based on his ideology of pro-market, he argues that Americans need to realise and recognise the vital role Mexican workers contribute in its economy (Murphy 2006).

### ***Calderon Relationship with the Congress***

Calderon won 2006 Mexican presidential election, the PAN candidate, and took office on December 1, 2006. He was the second president to assume office after Mexico’s passage to democracy in 1997. His foreign policy prioritises national interest over policy doctrines; foster international trade, democracy and human rights; and active engage in international institutions like UN. At the same time, he prefers for close cooperation with the US (Starr 2006: 18). On immigration issue, he asserts the US has obligation to safeguard the human rights of Mexican immigrants in its territory (Starr 2006: 19).

However, to achieve his foreign as well as domestic policy, he needs his party members united behind him and also procuring support from oppositions. His party, the PAN holds only

206 out of 500 in the lower house of the Congress. The position is same in the Senate, where PAN won only 52 of 128 seats (see table 2.3 below). Again, the mid-term elections of Chamber of Deputies in 2009 reduced his party to 147 seats, and the Senate will continue with him till 2012. As such, his administration or his party PAN was not command in either house of Congress. To pass any bills, he must keep his party united as well as procure the favour of other parties (Lawson 2007: 7).

**Table 2.3 Initial distribution of seats in 60<sup>th</sup> Mexican Congress**

<b>Names of Party/Coalition</b>	<b>Chamber of Deputies</b>	<b>Senate</b>
PAN	206/147 in 2009	52
*General Welfare	157	36
**Alliance for Mexico	123	39
New Alliance Party (PANAL)	9	1
Social Democratic Peasant Alternative (Alternativa)	5	0
All Seats	500	128

*Source: Lawson, 2007: 7*

\* It is a coalition of Party of the Democratic Revolution, Democratic Convergence and Labour Party (PT).

\*\* It is a coalition of PRI and Green Ecologist Party of Mexico (PVEM).

Although Calderon had emphasised an inclination to reach agreements with the opposition, he declared that his government would be PANista. This statement proved he too would continue far closer to PAN than his predecessor, whose connection with the party was frequently strained. In spite of this partisan modus operandi, liaisons with the PAN have not been completely smooth. For example, at the time of cabinet selection, his party leaders resisted many promising nominees whose partisan credentials were deficient or doubtful. The second obstacle for him was procured support from opposition legislators, which in fact, accepted less problematic than foresaw. A huge number of bills had been approved by almost solid votes. The budget passed serenely in December 2006, instead of opposing, the opposition gave valuable ideas and

recommendations and the administration showed versatility to adapt them. His administration also approved pension bill on 28 March, 2007 with the help of PRI (Arai and Harrington 2007). This tendency did not mean that all was excellent: for example, the PRI and PRD in the Senate blocked bill—soft drink tax—arguing that the tax would make soft drinks more expensive and harm poor people (Randall 2007). On many occasions, opposite to general perception, PRD and its allies had mediated with legislators from other parties on urgent issues, tendered their suggestions and willingness to compromise. Specimens of such matters include legislation to validate and broaden salary cuts for high-level officials, legalisation of defamation, pension revision and stringent regulation of the predominately foreign owned banking sector. However, administration and PRD clashed on many significant topics like the deregulation of energy sector, political reform and tax policy. As such, to pass bills like those argued above and many other issues, PAN needed back up of PRI (Lawson 2007: 9).

However, when it came to immigration issues, all parties softened their stand and the Senate granted Calderon five-day State visit to New York, Chicago, Boston, Los Angeles and Sacramento with an aim to strengthen ties with Mexican diasporas in those states. This showed that all Mexican political parties were united on immigrants' issues, including the migratory agreement with the US. His tour to US in 2008 emphasised on strengthening the ties and deepens the engagement with Mexican communities. Simultaneously, to exert influence directly or indirectly on American policymakers to expand guest worker, more visas for Mexican citizens and legalisation of illegal Mexicans took place (Wall 2008).

### **Contribution Towards Democratisation**

This section will examine how diasporic issue furthered democratisation in Mexican domestic politics. Even though Mexico's 1917 constitution demanded a democratic government, democracy developed only in the late 1990s. For almost the whole of twentieth century, Mexico was governed by disciplinarian minded PRI and many terms have been applied to describe Mexico's political system. Some of the most widely used are: ultra-presidential, colossally presidential, authoritarian presidency, unequivocal monarchy and all-powerful presidency (Ugalde 2001: 116). The chief component of Mexican president played a double role as the head of ruling party as well as executive branch. According to law, the president could not hold office

more one term; however, several rules gave him additional powers. The president was able to dominate in the selection of governor, the senate, important positions in Congress and some mayors. Due to non re-election, president chose personally his/her replacement (Ugalde 2001: 117). On top of that, Mexico followed the principle of non-intervention in its foreign policy called 'Estrada doctrine'<sup>29</sup>, which prevent Mexico to interfere or bargain US when its diasporas face discrimination.

Mexican diasporas (Mexican Americans and immigrants) always opine on Mexico's governing technique. About 85 per cent Mexican diasporas who have green card in the US, 83 per cent of temporary workers and 86 per cent of Mexicans who live in Los Angeles said Mexican governments were unscrupulous and inefficient. In 1996 report, Mexican diasporas (citizens and non-citizens) in Texas and California worried about Mexico's administrative system. In Tejanos, 37 per cent presumed that the 1994 Mexico's elections were fallacious and unfair, and another 25 per cent alleged that 1994 elections were same as before. In California, 40 per cent reckoned that the 1994 elections were unreliable and unjust, while 18 per cent believed elections in Mexico were same as before (de la Garza 1998: 405). These reports on Mexican government, its foreign policy, its elections and problems shows that Mexican diasporas did not have positive opinion about Mexican government. More importantly, Mexican diasporas have no interest in domestic politics and are extremely doubt about Mexican government. However, democratisation in Mexico was one of the main wishes of its diasporas, which started in the 1990s; the democratisation process can be examined based on diasporic issues and engagement.

Salinas assumed presidential office at the time of debt crisis; to address this, he accepted Brady Plan in 1989 (Krugman 1994: 717). Beyond this, he attempted to complete restructuring system—privatisation and the liberalisation of trade, services and capital. To achieve his aim, he believed NAFTA would take Mexico to First World (Martinez-Diaz 2009: 48). To negotiate NAFTA, one thing he needs was maintaining a closer relation with Mexican diasporas, which led

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<sup>29</sup> Abizaïd Bucio (2004: 13) argued that Genaro Estrada Felix, Minister of External Affairs, developed a new policy in 1930, which later on came to be known as Estrada doctrine. According to it, Mexico should establish diplomatic relations with those countries, which were recognised by international community and not by particular government. Consequently, it discarded the use of recognition as an instrument to interfere in other countries internal affairs.

to two important meetings (Tijuana and Washington D.C.) in 1989, attended by prominent Mexican Americans as well as immigrants. At both meetings, Salinas emphasised the importance his administration attached to its relationship with Mexican Americans, stressing the value of a rapprochement for the construction of friendly relations with the US. The Mexican diaspora (Mexican Americans and immigrants) expressed that his government should institutionalise engagement with the creation of formal programme. Therefore, he established PCME on January 2, 1990 (Iskander 2010: 221). Here the Mexican Americans got an opportunity to influence the government.

Perez-Armendariz and Crow (2010: 120) argue diasporas were agents of democratic diffusion in their countries of origin. Diasporas assimilate features of democratic principles in their host country and transplant them in their home countries. It has done by three processes: a) bring new political values and policies when they return; b) remit information to individuals in their original country; and c) the imported news and information change the attitudes and beliefs of their communities. Such processes alter at least three political attitudes in home country: tolerance, contentment with democracy and valuation of government respect for rights; and three political conducts: individual political affair, participation in political organisations and protest. Diasporas also formed hometown association to make their situations better and help communities back home. Pfitze (2000: 7) argues hometown associations perform a significant role in altering political culture and home politics. Mexican hometown associations equip their members with democratic practices like electing their leaders, cooperatively establishing bylaws and course of actions and carry out charitable projects at home (Perez-Armendariz and Crow (2010: 122-123). Bakker and Smith (2003: 63) argue Mexican diasporas imported democratic values, attitudes and ideas in order to bring more democracy, less corruption and increase respect for civil and human rights in Mexican political system. They used their economic influence not for personal gain but to create spaces for popular political participation.

Although Salinas created PCME on January 2, 1990; his presidency can be categorised as denial stage. NAFTA does not include democracy clause in its original draft. In 1992, his administration voted against the Protocol of Washington, which authorises OAS to expel its member countries that dismissed representative democracy (Gosselin and Therien 1999: 179-

180). Earlier too, Mexico objected OAS intervention to restore democratic governments in Haiti, Peru and Guatemala, all in the name of non-interference in the domestic affairs of another country (Belanger and Mace 1999: 164-165). However, under the pressure of OAS, American Watch, diaspora and NGOs on human rights, Salinas created National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) on 6 June 1990 (Cleary 1997: 25). Nevertheless, his government refused both the American administration and Congress to scrutinise its democracy and human rights issues.

Shortly after that step, opposition forces, immigrant groups, human rights advocacy and NGOs in Mexico expressed the possibility of overseeing Mexico's presidential elections by outside observers. He rejected such observers and said that,

“Our democracy is sovereign. Yours is the universal ideal of self-government by means presentation based on a universal secret ballot. But one does not imitate or subordinate oneself to foreign criteria...our democracy has only one decisive judge: the Mexican people” (Chabat 1991: 13).

The PRI's political image was damaged by the armed rebellion in Chiapas on January 1, 1993, which coincided with NAFTA implementation. The armed insurgents Zapatistas called for democracy, human rights, equity and indigenous people rights over land. The EZLN openly accused Salinas's government as illegal and declared that their uprising was for political reforms in Mexico (Mazza 2001: 102). The EZLN showed a sophisticated knowledge to the international press and other transnational actors. It opened up room for domestic and foreign actors to democratise Mexican political system through electoral reforms (Castells 1997: 75-80). In responding to this, the government established a democratic pact called “Agreement for Peace, Justice and Democracy” in January 1994, which empowers Congress to “amend article 41 of the Constitution and 31 articles of COFIPE”. This reform allowed national NGOs, UN and international observers to participate in the coming elections (Dominguez 1999: 57). In addition to this, Salinas's administration also approved many electoral reforms laws: first, protection of minority parties' delegation in the legislature. Second, the IFE was given more power and function; established “check and balance” method between various political parties to supervise elections. Third, election process was made efficient and transparent; electoral register, voter lists and voter identification cards would be scrutinised by external agents. Fourth, it removed

presidential power to name the mayor of Mexico City and introduced popular election. Moreover, it also granted autonomy to the Bank of Mexico, hence reducing president's capacity to control monetary policy (Dresser 2003: 323).

The 1994 presidential election was monitored by governmental, inter-governmental and non-governmental observers and declared that it was relatively free from fraud. PRI's candidate Zedillo got 50 per cent of votes and assumed presidential office on December 1, 1994 (Cameron and Tomlin 2000: 215). International responses to the elections were very certain, while some condemnations came from Mexican diasporic organisations, NGOs and opposition. To win the confidence of general public, opposition and diasporas, he disengaged his party, often kept his word and entrust decisions to the Congress.

He introduced "National Political Agreement on Electoral Reform", all political parties accepted the proposal and eventually approved by Congress in 1996 (Dominguez 1999: 8). The agreement instituted the IFE as an autonomous institution. It also established that 25 per cent of senators would be reserved for proportional representation. Public funding of the political parties and the parties access to mass media was enhanced. Additionally, executive nominations for Supreme Court judges would be approved and sanctioned by two-third majority in the Senate (Dresser 2003: 323). These reforms brought massive change in the congressional elections, which were normally free and fair, hence reducing PRI's strength in Chamber of Deputies. This change brought EU and Mexico to sign three agreements on December 8, 1997 in Brussels (Cruz Miramontes 2003: 163; Sanahuja 2000: 52) and enhance Mexico's positive image to the world.

The opposition parties brought dual nationality issue as a part of political reforms to the Congress, which forced president Ernesto Zedillo to introduce dual national law on 3 December 1996, which subsequently amended article 30, 32 and 37 in the constitution (Castaneda 2006: 117). The Chamber of Deputies assented to it on December 10, 1996, the dual nationality amendment approved by vote 406-1 (Gutierrez 1997: 1006). In 1996 dual nationality debate the PRD Senator Porfirio Munoz Ledo demanded that legislation should allow all Mexicans who resided in the US irrespective of their status to exercise their franchise in 2000 presidential elections (Smith 2005: 112). The party's promotion of voting right is guided by the desire to empower disenfranchised group that are "citizens of nowhere" (Dresser 1993: 107). The PRD's



argument is “in favour of democracy for the right of all to vote and be voters, just like the advances in the past such as giving vote to youth and to women, now to Mexicans living abroad” (Schatz 2000: 90).

In 2000 presidential election, there were 860 observers from 57 countries (Dresser 2003: 321). After conducting an extremely competitive three elections since political reforms, Mexico has distinctly entered into an electoral democracy. To summarise, Mexico has a well-functioning of democratic government: fraud in elections has been reduced dramatically; campaigns were publicly financed; elections and vote-counting techniques are standardised; and votes transform into office in an impartial way. As such, political participation is now reached out to marginalised classes and a number of women in office are growing. In 2004, Amalia Garcia Medina was elected as the governor of Zacatecas and became the first woman governor in Mexico.

In December 2002, the Mexican Senate gave a green signal to establish OHCHR in Mexico. In the same year, Mexico established a freedom of information law and it entered into force in 2003. In June 2003, Fox also signed a bill that prohibited all forms of discrimination and set free 1537 prisoners. Similar to domestic reforms, Mexico’s foreign policy became more assertive on human rights. Jorge Castaneda, the Foreign Minister of Mexico, summed up the new foreign policy in Senate on 13<sup>th</sup> September 2001, Mexico’s main foreign policy goals:

- (1) to project democratic, pluralistic, transparent and safe image of Mexico;
- (2) to promote human rights and democratic values in harmony with UN Charters, and Mexico’s constitution;
- (3) to enhance country’s capacity to safeguard and protect the rights of its diasporas;
- (4) to participate actively in shaping twentieth-first century international system; and
- (5) to contribute equitable and suitable economic development for Mexico and the world (SRE 2001).

With his victory in free and fair 2000 election, Fox acquired democratic bonus, which gave Mexico’s foreign policy a new momentum in world politics. Fox’s international adviser, Adolfo Zinser asserts “Fox carries with him the strength of democracy as a new asset of Mexico” (The Economists 2000: 2). His administration depended on it to become an active actor in

international politics. Accordingly, the tenet of non-intervention has been destroyed by new activism. This new policy, what Wall (2002) calls Fox doctrine.

Mexico has a presidential form of government with separation of power. Even so, for almost the whole of twentieth century, Mexico was ruled by disciplinarian minded PRI, which brought all three branches of government under president. When democratic transition took place in 1997, all political parties are all richly endowed with resources, power and oratorical skill, but they have unable to create any basic unanimity with one another. The sharp divisions among them and their refusal to unite among them have put contemporary Mexican government in impasse since 1997 (Krause 2006: 1). Regardless of the condemnation that presidentialism under divided government could destroy democratisation, researches on contemporary Mexican government and its working system show Mexican legislators have ability to bridge in building policy coalitions for the benefit of their respect parties (Yu 2007: 177). Despite ideology differences, diasporic issues bring political parties together, for instance, PAN and PRD were working hand in hand in dual nationality bill in 1996, political reforms in 1999 and brought small parties (PT and PVEM) together on issue of vote abroad in 2005 (Castaneda 2006: 117-122). Thus, diasporic debates and issues are democratising Mexican politics.

The emergence of diasporic issues in domestic politics of Mexico reflected the growing number of Mexican-origin population in the US. Wall (2002) argued that there were about 23 million Mexican diasporas in the US are importance Mexico could not reject. They became an important instrument for Mexico to lobby American policymakers on the issues that will affect Mexico. They also formed an extra market to export and promote Mexican goods and were significant reservoir of foreign currency. On top of that, their contribution to Mexican economic, political, social and cultural was also an important factor as well. Maintaining special relations with them became one of the most important issues for every Mexican political party. Politicians and media in Mexico addressed them as hard workers, permanent cultural ambassadors, Mexico's gift to the world and national heroes. The history of Mexican diasporic policies and programmes that can be traced back to 1848, in the 1990s was marked the diversification and intensification of relationship with them. In 1990, Mexican government established PCME and it increased Mexico's cooperation and interactions with its diasporas.

Diasporas determine the political outcome of Mexico through its dual nationality law of 1998 (Fitzgerald 2006a: 278). The subject of immigration and diaspora is an important issue in Mexican politics. Any political, economic, social and cultural debate cannot escape diasporic agenda. Therefore, the debate about diaspora during the 1990s was based on how to strengthen ties with them. During the NAFTA negotiation, every political party framed their position to work in the interests of its diasporas. Debate on dual citizenship, for PRI, it meant transfer of responsibility of dealing with their own problems (Smith 2005: 112). Therefore, PRI rejected the right to vote from abroad. For PRD, dual nationality meant inclusion of all Mexicans abroad with full economic and political rights (Dresser 1993: 107).

The sharp division based on party line on the issue of right to vote abroad serves as the key issue in 2000 presidential election campaigns. Both PRI and PRD with leftist oriented ideology lead the PAN to win both the elections in 2000 and 2006. Yet, PAN did not enjoy majority in Chamber of Deputies and Senate, hangs most of the diaspora-related bill in the Congress, especially with PRI. However, Fox's policy of going to public through media to popularise his idea or agenda brought immigrants' organisations, immigrant rights advocates and PRD on its side and consequently approved absentee voting on 28 June, 2005 (Castaneda 2006: 122). Calderon was also facing similar problem as Fox, however, his cunning strategies of using opposition parties in different methods proved healthy. When it came to immigration issues, all parties stand united and the Mexican Senate approved Calderon five-day visit to US in 2008. This proved Mexico's diasporic policy and programme did not sacrifice at the altar of party politics and instead contribute to the democratisation process. The next chapter will be dealing with co-developmental strategy employed by various governments towards diaspora.

## CHAPTER THREE

### DIASPORIC POLICY AND NEOLIBERAL MODEL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

For many years, the issue of diaspora was considered to be one of the most important problems, either as it was assumed to have emerged from development deficiency or drain of skilled workers. However, over the past decade, there had been a change in perception about diaspora from brain drain to ‘brain gain’<sup>30</sup> and from traitors to ‘national heroes’ (Delano 2011: 40). There was a greater acknowledgement among academics and policymakers that diasporas can subscribe to economic development and these advantages can be increased if policymakers have abilities to manipulate them effectively. Besides economic development in both sending and receiving countries, diaspora could also reduce poverty and encourage economic growth through various forms (IOM 2010a: 45). Diasporas have been variously defined as an active actor in development strategies,<sup>31</sup> poverty alleviation<sup>32</sup> and economic growth<sup>33</sup> of home country. Boyle and Kitchin (2014: 18) described diaspora as investors, brain circulation, extra market and donors<sup>34</sup> for home countries.

Remittances from diasporas have been increasingly recognised as a momentous source of external capital for their families as well as for the countries of origin. Many home countries receive remittances more than overseas development aids or foreign direct investment. In

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<sup>30</sup> Kurup’s concept of ‘brain gain’ is referred to migrant return especially those who learn certain skill and returning home, which will increase over all development. He argued that more and more educated and skilled diasporas are returning to their traditional homelands (Kurup 2005).

<sup>31</sup> Diaspora actively transfers new ideas, advertises home products in foreign markets, expands tourist industries through their frequent visits, exerts political influence and several other ways contributes for the development of home countries (Goethe and Hilman 2008: 197). For Mexico, it has have been a momentous factor for the smooth functioning of national economic and society since 1980s (Zamoro 2005: 84-85).

<sup>32</sup> Remittances from diaspora reduce poverty as it direct goes to poor households and are used mainly for basic needs. Such spending has multiple effects in the home community. In Mexico case, diaspora continue to support their families back home. In addition, HTAs have initiated collective remittances for hometown development projects. Mexican states are working to make these remittances to alleviate poverty (Newland and Patrick 2004: 11).

<sup>33</sup> Remittances are sources of direct investment in Mexico. Mexico receives \$2 billion per year, out of it, not less than \$84 million are invested for business purposes. In Guanajuato, remittances are invested in footwear workshops and in Michoacán, remittances are invested in cattle rearing, farming and manufactures. In addition, their visit to Mexico increases demand for goods and services are also a source of income generation (Durand et al. 1996: 426-427).

<sup>34</sup> Diasporas have been contributed to the well-being of their family members as well as their countries as donors through remittances and philanthropy. They have invested in capital markets and promote foreign direct investment in their home countries. They have been supporting public, private and community organisations to their enhance knowledge and acquire global command and controlling capacities (Boyle and Kitchin 2014: 22-27).

addition to this, a large number of diasporic associations have participated in development effort by their own enterprise, for instance, collective remittances invested in community development in their hometown. Diasporas are the key deciding factor for the growth of information technology in home countries. Diasporas are also a significant source of skilled labour or expertise for the countries of origin through return migration. The involvement of diasporas in home country's economic development has been summarised by Orozco and Wilson summarised as "Five Ts"—"tourism, telecommunications, trade, transportation and transmission of monetary remittances".<sup>35</sup>

Many countries have established ministries and departments to look after the diasporic welfare. Diasporas also have been both theme and participants in many international talks. The African Union organised its first African Global Diaspora Summit in 2012, which brought large number of African countries and African diasporic representatives from various places signed a official declaration to work together politically, socially and economically (Newland and Plaza 2013: 2). In 2013, International Organisation for Migration conducted its first international conference of diasporic ministers at which over 500 delegates from more than 30 countries attended the conference. Diasporic role in development has been the main theme of Global Forum on Migration and Development, and UN General's High-Level Dialogues on Migration and Development (Newland and Plaza 2013: 2).

The impact of diaspora on home countries' economic development has many dimensions. However, we are analysing only three important aspects here: trade, investment and transfer of skills and knowledge. There is an evidence of strong trade ties between countries of origin and settlement. Even though diasporas are far away from their countries, they still consume home products and advertise home products in host countries. That is why Gutierrez (1999: 546) described them as extra market to export home countries' products. A case study of Canada's trade link with many countries during the 1980 to 1992 revealed a 10 per cent increase in immigration, 1% increase in exports and a 3% increase in import from a particular country. For El Salvador, the diasporas' purchase traditional products account for 10% of total exports

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<sup>35</sup> Five Ts stand for tourism, trade, transportation, telecommunications and transmission of monetary remittances. In all these processes, diaspora plays an important part for the economic development of home countries. Diaspora increases trade between developed and developing countries. The transfer of remittances is increasingly important for the development of their countries and their integration into the global economy (Orozco and Wilson 2003: 382).

(Newland and Plaza 2013: 4). Due to the enormous presence of Mexican diaspora in the US, the US becomes the largest trading partner of Mexico, the largest source of foreign direct investment, Mexico becomes the third largest supplier of crude oil to the US, and Mexico becomes the most favourite trade partner (Global View 2004: 25).

In terms of investment, diasporas became investors in their countries of origin and induced others to do the same. Newland and Plaza (2013: 4) have argued that diasporas increase direct investment in their home countries and pave the way for investment. Boyle and Kitchin (2014: 22) also argued diasporas invest in capital markets and promote FDI in their countries of origin. China experienced rapid economic growth and became powerhouse of manufacture during 1990s and 2000s, FDI was the main cause for that growth, and out of these almost 70 per cent of foreign investment was from overseas Chinese (Black et al. 2009: 2). Engaging diasporas signify enhancing and exposing countries' reputation to outside world, which gives investors greater trust about the quality of labour and business condition (Newland and Plaza 2013: 5).

For many home countries, diaspora acts as a kitchen cabinet. They provide ideas and offer support to business sector to increase their knowledge and assist them to acquire global command and control capacity. Diasporic members can promote brain gain through return movements (Boyle and Kitchin 2014: 22-27). The return diasporas bring in new experiences, knowledge and even savings. The return of skilled diasporas back home and the establishment of networks foster exchange or circulation of knowledge and create human capital in the countries of origin. Diasporas can outline the best business opportunities for home country. Moreover, they serve as intermediaries between home country and foreign investor for business development in home country (Spear 2006: 15). Thus, they transfer skills and knowledge, which reverse the brain drain. The concept of reverse brain drain either through return or transfer of knowledge is supported by international organisations, such as International Organisation for Migration (IOM), World Bank, etc. The Mexican government created Mexican Research Retention and Repatriation Programme, also known as "Repatriation Programme" in 1991 under the auspices of National Council on Science and Technology (Conacyt), seek to retain human resources in science and technology (HRST) in Mexico. Repatriation Programme promotes return of Mexican scientists and invites to integrate them in higher education institutions and scientific research

centres in Mexico. It expatriated 1859 researchers between 1991 and 1999 mostly from US (Guerrero and Bolay 2005: 14).

In other economic aspects, it is all about tourism—collective or individual. They maintain close connection with their homelands and make efforts to visit homeland regularly. This visit generates income in home countries through their demands for various services (Guerrero and Bolay 2005: 12). On top of that, they often send financial, socio-cultural and political remittances. World Bank and IMF have declared the huge annual increase of diasporic remittances. Data from World Bank (2006: 81-88) revealed in 2005 remittances flow into developing countries was 1999 billion dollar and it overshadowed the official development assistance. However, most of the studies conducted by educational institutions or international organisations are concentrated on Latin America, China, India, etc. and its economic utility. In 2007, around US\$28 billion were officially registered in Mexico (Lopez 2009: 6). Besides this, a large number of diasporic associations or hometown associations became significant actors in their countries' development efforts through collective remittances to finance community projects. Indeed, in comparison with family and individual remittances, the amount is very small—less than 1% of all remittances. Mexico received 175.9 million pesos in 2004 and 221.9 million pesos in 2005 as collective remittance from HTAs. Collective remittances are completely invested in productive projects (Torres 2000: 58).

Spear (2006: 15) adds political and socio-cultural contribution of diaspora in home country. Perez-Armendariz and Crow (2010: 120) argue they were agents of democratic diffusion in their home countries. They assimilate features of democratic principles in their host country and transplant them in their home countries. Beyond this, diasporic groups have played a lobbying role and influenced the foreign policy of their host country in favour of their home country. Some may have never been to their countries of origin but contribute constructive political and economic support. As such, this attracts home country to collect data, to reach out to diasporic groups, to advocate dual citizenship and positively influence the images and perceptions of expatriates (Ionescu 2006: 8). The development of modern technology and transport systems has also paved the ways for increasing engagement between diaspora and home country.

In socio-cultural sphere, Spear (2006: 89) argues that majority of diaspora invests time and money to sustain their contacts with family members and friends. Diaspora preserves their original socio-cultural identities; they not only support but in many occasions, sponsor renowned artists, musicians and writers from their countries of origin to visit their host countries. Diasporic populations prefer to have home products and advertise the same in their host countries. As such, Gutierrez (1999: 546) and Boyle and Katchin (2014: 26) consider diasporas as extra market to export home products. They still observe their home countries' national holidays; value its national language, manner and customs; and seek to maintain their original identity and nationalism (de la Garza and Desipio 1998: 403).

Recent policy of home countries has shown change of perception about them and changes their expression from 'migrant' to 'diaspora'. While traditional perspectives considered migrants and refugees as traitors to motherland, the present perspectives see diaspora as momentous transnational actors. In short, diaspora foster the economic (remittances and investment), political (lobby in the host countries on issues that will hurt their home countries' interests [Dominguez and de Castro 2009: 197]) and social-culture (preserve and promote their original socio-cultural identity) of their home countries (Turner 2008: 3).

However, their (diaspora) contribution towards their countries of origin solely relies on three major factors: first, willingness as well as ability to help their homeland; second, favourable condition prevail in home countries to promote its economic development; and third, aspiration to contribute their knowledge for the welfare of its people. The favourable conditions in host as well as home country are, thus, a main driving force for diasporas to help their home country. Political opinions among diasporic groups towards home government also determine their willingness to contribute. Enmity to government programmes and policies may not reduce their willingness to send remittances to friends and family but it will affect their zeal to contribute political and economic capital to home government (Turner 2008: 15).

Therefore, diasporic contribution to economic, social, cultural and political development in homeland depends on home country's policy. IOM (2010a: 46) suggests ten core issues to sending countries, which needs to include in their diasporic policy: 1) normalising diaspora in development schemes; 2) create policy to increase the volume of remittance; 3) establish policy



to utilise remittance for development; 4) develop diasporic policy to pursue all diasporic populations; 5) promote policy to increase knowledge network between country and diasporas as well as between diasporic groups itself; 6) use return migrants and their knowledge for development; 7) create favourable conditions for migrants to return home; 8) establish policy to retain diasporic knowledge and skills; 9) develop honourable enlisting policies; and 10) establish capacity building policy.

### **Assertive Diasporic Policy**

Assertive diasporic engagement policy comes in many forms. However, most accepted form of engagement should furnish to the accomplishment of MDGs, particularly goal number 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 including, most directly, the transfer of remittances from diasporic members to their families and communities back home (Matsas 2009: 3). To realise the above mentioned goals, Matsas also outlined the “road map” for diaspora engagement policy which includes 1) discovering goals, 2) locating the diasporic site and skills, 3) establishing an atmosphere of trust between diasporic groups and governments, and 4) organising diaspora for active participation in sustainable development and MDGs (Matsas 2009: 4). In addition to this, Dade (2006: 37) argues that an effective diasporic policy should include the following measures: 1) strengthen diasporic ministry and consular services; 2) worthy policy to attract investment from diasporas; 3) dual nationality including the right to be elected; 4) prolongation of state services; and 5) symbolic politics that go beyond traditional consular services. In this section, we will explore each of these policies more closely to demonstrate that Mexico has an assertive policy towards its diasporas.

### ***Bureaucratic Reform***

Many countries introduced bureaucratic reforms to attract their diasporas for their economic development. In 1990, Mexico established General Directorate for Mexican Communities Abroad (DGMCA) to get diasporas’ support for NAFTA and to fulfil the long demand of its diasporic organisations and implemented the so called PCME. The main purposes of PCME were: to foster joint ventures and bridge between Mexicans and its diasporas; to accomplish new and better image of its diasporas in Mexico as well as Mexico in foreign countries; to help Mexican diasporas get their rights and dignity abroad; to promote diasporic associations enrich

its ability for adaptation and self-sufficiency; and to expose the contributions and achievement of Mexicans in Mexico and abroad to international community (Figueroa-Aramoni 1999: 540). In consistence with this policy, Mexico established more consular offices and extended consular services to immigrants in the US including protection and legal advices to immigrants (Chabat 1997: 37).

Vicente Fox after taking office in 2000, created Presidential Office for Mexicans Abroad (OPME) in the same year (Fitzgerald 2009: 59). It was his first official reform to maintain a close relation with Mexicans abroad. The official goals of the OPME were to pay attention to millions of Mexicans who were settling in the US regardless of their status. The prior concerns of OPME were to maintain constant flow of remittances; to encourage the establishment of Mexican business centres; to promote of Mexican products in the US; and to encourage its diasporas to invest in Mexico (Bayes and Gonzalez 2011: 17). The OPME differed from earlier policy, the PCME; it exposed more to public, more advertise and more power. Fox terminated OPME in 2002 and established National Council for Mexican Communities Abroad in June 2002 headed by him. It was a part of the Foreign Ministry and enhanced the power and functions of Mexican consular offices in the US. The protection of Mexicans abroad; the promotion Mexico's commercial, cultural and tourist; and the strengthening of ties between Mexico and its citizens abroad were the main function of the council (Salum 2004). He also created Institute for Mexicans Abroad (IME) in 2003. The aims of IME was to forward strategies, formulate policies and acquire proposals and suggestions from diasporic communities to improve their living standard and fulfil the guidelines follow approved by the National Council (Government of Mexico 2002).

### ***Investment Policy***

In addition to bureaucratic reforms, a host of other policies were harnessed towards diaspora to attract or channel remittances. The World Bank, the IMF and the Inter-American Development Bank were the most conspicuous multinational actors that promoted such policies. The World Bank, for instance, recommended four main policies on remittances: the monetary infrastructure encouraging remittances; the development effect of remittances including poverty reduction, building human capital and retaining skills from diasporas; collection of diasporic data to know

the source and destination of remittances flow; and a website circulate data on remittances (Newland and Patrick 2004: 24). Following the above recommendations of World Bank, Mexico started “2x1 programme” in 1992 under the presidency of Salinas; the idea was to match every dollar of the HTAs’ collective remittances with one dollar each from state and federal government. This programme continued under the Zedillo presidency (1994-2000), in 2000 the programme was further extended to municipalities and thus became “3x1” (Goldring 2002: 66). As mentioned above, the Mexican governments’ outreach programmes have encouraged the creation of hometown associations, which send collective remittances for community projects in Mexico (Fitzgerald 2007: 3).

When Fox came to power in 2000, 3x1 programme covered all states. The programme finances public works and community developments. The programme was significantly strengthened by Fox and new mechanisms are added to clear the way for approval of diasporic initiatives and to supervise project completion. This policy was extensively regarded as the best system of migration management (Latapi 2008: 18). His administration in 2001 negotiated banks and order transfers companies to lessen commissions and exchange rate. As a result, the international banks and Mexico-US agreement of 2002 ignited the service of the Automated Clearing House (ACH) mechanism for money transfers at a lower rate. This was also promoted by Mexican government through liberalisation of transfer market. Fox policy of reintroducing *matricula* consular also assisted, as it enabled illegal Mexican immigrants to open bank account and reduce their remittance fees. Moreover, Mexican consulates have frequently rendered information on cheaper and efficient transfer systems (Latapi 2008: 17). In the same vein, in 2004, Peruvian government passed a law called “Law of Migratory Incentives” to promote the return of Peruvians who have been living abroad for more than five years through providing fiscal and professional incentives. In 2008, another programme entitled “*Mi Vivienda*” or “My Dwelling” was passed, which encouraged diasporas to buy their own houses in Peru through their remittances. These two programmes were directed towards diasporas who have acquired work experience abroad to return home with their families and apply their professional and business skills at home (Stephenson 2008: 188-189).

### ***Dual Nationality***

As a diasporic policy, by 2000, ten Latin American countries had approved a certain form of dual citizenship. Not less than ten Caribbean basin countries also recognised dual nationality with an intention to retain diasporic resources back home. In Mexican case, due to the presence huge and productive diasporic population, all political parties accepted the proposal of dual nationality and amended articles 30, 32 and 37 of its constitution in December 1996. The amendment aims to retain their skills and knowledge even if they acquired citizenship in their host countries (Gutierrez 1997: 1009). The extension of dual nationality, in all aspects, meant Mexican diasporas could retain some of their rights such as economic, social and cultural rights; however, this amendment did not grant absentee voting right (Castaneda 2006: 113). In fact, in 1996, article 36 too amended, which allows absentee voting rights to all Mexicans abroad. However, the original article gives certain conditions for a citizen to exercise his/her voting right and one of them is “vote in popular elections at the corresponding electoral district”. It means diasporas can exercise their franchise only within the boundaries of their respective district. Again, the 1996 amendments happened just to normalise the long demand of its diasporas, especially those living in the US, and PRD, which was supported by PAN (Castaneda 2006: 116).

The above argument makes it clear that PRI was not interested in the issue, in mid-1990 reforms, the agenda of right to vote from abroad was taken up by PRD, PAN, PT and PVEM, however, PRI blocked the issue and the diasporic populations could not vote in 2000 presidential elections. As a result, Ricardo Monreal, the governor of Zacatecas and PRD leader, introduced absentee voting right bill in his state legislature that would allow diasporas to exercise their right to vote in state officials and proportional representation seats in his state legislature. As such, the demand continues to gain momentum, even PRI leaders in the Congress and some governors are acknowledging the importance of diaspora for nation. This has allowed for better communication between immigrant organisations, political parties, Congress and the presidency and finally passed the voting right bill on 28 June 2005 under the presidency of Fox (Castaneda 2006: 122).

### ***Consular Services***

Apart from granting dual nationality, there are several policies for migrant sending country to render various services to its nationals abroad. Mexican government would be providing several

services to its diasporas through various policies and programmes. In this direction, it established PCME in 1990 and IME in 2003 respectively for the welfare of its diaspora. PCME modifies consulates' activities after consultation with its citizens, including legal defence to the victims of human rights violations and to those who are under sentence of death (IOM 2003: 177). In 2000, Fox government established Mexican Capital Legal Assistance Programme (MCLAP) and intervened in many cases to protect the rights of Mexican nationals. Mexican consular officers also provided funds for expert and investigative assistance and assist in gathering evidence in preparation for the guilt and penalty phases of capital trails. In others, consular officers supported defendants' attempts to obtain more qualified counsels (Warren 2008).

PCME considers education as a means and ways to reach Mexican cultural identity to Mexicans abroad and promotes bilingual education, adult education and immigrant education in collaboration with Mexican Education Department (SEP) (Iskander 2010: 225). It perceives many vantages in bilingual education: 1) it gives greater capacity for learning and developments to individuals; 2) it helps to identify Spanish-speaking teacher for Mexican diasporic children, thereby consolidating his/her cultural roots; 3) it places individual with more opportunity; and 4) it preserves community values, especially mother tongue and knowledge of parental authority (Leiken 2000: 25). The PCME arranges the Teacher Exchange Programme between the two countries that required 450 Mexican and 50 American teachers to students who use Spanish and English as their second language in their respective country. The Mexican government also has immense and energetic programme of distributing Spanish textbooks in the US. Mexican government inscribed distribution of free textbooks as right and states, "the programme is intended to provide support materials for students in the US who speak only Spanish and help American students who are learning as a second language" (Leiken 2000: 27). Libraries, community centres and educational institutions, which offer Spanish as optional papers or serve Latino students or Spanish speaking students, are eligible to acquire free books from Mexico or its embassy. The IME follows most of the PCME programme and also introduces IME-BECAS scholarship for Mexican students study in various universities in the US (Notimex 2011). PAN introduces Border Health Week (BHW) in 2001 and later incorporated into IME programme and health stations or *Ventanillas de Salud* (VDS).

## *Symbolic Policy*

In addition to the above discussed policies, many migrant sending countries have carried out various symbolic policies with an aim to reinforce their cultural identity among its diasporas and give them a sense of belonging to home country. These policies, in all aspects, are aiming to promote national culture among diasporas. Such policies cover such as contests, festivals, sport events and knowledge of home countries' history that aimed at second generation. In the same way, PCME promotes Mexican culture among its diasporas to reassert its identity and inject its national celebrations. It works with Mexican consulates, NGOs and Mexican cultural centres and organises various events such as seminars, concerts, exhibitions, etc. In 1997, it launches children drawing competition for diasporic children who are between 7 and 13 years old. It organises "photographic exhibition" in California known as "Mexican Faces in California" it projected its diasporas as "Americanised...but with clear links to Mexican culture" (Leiken 2000: 29). It was organised on the day Mexico awarded its highest honour, "The Mexican Order of the Aztec Eagle" to its diasporas: Gloria Molina, Los Angeles County Supervisor; Henry Cisneros, one of the senior most and excellent politicians of its diasporas; and Raul Yzaguirre, the president of NCLR (Leiken 2000: 28).

The PCME used sports as a means to reach the family and further community organisation. As such, it organises various sports for its diasporas in collaboration with National Sports Commission (CONADE) in Mexico as well as in the US. The events include soccer, basketball and baseball championships that brought more than 20,000 Mexican and its diasporic players in the US (Figuroa-Aramoni 1999: 539). Mexico also facilitates the participation of its diasporas to three (3) Youth Olympics in Mexico, which brought 399 diasporic athletes from twenty-two American cities (Leiken 2000: 28). Such events create space and time for Mexican and its diaspora to share and learn about their differences and similarities and thus strengthen their ties (Figuroa-Aramoni 1999: 540). Thus, symbolic policy promotes others policies and reinforces diaspora to actively participate in the development of their home countries.

## **Neoliberal Model of Economic Development**

Neoliberalism is a new phenomenon, recorded usage of the term traces back to nineteenth century. In the twentieth century, however, its popularity has been sparked off with the formation

of conservative governments in US and in various Western European countries, the quest for stabilisation of economic growth in Latin American countries, and the breakdown of socialism in Eastern European countries and Soviet Union as well as their policies towards market economies (Campbell and Pederson 2001: 1). Neoliberalism is a theory of political economy that argues emancipating entrepreneur freedoms from state is the best way to develop human welfare (Harvey 2005: 2). As such, it argues that the primary function of state or government is to establish and maintain policies and conditions suitable for individual freedoms. The military and legal framework of the state is to safeguard individual property rights and to certify the proper functioning of market (Harvey 2005: 2). It challenges Keynesian welfarism and render the theoretical momentum for deregulation and privatisation (Larner 2000: 7).

In this context, neoliberalism can be defined in four different ways: as a policy, as an ideology, as governmentality, and as a state form. Neoliberalism as a policy signifies transfer of ownership and control from public to private sector by way of privatisation, deregulation and liberalisation. It holds freedom of market, public choice, competition and effective management as the main reason for policy change (England and Ward 2007: 11). Neoliberalism as an ideology refers to the places and people behind its origin, which are geographically discrete but socially connected. This network builds its political dominance through class-based alliance, which produces and circulates a rational programme of ideas and images about the world (England and Ward 2007: 11). Neoliberalism as a governmentality means remodeling the role of public by governance strategies. Its strategies aim to construct individual responsible for their own needs with minimal state interference (Larner 2000: 13). Neoliberalism as a state form means reducing the role of state in governance, which Larner (2000: 5) described it as “citizenship regime”.

Neoliberalism is the latest version of global capitalism. Its transition in world economy is intimately linked with globalisation, and to some extent, it becomes new modalities of imperialism. As such, neoliberal model of economic development argues that developing countries linkage with developed countries is the key to economic development of the former. In such linkage, developed countries would transfer capital investments, technology and skilled human resources through free trade relations with the developing nations. According to this

approach, domestic structures in Third World countries act as an impediment for proper economic growth and thus need to have rational measure through structural adjustment programmes. The neoliberal model maintains that foreign capital penetration accompanied by economic restructuring would lead to economic growth (Iheduru 1999: 60). Therefore, trade liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation are the central components of neoliberal economic recommendations for maximising growth and productivity in developing countries. Beyond this, the fundamental arguments of neoliberal philosophy is “efficiency and transparency led by markets are better than inefficiency and opaque systems led by government”. Based on this assumption, it argues that state own enterprises should be privatised and deregulated social and economic activities in developing and developed nations. As such, WTO, World Bank and IMF support neoliberal model of economic development.

To address the 1980s economic problems: decline of earning from export and domestic investment, developing countries began to institute neoliberal reforms (Knight 2001: 29). One of the significant reforms undertaken by them included changing from a protection-based national system of economic organisation to a market-based system, together with lowering or, in some cases, withdrawing the national productions already in place. Moreover, the developing countries made attempt to guarantee short term success by devaluing currency, reducing price controls, grants (subsidies) and several worker protection schemes. These new policies had significant consequences on their respective economies. Some of the long term policies adopted by developing countries, according to Knight, are the institutional set up of a market economy had to be instituted or strengthened or both if needed. This included pull down of inflexible procedures of state, the deregulation of trade and foreign investments, the improvement of national market infrastructure and the reduction of the dominion and potency of private associations (Knight 2001: 30).

The practical application of neoliberal policy has been inextricably linked to the interests of transnational monopoly capital. The debt crisis of the early 1980s reduced not only in a “lost decade” for Latin America as it was termed by the ECLAC but also to a position the region lost any prospect to negotiate with developed countries. Under such situations the US, the international financial institutions and the rightwing think-tanks put their neoliberal economic



policies through Washington Consensus<sup>36</sup> (Lara and Lopez 2007: 19). The Washington Consensus exerted tremendous influence in modeling neoliberal policies in Latin America. It identified ten aspects of political economic reforms for the debtor countries so as to cement four basic components—(1) liberalisation of economy which can allow privatisation to occur; (2) severe curb wages; (3) opening up the economy to foreign investments and deregulation of the flows of commodities and capital; and (4) prioritisation of the concerns of financial capital (Lara and Lopez 2007: 19). On top of that, the IMF and World Bank in the 1980s linked loan guarantees for heavily borrowing countries to structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), authorised that loan receiving countries reorganise their economies based on neoliberal code of conducts. These included giving more importance on production for export rather than on fulfilling the needs of domestic and local market; strict spending cuts, especially on social programmes; broad privatisation measures; lessened regulation on the business of transnational corporation; and a considerable currency devaluations (Steger and Roy 2010: 98).

To address the debt crisis of 1980s, most of the Latin American countries initiated economic reform based on neoliberal model of economic development in the 1980s and 1990s, except for Chile which began in 1970s. Argentina<sup>37</sup> initiated reforms in 1989, Chile in 1973 (Ffrench-Davis 2002: 53), Mexico in 1982 (McKinniss and Nattela 1994: 28), and Brazil in the 1990s (OECD 2008: 11). As such, Hojman (1994: 191) argues that neoliberalism turned out to be the most influential in Latin America, particularly in the 1990s, largely because of debt crisis, large presence of highly educated technocrats, the emergence of new middle class entrepreneurs, the failure of ISI and public support.

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<sup>36</sup> Washington Consensus refers to ten policy prescriptions designed by economist John Williamson. It is a direction for all nations, which need assistance from international financial institutions like World Bank and IMF. The ten policy prescriptions of Washington Consensus included fiscal control; strict spending cuts on social programmes; tax revision; liberalisation financial capital; competitive exchange values; trade deregulation, liberalise FDI; privatisation of public sector; liberalisation and protection of private property rights (Lara and Lopez 2007: 19).

<sup>37</sup> Political instable, economic stagnated, high inflation and collapsed of state intervention forced Argentina to reform its economy in 1989. In the first phase (July-December 1989), the so called “BB” plan was introduced to stabilise economy, control inflation and improve fiscal accounts (Balze 1995: 65). In the second phase (December 1989-January 1991), the reform abolished all price control and total liberalisation of the currency exchange market. In the third phase, (January 1991-October 1994) devalued its currency, inflationary index was prohibited and use of US dollars was authorised as an accounting and transaction currency in the domestic economy. At the same time, it launched tax reform and reduced government expenditure.

However, neoliberal reforms came along with increased inequality and poverty mainly because of the termination of welfare state. Under ISI policy or protected economy, the state maintained and regulated the market and state is responsible for the welfare of citizens (Kurtz 2004: 269). Munch (1994: 92) argues that when neoliberal economic introduced in Latin America, the privatising and deregulating process remove the role of state to control the lives of its citizens. Therefore, the consequences of neoliberal policies are hurting many residents in the region. Income disparity has increased in most of the countries that implemented or followed the instructions of international financial institutions (Bay 1999: 68). Job losses and unemployment rates increased in the region mainly due to the liberalisation public sector and reduced the scope of public service (Kurtz 2004: 269). The withdrawal of subsidies on essential items like fuel, food and social services has suddenly raised the price of commodities (Crisp and Kelly 1999: 542).

### **Neoliberal Model of Economic Development in Mexico**

The evolution of economic liberalisation has rooted in the economic theory of free trade formulated by David Ricardo.<sup>38</sup> Policymakers of neoliberal policies asserted that a flourish in international trade brings forth greater economic development and the opening of trade barriers create profits for all countries. Based on this argument to overcome the debt crisis of 1983 (Roberts 2001: 4), Mexico began a process of economic transformation from protective trade policy and inward looking to free market policy. All restrictive laws on foreign investment were amended and reduced to attract more outside capitals and trade policy was also liberalised. Liberalisation on products also started in the 1980s with the removal of price controls together with agriculture and deregulation attempts in transportation and communication, in this manner trade barriers were modified to international standard. This process was strengthened by joining the GATT in 1986, and from 1986 to 1990 Mexico's policy was pointed to lessen the inflation rate. However, the major step towards economic liberalisation in the 1990s was the NAFTA (Alicia 2010: 142).

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<sup>38</sup> The economic theory of free trade formulated by Ricardo is commonly known as comparative advantage. The theory argues that in free trade all collaborative states profit from it, even if their economy might be different among them in term of commodities, competitiveness, infrastructure and development and even if state unilaterally opens their markets (Alicia 2010: 142).

During the early 1940s, Mexico experienced a tremendous economic growth and prosperity and this trend continued for more than three decades with growth rate of above six (6) per cent annually. During this period, Mexico followed inward-looking development path leading to rapid industrialisation, particularly, in the 1950s and 1960s (Lustig 1998: 14). These growth helped PRI to solidify its rule, which controlled domestic politics since 1929. The strategies of this progressive development were called '*desarrollistas* (Developmentalists)'. Mexico's magnificent industrialisation policy followed ISI policy; both foreign domestic companies operating in Mexico had acquired productive capacity to benefit ISI market strategy (Dedrick et al. 2001: 3). The rapid industrial development was accompanied by urban growth. As such, employment spontaneously shifted from agriculture to the service and industrial sector. The service sector became the cushion sector where surplus urban labour found a livelihood (Lustig 1998: 15).

However, Mexico's good economic performance started declining in the mid-1970s as ISI opportunities grew weakened as well as Mexico experienced the consequences of global economic crisis. Mexico discovered huge oil reserves in the mid-1970s transformed its economic growth suddenly. During this period, especially in 1976, its GDP grew above 8 per cent annually as oil export escalated. During the late 1970s, the government took huge loan to expand production as well as to invest in unproductive sectors. Unfortunately, global oil price declined in 1981 and international interest rates soared up and consequently its foreign debt rose dramatically. Its trade deficit increased and foreign investors withdrew their capitals from Mexico. The economic condition became serious in 1982 and the government carried out extreme policies to safeguard its diminishing foreign capitals, such as nationalised banks; control foreign exchange rate; suspension of payment of principal amount on international loan; and devaluation of peso (Dedrick et al. 2001: 3).

Mexico suffered an extreme shortage of capital, to overcome this, in 1983, the government re-privatised commercial banks. In 1984, it liberalised its economy and lowered its tax grade and number of tax grades. In 1986, it joined GATT, accepting to a plan of further relaxation, privatisation and deregulation. Carlos Salinas became president in 1988 further

quicken the ongoing economic reform and in 1989 he started debt negotiation to end economic crisis. Thus, Mexico obtained a debt restructuring agreement under Brady Plan (Unal 1992: 2).

The economic reforms introduced by Salinas were sudden. His reforms included tax reforms and huge cut in public spending in order to moderate financial deficit. Almost all significant state undertakings were denationalised, including *Telefonos de Mexico* (TelMex), mining, airlines, sugar refineries and various manufacturing companies. National banks were denationalised and foreign ownership in various sectors were liberalised. A new Foreign Investment Law and Foreign Trade Law were enacted in 1993, which withdraws almost all restrictions to foreign investment and trade barriers were lowered respectively (Dedrick et al. 2001). These changes or reforms restore the investors' confidence in its economy and FDI began to grow. Raising prices was dealt with successfully and competently and accordingly its economy began to flourish again (Kenneth and Palacios 2001: 4).

In the early 1990s, Mexico negotiated free trade with Chile and at the same time with US and Canada. Admittedly, Mexico signed the Economic Complementation Agreement with Chile in 1992, which was basically a FTA (Roberts 2001: 8). Mexico also signed NAFTA with US and Canada in 1992, which attracts more foreign investment into it. NAFTA has further pushed Mexico to liberalise its economy. Agrarian sector has been slowly liberalised and is scheduled to be fully deregularised by 2010. Investment and trade reforms in 1993 demonstrated that trade reforms and diversification would attract foreign investment easily into country. With that calculation, Mexico joined OECD in 1994 and WTO in 1995 (Roberts 2001: 9). Following the footstep of Salinas, the Zedillo administration (1994-2000) tried to diversify economic links by engaging free trade agreement with many countries. As of 2010, Mexico had signed as many as 10 (ten) FTAs with almost 31 countries (for detail see table 3.1 below), allowing its export industry access to more than 860 million consumers in the world (Roberts 2001: 10).

**Table 3.1 Mexico's Free Trade Agreements**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Countries/Organisations</b>
1986	GATT
1992 (FTA)	Chile
1993	APEC

1994	NAFTA and OECD
1995 (FTA)	Colombia, Venezuela, Bolivia and Costa Rica
1998 (FTA)	Nicaragua
2000	Israel and European Union (EU)
2001	Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador

*Source: Roberts, 2001: 10*

There are many reasons to justify why Mexico liberalised and diversified its trade that began in 1983. It can be categorised into many parts, however, here we are focusing only on internal and external reasons. The internal reasons that convinced Mexico to liberalise its trade and signed trade agreements with various countries were evolved from the downfall of import-substitution policy and the economic liberalisation in 1984 demonstrated productive in creating jobs and expansion of export industry. Also economic theory revealed that open economies, in many ways, encourage entrepreneurs to increase their productions and decrease their marginal revenues, which successively transforms into lower prices for clients and a better income distribution (Roberts 2001: 11).

The import-substitution policy enforced a number of tariffs, licenses and direct subsidies to boost its industrialisation and development. Nonetheless, this policy deformed the positive image of economy in the early 1980s and brought a huge fiscal deficit. These deformations were occurred mainly due to huge subsidies given to some industries, including the transportation, energy and most significantly, the credit industry. Moreover, the state granted fiscal extensions to private and state enterprises, assets devalued at a faster rate, regulated price on food items, which kept on to sustain the low minimal salaries. International investors grew uneasy of these practices and capital necessary to maintain growth disappeared. As such, under import-substitution model of economic development, it had very few options to maintain a balanced economy and create new jobs (Roberts 2001: 12).

In addition to adverse impacts of import-substitution model of development, there was an economic sector that demonstrated free trade actually promotes economic growth and generate new jobs in the country. *Maquiladora* industry proved that free trade could create economy growth. It generates new jobs and retains foreign capital (Roberts 2001: 12). Its growth rate was

ahead of the country. There were 50 *maquiladora* plants in 1965 and it increased to 2000 in 1992; within this period, it generated 10 per cent of jobs whereas the national average was 2 per cent. The major reason was the rest of the country's economy was almost closed and the *maquiladora* plant had been managed and ran under liberalised system since its inception in 1965. With an objective of generating one million new jobs to maintain the growing population, Salinas introduced extensive reforms to promote economic competitiveness and growth. The reform programme privatised almost all state companies except Pemex. The successful experience of *maquiladora* plant and the growth of an export industry under trade liberalisation proved that free trade was the best option for creating an active export industry and generating new jobs for its growing population (Roberts 2001: 13).

Salinas signed trade agreements with many countries in order to fulfil his reform or modernisation programme. Also, Mexico's trade policies are intimately framed to attract foreign investment, it decided to formalise its commitments to economic reforms and liberalisation through a durable structure of trade and investment rules included multilateral and preferential agreements. Such reform programmes were needed in order to stabilise its economy (Roberts 2001: 13). In this regard, Gruber (2000: 128) argues free trade was an instrument to mitigate negative trade and to attract foreign direct investment. Completing the reforms and liberalisation process was one of the main goals of Zedillo. Many believed that 1994 crisis could decelerate the liberalisation process, but contrarily, the liberalisation process was escalated, which became a major strategy to recover 1994 crisis (Roberts (2001: 14). President Fox initiated NAFTA-Plus, which advocates that free trade would be enhanced by opening borders to the flow of labour across North America (Ugalde 2004: 115). At the same time, he also diversified Mexico's access to international markets and reduces its dependence on the American economy (Roberts 2001: 14). On free trade, Calderon followed the footsteps of Fox and argued in his election campaign, "in coming two decades, I envision the whole North American region as a single region with a free market, not just in goods, services and investment, but also a free labour market" (Hing 2010: 52).

The external reason, for Mexico, to involve in free trade with various countries is to take the benefit of globalisation. The globalisation of technology has reduced the cost of information,

telecommunication and transportation across borders and forced state to integrate its market in world market. There was a struggle among states to dominate or survive in this global market and this compelled countries to specialise in certain goods or activities in which they maintain a comparative advantage (Roberts 2001: 17). Another reason for Mexico to liberalise its trade is to attract outside capital and FDI. Also, to some extent, Mexico was influenced by World Bank and IMF to liberalise its economy. In many instances, World Bank and International Monetary Fund placed trade or economic liberalisation and the establishment of certain macroeconomic policies were the conditions for developing countries to lend money from them (Roberts 2001: 18).

The decade long experience of economic reform and integration with North America through NAFTA has altered its economy significantly. This process exposed Mexico to foreign competition, offering huge opportunities for certain people, while generating economic and social displacement for others. Trade liberalisation favours only business interests, who can easily form cross-border alliance, while workers experience complete financial, political and cultural constraints in forming cross-border alliances (Sanchez- Ancochea 2006: 177). As such, Cohen (2006: 116) argued that small farmers would face difficulties to compete with the American farmers and unless jobs are created for them, most of them would migrate to the US. The increasing migration to the US forces Mexico to establish assertive diasporic policies in the era of liberalisation.

### **Linkages between Diasporic Policy and Neoliberal Economic Model**

For the last two decades, in many migrant sending countries, there was a clear change from denouncing migrants as traitors to proclaiming them as national heroes. At the forefront of this change was Mexico's President Fox overruled the traditional model of Mexican immigrants in the US as '*pochos*', who abandoned their motherland, marketing them "national heroes, the cultural engine and the permanent ambassadors of Mexican culture" (Gamlen 2011: 4). Fox knows Mexican diaspora are huge asset for Mexican government, business classes, researchers and professional to expand their image in international sphere as well as for their hometowns and families. In the light of this, this section is going to examine the Mexican governments' changing orientation towards its nationals abroad in the age of neoliberal model of economic development.

As argued in chapter 1, diaspora, like many good ideas, has frequently been overused and as a result there has been argument over what it really means. According to general agreement, the vital features of a diasporic people are physical deracination (Cohen 1997: ix), strongly hope for the homeland (Safran 1991: 8384), alienation from host societies, and a common identity (Rinderle 2005: 295). However, diasporic scholar has moved beyond definition and features in search of how and why these groups surface and scatter (Butler 2001: 192). As such, people are, to a certain extent, diasporic in various ways—wars, natural disasters, political campaigns, and celebrations can rouse a sense of longing to connect with homeland (Gamlen 2011: 6). Here the home governments are the central point for activities that can bring diverse and dispersed people into a united diaspora. This social-constructionist or strategic essentialist approach to diaspora is now more or less pervasive. In particular, approaches drawing on Foucault's notion of governmentality are becoming increasingly common (Kunz 2008: 4). Thus, the linkage between diasporic policy and neoliberal economic development is commonly known as diasporic strategy for economic development. Therefore, in order to examine the idea of diaspora strategy, it is essential to understand the notion of neoliberalism.

Although neoliberalism is often used glibly along with the word globalisation, the term has a complex archaeology. The suffix 'ism' suggests that neoliberalism is an ideology. Harvey (2005: 2) argues "neoliberalism is a theory of political economy, which suggests that human welfare can be best developed by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills from institutional structure portrayed by private property rights, free markets and free trade. The function of state is to establish and maintain an institutional structure suitable to such practices". It also argues that state must establish military and legal framework to safeguard the individual property rights and to certify the proper functioning of market. On the other hand, England and Ward define neoliberalism as policy and programme. Neoliberalism as a policy and programme signifies transfer of ownership and control from public to private sector by way of privatisation, deregulation and liberalisation. It holds freedom of market, public choice, competition and effective management as the main reason for policy change (England and Ward 2007: 11). Its strategies aim to construct individual as an active citizen responsible for his/her well-being with minimal state interference (Larner 2000: 13). It challenges Keynesian welfarism and render the theoretical momentum for deregulation and privatisation (Larner 2000: 7).



Gamlen (2011: 7) suggests neoliberalism should be viewed as a combination of ideology and policy programme, what he termed it as a way of governmentality. The term governmentality was coined by Michel Foucault (1995) to indicate, among other things, a liberal view of government, which attempts to optimise the welfare of citizens rather than controlling territory and functions through the consent of people rather than domination (Gamlen 2011: 7). Neoliberal governmentality's motto is 'market' and government action should be based on market need in order to inject correct rules and values of self-responsibility on citizens. The central features of neoliberal governmentality are a 'marketisation' of state, according to which the state should be submitted to the principles of market. The rationality of market is not only extended to economic but also to family, villainy and crime (Kunz 2008: 10), which will lead to market society. As such, market will regulate human activities and human relations will progressively symbolise as "relation of exchange". Larner (2000: 11) argues neoliberalism "involves form of governance that encourages both institutions and individuals to conform to the norms of the market". These features of neoliberalism have dreamt up new pattern of development and welfare. Neoliberal welfare patterns entail three major components. First, citizen welfare moves from state to individual. Second, civil society becomes the main actors in development and welfare services. Third, it entails a growing responsabilisation of civil societies/citizens in development and welfare (Kunz 2008: 10).

The concept of governmentality with special reference to diaspora, to some extent, is the diffusion of power and has been explained in many ways. However, we can sum up into three meanings: first, it refers to the way of governing; second, it is a particular model of governance; and third, it is a logical way of investigating the governance. Governmentality centres on the connections between governing and ways of thought (Kunz 2008: 8-9). Thus, governmentality of diasporic activity means decentred and constructive force, which power to yield particular social form (Foucault 1987: 119). Based on Foucault's notion of power, the concept of governmentality focuses towards divers sites where governing take place and the power stimulates growth and development involved. Hunt (1994: 50) argues "it is not only government that governs, but all sorts of levels or forms of social relations are involved in governance."

Based on the above mentioned meanings of neoliberal governmentality, we can analysis neoliberal governmentality in three different ways. The first dimension is all about courting of diaspora in order to mobilise them for the promotion of its national interests. In the case of Mexico, a number of conceptual changes appeared in the neoliberal model of development related to migration, migrants and remittances. First, a complete change appears in the interpretation of its migrants from traitors and heroes. Conventionally, Mexico viewed its migrants as national traitors as they were working for the betterment of other country. Mexico considered its migrants as a sign of sin or illness (Kunz 2008: 11) and called migrants as *pochos* (who were neither real Mexican nor real American). Yet, in the late 1980s, such derogatory term began to experience a major change, reaching the highest point during Fox administration, who regarded migrants as national heroes. Thus, Fox administration makes migrants the heroes of Mexico.

Second, this drastically shift has re-defined Mexican nation to exceed the limit of its territorial borders in order to integrate Mexicans abroad, such policy began in the early 1990s (Goldring 2002: 56). Admittedly, Fox declared he would govern 118 million Mexicans including 18 million of its diasporas (Nafey 2007: 179). These two approaches create diasporic population as entrepreneurs and liaison of Mexico's development also portrayed them as economic actors and entity of knowledge. Third, Mexico reframed its diaspora as not a problem but as an opportunity to hunt new knowledge about economic, political and cultural development. Fox asserted publicly on November 13, 2001, "migration is not a problem, it is an opportunity for both Mexico and the US to make our future brighter" (Kunz 2008: 12). Moreover, Mexico also framed remittances as a 'domain of its economy' and as a 'mover for development' and created many institutions to get migrants send remittances.

The second dimension regarding diaspora strategy of Mexico conceptualised migrants as economic actors, which means diasporas are key partners in national development. In addition to new way of conceptualising migration, migrants and remittance, for the last 20 to 25 years, Mexico launched various policies to collect data about its migrants, their associations and activities at home and abroad. As such, there is sufficient number of studies and surveys with details about its migrants' lives, their living status abroad and remitting activities. Such

information is disseminated in various national and international conferences, publications and expert discussions. The collection and distribution of such information makes migrants more visible in public at home and abroad and establishes specific policies targeting diasporic populations. For instance, the registration system established in its consulates in various countries and reintroduced *matricula* card has made easier for Mexico to collect information about its migrants (Bruno and Storrs 2005: 3), the policies and programmes of PCME and IME make them more visible diasporas than before. The diaspora strategy of Mexico also established policies and programmes to offer various services for its migrants abroad and dual nationality law was passed offering investment opportunities for them. IME was established in 2003, aiming to promote diasporic welfare as well as disseminate Mexico's diasporic policies and programmes (IME detail programmes will be discussed in chapter 6). The logic behind disseminating information about its policies and programmes towards diaspora is to encourage them involved in national development initiatives.

The third dimension is the courting strategy of Mexico that encourage its migrants to organise and institutionalise their associations—hometown associations and federations. As a result, HTAs increased dramatically and HTAs increasingly federated. This is how Mexican government strengthened its diaspora's political (lobbying) and economic resources (collective remittances) to extract by the state, simultaneously it empowers HTAs with more bargaining power with Mexican government (Goldring 2002: 63). Consequently, the connection between diasporic policy and neoliberal economic development is to promote Mexico's economic development through migrants' resources. However, different parties, governments and at the same time individual presidency within the same party adopt different policies and mode of approaches to diasporic strategy for national economic development. The next section will briefly examine Mexico's approach on general diasporic policy and also how four Mexican presidents courted its diasporas as a development strategy.

### **Mexico's Developmental Approach through Diaspora**

The role of diasporas in development has been the main attention for many migrant sending countries and international organisations like World Bank, IMF, EU and IADB. Most of these organisations reveal that diasporic contributions have been the main sources for the development

of home countries. In this case, Mexico has frequently mentioned as a successful role model of this positive engagement. In 2004, official estimated reached 16,600 million dollars transferred to Mexico as remittances. This was 24 per cent more than in 2003 (Cordova 2009: 10). For Mexico remittances is the second largest source of national revenue after oil; it is also the fastest flourishing source of national income and chief supporter of Mexico's trade balance. In addition, government data indicates that remittances also the main source of survival for many families, reducing poverty and social marginalisation (Wise and Covarrubias 2007: 13).

However, there are two schools of thought on migration and development relationship: the vicious circle and the virtuous circle. The former view suggested that migration and development are opposing process, particularly the labour migration from south to north. This view argues that migration from poor south to the industrialised north is not the promoter of development in their home countries. Conversely, such migration is associated with various unfavourable effects like inflation, depopulation and desertion of many productive economies, which increased more migration (Wise and Covarrubias 2007: 6). In the latter view, migrants not only adapted in their host countries, but also consolidated their social networks and formed their associations. Their organisations are potential liaisons for economic development in Mexico. These organisations used remittances positively for the development of their places of origin (Wise and Covarrubias 2007: 6).

As mentioned earlier, given the huge significance of remittances flows and diasporas' potential to foster economic development, Mexico has designed its policies to boost remittances sending. Mexico is not only encouraging the flow of remittances but also promoting the productive use of remittances (Matsas 2009: 8). Unlike individual remittances, whose private nature makes them tough to supervise and manipulate, collective remittances are, in essence, suitable to be utilised as an instrument to enhance the provision of social and fruitful infrastructure in poor communities. Mexico has abundant and diverse policies to encourage remittances flow and use it for development. The existing diasporic policies (till 2008) can be categorised into (5) five divisions: 1) human rights: it aims to protect migrants' furtive border crossing, promote their safe return and offer effective consular services. These policies include *Grupo Beta*, *Paisano* Programme, *matricula* card and expanding network of consulates to defend

migrants' human and labour rights in Mexico as well as in the US (Wise and Covarrubias 2007: 14). 2) Transnational ties: Mexico engaged with its migrants aimed at promoting a sense of Mexican communities abroad. Such policies led to the creation of PCME (1990) and IME (2003), which promotes education, health and cultural programmes for Mexicans broad as well as the formation of HTAs. 3) Political rights: the acceptance of dual nationality through 1996 constitutional reforms aimed at providing opportunities for those who have taken American citizenship to retain their original nationality, to invest, work and buy properties without the restrictions that foreigners have. 4) Development with diasporas: Mexico institutionalised HTAs proposals through strategies like 2x1, 3x1 and 4x1 for hometown development. These programmes aimed to promote development of their communities and their contributions represent a kind of subsidy for public work in Mexico (Wise and Covarrubias 2007: 15). 5) Family remittances: they are mainly sent to satisfy basic needs such as health, education and about 10 per cent of it would be invested either land or livestock. One of the major purposes is to alleviate poverty (Wise and Covarrubias 2007: 13).

### ***Diaspora Strategy of Salinas***

Salinas, a member of PRI, was elected as president of Mexico in 1988 election. He assumed office at the time of debt crisis, to address this; he accepted Brady Plan in 1989 (Krugman 1994: 717). Beyond this, he attempted to accomplish restructuring process; denationalisation and the deregulation of trade, services and capital were broadened and deepened. He also attempted to maintain economic growth through private investment, promote manufactured export and diversify investment in infrastructure. He opened Mexico's economy to foreign capital, denationalised state-owned firms, cut subsidies and public spending and demolished Mexico's agrarian reform policy. He confidently said such measures were essential to establish Mexico's trustworthiness among the developed nations, secure the trust of business and increase investment in Mexico (Hogenboom 2010: 62).

However, he was very careful not to break public confidence in his government. To sustain this, he introduced *Programa Nacional de Solidaridad* (PRONASOL), the National

Solidarity Programme<sup>39</sup> in 1989. Mexico restructured its economic based on the recommendations of World Bank and OECD. The economic restructure produced social effects, therefore, the creation of PRONASOL claimed to address two aspects of these problems: in the economic sphere by designing a compensatory microeconomic programme with target expenditure, and in political sphere, by preserving popular approval of the government in the context of important change (Raport 2006: 508). PRONASOL was a grassroots poverty alleviation programme. Among its key elements were: (1) the direct targeting of poor communities by the federal government bypassing state and local governments; (2) the use of a corps of local leaders; (3) an emphasis on beneficiary participation; and (4) the provision of soft loans to small enterprises (Urzua 1997: 94). The programme targets risk farmers, indigenous communities and women. It supports sectoral ministries by expanding the country's health and educational facilities through scholarship and school meals. It also supports municipal development through regional solidarity funds. Thus, the programme reached to all marginalised group of people. However, it became a political tool in the hands of regional PRI leaders in the areas where non-PRI was ruling. Therefore, it is criticised as a populist tool and as a means for Salinas to build up his personal base of power (Graham 1997: 337).

His next target was Mexican diaspora, to maintain close relations with them; he launched PCME on January 2, 1990. It is an umbrella programme of government's most important policy tool in its approach towards both Mexican Americans and its migrants living in US. The programme was the outcome of two important meetings in 1989, one in Tijuana and one in Washington, D.C. At both meetings, Salinas emphasised the importance of his administration attached to its relationship with Mexican Americans, stressing as a ways and means for the construction of friendly relations with the US. The Mexican Americans and immigrants insisted that the government should institutionalise its engagement with them and establish a formal programme. Thus, the creation of PCME was the government's response to their demands (Iskander 2010: 221).

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<sup>39</sup> It is a federal fund available directly to independently organized, local communities. It was a critical factor in obtaining the confidence of, and support from the less-privileged elements within the liberal coalition. Indeed, PRONASOL was politically astute for a number of reasons. It was a "multifaceted, multipurpose populist social programme" to ensure the social peace, and it allowed the government to pursue economic restructuring (free trade agreement) without substantial political reform (Morris, 1992:32).

PCME was established within the Foreign Affairs; however, the programme, supported by various federal agencies as well as state governments. It served as a bridge between Mexicans at home and its diasporas, aiming to improve the quality of life as well as encourage them to assimilate to their host society. Its main objectives are: 1) to foster joint ventures between Mexico and its diasporas; 2) to accomplish new image of Mexico and its diasporas in Mexico as well as abroad; 3) to foster Mexican identity abroad; 4) to help Mexican diasporas get their rights and dignity abroad; 5) to promote diasporic associations enrich their capacity for adaptation and self-reliance; and 6) to expose the contributions and achievement of Mexicans in Mexico and abroad to international community (Figueroa-Aramoni 1999: 540). The sole aim of the programme was to develop closer economic ties between Mexico and its diaspora and at the same time protect their human and labour rights, which was one of the major objectives of his foreign policy (Chabat 1997: 37). This programme encouraged and sponsored 2x1 plan which every dollar sent by HTAs would be matched by one each from federal and state governments (Portes and Rumbaut 2006: 135). This programme brought US\$ 6,497,466 in 1993, and US\$10,544,518 in 1994 (Goldring, 2002: 75).

In consistent with his diasporic policy (PCME), a week after California legislature approved Proposition 187, the “Save Our State” (SOS) initiative, he called on the US not only to discuss immigration issue but also to frame a legally binding accord which would allow Mexican workers to seek job legally lawfully in the US. He argued influx of Mexican labourers to the US was “inevitable and it is better to be order and regulate it than to confront it with administrative measures that are not going to stop it because the force of the economies is greater” (Migration News 1994). His proposal was supported by the then Governor Wilson and several newspapers have suggested that the guest-worker was the best way to deal with “immigration damage control”. It was a part of his policy to safeguard the human and labour rights of Mexican workers in the US.

As argued earlier, one of the PCME’s objectives was to encourage joint venture between Mexico and its diaspora. In business sphere, PCME promoted investment and joint ventures between entrepreneurs and business classes. The main participant in this programme was MCHB. To promote PCME’s economic policies, the council organised number of meetings and

discussions both in Mexico and US, concentrated on the promotion of Latino market abroad, especially in the US (Figueroa-Aramoni 1999: 540).

Beyond this, in 1991, he established the Programme to Retain and Repatriate Mexican Researchers under the National Council for Science and Technology (CONACYT). Since its inception, every year the programme brought Mexican-origin researchers from Europe, Asia and North America (Camelia 2011: 41). He also authorised the creation of State Offices for Attention to Natives (OFAOS)<sup>40</sup> to accomplish some of the goals of PCME. In 2002, there were twenty-three OFAOS offices established by the major sending states and each state office emphasised on its own diasporic needs as well as state (Smith 2003a: 475). Thus, Mexico's diasporic policies and programmes empowered the states and become decentralised. The diasporas' contribution to local, regional and national economies in Mexico was clear to its national and local elites as well as communities. Thus, PRONASOL, PCME and OFAOS make Salinas won the heart of public.

Once he got the support of both Mexicans at home and abroad, his vision was to pursue a comprehensive FTA with US and Canada, which could substantially eliminate trade barriers in most sectors of the economy, including financial services. He believed NAFTA would lead Mexico to the First World status (Martinez-Diaz 2009: 48). NAFTA featured a wide range of foreign policy instruments used by the Mexican government to achieve its objectives and included four of the six foreign policy goals: promoting economic development, promoting national culture, promoting a positive image of Mexico abroad, and encouraging international economic development (Chabat 1997: 38). Salinas's motives in engaging an FTA with the US were to escalate economic growth through FDI including the Mexican Americans; boosting exports; creating industrial jobs; and giving the Mexican economy to grow. Again, through NAFTA, Mexico would have greater strength in dealing with other trade bloc like EU and ASEAN (MacDonald and Fauriol 1999: 130). On top of that, maintaining good relations with US

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<sup>40</sup> It was a decentralisation of Mexican diasporic policies and programmes in order to maximise collective remittances and to popularize PCME's agenda. It aims to promote a closer relationship between state and its diasporas; encourage the formation of HTAs; provide institutional framework for migrants to involve in their community development projects; to improve the image of its migrants in sending states and distribute its unique history among its migrants; grant license to migrants for community development projects in their hometowns; offer assistance to migrants' relatives; and provide support to PCME's activities (Smith 2003a: 475).



will give positive result to its diasporic policies and programmes and encourage Mexican diasporas to invest in Mexico, thus NAFTA was also a big opportunity.

In his policy of neoliberalism, he emphasised too much on foreign direct investment and generating employment, therefore, diasporic policy and economic policy went hand in hand. Diasporic policy stressed on close economic ties with people of Mexican-origin, and development policy underscored investment to generate employment. To attract investment for generating employment, NAFTA became necessary. NAFTA called for greater investment in Mexico, was directly attached to Mexican diaspora. Mexican diaspora are concerned about economic and political development in Mexico, therefore, neoliberalism served as a bridge to that goal.

### ***Ernesto Zedillo's Policy***

Zedillo is a well-known economist and politician, who served Mexico as president for six year—1994-2000. His political slogan was “well-being for your family and welfare for your family”. In consistent with his election campaign policy, he established *Progres a Oportunidades* programme in 1997. It was a targeted poverty fighting programme. Poor households were identified by a point system based on their demographics, assets and other measurable features. The programme has three intimately connected and complementary constituents: nutrition, health and education. It sought to shatter the poverty in all highly poor households. Its objectives were: 1) to ameliorate the health and nutrition status of poor households, especially children below five year old, pregnant and nursing women; 2) to assist children and young people to complete their primary, secondary and high school education; 3) to incorporate education, health and nutrition so that students' performance is not disturbed by ill-health or malnourishment; 4) to redistribute the income of extremely poor families so that they have minimum level of consumption; and 5) to encourage parents to take responsibility and participate in improving their children's health, nutrition and educational status (Levy 2006: 21). He was credited with remodeling education, corporate debt and budget and generating economic growth into his financially gloomy nation.

He assumed office at the time of economic crisis. In response to this crisis, he introduced many economic measures, negotiated with the US and IMF. In 1995 the government announced a series of economic measures. The main economic policy action included the following: (1) a

controlled monetary policy compelled a monetary base lessening of 25 per cent (2) a freewheeling exchange rate was instituted; (3) wage and salary curbs were introduced; and 4) substantial adjustment regarding fiscal matters were introduced by increasing the price and rate of goods and services provided by the public sectors (Gomez 1998: 51). Salinas actively diversified Mexico's foreign policy; however, Zedillo oversaw a more restrained foreign policy concentrated on economic matters and on solidifying Mexico's new economic relationship with the US (Randall 2006: 55).

In response California Proposition 187, in November 1994, he asserted, "Mexico cannot object to legitimate enforcement of American laws," but it objected to "enforcement that might lead to deprivation or violation of basic human right...including education and health care" (Migration News 1994). He promised his government would provide attorneys and finances to fight it in American courts. On 16 April 1996, in an international human rights conference, Ernesto Zedillo condemned American violence: "We are deeply offended by acts of intimidation, which threaten the health and safety of migrants and which have seen resulted in loss of life" (Migration News 1994) referring to American police beaten up two Mexican immigrants in the border. On 24 June 1997, Zedillo said that Mexican government was prepared to defend their human and labour rights of its diasporas, wherever they may be (Migration News 1997).

In his National Development Plan 1994-2000, he established, "the Mexican Nation extends beyond the territory contained within its borders" (Government of Mexico 1996). It defined the nature of the PCME as a top agenda in his foreign policy to defend the Mexicans human and labour rights. The work of his government carried out for the welfare of Mexicans abroad acquires new dimension and in this regard his government policies are: (1) to carry on the PCME and also create new policies and programmes; (2) to strengthen the scope and importance of PCME; (3) to support and encourage Mexican HTAs in order to strengthen their response capabilities; (4) to increase the capacity of foreign office and other engaging departments to give best attention to Mexican communities abroad; and (5) to give publicity about the struggles and achievements of its diasporas, especially those in the US (Government of Mexico 1996). The Department of Foreign Relations implements PCME's policies and programmes along with 9 federal departments, Mexican consulates, 23 provincial governments, hundreds of local

governments and various NGOs in Mexico and abroad. The programme promoted community organisation, education, health care, sports, joint business, etc. for Mexicans abroad. As such, “*Mi Comunidad*” Programme was launched by Guanajuato government in 1997 to guide the flow of remittances in their hometowns for productive investment. “*Mi Comunidad*” acquired economic resources from its migrants by inviting its diasporic entrepreneurs to invest their monies, knowledge and skills in their hometowns. The state policymakers expressed their hope that this programme would economically help the poorest communities in Guanajuato within a short period of time (Smith 2003a: 485).

His educational programme towards Mexican abroad was focused on teaching Spanish, reinforcing ties with bilingual educational organisations and strengthening cooperation with institutions teaching Mexican children in the US. To achieve all these, he continued the educational programmes such as adult education, free distribution of Mexican text books and teacher exchange programme. In 1996, more than 4000 Mexican diasporas learnt how to read Spanish from National Adult Educational Institute (Government of Mexico 1996). In the same year, Mexico has distributed 2,76,000 Mexican text books for its diasporas. His government sent 220 Mexican teachers to 49 cities in the US and received 25 American teachers in the teacher exchange programme in 1996 (Government of Mexico 1996).

In cultural sphere, his administration encouraged various artistic and cultural expressions in order to strengthen its cultural roots among its diasporic population. To achieve these programmes, the PCME in collaboration with National Council for Culture and the Arts established catalogue showing more than 300 programmes offer exclusively for its diasporas. It organised around 10 exhibitions, presentations, conferences, plays and film series abroad. It also continued drawing contest for children, “This is my Mexico”. It launched a circulation campaign known as “Celebrate Mexican Traditions with Pride” (Government of Mexico 1996). In health sector, it concentrated on the issues of addiction and the transmission of HIV/AIDS among its nationals abroad. It collaborated with US, distributed pamphlets and posters and organised seminars and conferences on various health-related issues (Government of Mexico 1996).

On top of that, to fulfil his National Development Plan, Zedillo government in 1996, amended Mexican constitution to provide them Mexican nationality called “No Loss of

Nationality”. Though it was a part of general attempt to build a closer tie with its communities abroad, the act was particularly a reaction to Proposition 187, which Mexicans considered anti-Mexicans. Dual nationality was projected to enhance the political influence of its nationals who settled abroad, removed the obstacles or those article(s) or clause(s) in the constitution to retain their original citizenship. Earlier, Mexicans who adopted foreign citizenship automatically lost their property rights or their shared in communal farmlands known as ‘*ejidos*’. This amendment not only restored those rights but also allowed them to retain Mexican passport and some political rights (Gutierrez 1997: 1006). Fitzgerald (2005: 181) argues that dual nationality law in Mexico was response to the growing remittances from its diasporas, which was the second largest source of foreign currency after petroleum. Barry (2006: 13) argues that Mexico granted dual citizenship because its diasporas bolster its economy by remitting their earning to families; by investing in property, business, and even development projects back home; and by skills and technology transfers. Mexico had courted their diasporic communities aggressively in the economic sphere. Zedillo encouraged diasporas to remit money through official channels; and he addressed them as beloved, heroic, “gone but not forgotten citizens” (Barry 2006: 35). In the same vein, Castaneda (2006: 105) argues it was aimed to acquire economic resources from its diasporas as their contribution represented the second largest source of national income. However, for Purcell (1998: 112), it was a direct opposition to California Proposition 187, and also gave them more consular protection.

Under Zedillo presidency (1994-2000), the PCME’s programmes continued, invented some new policies and programmes and also granted dual nationality to its nationals abroad (Goldring 2002: 22). He encouraged the creation of HTAs abroad and officially authorised the state governments to deal with HTAs. As such, 310 projects were accomplished in Zacatecas between 1993 and 1998 through 2x1 programme. In 1995, he also created a new scheme known as Programme for Student Mobility in North America (PROMESAN), including 348 academic institutions. The PROMESAN aims to validate studies and set up trinational (Mexico, US and Canada) work teams (Camelia 2011: 41). Therefore, Zedillo’s approach to development through diaspora was empowering the diasporas as a way to encourage them for better investment in and transfer their knowledge and skills to Mexico.

### *Fox's Diaspora-Economic Development Mantra*

In July 2000 elections, Fox was elected as the president of Mexico, the first in 71 years who was not a member of the PRI. The elections of 2000 marked the beginning of new chapter in Mexico's democracy. Mexico not only became a government of shared power but also a more open nation (Tulchin and Selee 2003: 56). Fox promised to open up government and improve the state of human rights. His policy of human rights gone beyond Mexico—he sought to protect the rights of Mexicans abroad, especially those settled in the US. To achieve all these, he suggested that Mexico and US should establish a working group to improve human rights condition of migrants (Kesselman et al. 2010: 196). At the same time, he also promised deregulation, competition and a balanced budget together with an ambitious social development agenda including double education spending, increase subsidies for farmers and build health clinics, which aimed to address the enormous disparity between rich and poor (Haynes 2001: 68).

Fox's neoliberal plan concentrated on reducing federal budget for social programmes, carrying on privatisation of industry, privatising social security systems, approving regressive tax legislation and labour law (Botz 2005). In an era of economic liberation and Mexico's integration with the North American economy through NAFTA, Fox's diaspora based economic development called for greater integration and interactions between North American countries that would ultimately lead to the formulation of North American community (Pastor 2008: 98). To realise his vision of greater integration, he proposed NAFTA-Plus, which called for greater North America integration with common currency, customs union, shared passport and free movement of goods, services and labour (Carlsen 2003). His plan was to erase militarised border, removed illegal status of all Mexicans who entered US without proper document, stop racial discrimination in work place, educational institutions and above all, all Mexicans should uphold their cultural identity wherever they were and work for the development of nation through remittance, investment, and joint projects (Cooper 2004: 69).

His scheme of NAFTA-Plus was based on European Union (EU) model.<sup>41</sup> To be like EU, the first step, he argued Mexico and US should have comprehensive immigration agreement.

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<sup>41</sup> European Union (EU) model in which advanced economies helped backward nations such as Portugal and Spain converge economically and become part of the union. He advocated the same process of economic convergence for

According to him, the comprehensive agreement should base on four principles: (1) solve the key pending issue in US-Mexico relations: the immigration of Mexicans; (2) institutionalise the management of bilateral issues through agreements and target mechanism; (3) take advantage of the positive momentum—the “honeymoon phase”—at the beginning of Fox and Bush administration; and (4) move towards a greater integration of the countries in North America, the so-called “NAFTA-Plus” diplomacy (Dominguez and Carlos 2010: 30). To add more meaning to his concept of NAFTA, in March 2005, Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) was established as a central element of NAFTA-plus. Presidents Bush and Fox along with Canadian Prime Minister asserted that the new initiative was “based on the principle that our security and prosperity are mutually dependent and complementary” and was designed explicitly to “help consolidate our action into a North American framework to confront security and economic challenge” (Stokes and Raphael 2010: 210).

Fox’s policies toward Mexicans abroad were aimed to bring the talents, knowledge, as well as financial resources to build Mexico. Reflecting to this idea, in 2001, his government launched a pilot programme known as “3x1 *Para Migrantes*” or 3x1. In this programme, every dollar remitted through HTAs for communities development were equally matched with one dollar each from municipal, state and federal governments (Lopez 2009: 1). According to Orozco (2004: 36), 50 per cent of Mexican hometown associations said to conduct their philanthropic projects through the 3x1 scheme. On the other hand, Garcia Zamora (2005: 12) argues that only 20 HTAs in 2002, 200 HTAs in 2003 and 527 HTAs in 2004 had participated in 3x1 programme. At national level, in 2004 alone the scheme completed 1438 projects (Zamora 2005: 12). The federal government budget for the 2002 was 113.7 million pesos; 2003 was 97.3 million pesos; 2004 was 175.9 million pesos; and 2005 was 221.9 million pesos. However, for 2006 the budget was only 119.5 million pesos (Arrieta 2006). The priority of 3x1 funds is: (1) basic infrastructure such as drinking water, electrification, drainage, pavement, etc.; (2) community initiatives such as gardens, schools, libraries and churches; and (3) diverse projects such as sport fields and rodeo rings (Rugg and Auroi 2007: 12). For example, the 3x1 programme in Zacatecas between 2001 and 2002, almost a third of all projects correspond to street pavement. Other important

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Mexico to meet targets on inflation, interest rates and other criteria and eventually received assistance from NAFTA partners to develop its economic gap that separates from US and Canada (Ugalde 2004: 125).

shares were spent on social assistance and community services (13 per cent), educational infrastructure (10.6 per cent), urbanisation (6.8 per cent), sewerage (6.2 per cent), drinking water (5.6 per cent) and country roads (5.6 per cent) (Rugg and Auroi 2007: 227). In 2002, there were 8 *maquiladoras* in Guanajuato invested by the immigrants and provide more than 339 jobs to local communities. The programme brought in around \$2.2 million investment in the state purely from its diasporas (Smith 2003: 486). The latest development of the 3x1 programme was an attempt to include private companies as an additional contributor, making the programme 4x1. On October 12 2005, the 4x1 programme was launched in Zacatecas (Magallon 2005).

In addition to 3x1 programme, in 2002, he created the Special Programme for Science and Technology (PECYT) aiming at networking with Mexican abroad (Camelia 2011: 41). He also established the Network of Mexican Talents Abroad (RTM) in 2005, with the intention of acquiring Mexican diasporas' skills and knowledge and bringing them back to Mexico or at least have joint ventures with those experts and know-how to cooperate with Mexico. This project also reaped a number of benefits as it collaborated with the Mexico-US Foundation (FUMEC) to achieve its goals. RTM functioned in their host countries or local associations (formed by Mexican diaspora in various host countries) popularly known as "chapters" and scattered mainly in developed countries. There were eight associations in the US, three associations in Canada and four local associations in Europe (Camelia 2011: 41).

To realise his vision of NAFTA-Plus, at least within the Mexican-origin population in North America, Fox established Presidential Office for Mexican Abroad (OPME) in 2000. The OPME were to take care of millions of Mexican nationals abroad (Wall 2002). The main target of OPME was to secure better treatment of its nationals in the US (Tulchin and Selee 2003: 20). He, again, established National Council for Mexican Abroad in 2002; the council included Mexican American and its main goal was to empower Mexican consulates that the protection of its nationals was the one of the most momentous duties of the consulates (Salum 2004). He reorganized *Grupo Beta* in 2001; under this, the *Grupo Beta* was concentrated on protecting illegal migrants from brigands, carried out rescue operations and provided information about safe passage (Migration News 2001). In response to 9/11 terrorist attacks and Bush's redefinition of US-Mexico border, Fox reintroduced *matricula* card in March 2002. It enabled Mexican

nationals to gain access to various social services, obtain drivers and business licenses, open bank accounts, register children in schools and send remittances more securely (Allatson 2007: 156).

### *Felipe Calderon's Policy*

Calderon won 2006 Mexican presidential election, the PAN candidate and took his office on December 1, 2006. On March 28, 2006, he presented his visions on foreign policy at SRE and asserted that Mexico's international role should be based on its passage to democracy and pluralism (Davila 2008: 9). The protection and defense of Mexican nationals abroad became one of the one main objectives of his foreign policy (Davila 2008: 8). His vision of future Mexico included setting up of more competitive economy, which would assure every citizen a well paid and firmly established job. To be, he said his government would create conditions for direct foreign investment, widen opportunity for all Mexicans and a fair, pro-development regulatory framework. His economic policy was to make Mexico win in the global economy and stable economic growth at home (Washington Post 2007).

During the 2006 election campaign, Calderon promised to build more refineries, increased health care and establish immigration agreement with the US, created suitable jobs and offered more educational opportunities for the poor (Murphy 2006). He was the supporter of immigrants and promoted their rights; he called on the US Congressmen to stop "irrationality" of the Sensenbrenner bill, which was against the rights of immigrants. He also expressed his solidarity with immigrants, particularly Mexicans, who live in America, "and do a warrant from Mexico, called on American Congressmen to stop irrationality". He further argues that immigrants were not criminals but people who sought better living conditions, and also contributed to the American economy (Wall 2006). He said he supported Mexican nationals abroad who were struggling to get their human, labour and political rights. He asserted that migration was not resolved by wall and joked that "we'll jump over it anyway" (Wall 2006). To achieve all his promises, he said he was a pro-NAFTA and wanted to make North American region like EU, where free market was not confined to goods, services and investment but also a free labour market (Hing 2010: 52).



Calderon followed the policy of Fox's 3x1 programmes, and in 2006, 570 immigrant social clubs were officially registered in the US, but some suggested the number of HTAs would be between 600 and 2,000 (Lopez 2009: 5). Since 2002, government spending on 3x1 has extended to 27 out of 32 Mexican states. By 2007, 3x1 had sponsored more than 6000 projects with a federal budget of 20 million dollars. The federal budget sanctioned 50 million dollar for 3x1 programme in 2008, which meant more than doubled of 2007 budget. The president of Inter-American Development Bank declared that 3x1 programme was the leading source of economic and social development for rural areas in Mexico (Lopez 2009: 5). Nevertheless, 3x1's impact was a small number when put in the larger context of remitting and migration. Remittances to Mexico were estimated at 28 billion dollars in 2007 but it certainly has an important contribution to the general wellbeing.

Diaspora has contributed towards reducing poverty and economic growth in their home countries through collective remittances (IOM 2010: 45) and was an active actor in development strategies, poverty alleviation and economic growth for home country. Beyond this, diasporas are also actively involved in political, social and cultural contribution to home country (Bada 2003: 5). In short, their economic connections with home countries are remittances and investments. In order to benefit from the contribution of diaspora, many countries formulate an assertive diasporic engagement policy. Mexico established PCME, 2x1 programme, later became 3x1 (Goldring 2002: 66), private company joined this programme and became 4x1 in 2005. Mexico granted dual nationality in 1996 and launched various programmes and policies through PCME and IME.

Many immigrant sending countries adopt diasporic strategy for economic development in the age of neoliberalism. The concept of governmentality is becoming increasingly common to denote a liberal view of government, which attempts to optimise the welfare of citizens rather than controlling territory (Gamlen 2011: 7). In the context of Mexico, a number of conceptual changes appeared in the neoliberal model of development related to migration, migrants and remittances. A complete change appeared in the interpretation of its migrants from traitors and heroes. This drastic shift had re-defined Mexican nation to exceed the limit of its territorial borders in order to integrate Mexicans abroad, such policy began in the early 1990s (Goldring

2002: 56). These two approaches create diasporic population as entrepreneurs and liaison of Mexico's development and also portrayed diasporas as a new business actors and entity of knowledge. Moreover, Mexico also dubbed remittances as a 'domain of its economy' and as a 'mover for development' (Kunz 2008: 12). As argued earlier, given the significant importance of remittance flows and diasporic capacity to contribute in its development, Mexico has designed public policies to encourage its diasporas to send remittances regularly. Such strategy includes promote of human rights; strengthen transnational ties; grant political rights; promote social development through collective remittances; and encourage family remittances (Wise and Covarrubias 2007: 14).

## CHAPTER FOUR

### DUAL NATIONALITY AND ITS MEANING FOR MEXICO'S SECURITY AND CULTURAL RELATIONS WITH UNITED STATES

The enormous importance of remittance flows, diasporas' economic potential and their social capital compel many migrant sending countries to grant dual nationality as part of diasporic policy and programme. The issue of dual nationality has gained academic currency especially in the fields of legal and social sciences (Blatter et al. 2009: 2). It is, in all aspects, fostered by the process of globalisation and democratisation which reduce the states' boundaries and changes the meaning of citizenship. Democracy, in particular, has critical implications for definitions of citizenship, as it not only accepts individual's rights as universal rights but also endows all citizens with important responsibility of government. The countries with broad in scope of citizenship would provide decisive political, economic and social significances for potential citizens. Thus, a new version of citizenship called dual citizenship appeared, especially in Western based on universal individual rights (Dahlin and Hironaka 2004: 3).

The history of dual citizenship can be traced back to 1781 (Miller 1994: 74). However, during the 19 century, the legal status of international migrants was the main source of conflict between European states (who wanted to maintain their absentee citizens) and New World (who wanted to assimilate them into their society). Most European states did not recognise the naturalisations of their nationals in the New World and became one of the major causes of the War of 1812<sup>42</sup>, when British forced its migrants who had naturalised in US and acquired citizenship for service into navy. The US did not settle the issue with many European countries until bilateral Bancroft Treaties<sup>43</sup> was signed (Fitzgerald 2006: 92). In the same vein, Italy forcefully objected to Brazil's 1891 constitutional provisions that involuntarily naturalised its

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<sup>42</sup> Haberle (2003: 4) pointed out that there were three main causes of War of 1812. British were taking its migrants who serve as sailors in American ships and compelled them to serve in British navy. The British did it as they were searching for its sailors who had escape from navy. The British warship Leopard tried to board the American ship Chesapeake to look for deserters. When the Chesapeake's officers refused to let the British board, the British fired their cannons at the Chesapeake, and this was the immediate cause of War of 1812.

<sup>43</sup> The treaties between US and Western European nations over settlement of immigrants were collectively known as Bancroft Treaties. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, dual citizenship became a matter of concern chiefly because of the impact of emigration from Europe to the US. When the immigrants sought to naturalise citizens in the US were challenged by their home countries. Thus Bancroft Treaties were signed in 1860s and 1870s, which sought to avoid dual citizenship as much as possible (Kivisto 2009: 30).

migrants living in Brazil at the time of independence. Sharply reacting to Brazil's 1891 constitutional provisions, in 1912, Italy recognised the *de facto* dual nationality in an attempt to assert its right over Italians abroad (Fitzgerald 2006: 93).

The acceptance of dual nationality is relatively a contemporary development; however, its opposition has a long history. Bancroft not only expressed his opinion about dual citizenship, but he later on established it as a norm through several bilateral accords collectively called "Bancroft Treaties" that effectively prevented dual citizenship for naturalised Americans who immigrated from various countries. The historical opposition to it culminated officially in 1930 with the League of Nations' adoption of "Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Law", also known as the "Hague Convention". The convention states that "it is in the interest of the international community to secure that all members should recognise that every person should have a nationality and should have one nationality only" (Howard 2005: 700). After World War II, this position was reiterated again by the International Law Commission in 1954. Similarly, European countries also sought to consolidate the single citizenship policy in 1963 with its council "Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality". Among other things, it underlined that the nationals who, of their own free will, acquire the nationality of one of the contracting state shall lose their former nationality (Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2001: 72).

Based on the above arguments, Hansen and Weil (2002: 7) classified five points against it. First, allegiance is indivisible; as one cannot serve two masters, one cannot faithfully serve two countries. Second, it creates security threat, as such holders may use her/his status of country 'A' to gain sensitive information and passed on to 'B'. This threat becomes intensified when dual citizens hold high office. Third, it hinders integration, as it attaches to foreign culture. Fourth, it creates conflict over tax, heritage and marriage and above all military service. Finally, it fringes principles of equality, as the holders enjoy more rights and opportunities than their fellow nationals. Similarly, Wreh-Wilson (2010) also forwarded three points against dual citizenship: first, it challenges individual's sense of nationalism and patriotism; second, it questions one's devotion to country, particularly, the calls homeland; and third, it indicates citizens a doubtful and problematic enterprise.

However, both the “Hague Convention” and Council of Europe’s convention could not effectively stop the proliferation and growing acceptance of dual citizenship since the 1960s. There were several factors that contributed to this. Increased movement of migrants across international borders in the post-World War II led to the formation of permanent transnational social networks. In such environment, many migrants started holding two passports cautiously, without either country being able to find out (Howard 2005: 702). At the same time, more and more international marriages resulted in an increasing number of children who could technically claim both parents’ nationalities. This development was speeded ahead by the repeal of the patriarchal legal laws that provided for the child to receive the citizenship only of the father (patrilineal aspiration), often forcing the wife to surrender her previous citizenship and take the citizenship of her husband. Such discriminatory laws were one of the main targets of suffragette movement and were phased out once women secured the right to vote and even the children of international marriages could claim the citizenship of both their parents (Martin 2003: 10).

The rise of dual citizenship at the global scale started in the last half of the 20 century mainly due to high migration, which is the vital force of globalisation. The surge of globalisation has escalated since the 1970s, where international borders are becoming more mobile not only for capital, trade and investment, but also people. A rapid advance in technology facilitated global communication and make easier for migrants to contact their families and friends back home. This process allows migrants not only to maintain relations with families and friends back home, but also make them easier to retain their cultural identities. These invested ties and networks across the international borders have created necessitate and thus increase dual citizenship. The increasing migration, immigrants’ ties and networks through globalisation has been the main force for the rise of dual citizenship, which compels many sending as well as receiving countries to accept it. The receiving countries accepted dual citizenship as a policy to help immigrants integrate into its culture, as well as to increase their political participation.<sup>44</sup> The sending countries accepted dual citizenship based on economic reason and also as a means to

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<sup>44</sup> Most of the immigrants in their host country are not willing to give up their home country citizenship for various reasons such as security in case their expectations in their host country are not met or it is a sign of their identity. If this happen, immigrants will be left out of the political process. Therefore, dual citizenship gives suitable conditions for them to become citizens and fully participate in their host country’s political process. It is a means to enhance their political participation and also promote their rights and interests (Faist et al. 2004: 921).

encourage the preservation and development of its cultural identity abroad. Beyond this, the sending country primary motive was to foster investment and transfer of knowledge and skills back home.<sup>45</sup>

In addition to the above arguments, Hansen and Weil (2002: 10) also gave three essential arguments in favour of dual nationality. First, dual nationality is inevitable and even states opposed to might as well grit their teeth and bear it. As one cannot impose the nationality qualification of another and there is no international code or common definition on nationality, dual nationality will constantly build up along with increase mobility. Second, dual nationality is a value generator. The west should use dual nationals as privilege to export liberal democratic principles abroad. When dual national hold citizenship of semi-democratic country, this will be great worth to the US, west and the world. Third, it promotes integration. This thesis basically holds on the relationship between dual citizenship and naturalisation. Germany faced low naturalisation of immigrants mainly due to a prohibition on dual citizenship; other countries like Holland have experienced a direct link between toleration of dual citizenship and naturalisation.


Of course, dual citizenship is not a totally new phenomenon, but we have noticed its rapid growth has been witnessed only recently. More than half of all sovereign states in the world, today are accepting or tolerating some forms of dual citizenship (see figure 4.1 below) for various reasons. For Russia, dual citizenship is the best policies to resolve all problems with the neighbouring states, especially, which are emerged out of USSR disintegration in 1991. Taking this as an opportunity, Russia granted dual citizenship to all Russians abroad and people who had historical ties with Russia. Zevelev (2001: 133-134) argues that dual citizenship as a policy, for Russia, it serves three advantages. First, it serves as civilised policy to establish special relationship with co-nationals abroad. It stresses in civic, not ethnic and thus held the promise of protecting the Russian nation without ethnic conflict. Second, it could curb migration to Russia by providing them with some sort of security and peace of mind in their host state. Third, it

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<sup>45</sup> The sending countries are interested in its diaspora as they are the source of economic development. Remittances from diaspora have been recognised as a momentous source of external capital for home country. Many home countries receive remittances more than overseas development aids or foreign direct investment. They are the key deciding factor for the growth of information technology and skilled labour. Dual citizenship as a diasporic policy will facilitate remittance flow, investment, collective remittance, information technology and expertise back for home country (Rahemtullah 2006: 6).

serves as a convenient source of leverage and influence on the neighbouring states and also as an instrument for implementing a Russian policy of domination and hegemony. On the other hand, India approved dual citizenship in December, 2003 as a policy aimed to increase travelling to and from India, enable investment in business ventures and promote a sense of belonging for its migrants who have taken foreign passports. This provision is a bonus for Indian diaspora to make invest, transfer and other such things to India (Bharadwaj 2010: 10).

**Figure 4.1 Restriction and Tolerance toward Dual Citizenship around the World**



Light dark indicates Tolerance and Dark indicates Restriction

*Source: Faist and Gerdes 2008: 4*

Argentina and Uruguay have followed the Italian model: citizenship is obtained at birth and this right cannot be repealed by changes of loyalties and status. Their diaspora preserve their rights including passport even if they naturalised in foreign countries. In Columbia, Ecuador and Dominica, the idea of dual citizenship emerge from its co-nationals, who settled abroad, especially in the US. Their diaspora sends millions of dollar every year as remittances to their relatives back home and have a significant effect on local economies. As such, migrants have become significant campaign destination for politicians asking funds for political races.

Furthermore, they effectively translated their economic force to political power, winning rights and privileges from various political parties and legislatures of their home country, making them as citizens and granting dual citizenship, land ownership, easy access to various services when return and among other things (Jones-Correa 1998: 161).

In Mexico, dual nationality as a diasporic policy and programme has three objectives; all of them reinforce Programme for Mexican Communities Abroad (PCME)'s overall mission. First, it is intended to maintain and strengthen relations with Mexican immigrants and Mexican Americans. This would be achieved by allowing immigrants who become American citizens to retain their Mexican citizenship. With that, they would retain property rights in Mexico and additional privileges unavailable to foreigners. However, this move was repeatedly encouraged by the increasing remittances; in 1993 alone, Mexico received \$2 and \$3.2 billion. Additionally, the Mexican diasporas, after adjusting income levels, constitute a market that is equal to Mexico's internal market and is vital to the wellbeing of Mexican industries. Maintaining cultural and economic ties with the diaspora are, thus, essential to Mexico's economic health. Second, offering dual citizenship would demonstrate to the diasporas and in particular to recent immigrants, that the Mexican government and society are not only changed their perception about them but also concerned with their well-being (Garza 1997: 75). Third, the dual citizenship would encourage naturalisation, and this in turn would empower the diaspora to defend its interests within the US. This is necessary, because, Mexican government lacks resources to protect Mexicans from all attacks and discrimination they encounter. Additionally, Mexican officials assume that as American citizens, Mexicans would also mobilise in support of Mexican state interests (Garza 1997: 76). In other words, dual citizenship would stimulate the development of an ethnic lobby.<sup>46</sup> As such, migrant sending countries adopt dual citizenship as an outreach programme to safeguard the interests and rights of its diaspora. At the same time, it is also a strategy to develop its economy. Dual citizenship has been a subject of controversy in

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<sup>46</sup> Smith (2000: 1) argues that ethnic groups in the US play a major role in the formulation of foreign policy. Thirty-eight (38) ethnic groups identified as having an active presence in American foreign policymaking—Hispanic Americans, African Americans, Irish Americans, Mexican Americans, Italian Americans, Polish Americans, Jewish Americans, Cuban American, Greek American, etc.



international relations for many decades; however, many countries accept it mainly due to the influence of globalisation<sup>47</sup> and democracy.

### **Meaning of Dual Citizenship**

Dual citizenship is a concept that is slowly becoming one of the most controversial issues in contemporary international politics. By definition, dual citizenship refers to a migrant being a citizen of host and home countries or a legal status by which a migrant becomes a citizen of both sending and receiving countries. A migrant who has such status holds two passports and basically live and travel freely within his/her home and host countries without immigration constraints. While dual citizens enjoy the rights and privileges of both countries, they must also obey the laws of both countries and pay taxes for both countries (Biase 2009: 34). Dual citizenship sometimes occurs automatically. For instance, if a person is born abroad to American parents, he or she is automatically a citizen of both countries. If an individual is born to the American parents who are citizens of another country, he or she is automatically a citizen of both countries.

Dual citizenship is on certain occasion mistakenly used synonymously with dual nationality. Nationality signifies full membership in a state and the equivalent tie to state law and submission to state power, while citizenship indicates to the idea of collective self-rule, the freedoms and rights warranted by membership in a political community. Thus, the term dual nationality alludes only to the legal status and does not stipulate the rights and obligations a person holds with regard to the state of second nationality where he/she does not reside. Some state distinguish between citizenship that can be kept by residents only and nationality that can be maintained by diasporas without granting any political rights (Qstergaard-Nelsen 2008: 4).

There are three important sources of person who hold dual nationality in various countries. First, the largest source of dual national throughout the history is occurred from the interplay of birthright national laws—location (*jus solis*) and parentage (*jus sanguinis*). The child

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<sup>47</sup> Rubenstein and Adler (1998: 525-526) argue that globalisation altered nation-states basically by the inter-connection and multiplication of relationships between them and individuals. Sovereignty has inevitably been modified without being abolished. It has transformed and will continue to change the size to which the statecraft is sovereign. The economy becomes interdependent on a global level and reduces the role regional and local governments over the existence of its citizens.

born abroad will inherit the nationality of location and his/her parent. Most of the countries, however, have espoused the rule of *jus sanguinis*. For instance, a child born in the US of Mexican citizens will naturally be a Mexican-American at birth. Second, dual nationality has occurred more today than before because of huge intermarriage between different nationalities. In comparison with the past, a woman marrying another nationality would automatically lose her original citizenship and adopt her husband's nationality; now both husband and wife are legally entitled to maintain their original nationalities. The children of such unions are often entitled to maintain the nationalities of both parents. Third, a migrant who naturalises in his or her host country is presumed to retain his or her original citizenship, not to abandon it (Spiro 2002: 20). The escalation of dual citizenship emerges from huge influx of immigration to some countries, which inevitably further the frequency of all three causes of dual nationality stated above. Spontaneously, dual nationality occurring from naturalisation is augmented by changes in the existing laws (Mazzolari 2005: 6). As such, the IRCA of 1986 in the US naturalised more than 2.3 million Mexicans and made the largest immigrant group in the US (Lopez 2009: 6). Many migrant sending countries explicitly assert that its citizens who naturalise in their host countries do not lose their original citizenship (Mazzolari 2005: 6).

However, the rights and privileges of dual citizenship vary from country to country. As such, different scholars use different words to describe dual citizenship. For instance, Linda Bosniak (2000: 240) considers dual citizenship as “denationalised citizenship”,<sup>48</sup> which has four distinct meanings: 1) citizenship is considered as legal status means state recognises individual as its citizen. 2) Citizenship is considered as rights signify state recognises individual on the basis on rights and responsibilities. 3) Citizenship is considered as political activity symbolises rights, duties and opportunities for individual to participate in political activities. 4) Citizenship is conceptualised as a sort of collective identity and sentiment suggests socio-political dimension of membership within a community. Baubock assumed dual citizenship as “transnational citizenship”<sup>49</sup>—diasporic membership is motivated by an incomplete nation-building plan in

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<sup>48</sup> The term refers to collage of nation-state system—national ideas of public life have just disappeared their adopted authority and predominance. Nation-state is becoming decentred as the locus of our collective institutional and afflictive live (Bosniak 2001: 240).

<sup>49</sup> It refers not only to diasporas' political activities targeted towards their home countries but also to institutional changes that create new ideas of citizenship in many countries and linked with various immigrant groups through migration chain. It can be depicts as overlapping membership between two or more states' jurisdictions that

support of which it rallied. Gaventa, on the hand, argues that it is a “global citizen”<sup>50</sup> which calls for collective action for common good.

In state-diaspora relations, dual citizenship means a share of identity as well as responsibilities. Increasing international migration is the main factor that transforms the relationship between the state and its diasporic populations. The modern state-citizenship relationship developed under the assumption of confluence between state, the territory and the population. As such, international migration is forcing a redefinition of the state and of citizenship, both in its normative and substantive dimensions. The normative dimension of citizenship refers to the formal ascription of people to a state and its territory and is known in international law as nationality (Baubock 2006: 17). This perspective argues that migration is transforming relations between states, because it implies the intersection of two or more states that share a common body of citizens. Modern citizenship is solidly ascribed to single membership in a territorially defined state. Dual citizenship is opposed by most states individually and collectively in international agreement like Hague Convention of 1930, Bancroft Treaties the US signed with European countries and the European Convention on the Reduction of Multiple Nationality in 1963 (Escobar 2007: 45). However, in the late twentieth century, increased migration has challenged the validity of single ascription and dual citizenship has proliferated. In sending countries, the provision of dual citizenship is considered as advantages for economic development through remittances, diaspora bonds, transfer of knowledge and skill (Martin 2003: 67).

The substantive dimension of citizenship refers to the rights and obligations that tie citizens to the state. This perspective argues migration is also changed the state’s relationship with its citizens as sending countries are interested in retaining ties with their diasporas—extend basic rights and privileges to its diasporas. This extension of rights and privileges to its diasporas, in particular, is divorcing citizenship from the territorial dimension of the state.

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indistinct their political boundaries. Diasporic citizenship produces stronger base for political mobilisation than other transnational networks (Bauböck 2006: 28-29).

<sup>50</sup> Global citizenship refers to the practice of the right to take part in decision-making about socio-cultural, economic and political life within and beyond the local, national and reach international sphere. It lacks institutions and authority, however, the concept is based on process of action or human agency, which empowers people to make effective decision about their own lives. Right to participation in global decision-making also carries a sense of responsibilities based on self-developed and self-imposed strategy (Gaventa 2001: 278).

Political rights are very important in redefining the state-citizenship relations, as both civil and social rights have existed as status of citizenship, which distinguished citizens from noncitizens. Thus, giving the absentee voting rights is a proof of the broader alteration of the territorial and membership boundaries of citizenship (Baubock 2005: 683).

On the other hand, post-national approach maintains that citizenship rights are not bound to nation-state any longer but are organised by the principle of universal personhood. In other words, it is based on human rights that non-citizens too have tangible human, civil and social rights. Consequently, citizenship as a “right to have rights” is no longer the central basis for person to be a member of political communities. Alternatively, it is attached to international or regional norms and rules such as UN and regional organisations’ charters on fundamental rights. According to this perspective, the acceptance of dual citizenship by sending countries to its nationals abroad is based on human rights (Escobar 2007: 47). However, this perspective fails to understand the democratically legal status of citizenship and its attachment to states.

The transnational perspective argues that globalisation make migrants to trade border-crossing networks, communities and organisations. Its argument paints an image of life worlds and the endeavours of states and other organisations to supervise border-crossing exchange. It looks at the continuous ties that migrants maintain with their countries of origin and addresses the societal, cultural, political and economic consequences of these continuous ties for the migrants for sending and host countries as well. It argues dual citizenship is not a different form of membership in political organisations or communities; rather it is fundamentally a type of political membership complementary to national citizenship in a globalised world (Faist 2001: 20). It addresses the implication of migration for the status of membership in national political communities. Baubock (2005: 686) defines transnational citizenship as the overlapping membership between two or more states’ jurisdictions that indistinct their political boundaries and has proposed an alternative model of citizenship: “stakeholder citizenship”<sup>51</sup>. However, this approach does not see the end of nation-state, which continues as the main grantor of membership status and rights.

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<sup>51</sup> This model, which accepts the idea that migrants can have stakes simultaneously in more than one polity, addresses the fact that nationals abroad have "stakes" in the state of origin as senders of remittances, agent of development in hometown, property owners, lobbyists abroad in the interests of home countries, etc (Bauböck 2005: 686).

## **Mexican Dual Citizenship**

Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer (2001: 76) group dual citizenship regimes into three general categories: open, tolerant and restrictive. Open regimes (like Canada, France and United Kingdom) follow some form of *jus soli* principle that allows for dual citizenship at birth and do not require subsequent renunciation of one's citizenship at a certain age. In addition, they allow naturalised citizens to retain their prior citizenship and their citizens who naturalise elsewhere are not required to renounce their citizenship. Tolerant regimes (like Australia, Germany, Mexico and US) permit dual nationality at birth, but some countries, like Germany, still require renunciation of one's citizenship at certain age. Likewise, some countries, like US and Mexico, allow their citizens to retain their citizenship when naturalising elsewhere. Others, like Australia, require the opposite: their citizens are required to renounce their citizenship, while those naturalising in the country are not required to do the same. Lastly, restrictive regimes, like Austria and Japan, follow *jus sanguinis* principle. Both countries require proof of renunciation as a requirement for naturalisation.

There are several factors that may influence which path a country takes in its dual citizenship regulations (Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2001: 77). One of them is whether a country is state of immigration or emigration. While some countries of immigration, like the US, require naturalised citizens to renounce their prior citizenship; others, like Canada and Australia, do not. Likewise, some countries of emigration, like Mexico and Dominican Republic, are willing to permit their citizens to retain their prior citizenship in order to maintain ties with their diaspora and encourage their return and investment. Some new countries may limit or deny dual citizenship in order to instill a sense of loyalty and connection to the new state while some may adopt more open policies in order to attract its co-nationals. Lastly, countries with strong ethnic identities, like Austria and Japan, will follow *jus sanguinis* principle and will have restrictive attitudes towards dual citizenship. On the other end of this spectrum is country like Canada, with its liberal approach to its dual citizenship rules.

Mexico is a sending country that has radically changed its policies on dual citizenship in order to accommodate the needs and rights of its significant immigrant community, especially in the US. Nationality law in Mexico has its roots in the constitution of 1857. Many of the

provisions relating to citizenship were retained in the subsequent law adopted in 1917. For this discussion, the most relevant part is article 30 where nationality is based on a combination of *jus sanguinis* and *jus soli* principles. Article 30 establishes that Mexicans are: “(i) all those born of Mexican parents within or outside the territory of Republic; (ii) those foreigners who naturalise in accordance with the laws of the Federation; and (iii) those foreigners who acquire real estate or have Mexican children, as long as they manifest that they have no intention of retaining their nationality” (Ramirez 2000: 316).

As argued earlier, Mexico is willing to permit dual nationality in order to maintain ties with their diaspora and encourage economic investment. The discussions on dual national legislation began during the presidency of Carlos Salinas. For more than a decade, many groups that support immigrants’ rights in Mexico as well as in the US advocated dual nationality for Mexican diasporas. Moreover, the PRD, Mexico’s main opposition and transnational political party, has endorsed dual nationality to all Mexican nationals abroad since the inception of party in 1989 (Gutierrez 1997: 1007). In this regard, the PRD and its alliance *Frente Democratico Nacional* collected the opinion and signatures of Mexicans in the US about dual nationality for them (Jones-Correa 2001: 1005). The 1994 presidential election witnessed a large number of mobilisations about it and all the major political party candidates visited immigrants in the US (Smith 2007: 5). Consequently, President Zedillo kept dual nationality issue at “the centre of his foreign policy” and National Development Plan, 1995-2000, thereby cementing its importance in Mexican politics (Gutierrez 1997: 1007). However, the PRI introduced dual citizenship in 1996 as a means to curb the opposition’s transnational political activities and to control the diasporas’ resources.

**Table 4.1 Acceptance of Dual Nationality in Western Hemisphere**

<b>Countries</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>Countries</b>	<b>Year</b>
Brazil	1996	Guatemala	1996
Colombia	1991	Mexico	1998
Costa Rica	1995	Nicaragua	2000
Dominican Republic	1994	Panama	1972

Ecuador	1995	Peru	1980
El Salvador	1983	Uruguay	1919

*Source: Jones-Correa 2001: 999*

Prior to the debate in the Congress, the government organised various discussions on advantages and disadvantages of dual nationality. Moreover, congressional committee organised meetings with various human rights organisations and sought their opinions and suggestions before recommending the reforms' passed. It was proved that the reforms had basically no partisan problems and declared that all political parties wanted the bill to pass. Subsequently, Mexican Congressional committee approved the dual nationality bill in June 1996 and Mexican Federal Legislature passed the amendment on 10 December 1996 (Gutierrez 1997: 1008). Subsequently, Mexico withdrew from Montevideo Pact<sup>52</sup> in March 1997.

Migrant sending countries grant political rights to its diasporas with a motive to extract economic resources and market its culture abroad. In the same vein, Mexico also amended its constitution to grant some political rights popularly known as “no-loss of nationality law” and this reform includes articles 30, 32 and 37 of its constitution. This law certifies that anyone born in Mexico or born to Mexican parents wherever they live can assert Mexican nationality even if they acquired citizenship in another country (Brown 2009: 108). Article 30 deals nationality and the ways how it can be acquired. According to Mexican constitution, there are two approaches to acquire Mexican nationality: by birth or by naturalisation. Article 30(a) deals with those who acquired Mexican nationality by birth (*jus soli*)—born in Mexican territory no matter what his/her parent’s nationality may be; born outside Mexico from Mexican parents; and born on Mexican aircrafts and ships (Castaneda 2006: 106). Article 30(b) recognises Mexicans by naturalisation (*jus sanguinis*) are those who apply for and acquire such status; those who wed Mexicans, reside in Mexico and apply for nationality (Ramirez 2000: 319). Prior to 1996 reform, parents—no matter where they are born or from—could pass Mexican nationality to their descendent, provided only that they did not acquire another nationality. According to 1996

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<sup>52</sup> It is an accord signed by Mexico along with eighteen Latin American countries 1933, which seeks to restrict their citizens to single nationalities. However, of these, twelve countries withdrew from accord because of changing patterns of migration and economy. In 1997, Mexico also withdrew from the pact with the same reasons like twelve countries (Gutierrez 1997: 1011).

reform, only the first generation of diasporas and those whose parents either mother or father born in Mexico can claim Mexican nationality (Castaneda 2006: 106).

Article 32 deals with the legal aspects of Mexican nationals. Prior to 1996 reform, Mexicans would be given preference over non-Mexicans for any privilege, employment, which is not restricted solely to its citizens. The law also restricts non-Mexicans or non-citizens to engage in armed forces even in peacetime; armed forces are exclusively reserved for Mexicans by birth. Under 1996 reform, the law gives new regulations to its diasporas in order to evade conflicts with dual citizenship holders. The reform states “The law will regulate the exercise of those rights that Mexican law endows to Mexicans who hold another nationality and will establish the norms and rules to avoid dual nationality conflict. The exercise of public office and functions for which this Constitution requires the need to be Mexican by birth, is reserved to those who hold such quality and do not acquire another nationality” (Castaneda 2006: 106). As such, it restricts dual nationals from anything related to elected office, national security and sovereignty.

Finally, the main amendment included in the dual nationality law was article 37. It talks about how Mexican citizenship would be terminated. In earlier version, the constitution clearly expresses that when migrant(s) acquired nationality in their host countries, he/she would lose Mexican nationality. The 1996 constitutional reform points out all Mexicans by birth must have his/her nationality. In another words, it means a Mexican cannot lose his/her nationality. Mexican who has given up his/her Mexican nationality to acquire foreign nationality can retain his/her Mexican nationality and passport (Brown 2009: 108). It also describes how naturalised Mexicans can lose his/her Mexican nationality. This article points out that Mexican citizenship could be forfeited by those who accept nobility titles, who voluntarily work for another country without the consent of Mexican Congress; who accept or wear the insignias of foreign countries foreign without the approval of Mexican Congress; who admit titles or function of another countries; and who aid foreigner(s) or foreign government(s) against Mexico (Castaneda 2006: 108).

Thus, dual nationality amendments, as a diasporic policy, fundamentally diverge from its traditions and laws. They symbolise a “sharp reversal after decades in which successive



governments either ignored Mexicans expatriates or referred to them as *pochos*, or cultural traitors” (Gutierrez 1997: 1007). The new law means as “the boundedness that Mexican immigrants sustain with respect to their roots, culture, values and national traditions” (Castaneda 2006: 103). It also reverses longstanding constitutional limitations on Mexican dual nationality and enables Mexicans who naturalised in the US to retain or reacquire their Mexican nationality (Schuck 1998: 155). However, 1996 law (amendment), the term ‘citizenship’ and ‘nationality’ show different meaning when it comes to rights and obligations. The constitution bestows upon the Mexican citizens the rights to vote, participate in political and military activities. Nonetheless, these citizenship rights are not extended to dual nationals or excluded from nationality rights. However, they do share with citizens in property ownership, inheritance rights and the rights to work and study in Mexico without visa and own certain stock in Mexican businesses (Gutierrez 1997: 1007).

As argued earlier, Mexico granted dual nationality as a means to extract economic resources of its diaspora. Faist (2001: 15) argues migrant sending countries like Mexico, Philippines, Dominican Republic, etc. are generally granted dual nationality in order to reassure the continued transfer of remittances, investments, knowhow and skills. Granting dual nationality to diasporic members not only allows them to keep formal ties with their communities but also provides them more options to serve their communities back home (Blatter 2008: 20). It also eliminates one of the biggest obstacles to naturalise for Mexicans abroad, “the fear of losing property rights” (Gutierrez 1997: 1012). The reforms enable Mexican nationals to retain their Mexican properties and acquire citizenship in their host countries. By getting citizenship in their host countries, Mexican diasporas can organise to defend their own interests. Thus, the reforms permit US permanent residents of Mexican diaspora to apply for American citizenship without losing their cultural roots and heritage (Gutierrez 1997: 1013).

The dual nationality law of Mexico, which came into force in 1998, makes the procedure completely easy, overseas citizens can apply for it till 2003 at the Mexican consulate, which comes within the jurisdiction of where the applicant live. It confers certain rights and privileges; however, it will be subject to compulsory military service. To obtain it, the applicant(s) had to

fulfill certain requirements.<sup>53</sup> Mexicans who have dual national enjoy rights as well as responsibilities when they enter or leave country. These rights and responsibilities include equal right with other Mexicans before the constitution, the right to study in educational institutions, the right to be a member of *ejidos*, the right to get state sponsored credit and the right to work in Mexico under the protection of national labour law. In addition, they have the right to invest in public as well as private enterprises, which are restricted to foreigners (Carrillo 2004: 106). Apart from economic rights, it also carries a powerful symbolic value as it recovers their original nationality—identity and feeling of belonging (Castaneda 2006: 108).

It is estimated that more than 100,000 Mexican diasporas would retain their Mexican nationality in 1996 alone (Schuck 1998: 155). The Mexican Embassy in the US gone beyond this assumption and argued that 3 million naturalised would recover their Mexican nationality. However, between March 1998 and February 2002, only 44,300 people had recovered their Mexican nationality. On 17 December, 2002, *Partido Accion Nacional* (PAN) announced that there were 54,000 applications for dual nationality. On 20 March, 2003, that was the legal deadline for application shows that only 67,000 people had applied for dual nationality. Recent information shows that this low turnout has not changed. This indicates that the numbers of diasporas who responded to dual nationality law did not match with Mexican government's expectations (Castaneda 2006: 110-111). It has been criticised on various grounds. Activists who were against large influx of legal and illegal immigrants criticised Mexico's dual nationality and argued that Mexico was attempting to influence American politics. They also asserted that dual nationals would change their allegiances towards Mexico and their loyalties towards the US cannot be trusted (Gutierrez 1997: 1013). However, Mexican diasporas support it and stress on property rights and cultural links as motives, rather than political gain (Gutierrez 1997: 1014).

### **Rights and Privileges**

Millions have their hearts in one nation, but live in another; and most also feel at home in two countries. This has resulted from globalisation (interconnected through interdependence) and

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<sup>53</sup> The applicant(s) should attain 18 years and bring original as well as photocopies of birth certificate. Mexican women who married foreigners must present the marriage certificate; those who acquired American citizenship must present either passport or naturalisation certificate and official identity. Also two recent passport size photos and \$12USD in cash, cashier's check or money order (Rose 1999).

immigration. The main concern of immigrant sending countries is to protect the rights and dignity of its diasporas. Dual citizenship serves to restore the rights and dignity of its diasporas, which is increasingly accepted around the world and continues to grow through new laws in several countries. Reflecting to the above argument, Mexico adopted dual nationality law on August 22, 1996, which bases on the principle of “the boundedness that Mexican migrants sustain with respect to their roots, culture, values, and national traditions” (Castaneda 2006: 103-104). However, under dual nationality, different countries grant different rights and privileges to its diasporas. This indicates the degree of its relations with its diasporas and the way its diasporas are useful for country.

Dual nationality is becoming more popular in today’s growing interconnected global economies. Migrant sending countries like India, El Salvador, Philippines, Haiti and Mexico have adopted dual nationality in order to broaden its economic base, foster trade and investment. Such view is shared by many migrant sending countries and Africa’s Brain Drain, an NGO dedicated its works to it in order to translate brain drain into brain gain. As such, one of the benefits of accepting dual nationality is to empower diasporic groups to influence economic and political policies in their host countries in favour of home countries (Tande 2009: 44). Calculating on economic and political benefits, most of the migrant sending countries grant dual nationality to its diasporas, persons with dual national status are accorded equal rights, equal obligations and equal justice in both countries (Jones 2009). Tanzania adopted dual citizenship law in 2010, however, the holders of Tanzanian dual citizenship would enjoy only human rights security and there is no provision of privileges. Chachage (2010) argues this is because dual citizenship is primarily driven by a minority—the educated elite—who want to enjoy more privileges. As such, the holders are enjoying human rights associated with a liberal conception of citizenship in Tanzania. This causes the holders as second class citizens in Europe and America. Jamaica accepts dual citizenship under Nationality Act of 1962, which allows all Jamaicans to retain their former nationality. The current version (amended in 1999) maintains the provision that former nationals by birth, descent or adaptation who renounced their citizenship abroad may resume Jamaican citizenship (Boll 2007: 434). Following this law, Vaz (Jamaican-American) was strike off from membership in the House, simply as he did not renounce his American citizenship (Jones 2009). This is a situation, which opposed to internationally accepted rules of

dual citizenship; it also makes Jamaica the first and the only country in the world with dual citizenship that forces its dual citizen to surrender his democratic rights.

In Philippines, the rights and privileges for dual citizenship holders under Republic Act 9923 have granted full civil and political rights as well as privileges like other citizens of Philippines. They can visit country any time and are exempted from immigration fee and travel tax. In term of property ownership, the dual citizens, under Republic Act 9225, are permitted to buy land and other properties and carry out business activities in the Philippines. Unlike other countries, there is no limit (size of land or real property) for them to be purchased. In term of right to elect and be elected, the dual citizens must fulfil the Republic Act of Number 9189, also called as “The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003,” and other existing laws related to political rights of diaspora. Nevertheless, dual citizens who are occupying any public and who are in active military service in their host countries are ineligible for this privilege (Rianne 2010).

The combination of the above mentioned countries’ provisions that grant rights and privileges to its dual citizenship holders, Mexico under 1996 reform and its consequent amendments provide huge rights and privileges to its dual citizen holders. In terms of economic rights, Fitzgerald (2009: 58) argues the 1996 amendment law allows dual nationals to purchase property adjacent to the coast and border, which are prohibited zones for foreigners. Some of the economic rights also include ability to—directly own oceanfront property without setting up a complicated legal trust; obtain Mexican bank loans to finance a home more easily; and work in Mexico without visa (Roll 2009). The 1996 law was an opportunity for naturalised Mexican Americans in terms of property ownership and investment (Wong 2006: 192). According to MATT organization (2007), Mexico grants the right to own property within a strip of land of 50 kilometres along the Mexican coasts and 100 kilometres along its borders and the right to own a business. It also grants dual nationals to preserve their Mexican property and protect their family inheritances (Gutierrez 1997: 1009). Castaneda (2006: 105) further added that the economic rights included the right to study, purchase properties, work and invest in Mexico without the restrictions. Therefore, he concluded that the concept of dual nationality is a strategy to attract diasporic resources.

Despite, the dual nationality law is perplexing when it comes to political rights— involvement in domestic politics; in reality, it has only facilitated its diasporas to acquire American citizenship. Mexican diasporas have been ranked the lowest acquisition of citizenship among the diasporic groups in the US (Castaneda 2006: 109). However, it differs from dual citizenship because Mexican dual nationality law is mostly related economic activities. The difference surfaces clearly when it comes to exercise political rights, dual nationality does not grant full citizenship rights (Castaneda 2006: 111).

Dual nationality bill was introduced by PRI when it dominated Mexican Congress and article 36 could be included in the reform to grant absentee voting rights. However, the PRI seemingly enabled Mexican diasporas just to connect with Mexico. A political right has been the long demand of Mexican immigrants. As such, in 1994 political reform, the issue of vote abroad was brought by PRD. On 22 August, 1996, in the 56 legislature, a political reform was introduced including article 36 that would open the possibility of absentee voting right. However, article 36 has five (5) terms and conditions for every citizen to exercise his/her political rights and one of them is “one must exercise his/her right to vote in popular elections at his/her electoral district only”. It means citizens exercise this political right only within their electoral district. Nonetheless, there are some options for them to exercise their franchise in border states where special polling stations were set up but such special privilege is reserved for presidential elections only (Castaneda 2006: 113). Once the terms and conditions in article 36 were omitted, absentee voting right would be possible.

To address this problem, a group of Mexican diaspora came to Mexico City in early 1998 to press the IFE and a Specialist Commission was formed. This Commission submitted its findings to IFE on November 12, 1998 and recommended that political rights had to be respected (Castaneda 2006: 115). However, it did not happen during the PRI presidency. Therefore, Carrillo (2004: 110) argues that 1996 amendment did not grant the right to vote, but when PAN won presidential election in 2000, thousands of Mexicans sought absentee voting and special voting booths be set up along the border. In response to this demand, the PAN along with PRD and diasporas rights advocates pushed for absentee voting. Under this pressure, the Mexican Congress overwhelmingly approved absentee voting for immigrants on 28 June, 2005 (Castaneda

2006: 122). Therefore, MATT (2007) argues that Mexican dual nationality law granted all political rights such as the right to exercise their franchise in popular elections, the right to associate peacefully, individually and freely to take part in the political matters of the country and the right to petition. The 1996 and 2005 reforms legally allowed immigrants the right exercise franchise as well as contest in popular elections.

An estimated 11 million Mexicans, about 14 per cent of its electorate, lived overseas, mostly in the US in 2006. However, according to Geis (2006), out of 11 million Mexican diasporas only 16000 had registered to exercise their political right in 2006 presidential election, in which absentee voting was counted for the first time. This low response cropped up different opinion about absentee voting. As per Geis' survey, the process of exercising their political right was too unwieldy, too time-consuming and dealing with too many government departments to get it a usable process. The voting was not worthwhile to immigrants whose focus is to live a better life live in the US. On top of that, Mexican citizens must show their voter card at the time of casting their vote, many immigrants' voter cards were destroyed by the smugglers so people were not recognised as Mexicans (Geis 2006).

In terms of right to be elected, the dual nationality law of Mexico accepted with certain conditions—he or she (the contestant) should live in Mexico for at least a year. Mexico granted its expatriates right to participate in its domestic politics, mainly based on three factors:

- (1) the economic and political impact of migrant organisations (hometown associations) and the creation of strong state institutions (Programme for Mexicans Communities Abroad [1990] and Presidential Office For Mexican Abroad [2000]) to serve them;
- (2) a change of government and the absence of an absolute majority in the legislature; and
- (3) an eventual cross-border political coalition between migrant groups and non-PRI political parties (Jimenez-Cuen 2008: 6).

These three factors influenced Mexican politicians to grant right to expatriates to be elected in local governments. President Vicente Fox called Mexican immigrants the heroes of Mexico in his 2000 campaign. Andres Bermudez,<sup>54</sup> who was born in Mexico but naturalised as

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<sup>54</sup> Bermudez was a poor Mexican farmer, who illegally immigrated to the US in 1974 and became one of the most successful businessmen among Mexican diaspora. He has large tomato farms in Winters, employed many Mexicans

an American citizen, retained his Mexican nationality under dual nationality law and ran for mayor and won in his home town of Jerez, Zacatecas in July 2001 election (Quinones 2001). He was later stripped of his victory by Mexico's Federal Electoral Institute. In its ruling, the Institute stated that Bermudez did not fulfil the residency requirement of his home states Zacatecas—he returned to live there only eight months, and not the requisite twelve months, before election (Smith 2010). This clearly showed that he could contest again after a year of his staying in the state. Furthermore, Juan Hernandez was the first Mexican American to hold Mexican cabinet position and headed the Presidential Office for Mexican Abroad [2000-2002] (Duncan 2004: 246); Candido Morales<sup>55</sup> was the second Mexican American to hold cabinet position in Mexico and he was the former director of IME (Presidency of the Republic, 2002). Though many scholars argue that Mexican dual nationality is different from citizenship, however, it is clear from the above arguments that dual citizens are equal with Mexicans in every aspect.

### **Expansion of Consular Protection**

For the last two or more decades, changes in Mexico's policies towards its nationals abroad, particularly with those who are settling in the US point out the importance of its diaspora for both Mexico and US given its large size, economic strength and growing political participation across international borders. In the light of this, granting dual nationality in 1996 to its diaspora hold the key factor that determines Mexico's ability to expand of its consular protection towards its diasporas. These changes started in 1988 presidential election, however, at the government's policies started in January 1990 when PRI government established PCME. The PCME was established to regularise relations with Mexican diasporic populations, focusing on those who are living in the US so as to influence American Congress on important issues that concerns Mexico, particularly, the passage of NAFTA in favour of Mexico (de la Garza and DeSipio 1998: 404).

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immigrants, especially, the Jerezanos in his farms. After almost 30, he returned to Jerez to contest for mayoral election. His candidacy for mayor was the consequence of dual citizenship (Quinones 2001).

<sup>55</sup> He was born in 1945 in Oaxaca and immigrated to the US in 1953, when he was just about 8 years old. He lived and completed his education in Healdsburg, California. He was a successful social worker, worked in California Human Development Corporation, and elevated to Vice President and Director of Communications. As an excellent social worker he served director of various development programmes to help Hispanic communities in California. He is (2003) the chairman of the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce of Sonoma County. It is sure that he is the most qualified candidate to lead the IME, an institution sincerely working to strengthen the ties between Mexicans at home and abroad and to promote social development of all Mexicans (Presidency of the Republic 2002).

PCME enables Mexican consulates to foster a long-term relationship between Mexico and its immigrant communities and Mexican American as well as their leaders (Gutierrez 1997: 50). Although these immigrant communities do not come under consular protection, the PCME adopted an open and pluralist definition, which was more political than legal to unite Americans of Mexican origin to their ancestors (Gutierrez 1997: 56). The introduction of dual nationality in 1996 was means to grant more rights and privileges for their security in Mexico as well as in the US. The IOM argues that dual nationality law is a proactive consular policy, which aims to link immigrant communities with Mexico, protect their social, labour and political rights, maintain cultural and educational values, etc. To do this, Mexico is modifying its consulates' activities after consultation with its citizens, identifying their problems and solutions for those problems for its nationals abroad through effective action. To serve them better, Mexico increases its consulates from 45 (1990) to 50 (in the early 2000s) in the US. These consulates render legal assistance to victims of human rights violations, special programmes for immigrant minors and international adaptation and also legal assistance to those who are under sentence of death (IOM 2003: 177).

When Vicente Fox assumed presidential office in 2000, he increases policies and programmes for the security of Mexicans abroad. He initiated NAFTA-Plus plan, which aims to include all aspects of interactions and relationships between North American countries. In his NAFTA-plus scheme, North American community was the central idea, which attempts to achieve free movement of people, common currency and shared passport similar to European Union (Carlsen 2003). It also targets to solve immigration problems between them, remove the idea of militarisation of border and illegal status of all Mexican immigrants (Cooper 2004: 69). To meet this aim and better secure the rights and security of Mexican communities abroad especially in the US, Fox established OPME in 2000.

The official purposes of the OPME were to attend millions of Mexican nationals abroad, particularly those who settle in the US as citizens, residents, temporary workers and illegal immigrants. Dr. Hernandez, the director of OPME, dedicated at least three days of each week in the US; held meetings and discussions with American governors, state and federal officials and also with Mexican diasporic groups, associations and its leaders. He serves as a medium of



communication between Mexican government and its diaspora—hearing their complaints, settling their demands and problems and receiving numerous petitions from millions of diasporas (Wall 2002). He also advocates and lobbies hard for illegal immigrants’ access to public education and health care and makes them easier and cheaper to wire remittances back home. He advocates new laws in the US that would provide amnesty to illegal immigrants and open the borders once and for all (Duncan 2004: 246). The main target of OPME is to secure better treatment of Mexican nationals abroad (Tulchin and Selee 2003: 20).

He established National Council for Mexican Abroad in 2002; the council includes Mexican American and its main goal is to empower Mexican consulates that the protection of Mexican nationals abroad is one of the topmost duties of Mexican consulates (Salum 2004). He reorganised *Grupo Beta* in 2001; under this new scheme, the *Grupo Beta* is focused on protection of illegal immigrants from brigands, carrying out rescue operation and providing information about how they should cross border safely (Migration News 2001). National Migration Institute (INM) has a multimedia crusade appealing people to report smugglers to a free-toll telephone number and to shun crossing border illegally in dangerous zones or places. Moreover, in 2005, INM started distributing a booklet for illegal immigrants with detailed information on how to evade the major risks (Fitzgerald 2009: 60).

In response to 9/11 terrorist attacks and Bush’s redefinition of US-Mexico border as a potential line of terrorist entry, Fox reintroduced *matricula* card in March 2002. It enables Mexican nationals to gain access to various social services, obtain drivers and business licenses, open bank accounts, register children in schools and send remittances more securely (Allatson 2007: 156). It was estimated that by July 2004, four million Mexicans could get their cards, and that hundreds of US cities and counties, 33 states, nearly 1200 police departments and 178 financial institutions would accept it as a valid form of identification. He established Institute for Mexicans Abroad in 2003 to sensitise the rights and interest of Mexicans abroad and address the immigrants’ problems (IME 2003). He also reinforced *Paisano* Programme to “supervise and guarantee the well treatment of travellers” (Mala 2005).

All these policies and programmes sought to secure more rights and interests of Mexican nationals abroad, particularly in the US, through consular protection. Mexico has 45 (now 50)

consulates in the US. The need for active protection strategy of Mexican government emerged when thousands of Mexicans remained in the territory it lost to the US and the constant flows of migratory workers from Mexico. The Mexican government has always made clear that protection of Mexicans abroad is the highest priority of its foreign policy. Since 1848, Mexico has been providing consular protection to its nationals abroad as a part of its political culture and the consuls are responsible to perform their job on these foundations (Gutierrez 1993: 227). In 1942, Mexico and the US signed a Consular Convention,<sup>56</sup> which strengthens each country's consular officers' right to protect their nationals, to visit any of the nationals who are imprisoned or detained and to assist their nationals. In 1986, it also instituted PLCDMA with a view to ameliorate the function of its consuls in addressing the concerns of its diasporas related to legal proceedings (Quigley, et al. 2010: 233). Since 1990 Mexico established various policies and programmes of consular protection for its nationals in the US. Mexican consular officers have spent considerable time, energy and resources on capital cases over the years (Warren 2008).

Mexico also instituted the Mexican Capital Legal Assistance Programme (MCLAP)<sup>57</sup> in the US in 2000. With this programme, Mexico along with its consular officials and defence counsel promotes legal awareness among its diasporas (Quigley, et al. 2010: 233). Through this programme, Mexico has intervened in more than 100 capital cases to defend the rights of its nationals. In such cases, Mexico's overriding concern is to ensure each national receives an adequate legal defence from competent defence counsel. To get better results, Mexican consular officers provide funds for expert, investigative assistance, assist in gathering evidence in preparation for the guilt and penalty phases of capital trials. In others, consular officers support defendants' attempts to obtain more qualified counsel (Warren 2008). To enhance these programmes, in 2002 Mexico adopted legislation that "establishes a comprehensive legal framework pursuant to which Mexican consular officials must intervene directly to protect the

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<sup>56</sup> The Consular Agreement of 1942, the first of its kind between the two countries, declared that consular agents could protect the rights of their citizens by representing them before federal, state and local authorities in the host country. This agreement broadened Mexico's right to intervene on behalf of its nationals beyond the rights and privileges granted under *Bracero* Programme agreement. They signed Consular Agreement in 1942 in order to continue *Bracero* Programme with mutual respect (Zamora 2009: 72).

<sup>57</sup> It was created in 2000 by the Mexican Foreign Ministry, which was "established to provide experienced legal, forensic, and financial support to defense counsel around the country who represent Mexican nationals charged with capital crimes." It provides comprehensive assistance in the defense of any Mexican national facing the death penalty. Mexico also implemented MCLAP to improve the quality of its consular assistance programme in capital cases (Warren 2008).

rights of Mexican national.” Based on this legislation, on 9 January, 2003, Mexico instituted lawsuits against the US in the ICJ. It alleged that forty-four of its nationals had been “arrested, detained, tried, convicted and sentenced them to death in proceedings in which the competent authorities failed to comply with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) obligations” (Quigley, et al. 2010: 233). MCLAP’s most important objective was to avert the death penalty in future cases and prevent the execution of those nationals already condemned to death.

### **Mexico’s Security Relations with US**

There are many migration related problems which Mexico cannot resolve alone, therefore, any diasporic policy and programme is incomplete without proper engagement with the US. A proper engagement with the US is a part of Mexico’s effective diasporic policy as 98.5 per cent of its diasporas are living in the US. Rightly then Mexico declared immigration problem was a bilateral issue. In response to this move, Fox and Bush acknowledged immigration was a shared problem and concurred to establish a high-level commission on bilateral migration issue to make migration between them more orderly, humane and legal (Council on Foreign Relations 2009: 43).

US had been the only source of credible threat and main exporter of problems to Mexico’s international security during the twentieth century (Dominguez and de Castro 2009: 35). Indeed, the US intervened in Mexico in 1836, 1847-1848, 1914 and 1917 and in the minds of many Mexicans, these armed interventions along with constant encroachments in political, social, economic, cultural, are very fresh and bitter. Perhaps, the best expression to explain Mexican sentiment is credited to Mexico’s former president, Porfirio Diaz’s “Poor Mexico; so far from God, so close to the US”. His statement meant that Mexico did not have committed and cordial military relationship with the US (Deare 2009: 2). However, since 1940 shows that regardless of their past divergent views on defence, the military relationship between them had changed gradually towards greater cooperation.

Such positive and greater cooperation with the US in defence occurred during the World War II. When President Laro Cardenas voluntarily offered Mexico’s support to US including defence cooperation and also allowed American forces to use its territory. This offer produced

many positive results in their defence relations and the best was the establishment of the Joint Mexico-US Defence Commission (JMUSDC) in 1942. The commission was assigned to study their common defence problems; to deliberate broad plans of defence for both Mexico and US; and to suggest greater defence cooperation between the two countries (Deare 2009: 23). However, from the end of World War II until late 1960s, Mexico and US had a stable security relationship. It was a period of Mexico's international security strategy of abnegation.<sup>58</sup> This policy of abnegation created many positive images of Mexico in international arena. There have been no Mexican presidents with a military background since 1946 and Mexico was the only Latin American country to experience no military coup (Dominguez and de Castro 2009: 41) was the main reason for this image building.

However, in the 1970s changes occurred in security relations, when both countries enacted illegal drug law. This law brought the two countries together and they agreed to have a joint 'Operation Condor'<sup>59</sup>. With this joint operation, Mexico began to accept helicopters, specialised aircrafts, spare parts, pilot training and other forms of American assistance in large degrees. This cooperative relationship exploded in 1985 with the assassination of Enrique Camarena, the American chief agent of DEA in Guadalajara in Mexico. In response to this incident, the US launched 'Operation Intercept II'<sup>60</sup> and pressed on aggressively with a unilateral strategy to combat drug trafficking (Dominguez and de Castro 2009: 42). This policy alarmed Mexico and goaded it to unveil new policies aimed at countering the double threat to its security drug trafficking and the unilateral action of American government. President Zedillo perception of Mexico's security was based on:

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<sup>58</sup> Mexican governments since the revolution recognised that Mexico was a weak state incapable to confront US on its own. International alliance to balance or encounter US power proved impractical. As such, its strategy of abnegation aims to avoid military alliance with American rival; not to challenge American military; to rely on many international suppliers of weapons; and to cooperate little with the US over international security issues (Dominguez and de Castro 2009: 35-36).

<sup>59</sup> Toro (1999: 628) argues when Mexico became one of the major producers of opium and marijuana and became the main supplier of drugs to American market and transit centre of cocaine. The US tried to launch a unilateral antinarcotics campaign but Mexico opposed the move and asked for a joint operation. The joint operation was known as 'Operation Condor'. The operation has aimed to eradicate of crops, prohibit drugs in transit centre and disrupt drug-trafficking organisations.

<sup>60</sup> The assassination of American Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) chief agent, Enrique Camarena and the lack of full cooperation from Mexican government forced Commissioner of Customs William Von Raab to authorise a six-day Operation Intercept-style to suppress drug dealers as well as producers on the Mexican border. The operation was to force Mexico into greater cooperation and greater toleration for its unilateral incursions into Mexico by American security operative (Dominguez and de Castro 2009: 42).

- (1) to safeguard Mexico's national security, protect national sovereignty, national territory and strengthen private and public institutions;
- (2) to look after the health of Mexican citizens; and
- (3) to foster international bilateral and multilateral cooperation based on the principle of co-responsibility (Dominguez and de Castro 2009: 43).

In reality, the relation between the two countries was not smooth until early 1990s. During the administration of Salinas's perception began to change, leading to trade ties between the two countries and signing of NAFTA. Following the common trade and economic interests, the main transformative phase in defence relations was between 1995 and 1997, when even the two countries' defence secretaries, William J. Perry and General Cervantes developed a professional and intimate relationship. In 1994, General Cervantes visited Pentagon, met Secretary Parry and also invited him to visit Mexico. Though many official invitations had been extended to American Defence Secretaries, this invitation was the first to be accepted by the American Defence Secretary and in 1995, Secretary Perry was the first-ever Defence secretary to visit Mexico (Craig 2009: 3). During his visit, Secretary Parry suggested and General Cervantes accepted to establish a Mexico-US Bilateral Working Group (BWG), a forum that would involve Defence and State Departments of US and Mexican Defence, navy and Foreign Ministries. The two countries give high degree of attention to the BWG and a number of sub-working groups were instituted viz, those of counternarcotics, disaster relief, education, training and technology. Important coordination commenced at the first BWG meeting at San Antonio, Texas in 1995. General Cervantes made a reciprocal visit to US in 1996, where the two secretaries established several proposals for cooperation, including transfer of 73 UHIU helicopters to Mexican air force (Craig 2009: 3).

Emboldened by the success of BWG, President Clinton and Zedillo signed an official Declaration of the US-Mexico Alliance Against Drug in 1997. The declaration would seek to identify drug trafficking; treat it as a common threat to both countries; and vow to eliminate the problem. It not only sought to "consolidate, organise and rationalise" the bilateral counter-drug effort but also would establish a High Level Contact Group for Drug Control (HLCG), headed by Secretary of State and Attorney General of both countries. HLCG met annually between 1996 and 2001 in order to identify the problems, discover progress and was superseded by other

agencies like the Binational Commission and Senior Law Enforcement Plenary Group to continue the high-level attention to the problem. As per of bilateral agreement, Zedillo administration took extraordinary measures in its antidrug campaign. Thousands of police were dismissed; over a third of the members of Federal Judicial Police were fired. Hundreds of officers died in this literal drug war. The Bush and Clinton administrations responded constructively to Mexico; their predominant response was to foster an institutionalised economic cooperation. The security relations, however, had remained institutionalised and marked by cyclical crises (Dominguez and de Castro 2009: 44).

### *Security Relations in 21 Century*

The relationship between the two countries is notably important and unique due to contiguity. Mexico and US share not only a 2000 miles international border and historical social, economic and cultural ties. The election of Fox as Mexico's president in 2000 marked a new era of understanding between the two countries. The new era of bilateral relations was accompanied with the election of George W. Bush in 2000. Bush administration gave priority to Mexico and was keened to engage with it, as is evident from his announcement made just five days ahead of 9/11 attacks,

Mexico is an incredibly important part of the American foreign policy. It is our most important relationship, because Mexico is our neighbour, and neighbour must work together (Schaefer et al. 2009: 8).

As mentioned earlier, Fox proposed the creation of community of North America through NAFTA-plus, many observers argued and advocated permanent open borders and the creation of a community of North America. However, all these proposals changed by the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Bush administration not only imposed strict security measures along the Mexico-US border, but also called for global war on terrorism (Hufbauer and Vega-Canovas 2003: 133). The 9/11 terrorist attacks has completely changed the priorities of American foreign policy, and for Mexico, immigration accord with the US would not be possible. After 9/11 terrorist attacks, the US has, in every aspect, focused on its security and terrorism. However, Fox's yearn for North American integration did not disappear and in fact, he added defence component to his vision. Soon after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on US, Fox declared:

We consider that the struggle against terrorism forms part of a commitment of Mexico to Canada and the US, as a result of the need to construct the framework of the NAFTA within which we build a shared space for development, wellbeing, and integral security. At the hemispheric level, Mexico considers that the current struggle against terrorism is a basic component of our regional security that demands a redefinition of a doctrine of continental security and a redesign of the legal and diplomatic instruments for our legitimate defence (Dominguez and de Castro 2010: 20).

However, when US went for war in Afghanistan and prepared for another war in Iraq, Fox opposed US war policy in Iraq. At home, Bush created a new 'Department Homeland Security' with immense powers. These extensive security policies would have outrageous implications for Mexico (Hufbauer and Vega-Canovas 2003: 133). The American Congress had passed as many as five separate laws between 2001 and 2006 concentrated on border enforcement; restricted access to courts for particular classes of illegal immigrants; and enhanced systems for identifying illegal immigrants and sharing electronic information. These new laws also transferred immigration authority to Department of Homeland Security; thus, the Binational Immigration Working Group lost its function and powers and no new institution established to discuss immigration issues between the two countries (Rosenblum 2011: 12). The relations between the two countries were further deteriorated when Mexico, as a temporary member of UN Security Council, voted against American invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Despite the strained relations, President Bush came to Monterrey, Mexico, on 22 March 2002, to attend the International Conference on 'Financing for Development'; took part in a NAFTA meeting and had a brief discussion with Fox on Mexico-US relations. In that discussion, Bush and Fox declared many initiatives, including

- (a) US-Mexico Border Partnership Action Plan (Smart Border) with enormous cooperation and technological improvement at their international border;
- (b) Partnership for Prosperity Action Plan to promote investment in migration sending regions in Mexico;
- (c) agree to pursue legislative support to develop the authorisation of the North American Development Bank and the Border Environment Cooperation Commission to sponsor environmental development along the border; and
- (d) agree to carry on the cabinet-level discussions to accomplish safe, legal and orderly migration flow between them (Storrs 2005: 5).

The plan (Smart Border) aimed to secure the borders for goods and people and to keep them open. Following the plan, Mexico launched Operation Sentinel in March 2003 to beef up security along its northern and southern borders and secure its airports, ports, oil platforms and other key installations (Dominguez and de Castro 2010: 20). In March 2004, President Bush and Fox met at Crawford, Texas; where Fox articulated the “North American Initiative”, which aimed to maximise trade and systematise energy sector, and establish a North American security framework to protect the North American countries from terrorism (Diez and Nicholls 2009: 2). Based on Fox’s proposal, Bush, Fox and Paul Martin declared the formation of Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) of North America in March 2005. It would seek to improve the “position of North American industries in global market and to provide greater economic opportunity for all our societies, while maintaining high standards of health and safety for our people” (Stock 2006: 112). On the security front, the SPP would safeguard the region from external threats, collectively prevent and response to all threats in the region (Stock 2006: 112). Therefore, since 9/11 Mexico became more important military partner for US particularly with regard to border security issues.

The North American countries agreed to continue the plan of SPP by focusing on a number of high priority initiative. The three countries set up various working groups to monitor their security. At the North American Leaders’ Summit in Montebello in August 2007, Bush, Harper and Calderon acknowledged the progress of various working groups of SPP and gave greatest importance to them. The goal of SPP, in security aspect, was to coordinate the security system adopted by each country to protect their citizens from terrorist and transnational threats and promote safe and effective transition of legitimate people and goods. To accomplish the above mentioned goals, the working groups were divided into three under broad subjects: 1) external and transnational threats; 2) secured their shared border; and 3) collective prevention and response to any threats within North America. Ten expert security groups were established to address security of travellers, cargo, border, aviation, and maritime (Villarreal and Lake 2008: 3). The three also issued a joint statement in August 2007, which highlighted many security measures to secure North America including lessening repeat screening for luggage and cargo; computerising the law enforcement agencies in border areas; enhancing radio communication



between them; and identifying means and ways to further their cooperation on border security (Villarreal and Lake 2008: 3).

Another aspect of Mexico's security relations with the US is Merida Initiative, an American military aid package to Mexico. It was initiated by President Bush and Calderon in March 2007 (SRE 2007). Officials of both administrations met frequently between April and June 2007, to map out the basic framework of the proposed package, which largely concentrated on equipping material and technical support Mexico's security forces to eliminate drug trafficking and other criminal organisations. Bush signed Merida Initiative into law on 30 June 2008, which transfers around \$400 million worth of US support to Mexico's security forces in its initial year (Dominguez and de Castro 2010: 23). To make the initiative beneficial for both countries, the American State Department outlined the detailed spending plan of Merida funding in September 2008, including the acquisition of airplanes and helicopters for counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism operations (American States Department 2008a: 5); the acquisition of scanners and armoured vehicles from US; the creation of law enforcement databank; and the training of specialised police forces to eliminate organised crime and corruption within the federal police (American States Department 2008a: 6-7).

Merida Initiative was an acknowledgement of "shared responsibility" to eliminate drug trafficking. It was initially sought to (a) terminate the power and strength of criminal organisations; (b) consolidate border, air and marine security; (c) enhance the capacity of judicial systems; and (d) truncate illegal gang activity and lessen local drug demand. To attain its objectives, it trains and equips Mexican security forces (Seekle and Finklea 2013: 16). Under it, Mexico called for the exchange of intelligence and focused on American support for training Mexican forces. At the same time, US will make law to curb drug demand. However, Mexico insisted that no American troops would enter Mexican territory, nor would American civilian agents participate in operation in Mexico (Dominguez and de Castro 2010: 23). Although, this is not within the coverage of this thesis, yet worthy to note that in March 2010, Calderon and Obama concurred to set up new strategic structure of security cooperation under the Merida Initiative. The new strategy focused on: (a) to break up organised criminal organisations; (b) to establish the rule of law by eliminating local and transnational illegal organisations; (c) to build a

smart border suitable for 21 century; and (d) to build strong and communities (Seekle and Finklea 2013: 17). This new strategy calls for gradually withdrawal of American efforts and emphasis more on training and technical assistance to Mexican security and strengthening justice system in Mexico.

In addition to the law enforcement factor, it also mentions preventive measures such as online training of drug treatment counsellors, 'rule of law', 'human rights activities' and judicial reforms in Mexico (American State Department 2008a: 4). Although human rights was a side features of the initiative, however, it mentions that at least 15 per cent of funding would be set aside until Mexico attains four particular human rights goals. These are (a) enhance the transparency and accountability of Mexico's police forces; (b) guarantee civilian prosecutors, police and military forces who have committed human rights violations are punished in accordance with domestic and international laws; (c) eliminate the usage of testimony acquired through torture as evidence in court; and (d) establish a proper technique to consult civil society for the implementation of Merida Plan (American State Department 2008). The proper engagement with the US on security issue and the inclusion of human rights component in Merida Plan expands the scope of Mexico's diasporic policies and programmes.

### **Mexico's Cultural Relations with US**

In terms of cultural relations, the COMEXUS is the current and main pillar that determines Mexico's cultural relations with US. COMEXUS was a bilateral agreement signed on 27 November 1990 and came into force on the same day. Its main goal is to enhance cross-cultural understanding between the two countries through educational exchange programmes. The COMEXUS in collaboration with America's Fulbright programme gives grants to students, scholars and teachers for one-year cultural exchange programmes. The grants mean for teaching and studying in Mexico for Americans teachers and students and the same for Mexicans in the US (Gish 2010).

The history of Mexico's cultural relations with US can be traced back to 1920. Prior to 1920, frequent tensions and mutual disdain had prevented both countries to learn much about the culture, art, music and literature produced in the creative spheres. But the end of First World War and Mexican Revolution along with various general world changes in 1920s and 1930s,

established the groundwork for flowering of cultural relations between Mexico and US. In this new relationship, the Mexican arts and pre-Columbian culture and artifacts enjoyed its popularity and influence in the US. Mexico found culture as vehicles of diplomacy that could promote beneficial political and economic interactions. In addition, increased travel between the two countries is a significant aspect of cultural relations in this period (Long 2009: 21). On the other hand, after the Mexican revolution (1910-1920), Mexican government introduced a number of literacy programmes for Mexicans abroad particular for those who were living in the US. President Lazaro Cardenas (1934-1940) oversaw a more inclusive approach to literacy, including both literacy programmes and the production of literacy booklets in Indian language. The *Instituto Nacional Indigenista* (National Indigenous Institute), established in 1948 to improve reading and writing skill among the Mexico's Indian population. At the start of 1960s, the Mexican government initiated an 11 year project of educational reform. This process pushed US to abolish segregated schooling in 1954 and introduced bilingual education programmes in late 1960s (Stacy 2002: 466-467). Mexico supports the introduction of bilingual education and argues that it has several advantages—(1) it increases individual capacity for academic and general development; (2) it strengthens cultural ties; (3) it opens new window to sow its culture abroad; and (4) it preserves Mexican cultural values abroad (Leiken 2000: 25).

However, in 1990 Mexico strengthened its connection with the NABE and various NGOs working on bilingual education in the US as well as NASDME. Since early 1990, many government officials and educators from Mexico have often presented their intellectual papers at NABE conferences. Acknowledging the Mexicans' contribution in American bilingual education, the NABE awarded its Presidential Prize to Mexico in 2007 (Leiken 2000: 25). In Mexico, the Teacher Exchange Programme was supervised by PCME, which sent 450 Mexican teachers to US. In addition to Teacher Exchange Programme, the COMEXUS also promotes English Teacher Exchange Programme and added two programmes—"Summer English Workshops in the US" and "School Connection" in 2003. These two programmes have heightened the connection between COMEXUS and SEP in providing quality English language in various Mexican schools (Working Group on Education 2003).

As mentioned earlier, the current cultural relation is regulated by COMEXUS. Its main mission is to boost understanding between them through education and cultural exchange. To this end, the Commission offers several scholarship programmes—through the Fulbright programme—for teachers, managers, professors students and researchers in two countries (Embassy of the US 2005). COMEXUS targets to enable individuals who have international experience to cement and further Mexico-US relationship. With a mutual understanding in 1992, the COMEXUS renamed Fulbright scholarship as “Fulbright-Garcia Robles” in accolade of retired ambassador and winner of Nobel Peace Prize, Alfonso Garcia Robles. This prestige scholarship is sponsored by two countries to prominent students, teachers and researchers (Embassy of the US 2008).

To achieve better result in their cultural relations, the two countries use ‘Binational Migrant Education Strategic Plan’ as guideline to increase teachers and information exchange programme. The current activities between the two countries in education to promote cultural understanding include the distribution and acceptance of migrant student transfer certificate and free distribution of Mexican textbooks in American schools. Under COMEXUS, the two countries also work with the Department of Homeland Security to issue more visas for Mexican teachers who wish to teach dual language programmes in American public schools (Working Group on Education 2003).

Under COMEXUS administration, cooperation in higher education keeps on promoting students and faculties exchange, joint curriculum development and information sharing. This cooperation is implemented by the Programme to Promote Quality and Mobility, North American Studies Programme and EI NET Programme. The COMEXUS since 1992 sponsored more than 2000 Mexican and American teachers, students and faculty members under Fulbright-Garcia Robles scholarship. In 2003, under this programme, 102 American educators and students were brought to Mexico (Working Group on Education 2003). In 2008, the programme brought 80 American students and professors to Mexico, who spent their academic year in Mexico. Some of them taught English in Mexican educational institutions, some worked in renowned Mexican companies and others studied Mexican history, culture and art (Embassy of the US 2008). In 2009, it brought 65 American students and professors to Mexico and 200 Mexicans to US for

teaching as well as studying in various educational institutions (Embassy of the US 2009). Fulbright-Garcia Robles scholarship makes students, researchers and teachers to foster better understanding their projects. In addition, Mexico and US cultural relations are strengthened by the North American Programme for Higher Education Mobility that has sponsored 70 trilateral partnership, involving 400 educational institutions, since 1995 (Working Groups on Education 2003).

In Mexico, the COMEXUS carries out plan for building better understanding with the US, Mexican diasporic associations and its leaders. These are grants for students (all discipline and graduate degree programme), grants for scholars (all discipline) and teacher exchange programmes. The main objectives of these grants and programmes include to (1) develop understanding about educational systems between US and Mexico; (2) promote closer international education ties among teachers, schools, districts and state education agencies; (3) promote understanding and goodwill among professionals involved in the education of children on both sides of the border; (4) share methodology, instructional materials and models of dual language instruction; and (5) provide workshops and co-teach in a class room setting (Gouwens 2001: 63). Therefore, those who received grants and involved in the programmes are expected to—(1) work on promoting the Mexican culture and traditions amongst Hispanic origin communities; (2) conduct workshop on Mexican history and culture, reading and writing and the Mexican education system to teachers and parents; (3) counsel the elaboration and use of didactic materials, as well as study programme contents to improve the educational efforts aimed to the Mexican origin children and juveniles living in the US; and (4) develop joint working efforts with American authorities and teachers on the educational systems of both countries. Thus, Mexico-US cultural relations enhance Mexico's diasporic policies and programmes in various ways.

Globalisation and democratisation compelled migrant sending countries to grant dual citizenship. Different country used it to achieve its foreign policy. Russia used it to maintain its domination and hegemony (Zevelev 2001: 133-134). For Mexico, dual citizenship was to maintain and strengthen relations with its diasporic populations; promote their wellbeing; and empowers them to defend their interests in Mexico as well as in the US (de la Garza 1997: 75).

Mexico under 1996 constitutional reform and its consequent amendments provide huge rights and privileges to its dual national holders, the right to exercise absentee vote in general and local elections; right to own property within a strip of land of 50 kilometres along the Mexican coasts and 100 kilometres along its borders; the right to own a business; right to be elected in popular elections; the right to associate themselves pacifying individually and freely to take part in the political matters of the country, and the right to petition (MATT 2007). Mexican dual nationality law highlighted the significance of its diaspora—its large size, its growing economic and political power across borders. In the light of this, granting dual citizenship to its diaspora hold the key factor that determines Mexico's security and cultural relations with them. The IOM argues that dual citizenship is a proactive consular policy, which aims to link immigrant communities with Mexico and protect their basic rights. On top of that, Mexico increases its consulates to 45 (51) and diversifies its activities in the US. The Mexican consulates in the US provide legal assistance and defence programmes for its citizens (IOM 2003: 177). In addition to dual national law, Fox, in his part, initiated NAFTA-Plus plan, which aims to establish community of North America. The term community of North America means free movement of people and goods across the international border. Fox's plan targets to solve immigration problems between Mexico and US and eliminate militarization of border (Cooper 2004: 69). Fox also reintroduced *matricula* card in March 2002, which enables Mexican nationals to gain access to various social services, obtain drivers and business licenses, open bank accounts, register children in schools and send remittances more securely (Allatson 2007: 156).

There are many migration related problems which Mexico cannot resolve alone so proper engagement with US is a part of Mexico's effective diasporic policy as 98.5 per cent of its diaspora living there. Migration was acknowledged as a shared problem and President Fox and Bush agreed to establish a high-level commission on migration to suggest means and ways to make migration between them more orderly, humane and legal. In terms of cultural relations, the COMEXUS a bilateral agreement signed in 1990 gives grants to students, scholars and teachers for one year for teaching and studying in Mexico for Americans and for Mexicans in the US (Gish 2010). Thus, Mexican dual citizenship is a self-centric policy aiming to protect and enhance the cultural and security of its diaspora. In essence, the dual nationality law, the

expansion of consular protection and increased security and cultural relations with the US were directly promoting its diasporas' rights, dignity and identity in the US.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### DIASPORIC ASSOCIATIONS AND MEXICAN CULTURAL PROGRAMMES AND POLICIES

Immigrant organisations are established based on their members' shared experiences and interests, be it professions, ethnic affiliations, or a common hometown in their host countries. Orozco (2007) defines hometown associations (HTAs)<sup>61</sup> as "organisations that allow immigrants from the same city or region to maintain ties with and materially support their places of origin." Fox and Bada (2008: 443) define HTAs more broadly as "migrant membership organisations formed by people from the same community of origin." Immigrants established HTAs as a way to connect with the newly arrived immigrants from their home communities. These associations helped immigrants socially and emotionally as they adapted to their new environments. These associations later began to collect funds to sponsor development projects in their hometown. These projects included roads, sewage systems, educational scholarships, etc. Policymakers in home countries are interested in diasporic role to promote development either through transfer of money, knowledge, skills and ideas or return home. In contrast, policymakers in host countries view HTAs as signs of detachment and worry that such associations act as obstacles to their members' successful integration (Somerville et al. 2008: 2). However, diasporic associations have supported both immigrants integration in their host countries and community development at home.

For many diasporic groups, their top priority is maintaining tie with their families and friends back home. Most of them often mail, call and sometime visit their native place and send remittances regularly. Such connections with their homelands enabled them to maintain their cultural identities as well. Here, the hometown associations serve as a new or another type of forum which brings both diasporas and homelands together for better relationships. However, these associations are formed by immigrants with similar backgrounds (religion, place of origin or ethnic group). HTAs flourished in many immigrant receiving countries such as US, Europe,

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<sup>61</sup> Hometown associations are grassroots political organizations—institutions of local governance (in host countries) that are an essential part of the struggle which migrants strive to protect and provide for themselves and their families in host countries as well place of origin. It is an institution of flexibility, giving their members/participants ways of resolving their problems in a flexible and responsive manner (Honey 2004: 124).



Canada and some parts of Asia (Orozco and Rouse 2007). HTAs often evolve in response to a specific issue or threat: preventing a piece of hurtful legislation, reacting to a community crisis at home or abroad, promoting home culture or identity or market abroad, etc. As such, Filipino HTAs were formed in Hawaii to honour a distinguished visitor from their town, to recognise the achievements and contributions of town-mate, to render assistance to a town-mate in time of need and to contribute aid to their hometown (Okamura 1990: 175). The HTAs for Nigerian diasporas is to channelise investment back home in which all members can be assumed to have a shared interest, and where investments can be assumed to confer some benefits on relatives back home as well as non-relatives and the general public (Charles 2006: 146).

For most of the Central American immigrants, hometown association is one of the key institutions of engagement between the ethnic groups, communities and individuals. It is also one of the main forums of engagement between immigrants and their homelands. As mentioned earlier, HTAs formed in response to a particular concern; the Guatemalan HTAs in the US were formed to mobilise against military juntas, human rights infringements, promote the peace talks, indigenous rights and democratisation (Orozco 2006: 9). Recently, it also organises free-will donations like blankets, clothes and utensils for the victims of Hurricane Stan and school supplies for needed students; renders special care for women and assists community development; and fosters cultural links between Guatemalans and its diasporas (Orozco 2006: 10). The Salvadoran hometown associations are mainly focused on health and education of their hometowns. In health sphere, its collective remittances are focused on building health clinics, medicine and ambulance. In education, its funds are concentrated in building or promoting libraries, schools water systems, school supplies and renovations (Orozco 2006: 14). The Honduran hometown associations in the US donate according to the needs of their communities. To have better donation, the main entities they contact are local churches, local governments and community groups. However, most of their collective funds or remittances are invested in health care, disaster relief, education and infrastructure (Orozco 2006: 22).

Haitian hometown associations flourished both in the US and Canada. The guiding force of these associations is often a few professionals or well established Haitians living abroad, the fundraising is done among network that extends beyond individuals from the hometown and

channel back home for development (Schiller and Fouron 2001: 232). Indian hometown associations flourished in many countries as 22 million people of Indian origin (PIO) spread over 110 countries. One of them is Global Organisation of People of Indian Origin (GOPIO), established in 1989. As per its first convention, the main objectives of GOPIO are:

(1) to promote the legitimate interests and aspirations of the Indian community as a whole and of specific groups residing in various countries of their adoption;

(2) to promote the common cultural heritage of Indian abroad;

(3) to mobilise professional, financial and intellectual resources of Indian abroad for their mutual development and advancement;

(4) to encourage interaction between communities of Indians abroad on a global level to deliberate and decide on common issues and problems; and

(5) to further the interaction between Indian people and other communities at global level in promoting world peace, progress and ecological harmony (Chetty 2007: 35-36). Again, the GOPIO launched “GOPIO Connect” in 2002 and strengthen its objectives. Its main objectives are: (1) to identify and fathom key developmental need areas in India which demand the help of the NRIs/PIOs community; (2) to widen an awareness of developmental issues of India by organising interactive session with NRIs/PIOs-run civil service organisations; (3) to promote inquiry on basic development-related tenets and emphasise its enforcement problems for NRIs/PIOs; (4) to accomplish development projects at home; (5) to promote NRIs/PIOs to make an in-depth study of basic development-related tendencies in India to give new policy recommendations to various departments (Chetty 2007: 37).

Mexican HTAs are created in order to address diasporic problems in host countries as well as in Mexico, collect resources and contribute to hometown development. A large number of Mexican HTAs are sending collective remittances to their respective hometowns for development projects like repairing roads, building churches, schools, libraries, community halls and health centres and buying ambulances (Garza and Lowell 2002: 22). Bada (2011) argues that modern Mexican HTAs symbolise values of dedication, solidarity, altruism and nationalism. The HTAs in collaboration with other immigrant self-help groups act as social networks and transmit Mexican culture and values to Mexican diasporic populations regardless of their legal status.

The above arguments show that hometown associations of various diasporic groups emerged in response to solve their common problems they face in host countries. Again, its missions are focused on hometown development through donation and investment. That is why, Schiller and Fouron (2001: 20) described diaspora as “long distance nationalism”.<sup>62</sup> Turner rightly describes diasporas as “development actors”<sup>63</sup> not only in their home countries but also in their host countries. To tap their growing resources, many countries launched various policies and programmes to secure the rights and interests of their diasporas. India launched *Pravasi Bharatiya Divas* on January 9th, 2003 (Mullo 2007: 38), Armenia launched “*Ari Tun Programme*” (periodic visit of diasporic youth to Armenia) in 2010 and “One Nation, One Culture” policy of Pan-Armenian cultural festival in 2010 (Government of Armenia 2010), and Mexico launched PCME in 1990, dual nationality law in 1996, OPME in 2000 and IME in 2003. The chapter as it flows is going to examine critically the role of Mexican hometown associations in Mexico’s development and its role in promoting Mexican culture to younger generation and also Mexico’s cultural policies and programmes towards them, focusing on hometown associations in the US.

### **Meaning of Diasporic Association**

Hometown associations are voluntary organisations set up by immigrant workers to facilitate and fund community development project in their hometown and to offer assistance for immigrant workers from that town in the host countries (Allatson 2007: 125). Diasporic associations grow out of intimate networks of immigrants who are already connected together through ties of kinship, friendship and residential proximity. HTAs, therefore, by definition grounded on ties and common origin (Trans 2009: 72). HTAs are, therefore, an essential part of the struggle which migrants strive to protect and provide for themselves and their families in host countries as well

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<sup>62</sup> Long distance nationalism refers to diasporic populations living in various countries and having a common identification with their homelands and its governments. It binds the same diasporic groups and its populations in various countries together with those at home into a single trans-border citizenry. They may be far away from homeland but maintain common descent and share identity (Schiller and Fouron 2001: 20).

<sup>63</sup> They are actors of economic, political, social and cultural development of home countries and also the marketers of home products abroad. They send remittances and do investment their home countries. They transfer democratic values and rights and at the same time preserve their original identity. Their contributions are an important source of securing livelihoods in difficult situations (Turner 2008: 3).

as in place of origin. It is an institution of flexibility, giving their members/participants ways of resolving their problems in a flexible and responsive manner (Honey 2004: 124).

The first immigrants' associations were called "synagogue" located in the immigrant neighbourhood known as ansheys (taken from their Hebrew names, meaning "group of people from the same place"). These synagogues offered mutual aid and financial benefits. Another prevalent form aimed at meeting the economic needs of new immigrants was the hometown based free loan society. These voluntary hometown associations fulfilled many functions for the immigrants, including health benefits, burial, free loans, providing networks to find employment, teaching organisational dynamics that exist in the US, opportunities to congregate socially and speak one's language and dialect and sending aid to the hometown. The whole activities of these associations were devoted toward learning to be an American. The first voluntary Jewish immigrant association to form in Philadelphia was a synagogue, *Chevra Bikur Cholim*, found in 1861. The second such group, however, was hometown-based, the *Krakauer Chevra Beth Elohim*, formed in 1876 and named for the Polish city of Krakow. It first secured a location for prayer and then three years later united with the *Krakauer Beneficial Society* (Peltz 2010: 27).

There are four criteria that determine the emergence of HTAs and their participation in their home country:

- (1) the level of diasporic group consciousness especially their elite;
- (2) the level of outreach of the homeland government;
- (3) the perception of migrants by the society in the homeland; and
- (4) the relationship between the host and home governments (Endo 2010: 51).

However, change of regimes or governments in the homelands play a significant role in the creation of HTAs. Such shift could be observed in the cases of Mexico, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Morocco, etc. The change of regime in the sending country brings new diasporic policies and programmes, which widens the scope and functions of HTAs.

Based on above arguments, Orozco argues hometown associations have four important characteristics. First, their activities towards their hometowns includes charitable relief, building of recreational or religious facilities and community development like building schools, libraries,

community halls, roads, water-works, health centres and electricity, and any other areas of community urbanisation. Second, their structure varies, however, those in the US are very formal in nature and their relationship with hometown and governments are more sporadic. Third, any decisions on project are based on the following factors: the availability of finances, connection with their hometown, favourite of their members and organisational system. Fourth, they have a small economic base (Orozco 2002a: 93; Goldring 2003: 13). However, all the HTAs have some common characteristics in organisational pattern and in activities they are undertaking. Based on these assumptions, Lewis (2006: 52) argues that hometown associations have two important characteristics. First, they serve as a bridge between their communities back home and global market as well as provide favourable condition for education and local resources. Second, it is a voluntary association, which is based on needs and opportunities.<sup>64</sup> Similarly, Liu (2006: 395) argues it serves as an economic tie between home and host countries, and also involves in transnational agendas.

### **Mexican Hometown Associations**

Mexican immigrants created HTAs in various countries as a way to interact with newly-arrived immigrants from their communities. These associations helped newly-arrived immigrants socially and emotionally to more easily adapt to their new surroundings. Once organised and having resolved their basic needs, these immigrants through HTAs started collect funds to improve the living standard of their hometown and invested in projects such as road constructions, sewerage, potable water, scholarships and others (de la Garza and Hazan 2003: 20). By doing so, HTAs have helped immigrants maintain ties with their culture, customs, language and tradition; sustain connections with home communities; and preserve a sense distinct community in the US. It performs several functions for the development of their home community (Orozco 2003: 1). However, Newland (2004: 14) argues HTAs serve dual intention of providing socially and emotional support to its members and economic patronage to their hometowns. Thus, for Mexican immigrants, HTAs is an economic empowerment and social incorporation (Zabin and Rabadan 1998: 3). HTAs are initiating innovative policies for cross-

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<sup>64</sup> Needs and opportunities according to Lewis argument is that it meets diasporas' needs such as increase family or members' income, secure their rights, provide services for members as well as opportunities for all members to get new ideas, connects with outside organisations. Therefore, needs and opportunities serve as a force to form hometown associations (Lewis 2006: 52-53).

border collaboration seeking to spark economic development and lessening migration pressures in their communities. It also aims to alleviate poverty; function as a transmitter of Mexican culture and values to diasporic populations; and today it represents values of commitment, solidarity, altruism and patriotism (Kourous et al. 2003: 1). For Orozco (2003: 1), Mexican HTAs are small and effective philanthropic associations that usually provide various assistances to their communities back home and frequently engage in joint development efforts. However, in the last few years, many have acquired an explicit or implicit political stance on various issues in Mexico as well as in US (de la Garza and Hazan 2003: 20). That is why Fitzgerald considered HTAs as transnational institutions or transnational community.<sup>65</sup>

Generally speaking, Mexican HTAs grow out of intimate networks of immigrants who are already connected together through ties of kinship, friendship and residential proximity. While membership in most of the Mexican HTAs is not compulsory; it is generally demarcated in terms of eligibility: an immigrant must come from specified locale to be a member. HTAs are, therefore, by definition grounded on ties by common origin (Trans 2009: 72). Mexican HTAs are normally known as *clubes de uriundos*, its roots were traced back to 1925<sup>66</sup> (Bada 2007: 131). Nevertheless, soon after the Mexican-American war, Mexicans in the US formed various associations to protect their basic rights as well as to enhance their Mexican cultural identities. One of the earliest Mexican associations in the US was the *mutualistas* (mutual-aid societies) focused on welfare of workers. All these societies were self-help groups, offered help to Mexican nationals in times of unemployment, illness, injury, etc. They helped new immigrants to adjust with their new environments, collectively fight against racial discrimination or abuse at workplaces and political exclusion (Bada 2007: 132). These societies also organised picnics, dance parties and patron-saint festivities in order to develop better understanding among its members. At the same time, they were also concerned about political situations in Mexico, to this ends, they formed patriotic council. The council was actively raised funds, formed volunteers

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<sup>65</sup> It simply means attach to their ethnic group by integrating diasporic populations who are physically away from home but felt their presence through collective remittances for developmental works at home. Such engagement or interactions between diasporas and its homelands eliminate and exceed the traditional concept of belonging (Fitzgerald 2006: 145).

<sup>66</sup> The Confederation of Mexican Societies in the US was established in 1925 to protect the rights of Mexican nationals in Chicago. It was formed by the representatives of 35 Mexican mutual-aid associations. All these small associations were self-help groups, offered help to Mexican nationals in times of unemployment, illness, injury, etc. They helped new immigrants to adjust with their new environments (Bada 2007: 131).

and bought weapons for Mexican army during 1862-1867 (Garcia-Acevedo 2003: 535). In all these activities, they often worked closely with the Mexican consulates.

Mexican HTAs associations perform various functions: are social clubs: so provide place to gather and socialise for its member; exchange news, information and opinions about job opportunities, relatives, housing and documentation. They offer assistance for sick, provide legal assistance to the members if run into trouble with the law and conduct funeral if members died. They provide a solid connection to their communities at home and maintain their culture, customs, language and traditions (Leiken 2000: 15).

Mexican HTAs until 1990s were keeping low profile and were considered as a product of very small diasporic groups abroad and politicians. Such narrow definition changed in the 1990s and at the same time, it proliferated since 1980 and this tendency accelerated in the 1990s and 2000s (see table 5.1 below). This is because of huge influx of immigration and Mexican governments' outreach programmes through the establishment of Programme for Mexican Communities Abroad (PCME) 1990 and IME in 2003 (Viramontes 2008: 359). These diasporic outreach policies encourage the formation of HTAs, as such almost all Mexican states have HTAs (see table 5.2) in many American states and also led to formation of larger state wide federation that unites various hometown associations (see table 5.3). These policies and programmes strengthen the role of Mexican consular offices, which devotedly promotes the creation of HTAs and implements joint development projects in their hometowns. The Catholic Church also supported such policy and considers HTAs as a bridge for maintaining voluntaristic ties between various communities across international border (Fitzgerald 2007: 3).

**Table 5.1 Geographic Distribution of Mexican HTAs in the US (1998 & 2003)**

<b>States</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>States</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>2003</b>
Arizona	5	9	Washington	7	7
California	240	329	Utah	2	2
Colorado	4	5	Texas	73	48
Florida	3	1	Pennsylvania	5	11
Georgia	2	2	North Carolina	--	1
Illinois	82	170	Oregon	3	4

Indiana	--	2	New York	15	27
Michigan	--	1	New Mexico	--	3
Nevada	--	1	Total	1998=441	2003=623

*Source: Rivera-Salgado 2006: 7*

**Table 5.2 Geographic Distribution of Origins of Mexican HTAs (1998–2003)**

States	1998	2003	States	1998	2003
Aguascalientes	3	1	Tlaxcala	7	13
Baja California	1	1	Veracruz	2	12
Chihuahua	1	1	Yucatan	4	2
Coahuila	2	2	Zacatecas	113	126
Colima	1	4	San Luis Potosi	39	23
Distrito Federal	3	6	Sinaloa	12	17
Durango	19	20	Sonora	2	5
Mexico	6	11	Tamaulipas	2	3
Guerrero	23	51	Queretaro	1	0
Guanajuato	40	48	Puebla	12	34
Hidalgo	4	11	Oaxaca	22	36
Jalisco	74	100	Nuevo Leon	2	4
Michoacán	19	51	Nayarit	22	27
Morelos	0	5	Total	1998=441	2003=623

*Source: Rivera-Salgado 2006: 8*

**Table 5.3 Mexican Migrant Clubs and Federations in Los Angeles (1998 & 2003)**

State	Number of Clubs		Federation	
	1998	2003	1998	2003
Jalisco	49	82	Yes	Yes
Michoacán	11	16	No	Yes
Zacatecas	51	52	Yes	Yes
Guanajuato	1	4	No	No



Federal District	0	0	No	No
Sinaloa	11	6	Yes	Yes
Durango	4	3	Yes	Yes
Navarrit	9	16	Yes	Yes
Guerrero	1	4	No	No
Puebla	5	4	No	No
Oaxaca	8	41	No	Yes
Other	20	49	NA	NA
Total	172	275	8	8

*Source: Alarcon 2003: 14*

The motive among the immigrants to join hometown associations varies from person to person, community to community and region to region. However, the belongingness and fondness towards their hometown is the most common. This motive is imaged in their personal memories of their hometown, frequently in combination with a hope of some day to return to the ‘homeland’ to live ever after a blissful national life (Baumann 2007: 71). Trans (2009: 79) argues that every year people contribute their share as it is part their identity; it gives a sense existence; it gives them a sense of distinct community; and it gives them a sense of oneness and Mexicanness. He further argues that HTAs is a significant feature of individual identity, it demonstrates one connection with his/her village/town of origin and it also restores a sense of community. Another explanation for joining the HTAs is focused on the importance of status as most of them are based on place of origin (Trans 2009: 79).

HTAs have their basic objective—helping one another, collecting funds and investing them in their places of origin. However, they have developed more complex goals as they have integrated into state federations since the late 1990s. Therefore, even if they are still remained in their original goal, they now have other expectations as well. Although not all organisations share the same goals, de la Garza and Hazan (2003: 26-27) identified the following as the common goals for both HTAs and state federations:

(1) to participate in the economic and social development of communities and states of origin by investing economic resources and being part of the decision-making process together with Mexican authorities.

(2) To create programmes that maintain Mexican cultural identity and help the second generation becomes proud of their Mexican root.

(3) To foster the development of pro-immigrants activities in the US, and to be involved in the Mexican democratic process, including the effort to promote the absentee voting rights for diasporas in Mexican elections.

(4) To motivate citizenship rights in Mexico and the US.

(5) To facilitate immigrants' access to social, economic and political opportunities in their host countries, particularly in the US and Canada through different activities such as conferences, workshops and joint events with other grassroots organisations in the US.

Several organisations have goals that are related to both Mexico and the US. Nonetheless, several of these goals have not yet been realised. Instead, these groups are mostly focused on issues related with investing resources in their home country and helping to motivate Mexican cultural identity among the first and second generations. Also several members of HTAs and state federations have participated in the campaign to secure the right to vote in Mexico.

HTAs help federal, state, and municipal governments through collective remittances, popularly known as 'Two-for-One' (earlier) and 'Three-for-One' programme for the development of their community. Their contribution served as key source of development during economic crisis of 1995 (Stacy 2002: 517). Beyond these economic activities, it also collectively fights for their rights in the US. In 1994, it joined the immigrants' rights groups in educational campaign and in massive demonstration denouncing the Proposition 187 of California (Stacy 2002: 520). Hometown associations also fulfil several functions—social exchange, political influence and development goals in their home community (Orozco 2003: 3). Thus, Mexican hometown associations are organisations of immigrants, which form to link with Mexico/its places of origin. Its main objectives are—to address the problems that immigrants face in the US (social, education, political exclusion, wages and working condition); to maintain their cultural and religious identity; to help their community back home through collective remittances; to further Mexico's national interests in the host countries, particularly the US; to influence American foreign policy that concern Mexico; and to seek more protection and security from Mexico to attain their rights in the US and Mexico. The emergence of democratic government in

Mexico along with its various outreach programmes and policies expand the scope and strength of hometown associations. In short, HTAs are agents of development and transmitters of culture.

### **HTAs as Agents of Economic Development**

HTAs are playing a growing role in local development projects—infrastructure, community development and other activities. Sending countries can do more projects with their respective HTAs, along with international organisations, to target better activities and generate income in their local communities (Orozco 2005: 210). Mexico and El Salvador offer important lessons for joint partnership in local development. HTAs have got the concentration of international organisations (IO), government agencies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and academics who want them to focus their resources and skills for economic development in migrant sending areas or regions in their countries. This process, however, led to great debate about the role of diasporic remittances in community development. The pessimistic school asserts that remittances generate a sort of dependency in migrant sending countries since majority of remittances are used for consumption and very few are invested in productive projects. While on the contrary, the optimistic school maintains that remittances have indirect effect of savings and promote economic growth through consumer demanding for goods and services. As such, it argues remittances create a multiplier benefit as consumers' demand increase production, employment, investment and income (Alarcon 2002: 102). Regardless about the pessimistic and the optimistic arguments, Newland points out that HTAs channelised foreign direct investment from their members back home has tremendous potential and is already important for some countries. HTAs may also bring its members to their countries as tourists will be a major earner for countries. Collective remittances send by hometown associations in Mexico, charitable foundations in Egypt are few examples of remittances that promote community development in their hometowns (Newland 2003). As a source of economic development, HTAs have emerged key players in international economic development.

Similarly, Wei and Balasubramanyam (2006: 1600) also added that there are several ways diasporic associations can bring development in their countries. First, the substantial remittances repatriated to their places of origin by emigrants. According to them, these remittances exceed the amount of foreign aid in many countries. Second, it is a foreign direct

investment (FDI) undertaken by the diasporic associations and its members in their countries of origin. These kinds of investment are common among the Chinese diaspora. Third, the technology and knowhow diasporas can transfer their skills for the development of community through FDI or joint ventures. Fourth, it becomes key player in international economic development; its contributions serve as a source of investment in many migrant sending countries; and it sponsors a huge range of development projects at home. Debass and Ardovino (2009: 2) give a new concept of HTAs' role in community development, what they called 'alternative' to foreign direct investment (DFI), the 'diaspora direct investment (DDI)',<sup>67</sup> to promote economic growth in developing countries, which can eliminate the investment from G8 and traditional private sources.

The argument is remittances raise income level and reduce poverty in Mexico. It provides funds for various community development projects on education, electricity, health care, road and entrepreneurial activities. Consequently, remittances augment aggregate demand and thereby stimulate GDP as well as economic growth (Orrenius et al. 2010: 1). Mexico receives the highest remittances in Americas and second among the developing countries (see table 5.4, 5.5 and figure 5.1).

**Table 5.4 Remittances Flow into Mexico, 1988-2008**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Million in \$US</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>Million in \$US</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>Million in \$US</b>
1988	2439	1995	4368	2002	11029
1989	2793	1996	4949	2003	16546
1990	3098	1997	5546	2004	19862
1991	3030	1998	6501	2005	22742
1992	3700	1999	6649	2006	26543

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<sup>67</sup> DDI is defined as 'diaspora direct investment' and came in various forms such as donations, investments, trade, tourism and unilateral transfers by the diaspora individually or collective for the development of hometown. It is possible because diasporic members are from the same ethnic origin and just reside outside their home countries as minorities in various countries. They often link with home country, operate joint business ventures, remit funds to family and friends and often consider them as brave capital investors (Debass and Ardovino 2009: 6).


1993	3979	2000	7525	2007	26880
1994	4122	2001	10146	2008	26041

*World Bank 2012*

**Table 5.5 Remittances received in Americas, by countries, 2004**

<b>Countries</b>	<b>Amount in \$million</b>	<b>Countries</b>	<b>Amount in \$million</b>
Argentina	270	Honduras	1134
Belize	77	Jamaica	1497
Bolivia	422	Mexico	19862
Brazil	5624	Nicaragua	810
Colombia	3857	Panama	231
Costa Rica	306	Paraguay	506
Dominican Republic	2438	Peru	1360
Ecuador	1740	Suriname	51
El Salvador	2548	Trinidad & Tobago	93
Guatemala	2681	Uruguay	105
Guyana	143	Venezuela	259
Haiti	1026		

*Source: Terry 2005: 4*



*Source: World Bank report 2012*

Mexican HTAs and its federations have become more organised, diverse and substantial in terms of philanthropic drive. They have significantly increased their social investment under collective remittances in their communities of origin. These collective remittances are primarily used to build urban infrastructure and to support community projects. To achieve better development, HTAs member visits hometowns in Mexico, comes back with a list of works to be done and proposes at least three or four projects. Most of their projects focus on promotion of education, health and public infrastructure. As such, Johnson and Sedaca (2004: 13) revealed that remittances accounted for more than 20 per cent of capital investment in urban Mexico.

A collective remittance has been a longstanding practice of HTAs, namely, the fund-raising and sponsoring various projects for the benefit of their communities at home (Goldring 2004: 808). The phrase ‘collective remittances’ acquired its meaning in the mid-1990s. Collective remittances are diasporic community donation for investment and its utility is decided by the sender and not the recipients. It starts to meet natural disasters or other emergencies in hometown. With the time, amounts grew larger and move into community development

(Goldring 2004: 828). Indeed, in comparison with family and individual, collective remittances are a very small amount—less than 1% of all remittances. Nevertheless, Torres (2000: 58) argues collective remittances are noteworthy not because of its quantity but quality. He identifies some of the qualities of collective remittances: 1) it enriches solidarity between diasporic groups 2); it invests its resources to the most needed regions and communities; and 3) it has the potential to be used for productive investment. As such, there has been an increasing interest in collective remittances as a tool for local development not only within the scholar community, but also among governments and international organisations concerning on how these remittances could be better enhances development impact. In Mexico, collective remittances have three stages— 2x1 programme, 3x1 programme and 4x1 programme initiated by government as well as citizens abroad.

### ***2x1 Programme***

At the beginning, HTAs began 2x1 programme on a project-by-project basis with Mexican government unofficially. With the increasing amount of HTAs' resources for 2x1 programme and its work quality, the government became more interested in its diaspora in the US. There was an increasing intention to leverage the diasporas' contributions to development and to promote the creation of HTAs. As such, Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) established PCME in 1990 to cultivate closer relations with the Mexican diasporic community (Smith 2003: 728). Parallel to Salinas's interest in courting diasporas, the Zacatecas's governor Arturo Romo initiated the International Solidarity Programme for all Mexicans including diaspora in 1992, focusing on Zacatecan diaspora. The programme was also known as the 2x1 Programme, which attempts to develop Zacatecas with its diaspora. The idea was to match every dollar of the HTAs' collective remittances with one dollar each from state and federal government (Orozco 2004: 8). In 1993, the first projects were financed under the 2x1 scheme. The programme financed 7 projects in 1993 in 7 places and increased to 30 projects in 7 locales in 7 regions in 1994 in Zacatecas. Under the 2x1 programme (1993-1998), 310 projects were accomplished in Zacatecas. Although most of their projects concentrated in Zacatecas, other states also participated in the programme (Katrina and Tinajero 2012: 40).

### *3x1 Programme*

Under the Zedillo presidency (1994-2000), the outreach programmes of the Mexican government continued (Goldring 2002: 66). The municipalities were incorporated into the 2x1 programme in 1999; thus marked the beginning of 3x1 programme. The involvement of municipalities was possible because of decentralisation of federal budget. Since then, the HTAs' contributions make up 25% of the total amount spent on a 3x1 project. Thus, 3x1 programme came into exist through Zacatecan experience; it also compelled HTAs and Mexican government to plan higher in this project. As such, in 2002, the federal government under the Fox administration decided to expand the programme to 20 states and eventually to 23 and cover all (31) states. This nationwide version of the 3x1 was established under the coordination of the Mexican Ministry of Social Development. As such, the programme has a specific budget (Orozco 2004: 36). The programme gives special attention and prioritises its funds are: first, basic infrastructure such as drinking water, electrification, drainage, pavement, etc; second, community initiatives such as gardens, schools, libraries and churches; third, diverse projects such as sports fields and rodeo rings (Cavarrubias 2005: 224).

As argued earlier, collective remittances of diasporic community are invested in hometown and its utility is decided by diaspora. As such, the 3x1 programme is the federal government's response to diasporas' desire to improve their hometowns through collective remittances. The programme aims to guide collective remittances for social development; benefit the poor and marginalised people in the migrant sending communities; encourage more HTAs to participate in the programme; enhance civil society and government relationship; and strengthen diasporas' networks abroad as well as with communities back home (Gobierno Federal 2011: 4). To achieve the above mentioned aims, 3x1 programme focuses on environmental sanitisation, maintenance of natural resources, scholarships for student, electrification, promote education, health, sport, etc. (Gobierno Federal 2011: 7).

At the national level, during 2002-2009, the programme completed 3197 social infrastructures/projects—water supply, sewer system and electricity (Gobierno Federal: 11). In the same period, the programme has completed 217 schemes in medical infrastructure, rehabilitation centres and hospitals (Gobierno Federal: 13). In education, during 2002-2009, it



has completed 788 schemes, including rehabilitating schools, catering computing equipment and technology. At the same time, it also provides scholarship to 6000 (six thousand) students, in all educational levels (Gobierno Federal: 17). At the state level, the investment in Zacatecas during 2001-2002, almost a third of all projects corresponded to street pavement. Other important shares were spent on social assistance and community services (13%), education infrastructure (10.6%), urbanization (6.8%), sewerage (6.2%), drinking water (5.6%) and country roads (5.6%). It is, therefore, obvious that most 3x1 projects contain public works (Covarrubias 2005: 227).

A concrete merit of the programme is the positive contribution to the promotion and development of US-based Mexican HTAs. Within the 3x1 framework, HTAs have become more interdependent and stable. It generates employment opportunities and reduces migration. Cordova (2009: 6) argues that the programme generates employment in two ways. First, projects need workers in order to carry out, so the programme generates employment opportunities. Second, once finished, the projects themselves would be a source of employment in the municipality. Cordova also asserts that potential migrants may postpone their leaving or even feel discouraged to migrate at all. The 3x1 programme not only provides social, economic, health and educational infrastructures, but also generates employment and reduces outmigration (Orozco 2003: 41). Based on above arguments, the supporters argue that 3x1 programme is an effective development tool in Mexico. However, it is not free from criticism. One of the most frequent criticisms of the 3x1 programme is that it shifts the responsibility from government on to the migrants. Another criticism is based on the ground that the budget is too small and two-third of the projects go to just four states—Zacatecas, Jalisco, Guanajuato and Michoacán.

#### ***4x1 Programme***

The most recent development of the HTAs' community development through 3x1 programme is the attempt to include private companies as an additional contributor, making the programme 4x1. The first initiative of private-public partnership was taken by the 'First Data Corporation'<sup>68</sup>, through its subsidiary Western Union. Western Union is one of the leading companies through which remittances are sent. Thus, Mexico is an important market for First Data. The 4x1

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<sup>68</sup> The First Data Corporation (NYSE:FDC, New York Stock Exchange: Floppy Drive Controller), a global leader in electronic commerce and payment services (Business Wares 2005).

programme was launched in Zacatecas on 12 October 2005 (Magallon 2005). First Data promised to contribute \$250,000 for the initial phase with the prospect of expanding the programme to other state and the contribution up to \$1,250,000. It completed eight projects in Zacatecas. Indeed, on 24 June 2006, First Data and Michoacán signed an agreement for the programme to start in the state (Western Union 2006). When signing the 4x1 programme in Michoacán, the company emphasised that “the types of job-creating projects that will qualify for funding include agricultural infrastructure, natural resources conservation efforts, community-based economic projects such as structural improvements or technical upgrades to existing small business, educational facilities and health care centres” (Western Union 2006). The company will review the HTAs’ proposals in order to approve the matching grants for selected projects.

Collective remittances from hometown associations brought development in Mexico can be categorised in twofold. First, it is clearly through direct investment. In Guanajuato, remittances are invested in tennis shoes and footwear plants. In Michoacán, they are invested in farming, cattle rearing and the production of handicrafts for domestic needs and export as well (Durand et al. 1996: 426). Second, it influenced production. Migrants generally return home twice in year—during Christmas and community patron saint. In these visits, diasporas escalate the demand for goods and services, this demand compels local entrepreneurs to increase production, investment, equipment and labour (Durand et al. 1996: 427). Thus remittances are an essential tool for development and it is, therefore, correct to argue HTAs are agents of development.

### **HTAs as Transmitter of Culture**

Right after the US took control of northern Mexico in 1848, many Mexicans were quick to claim their Spanish origin and the European nature of their culture and traditions. However, in the twentieth century Mexican Americans began openly express their indigenous heritage. This trend developed through the formation of *mutualistas* (mutual aid societies), which later on known as hometown associations and formed ‘Chicano Movement’ in the 1960s (Stacy 2002: 775). *Mutualistas* emerged in the late 19th and early 20th century throughout Southwest and Midwest. In Los Angeles, *mutualistas* were concerned with workers’ rights; it also formed trade unions among ethnic Mexicans. In the Midwest, *mutualistas* were established to meet the needs

of ethnic Mexicans, because many Mexicans were removed from well-established communities and also emphasis on Mexican identity and culture. In Gary (city in Indiana) *Sociedad Protectora Mexicana* (The Mexican Protective Society) and its women's wing, *La Sociedad Mutualista Feminina* (The Feminine Mutual Society) was founded in 1924. They maintained close relations with Mexico.

Although, Mexican diasporas have been living US for more than 16 decades, they are still observing Mexican culture and traditions such as holidays and celebrations (O. de la Garza and DeSipio 1998: 403). Such ceremonies or special programmes are organised by HTAs to inject the meaning and its importance to younger generation and thus promote Mexican culture. They valued Mexican cultural attributes and promote its usage among them. They considered Spanish language as their roots and identity (de la Garza and DeSipio 1998: 414).

Roman Catholic is the main religious affiliation for them. However, there are also some people who follow Protestant sects as well as some other religions. They were Catholic in Mexico before migrating into the US. The whole culture growing up was and is very much Catholic. The education is Catholic, the friends are Catholic, the sport activities are all centred on the Catholic Youth Organisation (CYO), their social events, such as dances, were all connected to Catholic school (Garcia 2008: 4). Beyond this, the Catholic Church performed a huge role in the settlement and colonising of the Americas. The Catholic Church continued this role by helping the migrants adapt in the new society. In forthright competition with other denominations, Catholic Church intensifies its consciousness and activities to support immigrants' welfare. It has special missions in helping immigrants' settlement, getting them good housing and suitable jobs; providing them various aids to help them adjust with new environment; and fulfil their documentation (Weaver 1994: 2425). Thus, the HTAs along with Catholic Church promote Roman Catholic, which is the main religion of Mexico.

After the annexation of the Southwest, some Mexican families chose to live and work with Mexican Americans. Thus, the lifestyles of Anglo-Americans had only minimal impact on the family structure of Mexicans. This attracts further immigration from Mexico. Till 1960 Mexican Americans marry with Mexican Americans or with Mexican immigrants. There are three important distinctive feature of Chicano family. The foremost aspect is the male

domination. According to their tradition, the father is the decision-maker, the head of the family and has complete power. If father dies, then his power is shifted to the oldest son. All members of the family are supposed to follow his orders and decisions. Second, the basic principles of obedience based on age and gender—young ones obey the older, women obey men. A third feature of Mexican American family life is stability. It gives sense of emotional security and belonging (Stacy 2002: 300-301). Mexican diasporas/HTAs transmit Mexican culture to younger generations was mainly due to the close physical and historic proximity, the ease of communication, the economic ties and the constant influx of immigration between Mexico and US (Weaver 1994: 23). Thus, Mexican cultural identity such as Spanish language, national holidays, religious and family values are passing on from generation to generation through HTAs.

### **Conceptualising Culture**

Culture, in its simplest form, means the way the people live, the cloth they wear, their language, stories and celebrations (Kalman 2009: 4). Anthropologists define culture of a community as those customs and artifacts which are learned and shared among its member that brings social cohesion. Ethnologists, on the other hand, describe culture more broadly, to include intellectual, emotional and behavioural aspects that are passed on through learning and social interaction (Scruton 2007: 1). The word culture, in all these uses, is connected with the human require for membership and defines as a common asset of a social group. Culture, therefore, refers to the pattern of human activity and the symbols, is often represented by its art, literature, traditions and customs, and gives community an identity. The cultural value is learned and transmitted from one generation to another generation. The cultural symbol of a community is its art, language and religion, which serve as the means of transferring cultural values and norms between generations. Culture ties community together or its people across many regions (Oak 2010).

The culture that each society produces thus becomes a blueprint for the behaviour of each new generation. Among the most important elements of culture are institutions that develop around human needs. The most important human institutions are the family, religion, education, economy and government (Perry and Perry 2009: 355). For diasporas, hometown associations

become the most important institution. Hall (2007: 315) argues one of the main functions of hometown association is to transmit the home culture and values to the second generation.

### **Mexican Cultural Policies**

Cultural policy is comprehended as the promotion and furtherance of cultural practices and utilities by states, corporation, institutions as well as individuals. It is embodied in well-ordered, directed to certain action, adopted by the government to achieve its certain goals and identities (Miller and Yudice 2002: 1). However, the term ‘cultural policy’ is a nebulous concept; its demarcations are blurred; and can include educational policies, economic policies and communication policies as well. For a country, the government decides the goals of cultural policies; the experts ascertain its purpose and administrators establish its revenue.

Cultural policy is transpiring as a significant part of government policy establishment at national as well as international levels. For government, the cultural policy includes the prospect for the artistic industries as vigorous source of innovation, growth and change in new economy; arts and culture to promote employment creation and generate income in both rural and urban areas; create suitable condition for creative and performing art to flourish; regulate intellectual property rights of cultural goods and services; and establish suitable atmosphere for public-private partnership to preserve cultural heritage of a nation. At the international sphere, cultural policy deals with the problems of cultural goods and services in trade (Thorsby 2010: ix).

The UNESCO conference of 1967 was held in Mexico City to discuss ‘cultural policy’, the delegates’ main concern was how creative arts lead people to live a civilised life; how more people would be acquainted to the blessing of artistic ingestion; and how the art in education system and media would be ameliorated. The UK report talked about role of Arts Council of Great Britain, local as well as regional authorities in delivering cultural policy. The report of Bolivia was focused on postcolonial assertion of Bolivian nationalism through culture—heritage of language, music, ritual and tradition (Thorsby 2010: 1). The Bolivian cultural policy aims to promote and enrich all forms of national culture; to preserve and defend the cultural heritage of the country; to protect and register intellectual property; and to propagate all forms of national culture (Gumucio 1979: 68). However, cultural policy changes along with change in culture, widens its scope and covers cultural production, distribution and consumption.

In France, the cultural policy aims to preserve the great masterworks of its people; make accessible to its entire people; and promote the creation of creative art (Eling 1999: 150). Slovenian cultural policy aims to protect the national heritage as a significant testimony of the nation's past; give its support to contemporary domestic creativity which is seen to be of strategic national significance; and support those segments of contemporary cultural activity which lag behind other countries (European Programme of National Cultural Policy Reviews 1998: 257).

In Mexico, cultural policy aims to preserve its cultural heritage and establish cultural institution to strengthen Mexican identity (Bordat 2010: 15). However, it is undergone changes along with time and government, which encourages the creation of arts and spirit which will enrich it. Also change of policy is directly responded to build country's identity in international arena. Before the Mexican Revolution, its policy performed a significant function in enunciating and implementing public education; encouraged the creation of creative art; and defended the cultural sovereignty. After the revolution, cultural policy aimed to spread enlightenment among its people; promoted patriotic feeling among its middle class to resist the adverse influence of *caudillos*<sup>69</sup> and oligarchs; and ameliorated traditional social antagonism (Wilkinson 2006: 482). The government promoted many public art projects enterprises, but recognised mass media as the key actor of national integration and nation-building strategies of modernisation.

The history of Mexico's cultural policy traced back to 1905, when it created an Instruction and Fine Arts Ministry in 1905. It aims to connect culture with education. In 1917 a new department was created—Archaeological and Ethnographic department, the cultural policy was dedicated to the study of various ethnic cultures (Bordat 2010: 8). It also established the Public Education Secretariat (SEP) in 1921 followed by the Archaeological and Historical Institute (INAH) in 1938, which would be taking care of national heritage from pre-Hispanic period to 19 century. The Fine Arts National Institute was established in 1946, which was responsible for artistic education to the masses; to preserve Colonial Heritage from 19 century to 21 century; and look after the management of Fine Arts Palace. In 1960, a Cultural Affairs Sub-

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<sup>69</sup> Wolf and Hasen (1967: 169) argue the best and most appropriate translation for *Caudillo* as chieftain. The term derived from Latin caput, head. In contemporary usage, it refers to politicians supported by military forces and Mexican history shows that Mexico, from its beginning till 20 century, was governed by men who had grabbed power by force.

secretariat was established under SEP (Bordat 2010: 9). Finally, the National Council for Culture and Arts (CONACULTA) was established in 1988, which most scholars argued that it was a political act because president Salinas needed the approval of the intellectual community for his electoral legitimisation (Bordat 2010: 13). CONACULTA's cultural policy tenets are: (1) to preserve national heritage and cultural diversity; (2) to develop cultural infrastructure; (3) to promote national and international culture; (4) to promote and sponsor public for artistic creation; (5) to conduct anthropological, historical, cultural and artistic training and research; (6) to create cultural recreation and reading for the public; (7) to build culture and tourism linkages; and (8) to establish cultural industries (CONACULTA 2010).

The cultural policy of a country also reflects to international events as well. As such, in the post-World War II, Mexico's cultural policy has switched towards communal harmony as the UN enacted the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" in 1948 as well as non-aligned policy. This policy aimed to increase the cultural production of indigenous communities. However, the force of globalisation challenges cultural policymakers across the globe. The implementation of NAFTA and political opening challenge Mexico in many ways—concept of what constitute its national culture, heritage, its nation-state, citizenship and its national identity (Wilkinson 2006: 482). For Mexico, NAFTA and democratisation is an instrument to promote its national identity towards its diasporas.

However, the rights and interests of Mexican diaspora is they should be respected, protected and provided necessary means to maintain their cultural rights. Many Mexican diasporas in the US identify themselves as Mexicans and are still observing Mexican culture and traditions (O. de la Garza and DeSipio 1998: 403). Many valued Mexican cultural attributes, especially the Spanish language, their Mexican manners and customs. For them, the Spanish symbolises a cultural connection with Mexico just as English denotes American culture and society. So, they want public services to be provided in both languages (O. de la Garza and DeSipio 1998: 414). They are also still practicing Mexican traditional medicine and are healthier than any American middle class citizens of all ethnicities (Waldstein 2008: 111).

## **Mexican Cultural Policies and Programmes Towards its Diasporas**

Since the early 1990s, many Latin American countries have progressively reached out to their co-nationals abroad. In February 1990, Mexico established a new programme that has become an ideal for Colombia and Guatemala. The objective of such policy is to develop closer social, economic, cultural and political relations with their diaspora: promote their diasporas' well-being and marshaled them for mutual benefits. Mexico has launched various policies and programmes for the benefit of its diasporas including their health care, business, cultural and education abroad. It established PCME and IME in February 1990 and 2003 under the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs. In addition to federal government policy, fifteen states have established its own diasporic policies to promote their ties as well as to serve them. These policies and programmes are implemented by its fifty-one consulates in various American cities and coordinate the involvement of public and private agencies for the welfare of diasporas.

These two policies increased the functions and powers of Mexican consulates abroad in general and in the US in particular. To strengthen Mexican identity abroad and improve their ties with Mexico, consulates incite the formation of Mexican cultural centres in various American cities. The consulates also motivate the creation of soccer clubs and encourage sports and exchanges with Mexico. The consulates empowered the American based Mexican organisations to cater social services and assist immigrants in negotiation with local, state and federal officials and private institutions like banks, colleges, schools and companies (Gutierrez 2007: 57). It also provides health care to immigrants at a low fee through Mexican Social Security Institute, and conducts Binational Health Weeks, which offers medication, examinations, disease detection, prevention and vaccinations. The policy also covers student exchange programme, long-distance education for immigrants, adult literacy, donation of Mexican textbooks to various educational institutions and bilingual teachers.

Different scholars gave different reasons why Mexico framed such an integrated policy for its diaspora. According to Goldring (2001a: 66), Mexico shifted its policy toward its diasporas in the 1990s because the Mexico wants to create a pro-NAFTA and pro-Mexico lobby group among its diasporas. Salinas launched Programme for Mexican Communities Abroad to provide services to Mexican communities outside Mexico as part of his lobbying strategy to get



the American Congress approve NAFTA (Dominguez and Castro 2009: 197). Fitzgerald (2009: 57) argues that Mexico launched such policy to fulfil the demand of immigrants and also PRI's strategy to counter PRD's discourse, which emphasis a United Mexican nation that transcends its territorial borders. On the other hand, Garcia-Acevedo (2003: 537) argues it was recognition of the growing political potential of its diasporas as well as to increase diasporic ties; to promote the participation of various agencies in the programme; and to bring more Mexican-origin people within the diasporic policies. Mexico's policy addresses its political and economic importance and it carried two components. First, it promotes community organisations, known as hometown associations (HTA) through consulates. These policies have contributed to the creation of many new HTAs, strengthening the existing ones and led to the formation of federation of HTAs to develop a common agenda reflecting the binational concerns. Second, Mexico launched such policy to enhance its economic ties such as remittances and one-for-one, two-for-one and three-for-one programme (Hamm 2011). For Nevaer (2008), it is a part of 'Greater Mexico'<sup>70</sup> agenda. Thus, Mexican diasporic policy reflects political, economic and cultural needs for both Mexico and its diaspora.

### ***Cultural Policy under PRI***

PRI made several steps to standardise Mexican culture; however, before the CONACULTA, its policies were within the SEP's policy. During the presidency of Madrid (1982-88), Mexico's cultural policies were just a set of instructions to cultural institutes—INBA and INAH. However, it has two significant goals: to preserve cultural heritage and establish cultural institution to strengthen Mexican identity. CONACULTA was established in 1988 and in its inauguration ceremony, Salinas highlighted three essential values in his speech: (a) to reinforce Mexican identity; (b) to give freedom to all in artistic creation; and (c) to maximise access to cultural goods and services to all (Bordat 2010: 15). The cultural plan according to national development plan 1995-2000 are (a) to strengthen the role of culture as a groundwork of Mexico's identity and sovereignty; (b) to promote democratic development; (c) to further the formation and

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<sup>70</sup> The term 'Greater Mexico' was deliberated by Mexican intellectuals, which means migration to the US is continual and sustainable and Mexican identity could 'resettle' in its lost lands. The growing immigrants and higher birth rates of Hispanic are converting US into Mexico. Earlier, immigrants were composed of poor rural farmers, uneducated and unemployed people, but today well-educated, middle class professionals and urban rich people are migrating to the US. Thus, the concept of 'Greater Mexico' is surfacing in reality (Nevaer 2008).

maintenance of new federalism; and (d) to develop better link between culture and social policy (Bordat 2010: 16).

However, cultural policy is not limited within Mexico; it goes wherever the Mexican is. To achieve this, the government established PCME in February 1990. Various departments or agencies of federal as well as state governments supported the programmes; it works to establish proper and lasting link between Mexico and its communities abroad; to yield various services in order to improve the quality of life; and to foster their assimilation in their host societies. The programme targets: to promote joint projects and link Mexican communities abroad with Mexico; to create better image of Mexico abroad and better place for its diaspora in Mexico; to elevate Mexican history, tradition and culture among Mexican communities abroad and assist them to get fair treatment in their host countries; to support diasporic organisations and enhance their ability to remain suitable with their host societies; to enrich Mexico's image abroad through diaspora; and to encourage the specialisation of officers and Mexican Foreign Service in order to serve diaspora better (Figueroa-Aramoni 1999: 5389).

The PCME promotes Mexican history, traditions and culture with the purpose to maintain its identity as well as to preserve its celebrations among its diasporas. Its cultural policy seeks to make its diasporas known their roots and felt proud of it (Goldring 2001: 515). To achieve this objective, the PCME works with fifty-one Mexican consulates and 26 cultural institutes and centres to demonstrate its policies and programmes on various topics relating to Mexican cultural identity. One of the most wonderful projects of PCME is introduction of children drawing contest called "This Is My Mexico". Since 1997, children drawing competition has been introduced for diasporic children age between 7 and 13. The aim of such contest is to arouse pride root of Mexicans and Mexican-origin children who live outside Mexico (Leiken 2000: 28). The PCME also sponsored photographic exhibition in various American cities to make Mexican origin people feel proud of their historical roots.

The PCME focuses on sports in order to diasporic people together, promote oneness among its diasporic youth and make them healthy. Its activities include summer camps, soccer, basketball, and baseball championships. These activities enable young people to meet and mingle with each several times in a year (Figueroa-Aramoni 1999: 539). To achieve more of its

programme, the PCME works together with CONADE to organise various sporting events in Mexico as well as in US. Its main attempt is the *Copa* Mexican national soccer tourney, which in most occasions bring around 20,000 Mexican and Mexican-origin players from US (Leiken 2000: 28).

It also considers education as a means and ways to reach Mexican cultural identity to Mexicans abroad and also as great window for employment. As such, it has promoted bilingual education, adult education and immigrant education, with the assistance from SEP. The promotion of bilingual education began in mid-1970s and according to SEP, the cooperation between the two countries in bilingual education initiated by US. In response to American initiative, the SEP created a special department in 1978, to assist the education of its diasporas particularly those who were living in the US. As a result, the Binational Project between Michoacán and California was launched in 1982. The SEP, PCME and many other Mexican officials argued that Spanish instruction is vital to educate Mexicans in the US (Leiken 2000: 28). Therefore, the PCME dedicated its resources to promote bilingual education, targeting the children of immigrants and an effort to preserve their linguistic affiliation with Mexico (Iskander 2010: 225). It argued that it was ideal for everyone to use two languages in a globalised world. It perceived various advantages in it: 1) it provides more opportunity for individual in academic and other developments; b) it strengthens individual's cultural roots; (c) bilingual education maintains one's family values, especially mother tongue and acknowledge parental authority (Leiken 2000: 25).

Therefore, PCME focuses its works on diasporic populations and their children who need to master Spanish. To achieve this objective more effectively, it collaborates with NABE and various bilingual education associations in US. It also collaborates with UPN, SEP and PROBEM and established four courses for Mexican teacher who would teach in American schools. The courses included Spanish skills, Mexican history and culture and special attention for Mexican and Mexican American children (Leiken 2000: 26). It also included a basic and intermediate Spanish course on Mexican expressions, culture, development, and special interaction in bilingual societies (Leiken 2000: 26). These four courses were offered by UPN as training to teacher who teaches Mexican-origin children.

On the initiative of PCME, INEA has taught Spanish to 8000 diasporic population in US. INEA also Mexican consulates and provides 92 language training courses to 2062 instructors. It offers teacher training courses for adult education in Spanish and assist adult education teachers to meet the demand of immigrants' education. It aims to donate elementary educational tools to its diasporic populations who are continuing their studies through distance education; to maximise their self-esteem and pride with their original culture; to consolidate their parental faculty to educate their children; and to improve their mother tongue (King 1994: 121). Many Mexican cultural institutes and centres also provide Spanish classes to diasporic populations. Diasporic leaders argued that such classes are important tools to remove illiteracy and maintain a sense of cultural pride.

Along with SEP, PCME also offers distance learning for primary and secondary students via video-cassettes and television. It also sponsors "Summer Courses at Mexican Universities", "Mexican Vacation Plan" and "Youth Meetings".<sup>71</sup> The "Mexico Vacation Plan" enables its youngsters who are above 5 and below 15 year old to acquire Mexican traditions, sports and customs. Its physical educational teachers also organise summer camps in the US (Figueroa-Aramoni 1999: 539).

The Mexican government has massive and generous distribution of its Spanish textbooks. This provision is registered as a right for diasporic children by the Mexican government. The PCME states that "the programme is intended to provide support materials for students in the US who speak only Spanish and help American students who are learning as a second language" (Leiken 2000: 27). Libraries, community centres, schools, NGOs and educational institutions which teach Spanish to its students are entitled to get free books from Mexican government. Mexican government offers its textbooks free of cost every year and transports them to the border. Its consulates in various American cities distribute textbooks as well as other necessary materials to assist Mexican diasporic populations. In 1998, it distributed around 30700 textbooks to American schools and libraries (Leiken 2000: 27). PRI engaged with Mexican diaspora through various policies and have benefited many diasporic populations especially the young

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<sup>71</sup> PCME sponsors the visit of diasporic youths, organises meetings between leaders of HTAs, immigrant clubs and leaders in their states of origin. It organises games and sports at all level in order to establish Mexican identity among its diasporas. It also organises youth meeting, which brings Mexican diasporas from various host countries (Gutiérrez 1999: 545).

people by introducing children drawing competition, sports, summer camps and youth meetings. Its educational policies, such as, bilingual education, teacher exchange programmes, adult education programmes, etc. made its diasporas know their cultural roots. It also brings HTAs closer to Mexico and empowers HTAs to defend their cultural, social, economic and political rights in the US.

### ***Cultural Policy under PAN***

Many scholars warned Mexico that integration with North American through NAFTA would cost its cultural identity. The 2000 elections campaign alerted great anticipations about change in this direction; its intellectual community had organised a roundtable and seminar about the purpose and value of cultural policy in the context of new millennium. Fox conducted many public consultations about it and emerged with an idea of the establishment of “Secretariat of Arts, Culture and Heritage” that would embody INAB, National Institute of Indigenous, INAH and CONACULTA. However, it failed, mainly due to PAN’s political ideology—a conservative and Catholic world-view, a group of businessmen rather than writers had never get intellectual support (Bordat 2010: 17). However, in his address to present the cultural policy, 2001-2006, Fox gave his concept of culture, “The culture of the people is the expression of its history and the source of its identity, and it is what gives its place in the world and in civilisation. It is also what allowed it to preserve itself as a nation, and at the same time, to be related with the other societies on the planet” (Presidency of the Republic 2001). The change he brought in cultural policy is the notion of “*ciudadanizacion*”,<sup>72</sup> which means citizenisation, what he contemplated it as a “big democratisation movement.”

The most important change that PAN brought in cultural policy was although state has been chief promoter of national culture and art, there was a room for intellectuals and the artistic community in its policy. Fox argues that there is generation of new bond between state and society; refers to freedom of artistic creation and democratic access to national cultural goods (Bordat 2010: 17). In his scheme of *ciudadanizacion* of cultural policy, state and society get new

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<sup>72</sup> It refers to empowerment of municipals, mainly in rural, indigenous and marginal areas more generally, where people have common problems to organise themselves and defended their rights to elect, and efforts to produce social mobilizations that reach the state congress. In cultural term, it means inclusion of these people through public education, state protection and economic development (Khasnabish 2008: 100).

relationship; Mexico and its diasporas also get a new dimension of engagement through the establishment of institution. The new institution, he created is “Institute for Mexican Abroad” (IME)<sup>73</sup> in 2003. The establishment of IME was the result of his 2000 election campaign promises. He addresses emigrants as the “National Heroes” and prioritises their issues in his domestic and foreign policy. Following his predecessor’s diasporic policy—the Programme for Mexican Communities Abroad (PCME), he established Presidential Office for Mexican Abroad (OPME) in 2000, National Council for Mexicans Abroad in 2002 and in 2003 all these were merged into single department popularly known as Institute for Mexican Abroad (IME).

IME works with the 51 consulates and consulate generals to promote the welfare of Mexican diasporas (Laglagaron 2010: 11). Each consular office has at least one to five overseas community affairs staffs implementing the IME’s mission. IME also increases the functions and power of Mexican consulates in the US—its official duty is to protect the rights and interests of its diasporas through diplomatic pressure and specific interventions. In this regard, most attention has been paid to gain the validity of *matricula* consular in various areas, banks and police departments in the US (Bruno and Storrs 2005: 1).

IME goes beyond its traditional consular protection, began initiatives in the area of cultural activities, such as education, financial literacy, leadership training and health care. These policies aim to incorporate its diasporas into Mexican society through promotion of its culture. As diasporas and their descendents have been encountering various forms of discrimination in US; therefore, IME launched in the interest of Mexican nationals to improve the perception of Mexicans and Mexican Americans. To curtail racial discriminatory feeling in the US, IME encourages Mexican immigrants to actively participate in its programmes (Laglagaron 2010: 6).

As mentioned earlier, IME is the promoter of Mexican culture to Mexican communities living abroad. It has many policies and programmes to attract them. It has its own Advisory Council, including Mexican diasporas from various countries to suggest means and ways for their welfare abroad. The council collects the problems of diasporic communities and makes

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<sup>73</sup> It is autonomous department under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It aims to empower its diasporic communities through the formation of their own organisation in various host countries. It believes establishing an organised community abroad would maximise their visibility and improve their capacity to advocate their rights and interests in host countries (Keller-Lapayre 2006: 9).

various proposals and suggestions to IME. The first council consists of 101 advisors including 10 representatives of diasporic organisations. For the last three terms, at least three-fourth of council members was diasporic leaders (Laglagaron 2010: 6). It determines the election procedures; makes election rules and regulations; and establishes elections committee according to Mexican consular district in the US. It advocates the diasporic right to vote in Mexican presidential election from abroad. It also directs Mexican government to increase consular powers and functions, elevating their relationships with higher ministry staffs and helping them to fight anti-immigration or anti-Mexicans policies in the US. It is, therefore, clear that IME is building leadership within diasporic populations and creating a new generation of diasporas who will address their needs in two countries as well as promote Mexico's national interests in the US. As such, the council has been successful in creating a formal structure to explore diasporic needs, developing programmes to address their needs and directs migrants' problems to appropriate ministries in Mexico (Laglagaron 2010: 18). Thus, the council serves as a significant tool to make Mexican government responsible to its diasporas.

Another IME's strategy was to build cultural consciousness among its diasporas is organisation of conferences since its inception. It organises at least ten (10) conferences in a year on various themes either in Mexico or in the US with an intention to discover potential partners in IME's programmes and policies; to promote emerging leadership of diasporic community; and to serve channel for public diplomacy—improve their interactions, attract third-party to scrutiny IME's programmes and gather first-hand information about the problems immigrants face in American society. IME's strategy of holding conference is a favourable occasion for Mexican government to highlight its diasporic policies and programmes, share its policy developments and motivate its diasporas to work with Mexico on various issues (Laglagaron 2010: 19).

The most importance aspect of IME's cultural policy towards Mexican diaspora is promotion of education. In the early 2000s, 60 per cent of Mexican immigrants had no high school diploma and also they are struggling with the language barrier. This barrier creates social cost, low productivity and earning (McHugh et al. 2007: 3). To address these, the education of its diasporic populations became the most urgent issue for Mexico. IME dedicated, at least two conferences, on education every year. Its educational programmes have mainly focused on: (a)

its diasporas especially the immigrants accomplish their Mexican high school curriculum while staying abroad; (b) it sponsors adult education for its diasporas; and (c) it conducts teacher exchange programme with the US (Laglagaron 2010: 20). Under the Binational Migrant Education Programme, the IME works together with Mexican Education Ministry, its consulates, various educational institutions and American Department of Education and organises teacher and student exchange programmes on many occasions. It sends Mexican teachers to American schools, where Mexican-origin students are concentrated, for at least three to six week to assist Mexican-origin students as well as teachers to meet the needs of those students (Laglagaron 2010: 21).

Many Mexican teachers are working in US under the sponsorship of Fulbright Act.<sup>74</sup> Visiting teachers enlist for one-year but can be renewed twice and have full classroom responsibilities. Mexican teachers generally teach diasporic students as well as Spanish language classes. IME also promotes binational migratory student transfer document to help diasporic children as well as return migrants' children and place them in the right course in Mexico or in the US (Kindler 2011). Another IME's cultural policy is the free donation of Mexican school textbooks to its migrant children, libraries, schools and community centres in the US. The National Commission on Free Textbooks was established in 1990 and it distributes free textbooks abroad to assist Mexican-origin students to retain Mexican identity, learn Spanish and enhance their learning skills. It donated 9520 Mexican textbooks in 2007 and 2008 (Laglagaron 2010: 24).

One of the largest IME's cultural policies towards diasporas through education is community centres or "*Plazas Comunitarias*"<sup>75</sup>. Its staff serves as mediator between diasporic organisations and the Ministry of Education; it is for immigrants who are 15 years old or above.

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<sup>74</sup> Fulbright Act is established in 1961 and popularly known as the "Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961". It empowers US to maximise mutual understanding between Americans and other nationals through educational and cultural exchange; consolidate relations with other countries through educational and cultural interests; further international cooperation for the advancement of education and culture; and promote friendly and peaceful relations with other countries through educational and cultural exchange programmes (Muller 2003: 62).

<sup>75</sup> In order address various problems faced by its diasporas, Mexico's National Institute for Adult Education under the aegis of IME created community learning center, known as *Plaza Comunitaria*. It collaborates with International Friendship Ministries and expands its scope; its course is available to all Mexican adults who wish to continue their studies free of cost. Participate can complete their educational courses from elementary to college level (International Friendship Ministries 2007: 4-5).



Its programme is open to non-Mexican as well. The programme includes (1) basic Spanish course; (2) primary and middle school courses; (3) high school and American General Education Development (GED) course; and (4) computer literacy. The programme was established in 2001 and around 373 *plazas* are operating in 35 American states and serve around 16758 students in 2007 (Laglagaron 2010: 25). For migrants who face problem with ESL or workforce classes, plazas offer needed English literacy and workforce preparation.

The immigrants who miss to admit in *Plaza Comunitarias* due to their work or other engagements, IME arranges several distance learning for them. IME sponsors several Mexican government educational programmes for Mexican abroad to obtain Mexican high school certificate, known as *Bachillerato*. Through the *Bachillerato a distanciaB@UNAM* programme,<sup>76</sup> Mexicans abroad can register and complete their Mexican high school degree. There are still option for those migrants, who cannot complete their educational needs in *Plaza Comunitaria* Programme and *Bachillerato a distanciaB@UNAM* Programme, known as the *Bachillerato len Linea del Colegio de Bachileres*, an online course for upper secondary course programme through Colegio de Bachileres.<sup>77</sup> Lastly, the *Acreditacion de Bachillerato por Acuerdo 286* Programme aims to educate Mexicans abroad who have obtained substantial experiences but want to test Mexican upper secondary course and this course is only for individual who is 25 year old or above.

Although IME arranges several educational programmes, a small number of Mexicans abroad have participated in it. One of the reasons is that *bachillerato* (upper secondary) degrees are not recognised in the US. To deal with this problem, IME works with at least three universities in US to upgrade Mexico' upper secondary syllabus for students who did various courses in “*Bachillerato a distanciaB@UNAM, Bachillerato len Linea del Colegio de Bachileres* and *Acreditacion de Bachillerato por Acuedo 286* Programmes” as per American standards. The

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<sup>76</sup> It is a distance learning programme operated by National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM). Under IME's policy, it targeted mainly young adults Mexicans who are living and working in the US, to complete their high school degree within a stipulated time. Those students, who complete their upper secondary programme under it, can continue their undergraduate courses at university or at its various correspondent centres in US as well as Canada (Laglagaron 2010:27).

<sup>77</sup> It is a national institute for upper secondary education located in Mexico City. It offers open and flexible registration for Mexicans abroad and learners can start their opted courses at anytime throughout the academic year. This programme aims to educate Mexicans abroad whose time schedule is limited and want informal education (Laglagaron 2010: 27).

programme, the *Porgrama de Alineacion de Creditos*, was established to equalise the educational system between the two countries. If successful, this will benefit many students who have accomplished their upper secondary degrees via these three distance educational programmes to continue their studies in various American colleges, labour training programmes or other post-secondary education.

The IME continues “This is My Mexico”, a diasporic Children’s Drawing Competition as cultural policy. The contest has a mandate of strengthening the ties of children of Mexican ancestry with their country of origin; through their drawings they express their vision of Mexico. The purpose of the contest is to awake the pride of their origin among Mexican diasporic children (Leiken 2010: 28). For 2011 contest, the Foreign Ministry’s IME and Teleton Mexican Foundation A.C. has announced that the 15th “This is My Mexico”, the Children’s Drawing Contest is reserved for diasporic children and youths with physical, mental or sensory handicaps. The purpose of competition is to appeal Mexican disabilities age between 7 to 18 years old to draw their dreams and desires about Mexico and empower them to integrate into society. This is the first time; the competition has been solely opened to disabled children abroad (SRE 2010). Selected drawing and painting will be displayed as exhibition in various countries.

In the field of sports as a cultural policy, the IME in collaboration with National Commission of Physical Culture and Sports (CONADE) and the Mexican Consulates in the US, along with the support of many community organisations, schools, and sports promoters organised various sports with the aim of promoting recreation, physical activity and sport among Mexicans living outside Mexico. IME organised Mexgames<sup>78</sup> including taekwondo for both men and women; Olympic boxing for both men and women; associated wrestling for both men and women; and football for women (IME 2011a). IME organised sports as a means to bring Mexican diasporic people together, motivate a feeling of oneness and keep youths healthy.

IME along with Mexican Restaurateurs Association (NMRA) organised a seminar in the US to further the diversity of its cuisine and culture. Again, in 2010, the trinational (Mexico, US

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<sup>78</sup> The Mexgames are a multisport event organized by IME aimed at Mexicans living in the US and Canada. It is organized with the vision to identify capable sportsmen who will participate in the National Olympiad and strengthen integration of delegates who will represent Mexico in international events (IME 2011).

and Canada) seminar's theme "The Mexican Restaurant: Community, Culture and Business", was held on 2 and 3 November in Kansas City, which also commemorated 90 years of service. The idea of organising such seminar is to safeguard the traditional Mexican cuisine, offered to chefs, restaurant owners and staff involved in food preparation, a refresher course in their speciality, considers that it contributes to the strengthening of national identity. As such, the objectives of the seminar stress on: to sensitise and train a group of owners and chefs of Mexican cuisine restaurants in the US and Canada on importance of traditional Mexican cuisine; to present options that can provide added cultural values to a restaurant to compete with an advantage markets and cultural consumption; and to promote Mexican food distribution companies located in the US and Canada in order to strengthen associations of people involved in Mexican cuisine (IME 2011).

Another cultural policy of PAN is IME-BECAS scholarship to Mexican students study in various universities in the US. Since 2005, the programme has financed 385 American institutions with over 15000 Hispanic adult students; most of them are Mexican origin. Mexican Consulate in New York announced on 18 February 2011 that the City University of New York would receive scholarship programme of the Institute of Mexicans Abroad (IME) worth \$20,000 to support the education of low-income immigrant community living in New York. This scholarship would be given to select eight young (age between 19 and 27) students of Mexican-origin who studies at the College of Staten Island (CSI), the City University of New York (Notimex 2011). The government of Mexico would also provide \$33000 of IME-BECAS Grant to four Utah institutions. The grant aims to offer scholarships to adult Hispanics for literacy, English, GED and computer courses, as well as elementary, middle school and high school. The institutions in Salt Lake City, which received IME-BECAS Grants in 2009-2010, are: Salt Lake Community College—\$10000, Pete Suazo Business Center—\$10000, Centro de la Utah—\$8000 and Ogden City School District—\$5000 209 (Consulate of Mexico 2009). IME-BECAS Higher Education granted programme awarded \$20000 to National-Luis University (NLU), which aims to assist Mexican immigrants, who studies at the university. The funding also supports Harrison Fellows to undocumented Mexican students at the same university (NLU News 2010). In California, IME-BECAS Programme Grants focused on two issues—adult education and labour

training programmes; a fellowship programme with grants ranging from \$10000 to \$20000 (Rodriguez 2010).

The PAN brought two new images of cultural policy—state and society relationship and Mexico and its diasporas engagement. Fox accepted the intellectuals and the artistic community in his policy. To achieve better and brighter result, he established IME in 2003 as outreach programme for Mexicans abroad. IME works with the 51 Mexican consulates in the US (Laglagaron 2010: 11). IME also increases the functions and powers of Mexican consulates in the US—its official duty is to defend as well as promote the rights and interests of Mexican diasporas through diplomatic force and specific interventions. IME is responsible for promotion and maintenance of Mexican culture to Mexican communities living abroad. To fulfil this, IME uses to promote awareness of Mexican culture, traditions and values to Mexican communities living abroad. It works with government institutions, NGOs, private and public cultural institutes (IME 2011). It promotes cultural awareness among Mexican diasporic communities through conferences. It launches various educational programmes for diasporic communities; conducts teachers exchange programme; distribute Spanish textbooks free of cost; and grants lot of scholarships for Mexican-origin students to complete their studies as well as maintain their cultural status. It also organises sports, drawing competition and conducts seminar to keep Mexicans abroad alive with their cultural identity.

Diaspora has transformed the relationship between immigrants and their homelands as well as between home and host countries. The new engagement between them flourishes through the establishment of hometown association (HTAs) in many host countries (Honey 2004: 124). Immigrants formed HTAs for various reasons—to support their places of origin, to maintain cultural identity, to help one another, to raise voice against regimes, human rights violations, to promote the peace process and indigenous rights and democratisation process in their countries (Orozco 2006: 9). Mexican hometown associations were created in order to contribute to hometown development. Bada (2011) argues that current Mexican HTAs symbolise complete dedication, solidarity, self-sacrifice and patriotism. It is an initiative taken up by diasporic leaders for cross-border cooperation attempted to spark economic development as well as to reduce migration pressures in migrant sending regions. It also aims to alleviate poverty; function

as a transmitter of culture and values to the American-born generation (Kourous et al. 2003: 1). Considering the above arguments, Turner describes diasporas as “development actors” (2008: 3).

The Mexican HTAs have multiplied since 1980s and this trend continued to grow in the 1990s mainly due to its diasporic policies and programmes through the creation of PCME in 1990 and Institute of Mexican Abroad (IME) in 2003 (Viramontes 2008: 359). These diasporic outreach policies and programmes led to the formation of larger statewide federation that unites various hometown associations. These policies and programmes empowered its consular offices, which actively encouraged the creation of HTAs (Fitzgerald 2007: 3). HTAs help federal, state and municipal governments through collective remittances, popularly known as ‘Two-for-One’ (earlier) and ‘Three-for-One’ programme for the development of their community. Their contribution served as key source of development during economic crisis of 1995 (Stacy 2002: 517).

The plethora of arguments show clearly that though Mexicans abroad are not living in Mexico, their presence is felt in economic development, cultural promotion abroad, political change, social transformation, etc. Therefore, since the early 1990s, Mexican government has progressively reached out to its diasporic residents in the US. The two Mexican outreach programmes—PCME and IME closely work with Consulates of Mexico and Mexican cultural centres in the US to reinforce Mexican culture to its diaspora. For Goldring (2001a: 66), these outreach programmes are government wanted to build pro-NAFTA as well as pro-Mexico influence among its co-nationals in the US. For Nevaer (2008), it is nothing else but a part of ‘Greater Mexico’ agenda. PRI made several steps to standardise culture of Mexico. President Salinas (1988-1994) used cultural policy to reinforce Mexican identity, encouraged artistic creation abroad and promoted cultural products abroad (Bordat 2010: 15). To fulfil these objectives, he created PCME in February 1990, which direct towards diasporic cultural policy. PCME builds better image of Mexico abroad; increases direct link with Mexicans abroad; promotes Mexican culture abroad; and supports community organisations abroad (Figueroa-Aramoni 1999: 5389). PCME organised children’s drawing contest, sports, Teacher Exchange Programme, promoted various educational programmes and donated free Spanish textbooks for

immigrants and their children (Leiken 2000: 27). Thus, PCME empowers diasporas, their associations and their leaders to defend their rights in abroad.

The cultural policy of PAN brought state and society closer and also Mexico and its diasporas. Fox, in his policy, accepted intellectuals and artistic community. To bring Mexicans abroad into Mexico's family, he established IME in 2003 as an outreach programme for Mexicans abroad. IME works with the 51 Consulates of Mexico and 26 Mexican cultural centres in the US (Laglagaron 2010: 11). IME also increases the functions and power of Mexican consulates in general and the US in particular, to promote the welfare of diasporic populations. IME promotes cultural awareness among Mexican communities living abroad and works with government institutions, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), private and public cultural institutes (IME 2011). It launches various educational programmes for Mexican-origin students to complete their studies as well as maintain their cultural status. It also organises sports, drawing competition and conducts seminar to keep Mexicans abroad alive with their cultural identity. While examine all the cultural policies and programmes of Mexico, it is found that all these strategies address the immediate needs of immigrants. However, change of government changes the policies reflect that policies are determined by the political party for their own benefits rather building a new image of Mexicans. Therefore, Mexico needs to have a constitutionally mandated diasporic policy, which will carry the voice of all Mexicans for Mexican communities abroad.

## CHAPTER SIX

### PROGRAMMES AND POLICIES UNDER NATIONAL ACTION PARTY (PAN)

Mexico has made genuine progress in its political, economic and social development since the 2000 presidential election. It has not only achieved peaceful democratic transition, but also that this transition occurred in the absence of economic crisis (Paz 2005: 191). Based on this account, Foster (2010: ix) argues Mexico would witness decrease corruption and poverty; it would become a more open society; it would see the end of privileged elite controlling the nation's resources; and it would also modernise its economy through free trade agreement. He further argues that most young and urban Mexicans viewed the Institutional Revolutionary Party's (PRI) continued domination of domestic politics as an embarrassment to Mexico, wanted a democratic and more modern Mexico and voted overwhelmingly for change (2010: 243).

In July 2000, Fox, the National Action Party candidate, was elected president of Mexico, the first in seven decades who was not a member of the PRI. The electoral process was transparent, clean and democratic, which marked the beginning of new chapter in Mexico's history. Tulchin and Selee (2003: 6) argue Mexico would not only witness a government of shared power but also a more open nation.<sup>79</sup> On top of that, Fox promised to open up the government, make it accountable and improve the conditions of human rights through inclusion of human rights activist in his cabinet and ordering to open up the police as well as military files of the past for public scrutiny. The various government departments and ministries had to inform about their works and various rights of citizens on the public domain. To fulfil all his promises, policies and programmes, he invited the United Nations to open human rights office in Mexico and his government ratified the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons on 22 April, 2002. His policy of human rights went beyond Mexico—he sought to protect the rights Mexican diasporas, particularly those who were settled in the US. To achieve all these, he

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<sup>79</sup> Today, the media are more critical. Strong grass-root organisations have proliferated and pushed their various creative ideas and agendas to the forefront of political affairs, which in turn increased the public debate and dialogue on important issues such as gender, ethnicity, development, equity and diaspora as well. Labour unions have multiplied, and although some of the largest remain co-opted by the government (Foster 2010: 241). Moreover, some scholars also pointed out that Mexico would implement separation of power; the president once all powerful would be checked by Congress and courts. At the same time, its economy will be one of the most open one in the developing world (Tulchin and Selee 2003: 56).

suggested that Mexico and US should establish a working group to improve human rights condition of migrants (Kesselman et al. 2010: 196). At the same time, he also promised deregulations, competition and a balanced budget together with an ambitious social development agenda including double education spending, increase subsidies for farmers and build health clinics aimed at reducing the enormous disparity between rich and the poor (Haynes 2001: 68). After 2000 Mexico got involved deeper in world affairs; its presence and voice increased in multilateral fora; and enhance its connection with North America, Asia, Europe and Africa. Taking all these factors into account, Cantellano (2008: 5) argues that National Action Party and its foreign policy built new image of Mexico at international level and made it active and responsible player in the global stage. Therefore, in true sense, Mexico an emerging power was being recognised positively in the international politics.

Reflecting on this emerging trend, Fox in his presidential statement emphasised Mexico is no longer ruled by a single person, it is governed by all Mexicans, through institutions they have created and respected for. Mexicans want to create a fairer and more humane society through the National Action Party (PAN) is effort of creating more and better opportunities and serving a platform for Congress, judicial, executive, state and municipal governments. Mexico according to Fox was combating authoritarian, corruption and poverty, the misappropriation of public funds, recent crisis and lies. To achieve freedom, responsibility, honesty, transparency and equal opportunities, every citizen had a role to play” (Presidency of the Republic 2005).

### **Brief History of National Action Party (PAN)**

PAN was formed on September 15, 1939 in response to address diverse set of concerns—betrayal of the original liberal democratic principles by Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI); Catholic groups that were hurt by the secular reforms; the anti-despotism of the late 1920s; and private-sector interest alarmed by the leftism of the 1930s. Its earliest supporters were professionals, intellectuals, entrepreneurs and Catholics and Manuel Gomez Morin<sup>80</sup> was the

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<sup>80</sup> He was a lawyer, economist, educator and intellectual who personified Mexico’s professional and entrepreneurial traditions. He served as undersecretary of finance and financial adviser to President Alvaro Obregon and Plutarco Calles respectively. On September 15, 1939, Morin founded the National Action Party of Mexico to address social and moral obligations of individual and society (Shirk 2005: 50).



visionary and chief architect of this new party. It had its own political ideology<sup>81</sup> that brought its members together. However, most of the scholars referred National Action Party (PAN) as Catholic Party because it adheres mostly to Roman Catholic moral and social tenets. At the ideological level, it calls for the formation of occupational union; six day and a day of rest in a week for everyone; and more importantly, an extensive allocation of land ownership. Its plan for land distribution emphasised on the importance of creating small family owned parcels that should not be impounded or separated arbitrarily. At the political level, the party stood for free and fair election; it demanded that all municipalities should have autonomous status; and the right to vote for all sections of people and special protection for Indian minorities. It also advocates the rights of individuals to possess property, to work, to protest, to join union or association and to educate their in schools of their choice. The party, in many aspects, opposed the socialist and anti-clerical policies established by Lazaro Cardenas in the 1930s, which gave state's legal control over educational system in the country (Hannon 1987: 3).

The PAN's domestic policy in the 1980s and 1990s hinged on two leading issues— political and economic reform. At the political level, the party calls for free and fair elections, more representative to empower the minority communities and democratic political system. It also attempts to link the solution of country's problems with a democratic political system in which people have the right to elect the most sincere and capable leaders. At the economic level, it reflects the ideas and programmes of many Mexican business classes; the party is progressively encouraging economic reforms, which will spark for economic growth and development and secure the economic freedom for all (Hannon 1987: 4).

The party first contested election for congressional seats in 1942 but failed to capture seats. The party, nevertheless, continued to contest elections based on its ideology. During the 1950s and 1960s economic expansion increased, large and diverse middle class whose material ambitions were associated with growing political expectations. The growing economic and

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<sup>81</sup> It had its own political ideology. Political ideology is a united set of notions about the political environment. Political ideology tells us the party's desired goals and ways and means to attain those goals (Connolly 2008: 2). At the ideological level, PAN calls for the formation of occupational union and an extensive allocation of land ownership. Politically, it stood for free and fair election and the right to vote for all sections of people. It also advocates property rights of individuals, the right to work and protest and freedom to join union and association (Hannon 1987: 3).

political ambitions middle class compelled PRI to open a few doors for them; however, elections to be manipulated. Traditionally, the party supporters were middle classes of southern states; however, economic problems and political disaffection have expanded the party electoral base significantly. The nationalisation of bank in 1982 gave a huge opportunity for PAN to gain valuable support from professional groups and associations (Hannon 1987: 5). Since 1946, the party contested in every presidential election except in 1976, when it could not suitable candidate to contest for the post. PAN has been the major opposition party in Mexican political history. By 1992, it governed more than 100 municipal governments along with three governorships (The Library of Congress Country Studies and CIA World Facebook 1994). PAN won presidential election for two consecutive terms—2000 and 2006.

### **PAN's Diasporic Policy and Programme**

According to National Development Plan (2001-2006), PAN admits that the protection of Mexicans abroad is and will remain the main focus for government. Accordingly, a growing demand is expected for consular services for the defence and development of its nationals abroad, especially in the US. To be, Mexico needs to accomplish a number of agreements and mechanisms to assure better treatment for its nationals abroad, immigration problem, particularly in the US, demands a long-term strategy. A strategy that will make the movement of its nationals to be safe, dignified, legal and orderly; a strategy that eliminates police prosecution envisage immigration as a labour and social circumstance (The Washington Post 2001). These issues were reflected in its foreign policy effectively—Fox sought to maintain a more activist and unified foreign policy. In the same vein, Nafey (2007: 171) argues Fox's foreign policy has four elements: (1) promotion of democracy and human rights; (2) activism in international fora; (3) protection of the rights of the Mexicans abroad; and (4) recasting its relationship with North America. Beyond this, Fox also wanted to build Mexico's image in international level and to this end, Roett (2005: 153) argues that his (Fox) foreign policy was mainly concerned on three issues: (1) there would be a burgeoning partnership the two countries; (2) possibility of expanding NAFTA to South America; and (3) Mexico would play an active role in world politics.

Reflecting to the above arguments, Rozental (2004: 88-89) added more substantial objectives of Fox's foreign policy, which he argues it has six clear objectives to be achieved during his presidency. The six objectives are: (1) he was intended to give a 'different image'<sup>82</sup> of Mexico to the world; (2) the promotion of democracy and human rights as universal values to the world, which Fox believed strengthening these values at the international level would consolidate in Mexico as well; (3) to refocus Mexico's relationship with North America through the establishment of a new dialogue so as to better reflect Mexico's interests and priorities including migration; (4) to promote and respect for and defend the interests of overseas Mexicans; to achieve this goal, he believed, a new agreement was necessary in order to channel the movement of people across the border; (5) to give Mexico a more active profile in multilateral system; and (6) to fully integrate Mexico into economic development objective of the 2001-2006 National Development Plan.<sup>83</sup> To achieve all these objectives, reforms in domestic politics became necessary. Foreign Secretary announced reforms which includes reforming and modernising the country's Foreign Services; reviewing Mexico's international treaty obligations and multilateral commitments to ensure that they were being complied with; bringing greater transparency to the foreign policy decision making process; and maintain a constructive dialogue and relationship with legislative and judicial branches of government. However, most of them failed to achieve desirable goal mainly due to internal crisis<sup>84</sup> (Rozental 2004: 89). Based on the above arguments, this chapter is going to analysis Mexico's diasporic policies and programmes under Fox and Calderon's government.

Vicente Fox assumed presidential office on December 1, 2006, who always saw globalisation as an opportunity. Fortunately, Mexico has free trade agreement with many countries including US and Canada also with Europe—the largest markets in the world.

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<sup>82</sup> The international community perceived Mexico's political and economic transformation during the seventy- one year ruled by the PRI as instability, violence and insecurity. According to Fox, unless this image was changed it is impossible to insert Mexico into the international arena. One way to change this image, Fox suggested that Mexico needs to reformulate its history, culture and art as a means to enhance its position in international arena (Rozental 2004: 88).

<sup>83</sup> To achieve these goals, all Mexican government representatives abroad were relocated and brought under Foreign Ministry's control; also empowered the Foreign Ministry to direct participate in multilateral trade negotiation; and investment and trade promotion were made a fundamental part of diplomatic activity (Rozental 2004: 89).

<sup>84</sup> These agendas were introduced by former Foreign Secretary Jorge G. Castaneda, many of these goals could not fulfil because of his lack of diplomatic experience and on top of that he resigned in January 2003 just after two years in Fox cabinet (Rozental 2004: 89).

However, before Vicente Fox, Mexico practiced the Estrada Doctrine, which favoured an enclosed view of sovereignty. Fox instantly broke the Estrada Doctrine and established a new foreign policy, which stand for openness and credence of criticism from domestic and international community and increase its role in international affairs. In this new policy, diasporic issue occupies an important place. To address this issue, he (Fox) reformulated the concept of NAFTA—NAFTA-Plus, established Presidential Office for Mexicans Abroad (OPME) in 2000, National Council for Mexicans Abroad (2002), reorganised *Grupo Beta* in 2001, reinforced *Paisano* Programme, reintroduced *Matricular* Card in 2002 and established Institute for Mexicans Abroad in 2003.

### **Fox Model of NAFTA**

The Mexican government's intention to negotiate free trade agreement with the US marked a profound shift in the history of Mexico-US relationship. In Mexico, many people apprehensions about the new scheme (NAFTA or FTA) because they know cooperation among unequal partners may turn into subordination. Again, most of them fear that it would destroy Mexican culture—in Mexico the value of 'community' is greater than 'individualism' (Landau 2003: 77-78). However, president Salinas's visit to US in October 1989 and June 1990 buried all suspicions and misperceptions of the past. As such, NAFTA was signed on December 17, 1992 and became operative on January 1, 1994. NAFTA, in its simplest terms, means lowering trade and investment barriers within North American countries. Free trade and investment is the only instrument that guarantees development and thus reduces labour migration (Bruber 2001: 705). Therefore, the main objective of FTA is to augment social and economic development in Mexico. In the same vein, both Salinas and Clinton claimed that one of the benefits of NAFTA would be to reduce Mexican immigration to the US. They believed that lowering trade barriers would increase economic growth through investment in Mexico and reduce potential migrants by providing greater employment opportunity and higher wages (Zabin and Sallie 1995: 395).

As such, PRI's argument on the rationality of signing NAFTA was that it was a means to retain Mexicans in Mexico. To prove this assertion, Salinas argues that Mexicans would never immigrate to US once there were employment opportunities and better wages in Mexico. He further argues that with NAFTA, Mexico would generate thousands of jobs; Mexicans would

migrate to places where jobs are available, the northern Mexico; and migration would drastically reduce within and outside Mexico (Wu 1999). Zedillo also viewed NAFTA as an instrument to address, improve and expand economic conditions of migrant workers (Rodriguez-Scott 2002). Jaime Serra Puche adds that free trade with the US would remove the negative trade and investment inequity that Mexico might otherwise face due to its exclusion from trading blocs, which were growing in Asia, Europe and North America (Gruber 2000: 128). In short, for PRI, NAFTA is a means to reduce immigration and remove trade discrimination between the two countries.

When Fox assumed presidential office, the concept of NAFTA is gone beyond the original meaning and definition, which attempts to include all aspects of interactions and relationships between North American countries that will finally lead to the formation of North American community<sup>85</sup> (Pastor 2008: 98). In his debut to public after assuming office, Fox declared that the present phase of NAFTA was gone and that Mexico, US and Canada would engage in June 2001 on negotiations for a “new phase of NAFTA”, what he called NAFTA-Plus<sup>86</sup> and would include “more development, more trade and more integration” (Carlsen 2003). His idea was underscored by Fernando Canales, Mexico’s Secretary of Economy, who revealed the intention of seeking “European Union-style” of North America integration with common currency, shared passport and immigration agreements (Carlsen 2003). Fox circulated a number of proposals for North American community, including common currency, customs union, shared passport and free movement of goods, services and labour. His policy has two significant components connected to refresh the image of Mexico. On one axis, his policy intended to erase the notion of illegal/undocumented immigrants and on another axis to remove militarisation of border (Cooper 2004: 69).

He conveyed his idea of NAFTA-Plus to US during his visit in August 2001. The scheme he had proposed includes not only the free movement of products and services across borders,

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<sup>85</sup> Although NAFTA is a market driven organisation, the North American leaders can learn a lesson from EU to translate the goals of NAFTA into more and deeper cooperative organization through the establishment of North American Community. The policy includes in this new scheme are infrastructure and transportation, trade and common currency (Pastor 2008: 98).

<sup>86</sup> Fox initiated NAFTA-Plus, which advocates that free trade would be enhanced by opening borders to the flow of labour across North America. He argues that NAFTA-Plus would further deepen North American economic integration, convergence of people’s income and convergence of salaries (Ugalde 2004: 115).

but also of labour. He argues his idea was based on European Union (EU) model in which advanced economies helped backward nations such as Portugal and Spain converge economically and become part of the union. He also advocated the same process of economic convergence that would allow Mexico to meet targets on inflation, interest rates and other criteria and eventually received assistance from its NAFTA partners to develop its economic gap that separates it from US and Canada (Ugalde 2004: 125). Under this scheme, he also called for unprecedented trilateral cooperation in border security, law enforcement as well as migration policy (Hristoulas 2003: 41).

Fox, in his new scheme, not only dealt with immigration problems but combined it with a demand for greater equity between the members of NAFTA by highlighting the importance of regionalism as a development lever. He aimed at a scheme that would not only benefit the prosperous North but also bring the welfare for the poorer zones of Mexico (Cooper 2004: 69). At the same time, Fox proposed four principles to negotiate a comprehensive immigration agreement with the US: (1) solve the key pending issues in the US-Mexico relations—immigration; (2) applies the same diplomatic approach which was used by President Salinas: institutionalise the management of bilateral issues through agreements and target mechanism; (3) take advantage of the positive momentum—the “honeymoon phase”—at the outset of the Fox and Bush administration; and (4) move towards a greater integration of the countries in North America, the so-called “NAFTA-Plus” diplomacy (Dominguez and Carlos 2010: 30). In these four principles, he had intended to meet five objectives: (1) establishment of a guest worker programme with the US; (2) earned regularisation of legal status for illegal immigrants who meets certain criteria; (3) socio-economic development scheme in migrant sending states in Mexico; (4) bilateral cooperation over border administration and security; and (5) facilitating family reunification (Dominguez and Carlos 2010: 32).

He got support from Mexican Congress and also from American intellectual community. Robert Pastor advocated the adoption of a customs union to replace NAFTA, for the formation of a community of North America and adopting many features that existed in European Union, particularly financial help to less-developed region (Pastor 2008: 48). Similarly, Weintraub (2010: 37) highlights three significant points to establish North American Community or

NAFTA-Plus to gain better profit in global business; to protect North America from terrorism; and to reduce economic disparity between the three countries.

Bush took seriously the ambitious immigration proposal that Fox put forth. It was an opportunity for the Bush administration to show its interest in Mexico as the US experienced an economic boom in the late 1990s, which augured well for a bilateral migration agreement. Admittedly, reviving guest workers is in the interest of US to meet local demand and prevent further illegal entry. Bush gave a condition to have such agreement—Mexico needs to cooperate with the US over border administration and security (Pastor 2008: 3233).

However, the 9/11 terrorist attacks on US hijacked every possible migration agreement, which was the key issue in Fox's proposal of NAFTA-Plus. After 9/11, talks on migration issues between Fox and Bush took place in March 2002 and October 2002 during the United Nations Conference and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in Monterrey and Baja California. Fox continued to push the migration agenda again (Ugalde 2004: 130). As a response to Fox's demand, Bush announced to revive immigration policy on January 7, 2004. A revised policy enables immigrant workers to work in the US, who are suitable for the work and when native workers are not available for the job. It also allows undocumented foreign workers, who are working in the US, for three years to renew their work permits. The new policy also includes some incentives to encourage immigrants to return home (Storrs 2005: 8).

Fox faces many difficulties to sell his vision of NAFTA-Plus. Canadian decision makers have made it clear that it gains nothing by shifting the discussion from a bilateral to a trilateral format. US stresses that though migration is a significant issue between the two countries; it is not related to its homeland security (Hristoulas 2003: 41). However, Castaneda described it as "a rosy picture of a hypothetical North American Economic Community, along European lines associating Mexico with US and Canada" (Dominguez and Carlos 2010: 32). Again, Dominguez and Carlos (2010: 195) argued that it was a creative vision, which aims to ties guest workers programme and remittances for solving a century of immigration, of deepening poverty and of emptying villages. In short, NAFTA-Plus was a Fox's strategy to address the migration, trade and border issues.

However, to add more meaning to Fox's proposal of NAFTA-Plus, in March 2005, Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP)<sup>87</sup> was established as a central element of NAFTA-Plus. President Bush and Fox along with Canadian Prime Minister asserted that the new initiative was "based on the principle that our security and prosperity are mutually dependent and complementary" and was designed explicitly to "help consolidate our action into a North American framework to confront security and economic challenge" (Stokes and Raphael 2010: 210). The SPP also calls for rapid expansion of temporary guest workers programmes between the three countries, and in this regard, Canada's Seasonal Agricultural Workers Programme was considered as a model to implement (Walia and Oka 2008).

### **Presidential Office for Mexicans Abroad (OPME) (2000)**

Today, most of the migrant sending countries are increasingly acknowledged their diasporas as agents of development, what Kurup categories as "brain gain". Responsive to diasporic potential, most of the migrant sending countries have set up institutions to consistently facilitate ties their nationals abroad. The diasporic ministry of various countries works at different levels of government and manifest diverse priorities. For example, some are interested only with those diasporas living in developed countries while others aim at permanent residents and naturalised citizens (Agunias 2009).

Fox, during his 2000 election campaign, promised that he would enter a binational partnership with the US on migration issue and also create more jobs in Mexico to stem migration. "Mexican diasporas, especially those living in the US, would play a significant role in rebuilding Mexico and Mexico would never accept any policy that seeks to transfer Mexican immigrants into servants", he added (Ellingwood 2000). During his campaign in Los Angeles, Fox said "we will use all persuasion and all our talent to bring together the American, Canadian and Mexican governments so that in five to ten years, the border is totally open to the free movement of workers" (Robinson and Mandel-Campbell 2000).

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<sup>87</sup> Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) is a part of North American integration, which is designed to deepen North American economic integration beyond the creation of NAFTA-Plus. It serves as the best venue for leaders to discuss and resolve their problems and differences (Weintraub 2008: 174).



To fulfil all his promises, Fox created OPME in 2000 headed by Hernandez<sup>88</sup> (Fitzgerald 2009: 59) to maintain a close relation with Mexican diaspora, especially in the US. He accepted immigration as a structural feature of Mexican society and framed out policies and programmes to increase their positive efficacy and meliorate their negative consequences. He established OPME in 2000 with the following directives: 1) to advise and assist President and Congress in the formulation of diasporic policies and programmes; 2) to implement diasporic policies and programmes and promote the interests and well-being of Mexican diaspora; 3) to serve as forum for strengthening the social, economic and cultural ties between Mexico and its diaspora; and 4) to offer liaison services of Mexican diaspora with appropriate governmental departments and agencies in the arrangement of business and similar ventures in Mexico (Hugo, et al. 2008: 51).

Increasingly, the official goals of the OPME were to take care of Mexican diasporas and promote their welfare in US regardless status. Dr. Hernandez, the director of OPME, dedicated at least three days of each week in the US; held meeting and discussion with American governors, state and federal officials and also with Mexican diasporic groups, associations and its leaders. As such, he serves as a medium of communication between Mexican government and its diaspora—hearing their complaints, settling their demands and problems and receiving numerous petitions from millions of diasporas (Wall 2002). He took their opinions and proposals and advised President and Congress to include them in diasporic policies and programmes. He constantly supported the issuance of extra visas for Mexicans; the establishment of guest worker programme that would give employment to 250,000 or more Mexicans in the US; and the provision to legalise for more than four million Mexican illegal immigrants (Grayson 2002). He also advocates and lobbies hard for illegal immigrants' access to public education and health care and makes them easier and cheaper to wire remittances back home. He notes that there are 20 million legalised Mexican diasporas in the US, who “like myself have one foot in Mexico and one foot in the US and we are proud of it”. He advocates new laws in the US that would provide amnesty to illegal immigrants and open the borders once and for all (Duncan 2004: 246). Beyond this, the programme provided Mexican immigrants and their descendents with privilege to access

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<sup>88</sup> Juan Hernandez was a Mexican American and the first Mexican dual citizen to hold a cabinet position. He headed the OPME. His official duty was to channelize proper communication between Mexican government and its diasporas. He was the one who advocated and lobbied hard for illegal immigrants access to public education and health care and makes diaspora easier and cheaper to send remittances back home (Duncan 2004: 246).

to the Mexican government and encourage them to participate in the rebuilding of Mexico. The prior concerns of OPME were remittances, the development of business centres, the allocation of Mexican products abroad, and the promotion of diasporic investment in Mexico as well as in their hometown (Bayes and Gonzalez 2011: 17).

Clearly the main function of OPME is to promote closer ties between Mexico and Mexican diaspora and between US and Mexico as well. According to Hussian (2004: 155), the OPME is over-viewing every bilateral issue involving immigrants, from trade to undocumented workers to border deaths to remittances utilisation. Similarly, Tulchin and Selee (2003: 20) argue that OPME has been designed to encourage Mexican diaspora to invest in their respective hometown as well as to find ways of improving the treatment of Mexican immigrants in the US. As such, in October 2000, the OPME declared that it had made an agreement with municipal health authorities in American cities to ascertain that Mexican diasporas would receive medical care (Human Rights Watch Staff, 2002: 195). However, Fox terminate the OPME in 2002 and established a new office called National Council for Mexican Communities Abroad. Wall (2002) argues that Fox terminated the OPME mainly due to political or ideological struggle between Jorge Castaneda and Juan Hernandez. In short, the OPME is to address the diasporas' problems and increase their ties with Mexico.

### **Reorganisation of *Grupo Beta* (2001)**

The Mexican government in 1989 asked the head of immigration services in Tijuana and a reformist, Javier Valenzuela, to institute a new law enforcement group to protect migrants and minimise violence at the international border. A new law enforcement unit formed by Javier Valenzuela is known as Grupo Beta.<sup>89</sup> The “*Beta Grupos* for Protection of Migrants” is a new police force, which was unique worldwide. It was a response to increased US border enforcement and public demand to reduce violence, assaults, rapes, murder and an everyday corruption of Mexican police forces against immigrants in the border zone on both sides of the borders. As a result, murders and violence at the border dropped from 10 in 1990 to none in

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<sup>89</sup> Grupo Beta was mainly composed former police officers, who have trained to provide first-aid to desperate migrants as well as to protect them from smugglers. It receives high respect from American and Mexican official for their effectuality and honesty. Moreover, it, in many cases, collaborates with American law enforcement agencies (McDonald 2001).

1991. The positive result of such operation forced Mexican government to create more *Beta Grupos* and posted along Mexico-US border and southern border as well. This unit is also cooperating with the neighbouring countries in cracking down the smuggling of immigrants, a crime under Mexican law (Specht 2009: 2). The legal basis for the establishment of the *Grupos Beta*, Migrant Protection Force is based on Articles 137<sup>90</sup> and 138<sup>91</sup> of the Regulations of the General Population Act.

It erected blue-and-white signs warning: “Caution: Don’t Expose Yourself to the Elements. It’s Not Worth It”. In addition to the erection of warning signs in the border towns and cities, Grupo Beta agents have put 55-gallon drums of water at key border routes in order to save illegal immigrants. Hundreds of migrants, who failed to cross international border, have been provided free meals and some dozens have slept in their office (Smith 2001). Catholic churches and some Mexican NGOs also established shelters for desperate immigrants as well.

It is an agency within the National Immigration Institute (INM) entrusted to assist migrants both Mexicans and foreigners travelling on Mexican soil. It gives guidance on personal safety, food and water to migrants; counsel them about the dangers of travelling in the desert; and persuade them to return home (Clark 2006). If they (immigrants) did not obey their instructions, the *Beta* used muscle power. As a result, Fitzgerald argues that the PRI government used this agency as a means to control immigrants who tried to enter US through Mexico. When Fox became the president of Mexico in 2000, the *Grupo Beta* stations increased to 75 on American border and apprehended around 100 smugglers a month for infringing the ban on human smuggling in Article 138 of the General Law of Population. In June 2001, he (Fox) brought the matter to Congress for debate whether *Grupo Beta* could use force to stop immigrants from travelling across the dangerous zones. In the debate, the final decision was that migrants could not be legally prevent from leaving the country; therefore, the *Grupo Beta*

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<sup>90</sup> Article 137 says that the Secretary may establish Migrant Protection Groups that are in the national territory, which will support the protection and defence of human rights and their physical integrity and property, regardless of their nationality and its status as documented or undocumented (INM 2009).

<sup>91</sup> Article 138 says that the Institute shall coordinate the operation and functioning of the groups referred to in the proceeding article and the same may participate, together, elements of public safety at the federal, state and municipal levels (INM 2009).

abandoned its policing functions totally and focuses on humanitarian issues (Fitzgerald 2006a: 279).

The new functions of *Grupos Beta*, under the PAN government, was focused on protection of undocumented immigrants from brigands, carrying out rescue operation and providing information about how they should cross border safely (Migration News 2001). National Migration Institute (INM) has a multimedia crusade appealing people to report smugglers to a free-toll telephone number and to shun crossing border illegally in dangerous zones or places. Moreover, in 2005, INM started distributing a booklet for illegal immigrants with detailed information on how to evade the major risks (Fitzgerald 2009: 60).

Therefore, main functions of the Grupo Beta are: (1) the protection and defence of the human rights of immigrants, their physical integrity and property, regardless of their nationality and status. (2) Functioning for the security and concern of human rights of immigrants, giving them aid and protection in case of risk, attempts to abuse by authorities and/or individuals. It acts primarily in the border areas and transit points for immigrants. (3) Staff of the three tiers of government works specialising in search, rescue and first aid, who are trained to safeguard and uphold the human rights of immigrants. The functions of *Grupo Beta* are developed in four main focus areas—performing search, rescue and assistance to immigrants who are at risk in coordination with the agencies involved in the matter; performing tasks aimed at providing legal support and social assistance to migrants; receiving and addressing complaints and channelling complaints to the appropriate authorities in order to protect the physical integrity and property of migrants; and guidance to migrants on the rights they have in Mexico as well as natural hazards they face when attempting to cross the border (INM 2009) [for detail see table 6.1 and 6.2 below]. In addition to this, *Beta Grupos* was given wide range of works such as avoiding the gathering of drunken people, prohibiting minor offenses and also going for drug related controls, car theft, smuggling and violent crime up to murder. To achieve all these, the *Beta Grupos* worked mostly undercover, dressed like immigrants and mixed with them in the hot zones of crime incidents in the canyons and semi-urban areas in the Mexico-US border. They pretend to be immigrants, wait for criminal offenses and in many cases get in direct confrontation with armed bandits (Specht 2009: 4).

**Table 6.1 Government's Protection to Migrants through *Grupo Beta*, 2002-2003**

Type of works	No. Rescued in 2002	No. Rescued in 2003
Migrants served	166997	337275
Migrants located	207	104
Social assistance	20890	34130
Legal assistance	2597	1742
Legal representation of migrants for crime prevention	1466	967
Total	192157	374218

Source: Bustamante 2003: 32

**Table 6.2 Number of Foreigners Detained and Returned, 2002 & 2003**

Type of works	No. Detained in 2002	No. Detained in 2003
Detained foreigners	86302	109534
Returned foreigners	70340	101458
Total	156642	210992

Source: Bustamante 2003: 32

As a result, the Mexican state institutions such as the Department of the Interior (Secretaria de Gobernacion) or its branch National Migration Institute (INM) also local mayors, state governors and even the Office of the Presidency use the *Beta Grupos* as a proof of their good will. In advertising, speeches, information materials, books and magazine publications, *Beta Grupos* appear as the number one agency of the Mexican state to stand for human rights protection of immigrants and a central figure in the whole of the state-run efforts in the migration field. It offers cost-free phone call, giving out food or water or an aspirin or offer to ride the immigrants to the bus station or to the consulate. It rescues more than six thousand immigrants in 2007, nearly eight thousand in 2006 and nearly six thousand in 2005 (Specht 2009: 13).

The media coverage of *Beta Grupos* uttered by both national and international produces these state presented figures and reproduces the argumentation of the successful Mexican immigrant protection and rescue group. Special acknowledgment came from authorities, such as United Nations Rapporteur for Migrants, Gabriela Rodriguez Pizarro, who in a visit to Mexico in

2002 recognised the *Beta Grupos* as an extraordinary force with extremely good results and a worldwide example for a humanitarian work in the immigration field. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) describes it as the best agent for saving thousands of immigrants' lives in the international borders. In 2009, Mexico has 16 *Beta Grupos* in its international borders and rescued more than 230000 immigrants from various countries (IOM 200).

One of the main criticism on *Beta Grupos*, uttered mostly by anti-immigrant groups in the US, indicate that *Beta Grupos* are supposed to be actively helping undocumented immigrants to cross the borderline, an accusation that has never ever been proved. The fact that *Beta Grupo* agents do not enforce Mexican migration law, for example, by arresting immigrants who are without legal residence in Mexico, seems to irritate and leaves wonder about *Beta Grupos'* aim (Specht 2009: 18).

### **Reintroduction of *Matricular Consular* (2002)**

Consular Identification Cards (CID) are dispensed by some migrant sending countries to aid and identify their diasporic population. It helps holders to open bank accounts, acquire driving licenses, verify identity to police and gain access to various services (American Government Accountability Office 2004: 1). Keeping those benefits to holders in mind, Mexico has been issuing such identity cards to its citizens who register in its consulates since 1871; however, its significance and demand increased recently. The issuance of such card escalated substantially during the presidency of Fox, who has emphasised on providing various services to Mexican citizens abroad. Following 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US and its subsequent strict security measures, Fox reintroduced the card with new features and made it more beneficial and reliable document. The new version is called "high security consular registration (*matricular consular de alta seguridad* [MCAS] in Spanish)", first appeared in Mexican consulates in 2012. The official purpose of CID is to prove that the card holder is a Mexican national living outside Mexico.

Following his National Development Plan's objectives, Fox said that the movement of Mexicans should be secure, dignified, legitimate and orderly. Accordingly, Fox reintroduced *matricular* card in March 2002 in response to 9/11 terrorist attacks and Bush's redefinition of US-Mexico border as a potential line of terrorist entry. It may be regarded as a tactical response

by the Fox administration in the 9/11 climate resistant to formal recognition of the undocumented migrants. As per Mexican officials, every Mexican who lived and worked outside Mexico can obtain *matricular* consular card with the following documents: (1) any document proving him or her as Mexicans citizenship; (2) any identity card having his/her photograph for identity proof; and proof of his/her present address in host countries (Bruno and Storrs 2005: 3).

The *matricular* consular card is useful in the US only for illegal aliens. With the presence of huge illegal immigrants in the US, the Mexican government along with its consulates and diasporic associations launched a forceful grassroots lobbying crusade to accept its MCAS in the banks, local jurisdiction and state level, particularly in localities where undocumented Mexicans are concentrated. The purpose of such grassroots campaign is to accomplish quasi-legal status for undocumented Mexican immigrants in their respective localities without waiting for approval from Washington. The card is useful for illegal immigrants if American institutions are willing to accept Mexico's attempts to outwit American immigration law (Dinerstein 2003). Wall (2010) argues that the *matricular* card prevent illegal immigrants from being deported by the American Immigration and Naturalisation Service (INS). As such, it became the hottest item available in all Mexican consuls in the US.

The Institute for Mexicans Abroad estimates that by July 2004, four million Mexicans got cards and hundreds of American cities and counties, 33 states, nearly 1200 police departments and 178 financial institutions had accepted it as a valid form of identification. It has enabled Mexican nationals to gain access to various social services, obtain driving and business licenses, open bank accounts, register children in schools and send remittances more securely (Allantson 2007: 156). The Bush administration granted 'temporary' workers status to illegal Mexicans through MCAS. Some American states recognised it as an authentic American card and issued driving license (Redd 2009: 62). Dinerstein (2003) argues that this is because of the brilliant propaganda formulated by Mexico's foreign ministry and enforced by its consulate offices. Their strategy is to secure widespread acceptance of the card in the US. For this, many consulate staff travelling from city to town within their jurisdiction, meeting the mayor, police chiefs, bank functionaries, motor vehicle departments, state legislators, etc. and persuading them to accept MCAS as official identification. In addition, they delivered speech at official meetings, court

prominent community leaders, engage with the editorial boards of various newspapers and take advantage of every opportunity for media coverage. The police departments accept MCAS with the following reasons: 1) it facilitates immigrants to open bank account, thus help them shun having large amount of cash with them or at home, and prevent them from robbery and home invasions. As such, police asked banks to allow *matricular* holders to open account. 2) People with identification would report crimes and give evidence about crimes, thus, help police and society. 3) When police detains someone with identification card, it saves resources in identifying. 4) MCAS makes easier for police to identify dead, unconscious and missing people (O'Neil 2003).

In foreign policy implications, MCAS can be explained in three major categories: the US-Mexico relations, reciprocal treatment of nationals and consular identification. In US-Mexico relations, the main political parties and their candidates for 2000 Mexican presidential elections found the well-being of Mexicans abroad was the main concerns of Mexicans. Almost all Mexicans have relatives abroad especially in the US and Mexicans at home are concerned about their difficulties particularly who died in the border or bused by the American authorities. Consequently, when Fox came to power in 2000, he urgently proposed to legalise all illegal Mexican immigrants in the US through amnesty or guest worker programmes but failed mainly due to 9/11 terrorist attacks (Bruno and Storrs 2005: 7). Acknowledged the failure of bilateral talks on migration, many observers commented that Mexican government's lobbied to accept MCAS would provide benefits to its illegal immigrants in the US. MCAS would help many illegal immigrants to access various services in US like banking, remitting money at cheaper rates and carrying their daily activities actively. People who support MCAS postulate that improving the status of illegal Mexicans, it has, in many ways, improved the bilateral relationship in the absence of migration agreement. They mention joint action in many areas such as enhance Mexico's endeavour to curb drug trafficking activities and cooperate on border control schemes. They also further argue that rejection of MCAS might have unfavourable consequence between the two countries (Bruno and Storrs 2005: 8).

At the reciprocity of treatment of citizens abroad, it is conventional practice for consulate to register about their nationals with an intention to notify and protect them. Such system is



accepted and protected by international law. Moreover, such document is accepted by various countries for several purposes. The supporters of the MCAS argue US should accept it and expect the same from Mexico and other countries for various activities (Bruno and Storrs 2005: 9). On consular identification, the card facilitates the notification by the American law enforcement officer(s) of foreign consulates when foreigners are arrested for illicit activities. The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations specifies that foreigners who are detained abroad have right to communicate to their consulates for protection and assistance. It also indicates that in order to enjoy such rights, it is the duty of detaining state to issue consular notification without delay. Mexican who has MCAS and detain in US would make consular notification easy for American authorities (Bruno and Storrs 2005: 9). The issuance of MCAS by Mexican government is to make consular notification as well as to assist and protect its citizens in US. Mexico has been protesting against US for never issuing consular notification about Mexican nationals; executed many as per its laws; and there are many waiting for execution without the benefit of consular assistance and competent defence. In 2002, Texas authorities executed Javier Suarez Medina without consular notification about his detention to Mexican consulate(s); in protest against this execution, Fox cancelled his trip to US in August 2002. Supporters of the MCAS argue that it makes US easier to notify consulate(s) about the detention of Mexican(s) and thereby mend the prospect that American nationals in custody in Mexico will enjoy protection and assistance through consular notification (Bruno and Storrs 2005: 10).

In support of the above arguments, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) argues that it meets the purpose of creating an effective tool that helps migrant workers to access key services through regular channels, including financial services. It will reduce concerns relating to security issues by providing undocumented migrants with identification and attestation of Mexican citizenship. It also facilitates Mexican immigrants' access to banking and other financial services. A number of Latin American countries have followed Mexico's initiative to protect and assist their citizens abroad. This practice is innovative as it provides immigrants, especially those in irregular status with identification and access to various services. The practice has achieved its objectives of providing undocumented Mexicans living in the US with an identification card and thus, access to assistance and services (ILO 2002).

However, the *matricular* card has been attacked on various grounds. According to Dinerstein (2003), the cards shield criminal as it is accessible by hard-core criminals. Local police are trying to confront with an influx of undocumented Mexican immigrants; MCAS has made them a kind of protection badge. Some argue that MCAS helps illegal Mexican immigrants to live and run business in the US. They also that MCAS accepted by American threatened public safety (Bruno and Storrs 2005: 5).

### **National Council for Mexicans Abroad (2002)**

Fox terminated the Presidential Office for Mexicans Abroad in 2002 in order to bring common platform and end political or ideological differences between his cabinet. However, he did not abandon about the well-being of Mexican diaspora in his foreign policy. As such, he established a new institution in June 2002 for Mexicans abroad popularly known as National Council for Mexican Communities Abroad. The council was headed by him and eleven federal departments were added and it was a part of the Foreign Ministry and its consulates throughout US and Canada. Hernandez was appointed as coordinator of presidential records (Wall 2002). Now Fox have direct contact with Mexicans abroad and the same time, the diasporic communities can directly appeal or communicate with him. However, Keller-Lapayre argued that Fox conveyed his message to the Mexican communities abroad through “*Lazos*”.<sup>92</sup>

The objectives of council were same as OPME. It formulated Mexico’s diasporic policies and programmes; strengthened its institutional capacity; and advanced a more thorough perspective to deal with its diasporas in the US and Canada. It had two key roles to play: 1) coordinate diasporic policies and programmes within various cabinet ministries; and 2) to guide Mexican diasporas to take part in decision-making and to extend their recommendations and suggestions in national diasporic policies and programmes (Corchado 2002). Fox emphasised much on Mexicans in the US and Canada in this policy and argued at the inaugural ceremony (6 August 2002) that among its beneficiaries would be “Mexican diasporas” in the US and Canada. Interestingly, Wall (2002) argued that Fox considered Mexican diasporas as tools of “Mexican

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<sup>92</sup> *Lazos* is an IME free electronic newsletter, which contains Mexico’s policies and programmes for the welfare of Mexicans abroad, but mostly focus on those settle in the US. Fox also used *Lazos* to send his weekly message to the Mexican communities abroad (Keller-Lapayre 2006: 18).

foreign policy” and eliminated the term “*pochos*”. Today Mexico’s media and politicians viewed diasporas as a window to expand their influence in American politics especially in migration and trade. In 2003, when Fox established Institute for Mexicans Abroad, it became diasporic policy maker (Bayes and Gonzalez 2010: 7).

The council governs the Institute for Mexicans Abroad. It advises IME to focus its works based on three main objectives—(1) strengthen the leadership and organising skills of the Mexican diaspora; (2) implement programmes to improve the diasporas’ quality of life; and (3) establish networks for exchange of knowledge and skill. It is created as an ideal channel to attend to a universe of 22 million people of Mexican origin (Government of Mexico 2002).

### **Institute for Mexicans Abroad (2003)**

The Institute for Mexicans Abroad is one of the most productive Mexican institutions in attaining its goals—to protect the interests and address its immigrants’ problems. It was established in 2003 to protect and promote the interests of Mexican diasporas, its work expanded tremendously since its inception and is carrying out many policies and programmes to heighten the standard of life of Mexican diaspora. It discharges the functions of OPME and PCME (IME 2003). Therefore, IME is the best strategy of public diplomacy (PD).<sup>93</sup>

It is an autonomous department within Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a goal to develop better and suitable policies and programmes for Mexicans abroad especially in US. Mexican-origin population in the US is more than 20 million and at least half of them are Mexican born. As such, the main purpose of IME is to address the needs of all Mexican diasporas (Keller-Lapayre 2006: 9). To serve them better, IME not only include diasporic representative in its advisory council but also seeks their opinions, suggestions and advices from them. It, therefore, receives suggestions and recommendations from diasporic associations, their members and advisory agencies that seek to uplift the conditions of Mexican diasporas such as health, sports,

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<sup>93</sup> Public diplomacy aims to promote national interest of a country through apprehending, informing and influencing foreign spectators. For Mexico, the audience intended by IME is basically the Mexican diasporas, their host countries and other foreign audiences. Mexico’s diasporic diplomacy through IME is to attend some of the needs of diasporas as well as advance its national interests (Leonard, et al 2002: 24).

culture and community organisations (Government of Mexico 2002). The Institute for Mexicans Abroad has the following missions:

- (1) to promote both reevaluation of the migratory phenomenon and the dignified treatment of Mexicans who live abroad;
- (2) to encourage the creation of meeting places and promote communication with and among the Mexican communities abroad;
- (3) to act as liaison, coordination with Mexico's diplomatic offices, with the Mexican communities abroad;
- (4) to establish adequate coordination with the state and municipal governments, institutions and organisations involved with assisting the Mexican communities abroad and with other related and complementary issues;
- (5) to design and promote mechanisms to implement programmes and projects that pertain to the work of the Institute for Mexicans abroad;
- (6) to organise and participate in seminars, conferences, symposiums, colloquia and public, private and academic congregations relating to migration and issues involving Mexicans abroad; and
- (7) to gather and systemise the suggestions and recommendations for enhancing the social development of Mexican diasporas submitted by advisory boards made up of representatives from these communities (Government of Mexico 2002).

IME was headed by president including most of the cabinet secretaries and representatives of "Aztlán"<sup>94</sup>. Such policy is an adventurous move that basically stretch its arms into the territories it lost in 1848 (Cienfuegos 2002). To meet all its objectives, the IME has advisory council and organises informative conferences, conducts binational health week (BHW), sponsors educational programmes and publishes newsletters.

### ***Advisory Council***

As argued in chapter 1, diaspora as a state subject of transnationalism, the council is a noteworthy and unequalled transnational organisation of Mexican diasporic leaders established by

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<sup>94</sup> Here Aztlán refers to Mexican diasporas. Aztlán has been variously translated as "Place of Whiteness" or "the lands to the north". However, Aztlán carries historical significance as the original home of the Aztec people. Aztlán connects people of prehistoric Mexico to modern day Chicanos in the US. The Chicano Movement used it as symbol of Chicano pride, Mexican heritage and Chicano Nation, the name given to the southwest region that was ceded by Mexico in the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo (Stacy 2002: 70).

IME or SRE and entrusts to give advices and suggestions to Mexican government about diasporic policies and programmes. IME advised its consulates in US and Canada to form an elected body of about 100 advisors from diaspora to represent in the council (Bayes and Gonzalez 2010: 7). The election of the council was proportioned based on the size of the Mexican diaspora in the area. The Council was made up of 120 members, including 35 women—72 were Mexican diaspora in the US; 28 were American-born citizens of Mexican-origin (Salem 2005: 9). For the remaining 20 members were equally represented by American based Latino organisations and Mexican state governments. Their tenure is for three years and cannot be reelected. The affair of Mexican diaspora, especially in the US and Canada is the main issue of the Council (Salem 2005: 10). The establishment of council was, thus, enabled diasporas to participate in the blueprint of Mexican public policies and acts as a bridge to trade new ideas and promote better understanding within North American countries.

The advisors selected six coordinators and six secretaries elected among themselves for commissions on specific topics such as education, health, political, culture, legal and border. The council meets twice in a year to achieve consensus on recommendations (Government of Mexico 2002). Its main objective is to advise Mexican government on diasporic policies and programmes; maintain close ties with Mexicans abroad; and strengthen the existing schemes. The Council's functions is to present directives and propose policies in the area of attention for Mexicans abroad to improve Programme for Mexican Communities Abroad and Presidential Office for Mexican Abroad (Government of Mexico 2002).

It will be part of the Foreign Ministry and its consulates throughout the US. This programme enhances the power and functions of Mexican consulates. The Mexican consulates have several central functions: first, to issue documents like visas, passports, civil register to Mexicans, visas for foreigners, etc.; second, to provide consular protection to Mexican diasporas in their service areas; third, to promote Mexico's commerce, culture and tourist; and finally, to promote and reinforce the ties between Mexico and its diaspora. Of these, the defence of diasporas is one of the most significant duties of Mexican consulates. It also offers help and consultations to immigrants on matters of immigration, work, civil and administration issues

(Salum 2004). Besides this, almost all Mexican consulates in the US and Canada have special staff members accountable for IME affairs (Keller-Lapayre 2006: 11).

The IME received hundreds of recommendations from advisory council, during the first tenure (2003-2005), IME got 255 recommendations. IME personnel has obligation to respond to each recommendation. If any recommendation is outside the scope of IME, IME passed to the appropriate departments which must respond. The advisory council's recommendations moulded and informed the activities of IME and SRE towards Mexicans abroad. For instance, based on the recommendations from council, IME organised conference on gender and instituted a scholarship programme for immigrants (Laglagaron 2010: 16). The first council term recommendations were concentrated on improving relationship between council and Mexican authorities as well as suggestion for better comprehension of Mexico's diasporic policies and programmes. The council also recommended absentee voting right for diasporas in presidential elections. The succeeding term concentrated on enhancing consular capacities, fostering closer relationship with Mexican cabinet and collectively fights against American anti-immigrant or anti-Mexican policies. As such, in spring 2006, many IME leaders and council members were protesting against American attempts to make undocumented immigration a felony<sup>95</sup> (Ibid: 17).

Mexican government through the council continues to lobby American legislators and public leaders to bring immigration reform, which would legalise undocumented Mexican immigrants. This political alliance also attempts to branch out education and health benefits to Mexicans abroad especially in the US in addition to labour, community development and access to services (Keller-Lapayre 2010: 11). It also aims to empower and develop new leaders who can lead and advocate for their rights in Mexico as well as abroad. To build such generation, IME not only took Jewish diaspora as a model but also teamed up with the American Jewish Committee (AJC) to teach strategic skills among the Mexican diasporic leaders. IME along with council has formulated structure to address diasporas' needs; establishes policies and programmes to address these needs; and directs diasporic welfare to appropriate departments in Mexico. The

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<sup>95</sup> The American House of Representatives, in 2005, enacted "the Border Protection, Antiterrorism and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005", popularly known as H.R. 4437. This act attempted to make illicit presence and undocumented entry into US a felony (Laglagaron 2010: 17).

establishment of council was an empowerment to diasporic groups to discuss their issues, coordinate action among them and seek help from key Mexican officials at federal and state governments (Laglagaron 2010: 18). Thus, council is a significant resource for diasporas' needs as well as for democratisation of Mexican domestic politics.

### ***Health Programme***

IME has given a special attention to the health and well-being of its diasporas in the US, as 56 per cent of them do not have health insurance and 47 per cent do not get regular medical care. Acknowledged their poor admission to excellence health care, IME has centralised its work on improving diasporic health (Laglagaron 2010: 28). Fox instructed Mexican consulates to organise various events related to health care at least once in a week in collaboration with medical services and insurance companies in their respective areas to acquaint diasporas about medical services available in their residential areas (Keller-Lapayre 2006: 14). As such, Mexico's Ministry of Health along with Ministry of Foreign Affairs in collaboration with American local, state and federal agencies, foundations and private companies launched Bi-national Health Week (BHW) in 2001. The programme aims to ameliorate access and quality of health care for inadequately served immigrant communities in the US through seminars, insurance, referrals and medical screenings (Laglagaron, 2010: 29). According to IME (2005),

“The BHW is a bi-national endeavour coordinated by the California-Mexico Health Initiative (CMHI), the US-Mexico Border Health Commission (USMBHC), the University of California, the California Healthcare Fund, the California Endowment, federal, state and local entities, both public and private, for example: the Commission of Health of the Consultative Council of the IME, nongovernmental organisations, legislative groups, clinics, university, community associations, financial agencies, private and voluntary organisations from all over the state” (IME 2005).

It is worth to note that BHW began its work before the establishment of IME and later it was integrated into the IME's programme. Once it was incorporated into IME, its importance grew throughout the year. The first Binational Health Week was held in 2001 and it brought only together only five counties of US; however, in 2005, it conducted in 25 states (US) and 3 (three) provinces in Canada were coordinated by Mexican Consulates (Keller-Lapayre 2006: 14). The inaugural events was held in Chicago as it has the third largest Hispanic population and more than 66 per cent is Mexican ancestry. High ranking officials from Mexico as well as US attended

the inaugural function and conduct two days conference on health policy under the theme, “Transnational Health of Mexican Immigrants in North America: Bridging Communication for Action”. Coincidence to these events in US and Canada, Mexico also conducted “National Health Week (NHW)” in 17 migrant sending states. The closing ceremony of 5<sup>th</sup> BHW was organised in Zacatecas, which has the highest percentages of diasporic population in the US. The inaugural function held in Chicago and closing ceremony in Zacatecas was a well plan strategy. First, Mexican institutions participated in the BHW have privilege to strengthen collective effort with American and Canadian health sector. Second, the BHW provides opportunity mainly to undocumented immigrants to know about the right to healthcare and checkup. Simultaneously, Mexican consulates have privilege to reinforce the connections with the immigrant populations. Third, it sent a strong message to the nation and regions or states that send most migrant to the US that Mexican government is taking care of its diaspora (Keller-Lapayre 2006: 15).

In addition to BHW, IME also has a distinctive health programme known as “*Ventanillas de Salud* (VDS) or health stations. It launched in 2003, as a pilot project in Los Angeles and San Diego, it was a mutual programme of IME, California Endowment and American Border Health Commission. The health stations are attached to consulates and cater basic medical care to Mexican immigrants and also serve as a gateway to local health care services. It aims to provide on-site aid and medical outreach to poor Mexican immigrants who are unfamiliar with the American health programme, it has three primary goals: 1) to make referral and appointments for immigrants to local health care; 2) to enroll desirable immigrants in American healthcare; 3) to inform immigrants about health programmes legally acceptable to them (Laglagaron 2010: 29).

IME regional workers at the Mexican consulates do not furnish medical services but work with local organisations that provide health care to poor and established *Ventanillas*. Therefore, the service of *Ventanilla* depends on geographical location of the Mexican consulates, budget of sponsoring agency, local non-profit organisation and nature of community need. However, IME furnishes financial assistance for these programmes. In 2007, Mexico granted \$460000 for IME health-related initiatives. The programme has grown rapidly since its inception; within six years the programme has grown from two (2) consulates to thirty (30) and



currently (2009) it operates in 17 American states and District of Columbia (Laglagaron 2010: 29).

### ***Education Programme***

In the field of education, the most significant IME programmes are known as “Community *Plazas*”<sup>96</sup> and “Dream Act and Student Adjustment Act”. Community *Plazas* concentrate on fostering education to immigrants by creating a centre for them to study courses according to their need. Dream Act and Student Adjustment Act seeks to assist law initiatives in order to avoid deportation and earn legalisation of undocumented students (Keller-Lapayre 2010: 16). IME co-ordinates between sponsoring agencies and Ministry of Education, offers guidelines for its establishment. *Plazas* are IME’s educational programmes for Mexican immigrants who are above 15 year old. It launched in 2001 and more than 373 *plazas* are operating in 35 states. The curriculum is equivalent to the ones enforced in Mexican rural community centres. Local authorities or educational institutions can cater the facilities for *plazas* by appeal the Mexican consulates. National Council for Adult Education (INEA) is responsible for training the teachers, while IME coordinates the work of the *plazas* (Keller-Lapayre 2006: 16). According to National Council for Adult Education, 16758 students attended community *plazas* in 2007 (Laglagaron 2010: 24).

Mexican immigrants as well as other who attain 15 years and above can complete their primary and secondary education from *plazas*. *Plazas* are an opportunity for Mexican and Central American immigrants who face long waiting list for English as second language (ESL) or workforce opportunities. It gives opportunity for all immigrants to master Spanish language (Laglagaron 2010: 26). Besides these, immigrants also get legal advice and English tuition from *plazas*. Moreover, it gives immigrants the opportunity to enhance their educational skills with new technologies, which incline to close digital and cultural gap in new environment (Keller-Lapayre 2006: 16).

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<sup>96</sup> It is a Mexican educational policy and programme aims to provide favourable chance for immigrant youth and adults to continue their studies based on work opportunity and English as their second language. It becomes a centre for children, youth and adults to enhance their knowledge on life and work (Government of Mexico 2005).

The “Dream (Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors) Act” initiative came into existence in Michigan in 2005. It was established by Mexican consulate in Detroit, Senator B. Thomas and legislator S. Tobocman. It was also known as “Non-Resident Scholars Awards” for Mexican nationals or “NAFTA scholarships”. The above scholarships are conferred to Mexican research scholars who do not enjoy social security benefits or residential status to get admission in higher education. The above mentioned legislators also expressed their wishes to establish NAFTA scholarship in all 19 universities in the state. Such initiatives have been followed in other parts of the US. For instance, Mexican General Consulate in New York had signed “a joint memorandum of understanding with City University of New York (CUNY)” to make Mexican immigrants access to university. Such engagement with CUNY was a part of empowerment to Mexican diaspora in New York. IME scholarship was set up in 2006 in CUNY as well. To achieve the desirable goals, the Mexican consulates in New York are closely working with CUNY as well as with American Jewish community. Diasporic leaders and their organisations are trained to lobby and fund raising in fighting their causes (Keller- Lapayre 2006: 17).

Since 2003 IME coordinates a Mexico-US teacher exchange programme to strengthen the Mexican-origin students in the US to acquaint about the Mexican history, culture, values and traditions. It eases in ameliorating the educational services provided to Mexican diasporic populations in the US. As such, Mexico sent Mexican teachers to the US (Keller-Lapayre 2006: 17-18). IME distributes free Mexican textbooks not only to immigrant children but also to schools, community centres and libraries that impart Spanish to its students (Laglagaron 2010: 14).

### ***Communication Programme***

To popularise its policies and programmes among its diaspora, IME possesses a free electronic newsletter known as “*Lazos*” (Bonding, in English) that can be obtained in its webpage, which contains information about Mexican diasporic population in the US and Canada. The subscribers receive every weekday newsletters and press reviews on different topics and are written in both Spanish and English (Keller-Lapayre 2010: 18). Fox sends his weekly message to Mexican communities abroad through *Lazos*. His weekly message is also aired in 35 television and radio

stations in Spanish in the US. The General Consulate in New York also promotes Mexico's diasporic policies and programmes through its own AM radio programme, aired thirty (30) minutes once a week to give advice on different topics such as family, migration, labour, free health services and education programmes coordinated by IME (Keller-Lapayre 2010: 19).

Acknowledging the positive contributions of IME, ILO (2009) argues that IME bolsters immigrant workers rights; responds to the needs of Mexican communities abroad; connects immigrant communities to their origin places; provides a model for other countries seeking to strengthen ties and facilitate services to their nationals abroad; and innovate specialised government agency for Mexican abroad. It concludes that the IME successfully reached out to Mexican communities abroad, crafting programmes that respond to their particular needs. This has strengthened the diasporas' ties. It also acts as an important network for the transfer of knowledge, skills and information.

### **Reinforcement of *Paisano* Programme**

*Paisano* (is a Spanish term means countrymen) Programme was created in 1989 to address the diasporic complaint against Mexican law enforcement bureaus' superfluous red-tape, slow bureaucratic procedures, verbal abuses and blackmails. Consequently, the "*Programa Paisano*"<sup>97</sup> was established to promote the legal and dignified treatment of Mexican diasporas when they enter or leave Mexico. Its purpose is to safeguard the fundamental rights of Mexican nationals who live or work abroad, as well as to make Mexican diaspora know about their rights, duties and obligations when they enter, transit and leave the country (Government of Mexico 2008). However, mistreatment continued in the border areas. Fox came to power in 2000; he changes the image of *Paisano* Programme by increasing the number of volunteers, booths and observers.

Roughly one million Mexican diaspora have come home during the winter months of 2002-2003. This multitude of migratory movements is suggestive of the return flow of diasporas for winter holiday, festivities and family reunions. As such, Mexican government installed 114 complaint and information modules at the major entry locations for returning migrants. It also

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<sup>97</sup> *Paisano* Programme was created in 1989 to eliminate verbal abuses and blackmails and welcome Mexican nationals who come home from abroad. It composed of 21 ministries of the Mexican government. Its mission is to safeguard the fundamental rights of Mexican nationals who live or work abroad and make them know about their rights, duties and obligations when they enter, transit and leave the country (Government of Mexico 2008).

installed in international airports, international bridges, tollgates and bus terminals in 69 cities and 29 states, the modules registered about 300,000 migrants' information, requests or complaints related to their journey (Bustamante 2003: 5). An assessment of the programme during the same period shown many corrupted officers have been penalised as well as many new works have been added to facilitate safe entry for diaspora (Bustamante 2003: 4).

In 2004, the government estimates that around 1.2 million migrants would return home during festive season. To make their journey safe and sound, the government enlarged its popular *Paisano* Programme. The government activated 300 *paisano* booths in airports and bus stations especially in border towns and cities, where its volunteers provide help, information and necessary forms. It also has a toll-free phone line (Vega 2009). The government also announced that between December 1, 2004 and January 10, 2005 migrants could bring up to \$300 worth of merchandise into Mexico freely. Those who merchandised beyond the limit were requested to declare their goods and pay import tax. It also asked Mexican immigrants who want to drive home a vehicle registered in the US must request for a Temporary Importation Permit. The Mexican consulate in San Diego offered travel tips—the “*Guia del Programa Paisano*”, which cater the latest information of what is allowed as well as prohibited in Mexico (Vega 2009). In 2005, more than 1 million Mexican migrants living abroad were expected to come home for holiday season; Fox warned that blackmails by border guards would not be accepted. Protection of migrants, whom he referred to as “national heroes”, became an annual pledge, Fox advised returning migrants to notify corrupt police, border guards and officials without fear. He addresses them as "My countrymen, I will personally make sure you get the treatment you deserve," Fox stated in many public announcements, “Welcome home” (Schiller 2005).

In 2005, according to Fox, more than 1,300 people would participate in the programme as observers and volunteers. The main goal of the programme is to “supervise and guarantee the well treatment of travellers” (Mala 2005). Fox added he would be "in the customs offices and on the highways to receive with open arms to all Mexican immigrants. We are going to make sure no one is blackmailed, no one is shaken down and that people are received with the honour that each one deserves" (Migration News 2001). Fox also inspected various border crossing points as many migrants were returning home and said his government would not withdraw the

checkpoints:"It's not about removing checkpoints; it's about cleansing them of corruption" (Migration News 2001). He also instructed Mexican consulates in the US to offer the following services to returned immigrants—(1) advice, guidance and information in general; (2) protection and assistance to all Mexicans without discrimination; (3) processing of documents in general for Mexicans; (4) issuing visas for foreigners who visit Mexico; and (5) informs them of events, associations and clubs in your place of origin (Government of Mexico 2010).

### **Institutional Development under Calderon**

Calderon won 2006 Mexican presidential election, the PAN candidate and took office on December 1, 2006. He was the second president to take on office after Mexico's passage to democracy in 1997. His foreign policy prioritises national interest over policy doctrines; foster international trade, democracy and human rights; active engage in international institutions like UN. At the same time, he prefers for close cooperation with the US (Starr 2006: 18). On diasporic issue, he asserts that US has obligation to safeguard the human rights of Mexican nationals in its territory (Starr 2006: 19).

On March 28, 2006, he presented his coming foreign policy and argued that Mexico's foreign policy would not begin from zero, as Mexico has a history of prosperous diplomacy. "Mexico has made important contributions to international issues such as disarmament, refugees and asylum, international peace and security and the codification of international law" he added (Washington Post 2007). He asserted that Mexico's international role should be based on its passage to democracy and pluralism. The new political and social reality for Mexico is promoting democracy and protecting human rights throughout the world (Davila 2008: 9).

Since the beginning of 2006 presidential campaign, he has articulated Mexico's foreign policy should be "active and responsible" (Davila 2008: 7). He highlighted three key global aspects that would vitally influence on his foreign policy: 1) regional debate about the benefits and pitfalls of economic modernisation, globalisation, development and democracy. 2) The political and ideological debate in the US in response to 9/11 concerning national security and role of nation in world politics would affect Mexico's well-being; security threat to US would affect Mexico's interests, security and prosperity as well; the most important bilateral issue for Mexico would be the establishment of North American Community and free movement labour in

the region; and Mexico must collaborate with US to address the undocumented migratory flows. 3) Mexico must realign with Asia, particularly China and India, to promote concrete dialogue on global issues (Washington Post 2007).

The protection and defense of Mexican nationals abroad become of the one main objectives of his foreign policy (Davila 2008: 8). As such, PAN reformed the Mexican Foreign Service Law and was highly interested to improve consular protection for its diasporas, the defence of their rights and dignity, regulation of remittances and signing of a migratory accord with the US (Davila 2008: 7). However, drug trafficking and violence, border security and immigration are the deciding factors in the Mexico-US relationship during his tenure. Calderon did his first official visit to the US as president-elect in November 2006 and condemned the authorisation of 700 miles of fencing in the US-Mexico border. He confidently declared that job generation and scaled up investment in Mexico would be more productive in reducing illegal immigration than fencing the US-Mexico border. President Bush visited Mexico in March 2007 and in the meeting Calderon promised to fight against drug trafficking and requested US to lessen its demand for drugs (Seelke 2007: 14). His willingness to collaborate with the US on narcotics led to the formation of the Mérida Initiative.<sup>98</sup>

At the same time, Calderon blasted American immigration policies and pledged to fight hard to protect of Mexican diasporic rights and interests in US, and added “Mexico does not end at its borders” (Carl 2007). He added that “We strongly protest the unilateral measures taken by the American Congress and government that have only persecuted and exacerbated the mistreatment of Mexican undocumented workers” (Carl 2007). He also extended his support to the millions of Mexican nationals abroad, particularly in the US and Canada, regardless about their status and asserted “Where there is a Mexican, there is a Mexico” (Carl 2007). He maintains strong ties with the US but always condemned American immigration policies in order to prevent deportations that divide many families, in some cases, forced American born Mexicans to build new lives in Mexico.

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<sup>98</sup> Merida Initiative is an American assistance programme to the governments of Mexico to combat criminal organisations whose illegal actions weaken public safety, deteriorate the rule of law, and threaten the American national security. Under this assistance programme, the US will provide equipment, training, technical assistance to Mexico. As such, in 2008, American Congress sanctioned an initial \$400 million for Mexico (Seelke 2009: 14).

He asserted that migration agreement with the US is one of his top priorities and argued migration accord would equally benefit the two countries (Wall 2006). Such accord would legalise illegal Mexican immigrants and open a door for guest worker programme between the two countries. As such, he called upon American Congressmen to stop the ‘irrationality’ of HR4437<sup>99</sup>, as it goes not only against the rights of immigrants but also against the will of American employers. He said Americans should stop violating immigrants’ human rights as they are not criminals and are a source of labour for booming American economy. The Mexicans in the US are fighting for their human rights, labour rights and political rights, he added. Calderon has ordered Mexican consuls in the US to work hard to promote the positive contributions of Mexican immigrants (Darraj 2009: 88).

His government is deeply interested in reaching a comprehensive migratory agreement that would legalise undocumented Mexicans and guarantee their human rights. Mexico is completely understanding about the reluctance of Americans feeling to negotiate anything that might endanger the American security, especially after 9/11. However, every year 1 million Mexicans enter US and the approval of bills like the HR 4437 plan to construct border wall would bring greater misunderstanding between the two countries (Davila 2008: 10). However, Mexican politicians are united behind Calderon on migratory agreement with the US and Mexican Senate approved his five (5) days visit to various American states on February 2008.

During that visit, he emphasised on Mexican diaspora “to strengthen the ties and deepen the dialogues with the Mexican communities”. However, much of his visit focused on cultivating proper relationships with allies in the US who could fight for the rights of Mexicans immigrants as well as call for open borders policy between the two countries. Wall (2008) argues “the reason he is in the US is to exert influence directly and indirectly on American policymakers in hope that after the presidential election, there will be an expansion of the guest-worker programme, there will be more visas issued to Mexican citizens and there will be a path to legalisation for the Mexican illegal immigrants.” As such, in New York City on February 10, he had meeting with

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<sup>99</sup> The HR4437 bill was approved by the House of Representative but rejected by the Senate. The bill authorises to fence US-Mexico border; authorises employers to verify foreign workers’ legal status through electronic means; remove “Diversity Immigrant Visa’ scheme; forbids grants to agencies that provide refuge to illegal immigrants; impose a fine of \$3000 if illegal immigrants agree to leave voluntarily; allows deportation of any illegal; increases penalties for employing illegal; and prohibits accepting immigrants from any country (Chavez 2013: 217).

the Council of the Americas—“the main organisers of the American businessmen, investors and American opinion leaders devoted to promote the development and integration of the hemisphere” (Wall 2008). On February 11, he had discussion with New York Governor Eliot Spitzer, both agreed to promote and respect for the rights of immigrants and acknowledged the importance of economic, social and cultural connections between New York and Mexico (France-Pressé 2008).

On February 12, in Chicago, he met Mayor Richard M. Daley; they signed a ‘letter of intent’ to establish a joint programme to certify Mexicans, who are working in Illinois’ food and restaurant industry. He praised Governor Blagojevich for keeping a good relationship with Mexican community in Illinois, notably the ‘All Kids Health Programme’, medical care for all Mexican children regardless of their status in the state. He also had discussion with Chicago Mexican community and said “It is my duty to echo the voice of all *Mexicanas* (Female) and *Mexicanos* (male)” (Wall 2008). On 13 February, he was received by Californian Governor and met various legislators and publicised immigration reform to legalise Mexicans illegal immigrants and North American Integration for free movement of goods, service and labour. He argued “if there is not a migratory accord, both countries will not prosper” and added “the prosperity and economic growth of the US would not be possible without the Mexican labour force” (Milliken 2008).

*Paisano* Programme begun with his meeting with the immigrants at Nogales on 20 December 2006. He hailed immigrants returning from the US and Canada for the festive season and promised to create good and suitable jobs for them to stay at home. He also pledged to defend their rights and dignity in the US but added his priority is to staunch the flow of migrants by ameliorating economy (Rodriguez 2006). He sent 1000 voluntary helpers to checkpoints along the 2000 miles Mexico-US border and various international airports, tollgates and bus terminals to ensure nobody confiscate their belongings, bribe and mistreat them. He also authorised Mexican consulates in the US that all fees collected from immigrants be utilised to defend their rights in the US (Rodriguez 2006). The Mexican government, through the Ministry of Interior and the Consular Network in Canada and US launches the "*Paisano* Winter 2008 Programme" with the main purpose of guiding and supporting the Mexican citizens living abroad



that visit Mexico during this upcoming holiday season. From November 24th, 2008 to January 9th, 2009, the Consulate General of Mexico in Phoenix introduced a more intensive educational campaign with travel tips for Mexicans and foreign tourists to visit Mexico better informed and avoid major setbacks. Before heading south, travellers are encouraged to obtain the "Winter Guide 2008" (free of cost) which offers information on customs regulations such as goods and products allowed in Mexican territory, the terms and conditions of personal luggage and gifts exempt from duty and taxes during the holiday season, entry requirements, visa and vehicle permits as well as the required procedure for conducting the final import of a vehicle (Consulate General of Mexico 2008).

On issue of NAFTA, Calderon follows the footsteps of Fox and argued in his election campaign, "In coming two decades, I envision the whole North American region as a single region with a free market, not just in goods, services and investment, but also a free labour market" (Hing 2010: 52). This means Mexicans should not panic about the current situation, the government has a brighter vision for all North American and must trust the government on this issue. NAFTA will soon become like European Union with common currency, shared passport and immigration agreements. He added that NAFTA has benefited Mexicans and their welfare. He gave an example of his state Michoacán—NAFTA enabled it to become a larger exporter of avocados, which in turn has attracted investment and created more jobs (Hing 2010: 52). However, many Mexican farmers and commodity groups are compelling Mexican government to revise some of the NAFTA provisions, especially agricultural commodities. Fox government argued that renegotiating NAFTA was not in the card and the Calderon continued to face public pressure to look into it (Jurenas 2008: 34).

Calderon used IME's programmes and policies to promote diasporic interests, dignity and rights as well as to enhance Mexico's image at abroad. Education and migration issues have been discussed at the cabinet level between Mexican and American governments. As a result, Binational Commission was established in 1981, which allows regular exchanges at the cabinet level of the two countries, and includes fifteen working groups, among them a group focused on education and cultural affairs and another on migration and consular affairs. States like California, New Mexico, Michigan, Florida, and Texas have established programmes that

support cooperation and collaboration with Mexico (Gouwens 2001: 62). One component that developed out of this cooperation is a teacher exchange that began in 1995. The main objective of teacher exchange include: (1) to develop understanding about the education systems of the two countries; (2) to promote closer international ties among teachers, schools, states and districts education agencies; (3) to promote understanding and good will among professionals involved in the education of children on both sides of the border; (4) to share methodology, instrumental materials, and models of dual-language instruction; and (5) to provide workshops and co-teach in a class room setting (Gouwens 2001: 63). To accelerate this process, in 2009, Felipe Calderon signed a partnership agreement with Oregon state officials whereby Mexican government would provide a pool of screened Spanish-speaking teachers to meet the needs of the state's English learner population (Salomone 2010: 62). In 2008, he calls upon immigrants to help "transform Mexico" into an economic powerhouse (Salomone 2010: 62). Between 2007 and 2008, IME also distributed 9520 Mexican textbooks to diasporic children and schools, libraries and communities that promote Spanish language in the US. According to INEA, there were 16758 students attending plazas in the US in 2007 (Laglagaron 2010: 24-25).

The health of farm workers and that of Mexican Americans who make up a majority of farm workers in US cannot be taken granted. They lack access to affordable health care and insurance and also lack health research on Mexican American community (Lopez 2003: 1). The well-being of Mexican Americans is the main concern of Mexico's diasporic policies and programmes. A concrete diasporic policies and programmes started in 1990, which established various institutions in Mexican government. To achieve those institutional goals, Mexico cooperates and collaborates with US on various issues. One of them is the health care of its diasporas. Their cooperative institution on health care is commonly known as Binational Health Week (BHW) and Office of Border Health (OBH). Calderon's health policy toward diaspora is Mexicans involvement in BHW and OBH. The 9th BHW took place from October 3-15, 2009. It aims to increase awareness among the immigrants about nutrition, stroke, H1N1 and importance and ways to prevent addiction and healthy living. The tenth BHW took place from October 4-15, 2010 in forty (40) states in the US and three (3) provinces in Canada, where Mexican immigrants are concentrated in large number. It was focused on promotion of medical awareness among inadequately served Latino community about how give up addictions and gang involvement. It

also attempts to make awareness about oral health, obesity and diabetes, disabilities and autism and how to access public health care (BHW 2010).

The OBH drafted a programme and policy known as “Healthy Border 2010” intends to develop better health strategy in US-Mexico border. The programme establishes 10-years plans to promote healthy living and eradicate diseases in the border region. It is a binational scheme encompasses general features of health programmes of two countries. There are 20 common features in the programme clubbed into 11 areas. The 11 areas and its objectives are given in table 6.3 below.

**Table 6.3 Eleven (11) Areas and its objectives of “Healthy Border 2010”**

<b>Areas</b>	<b>Objectives</b>
Right to healthcare	Make certain admission to basic healthcare services
Cancer	Reduce the risk and fatality of cancers
Diabetes	Reduce fatality and increase hospital for its patients
Environmental health	Ensure every family access to Ameliorate household access to sewerage system and lessen the number of pesticide poisoning
HIV/AIDS	Reduce the number as well as promote its awareness
Immunisation	Increase immunisation and reduce the growth of hepatitis and TB
Injury avoidance	Lessen fatality from accident and from injury
Child care	Lessen infant fatality, ameliorate child care and reduce the growing number of teenage pregnancy
Psychological health	Reduce the number of suicide
Counseling	Increase counseling services on various diseases
respiratory problems	Reduce the number of asthma

*Source: OBH 2011*

In 2008, Mexico received \$26 billion as remittances or about 3 per cent of country’s GDP (World Bank 2009). Given this large quantity and importance of remittances and other financial subscriptions to Mexico, IME introduced formal banking and financial literacy to immigrants, which aims: (1) to promote banking knowledge among Mexican immigrants, provide them financial services and teach them where and how to keep their savings; (2) spread information

widely among Mexican immigrants about low-cost options for sending remittances at home; (3) support collective remittances for 3x1 or 4x1 programmes that add additional value to remittances for productive investment at home; (4) establish programmes and projects to extract ideas and knowledge from diasporic entrepreneurs who can invest their knowledge and money in Mexico's development or collaborate with domestic companies (Laglagaron 2010: 31).

IME promotes the growth of entrepreneurial talent by bringing together Mexicans and its diasporas who are professionals and skilled workers to share their knowledge and experience with one another and establish new foundation for partnerships and business opportunities in two countries. The Mexican Talent Network established in 2005 at the request of US-Mexico Foundation for Science (Laglagaron 2010: 32). The Foundation wanted to know about the high-skilled Mexicans abroad and requested IME to arrange venues to exchange talent and know-how across international borders. It had organised three (3) conferences on 5-7th June 2005, June 18-20, 2006 and July 8-10, 2007. These three important conferences brought business, IT, biotechnology, medical and automobile experts from US and Canada. Mexican Talent Network promotes Mexican businesses and companies and negotiated with various high-technology industries in Silicon Valley, which arranged Mexican IT companies to have internship in Detroit automobile factories. It also introduces TechBA programme and arranges means and ways for Mexican companies to market their products abroad (Laglagaron 2010: 33).

The 2000 presidential election was a turning point for Mexico to have proper diasporic policies and programmes in collaboration with Mexican public opinion, Mexican Catholic Church and NGOs. That is why, Foster (2010: ix) argues Mexico would decrease corruption and poverty; Mexico would become a more open society and would see the end of privileged elite controlling the nation's resources. This change opened more opportunities for PAN to have better position and asserted clearly what Mexico wants to be with its diasporas. Fox addressed migrant workers as heroes, brought reforms on existing policies and introduced many schemes for the welfare of Mexicans abroad. President Calderon called Mexican diaspora to help "transform Mexico" into an economic powerhouse. These two lines indicated that diasporas have been the main pillar in nation-building as well as Mexico will depend on them to have brighter tomorrow.

However, the chapter examines few of the PAN's diasporic policies and programmes focus on Fox's Model of NAFTA, Presidential Office for Mexican Abroad (2000), Reorganisation of *Grupo Beta* (2001), Reintroduction of *Matricular* Consular (2002), National Council for Mexican Abroad (2002), Institute of Mexicans Abroad (2003), Reinforcement of *Paisano* Programme and Institutional Development under Calderon. While examining all these policies and programmes of PAN, it is found that all these strategies address the immediate needs of both Mexico and its diasporas. However, the fruits of these policies and programmes depend on the collective action of federal, state and municipal governments and its agencies. Therefore, diasporic policies and programmes should reflect the following points: first, policy and programme should focus on nation building rather than address the party politics. Second, it should have all parties consensus (including the HTAs) to build new and different image of Mexico in international arena. Third, it should have more linkages with NGOs, private institutions, especially, the American institutions and international institutions like ILO, IMO, etc. Above all, to fulfil all these policies and programmes, Mexico needs political consensus supported by public opinions and media.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### CONCLUSION

The thesis has attempted to comprehend two important arguments: that the state is still the main actor for carrying out global processes (Sassen 1999: 29) and the reinvention of the state has to be along neoliberal governing rationalities (empowering the economic classes such as migrant workers, small and medium entrepreneurs as well as linkage with the diasporas for economic development). The Mexican government has asserted its rationality in the age of neoliberalism through the extension of its governmentality beyond its national boundary. Such an aspect of extension of governmentality has become clear through the establishment of several diasporic policies and programmes over nearly the last two and a half decades. Successive Mexican governments initiated several programmes (student tour, youth and summer camps, sports, free distribution of text book abroad) and innovative policies that have aimed at managing global flow of people, cultures and financial resources. Mexico not only protects and dignifies its nationals abroad but also promotes its culture and tradition beyond its territorial boundary (Goldring 2002: 56). These programmes include diverse initiatives like setting up educational institutions for Mexican immigrants, sponsoring cultural trips to Mexico for children of Mexican immigrants, developing a consulate based identity card for immigrants in order to secure their rights, dignity and interests (Bruno and Storrs 2005: 1). These intensified programmes and policies began with the administrations of Salinas (1988-1994) and Zedillo (1994-2000), reached its zenith under the presidency of Fox (2000-2006) and continued under the administration of Felipe Calderon Hinojosa (2006-2012).

The thesis has undertaken to outline the formation of Mexico's assertive policies and programmes towards its overseas populations in the US from 1848 till 2008. A pivotal examination is the evolution of diasporic policies and programmes that have evolved exhibiting the contextualisation of an organic community in custom and tradition. Focus has also been on probing the policies surfacing into the arena of competing and often contested ideologies of integration and economic development in North America. The way in which the policies have seen a continuity of sorts under different presidencies yet there are specific departures keeping in tune with the global and foreign policy realities. Nevertheless, the focus of the thesis is limited to

policies and programmes that have emerged in the two decades between 1988 and 2008. Mexican government have by and large sought to maintain the unity of its citizens both within and beyond its borders, a driving force that led to the formation of Programme for Mexican Communities Abroad (acronym in Spanish, PCME) in February 1990. To promote such organic unity as has been mentioned, Mexico's diasporic policies and programmes aim to promote joint projects that serve as link between Mexico and its diaspora; to accomplish superior image of its nationals abroad; to promote knowledge of Mexican history and culture among its communities abroad; to assist Mexican immigrants in acquiring fair treatment in their host countries; and to give backing to the formation of native associations in their host countries (Figueroa-Aramoni 1999: 538-539). In totality, all the major National Development Plans (1994-2000, 2000-2006 and 2006-2012) have aimed to declare that Mexican nation extended beyond its natural border (Government of Mexico 2006).

As argued in the first chapter, the state is the main actor directly or indirectly, in mobilising its diaspora for its own purpose and needs. Sassen (1999: 29) has rightly argued that "the state itself has been a key agent in the implementation of global processes, and it has emerged quite altered by this participation". Similarly Anderson (1991: 35) is of the view that modern nations need not be confined to territorial state. Given the proliferation of media and social environments due to the network of World Wide Web, nationalities and identities can no longer be spatially contained. Barnett (1999: 375) has rightly suggested the processes of identify formation are stretching across various networks and spatial scales. From these perspectives, mediated cultural practices transcend state borders and therefore nations need not be territorially bound.

The globalist, post-nationalist and post colonialist scholars argue that the nation-state has failed to account for the complex processes of identity formation that take place in the borderlands or in global flows and interactions. In the absence of dominant centres, the image of the coherent national subject is no longer adequate to describe contemporary conditions and possibilities for subject formation. However, States use cultural roots as the main aspect in formulating diasporic policies and programmes to achieve their national goals which mainly are economic development (remittances, market for exports, investment, etc.), political inclusion

(connecting with civil society, participate in political party, elections and lobbying in host countries) and social upliftment (the transfer of ideas, knowledge, and values) and cultural (maintaining their language, custom and arts activities). In the context of the economic development goal, Gutierrez (1997: 55) has effectively argued that Mexico has often mobilised its population in the US for several reasons but the most important one is that the diaspora form a sizeable and remarkable market for Mexican exports and thereby are important source of national revenue. Wall (2002) argued that there were about 23 million Mexicans living in the US and their remittances become the primary source of economic development especially during the 1990s when Mexico faced economic crisis (Gutierrez 1997: 55). Mexico received US\$16.6 million in 2004 and was the highest recipient of remittances in the world (Goldring 2004: 801). In addition, within the political setting they are also source of lobbies, which influence the American policies related to bilateral relations. Such policies of diasporas engagement are often termed as neoliberal mode of governmentality that aims to achieve better welfare of the citizens rather than have control over national territory. Moreover, this model functions with the approval of self-governing citizen rather than by mean of strict control, legal discipline and issues of sovereignty (Dean 1999: 16-20). Importantly this technique of governing emphasises the necessity to forge alliance with the Mexican diasporic population in the US as an obvious object of the state's affection. In this regard, Mexico has made a radical change in the traditional interpretation of the identity of its overseas nationals from traitors of the motherland and lacking patriotism to national heroes. They were called *pochos* who, in every aspect, were neither real Mexicans nor real American so working for betterment of diasporas was like promoting the development and betterment of an enemy.

However, in the late 1980s, the image of diasporas underwent a major change in perception and the government began to dramatically redefine the Mexican nation to exceed beyond its territorial limits. Such changes occurred in order to include the Mexican population overseas as part of the nationals within the geographical territory (Goldring 2002: 56). This was appropriately reflected in the regime of President Fox who through his policies and declarations intended to govern 118 million which importantly included the 18 million Mexican that were overseas nationals (Nafey 2007: 179). As a consequence of the latter approach, diasporas started



emerging as entrepreneurs and agencies of national development and eventually established themselves as new actors.

In regard to the issue of cultural roots, there are several compelling factors for governments in Mexico to engage with its diaspora. The emergence of diasporic policies and programmes in domestic politics is reflected by the growing number of its overseas population in the US. As such, maintaining special relations with them (diasporas) became one of the most significant agendas in Mexican domestic politics.

In the light of the above argument, the second chapter examines the role of the Mexican public opinion, the interface of the government with the NGOs, the intervention by the Mexican Catholic Church and the mobilization and issues raked up at the behest of the political parties. It has been established that that the Mexican public opinion, Mexican Catholic Church and the grassroots NGOs working on diasporic issues, not only supported the government initiatives but also effectively contributed through valuable suggestions towards diasporic policies. Beyond this, all of them are also advocating immigrants' rights and are actively bonding with their American counterpart to intensify diasporas' ties with their respective hometowns. Owing to these developments, the Mexican politicians have been compelled to place diasporic issues on high priority in their foreign policy agenda. Acknowledging this trend, Carrillo (2004: 108) emphatically argues that there is a growing acknowledgement of the strength and importance of Mexican diasporas in the US, not merely due to the remittances but also due to the repository of knowledge, expertise and investment that they have proved themselves to be. This drastic shift has redefined Mexican nation to extend beyond the population within its territorial borders to include Mexican overseas also as Mexican nationals (Goldring 2002: 56).

Under such circumstances diasporic issues have received special treatment in every debate in bilateral or multilateral forum. This importantly would include the deliberations in NAFTA, canvassing and release of manifestos during the Mexican presidential elections in 2000 and 2006. Every political party has agreed to have time and again reiterated the importance of having free trade agreements and migration accord with the US. Notwithstanding the variations between the different actors and political parties, the essence of the approach has been the incorporation of the diaspora's interests in any policy making. In regard to the above aspect, for

instance, during the debate on signing of NAFTA, for PRI, NAFTA was analogous to attracting foreign investments for economic growth, which would in turn retain the Mexicans at home (Andres 2002: 47); whereas PAN propped up the social aspects of migratory affair within NAFTA (Rosenblum 2004: 109); and the PRD vehemently opposed NAFTA and instead proposed a “Continent Development Treaty” (Botz 1995: 235).

In the presidential elections of 2000 and 2006, PAN came to power and institutionalised relationship with diasporas through the establishment of diasporic institutions and extraterritorial bureaucracies that promoted immigrants’ rights and interests within and beyond Mexico’s borders. Nevertheless, despite tall claims PAN was not able to fulfil all its promises because the president was wrestling with a fractured majority within the Congress even as opposition parties continued controlling the Mexican Congress so much so that Fox and Calderon received a significantly weaker presidency within limitations in the legislature than Mexico had ever experienced in the past years. Under such circumstance executive-legislative deadlock was high during their tenures and was particularly evident in the congressional resistance to PAN proposal for reforms (Yu 2007: 152). In such situation, Fox wanted to avoid the legislature and would rather rely on the agency of media to spread and popularise his ideas with a view to eliciting favourable public opinion. Consequently the diasporic associations and public were compelled to mobilise the related issues at the state and local level through the conduit of political parties and other avenues (Smith 2007: 7). Be that as it may, the diaspora related issues often brought opposition parties together on various occasions and can, therefore, be successfully argued that diasporic issue democratised Mexican domestic politics.

With this in mind, it is often believed that home countries’ interests are time and again served well by better diasporic policies and programmes (Gamlen 2008: 6). That being the case, Mexico not only promoted, protected and dignified its diaspora but also established assertive diasporic policies that included bureaucratic reforms, favourable investment policyies, grant of dual nationality, extension of consular protection and upbeat cultural policy (Dade 2006: 37). To resume the linkage ,chapter three has laid doen that Mexico’s diasporic policies are all about targeting diasporas’ contribution in economic development and poverty alleviation. To achieve these goals, it established PCME in 1990,IME in 2003 and adapted neoliberal economic policies

through membership of deliberations within NAFTA since 1993. These policies and institutions brought about a number of conceptual changes in the neoliberal model of development related to diasporas and remittances. There was a major shift in the perception within Mexico of the changing image of diasporas from being looked upon as ‘traitors to national heroes’ (Nafey 2007: 179). Connected to this argument, there has been changed perception about remittances as well and figured them as a “sector of national economy” and “agent of development” (Lozano Asencio 2005: 44).

Similarly, Wise and Covarrubias (2007: 14) argue that Mexico has abundant and diverse policies to encourage remittances flow and use it for development. They also added the current policies of Mexico that comprise promoting human rights, encouraging transnational ties, granting dual citizens’ rights, establishing 3x1 programme and encouraging family remittances. Accordingly President Salinas’ took the lead and established Programme for Mexican Communities Abroad and State Offices for Attention to Native (OFAOS). Together these two programmes targeted the diasporic entrepreneurs and business community to set up joint ventures in contributing to Mexico’s economic development. The diaspora based development programmes—2x1(1992), which later developed into 3x1 and 4x1 programme were aimed at harnessing the interests of such investors in the Mexican economy. Most of the times, it was ensured that the collective remittances were invested in their respective hometowns (Bada 2003: 5). Mexico started treading on an innovative diasporic strategy intended to encourage immigrants to organise and institutionalise their associations—hometown associations (HTAs) and federations. This was how the Mexican government began strengthening diasporas’ political (lobbying) and economic interests by roping in their surplus resources (collective remittances) to be tapped by their home state (Burgess 2005: 113); Goldring 2002: 63). Therefore, the linkage that was established between diasporic policy and neoliberal economic development was intended to the ensure Mexico’s economic development through use of diasporic resources.

To add more meaning to the above arguments, Mexico granted dual nationality to its outside nationals on August 22, 1996 with the support of all political parties. It has been logically considered in chapter four that the formulation of dual nationality law was in response to the increase in the following: size of diaspora, economic power and political participation across

border. It has, in all aspects, determined Mexico's security and cultural relations with its diaspora. The three objectives of dual citizenship act is viz. to strengthen relations with Mexicans abroad by allowing them to retain Mexican nationality, confer property rights and extending additional privileges unavailable to foreigners. The clear intention of this act is to demonstrate that the Mexican government and society are concerned for their well-being and it has intentions to empower its diaspora to defend their interests in the US so much so that it resulted in increased remittances: in 1993 alone, Mexico received \$3.2 billion and thus maintaining cultural and economic ties with them became imperative to Mexico's economic health. Similarly, Fitzgerald (2000: 23) argues it was solely intended to strengthen and guarantee the uninterrupted flow of remittances, investment and development to Mexico through diasporas. Beyond this, IOM (2003: 177) reveals that dual nationality was a proactive political and foreign policy (consular) consideration which aimed to link diasporic communities with Mexico and project their social, labour, political, educational and cultural rights.

However, there are many immigrants' related problems which Mexico cannot resolve alone and the same is the case with the US. Therefore, given the volume of diaspora in US, any effective diasporic policy and programme would be incomplete without proper engagement with the US. Mexico has often argued that immigration was a bi-national issue (Fox and Bush declared immigration is a shared problem) and this is the criterion on which it has agreed to cooperate with US to make it more orderly, humane and legal (Council on Foreign Relations 2009: 43). In this regard for taking the collaboration further, Mexico and US have incessantly been working together to tackle problems of drug related war and terrorism, which has been positively reinforced by the Plan Merida which indicates that Mexico is actively engaged with the US in its diasporic policies and programmes and human rights concerns. Concomitantly, Mexico is developing cultural relations with the US through the COMEXUS which in collaboration with America's Fulbright programme gives grants to students, scholars and teachers for one year cultural exchange programmes. The grants are meant for reciprocal teaching and studying in Mexico for Americans and for Mexicans to do the same in the US (Gish 2010). Hence, such engagements with US provide more opportunities and venues to enhance interactions and widen the scope and objectives of Mexico's diasporic policies and programmes.

Another important focus of Mexico's diasporic policies and programmes is hometown associations. In chapter 5, hometown associations have been described as voluntary organisations set up by immigrant workers to help one another, to maintain cultural identity and support their places of origin (Orozco 2006: 9). Mexican hometown associations are very active in sending collective remittances through 2x1, 3x1 and 4x1 programmes. PCME and IME are Mexico's diasporic policies encourage the formation of THAs and federations in the US. These policies and programmes energised the role of Mexican consular offices, which actively encourages the formation of HTAs and also guides the smooth flow of remittances and community development funds. Their contributions (remittances) served as key source of development during economic crisis of 1995 (Stacy 2002: 517). Similarly, Durand et al (1996: 426) consider hometown associations as agent of development. Beyond this, HTAs also perform a significant role in transmitting its national culture to younger generations.

As such, Mexico's policy towards HTAs is to stir up its cultural roots and ethnic nationalism. PCME and IME impart Mexican history, culture and tradition to sustain Mexican identity among the Mexican communities abroad and to maintain Mexican national celebrations and holidays. It also attempts to create its diasporas proud of their cultural roots (Goldring 2001a: 515). It presents expositions, exhibitions, concerts, readings, seminars and conferences on various topics relating to Mexican cultural identity. Besides this, it introduced drawing competition among diasporic children called "This is My Mexico" in 1997; promotes bilingual education (Iskander 2010: 225); and supervises the Teacher Exchange Programme to impart Mexican culture, history and traditions to Mexican overseas nationals (Southwest Educational Development Laboratory 1999). Thus PCME and IME empower HTAs to defend as well as promote their cultural, social, economic and political rights in the US. To fulfil this, it works with government institutions, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), private and public cultural institutes. It promotes cultural awareness among the Mexican migrants and their descendents by organising conferences, launches various educational programmes—community centres and correspondent courses. It also distributes Mexican textbooks free of cost and grants lot of scholarships for Mexican-origin students to complete their studies as well as to maintain their cultural status.

The most extensive and intensified diasporic policies and programmes of Mexico come into light during the PAN government (2000-2012). Fox is the champion of diaspora; admittedly, the National Development Plan (2000-2006) declares that “the protection of Mexicans abroad is and will continue to be a priority issue of the government”. Fox introduces new schemes and programmes to make Mexican diasporas safe, sound and proud of its identity and contribute to Mexican development. His first policy was NAFTA-Plus, which attempts to include all aspects of interactions and relationships between North American countries that would finally lead to North American community. Fox’s plan targeted to remove the image of illegal immigrants and militarisation of border (Cooper 2004: 69). He also established Presidential Office for Mexicans Abroad in 2000, which provides liaison services to overseas Mexicans with specific or special government departments and agencies in the transaction of business and investment in Mexico (Hugo 2008: 51). In 2002, National Council for Mexican Abroad was established with its main functions to present directives and proposes policies for Programme for Mexican Communities Abroad and Presidential Office for Mexicans abroad (Government of Mexico 2002). Fox reorganises *Grupo Beta* means to give up muscle power completely and concentrate on humanitarian issues (Fitzgerald 2006: 279). He also reintroduces *matricular* consular card in 2002 in order to secure the rights and access to social services (Bruno and Storrs 2005: 1). He reinforces Paisano Programme in order to assist the legal and dignified treatment of Mexican diasporas as they enter, travel or leave Mexico. It also aims to safeguard the fundamental rights of Mexicans abroad who are settling in the US and Canada as well as to let them know their rights, duties and obligations when they enter, transit and leave the country (Government of Mexico 2010). The final and the most successful institution is Institute for Mexicans Abroad (IME) aims to protect the interests and address the immigrants’ problems (IME 2003).

Adding to Fox’s open and assertive policy, Calderon declared that “Where there is a Mexican there is Mexico” and “the protection of Mexicans abroad was the priority of his government” (Wall 2006). He also implement Paisano Programme throughout his tenure and also increased funds and volunteers for the same. He strengthens the ties, deepens the dialogues and cultivates better relations with them. Simultaneously, he also builds strong allies with various American governors who could join him to open borders in the future. He uses IME to bring high-skilled and professionals’ diasporic populations for Mexico’s development.

While analysing all these, we found that Mexico's diasporic policies and programmes target at least 5 (five) things to be achieved. First, Mexico wants to erase negative perception of its diasporas once and forever. Gamlen (2011: 4) argues that Fox changed the traditional perception and image of diasporas as "*pochos*" to "national heroes", "the cultural engine" and the "permanent ambassadors of Mexican culture". This drastically shift has redefined Mexican nation to go beyond its territorial border so as to include Mexicans abroad (Goldring 2002: 56). In consistence with this policy, Mexico granted dual nationality in 1996 with certain rights and obligations (Castaneda 2006: 105). Hence, Fox declared he govern 118 million, including 18 million in US (Nafey 2007: 179).

Second, Mexico wants to dignify the rights and dignity of its diasporas through expansion of its consular protection. Although many Mexican immigrants do not come under consular protection, the PCME adopted an open and pluralist definition, which was more political than legal to unite Americans of Mexican origin to their ancestors (Gutierrez 1997: 50). As such, the dual nationality law is a proactive consular policy, which aims to link immigrant communities with Mexico and protect their social, labour, education, political and cultural rights (IOM 2003: 177). In 2000, Mexico established MCLAP in US; through this programme, Mexico has intervened over 100 capital cases. Again, in response to 9/11 terrorist attacks and subsequent American security policy, Fox reintroduced *matricular* card in March 2002, which enables Mexican nationals to access to various social services, obtain driving and business licenses, open bank accounts, register children in schools and send remittances more securely (Allatson 2007: 156). He also established Institute for Mexicans Abroad in 2003 to sensitise the rights and interest of Mexicans abroad and address the immigrants' problems (IME 2003).

Third, Mexico wants to bring its diasporas back to its roots; in this regard, Mexico launched unprecedented educational projects through PCME and IME. The PCME and IME promote Mexican history, traditions and culture among the Mexican overseas populations in order to inject Mexican identity, celebration and holidays. It seeks to assure its diasporas proud of their roots (Goldring 2001: 515). In this regard, it works with the forty-five (now fifty-one) Mexican consulates and cultural institutes demonstrate expositions, exhibitions, concerts, seminars and conferences on various topics relating to Mexican cultural identity. One of the most

wonderful projects of PCME is introduction of children drawing contest entitled “This Is My Mexico”. Since 1997, children drawing contest has been organised in Mexican embassies around the world (Leiken 2000: 28). SEP, PCME and many other Mexican officials hold that “Spanish instruction is essential for the education of Mexicans in the US and this has scientifically proven” (Goldring 2001: 515). Therefore, PCME dedicated resources to promote bilingual education, targeting the children of immigrants in order to preserve their linguistic affiliation with Mexico (Iskander 2010: 225). On top of this, IME also organize conferences, promotes education (Laglagaron 2010: 20), encourages binational migratory student transfer document (Kindler 2011) and distributes free Spanish textbooks.

Fourth, the policies also target that Mexican diaspora should have some rights in order to maintain its cultural affiliation with Mexico. Dual nationality law serves as path to restore these rights and dignity of diasporas. Mexico granted dual national on August 22, 1996 based on the principle of “the boundedness that Mexican migrants sustain with respect to their roots, culture, values and national traditions” (Castaneda 2006: 103-104). It restores economic right—the rights to work, invest, study and buy properties in Mexico and preserve their Mexican owned property (Gutierrez, 1997: 1009). Beyond this, it also allows right to petition, right to take part in the political matters, right to association and right to be elected in popular elections with certain conditions (MATT 2007).

Fifth, Mexico wants its diaspora a permanent co-development partner. As such, the image of its diasporas shifted from traitors to national heroes. This drastically shift has redefined Mexican nation to extend beyond its territorial borders to include Mexicans abroad (Goldring 2002: 56). This approach creates Mexican diasporas as entrepreneurs and chief agents of national development. In short, Mexico reframed its diaspora from a problem to opportunity and made diaspora a permanent co-development partner through community development programmes and family remittances. At the same time, the government also aims at protecting their rights and dignity through reforms like consular card, *Grupo Beta*, *Paisano* Programme promoting ties through education and health programmes. Above all, Mexico’s diasporic policies and programmes identify diasporic resources—human capital, financial and entrepreneurial and social capital as effective capital for its development.



It is worthwhile to highlight some policies and programmes enacted after the period that has been the subject of scrutiny within the thesis, i.e. between 2009 and 2017 related to diaspora in Mexico. During these almost nine years, four year (2009-2012) of PAN regime under the leadership of Calderon and the remaining five years (2012-till date) has been under Pena Nieto of PRI. Calderon had almost stabilised Mexican economy and reduced sizeably the extent of immigration of Mexicans to US. In his meeting with Obama on 12 January 2009, he reiterated the need for an evolving and dynamic immigration policy. Calderon's reason for the timing of the meeting was also to express concerns about the ill-treatment of undocumented Mexican workers by US immigration authority as well as US police. His active participation in the welfare of the Mexican diaspora and specifically in IME's activities resulted in the formation of Mexican-American Coalition (MXA C) in 2009. This coalition is a platform to unite the diverse sections of Mexican-American leaders and to educate their communities on the trauma and treatment of immigrants (Bayes and Gonzalez 2011: 8). Apart from education and creating awareness, its tasks are also to create a network of various Mexican leaders in the US and translate immigration reform documents into Spanish for the comprehension of the Mexicans who are not familiar with English. Later in March 2010, it organised immigration reform procession in Washington DC and also highlighted their problems in Spanish mass media including the newspapers, radio, television and internet. As an outcome of these efforts, he succeeded in strengthening Mexico's diasporic policies and programmes and effectively used IME in protest against American anti-immigration policy, such as Arizona SB 1070 (Gonzalez-Murphy and Koslowski 2011: 11). On the domestic front, his administration took a courageous step in the late 2010s by enacting a new migration law. The new migration law was the amendment to the General Law of Population and approved in January 2011. This new law guaranteed equal treatment to both foreigners and Mexican nationals under Mexican law; it gave all immigrants regardless of their status the right to access education and health services (Gonzalez-Murphy and Koslowski 2011: 19). As a goodwill gesture in response to these changes brought in by Mexico, the Obama administration introduced DACA (Deferred Action for Children Arrivals) in June 2012, which prorogues deportation to illegal immigrants who entered US as minors and renew their work permit for two years.

The current diasporic policies and programmes of Mexico can be scrutinised on the basis of foreign policy initiatives of the Pena Nieto administration. Pena Nieto who was elected as the President after the 2012 elections and took presidential office on 1st December 2012 had demonstrated genuine concern towards diaspora issues by making it the keystone of the four pillars of his foreign policy which emphasized the intention to protect and promote the interests of Mexicans abroad (Presidential Statement 2017). His diasporic policies and programmes have not only targeted to defend and promote Mexicans abroad, but also have taken the initiative to invite its nationals abroad to help Mexico fulfill its development objectives. Pena Nieto has time and again vehemently argued that the motive of his administration would be to protect Mexicans abroad through proper engagement with their host countries. Even he, like his predecessor met President Obama in May 2013 in Mexico City but no concrete roadmap on immigration was worked out even as Mexico continued to face the biggest number of deportation (435,000 immigrants were deported out of US of which almost 70 per cent were Mexicans) by the American immigration authority. US somehow did not adhere to its promises of active engagement and went on to taking an extreme step of terminating DACA programme in 2015.

With the coming to presidency of Donald Trump, the apprehensions within the world at large and Mexico specifically made inroads, uncertainties prevailed due to the fact that he would deport immigrants and even build a physical wall along the US-Mexico border as per his election campaign's promises. President Trump has seemingly been apathetic to the plights of the Mexican population within US and has so far deported more than two million illegal immigrants. On 26 January 2017, President Trump formally endorsed two executive orders, first one to build the border wall and the second one to increase the number immigration officers posted on the borders to deport illegal Mexican migrants (Bautista 2017). In protest against these two infamous executive orders, Pena Nieto cancelled his proposed official visit to US and made some proactive policy decisions-he promised to provide mobile consular services to immigrants and laid down certain conditions for a bilateral dialogue with US which hitherto had always been more cordial. For many immigrants as well as Mexicans at home, the general reaction was that his response was too late as many had already faced detention and some are continuing to be even deported. The criticism is that Pena Nieto in his tenure is neither creating new and innovative policies and programmes nor making any efforts to continuing the existing

institutions. The critics opine that he has only been retaliating to the American policies and not concerned with thinking of a creative policy which will cost Mexico a lot. Increasingly the public opinion has been going against him and he may be soon rated as one of the most unpopular presidents in Mexico because of the fact that diasporic policies and programmes under his administration are very fragile.

Whatever be the case, Mexico has much to achieve in its immigrant policy so as to bring diasporas' diverse interests to common platform in order for better understanding and development of strategy. First, Mexico needs political stability and democratic institutions to make its diasporic members have positive view on Mexican government. During the 1990s, Mexican Americans and immigrants always expressed concern about Mexico's governing system as being corrupt and inefficient (de la Garza 1998: 405). In the same vein, Newland and Patrick (2003: 13) argued "poor infrastructure, underdeveloped markets, corruption and poor investment policy" are the main reasons for policy failure. In the given scenario, political stability would offer the right conditions to invest, start business, transfer finances and finally return. Second, Mexico should not only change its negative perceptions but also build trust through responding to diasporas' requests including property rights, banking needs, infrastructure development, full citizenship rights, etc. (Ionescu 2006: 37). Such measures can be achieved through establishing dialogue, regular meetings and visits backed up by real inclusion through rights and partnership (Agunias and Newland 2012: 30). Third, Mexico's policy should reflect the diversity of diasporic interests and strategies must include considerations such as that of region, religion, class, status, etc. Moreover, while targeting entrepreneurs to create wealth and jobs in hometowns, small and medium size entrepreneurs should not be ignored (Ionescu 2006: 56) because these groups are the most prolific job creators and are intimately tied to local demands. Fourth, allow diasporas to keep ownership of their initiatives and contributions, as most diasporas know their places of origin more than the policymakers. The task for government is to extend support and facilitate the access of diasporic organisations that act as bridges between the diasporas and its places of origin (Goldring 2004: 828). Fifth, many researches on diasporas, remittances and development in Mexico point out potential drawbacks and adverse effects of diasporic policies. Policymakers should be able to identify these potential negative impacts such as remittances should have impacts at individual, local and national levels, they

should not deepen inequality and must always go to the poorest (Agunias and Newland 2012: 23).

As has been effectively laid down in the first chapter that immigration was the main source of Mexican diasporic formation and to this effect the Binational Council (2004) had suggested migration between the two countries would remain and foreseeable even in future. Mexican nationals constitute 20 per cent of American annual legal immigration; 30.7 per cent of foreign born population; and constitute 83 per cent of illegal immigration. Binational Council (2004: 6) also argued that since American population is aging so demand for young workers would naturally increase and if US wants its economy to grow it would need young workers from neighbouring countries to fill these jobs. Consequently, Mexican diasporic population in the US will continue to increase year after year. For this reason, diasporic policies and programmes are, therefore, directly targeted towards this population which aims to provide social, economic and political security towards its nationals in the US and requires Mexico to oppose as well as cooperate with US on certain issues.

Altogether as a summary of what has been said in the monograph, successful diasporic policies and programmes will depend on a combination of mutual binational, reinforcing and dynamic policies given the changing realities. To be mutually beneficial for both countries, certain degree of compromise and accord on general principles is the need of the hour to steer policies. Revitalising the binational dialogue will find mutually beneficial solutions to increase Mexico's involvement in the welfare of its nationals abroad. Immigration and border issues have been administrated by working group that suggests means and ways the two countries would like to collaborate in managing migration and border security. In the post-NAFTA period, the Binational committee and working groups met frequently and regularly to reach consensus on both issues but eventually in 2001, their roles were replaced by presidential level of dialogue. The working group needs to be revitalised (Escobar et al. 2003: 2). More frequent meetings of the working group can start momentum towards a set of achievable agreements.

However, dialogue should be based on the postulate that migration between the two countries is presumably be mutually advantageous so why not make it safe, legitimate, orderly and foreseeable and may be in the long run, immigration would naturally diminish and

numerically would be at reasonable levels. In binational dialogue, Mexico should focus on (1) improving the treatment of its nationals by legalising unauthorised immigrants; (2) assisting to reduce illegal immigration by cooperating US in cracking down criminal and smuggled organisations; (3) jointly build a feasible border region; and (4) setting up development projects in regions or areas of high migration and beefing up its economy to reduce migration pressure (The US-Mexico Migration Panel 2001: 2). These four principles are identical to Fox government's four proposals: legalisation of unauthorised Mexican immigrants; a new guest-worker plan; cooperative steps to end border turbulence; and let off Mexico from per country visa quotas (Agustin et al. 2003: 3).

In sum, cooperation on migration and border issues between the two countries is the only solution to manage the movement of people. Border Network for Human rights (2008: 33) argued that cooperative economic and legal understandings between two countries need to address equitable movement of people as well as trade and capital. Moreover, cooperative law enforcements between them need to aim human security. In short, it will facilitate legal status, deter illegal immigration, leverage remittances, encourage return migration and improve their relationship. Thus, cooperation with US on migration and border problems is a part of strengthening Mexico's diasporic policies and programmes.

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