

**EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGICAL  
UNDERSTANDING OF EMOTIONS:  
A CRITICAL STUDY**

*Thesis submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University  
in partial fulfilment of the requirements  
for the award of the degree of*

**DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

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I, **Piyanat Prathomwong**, declare that the thesis entitled, **Existential Phenomenological Understanding of Emotions: A Critical Study**, submitted by me for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy is my own original work. The Thesis has not been submitted so far in part or in full, for any other degree in this or any other university.

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**CERTIFICATE**

This is to certify that the thesis entitled **Existential Phenomenological Understanding of Emotions: A Critical Study** submitted by **Piyanat Prathomwong** in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy** from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, is a bona fide record of research work carried out by him under my/our supervision. The contents of this thesis, in full or in parts, have not been submitted to any other Institution or University for the award of any degree or diploma.

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## **Abbreviations**

OFT	Orthodox Feeling Theory of emotion
SCT	Strong Cognitive Theory of emotion
WCT	Weak Cognitive Theory of emotion
AMI	Analytic Philosophical Methodology of Intentionality
PMI	Phenomenological Methodology of Intentionality
WUT	The Weak Unity Thesis
SUT	The Strong Unity Thesis
NPE	Non-Phenomenological Approach to Embodiment
PE	Phenomenological Approach to Embodiment



## **Introduction**

In traditional Western philosophy, it was widely accepted that emotions could be an obstacle to human rationality when it comes to attempting to gain objective knowledge and truth. One way of understanding emotions was that they may accidentally happen to us; they are a purely non-volitional form of a mental phenomenon. Such understanding led to an extremely negative view of the role of emotion in philosophy and was widely responsible for the tension between emotion and reason. Therefore, the study of emotion was ignored by most philosophers.

In recent decades, a complete exclusion of emotions has been conceived by contemporary philosophers as a prejudice of an old-fashioned articulation of human experiences. Emotions are increasingly conceived as a crucial mental phenomenon; they include the potentiality of human beings understanding themselves, executing actions, and engaging with the world. Crucially, emotions could be regarded as essentially having intentional objects concerning their significance for human beings while involving the bodily phenomena. Yet, it is worth noting that a position which romanticises emotion should be avoided. In the light of this contemporary understanding, the role of emotions should be reassessed in the present study. Therefore, this study will try to encourage a comprehensive understanding of emotions as a necessary and real component of our existence.

The typical question of “What is emotion?” could be a starting point to focus on. However, as we will see, there are many issues that emerge from this question. Unsurprisingly, there is no agreement about these puzzles among scientists and philosophers. It is widely accepted that the study of emotion is very complex and has its difficulties. We are seeking to solve the problems or at least make as much progress as possible in understanding some of these issues.

The question of “What is emotion?” is no less contentious than other extensive philosophical concepts, for example, “What is goodness?”, “What is justice?”, “What is the universe?”, “What is the mind?”, and so on. Inquiring about their essence is reckoned to be a way to seek the answer. In identifying what is essential to emotion, one should aim at capturing the defining characteristics of emotion.

Recent theorists have suggested a number of components of emotion. While several of these components can be measured objectively at a subpersonal level, such as neurophysiological arousals, facial expressions, behaviours, and so on, other components can be accessed only from a personal point of view, such as bodily feelings. In addition, cognitive appraisals or judgments with the structure of intentionality are also considered as a crucial component of emotion. However, it is debatable whether the cognitive judgments are representational contents capable of revealing themselves from the third-person perspective, or kind of involve the phenomenal character within the first-person account.

This issue partly leads to the following questions: Can emotions be measured objectively and empirically? If one believes that empirical framework is the way to understand emotions, others may raise the question of how we can explain the conscious experience of emotions, or “what it is like to feel something”, which seems to be impossible to be reduced to physicality. Accordingly, they may argue that the empirical evidence regarding neurophysiological activities of emotions is inadequate for the whole story of what emotions are. Furthermore, in philosophy of mind, philosophers may contend that even though emotions have intentional objects in regard to the evaluative judgments, it seems to be tricky to explain their phenomenal character, which may not be reduced to a representational content.

On the contrary, the question could be whether a study of emotions needs to rely on scientific method at all? Can emotions be investigated merely through conceptual analysis and introspection? Are emotions only accessed, felt, and even understood from the first-person perspective? If the answer is positive, it indicates that we should have to refute pieces of subpersonal empirical evidence regarding neurophysiological activities of emotions. Thus, we should give up the subpersonal level and the third-person perspective methodology. All emotions are mere subjective

feelings as a deep secret inside one's consciousness, and there seems to be no point to talk about a comprehensive study of emotions.

These questions also touch upon a debate about natural kind of emotion. Is the category emotion a natural kind? If it is, all emotions are something we can discover in nature. In addition, the most dominant methodology for this discovery is empirical and natural science. According to some researchers, emotion could be classified into two types: basic emotion and cognitive emotion. The former is kind of primitive, which both humans and non-human animals can possess, for example, fear, anger, joy, disgust, etc. The evolutionary-minded theorists are typically attracted to the basic emotion. It is supposed to be an automatic system set by our ancestors in order for them to adapt and survive. We can neurophysiologically study it. For example, a group of neurophysiological patterns regarding fear is different from anger. Hence, scientists hope that they will someday be able to identify all types of emotion. In this respect, the basic emotion obviously is a natural kind. On the other hand, cognitive emotion involving a higher cognitive ability seems to be potentially possessed only by human adults, for example, guilt, embarrassment, jealousy, envy, love, and so on. This type of emotion requires a cognitive ability such as belief or judgment. It would be impossible for us to feel guilt without believing or judging that we have done something wrong.

If there are two types of emotion, the question arises on how to explain the relationship between basic emotion and cognitive emotion. Is the former the building block of the latter? If it is, we can assume that the category emotion is natural kind. In other words, all emotions are natural kind. However, one may argue that there is no connection between basic emotion and cognitive emotion. This means that the basic emotions are natural kind whereas the cognitive emotions are not. Thus, these two types of emotion cannot be accounted for in the same. At this point, one may ask what cognitive emotions really are. Are they emotions at all? Could it be that they are just non-emotional cognitive judgements accompanying physiological patterns? Nonetheless, beside this issue, there is a constructionist view holding that even that category of emotion is not an entity at all; all emotions are not a natural kind at the outset. We socially or psychologically construct them. We just collect corresponding data of certain neurophysiological patterns and name them.

This thesis concerns the philosophical debate of emotion. Therefore, it would be appropriate to begin with what most philosophers of emotion usually refer to. There are competing theories of emotion understood as divided between the mind and the body; the Cartesian split. This division eventually creates a philosophical problem that concerns how the structure of intentionality meets bodily phenomena.

The first competing theory holds that physiological arousals and subjective bodily feelings are essential to emotions. Emotions are mere internal bodily arousals and sensations. Thus, they are subjective bodily feelings and are unlikely to account for the structure of intentionality. They lack the intentional object; they are not directed at something in the world. This view is what I will call the Orthodox Feeling Theory.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, a cognitively grounded theory argues that cognitive appraisals or judgments are central to emotions. It regards emotions as having intentional contents reducible to cognitive accounts such as beliefs and desires. Thus, emotions are intentional and evaluative. This view dismisses the role of the body as well as the experiential dimension of emotion. Otherwise, this theory may allow us to regard physiological processes and their subjective feelings as a non-essential and secondary afterthought. I will call this view the Strong Cognitive Theory.<sup>2</sup>

The main problem of these theories is that the Orthodox Feeling Theory neglects a significant dimension of emotion regarding evaluative property and the structure of intentionality. On the other hand, the Strong Cognitive Theory dismisses any bodily phenomenon, especially a subjective bodily feeling regarding the experiential richness of emotions.

After all, in recent decades, most theorists recognise that all these components involve emotions. The problem is how to construe them without losing a core feature of each side. In other words, it is about how to integrate bodily phenomena and their subjective feelings with the structure of intentionality. The perceptual theory is currently regarded as a possible account to solve the problem. It proposes that emotions can be reduced to perceptions since perceptions possess peculiar attributes

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<sup>1</sup> James, 1884.

<sup>2</sup> Kenny, 1963; Lyons, 1985; Solomon, 1973; Nussbaum, 2003.

in the same way emotions do; they are intentional and have a phenomenal character. However, others might contend that emotions cannot be reduced to such folk psychological attitudes (beliefs, desires, and perceptions); rather, emotions have a distinctive form of intentionality.

The present thesis also concerns another area study of emotion which is no less crucial than what I have drawn so far. It is the problem of mood. What is mood? Is mood a kind of emotion? In our everyday language, mood and emotion tend to be combined in one word, affectivity. This creates a blurred boundary between mood and emotion. However, many philosophers consider mood as different from emotion. Philosophers of mind, for example, typically hold that mood does not have an intentional object, while emotions do. Free-floating anxiety does not seem to be directed at any specific thing. Moreover, feeling depressed is not about anything. On the other hand, emotion, such as anger and love, is directed to a particular thing. It can be said that I am angry at my friend; I love my parents.

However, by accepting that emotion and mood are different, and considering their relationship, it could be said that mood can shape our existence and how we experience the world. Mood can also impact our emotions. For example, if I am in a certain mood, such as depression, then, I might easily get angry at something or someone. In contrast, when I am in a mood such as bliss, I might not feel easily angry, even in a bad situation. Mood may be understood as an affective phenomenon which glosses our engagement with the world. According to this meaningful aspect of mood, one might ask: How is it possible that mood has such significance in our life without involving intentionality? Is mood intentional? If mood can be considered to have intentionality, it is intentionality in what sense? On the contrary, if mood is non-intentional, can we still talk about its relation to the structure of intentionality? Furthermore, what is the difference and the relationship between mood and emotion?

The problems of emotions I have raised could be the following: 1) the problem of intentionality and 2) the problem of conscious experience. These two issues are closely linked. It is widely accepted today that it is impossible to understand emotions by isolating them from the structure of intentionality as well as the role of a bodily phenomenon, especially bodily feeling. Therefore, an appropriate understanding of

emotion can best be grasped by means of reconciling between the Strong Cognitive Theory and Orthodox Feeling Theory. Accordingly, the problem of the conscious experience would be perfectly relevant to the problem of intentionality where the subjective bodily feeling is supposed to involve the structure of intentionality and evaluative property.

As to attempting to reconcile these standard competing theories, several philosophers have applied a phenomenological approach. They believe that turning to existential phenomenological philosophy may provide a possible interpretation and formulation for a weaker and more productive feeling theory. This is necessary to recognise that bodily feeling of emotion may properly be construed as a mode of intentionality.

There are substantial breakthroughs within the domain of existential phenomenological philosophy that may contribute to a comprehensive understanding of emotion enabling an interesting reconciliation between the residing tensions in theories of emotion. First, an ontological turning point in phenomenological philosophy offers a notion of embodied subjectivity standing against and above a rooted theory of mind-body Cartesian split. Second, it proposes a non-representative theory of lived-experience in which an embodied subjectivity engages with the world.

Most emotion researchers seem to receive inadequate attention to acknowledge that an existential phenomenological philosophy could be drawn along with a contemporary debate in philosophy of emotion as well as philosophy of mind. Yet, the ways to articulate intentionality of emotion depends on which approach one brings to the debate. Broadly speaking, it could be said that the concept of intentionality has been formulated quite distinctively between analytic philosophy of mind and phenomenological philosophy. In the light of the present study, the phenomenological approach would be taken up in construing a proper structure of intentionality of emotions.

These attempts from the existential phenomenological approach should be investigated, exposed, and expanded in the present study. The obvious as well as inevitable inquiry in this thesis, in turn, has the purpose of articulating how this

existential phenomenological understanding describes an integration of bodily phenomena and world-directed intentionality in regard to emotion.

This thesis consists of four chapters with an Introduction and Conclusion. The first chapter aims to explore competing theories of emotion which could be divided along the mind-body dichotomy: the Orthodox Feeling Theory and the Strong Cognitive Theory. Besides, I will point out the problematic aspects of each theory. Then, I will explore different concepts of intentionality from analytic philosophy of mind and phenomenological philosophy. Finally, I will clarify what I mean by “existential phenomenological understanding”. In this respect, the existential phenomenological understanding could be interpreted through three dimensions as 1) the first-person perspective approach, as 2) the methodology of intentionality which is an embodied engagement with the world, and as 3) the phenomenological tradition. Indeed, these themes can overlap, and they will cover all the chapters of the present thesis.

Even though this study aims to explore and understand emotion, it also includes mood. The second chapter will begin with a brief elucidation of emotion, mood, and feeling—the terms typically understood under the word affectivity. Then, I will explore a debate about natural kind of emotion, the issue that many theorists of emotion are dealing with. Even though one important point of the present study will not focus on this problem, one should take into consideration what theorists of emotion are talking about. Finally, a relationship between emotion and mood will be partly discussed. Therefore, a debate on the problem of intentionality of mood will follow. In this regard, the phenomenological approach will be applied.

The third chapter is dedicated to an investigation of emotion and mood from the existential phenomenological tradition. Although there are several phenomenologists discussing emotion, I chose classical phenomenologists in the person of Heidegger, when it comes to mood, and Sartre, when it comes to emotion. Their ideas could be regarded as an important contribution to philosophy of emotion. Then, I will assess and criticise the extent to which these ideas from the phenomenological tradition could be construed as making a dialogue with a contemporary debate in philosophy of emotion.

The last chapter will attempt to articulate how to integrate bodily feeling with the structure of intentionality in regard to emotional experience without losing a core feature of each side. It is to reconcile the Orthodox Feeling Theory with the Strong Cognitive Theory. First, I will explore a concept of embodied cognition, a non-traditional concept of mind underlying the possibility to integrate the bodily phenomenon with intentionality. The concepts of embodiment could be roughly categorised into two types: a non-phenomenological embodiment and a phenomenological embodiment. Then, I will discuss the advanced theories of emotion which attempt to modify the standard theories; Prinz's theory of non-phenomenological embodied emotion and perceptual theory of emotion. I will reveal the way in which these formulations fall short.

Finally, I will suggest formulations applying the existential phenomenological understanding, which could enable us to integrate bodily feeling with intentionality in a unification view. They are what Slaby calls "Affective Intentionality"<sup>3</sup> and a phenomenological embodied-enactive approach to emotion.

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<sup>3</sup> Slaby, 2008.



## Chapter One

# Standard Theories of Emotion and the Concept of Intentionality

At the beginning of the study of any area, we cannot properly understand and investigate an emotion from any point of view without initially engaging with what theorists of emotion are usually referring to. Before going to the essential parts of the present work, we should initially explore these standard competing theories, and point out their problems.

The formulation of the theory of emotion could be done in several ways. Given that emotions are mental phenomena, we cannot understand them without taking into consideration the problem of mind. One way to categorise these theories is to divide them into the dichotomy which could be seen as the well-known Cartesian split. The Cartesian split raises the mind-body separation, which finally becomes the major competing camps in philosophy; materialism and dualism. Briefly, materialism is best understood in terms of bodily and physiological grounds reducing all mental states to brain activities—which are material and observable.<sup>4</sup> On the other hand, dualism speculates that the mind or consciousness cannot be scientifically observed; the mind is not exhausted by natural law. Accordingly, the mind seems to have its own place and be merely accessed by the subject that possesses it. Yet this is not what I would discuss in detail here. For present purposes, it is just implying that the division of mind and body influences more or less the way theories of emotion could be formulated. It is extremely important to state that even though most theorists of

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<sup>4</sup> In the contemporary debate, there is a form of materialism (physicalism) holding that consciousness cannot be reduced to but is determined by brain activities. This formulation could be called a weak materialism, and it could be said that this view holds the broad sense of naturalism.

mind today endorse materialism, the Cartesian split is still relevant as the brain-body dichotomy.

There are two competing theories of emotion. Both primarily depend on the Cartesian split: the feeling theory and the cognitive theory of emotion. Broadly speaking, feeling theory postulates that emotions are merely our feeling of bodily responses. They automatically happen to us as physiological and biological responses. Thus, emotions are seen as a purely non-volitional form of consciousness. An Orthodox Feeling Theory of emotion—which I posit as equally important as James’s theory of emotion—argues that emotions accidentally happen to us, primarily involve bodily changes or arousals, and are therefore to be understood as non-intentional.<sup>5</sup> In that case, what is the Orthodox Feeling Theory of emotion construed as? How does such a theory fail in fully grasping emotion by way of ignoring intentionality?

On the other hand, cognitive theory contends that emotions are the act of conscious states; they are necessarily reducible to cognitive judgements or beliefs. Cognitive theorists posit bodily changes as more or less contingent to emotions. No doubt, they accept the fact that emotions are intentional states and involve cognitive appraisal like belief, intention, desire, and other folk psychological attitudes. Thus, cognitive theory, as opposed to feeling theory, is much more compatible with the structure of intentionality. It conceives that emotions are intentional cognitive states (mostly with representational contents). Nonetheless, one may ask whether a pure or strong cognitively grounded theory of emotion can even ignore important experiential and bodily aspects of emotion.

In section I., I will explore such non-trivial problems concerning the structure of intentionality and bodily aspect regarding the competing theories of emotion: Orthodox Feeling Theory (OFT) and Strong Cognitive Theory (SCT).

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<sup>5</sup> We typically hold that James’s theory of emotion cannot be accommodated with the structure of intentionality. However, it is worth noting that Ratcliffe attempts to interpret James’s theory to be accommodated with the structure of intentionality. See Ratcliffe, 2005b.

In section II., I will illustrate the concept of intentionality from different approaches in philosophy: an analytic philosophy of mind and a phenomenological philosophy. What I have in mind is that the different methodological approaches to intentionality assume the way we attempt to understand and construe affectivity. To be fair, I would not discuss which one is justified in all aspects, even though I am more convinced by the phenomenological method for it could support the thesis I will exhibit later about the intentionality of emotion, and even mood. Finally, I will clarify the term “existential phenomenological understanding” used in the present research. These points will be explored and discussed in the following parts of this chapter.

### **I. Orthodox Feeling Theory and Strong Cognitive Theory**

In this section, I will explore the standard competing theories of emotion and point to their problems. To be more precise, in this context, I would call Orthodox Feeling Theory as OFT and Strong Cognitive Theory as SCT. As far as using the modifier “orthodox” and “strong”, I mainly focus on the standard competing theories which contain crucial problems. Therefore, I might just call both theories as “standard theories”. Although there are researchers today applying such standard theories for reconciling the tension between the account of intentionality and physiological conditions, I should leave those applied theories aside, or at least, I might discuss them briefly. Those applied theories will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters.

Before investigating the OFT and SCT, I shall briefly point to the constructive approach of such an evolutionary theory of emotion, which is worth surveying. Evolutionary theory of emotion could be understood in part by referring to Charles Darwin. It generally holds that emotions are biologically inherent and universal, and are hard-wired to our body and brain. Creatures evolve a set of basic emotions for the purpose of survival through natural selection. Roughly speaking, the basic emotions are quite unconscious and even non-volitional. Although a human being is the highest form of an evolved organism, there would be many similar kinds of emotions shared among the related species. Some emotions could be functional in the same way for both human beings and other creatures. For instance, human beings and chimpanzees

respond to danger with certain emotions, like fear for example—that is manifest in other creatures as well, e.g. rats, dogs, lions, and so on. The function of fear is the survival of their lineage and reproduction. Based on this, they behave by either fighting or flying.

The prominent pioneer of the evolutionary theory of emotion other than Charles Darwin is Paul Ekman, a psychologist and anthropologist who proposed that basic emotions can be universally identified by considering facial expressions. Facial expressions of basic emotions are universal, across cultures. Ekman formulated his idea through many experiments, starting in the 1960s. Many of his early famous cross-cultural experiments were very substantive. In one of his crucial experiments, he combined the portraits of facial expressions of westerners with the story telling of related emotions to show them to tribes who had never been exposed to western stories and culture; the tribes could mostly identify and match basic emotions with those photographs and stories at the high agreement. Therefore, Ekman concluded that people in all cultures around the world share six basic emotions. However, the theorists after him came up with different lists.<sup>6</sup> According to Ekman, basic emotions are joy, sadness, surprise, disgust, anger and fear, which are known as “affect program emotions”.<sup>7</sup> The affect program theory has been accepted and modified by other evolutionary theorists. One of them is Griffiths. According to Griffiths, affect programs are “short-term, stereotypical responses involving facial expression, autonomic nervous system arousal, and other elements.”<sup>8</sup> This passage points to the essential attributes which indicate a non-volitional aspect of basic emotions; moreover, they are an automatic system for a short duration. The processes of basic emotions cannot be affected by thought or cognitive ability. This feature of basic emotions is known as modularity.

The evolutionary view I have briefly drawn is the very foundation of a science of emotion. The adherents of the scientific enterprise always update their theorisation

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<sup>6</sup> Evans, 2003: 3-6.

<sup>7</sup> In other research of affect program emotion, sadness may be understood as a mood rather than an emotion.

<sup>8</sup> Griffiths, 1997: 8.

to new scientific evidence related to the brain and bodily performances. This approach seems to be much more related to feeling theory since it focuses on the bodily realm. However, the endorsement of the evolutionary theory of emotion does not prevent one from being a cognitive theorist. The science of emotions explains the functions of the brain and the body that have evolved from time immemorial. Importantly, cognitive judgment is an essential ability of the evolved human brain that has developed since the primitive era, and its function is to help human beings survive. For Griffiths, it is true that some emotions are non-cognitive: basic emotions or affect programs. However, he also recognises that, besides affect program emotions, other emotions are cognitive. For him, there are higher cognitive emotions that have evolved.<sup>9</sup>

We have looked at an evolutionary view whose approach widely inspires the later theorists of emotion. Many researchers of emotion strictly follow the evolutionary theory since it is the great enterprise of the modern age and represents a rich repertoire in the framework of naturalism.

### **Orthodox Feeling Theory (OFT)**

The feeling theory of emotion in general is largely motivated by the evolutionary approach. Yet we cannot approach it without referring to William James—the nineteenth century American philosopher and psychologist. James published an ground-breaking article titled “What is an emotion?” (1884) to formulate the theory that came to be known afterwards as the feeling theory of emotion, therefore being recognised as the pioneer of the theory.<sup>10</sup> For the purposes of this study, one should bear in mind that I refer to James’s theory of emotion alone as OFT, for the feeling theory is a huge, and most feeling theories today have shifted from OFT. These theories will be discussed in Chapter Four. In what follows, I shall directly examine the article “What is an emotion?” to investigate the conceptualisation of OFT.

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<sup>9</sup> Johnson.

<sup>10</sup> Carl Lange (1885) coincidentally proposed the same idea of James. We can also call this theory “James-Lange Theory of Emotion”.

At the beginning of “What is an emotion?”, James noticed that physiologists of his time overly emphasised on studying the cognitive activity of the brain. Also, they ignored what James called “the aesthetic sphere of mind”, the domain including pleasures, pains, emotions, and so on, which is usually reckoned as being non-cognitive.<sup>11</sup> All emotional performances in his opinion are only those which have distinctive bodily expressions; they are what he calls “standard emotions”. Other performances which are likely to engage mental operations such as pleasure and displeasure but eventually do not witness any obvious bodily changes are excluded from his formulation.<sup>12</sup> Notice that James narrowed his work on “standard emotions”. It seems that, in this article, he dismissed what later theorists call cognitive emotions, such as guilt, shame, embarrassment, love, and so forth.

According to James, “we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that we cry, strike, or tremble, because we are sorry, angry, or fearful, as the case may be.”<sup>13</sup> What he meant is simple and literal. The bodily changes are the cause of emotions. In fact, the *feelings* or *perceptions* of those bodily changes *are* emotions. To put it in today’s anatomical and physiological terms, emotions are proprioceptive perceptions. Put in another way, “emotion = proprioceptive phenomenology”.<sup>14</sup> Accordingly, perceptions/feelings of bodily events imply the phenomenology of emotion in the sense that they simply have an experiential aspect.

James admitted that his argument might be contrary to common sense. We, commom-sensically, tend to think that emotional states primarily appear in our mind based on our thinking processes, then bodily reactions follow consequently. Instead, for James, whatever we perceive or feel toward our bodily changes, such as the increasing of our heart rate or the blood pumping in our face *are* emotions by themselves. Again, the *feeling of bodily change* is the defining characteristic of emotion, as it *is* emotion. James points out that “[t]he bodily changes follow directly

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<sup>11</sup> James, 1884: 188.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 189.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 190.

<sup>14</sup> Kriegel, 2015: 130-131.

the PERCEPTION of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion.”<sup>15</sup> We may consider the feelings of emotions in relation to experiences as well. The feelings by themselves are an experience. The emotional experiences are the experiences of our bodily changes, as Kind argues while discussing James’s theory. For her, “emotions are to be *identified* with the experiences of physiological changes.”<sup>16</sup> So, they are nothing other than the experiences or the feelings of bodily changes that automatically precede thoughts and all cognitive activity.

James anticipated that there would likely be many readers who would immediately reject his proposal. Thus, he raised the crucial point by persuading the readers to do the experiment of introspection. It is to imagine some distinctive emotions and abstract them from all possible feelings of bodily changes. He asserted that we would find nothing remaining.<sup>17</sup> The main point here proposes that bodily changes are essential to all standard emotions, and we cannot feel any standard emotion outside the corporeal realm. It is impossible to imagine any state of anger without the feeling of the increase of heart rate; when I am angry, what I primarily experience is the increase of heart rate. This feeling of such bodily change is my anger.

The word “feel” in common usage means “to experience something physical or emotional.”<sup>18</sup> Nevertheless, this is inadequate to understand the word. The word should be considered in more detail in regard to James’s theory. There might be three characteristics related to the word “feeling” which corresponds with James’s theory: bodily, momentary, and automatic.

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<sup>15</sup> James, 1884: 189-190.

<sup>16</sup> Kind, 2014: 122.

<sup>17</sup> James, 1884: 193.

<sup>18</sup> The meaning refers to Cambridge dictionaries. Admittedly, the philosophical concept should not be regarded by opening dictionaries. I just refer to it for indicating a word being used in an ordinary language.

### 1) The feeling is bodily

Feelings are bodily activities rather than performances of pure cognitive mind. In general, the word “feel” is also used for non-emotional states of the body, such as pain, hunger, and so on, which are sensations.<sup>19</sup> For instance, we say, “I feel pain,” or “I feel hungry.” Thus, the feeling is not exhausted by emotion. In everyday language, to indicate the nature of emotions we often say: “I feel things with my heart rather than my head.” To talk about a certain emotion, we say: “I was so terrified by the dog in the street that I felt my heart beating and blood pumping in my body.” For an emotional state, when I feel something it seems that I feel it through my body. On the other hand, the pure cognitive activities in our head do not require the bodily feeling in their processes in this sense. Even when the nerve cells are firing in our brain in the process of thinking, we cannot feel them for they are pure cognitive thinking. For James, since the feelings of bodily changes are emotions, there cannot be emotions in the domain of pure cognition, given that “a purely disembodied human emotion is a nonentity.”<sup>20</sup> This is the so-called “feeling theory” of emotion which James formulated.

### 2) The feeling is momentary

The “feeling” indicates the momentariness of its occurrence. James connected the word “feel” to the momentariness of its occurrence. He argued that “every one of the bodily changes, whatsoever it be, is felt, acutely or obscurely, the moment it occurs.”<sup>21</sup> In addition to the body aspect, the characteristic of the feeling includes a momentary occurrence of emotion; one can feel something only at the moment that feeling is occurring. As James contended, we might think the bear is dangerous, then, decide to run, but we would not *actually* feel fear. Since this instance is a pure cognitive performance rather than an emotional feeling, we cannot feel it. The

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<sup>19</sup> One may contend that emotions can be related to, or partly caused by, sensations, such as pain, even though pain itself is not an emotion.

<sup>20</sup> James, 1884: 194.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 192.



moment we think and decide to run is not the moment we feel, or experience, fear.<sup>22</sup> Furthermore, it is important to see James's idea that *every one* (every case) of the bodily changes can be *felt* by the subject. It is to say, for James, that all bodily changes are exhausted by the *feelings* of their changes.<sup>23</sup> In other words, it is unlikely that there can be bodily change without feeling it.

### 3) The feeling is automatic

Finally, according to James's theory, the bodily changes are a mere automatic system; our bodies have a reflexive mode. Therefore, we cannot pretend to feel anything which is not actually elicited. We might try to reproduce a fake emotion with facial expressions or tensing our muscles, but what we fail is to control our organs: heart beating, secretion of glands, and so on.<sup>24</sup> These internal organs are an automatic mechanism. They are the same set of organs that usually play the other usual roles of our bodily functions other than emotions. Accordingly, James believed that "[emotions] correspond to processes occurring in the motor and sensory centres, already assigned, or in others like them, not yet mapped out."<sup>25</sup> This presumes that human emotional processes do not require any special unique organs. They perform through the ordinary sensory and motor centres that are already assigned in the evolved body.

It is worth noting that even though James focused on the feelings of bodily changes, his theory of emotion also contributes to the phenomenology of emotion. The "what it is like to feel such emotion" must be gained only by the subject that feels its emotion—as conscious experience—at the moment it occurs. As Colombetti states regarding James's theory, "[we] could not imagine experiencing an emotion without experiencing bodily feelings."<sup>26</sup> However, the chief difference between James's theory (or OFT) and the traditional phenomenology of emotion is that the former

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 195.

<sup>23</sup> Goldie, 2000: 53.

<sup>24</sup> James, 1884: 192.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 188.

<sup>26</sup> Colombetti, 2011: 293.

seems to lack the account of intentionality while the latter associates the structure of intentionality essentially with affective phenomena.

The OFT came out in the heyday of early modern science; physiologists and scientists thoroughly emphasised and observed the physical worlds such as the animal and the human bodies. Lyons remarked that “from the seventeenth century to roughly the end of the nineteenth century . . . feeling theory was the orthodox theory.”<sup>27</sup> The reason could be that James’s theory was consistent with scientific enterprise at the time. Cognitive science and neuroscience had not yet emerged and developed like today. The feeling theory has been finally dubbed as orthodox. Nonetheless, James’s theory has been afterward criticised by many contemporary philosophers and researchers of emotion. As de Sousa points out, the criticism mostly rejects feeling theory due to two problems.<sup>28</sup>

1) The OFT fails to accommodate the intentionality.

The first problem, for de Sousa, as one might have noticed so far, is that the OFT fails to accommodate the rationality, intentionality, and significance of emotion. It disconnects emotions from the capacities of human thought and judgment. The criticism contends that human beings—as the highest form of creatures—are much more rational than other biological beings. They are capable of understanding language and cognitive judgment; they understand logic and mathematics as well as control their emotions. Furthermore, the OFT considers emotions non-intentional, which means emotions do not signify anything. This also assumes that an emotion does not have significance: it cannot refer to the external world, it does not inform us about something.

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<sup>27</sup> Lyons, 1985: 2.

<sup>28</sup> de Sousa, 2013.

## 2) The OFT is not capable of distinguishing different emotions.

The second problem is that the OFT is not capable of distinguishing different emotions.<sup>29</sup> This criticism is largely shared by disapproving theorists. Without the process of thought, it is impossible to distinguish between anger and fear. For instance, the feeling of an increasing heart rate can *identically* occur for both kinds of emotions. It is natural to think that we cannot distinguish between different emotions without the process of thinking. The adherents of cognitivism criticise the OFT for these reasons. In the next section, I will examine the SCT, which is opposed to the OFT.

### **Strong Cognitive Theory (SCT)**

A theory of emotion grounded on cognition is not a novel theory; one can find it in ancient philosophy. Aristotle held that types of cognition, such as beliefs and judgments, are *central* and *essential* to emotion.<sup>30</sup> For instance, let us say that I walked through the street. There was a man who strangely gazed at me, and kept his hand in his pocket. It looked like he was pulling something from it. It turned out to be a bar of chocolate and handed it to me. I judged that he was kind, and then, I was happy. On the other hand, another person in the same situation might judge that this man looked down upon him by giving him chocolate. Hence, instead of being happy, he could have been angry. In fact, the Stoics taught us to be indifferent to emotions, this being the practical way to understand and manage our emotions for a good living.<sup>31</sup> The ancient philosophers articulated their views on emotion through conceptual analysis, which was the only way of philosophising at the time.

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<sup>29</sup> de Sousa, 2013; Sartre, 2002.

<sup>30</sup> Lyons, 1985: 33. One should note that even though Aristotle regards cognition as *essential* to emotions, he does not reject that bodily aspects are an accompanying component of emotions (See Colombetti and Thompson, 2008: 47).

<sup>31</sup> Oatley, 2004: 42.

Even though there are many researchers of emotion these days endorsing evolutionary biology, scientific methodology, and philosophical naturalism,<sup>32</sup> there are also traditional philosophers who primarily focus on human rationality alone and do not need empirical evidence for philosophising and theorising. According to the traditional philosophical view, that is conceptual analysis, they mostly sympathise with the SCT rather than the OFT (The latter is mainly proposed by modern psychologists, scientists, biologists along with empirical explanations). I, however, quite disagree with the traditional philosophical view, for I think that it leads to a form of “strong” cognitive theory. It does not follow that I totally reject a cognitive theory of emotion; what I reject is a “strong” theory. This perspective holds that conceptual analysis alone is sufficient for understanding things. Those traditional philosophers tend to investigate the question of “what is emotion?” by seeking the conceptual meaning and definition of emotion. This tendency indicates the way philosophers, especially traditional ones, have dealt with OFT and SCT, emphasising mostly on the latter. Likewise, by saying that I disagree with using conceptual analysis *alone* for philosophising the problem, I do not mean that I reject conceptual analysis by itself. What I mean is that a conceptual analysis of philosophical methodology must not limit itself to its own domain. Rather, it ought to pay attention to other disciplines and scientific evidence.

The word “cognitive” could be understood in many ways. It ranges from involving “intentionality”, “belief”, “desire”, “intention”, “judgment”, “thought”, “evaluative judgment”, “representation”, “construals”, “appraisal”, “consciousness”, and so on. Broadly speaking, the SCT argues that emotions involve thoughts, beliefs, judgments, and other instances mentioned earlier; the human mind cognitively rationalises emotions. The adherents of the SCT reject the OFT—the view that emotions are brute and may accidentally happen to us in a purely non-volitional form of consciousness. Rather, the SCT’s theorists would ignore the role of the body in emotions, or posit it as contingent. Anthony Kenny, a philosopher whose book *Action*,

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<sup>32</sup> Paul E. Griffiths defines “philosophical naturalism” as “the view that philosophy deals in knowledge of the natural world no different in principle from that revealed by the sciences”. (See Griffiths, 2013: 215).

*Emotion and Will* inspired the SCT's theorists that came after him, tries to relatively ignore the role of the body—including sensations—from emotions, as he states that:

[t]he most important difference between a sensation and an emotion is that emotions, unlike sensations, are essentially directed to objects. It is possible to be hungry without being hungry for anything in particular, as it is not possible to be ashamed without being ashamed of anything in particular. It is possible to be in pain without knowing what is hurting one, as it is not possible to be delighted without knowing what is delighting one.<sup>33</sup>

He insists that “bodily changes may be the vehicle of an emotion, but they are not themselves emotion.”<sup>34</sup> Therefore, thoughts, such as beliefs and judgments, are what we call cognition, which, for the SCT, is essential to emotions, and we can distinguish different emotions with cognition. As Lyons states,

In general, a cognitive theory of emotions is one that makes some aspect of thought, usually a belief, central to the concept of emotion and, at least in some cognitive theories, essential to distinguishing the different emotions from one another.<sup>35</sup>

Emotions have a more significant feature as a result of the capacity of cognition; many emotions, if not all, are rational. For example, guilt, pride, love, embarrassment, envy, and so on. It is unlikely to imagine having guilt without judging that we have done something wrong, or feeling love for someone/something without thinking about the particular intentional object of our love. These emotions are what Griffiths calls “higher cognitive emotions”, which require a much higher cognitive ability than basic emotions or affect program emotions.<sup>36</sup> No doubt, Griffiths is not a cognitive theorist *per se*. Rather, his theory essentially adopts the evolutionary approach. As a naturalistic-minded philosopher, he distinguishes higher cognitive emotions from

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<sup>33</sup> Kenny, 2003: 41.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 26.

<sup>35</sup> Lyons, 1985: 33.

<sup>36</sup> Griffiths, 1997: 100.

affect program responses. However, this distinction does not make his theory clash with the evolutionary approach. As Prinz points out,

Griffiths argues that cognitive involvement in higher cognitive emotions does not render them less amenable to evolutionary explanation than affect programs. He is open to the possibility that higher cognitive emotions are products of natural selection.<sup>37</sup>

Cultural theorists of emotion also focus on these higher cognitive emotions, holding that emotions are constructed by social norms and environments, a view known as social constructivism. A particular social norm may prescribe the meaning of a certain emotion. For instance, Western people get angry when their personal space is invaded, unlike Eastern people.

However, one may argue that *all* emotions are related to thoughts. Sartre's theory of emotions in his book *Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions* (1939/2002) is well known among cognitive theorists. For him, there is something more than merely what emotion is. Emotion also tells us about its significance. Sartre points out that "an emotion refers to what it signifies. So what it signifies is indeed, in effect, the totality of the relations of the human-reality to the world."<sup>38</sup> Sartre asserts that all emotions have signification; they always signify something. To think that emotions have signification assumes that they are related to meanings and thoughts, thus his theory seems to be more compatible with a cognitive theory of emotion. Anger, fear, and sadness, for examples, are considered by Sartre as the magical alteration of the world to deal with the difficulties of human lives; emotions are "a transformation of the world."<sup>39</sup> This notion means we can choose or control our emotions by choosing our thoughts for dealing with difficult situations in our everyday lives.

Robert Solomon, who is dubbed by the literature as a cognitive theorist of emotion, derives interesting insights from Sartre. Solomon is a philosopher well-known for taking a position based on the SCT and productively merging it with the

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<sup>37</sup> Prinz, 2004b: 83.

<sup>38</sup> Sartre, 2002: 63.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 39.

existentialist and phenomenological traditions. His stance opposes to the OFT. At the face of it, we could consider Sartre and Solomon as cognitive theorists. Their theories, however, have a foundation from an existential phenomenological tradition. It is true that we might see Solomon as a cognitive theorist as Prinz argues that Solomon believes that “emotions are evaluative judgments that provide the structure of our world.”<sup>40</sup> However, it is important to recognise that the claim that Solomon’s theory is the SCT-based mostly refers to his early works.<sup>41</sup> In fact, Solomon’s later works about emotion rather conform to the existential phenomenological tradition in which the evaluative judgments are the ways (strategies) to engage with the world, rather than the pure cognitions/judgments involving propositional attitudes. Arguably, I would say that Solomon and Sartre are *weak* cognitive theorists of emotion. In this regard, I will discuss Solomon and Sartre’s theories in more detail in Chapter Three.

In what follows, let us set aside those standard theories of emotion. I will explore the concept of intentionality as understood in two traditions of philosophy: analytic philosophy of mind and existential phenomenology. To do so, I have to first admit that the concept of intentionality is huge, complex, and contentious, for it is one of the central debates in philosophy of consciousness and mind. One should bear in mind that exploring the different concepts of intentionality is related to the debate about embodied emotion as shown afterwards in the present study.

## **II. Exploring Intentionality and Clarifying the Method of Research**

It is true that there has been a division between the analytic and phenomenological traditions in the history of philosophy. The division has been held firmly among some scholars and researchers, causing to extend the gap between the two sides. This gap suppresses the possibility of full-blown understanding of human mind and experiences. The gap should be narrowed, particularly the debate about the problem of consciousness, a field which has boomed in the science of mind and philosophy. There are scientific-reductionist philosophers believe that they do not need to rely on phenomenology in regard to the study of the first-person perspective of experiences

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<sup>40</sup> Prinz, 2004b: 8.

<sup>41</sup> Solomon, 1993; Solomon, 2003.

since they assert that the subjective experiences as such are illusions, or even mysterious. Thus, the attempt to bridge the gap between analytic and phenomenological philosophies is not aimed at those who hold a strong scientific-reductionist view—the view that every mental state can be reduced to material brain activities. However, those who are concerned with phenomenal consciousness and holding that the problem of consciousness is a really hard one<sup>42</sup> should get some benefit from the endeavour to merge these traditions—or, to be precise, combine these methodologies. If they could not be fully bridged, at least, they should have a dialogue between each other; retaining some distinctions and sharing possible common grounds.

In exploring the notion of intentionality, I shall start with the word's etymology. The word “intentionality” is a technical term for a philosophical concept, and to give a certain conception of intentionality is quite complicated and contentious. The word “intentionality” derives from the Latin word “*intentio*”, which means directing toward things.<sup>43</sup> It is obvious that intentionality is the very essence of human life and permeates all over our activities, both mentally and physically, toward reliable truth, satisfaction, goal, and purpose.<sup>44</sup> The structure of intentionality requires intentional objects, which are essential to mental activities—thinking, perceiving, experiencing, desiring, imagining, and so on—and they can also expand to action or behaviour in a certain environment.

In fact, we always involve the structure of intentionality in our ordinary life. For instance, someone might ask me questions like, “What are you thinking?”, “What

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<sup>42</sup> The “hard problem of consciousness” is a phrase coined by David Chalmers (Australian philosophy) in referring to the question of why and how we have a subjective feeling or conscious experience, which seems to us as a private experience. (See also Thomas Nagel, 1974).

<sup>43</sup> Jacob, 2010.

<sup>44</sup> It is worth noting that we must not confuse the concept of intentionality with intention. Intention is one instance of mental phenomena within the structure of intentionality. There are many types of mental phenomena in this structure along with intention, for example, belief, desire, love, imagination, and so on. The word “intention” understood as one kind of psychological attitude, in which it relates an aim of some goal or purpose and is contained in one's mind whereas the structure of intentionality includes all kinds of psychological attitudes.



are you seeing?”, “What do you want?”, “What are you imagining?”, “Who is the person you love most?”, “What do you feel?”, and so on. To answer these questions, I have to direct the intentional objects of these mental phenomena. These intentional objects could be things, events, states of affairs, propositions, imaginations, and so on. For instance, “I am thinking about the world political crisis”, “I am watching the soldier on the television”, “I want to drink a cup of coffee”, “I am imagining world peace”, “I love my mom and dad”, and “I feel scared of the war”. These psychological processes, contained in the individual mind, have an ability to direct to something beyond themselves like an arrow is directed at the target. The arrow has a target just like the mental phenomena have their intentional objects. Nonetheless, my intentional objects could be things which do not exist, e.g. “I am thinking about Harry Potter and his friends”, “I want to see Superman and Batman”, “I love God”, and so on. This is to say that intentionality in a general sense provides us with a meaning for things—they enable us to make sense of the world. This seems to be the link between the mind/consciousness and the world.

The different methodological approaches to intentionality impact the way we attempt to understand and construe any mental phenomenon. Broadly speaking, an analytic philosophy of mind takes intentionality or intentional states to be mental contents, or mental representations (representative theory) which typically involve an emphasis on logic and language. It started with the linguistic turn in philosophy, especially semantics, in the nineteenth century. Philosophy is a conceptual analysis; to analyse concepts is to analyse language. For example, what we perceive, believe, intend, desire, and so on, can be reduced to intentional contents, and the structure of intentionality always bears such contents. This way of articulation accounts for the third-person perspective, which means that such contents can be conveyed to the public domain as objective knowledge or the view from nowhere. On the other hand, a phenomenological methodology takes intentionality to be the object-directed intentionality of conscious experiences, which typically involves an emphasis on experiential subjectivity. More specifically, an existential turn in phenomenology shifts the focus from the epistemological conception of object-directed intentionality to the ontological conception of world-directed intentionality as Being-in-the-world (conceiving human reality as existential coping with, engaging with, or being embedded within the world). The human existence encounters the world from a

subjective point of view as the experiential aspect of phenomenal consciousness. Thus, a view from nowhere is impossible. For instance, experiencing the aroma of coffee has its phenomenal character. Such a phenomenal character, which forms the subjective experience of the first-person perspective, cannot be reduced to mental content from an objective point of view, as per analytic philosophical understanding.

Although the both side of philosophical aspects are called tradition or camp, I am convinced to see them as the difference in methodology as well. This section will explore the concept of intentionality in analytic philosophical methodology and phenomenological methodology. Then, I will clarify what I mean by “existential phenomenological understanding” which I apply in the present research.

### **Analytic Philosophical Methodology of Intentionality (AMI)**

Although we can trace back the origin of “intentionality” to ancient philosophy and medieval scholastic works, the investigation of the concept of intentionality should start with Franz Brentano, who took the word “intentionality” and introduced it to the discourse of philosophy through the famous slogan of intentionality being the mark of the mental. The concept of intentionality as such is developed by later phenomenologists. However, the phenomenological approach does not exhaust the concept of intentionality. It is quite not right to say that phenomenology is the only one approach to study the structure of intentionality.

The formulation of analytic philosophy—which initiated the philosophical movement of the linguistic turn in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century—is mostly concerned with the philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of action. It focuses on mental states, mental content, or mental representations that refer to, represent, or stand for things, properties, and state of affairs. Beliefs, desires, intentions, and other folk psychological attitudes are mental states within the structure of intentionality. Our mind bears certain mental contents when we perform mental activities. In other words, the mind has intentional contents or intentional states that involve the rationality of judgments, beliefs, and actions. Intentionality is considered an account of the agency of human beings. It commits them to an action in some way and makes moral responsibility for an intentional

action possible. It is the study of subjectivity, the core theme of philosophy. Thus, in analytic methodology, the focus is the analysis of logical and linguistic concerns rather than conscious experiential aspects of subjectivity.<sup>45</sup>

Broadly speaking, the theory of intentionality for analytic philosophy is the theory of mental representation. An analytic tradition concerns logic, linguistic, semantics to the extent that it formulates forms of mental contents. Also, an analytic philosophy aims at the third-person perspective. In contrast, the existential phenomenological tradition is concerned with the first-person perspective, which is a conscious experience through which the subject can make sense of the world from a certain viewpoint. Even if there might be more or less some engagements among both circles, it would be safe to say that both traditions at their early stage could remain independent of each other. Each of them had developed their own line of thought with its particular jargon. There was no need to communicate with each other since their approaches to the mind seemed to be very different from the outset.

Around the late twentieth century, there was a mentalistic turn in analytic philosophy of mind that influenced the way of doing philosophy. It was a return to consciousness. In 1994, David Chalmers, an Australian philosopher, echoed the question “what is it like to be . . . ?” of Thomas Nagel’s paper “What is it like to be a Bat?” (1974), indicating the hard problem of consciousness. Chalmers argued that there are two levels to the problem of consciousness: the easy problem and the hard problem.

The easy problem of consciousness is the problems of brain mechanisms, which is mostly in the hands of a neuroscientist, psychologist, biologist, and so forth. For instance, the task to discover the particular parts or regions in the brain which are related to certain mental and physiological activities. Such problems will be solved as long as high technology is developed. Thus, it is a matter of time, this being not different from other scientific projects which are about accumulating data and information, just as human genome mapping for example. In other words, the easy problem is to explore the consciousness or mental phenomena in the physical domain.

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<sup>45</sup> Siewert: 2016.

The hard problem of consciousness is the view that the real problem of consciousness is a very hard one. It is about the following questions: How and why do we have subjective feelings or conscious experiences at all? How can the conscious experience emerge from the physical world as brain activity? So what is that conscious experience? When I sip coffee from a cup, I feel some exclusive conscious experience of “what it is like to feel the aroma of the coffee”, which is difficult to explain. Consciousness is essentially an inner life, a phenomenal character that is understood as “what it is like to be such and such”. Some philosophers believe that the hard problem of consciousness is true and return to consciousness studies; others hold that the hard problem is an illusion and totally dismiss it.

Around the 1990s, the turn to the study of consciousness coincided with the partial weakening of behaviourism and standard computer science. The former neglected the existence of mind and consciousness, holding that the study of humans and animals is to observe their behaviour. The latter believed that the mind is nothing other than computational processes (information processing). Both dismissed consciousness. The study of consciousness pays attention partly to the phenomenological approach as the study of conscious experience. However, there is the question of whether there can be a science of consciousness. Indeed, science is unlikely to wholly capture consciousness, for consciousness does not fit the reduction framework of science. For this reason, philosophers try to solve the problem by using the concept of intentionality to account for consciousness or the phenomenal character.<sup>46</sup> And in some cases the intentionality should be adopted from all possible traditions, e.g. the phenomenological tradition, for some mental and affective phenomena could be non-conceptual and/or non-representational experiences.

### **Phenomenological Methodology of Intentionality (PMI)**

Cerbone remarks that the phenomenological methodology considers intentionality as “the defining, and even an exclusive feature of experience, and so phenomenology can be characterized as the study of intentionality.”<sup>47</sup> Again, one should keep in mind

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<sup>46</sup> Kind, 2014: 114.

<sup>47</sup> Cerbone, 2010: 4.

that the study of intentionality is not exhausted by the phenomenological approach. The concept of intentionality from different approaches has different characters. The study of the concept of intentionality through the phenomenological method began with Husserl at the same period of the linguistic turn in the analytic tradition around the end of nineteenth and the early twentieth century. Husserl attempts to characterise the mental experiences as falling under either *directedness* or *aboutness*, the essence of consciousness. The crucial concern of this method is the structure of consciousness from the point of view of experiential subjectivity where the act of consciousness is always consciousness of something; the experience is always directed to the object of act, whether the object actually exists or not.

Moran points out that phenomenology is a methodology which “claimed to have overcome the impasse reached in the treatment of many traditional philosophical problems.”<sup>48</sup> To a certain extent, phenomenology arguably started from Brentano, who considered his way of philosophising as a new science of descriptive psychology or descriptive phenomenology and considered it as a foundation that would “provide clear, evident truth about mental acts employed in these sciences.”<sup>49</sup> Husserl was a student of Brentano, and was strongly inspired by him. Husserl formulates the idea of phenomenological reduction (*epoche*) for bracketing the world, or to be precise, to suspend a natural attitude. Philosophy, for him, is a rigorous science. It aims at the description of things themselves; it lets them show themselves *as they are* in the human experience from a subjective point of view, not through a causal explanation as per the presupposition of naturalism. Husserl’s phenomenology is concerned with the content of act rather than the content of the object of the act and the object itself. For Husserl, ‘intentionality’ is the way to presuppositionless of both natural attitudes and psychology. The idea that a natural attitude reduces everything to an object outside consciousness and that psychology reduces everything to the individual mind is rejected by Husserl. He argues that natural attitudes and psychology have the limitation since they are not being able to gain the real essence of the things. In other words, they cannot grasp the things as they are. The purpose of Husserl is to do science in a new way through grasping the essence or meaning of things. Things

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<sup>48</sup> Moran, 2006: 5.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., 9.

manifest themselves to us as they are through intentionality which suspends the world, or natural attitude (scientific presupposition). Husserl's philosophy becomes a pure phenomenology or transcendental phenomenology that tries to make sense of the world, of the object by connecting it to the content of the act of consciousness. Thus, his aspiration is to "achiev[e] epistemological certainty."<sup>50</sup> As Moran stresses, "for Husserl, as for Brentano, philosophy is the description of what is given in direct 'self-evidence.'"<sup>51</sup> Husserl tries to construct an indubitable foundation along the lines of Descartes's philosophy. At the same time, his purpose is to beat Cartesianism, though what he actually does is "a radical rethinking of the Cartesian project itself."<sup>52</sup> He tries to posit intentionality as the foundation of doing philosophy. Consequently, it is 'pure consciousness' or 'transcendental phenomenology' that indicates the role of the phenomenological reduction, but it differs from the notion of Descartes in that the *cogito* is not always directed to an object.

Here we see that, roughly, the phenomenology of Husserl can be understood as epistemological foundationalism. It is nonetheless more accurate to consider it as the thought of early Husserl (around 1887-1929), the works before he was concerned with the notion of 'life-world' (*Lebenswelt*), or his second reduction method that distanced him from Cartesianism. The later Husserl, responding to Heidegger's notion of Being-in-the-world, is more concerned about the lived-body, the embedded historical context of the world we live through. Consider the following statement:

[Husserl's work is] later published under the title *Cartesian Meditation* that Husserl began to explore a line of thought that is profoundly anti-Cartesian in its implications. Ultimately these considerations lead us away from solitary, immaterial, self-substance consciousness, as the focal point of philosophy, and indicate instead the importance of the body, of the existence of a plurality of conscious beings, and the life-world or *Lebenswelt* which they share. These new thoughts receive a final—though hardly a definitive—

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<sup>50</sup> Cerbone, 2010: 21.

<sup>51</sup> Moran, 2006: 7-8.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, 16.

expression in Husserl's last, unfinished work, *The Crisis of European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology* (1936).<sup>53</sup>

After Husserl's formulation of intentionality, the concept was adapted from within the phenomenological tradition; such an adaptation took place following the existential turn in phenomenology. The so-called "existential phenomenologists", such as Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty, theorised that the root of intentionality is the structure of Being-in-the-world as well as its temporality. This means that human reality is engaged with the world and materiality. However, it is debatable whether the existential turn in phenomenology excludes Husserl's phenomenology, for Husserl also offers the notion of life-world and intersubjectivity, which require the context-dependence in understating our self and the world.

Merleau-Ponty owes much to Husserl, who made the distinction between the "intentionality of act" and "operative intentionality". Operative intentionality is "the intentionality of the lived world".<sup>54</sup> It is a comprehensive phenomenological understanding rather than traditional reflection on the representational theory of knowledge. Mohanty too points out that there is primary intentionality as *already there*, which Merleau-Ponty calls "operative intentionality", and in this respect "[he] treats feelings, emotions, desires, and evaluations, as experiences which are not acts, nevertheless intentional in a rather extended sense."<sup>55</sup>

Merleau-Ponty adopted the original phenomenological concept of intentionality, what Reuter calls "pre-reflective motility", which posits the body-subject as the centre of a comprehensive phenomenological understanding.<sup>56</sup> Body-subject or embodied subject is not the body which is separated from mind in the sense of the Cartesian dualism, but the embodied subject as consciousness intertwined with both the body and the world. Mohanty states: "The body-subject is not a thing, but an intentional movement directed toward the object, or, at least is a potential

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<sup>53</sup> Bell, 1995: 203.

<sup>54</sup> Reuter, 1999: 70-71.

<sup>55</sup> Mohanty, 2006: 74.

<sup>56</sup> Reuter, 1999: 71-74.

movement.”<sup>57</sup> This body-subject is understood as an embodied subject or embodied consciousness which is an ontological breakthrough of existential phenomenology.

### **Clarifying “Existential Phenomenological Understanding”**

I shall clarify the approach of the present research, which is an “existential phenomenological understanding”. The research is an attempt to understand emotions through three dimensions: 1) existential phenomenology as *the first-person perspective*; 2) existential phenomenological understanding as *the methodology of intentionality, which is an embodied engagement with the world*; 3) existential phenomenology as *the phenomenological tradition*. Let me elucidate this.

#### 1) Existential phenomenology as the first-person perspective

The words “phenomenology”, “phenomenological”, and “phenomenologically” are commonly in use in academic research today. One might come across such statements as, “*Phenomenologically speaking, we need to describe how such experiences seem to us rather than explaining them from nowhere.*” The word “phenomenology” in this broad sense probably refers to conscious experiences, subjective feelings, inner life, or the mental phenomenon known as describing “what it is like to be such and such”. In some cases, it is perhaps referred to as “qualia”. The paradigm cases of the phenomenology of mental states are pain, bodily feelings, perceived colours, affective feelings, and so forth. In philosophy of mind’s jargon, these characters is known as a “phenomenality” or “phenomenal consciousness”.<sup>58</sup> The term “phenomenology” is widely used in analytic philosophy of mind’s literature today, but the same literature sometimes does not refer to the phenomenological tradition and classical phenomenologists. Besides, using the word “phenomenology” in any case might dismiss the whole idea of embodiment, lived-body, lived-experience, and Being-in-the-world. For example, it could be used in referring to the perception of the bodily feelings or something similar to the introspection method as used in the nineteenth

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<sup>57</sup> Mohanty, 2006: 75.

<sup>58</sup> The term “phenomenal consciousness” is coined by American philosopher, Ned Block. (See Blackmore, 2005: 8).



century which is not exactly the same as the one recognised by the phenomenological tradition.

However, this use of the word “phenomenology” reflects the way philosophy of mind is related more or less to the phenomenological tradition. At some level, this implies that, in the study of mind, we cannot neglect consciousness. One should note that in the present study when I use the word “phenomenology”, I am simply referring to the sense adopted by most analytic philosophers of mind. I might employ the words “phenomenality” and “phenomenology” interchangeably. In this regard, however, one should bear in mind that, at the same time, the word “phenomenology” could be used to include lived-body and lived-experience as it is the case in the phenomenological tradition.

In fact, the need to distinguish the “existential phenomenology” from “phenomenology” is debatable. So, it is worth mentioning that what I am most concerned about in the phrase “existential phenomenological understanding” is that it essentially involves the notion of the embodied subjectivity, lived-body, lived-experience, Being-in-the-world understood as *the first-person experience*. This could be also referred to as the investigation of “what it is like to be something”. The subject being embodied and existential (engaging with the world and concerned with what matters to it) is to deal with the question of “what it is likeness” as well.

## 2) Existential phenomenological understanding as the methodology of intentionality which is an embodied engagement with the world

This is a phenomenological understanding in an existential aspect. By the word “existential”, I mean that the human reality *exists* and understands itself in the world or environment. The subject is concerned with what matters and does not matter to it. In other words, it is an attempt to understand emotions from a subjective point of view, emphasising on the embodied subjectivity or lived-body aspect; the embodied subjectivity *exists* as Being-in-the-world. Such a formulation is known as existential phenomenology. Although the word “phenomenology” alone can be understood today to include the notion of embodied subjectivity, I prefer to use “existential

phenomenology” to stress the importance of the idea of existential and/or embodied subjectivity in the phenomenological tradition.

Moreover, I put the modifier “existential” before “phenomenology” for two reasons. First, I intend to oppose any methodology based on the formulation of Cartesian mind, on the one hand, and a “transcendental” phenomenology as posited in Husserl’s phenomenology, on the other. So, to be “existential” is to be “Being-in-the-world”. This can include Husserl’s phenomenology only to the extent that he brings the consciousness back to the world as the life-world. Consequently, to use the term “existential phenomenology” is not to exclude the whole of Husserl’s phenomenology. In this respect, “existential phenomenology” concerns a methodology undertaken by the classical phenomenologists, such as Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and so forth. These philosophers are taken up as long as their works posit human reality as Being-in-the-world, and formulate the notion of embodiment and lived-body.

The concepts of embodiment, lived-body, lived-experiences, Being-in-the-world, and so on, come from the phenomenological tradition. It could be said that the concepts have been formulated to be understood in terms of phenomenological philosophy. The present study will refer to prominent works of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. Importantly, as far as the methodology is concerned, I will also engage with the recent formulations involving the blend of phenomenology with other approaches, for example, an embodied cognitive science and an enactive approach formulated by philosophers like Evan Thompson, Giovanna Colombetti, and so on. The current researchers adopting the phenomenological approach mostly absorb themselves into other disciplines. Gallagher suggests that,

More recently phenomenologists following [the phenomenological] tradition have been drawn into theoretical and empirical research in the cognitive sciences, and especially into discussions of enactive and embodied conceptions of the mind.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> Gallagher, 2014: 9.

So, to be fair, to apply the phenomenological methodology cannot be the exclusive task of classical phenomenologists. Rather, applying the phenomenological methodology should also include the works of contemporary theorists who rely on the phenomenological tradition. Thus, I shall include the recent approaches like the enactive approach in the present work. The reason is that I regard such an approach as a more developed formulation of phenomenological methodology.

It is very important to bear in mind that in the present work, the “existential phenomenological understanding” as the methodology of intentionally embodied engagement with the world would be largely applied in the following chapters. I shall argue that it can contribute to an integration of both the OFT and the SCT in showing that emotions are intentional, bodily felt, and have a rich phenomenological dimension.

### 3) Existential phenomenology as the phenomenological tradition

From Chapter One to Chapter Four, the main works involve the debates in philosophy of emotion, and I would take up the phenomenological methodology to contribute to solving the problems. Besides, I use the phrase “existential phenomenological understanding” in the sense that it refers directly to the phenomenological tradition.

In chapter three, I shall explore the philosophical works in the phenomenological tradition regarding the philosophy of emotion. In doing so, I opted for Heidegger’s *Being and Time* to investigate mood, and Sartre’s *Sketch for a Theory of Emotions* to explore emotions. Accordingly, their works would be reinterpreted so that there can be a dialogue between them and the recent debates in the contemporary philosophy of emotion.

One should note that these three dimensions could overlap since the phenomenological methodology derives from the phenomenological tradition and the phenomenological philosophy fundamentally concerns the first-person account of consciousness.

## Conclusion

In the history of the philosophy of emotion, the competing theories place themselves either on “cognitive” or “bodily” grounds; both are responsible for the mind-body dichotomy and have their difficulties. The former is what I call the Orthodox Feeling Theory (OFT), which cannot account for the structure of intentionality and the evaluative property of emotions; the latter is the Strong Cognitive Theory (SCT), which ignores the role of the bodily and experiential aspect. Such standard theories are out of date. As Slaby points out, “it is fortunate that the old dispute between cognitivist theories and feeling theories of emotion is no longer in the centre of the philosophical debate”.<sup>60</sup> Thus, I shall carry out the present research according to the facts about emotion that are undeniable today (as we will see in Chapter Four); emotions structurally comprise of bodily, intentional, and phenomenological features. The quest here is to properly articulate them.

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<sup>60</sup> Slaby, 2008: 431.

## Chapter Two

### **Under the Umbrella of Affectivity and the Problem of Mood**

Even though the present research aims to explore and understand emotions, it also includes mood. It is important to know that emotion and mood ought to be regarded as different, and we should focus on how to articulate this distinction. In everyday life, it seems that our emotional lives have a close relationship to moods. Perhaps one probably assumes that they are quite the same, as one can use the word “affective” or “affectivity” for indicating both emotional and mooded phenomena. As a matter of fact, however, they are not the same.

If we take for granted the difference between them and see emotion and mood unified as an affectivity, one could say that affectivity seems to influence our mental phenomena. It could regularly disturb and motivate our coping with situations in life. For instance, emotions and moods can motivate our creating of a poem, music, film and other forms of art. Due to great sadness following a broken heart, one can create a great poem. On the other hand, such sadness may result in encountering serious problems, for example, losing one’s job for not being able to focus well as the result of deep sorrow. In addition, emotions and moods have the potential of helping us to do the appropriate thing with others. When having a peaceful state of mind, people have the potential to do the right thing to others, for instance, holding themselves back from harming them.

Nonetheless, if we step closer and accept the fact of the difference between emotion and mood, in considering their relationship, we could see that moods may shape our existence in how we experience the world and moods impact our emotions. For example, if I am in a certain mood, such as depression, then, I might easily get angry at something or someone. In contrast, when I am in a mood such as bliss, I might not to feel easily angry, even in a bad situation.

Based on these meaningful aspects of affective phenomena, especially for mood, one might ask: How is it possible that moods have such signification in our lives without involving intentionality? Are moods intentional? If moods can be considered to have intentionality, it is intentionality in what sense? On the contrary, if mood is non-intentional, can we still talk about its relation to the structure of intentionality? Furthermore, what is the difference and the relationship between mood and emotion?

This chapter focuses on these questions, throughout two parts. In section I., I shall attempt to clarify the concept of feeling, emotion, and mood—that usually falls under the umbrella of “affectivity”. Then, as any study of emotion should require, I shall explore and survey the question of natural kind regarding emotion. Although it might be less relevant to the main discussion of the present work, it is worth noting in order to understand the problem.

In section II., I will discuss the problem of intentionality in relation to mood. I would like to suggest that, while emotion and mood ought to be regarded as different, we should not stop there but rather attempt to explore this distinction. Mood is typically considered non-intentional, while emotion intentional, but mood may at times have signification, that is it may have an intentional object. I shall explore the notion that is attempting to intentionalise mood. However, I shall point out that although there could be the possibility of placing mood within the structure of intentionality by using the phenomenological approach, mood does not necessarily have an intentional object. Finally, I shall argue that even though the view that emotion is intentional and mood is non-intentional could be held, it could be said that mood can be regarded as related to the structure of intentionality in a peculiar sense. I would argue that mood may be part of the structure of intentionality, the openness to the world.<sup>61</sup> This proposition would be tenable if we take the existential phenomenological approach into account.

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<sup>61</sup> This argument will be discussed in detail as we will see in Chapter Three.

## I. Under the Umbrella of Affectivity

The meanings of the concepts of feeling, emotion, and mood are quite disputable. These words are related to the affective side of mind in our everyday language and seem to be used quite interchangeably. In this section, I will try to elucidate these concepts—the mental phenomena generally regarded to be under the umbrella of “affectivity”. Even though some certain feelings involving bodily sensation could not be generally regarded as essential to emotions, like pain for example, some theorists regard the bodily feeling as a constitutive part of emotions (as we saw in Chapter One). Moreover, the idea the emphasis on bodily phenomena in relation to emotion is interestingly developed by the neo-feeling theorists today. So, the bodily feelings related to emotions will be discussed in Chapter Four. Here, the concept of feeling should not be our focus. The exploration of these concepts for our present purposes is focused more on mood and emotion. Indeed, I shall insist that mood and emotion are quite not the same; the former is somehow different from the latter. The issue here is how to account for the difference. They are different in what sense?

### Feeling, Emotion, and Mood

The word “affectivity” in a broad sense expands to an aesthetic phenomenon of mind. It seems to refer to the mental phenomena opposed to any disembodied/computational mind in terms of the standard cognitive science holding mental activities as the input-output of information processing just like a machine.<sup>62</sup> In addition, affectivity allows the inclusion of the affective phenomena which are usually understood in philosophical literature as non-intentional, for example pain and even mood. Most theorists think that mood is non-intentional. It is natural to think that the word affectivity includes all such states like feeling, emotion, and mood.<sup>63</sup> In everyday

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<sup>62</sup> In Chapter Four, we will see in more detail about what I mean by a standard view in cognitive science and analytic philosophy of mind.

<sup>63</sup> Solomon (with the cognitively grounded theory in his early works) suggests that emotions, moods, and desires, are essential classes under the umbrella of the word “passions”. The passions have a capability to reveal the meaning to our everyday life. (See Solomon, 1993: 70). In this respect, one should note that he seems to exclude “feelings” from passions. The reason could be

language use, the boundaries between the words “feeling,” “emotion”, and “mood” are blurred.

The word “emotion” in the English language dates from the early nineteenth century. Before that time, the word “passion” or “affection” was more common to refer to affective phenomena. Interestingly, most world languages have a word referring to affective states, but such words in different languages convey “feeling” rather than “emotion”. Such a commonly used and translatable word as “feeling” possibly includes sensations, moods, pain, and so on, as well as emotion.<sup>64</sup> Even though some words in other languages than English currently could be translated into “emotion”, the origin of such a word implies other kinds of affectivity, such as feeling. For example, there is no original word in German that stands for the word “emotion”. However, the word *Gefühl* may be used practically for the word “emotion”. What is interesting is that the original meaning of this word derives from the verb *fühlen* means “to feel”.<sup>65</sup> This implies that these words that involve affectivity in many languages are used in a very blurry sense. It is possible that all of these words (i.e. feeling, emotion, mood) under the umbrella of affectivity have been invented later. The reason could be that the more the science and the study of affectivity developed, the more the reductive clarification among these words and concepts was needed. This development makes the differences not only in the words (feeling, emotion, mood) but also in the comprehension of the concepts. I shall now examine what could be regarded in general as the core characteristic of feeling, emotion, and mood.

### 1) Feeling

Feeling is the mental phenomenon derived from bodily changes that could be connected to an emotion as well as a non-emotion. As we saw in the previous chapter, since the OFT views bodily feelings as a constitutive part of emotion, feelings and

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that Solomon dismisses the role of body in understanding passion. Critically, Solomon’s early work seems to be grounded on the strong cognitive account.

<sup>64</sup> Beck, 2015; Prinz, 2004b: 79; Deonna and Teroni, 2012: 21.

<sup>65</sup> Elpidorou, 2013: 571.



emotions are inseparable. However, it does not mean that emotions exhaust feelings. In general, there can be feelings which are not relevant to emotions. One could be in pain without any emotion involved. Pain may cause me to be afraid (afraid of the inflammation of a certain part of the body which is in pain), but the pain itself is a non-emotional feeling. The case of feeling pain shows that the word affectivity can also comprise non-emotional states. Needless to say, feelings are also regarded as mere sensations.

Moreover, the ability of feeling suggests that one could locate his/her feeling at a certain part of the body. For example, when I feel a stomach ache, I can point to my stomach as the location of the feeling. Accordingly, it could be said, in a nutshell, that *feeling is usually related to a bodily aspect*—whether it is emotional or non-emotional. So, feeling typically refers to bodily feeling. However, there is the important question of whether a pure feeling like pain essentially involves emotion, or not, is debatable. One might contend that feeling is not only bodily sensation. Solomon, in his later works, suggests that feeling is in the domain of consciousness. For instance, one may say in a mathematics class that the proof does not feel right. Accordingly, such a feeling seems to be a subjective experience beyond the bodily aspect. It is to embrace the feeling in the realm of consciousness.<sup>66</sup> In this respect, feeling involves consciousness and seems able to be detached from bodily events. To my mind, this is partly right. As opposed to the Jamesian view, feeling is not merely related to bodily sensation. At the same time, feeling is not entirely detachable from bodily events. Rather, the feeling is felt through the lived-body of the embodied subjectivity, which we will see in following chapters.

## 2) Emotion

The core features of emotions can be said to be *their being intentional, phenomenological (experiential), and related to bodily phenomena, including bodily feeling*. The emotion researchers have provided pieces of evidence revealing all these features as the characteristics of emotions. For instance, if one is angry at his/her friend, their anger has an intentional object, the friend—signifying his/her friend has

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<sup>66</sup> Solomon, 2006b.

offended him/her. They would feel their heart rate increasing. Importantly, such anger provides us with an experiential aspect from a personal viewpoint, what it is like to feel such anger. This experiential aspect is part of the phenomenology of emotion. The question of how to properly formulate that emotions have all these characteristics is the main point of the present research.

### 3) Mood

Let us consider moods. In comparison with feelings and emotions, moods are more complicated. They are peculiar phenomena in the sense that they are unlikely to fit the specific intentional object (as we will see in Section II.). Arguably, moods are not related to bodily changes in a specific manner. However, moods can be considered to have an experiential point of view. For example, one can feel what it is like to be depressed.<sup>67</sup> Accordingly, one may argue that moods involve bodily feelings.<sup>68</sup> As we will see in Chapter Three, to understand mood one may require relying on the existential phenomenology of mood offered by Heidegger.

The present research aims to provide a general understanding of “emotion” (including its relation to moods and feelings), though it acknowledges that such a task has its limitations and difficulties. However, to provide a general understanding of emotion does not mean to totally ignore the special features of each instance. Rather, it aims to explicate the overall characteristics of “emotion”, for example, its intentionality, its phenomenology, and its bodily feeling. These three features of emotion need a proper integration.

As I mentioned above, most emotion researchers today believe that affectivity is divided into feeling, emotion and mood. Given that feelings should be kept aside for our present purposes. So, “emotion” may imply a large range of instances ranging from anger to fear, disgust, surprise, sadness, joy, guilt, pride, shame, jealousy, envy, and so on. “Mood”, on the other hand, includes bliss, wonder, frustration, disappointment, sorrow, grief, tantrum, boredom, anxiety, depression, and so on.

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<sup>67</sup> Deonna, J. A. and Teroni, 2012: 4.

<sup>68</sup> Ratcliffe, 2005a.

Occasionally, mood (and even emotion) may also be regarded to include the states of being affected, moved, or shaken by something.<sup>69</sup> One should note that it is not appropriate to hold that these instances of emotion and mood cannot be criticised and altered. The emotions and moods on the list are not easy to classify. How to categorise them should be open to the possibility of modification. Moreover, pleasure and pain can be seemingly regarded as bodily feelings which imply well-being and ill-being, positive and negative evaluation. They may be considered as a close connection to emotion (and even mood).

Furthermore, “emotion” in this study mainly refers to an occurrent emotional episode. This means that I do not aim to investigate certain specific emotions, but rather “emotion” at large. Nor do I intend to understand other long-term affective characters like disposition, character trait, sentiment, temperament, and so on. It is true that emotions can be instantiated enormously and each of them may have its distinct characteristics and require case-by-case analysis. For example, when one feels emotions like shame or pride, the intentional object is oneself—self-directed, whereas when one feels emotions like fear or anger, the intentional object is something outside in the world.<sup>70</sup> Moreover, when one feels afraid of something, something is being dangerous. On the other hand, when one feels angry at someone, someone may be offensive. The present work is not a case-by-case study of emotion.

### **The Problem of the Natural Kind**

Before exploring the problem of intentionality in relation to mood and how the latter differs from emotion, one should initially enquire into the question which is often debated by theorists of emotion, especially emotion science researchers. Is emotion natural kind? So, we need to know what a “natural kind” is.

What is a “natural kind”? The possible answer is that a natural kind is characterised as a “kind” given by “nature”. This suggests that one discovers a kind rather than construct it. Accordingly, what does the modifier “natural” imply? How is

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<sup>69</sup> Slaby, 2008: 432; Kriegel, 2015: 129.

<sup>70</sup> Hufenkief, 2016.

a “natural kind” different from any “kind”? The word “kind” is used in everyday language in the same way as “category”, “type”, “class”, and so forth. For instance, video games can be categorised as sports, puzzle, shooting, and so on; diabetes is of different types: type-1 and type-2. How is one category distinct from another? One might think that if something can be regarded as pertaining to a certain “kind”, it must have the essential features allowing one to distinguish something from other things. That thing can be identified by the defining characteristic of the slogan “without which not.” Let me give an example. What makes salt salt? The defining characteristic of salt is saltiness; saltiness makes salt as a kind called salt (which is different from sugar). Whatever the colour of a type of salt is, if it is salty, it is salt. Without saltiness, it is not salt.

How can we know that salt is salty? The possible answer is by tasting it—sensation. However, how can we trust our taste buds since the taste you get may be different from the one another person does? Taste seems to be subjective and unreliable at some level. To be able to assess the essential feature of salt seems to require something more reliable. I will come back to this point again. Now, what about musical genres? Of course, a genre can be regarded as “kind” in our everyday language. There are many kinds of music such as rock, jazz, blues, classical, dance, world, and so on. The category of salt is “natural kind”, whereas a musical genre is of different category. For a genre (or kind) of music is made up by humans. One does not discover a kind of music as they are culturally constructed. On the other hand, as a natural kind, salt is discovered or recognised as a category found in nature.<sup>71</sup> Accordingly, it seems that there are two senses for “kind”. One is the cultural kind like a musical genre; the other is a natural kind, for instance, salt.

Let us consider the case of salt again. We must rely on accurate measurement instead of the subjective taste we get using our tongue. Obviously, scientific measurement is adequate for assessing the natural kind. The saltiness of salt can be discovered in nature. The chemical properties of salt may be considered as the defining characteristics of salt or sodium chloride. Moreover, in the case of water, if it is considered as a “natural kind” which is different from other entities, what underlies

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<sup>71</sup> Barrett, 2006: 29, 32; Prinz, 2004b: 80.

that natural kind must be natural properties, in other words the chemical formula H<sub>2</sub>O. Although we can distinguish water from other entities with our eyes (perception), the chemical formula H<sub>2</sub>O is much more accurate and reliable. It is true that human beings have constructed the words to call Hydrogen and Oxygen for certain chemical molecules. Suppose that even though there were no names for them and water was never discovered, it (water) would still have the same chemical properties in nature. I call this way for explaining a natural kind as “the physically essential feature” of kind.

The physically essential feature of a natural kind is defined based on the methodology of modern scientific knowledge production. However, philosophers have had a lengthy discussion about kind (or the concept of things), starting from Ancient times, in which kind was not cultural, nor was it natural, as the kind discovered by scientific observation (for example, water is H<sub>2</sub>O). Instead, such a kind has an essence or concept given to it by something else. According to Plato’s theory of Forms or theory of Ideas, a human being can distinguish the tree from the rock by recollecting such a concept from his/her innate idea. On the other hand, Aristotle contends that certain things are the way they are because of teleology, which is the essential purpose they always serve. The teleology is the cause of all things. So, the things of the same kind share the same origin or source by their nature, teleology, form, and matter.

In a broad sense, modern philosophers following Plato have developed his theory into a theory of language. To clarify the kind of things is to give its definition; this could be understood as a conceptual analysis methodology. Griffiths calls this method “semantics kind term”.<sup>72</sup> This formulation is opposed to the method discussed above, the seeking of a physically essential feature by scientific observation. The physically essential feature may also be understood as grounded by the “causal theory”, which is partly derived from Aristotle’s science in the way that it seeks the cause which gives the nature of the kind (however, Aristotle’s idea of teleology is dismissed in this regard). So, in this sense, certain kinds of things are real in nature

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<sup>72</sup> Griffiths, 1997: 4.

rather than in the linguistic realm provided through conceptual analysis.<sup>73</sup> The causal theory argues that “the meaning of a natural kind term is in part a schema, to be filled in after further empirical investigation.”<sup>74</sup>

Nonetheless, the causal theory is not exhausted by the physically essential feature. Investigating the cause of a natural kind can be conducted through two methods: (i) by finding, as we saw, the physically essential feature of a kind by empirical investigation, for example, anything that comprises H<sub>2</sub>O falls under the category of water, and (ii) by way of explaining the “homeostatic property clusters”, which are the clusters of properties co-occurring for being the certain kind according to the kind it is. For example, whatever thing that is being liquid and tasteless will co-occur with the clearness; these properties combine in being water.<sup>75</sup> Although this method seems to be similar to the method of giving a definition or conceptual analysis, the two are different. The conceptual analysis has nothing to do with the cause of the kind for it depends on how one defines things, whereas the homeostatic property clusters need the causal mechanisms which bind the co-occurring properties together in nature. Consider the example of the kind river in the following statement: “Rivers are a natural kind, because flowing water, beds, banks, tributaries, and other properties of rivers cooccur because each of these properties is causally supported by the existence of the others.”<sup>76</sup> The causal mechanisms dependently occur together forming the kind in question.

However, one might ask if the river is a kind given by nature or is conceptually constructed by human language, in the English “river”? It is true that the water in the river is a natural kind (H<sub>2</sub>O). What about the river itself? Human beings always look at nature and name things. For instance, one could consider a mountain containing lava and people naming it “volcano”. In other words, we give it a definition. To my mind, it seems that the homeostatic property clusters method is the

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<sup>73</sup> Ibid., 3-4. (See also Barrett, 2006: 29-30).

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>75</sup> The “homeostatic property clusters” was offered by Boyd (referred in Prinz, 2004b: 81). This view influences Griffiths about how to understand a natural kind. (See Prinz, 2004b: 81; Charland, 2002: 512-515).

<sup>76</sup> Prinz, 2004b: 81.

blend between the conceptual analysis and the causal theory. In modern science, the causal theory is likely to be more reliable than conceptual analysis. However, conceptual analysis, that is philosophical analysis, is vital to some extent. For our present purposes, in studying emotions, one should be concerned with how science meets philosophy.

It could be said that the philosophical problem regarding the first-person perspective or subjective feeling is non-trivial when it comes to understanding emotions. On the other hand, water and trees are things in nature; we can objectify them. Discussing the natural kind of emotions, however, is not so easy. In comparison with water, which can be observed and objectified with scientific tools, emotions involve human bodily and mental phenomena. The latter require another methodology than the one employed by modern science; the phenomenological methodology, for example. In phenomenological philosophy, one can investigate one's body from two perspectives. First, by setting our body as the object of the study, in the same way as one would observe water—examining the causal relations which are related to one's emotions, for example, facial expressions, bodily changes, behaviours, etc. Second, by introspecting into one's experiences to describe how it feels to be emotional. This suggests that the lived-body as the subject has the lived-experience of emotions. Likewise, studying mental phenomena is a challenging task since it is inadequate to observe the mental phenomena from the third-person perspective. Besides, some mental phenomena can be felt from the first-person perspective. Thus, it is the perennial burden of philosophers and scientists to solve such issues.

Now, I shall investigate the question of the natural kind of emotions. Is the category emotion a natural kind? There can be two answers: one affirmative and the other negative. For the affirmative answer, the category emotion is a natural kind. This implies that all sub-kinds of emotion can be unified into a single examination, i.e. all instances of emotion like anger, fear, guilt, shame, love, and so on, can be captured all in one explanation or theory. This view holds that the study of emotions could be exhausted by a single principle because they all are grouped in the same natural kind in relation to the term "emotion".

In supposing that the category emotion is a natural kind, there could be two levels. First, there are basic emotions (One should recall Ekman’s theory of basic emotions in Chapter One) which are the building blocks of higher cognitive emotions (for example, love, guilt, pride). Second, all emotions are of the same type. Both combined, the two make up the thesis known as the “unity thesis”.<sup>77</sup> I call the former “The Weak Unity Thesis” (WUT), and the latter “The Strong Unity Thesis” (SUT). Prinz is one of the theorists adopting the unity thesis as he believes that all emotions are initially of the same type. His proposition is the SUT. He states that “there is no inelegance in the category that contains both basic emotions and higher cognitive emotions. All emotions are states of the same type.”<sup>78</sup> Prinz tried to lump all kinds of emotion in one box. This implies that there is no clear-cut division between different types of emotion—i.e. basic emotions and higher cognitive emotions. Instead, *all* emotions, for Prinz, are natural kind. Prinz argues that,

one could concede that emotions form a mongrel category: some fit the somatic model and others do not. But this concession would leave us with a puzzle. How do we recognize disembodied emotions as belonging to the same category as our most visceral sorrows and fears? Why does a single word, *emotion*, lord over such a motley? I suspect there is far greater unity in the emotion category than often appreciated. I think the somatic approach can subsume anything that deserves to be called an emotion.<sup>79</sup>

Since Prinz’s theory is the advanced feeling theory of emotion formulated to bridge the gap between OCT and SCT, I will discuss his embodied appraisal theory in more detail in Chapter Four. For the time being, let me introduce another theorist adopting the unity thesis but in a different way, which is the WUT. Damasio advocates the unity thesis, or, more precisely, the WUT. He distinguishes between two types of emotions, and one type is the building block of another. For Damasio, emotions are related to bodily changes in the Jamesian sense—which by the way seems to be brute—which is what he called “primary emotions”. However, nor are all emotions basic. Damasio believes that other emotions are evaluative. They are “secondary

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<sup>77</sup> Prinz, 2004b: 79-102.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, 101-102.

<sup>79</sup> Prinz, 2004a, 49.



emotions”. This type of emotions is more substantial to the development of human beings than primary emotions since they, that is secondary emotions, require the ability of evaluation. Therefore, for Damasio, the emotional phenomena consist of primary emotions and secondary emotions. The former involves bodily changes; this function is innateness that emerges in a human being when he/she is born. The latter is associated with evaluation requiring the learning experiences that gradually develop from when one is a baby till they become an adult human. Accordingly, the secondary emotions build on the primary emotions.<sup>80</sup> Importantly, one should bear in mind that Damasio held the holistic view that the two types of emotion are related; secondary emotions and primary emotions can overlap or be united in their respective processes. Consequently, the WUT is the unifying view.

As we have just seen, if one distinguishes between basic (primary) emotions and non-basic (secondary) emotions, one will face an important question: What is the relationship between basic emotions (“standard emotions” in a Jamesian sense; “basic emotions” from an Ekmanian point of view, and “primary emotions” from a Damasioan perspective) and non-basic emotions (“higher cognitive emotions” for Griffiths and “secondary emotions” for Damasio)? Can there be overlap between each other in their processes as the unity thesis seems to offer? Otherwise, they could never overlap with each other as the disunity thesis holds. If they do not overlap with each other, it means that the disunity thesis requires the view that the *overall category* emotion is not a natural kind. The reason is that it must be one type of emotion, for example, non-basic emotions, which are self-enclosed and cannot be explained by the same principle applicable to basic emotions.

I shall elaborate more on the questions regarding the natural kind of emotion. There is a difference between saying that 1) the overall category of emotion (i.e. the concept of “emotion”) is a natural kind and that 2) there are certain types of emotion (for example basic emotions like anger, fear, disgust, etc.) which are of the natural kind, while others (non-basic emotions) are not.<sup>81</sup> Charland succinctly points out these different questions: “[L]et us distinguish the hypothesis that *emotion* is a natural kind

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<sup>80</sup> Damasio, 1995: 131-139.

<sup>81</sup> Barrett, 2006: 30 (footnote).

from the hypothesis that *emotions* are natural kind.”<sup>82</sup> The former is within the unity thesis (both SUT and WUT) holding that the overall category of “emotion” is a natural kind. All instances of “emotion”, like anger, surprise, hope, guilt, shame, etc. share very common core features.

On the other hand, to hold that “emotions” are natural kind does not take into consideration the “overall category emotion” but “emotions.” In other words, *some emotions* are natural kinds. This view fits the disunity thesis, which I will discuss in what follows.<sup>83</sup>

Consider the same question again: Is the overall category of emotion of the natural kind? Let me now point to the negative answer; the category emotion is not a natural kind. This suggests that the word/concept of “emotion” cannot be categorised as a natural kind. In that case, how to explain it? The view that the overall category of emotion is not of the natural kind could be justified by two hypotheses: *the disunity thesis* and *psychological constructionism*.

The disunity thesis argues that although the overall category of emotion is not a natural kind, yet there can be some types of emotion such as basic emotions, which can be considered natural kind, whereas non-basic emotions are not natural kind. It could be the case that basic emotions and non-basic emotions do not overlap in their processes; the former are not the building blocks of the latter; they are disunited. If this view is correct, the study of emotions needs more than one theory or principle to explain all emotions. I should stress that the disunity thesis does not reject that all emotions are not a natural kind. Rather, it proposes that some emotions like basic emotions or affect program emotions are of the natural kind. Such basic emotions can be objectively identified by causal mechanisms, such as facial expressions, bodily events, neural activities, etc., which respond to stimuli. Certain instances of emotion have certain components which define what kind of emotions they are, for example, fear is related to certain bodily changes, facial expressions, brain activities, and certain intentional objects (i.e. the object which instils fear). All the essential

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<sup>82</sup> Charland, 2002: 513.

<sup>83</sup> The term “disunity thesis” is coined by Prinz. (See Prinz, 2004b: 79-102).

components of fear vary in their details from other kinds of emotions, like anger, joy, happiness, and so on.

However, a problem arises when instances of higher cognitive emotions need explanation, for example, shame, guilt, embarrassment, etc. One could believe that higher cognitive emotions may not be basic in terms of their relation to the automatic system and the affect program emotions. It is to say that higher cognitive emotions are more sophisticated than primitive emotions, and need cognitive abilities and learning processes. Furthermore, the evaluation of higher cognitive emotions, like shame, guilt, etc., may be different from one culture to another, or even from one person to another. Thus, higher cognitive emotions do not seem to be a natural kind.

The theorist who advocates the disunity thesis is Griffiths.<sup>84</sup> He asserts that while only basic emotions are formed by the homeostatic property clusters which deserve being a natural kind,<sup>85</sup> the non-basic emotions have a separate place. As he says,

there are two or three fundamentally different processes going on in “emotion” that, while these can occur together, *can also occur independently of one another*, and that the way forward for the study of emotion is to distinguish these processes, rather than studying “emotion” as a whole.<sup>86</sup> (my emphasis)

As we have seen, there is a dispute between Damasio (who adopts the unity thesis, specifically the WUT) and Griffiths (who adopts the disunity thesis) in dividing emotion into two categories. Although Damasio holds that primary emotions (basic emotions) and secondary emotions (non-basic emotions) are two different types, he maintains the unity thesis by arguing that these two categories are united in their processes and reciprocally trigger each other. On the other hand, Griffiths asserts that basic emotions and non-basic emotions could be separated in their processes, and it could be the case that they do not overlap. As mentioned in the passage above, in

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<sup>84</sup> Griffiths, 1997; Griffiths, 2013.

<sup>85</sup> Barrett, 2006: 30. (See also Griffiths, 1997).

<sup>86</sup> Griffiths, 2013: 218.

defending the disunity thesis, Griffiths rejects the study of emotions in a holistic fashion. Conversely, Damasio formulates his theory in a holistic, unification view.<sup>87</sup> At this point, given that both Prinz and Damasio believe in the unity thesis, it is unsurprising to see that Prinz agrees with Damasio rather than Griffiths, as he argues: “Intellectual emotions can overlap with surprise or delight and almost certainly have a somatic mark.”<sup>88</sup> Prinz and Damasio share the idea of a feeling theory of emotion emphasising the role of bodily events, which is formulated as the proposition holding that all emotions could be understood within the physiological domain. However, as I mentioned earlier, there is a crucial difference between them. On the one hand, for Damasio, even if higher cognitive emotions somehow exist distinctly from basic ones, the former must be generated or built by the latter. On the other hand, Prinz holds that “all emotions are embodied appraisals”.<sup>89</sup> The question of what is an embodied appraisal is will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter Four. For the time being, I would like to stress that Prinz does not distinguish between basic and non-basic emotions. He sees the entire category of emotion, that is all instantiations of emotion, as pertaining to the same type.

We shall now briefly consider the psychological constructionism formulated by Barrett. This theory dismisses both the unity thesis and the disunity thesis. It rejects that the category emotion as well as some emotions are a natural kind, neglecting the view that there are basic emotions that are hard-wired biological entities. It instead holds that the category of emotion and basic emotions are psychologically constructed by the human mind; they are not real in nature. In fact, the target of this theory is Ekman’s affect program theory and the evolutionary theory of emotion. Barrett does not reject the whole evolutionary theory; she just disagrees with emotions being biological entities as the basic emotions theory holds. Importantly, this does not mean that psychological constructionism believes that there are no such things as emotions. In fact, it considers that there are emotions which we can conceptually capture and label, but they just do not exist in nature. Take as an analogy the concept of money. Money is not real in nature; human beings have

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<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

<sup>88</sup> Prinz, 2004a: 50.

<sup>89</sup> Prinz, 2004b: 101-102.

constructed it, but it does not mean that there is no money.<sup>90</sup> This approach seems to take issue with the empirical evidence concerning the physiology of emotion. Colombetti criticises psychological constructionism by remarking that to denounce the biological and physiological aspects of emotion and turn to the psychological constructionism is too radical.<sup>91</sup> I, however, will not elaborate on this since the purpose of reviewing the natural kind problem is only for recognising its importance regarding the study of emotion. Rather, the present work essentially aims to find a way to formulate how emotion could be understood while bearing in mind all its features like intentionality, bodily aspects, and experientiality.

I shall give some remarks concerning the natural kind problem. Based on my own reading, Colombetti has a tenable solution with which I sympathise. In her claim, the central problematic of the debate regarding the unity/disunity thesis (the relation between basic and non-basic emotions) is the view that there are basic emotions. She believes that it is better to abandon basic emotions, an idea which has its roots largely from the notion of affect programs. At the same time, she also points out that psychological constructionism has its flaws and limitations.<sup>92</sup> It is true that the latter's proposition is also to dismiss basic emotions. However, in doing so, especially for rejecting the affect program theory, it seems to completely neglect the idea that emotions are innate, universal, and involve automatic biological functions. This argument is very untenable and inconsistent with the scientific evidence. Colombetti believes that there is a way to come to terms with the idea of automatic biological (neurophysiological) patterns without at the same time endorsing the idea of basic emotions offered by the affect program theory. Such patterns show that emotions can be held as entities rather than being constructed by mere human psychological activity. In this regard, she says:

Existing evidence remains consistent with the claim that a number of emotions come in relatively recurrent patterns of neural and ANS [automatic nervous system] activity. Importantly . . . this stability need not imply that neural and autonomic patterns are products of prewired affect programs. Yet

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<sup>90</sup> Barrett, 2006; Beck, 2015.

<sup>91</sup> Colombetti, 2014: .48

<sup>92</sup> Ibid., 26.

it indicates that “there is something” in, or better “of,” the organism, which remains relatively stable for at least some emotions (versus . . . the radical claim that emotions are not “entities”).<sup>93</sup>

In the study of emotions, it is important to pay attention to what theorists of emotion typically engage with. The question of natural kind is one of the important problems for emotion theorists, especially in affective science. However, the question concerning a natural kind—or an observation of emotion and mood—is an attempt to atomise emotions into discrete episodes and internal neurophysiological events, and seems to be irrelevant when we conduct an existential phenomenological, ontological analysis of affectivity from the first-person account.<sup>94</sup> It is true that, at some level, we need a reductive science to understand emotions related to bodily events in the physical body. At this level, the view that somehow “emotion” or “emotions” is/are of the natural kind or that at least some emotions are entities, seems primordial. However, for a complete understanding of emotions, we need the existential phenomenology of emotions which may not be fit for the reductive science since the lived-body—which is the subject of affective states—can feel the emotions from first-person perspective experience. At this point, the question about the natural kind of emotions might not be important, and it should be suspended, as we will see in Chapter Three, if the existential phenomenological analysis does not clash with the scientific evidence. These two dimensions could be understood as two sides of the same coin called “emotion”. Importantly, the existential phenomenological analysis does not undermine the empirical study of emotion. This seemingly neutral position regarding the natural kind problem does not reject the possible claim that emotions somehow are “entities”.

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<sup>93</sup> Ibid., 36.

<sup>94</sup> Freeman, 2014.

## **II. The Problem of Intentionality of Mood and the Phenomenological Approach**

In this section, I will explore the problem of intentionality of mood. I shall investigate the argument that mood may be construed as intentional. Therefore, I shall analyse the intentionalist view, as an interpretation of the existential phenomenological philosophy, which argues that moods are directed toward the world as a whole. I would argue that even this view seems to be fascinating; it is inadequate to hold that mood is intentional and has intentional objects. However, this does not mean that we cannot talk about the relationship between a mood and the structure of intentionality. There can be the implication that even though moods do not have intentional objects, they may be regarded as the openness to the world.

### **Intentionalism and Non-Intentionalism**

The function of the human mind is to perceive, conceive, believe, desire, intend, experience, imagine, and understand the meanings and significances of the external world. Our mental states are directed toward something beyond themselves which the philosophical literature calls intentionality. Intentionality is a proof of human rationality. The concept of intentionality, especially in the analytic philosophy of mind, which emphasises the role of language, is likely to correspond with most, if not all, mental states, like beliefs, desires, intentions, and so on. The remaining phenomenal characters of mental states such as pain, pleasure, affective states, and some other sensations—more or less involving bodily states—do not fit this framework. For example, pain is not about anything at all for pain is just pain. Even though a nail might cause pain, it does not mean that the pain is directed at that nail. The cause of pain cannot be an intentional object of pain. Consequently, pain is unlikely to give us any significance about the external world. It does not represent anything; it is non-intentional. Roughly speaking, according to this view, claiming that there are non-intentional mental states is known as non-intentionalism. However, there is an antagonistic view arguing that all mental phenomena are intentional, including pain, pleasure, and some other sensations as well as affective states. This view is known as intentionalism.

The apparent controversy between non-intentionalism and intentionalism, in general, is due to whether they characterise intentionality in a narrow way or in a broad way. Non-intentionalists tend to use the narrow way of characterisation; they limit the ability of directness or aboutness that is usually towards things *beyond* themselves, in other words, towards the external world. They also posit the structure of intentionality as essential to language which represents to external world. It could be said that this way of characterisation is close to the traditional analytic philosophy of mind. On the contrary, internationalists may prefer a broader way; they characterise intentionality by taking other possibilities into account, for example, the *internal objects* which possibly dwell in the mental act itself. This formulation seems to combine another concept of mind rather than a representational-computational concept of mind as understood by standard cognitive science and traditional analytic philosophy of mind. It is related to the phenomenological tradition. For instance, the style of intentionalism makes the difference between the mental act (or intentional act) and what it is about. The mental state of being in pain, for instance, is *directed to* a pain, to represent bodily disturbance.<sup>95</sup> Thus, in doing so, it may be possible to account all mental states for the structure of intentionality. Importantly, this broad way also offers the possibility of accounting for the intentionality of mood.

Among the problems of intentionality of mental states, there is the puzzle of emotions and moods as non-trivial and mysterious matter, in the sense that emotions and moods are conscious experiences, but we are still scientifically inadequately equipped to understand them. There are two reasons for that. The first one has to do with lacking attention to the subject-matter. The topic of emotion and mood has been excluded from—or not so much dealt with—debates for a long time in the history of philosophy. Although some philosophers have been concerned with affective states, like emotions, moods, or passions, those are a minority. In fact, most philosophers have mainly focused on human rationality as opposed to affections.

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<sup>95</sup> Crane defends intentionalism about sensation by endorsing Brentano's concept of *intentional inexistence*, that every intentional act "includes something as an object within itself" (Brentano's statement quoted by Crane). See Crane, 1998.



The second reason is the complexity and the mystery that affective states are. One should note that the word “mystery”, for our present purposes, does not mean something supernatural, but the mystery within the domain of the natural world. Although more and more researchers today are focusing on affective states, they also take into consideration empirical findings, but it is not enough to grasp emotion and mood. Unfortunately, affective mental states such as emotion and mood are likely more contentious than the so-called disembodied mental states like beliefs, desires, intentions, perception, and so on. The reductive representationalism is more applicable to those putative disembodied mental states than affective states; the problem seems to arise whenever one tries to capture affective states with the reductive framework, especially the representational theory of mind or reductive representationalism.<sup>96</sup> Again, this is because moods seem to be non-intentional; they cannot be reduced to an intentional content. Although most of us would acknowledge that the affectivities enormously affect and motivate our self-understanding and the meaning of life, we would straightforwardly admit that we know very less about what they really are. It is likely that, whereas mental states such as belief, intention, and desire might be best understood by analytic philosophy of mind in the reductive framework which concerns intentionality and semantics, linguistics, and the third-person account, emotion and mood, which are mostly understood as the first-person perspective, on the other hand, may be more understood appropriately by the existential phenomenological approach.

### **Existential Phenomenological Approach to Intentionality of Mood**

The problem of intentionality of affective states is putative. Intentionalists have been in trouble with affective states. As Mendelovici puts it: “[m]oods and emotions throw a wrench in the intentionalism project.”<sup>97</sup> The subject of the distinction between emotion and mood in the philosophical and scientific literature is very controversial. On the one hand, there is a prevailing view that moods are obviously distinct from emotions. The distinction can be divided into two aspects: 1) emotions are intentional,

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<sup>96</sup> The reductive representationalism is the view that, “the phenomenal character of a mental state reduces to its intentional content”. See Kind, 2014.

<sup>97</sup> Mendelovici, 2014: 135.

whereas moods are non-intentional, and 2) emotions have a short duration, whereas moods have a longer duration. On the other hand, the pieces of affective science research confuse emotions with moods in their experiments.<sup>98</sup> Furthermore, there are researchers who tend to hold that they are similar.<sup>99</sup> It seems to be obvious that emotion is different from mood. The question is how to identify the difference.

Let me start the analysis with the proposition that emotion and mood are different in terms of their duration. There is a general claim that emotion has a short duration. Mood, on the contrary, can extend over a longer duration as it could be a long-lasting occurrence. For example, one might be in a state of depression for a day, a month, or even a year. However, the argument of the distinction regarding duration is weak. There are cases which contradict this claim. In this regard, Kind argues,

Although moods are *typically* long-lasting, there are plausible cases in which they are relatively brief. An unexpected act of deep kindness, for example, might shake someone from her gloomy mood very shortly after its onset. Conversely, although emotions are *typically* short-lasting, there do seem to be cases where they are sustained over a considerable period of time. Might not a strong-willed child fume with anger for hours? Or consider a mild claustrophobic trapped in an elevator for an entire morning. Can't we easily imagine her terror lasting the entirety of the episode?<sup>100</sup>

For the present research, this argument is not relevant. Rather, I am interested in the assertion that the structure of intentionality in relation to emotion and mood; the claim that emotion is intentional whereas mood is non-intentional. As I mentioned earlier, the most acceptable view is that emotions could be characterised as having their intentional contents, whereas moods do not have any. This means that emotions are intentional, directed toward things, objects, and events, in an external world, whereas moods are non-intentional in the sense that they are not directed at anything. When it comes to emotions, one can be angry at his/her friend, afraid of an earthquake, afraid of an economic crisis, ashamed of oneself, and so on. One should note that these

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<sup>98</sup> Freeman, 2014.

<sup>99</sup> Kind, 2014: 116.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid., 117.

intentional objects of emotions are specific things; they are “something” that we can concretely grasp. On the other hand, moods do not seem to be directed toward anything in particular; for example, free-floating anxiety which is not aimed at any specific thing, or depression due to no particular reason.

If one would like to challenge the above view and try to intentionalise mood, one may argue that moods are intentional in terms of being directed at “nothing and everything”. For example, one might be anxious about nothing and everything. His/her anxiety is *directed at* “nothing and everything”. But this argument is flawed. It cannot follow that mood has an intentional object. The reason for this is that “nothing and everything” does not direct to any specific thing; it cannot be used as an instance of an intentional object. In comparison with emotions, if one says that he/she loves nothing and everything, another might contend that that does not tell us anything about what the person loves. Thus, this case fails to instantiate an intentional object.

Still, one might argue that mood can have a *generalised intentional object* in the sense that such an intentional object could be a whole world.<sup>101</sup> It can be said that one is depressed about the whole world. This argument partially is inspired by the existential phenomenological tradition, specifically Heidegger and Sartre’s formulation of affectivity in which the emotional phenomena diffuse in our mental lives and make us engage with the world. What is interesting here is that there are several philosophers inspired by the existential phenomenology who regard emotion and mood as quite the same. For example, Ratcliffe connects Heidegger’s idea of mood to the study of emotion by stating that “[he] treat[s] moods as a specific subclass of emotions. Heidegger’s discussion focuses on moods. However, I will suggest . . . his theory can be generalized to encompass emotions more generally.”<sup>102</sup> Elpidorou also points out that Heidegger does not make a distinction between mood and emotion, even it seems to be problematic since Heidegger counts some emotional states, for instance, joy, fear, and anger, as mood.<sup>103</sup> The view holding that emotion

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<sup>101</sup> Solomon, 1993; Solomon, 2006a; Crane, 1998.

<sup>102</sup> Ratcliffe, 2002: 308 (endnote 3).

<sup>103</sup> Elpidorou, 2013: 567-568.

and mood are similar is also endorsed by Solomon, whose works engage with the existential phenomenology, as illustrated by the following statement:

*Moods* are generalized emotions: An emotion focuses its attention on more-or-less particular objects and situations, whereas a mood enlarges its grasp to attend to the world as a whole, typically without focusing on any particular object or situation. Depression, for example, is aimed at the world in general, but it is constructed upon a base of particular emotions which remain at its core, visible but no longer distinctive. The emotion is the precipitating particle that crystallizes the mood. The distinction is not always clear, since emotions can attend to objects of considerable generality. The world of a mood may also become so cramped that its focus becomes narrowed despite its universal scope.<sup>104</sup>

The claim that emotion and mood are similar blurs the line between the two, suggesting that mood is somehow intentional, and the difference between them is about degree rather than kind. According to Goldie, the difference between emotion and mood is a matter of the degree of specific intentional objects.<sup>105</sup> In my reading, this could be thought of in terms of analogy. If it can be said that ice is a solid state of water, it means the ice is the water. Goldie states that “emotion and mood are to be contrasted as *specific* and *non-specific* emotions.”<sup>106</sup> Accordingly, it could be claimed that moods typically have a more general character than emotions. A mood is a non-specific emotion just as ice is a solid state of water. Therefore, this claim suggests that mood and emotion are not entirely different. A mood may have a generalised intentional object while an emotion may have a specific intentional object. Thus, moods are intentional but to a more generalised degree.

Crane is another philosopher whose works are known to subscribe to a intentionalist project. It is worth noting that, in proposing the notion of the intentionalism of moods, Crane does not seem to make clear the difference between

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<sup>104</sup> Solomon, 1993: 71.

<sup>105</sup> Goldie, 2000: 143.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*, 144.

mood and emotion. For example, he mentions “undirected anxiety” as an instance of what he calls “emotions or moods”.<sup>107</sup>

In attempting to intentionalise moods, Crane takes up the phenomenological approach to support his intentionalist claim. His main argument is in the following statement:

Someone experiencing anxiety might not be able to put into words what it is they are anxious about; but they may still be able say *how things seem to them* in their state of anxiety. And even if they can’t express it, there is still nonetheless such a thing as *how things seem to them*.<sup>108</sup> (emphasis mine)

Crane argues that the inability to express what moods are about does not mean that moods are non-intentional. The phenomenology of moods is possible, even if the subject cannot identify the intentional content. To apprehend *how things seem to us* does not require language. It fits a first-person perspective.

Mood can be directed toward more general things, for instance, the world as a whole. However, to say that a generalised intentional object (or the world as a whole) is a form of intentionality is flawed and inadequate. It needs to include alternative and creative ways for interpreting it *existentially* and *ontologically*, as we will see, through an existential phenomenological approach.

According to Sartre’s theory, emotion is “a transformation of the world.”<sup>109</sup> This suggests that we can control our emotions by choosing thoughts for dealing with difficult situations in our everyday lives. If we suppose that the difference between emotion and mood is blurred, then the world seems to be glossed by our moods or emotions. Sartre’s theory of emotions—as a mode of apprehending the world—intensely inspires intentionalism about emotions. Crane suggests that “Sartre’s view provides one general framework in which to defend the intentionality of all

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<sup>107</sup> Crane, 1998.

<sup>108</sup> Crane, 1998.

<sup>109</sup> Sartre, 2002: 39.

emotions.”<sup>110</sup> Emotions (or moods) are the way we apprehend the world; our moods are directed toward the whole world. This approach attempts to defend the intentionality of moods. However, as we will see in the next chapter, emotion should be held different from mood when one addresses the latter as the more primordial structure of consciousness in which we are able to have other mental phenomena, including emotion.

It is worth noting that Crane talks about the phenomenology of mood without referring to Heidegger. The reason might be, according to Crane himself, that “the phenomenology of emotion is a very complex area, and I have only touched the surface of the issues.”<sup>111</sup> Heidegger’s contribution to understanding emotion is based on the notion of mood, which is primary to human existence. Elpidorou points out that the conception of mood in Heidegger’s existential phenomenology proposes that “moods . . . are constitutive of human existence: we are not only rational, social, or practical beings, but we are also beings whose everyday existence is permeated and shaped by our moods.”<sup>112</sup> Human beings are rational and cannot be outside their moods. In other words, moods affect the everyday life of human beings. Consequently, it is impossible to consider human existence by neglecting the role of moods. Moods might shape our existence of how we experience the world, and impact our experience of emotions. We cannot get rid of moods, so what we can do is to change our moods, or in Sartre’s view, apprehend and transform the world. Solomon also endorses Heidegger’s view about mood. Solomon argues that “moods are directed toward the world”.<sup>113</sup> Moods gloss the whole world in a certain way depending on what mood one is in; in depression, everything, including the world, seems depressed to us; in happiness, the things seem happy to us.

Elpidorou also insists that mood is likely to be intentional:

I reject the claim that *Stimmungen* [moods] are non-intentional. The admission of states or phenomena that are non-intentional seems to fly in the

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<sup>110</sup> Crane, 1998.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid.

<sup>112</sup> Elpidorou, 2013: 565.

<sup>113</sup> Solomon, 2006a: 297.

face of Heidegger's account of Being-in-the-world. How could *Stimmung* [mood] lack intentionality—i.e., be about nothing or have no intentional object—and still be an integral part of our existence in the world, disclose our thrownness, and reveal things as mattering to us?<sup>114</sup>

The argument that moods are intentional in the sense that they are directed to the whole world could be critiqued if we take into consideration that the generalised intentional object in question cannot be considered as an intentional content at all since the intentional content must be only something in particular. Yet the “world as a whole” is not something in particular. Put this way, it seems to be acceptable to hold that emotions are intentional, whereas moods are not. Such a claim of the distinction between the two is likely to strongly differentiate them. Just as the mental states are intentional, matter like stones is non-intentional. However, one might still argue that it seems to be untenable to regard the affective phenomena such as mood to be non-intentional. Mood is not stone.

Another way of arguing that emotion is not very distinct from mood is through the case of an emotional state possibly not always having a particular intentional object. There may be cases in which emotional states are not directed at a particular thing. When one says or thinks that he/she feels afraid of a dog standing and barking in front of him/her, we may wonder what the limits of his/her intentional object, of that dog is. Is there any specific part of the dog he/she is afraid of? Could it be its tail, ears, legs, or fangs, *in particular*? It could be said that he/she is afraid of its fangs in particular. Because the dog's fangs are the thing which might bite him/her—its fangs are evaluated as being dangerous. Therefore, why do we not say that he/she is afraid of the “dog's fangs,” if the intentional object must be specified. Instead, one typically says or thinks that he/she is afraid of the “dog”. If we imagine the dog's head without the body, or its fangs lying on the floor, I am not afraid of this thing since it cannot run or move. It is not being dangerous for me. Thus, when one says that he/she is afraid of the dog, does it not mean that he/she is afraid of the dog as a whole? Here, we would realize that the object of the person's fear could be regarded as a generalised object, the dog as a whole—not only its tail, ears, legs, or fangs, but the

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<sup>114</sup> Elpidorou, 2013: 586-587.

entire organism called “the dog”.

Let me give another example to illustrate how emotions may be directed at a generalised object. When one is walking through a dark alley late at night, he/she is afraid *of* something. What is he/she afraid of? He/she may not know; it could be darkness or a strange sound. This kind of fear has indeed an intentional object.<sup>115</sup> This could also be the case of a generalised intentional object of an emotion.

However, the above argument falls short of the expectation of rejecting that mood lacks intentional objects. When one is afraid of a dog, the dog is specific enough in comparison with many things in the surrounding world. If the dog is standing on a huge stone, for example, one would be afraid of that dog rather than the stone beneath its paws. The whole organism called “dog” is specific in terms of being dangerous while other surrounding elements seem to be unimportant. Furthermore, even though it might sound viable to claim that emotions and moods may be directed at generalised objects, to say that a generalised intentional object (or the world as a whole) is a form of intentionality is a contradiction—especially for an analytic philosopher of mind.

Colombetti is not satisfied with the claim that moods are intentional in terms of directing at general objects, i.e. everything or the world.<sup>116</sup> It is likely that she considers “everything” and “the world” as the same. But they are in fact distinct. The “world” referred to as the intentional object is not the world in a literal sense (the physical objects in the world; the earth). Rather, it means the human world; the constitutive world that is experienced by human consciousness. In this sense, “everything” is different from “the world”. “Everything” means everything that is not something in particular, but the “world” does not seem to include everything. Instead, the world in the sense of constitutive world is revealed to us in a certain way: when I think *about* my world, it seems that a particular way of something matters to me; it excludes many things for I cannot be concerned with or care about everything. There

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<sup>115</sup> Sartre, 20002: 35.

<sup>116</sup> Colombetti, 2014: 79-80.



is always something that does not matter to my world, whereas some other thing does. Inspired by the phenomenological approach, Thompson and Zahavi also suggest that,

moods are not without a reference to the world. They do not enclose us within ourselves, but are lived through as pervasive atmospheres that deeply influence the way the world is disclosed to us. Moods, such as curiosity, nervousness, or happiness, disclose our embeddedness in the world and articulate or modify our existential possibilities.<sup>117</sup>

Even though referring to the “world” makes more sense than referring to “everything” in attempting to intentionalise mood, it is difficult to say that mood discloses our embeddedness in the world in the same way that mood has the world as an intentional object. Thus, the intentionalist view of mood seems to be fallible if the notion of intentional object is understood as the content represented in an internal mind rather than the way consciousness is practically engaged with the world. Going back to the different concepts of intentionality in Chapter One, the former is within analytic philosophy of mind, while the latter is tackled by the phenomenological philosophy. The word “intentional object” implies that there must be a *subject* against an *object*: there is an internal domain against an external one. This idea is rejected by the phenomenologist. In phenomenological philosophy, it is said that the subject-object dichotomy is wrong in understanding consciousness. Rather, consciousness is Being-in-the-world with no independent world outside consciousness; we are already and always absorbed and intertwined with the world.

The possibility of having a broader version of the structure of intentionality of mood may be appealing, although it relies on the concept of intentionality from a phenomenological methodology rather than the analytic philosophy of mind.<sup>118</sup> Therefore, this phenomenological intentionalist view about moods may not satisfy reductive representationalists, who are typically concerned about analytic philosophers of mind.

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<sup>117</sup> Thompson and Zahavi, 2007: 73.

<sup>118</sup> Colombetti, 2014: 80-81.

Kind thoroughly explores the research providing several options in attempting to intentionalise mood in the reductive framework. She concludes that even though there are possible options to offer for moods being intentional—including directedness toward the generalised world, these options cannot satisfy reductive representationalism.<sup>119</sup> However, this does not mean that these options cannot satisfy non-reductive representationalism. An attempt to intentionalise moods for non-reductive representationalism remains to be seen as possible. Kind's argument that moods pose a serious objection to reductive representationalism may guide us to be able to deal with phenomenological non-reductionism of mood. Briefly, non-reductive representationalism can also be regarded as a non-representational theory of mind, which we will see in Chapter Four, that is likely to be consistent with the existential phenomenological approach.

The view of non-reductionism is what Solomon would probably like to hold. However, he tends to suggest that to avoid reductivism may be unsatisfactory as well. This dissatisfaction may complicate our emotional lives. Let us consider Solomon's suggestion:

To reduce emotional experience to anything less is to fail to appreciate the complexity and richness of our emotional lives, but to appreciate the complexity and richness of our emotional lives is to further enrich them as well as to further complicate them.<sup>120</sup>

Importantly, Kind suggests that non-reductive representationalism of moods does not aim to solve the hard problem of consciousness, whereas reductive representationalism has a driving motivation to solve that problem.<sup>121</sup> Accordingly, for an existential phenomenological philosophy, the hard problem of consciousness of mood (and corresponding affective phenomena) is not a pressing problem to solve. The hard problem of consciousness addresses the question of how can the conscious experience emerge from the physical world such as brain activity? The existential phenomenological philosophy, however, may not aim to answer such issue. Rather, it

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<sup>119</sup> Kind, 2014.

<sup>120</sup> Solomon, 2006a: 307.

<sup>121</sup> Kind, 2014.

is focused on the issue of what and how it is for us to exist. Phenomenological non-reductive intentionalism of moods may pave the way for a more self-understanding of human beings as we are not only rational beings but also emotional and existential beings. One may argue the view that mood involves the structure of intentionality in another alternative way. In doing so, although mood is held by many analytic philosophers of mind as non-intentional, phenomenologists may regard it as the openness to the world, as we will see in the next chapter.

## **Conclusion**

Emotion, mood, and feeling are typically understood as falling under the umbrella term of “affectivity”. The philosophers of affectivity have been dealing with the question of how to instantiate each category and understand their relationship. Furthermore, the problem of the natural kind of emotion is very controversial among the theorists and philosophers of emotion. Inspired by Colombetti, I tend to be neutral when it comes to the question of whether emotion is of the natural kind, and hold that emotions are somehow entities, but the basic emotion theory should be abandoned.<sup>122</sup>

One of the main purposes of the present research is to solve the problem of intentionality, for which the second part of this chapter is dedicated. Although I aim in this research to study and understand emotions, I cannot overlook moods. Hence, this chapter focuses on the problem of intentionality of mood, while the debate on the intentionality of emotion will be discussed in Chapter Four.

As we have seen earlier, the intentionalists attempt to intentionalise mood through an interpretation applying the existential phenomenological approach. In doing so, however, there seems to be a shift in the concept of intentionality from an analytic philosophy of mind’s fashion to the way of phenomenological philosophy. The intentionalist project may be inadequate in this respect. Nonetheless, even if it is inevitable to hold that mood does not have an

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<sup>122</sup> Colombetti, 2014.

intentional object, it does not prevent us to think that it may have an intrinsic relation to the structure of intentionality. Even though the view that emotion has an intentional object and mood does have an intentional object may be held, this, however, *implies* that mood can still be regarded as being related to the structure of intentionality. As we will see in the next chapter, an existential phenomenology of affectivity can be construed that mood may be part of the structure of intentionality; it is the “openness” to the world in regard to the existential mode of human reality playing a significant role in our lives.

## Chapter Three

# Emotion and Mood in Existential Phenomenological Philosophy

This chapter aims to emphasise on an understanding of human emotion in an *existential* dimension. The emotional experiences take place through the phenomenal field of the subject's conscious experiences. While investigating emotional life, it is worth considering the existential dimension which may be used to mainly explicate human beings and their existence. It is fair to say that some animals may be regarded to have an existential dimension, just as it could be said that they could be conscious. However, in this chapter, I keep a distance from this argument and limit my task to human affectivity.

An existential analysis is required in this respect. Human emotions are the experiential phenomenon; one way to understand them is to explore emotional experiences as they affect the subjectivity, which faces and copes with the situations and engages itself with the world. In other words, it is to encounter the emotional experiences as they are, or as they appear to our experience and existence in everyday life. Thus, to apply the existential phenomenological analysis is an integral part of studying affectivity. As Elpidorou and Freeman suggest, “[f]rom the perspective of phenomenology, one cannot come to terms with the nature of affectivity without at the same time also delineating the character of our existence, nor vice versa.”<sup>123</sup> It could be said that at some point we may need to suspend the empirical framework to explore our emotional experiences. In other words, to explore the existential level insightfully as one side of the coin (emotion) is a non-trivial dimension of understanding emotion. Another side of the coin is available for empirical non-phenomenological investigation. I would argue that there should be a dialogue

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<sup>123</sup> Elpidorou and Freeman, 2015: 662.

between the two. The crucial advantage is to bring a phenomenological dimension regarding the subjective experience to create and design the way the new empirical experiment is set up. At the same time, the new pieces of empirical evidence ought to inform the way phenomenological philosophy formulates a novel theory.

For this chapter, we shall turn to the existential phenomenological tradition to explore what phenomenologists say about emotion and corresponding affective phenomena. This does not mean that I reject the empirical enterprise. Rather, I would just suspend and distance this study from a causal mechanism and reductive framework to explore directly the first-person experiences engaging with the world, as they cannot be empirically measured. It is to say that at an existential phenomenological dimension, we shall explore and analyse emotional experiences from within the subjective viewpoint rather than from outside or nowhere. Insofar as it does not take any issue with the empirical framework, the existential analysis of emotional experiences is appropriate. In fact, it is impossible for them to conflict with each other for they follow different approaches. Hence, there is no reason to think that we should ignore pieces of empirical evidence. The empirical framework is still very important no less than the investigation of the experientially subjective domain of mind. The two are different sides of the same coin.

Human being can be able to concern an existential question. What matters to its existential life? What is it to exist in the world? How to deal with the difficult situation in life? The existential analysis raises these questions. Classical phenomenologists endeavours to understand human beings as they are affective as well as rational beings. Existential phenomenological tradition, however, seems to isolate itself from other empirical studies. Furthermore, it mainly aims to describe how things appear or given to our experiences regardless the metaphysical and theoretical question. The phenomenologist aims to the question of how things *seem* to us.

For our present purposes, the phenomenologists whose works directly investigate emotions and moods are the focus of this chapter. Accordingly, although there are several phenomenologists discussing emotion, I chose classical phenomenologists in the person of Heidegger, when it comes to mood, and Sartre,

when it comes to emotion. Furthermore, there are impressive works by Heideggerian and Sartrean theorists which deserve to be highlighted in the present investigation, including the ones by Solomon and Ratcliffe.

Construals and criticism of the theories in the phenomenological tradition will also be sketched. Accordingly, it aims to discuss the implications of Sartre's theory of emotion in regard to the standard theories discussed in Chapter One. Heidegger's idea of mood will be also investigated and discussed. This is to assess the concept of emotion and mood formulated by the classical existential phenomenologists in connection with what recent philosophers of emotion are debating.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section (I.) explores Heidegger's notion of Attunement through mood and the concept of existential feeling offered by Ratcliffe. The second section (II.) investigates Sartre's theory of emotion. Then, I shall explore Solomon's formulation of emotion, which is the continuity and development of Sartre's theory.

Construals and criticism will be placed in the last section (III.). It comprises of a discussion about the attempt to combine Heidegger's notion of mood with Sartre's theory of emotion offered by O'Shiel. Then, construals and criticism of Heidegger on the boundary between mood and emotion will be addressed. Finally, I will discuss Sartre's theory and how it may be, intentionally or unintentionally, an encouraging part of the endeavour to integrate the bodily phenomenology with intentionality in regard to emotion.

## **I. Heidegger on Mood**

As we saw in Chapter Two, unlike emotion, mood poses a serious problem to research in affectivity. Accordingly, despite mood seeming to have great significance in our lives, it could be considered as non-intentional. On the other hand, having an extremely generalised intentional content is unlikely to account for intentionality in regard to the representative theory of mind (or AMI) since a generalised intentional content does not seem to represent anything in particular. It is to say that the

representative theory of mind does not permit to intentionalise mood and cannot provide a comprehensive understanding of affective phenomena.

I will explore Heidegger's notion of human existence, i.e. Dasein and Being-in-the-world, which contrasts with the standard view of the Cartesian mind. It suggests that the Dasein cannot be detached from the world; the Dasein should not be understood as the internal mind or consciousness having the content about the independent world. Rather, Dasein is always already engaged with the world and primordially affected by mood which is an existential mode of the way one finds itself in the world. This formulation is indeed related to the concept of intentionality in the phenomenological tradition (or PMI). Moreover, this Heideggerian notion of mood could be construed as primordially constitutive of human existence as a condition of possibility for other cognitive states.<sup>124</sup> One should bear in mind that "mood" in a Heideggerian sense is distinct from mood in a general sense, as applied by most emotion science researchers.

In this section, I shall focus on Heidegger's notion of mood. Accordingly, I shall explore the notion of Attunement through mood in Heideggerian phenomenology. Then, I will investigate Ratcliffe's notion of "existential feeling", which is inspired by Heidegger's concept of mood.

### **Heidegger on Attunement through Mood**

In this part, I shall explore Heidegger's notion of Attunement (*Befindlichkeit*) through mood (*Stimmung*). The word *Stimmung* is usually translated as "mood" in the English literature. Again, what Heidegger means by *Stimmung* is different from the concept of mood referred to by current affective scientists and even other philosophers of emotion. In fact, *Stimmung* means "being attuned", for example, to attune a piano or any other musical instrument. However, in this context, I would translate it into English as mood. This translation is common even among Heidegger scholars. Moreover, one should take into consideration that Heidegger's concept of mood cannot be understood alone without considering the notion of Attunement.

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<sup>124</sup> See Elpidorou and Freeman, 2015.



Before going to investigate the Heideggerian notion of mood, we should examine Heidegger's concept of human existence—Dasein and Being-in-the-world. Since Heidegger's philosophy is complex, I will focus only on mood as far as my reading of *Being and Time* is concerned.

### 1) Dasein and Being-in-the-World

In formulating the novel concept of human existence, Heidegger coins the word “Dasein” to avoid being trapped with and differentiate his position from the traditionally Western philosophical conception of mind. The latter treats the mind as an internal domain against the independent world as an external domain. Accordingly, Heidegger avoids using the word “consciousness”, “awareness”, and “intentionality”, partly to distance himself from Husserl's transcendental phenomenology.<sup>125</sup> Dasein can be translated into “being-there” or “being-here”, *da* means there or here, and *sein* means being. This implies that Dasein is not merely located in the body but in an extended world with which Dasein is engaged.

As opposed to the Cartesian mind-body split, Dasein is not a mind having a content by confronting an external world. Dasein is not the internal mind which is conscious of, or represents the external world; rather, Dasein is constituted pre-theoretically and directly by its engagement with the world.<sup>126</sup> Dasein is always interrelated with or located in-the-world, in the sense that it cannot withdraw from Being-in-the-world. In other words, the Being-in-the-world cannot collapse. Dasein cannot be outside of the world. Moreover, Dasein is the kind of Being-in-the-world which asks the question about its own existence, about which it cares.<sup>127</sup> Since it is in-the-world, Dasein is also temporal, social, and historical being.

Heidegger claims that fundamental ontology must begin with an account of human existence. First and foremost, Dasein exists. Heidegger states: “Dasein is a being which is related understandingly in its being toward that being. In saying this

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<sup>125</sup> Elpidorou and Freeman, 2015: 662.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid., 663.

<sup>127</sup> Inwood, 2000: 11.

we calling [sic] attention to the formal concept of existence. Dasein exists.”<sup>128</sup> For Dasein, to exist requires several ontological structures to constitute one’s existence. Accordingly, Dasein is constituted equiprimordially by four ontological structures: Attunement (*Befindlichkeit*), Understanding (*Verstehen*), Discourse (*Rede*), and Fallenness (*Verfallensein*). All features are united ontologically in Dasein’s care structure; therefore, to split them is possible only for the purpose of analysis.<sup>129</sup> In understanding Heidegger’s concept of mood, we shall focus on Attunement.

## 2) Attunement through mood

In trying to understand Heidegger’s concept of mood, we shall focus on the notion of Attunement in *Being and Time* (§29).<sup>130</sup> One should bear in mind that, hereafter, I may use “Attunement” and “*Befindlichkeit*” interchangeably. *Befindlichkeit* primordially is the existential mode of Dasein, the way one finds itself in the world, which is disclosed through mood. Heidegger says that “[W]hat we indicate *ontologically* by the term [*Befindlichkeit*] . . . is *ontically* the most familiar and everyday sort of thing; our mood, our Being-attuned”.<sup>131</sup> For Heidegger, the *ontological* enquiry is the very primordial structure in which Dasein can constitutively exist in the first place; it could be referred to as the Being. The Being is “always the Being of an entity [being]”.<sup>132</sup> This means that the Being always requires to be Being of being. The totality of beings can be investigated by a subject-matter such as science. It is the everyday sorts of things in the world, and can be understood as the *ontical* enquiry.<sup>133</sup> Mood, as the specific ways Dasein finds itself in the world, is regarded as the *ontical* enquiry. Mood is *ontically* the “concrete manifestations”<sup>134</sup> of the *Befindlichkeit*, which is the *ontological* structure of the constitution of Dasein.

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<sup>128</sup> Heidegger, 1996: 49.

<sup>129</sup> Elpidorou and Freeman, 2015: 663

<sup>130</sup> Heidegger, 2008: 172-179.

<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*, 172.

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*, 29.

<sup>133</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>134</sup> O’Shiel, 2016.

The “*Befindlichkeit* through mood” is an existential mode of Dasein; it is constitutive of human existence. Moran elaborates on Heidegger’s notion of Dasein in relation to mood in the following statement:

Humans are always already caught up in a world into which they find themselves thrown, which reveals itself in moods, the overall nature of which is summed up by Heidegger’s notion of ‘Being-in-the-world.’<sup>135</sup>

In other words, Dasein always finds itself in a certain mood—in one mood or another. It would, as Heidegger says, “slip over from one to the other”.<sup>136</sup> Importantly, there cannot be mood without *Befindlichkeit*. At the same time, there cannot be *Befindlichkeit* without mood as the concrete manifestation of it.<sup>137</sup> It could be said that *Befindlichkeit* is a condition of possibility for mood. As Heidegger points out: “In a [*Befindlichkeit*] . . . Dasein is always brought before itself, and has always found itself, . . . in the sense of finding itself in the mood that it has”.<sup>138</sup> Dasein’s existence, as being “there”, always discloses the world to itself through one mood or another. Put in another way, human’s existence is always mooded.<sup>139</sup> Heidegger insists that “in every case Dasein always has some mood”<sup>140</sup> and “we are never free of moods.”<sup>141</sup> This means that we are *always* in some mood without any exception, even when we are being “indifferen[t]”, or in “the undisturbed equanimity and the inhibited ill-humour of our everyday concern”<sup>142</sup>. Dasein always exists “there” or “here”, already mooded.

In Chapter Two, I did not mention in detail about the typical account of most affective scientists regarding emotion and mood, which could be regarded as separate from the mind at the outset. This means that the mind is internally self-enclosed and

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<sup>135</sup> Moran, 2006: 13.

<sup>136</sup> Heidegger, 2008: 173.

<sup>137</sup> O’Shiel, 2016.

<sup>138</sup> Heidegger, 2008: 174.

<sup>139</sup> Elpidorou and Freeman, 2015: 661.

<sup>140</sup> Heidegger, 2008: 173.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid., 175.

<sup>142</sup> Ibid., 173.

could occasionally be affected by affective states. Thus, both moods and emotions contingently occur *in* the mind, then, vanish. They seem to be a disturbance of the (cold) mind. From this perspective, emotion and mood are recognised and atomised as a “discrete episode”.<sup>143</sup> This formulation could be found in most affective science research.<sup>144</sup> It is partly grounded on the standard view of the Cartesian mind, the view that the episodes of affective states represent contents in the self-enclosed brain states, and are occasionally aroused in or possibly caused by bodily states. In other words, it withdraws mood and emotion as an *internal* mental or bodily phenomenon given inside the subject’s mechanical brain and body (neurophysiological activities) from the world or environment. This way of understanding mood and emotion accepts that non-mooded and/or non-emotional states can exist. This means that we are not always affective. Accordingly, it seems to be tenable in general to say that there can be non-emotional states; one can feel nothing. However, the non-mooded state is impossible according to Heidegger.

Furthermore, although mood is not an internal state abstracted from the world, this does not mean that it exists purely in the external world. Heidegger asserts that “[a] mood assails us. It comes neither from ‘outside’ nor from ‘inside’, but arises out of Being-in-the-world, as a way of such Being.”<sup>145</sup> Mood is not a subjective property in our mental or bodily states, nor is it an objective quality of the external world. Rather, mood is the *background* conditioning the possibility of all mental phenomena, for example cognitive processes and volitions in which mood always discloses the world mattering to Dasein in one way or another as well as affects Dasein’s Being-in-the-world.<sup>146</sup> The sense of understanding mood as a background indicates that we cannot be free from mood. Thus, for Heidegger, what we can do is to alter from one mood to another. In this regard, mood is not an accident or just happens to us. Therefore, it is not possible to say that we *have* moods. We are rather *in* moods.<sup>147</sup> We are “always” and “already” in a certain mood.<sup>148</sup> We do not choose whether to have it in the first

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<sup>143</sup> Freeman, 2014: 464.

<sup>144</sup> Colombetti, 2014: 12.

<sup>145</sup> Heidegger, 2008: 176.

<sup>146</sup> One could regard mood as the background. See Ratcliffe, 2002; Ratcliffe, 2005a.

<sup>147</sup> Freeman, 2014: 451.

<sup>148</sup> O’Shiel, 2016.

place. Instead, we may attune into one mood or another, irrespective of whether we are aware of it or not. Attunement through mood is often pre-reflective and is a background against our other cognitive activities.<sup>149</sup>

### **Ratcliffe on the Existential Feeling**

One might think that if we aim to differentiate mood and emotion as clearly as possible, we should place mood (or something similar) under a distinctive category apart from emotion. Ratcliffe calls it “existential feeling” which is, for him, the bodily feeling outside the domain of emotions. The latter point makes Ratcliffe’s notion different from Heidegger’s in the sense that Heidegger seems not to emphasise the role of body.

For Ratcliffe, existential feelings are the feelings of being in which we usually spell out in our language as we are “being” in certain feelings beyond the domain of emotions. For Ratcliffe, it could be instantiated as when one says that he/she is being “there”, “complete”, “at home”, “powerful”, “part of the real world again”, “humble”, “at one with life”, “at one with nature”, “real”, “familiar”, “invulnerable”, “part of something greater”, “flawed and diminished”, “unworthy”, “separate and in limitation”, “a fraud”, “overwhelmed”, “abandoned”, “unloved”, “torn”, “disconnected from the world”, “watched”, “empty”, “completely helpless”, “trapped”, and so on.<sup>150</sup> He suggests that these instances are not in a standard list of emotions; they are not emotions. These existential feelings, he adds, non-emotionally but bodily, have been ignored by most philosophers of emotion, which mostly focus on bodily feelings only in relation to emotions. Moreover, they consider the bodily feeling as the object of awareness, which means that it lacks world-directedness. This critique targets the OFT, which holds that the feeling body “is” the emotion in which it is not directed at the world.

Ratcliffe attempts to formulate how to integrate intentionality with the bodily feeling as the unification view. However, rather than offering the unification view for

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<sup>149</sup> Freeman, 2014: 450.

<sup>150</sup> Ratcliffe, 2005a: 47-48.

the intentionality of emotion, he focuses in his work on the non-emotional bodily feeling of being—existential feeling. Importantly, he admits that his formulation is close to Heidegger’s notion of mood:

Heidegger’s conception of ‘mood’ closely approximates what I have called ‘existential feeling’; ‘mood’ for Heidegger is responsible for a sense of Being-in-the-world.<sup>151</sup>

For Ratcliffe, the existential feelings are about “how we find ourselves in the world”, which is a *background* shaping our experiences of the world through our bodily feelings. The existential feelings are “experienced as one’s relationship with the world as a whole.”<sup>152</sup> This does not mean that existential feelings are intentional. Alternatively, they could be regarded as the background feeling which opens the world for us in the first place; they provide the possibility in which the world matters to us, the *Umwelt*.<sup>153</sup>

In arguing that bodily feelings can be regarded as both objects of awareness and ways through which the world is experienced, Ratcliffe argues that,

- (1) Bodily feelings are part of the structure of intentionality. They contribute to how one’s body and / or aspects of the world are experienced.
- (2) There is a distinction between the location of a feeling and what that feeling is *of*. A feeling can be *in* the body but *of* something outside the body. One is not always aware *of* the body, even though that is where the feeling occurs.
- (3) A bodily feeling need not be an object of consciousness. Feelings are often that *through* which one is conscious of something else.<sup>154</sup>

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<sup>151</sup> Ibid., 54.

<sup>152</sup> Ibid., 51-52.

<sup>153</sup> The *Umwelt* is German word. It typically means the world as it is experienced, appeared or perceived by us.

<sup>154</sup> Ratcliffe, 2005a: 46.

In point (1), Ratcliffe offers an attempt to intentionalise the bodily feeling in the unification view—integrating the bodily feeling with the structure of intentionality. Phenomenologically, the bodily feelings inform us about the ways in which both our objectified body and the directed world appear to us. In point (2), the distinction between “the location of a feeling in the body” and “what the feeling is of” suggests the possibility of awareness of the external world. As the foreground-background alteration, we can alter whether we focus on the concerned location of the body or the external world in which such feeling is of. Ratcliffe states that the quality or intensity of such feelings can urge us to alter the focus from the specific location in our body to the object in an external world. He gives an example as to the tactile perception, the touch. When I grasp a cup of hot coffee, it is felt by me as hot. Ratcliffe asks what is the “it” which is hot? It is “the cup” which is an entity in the external world. So, my awareness is directed at the cup through my body.<sup>155</sup>

As for point (3), it suggests that our body can be the vehicle of feelings. This means that our existential feelings are that through which our consciousness is directed at the world. Thus, we are not aware of our body. In this regard, the body can be understood as “transparent”.<sup>156</sup> Bodily feelings are that through which consciousness is directed at the external world.

Ratcliffe emphasises on the role of the body in formulating the concept of existential feeling. He criticises Heidegger’s concept of mood, which lacks a bodily aspect regarding its phenomenology. However, one could say that Ratcliffe’s notion of existential feeling partly contributes to the philosophy of emotion in the way in which it attempts to combine intentionality with bodily phenomenology, as we will see in the next chapter.

Although Ratcliffe argues that existential feelings are perhaps non-emotional bodily feelings and are being in their distinctive category, sometimes he seems to recognise that the difference between emotion and mood—or existential feeling—is

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<sup>155</sup> Ibid., 50.

<sup>156</sup> See Merleau-Ponty, 2005.

blurred.<sup>157</sup> The formulation of affectivity in Heidegger's existential phenomenology—as well as Sartre's—inspires many contemporary theorists and phenomenologists dealing with the philosophy of emotion. Based on what I have read, the works inspired by the phenomenological tradition mostly regard the boundary between emotion and mood as being blurred. There is an exception as we will see in the section III. of this chapter. In Chapter Two, I showed that philosophers—endorsing the phenomenological approach—seem to think that mood and emotion are quite the same; their distinction could be only the intensity of the degree. Hence, mood is a non-specific emotion. Likewise, these affectivities seem to be lumped in one box as an affective phenomenon. After all, it seems to me that the difference between mood and emotion should be maintained as they are somehow not the same.

## **II. Sartre on Emotion**

Although I have briefly talked about Sartre's theory of emotion through several points in the previous chapters, I would like here to explore it in more detail. In the existential phenomenological tradition, Sartre is one of the phenomenologists who have directly discussed the subject of emotion. In a nutshell, for him, emotions do not just happen to us. They rather have significance in our life; they engage us with the world and situations. Along the lines of cognitivists, his theory allows to choose or control our emotions. It depends on how we evaluate worldly situations.

This section will explore Sartre's theory of emotion. Then, it will examine Solomon's work. His concept of emotion is intensely influenced by Sartre's existentialist dimension of emotion.

### **Sartre on Emotion as the Magical Transformation of the World**

In the existential phenomenological tradition, human beings tend to emotionally, but not irrationally, experience, understand, and cope with the world and their own

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<sup>157</sup> Ratcliffe, 2005a: 45, 48.



existence.<sup>158</sup> Emotion is non-trivial to human life as it is the ways we are faring with the world. It is obvious that we always encounter the world insofar as we are conscious, and emotions are part of our everyday life. If emotions involve, in part, the way in which our consciousness is significantly constituted, it is then urgent for us to investigate it. As Sartre suggests, “the task of the phenomenologist . . . will be to study the significance of emotion.”<sup>159</sup>

For Sartre, in exploring emotion, there is a question more important than merely wondering “what emotion is”. To seek “what emotion is” is to isolate the researcher or the investigator from emotion as if emotion did not appear to the researcher’s consciousness, as if emotion placed itself outside consciousness. Hence, the question of “what emotion is” cannot give us a full picture of emotion. It also neglects the phenomenology of emotion. Therefore, Sartre sketches his theory by asserting that in studying emotion as the way to go to the things themselves is to “place ourselves upon the terrain of signification, and to treat emotion as a *phenomenon*.”<sup>160</sup> In this regard, there are two aspects involved: the signification and the phenomenon. The phenomenon is something which appears or is experienced by our consciousness as it is. Sartre asserts that emotions should be understood as appearing to our consciousness and revealing us the signification. Furthermore, since emotions are not merely a fact that just accidentally happens to our consciousness, it should be acknowledged that they have a real active signification to our lives.

According to the signification of emotion, Sartre states that “an emotion refers to what it signifies. And what it signifies is indeed, in effect, the totality of the relations of the human-reality to the world.”<sup>161</sup> Such signification is *for us*; we possess the certain ways of emotions which matter to us. At the same time, we also put the signification to the world in a *magical* way (I will explain shortly later). It provides the relation between the emotional consciousness and the world; “emotion is the

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<sup>158</sup> As per Hass points out, the view that phenomenological philosophy is irrational is one of the deepest misconceptions. See Hass, 2008: 5-6.

<sup>159</sup> Sartre, 2002: 11.

<sup>160</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

<sup>161</sup> *Ibid.*, 63.

human reality assuming itself and “emotionally-directing” itself toward the world.”<sup>162</sup> This suggests that intentionality, which is the relation between the consciousness and the world, does not just randomly happen but is an “organized and describable structure.”<sup>163</sup> Sartre thinks all these engagements could be understood via the methodology of phenomenological philosophy.

### 1) The pre-reflective consciousness

First and foremost, before investigating Sartre’s theory of emotion, we need to understand his notion of pre-reflective consciousness or pre-reflective engagement with the world<sup>164</sup>, while noting that in his formulation it may be phrased as “non-reflective” or “unreflective”. For Sartre, as we will see shortly, emotions are the pre-reflective magical transformation of the world. Nonetheless, one should take into account that the pre-reflective engagement with the world is not exhausted by emotion. We are also pre-reflectively engaging with the non-emotional world.

Phenomenologically, consciousness could be simply understood as the mental activity or mental phenomenon that is always conscious or aware of something. When somebody says, “I am conscious of . . .”, this means that he/she is conscious *of something*. Besides, consciousness is *always* directed to something. There could be two aspects to the directedness of consciousness: self-consciousness and world-consciousness. The former is the consciousness directed towards oneself whereas the latter is the consciousness directed towards the world or something in the world. For example, one is conscious of the leaves falling from the tree outside the window. This is the consciousness of the external world, the world-consciousness. On the other hand, it could be that he/she is conscious of his/herself—self-consciousness. He/she is conscious of *his/her mental activity* that it is aware of something else. For example, one is conscious of *his/her thinking* about the moon, one is conscious of *his/her perceiving* a cup of coffee on the table, or one is conscious of *his/her perceiving* the

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<sup>162</sup> Ibid., 10.

<sup>163</sup> Ibid., 17.

<sup>164</sup> The phrase “pre-reflective engagement with the world” (which I used) refers to O’Shiel’s work. See O’Shiel, 2016.

leaves falling from the tree. In other words, one is conscious that he/she is aware of the world. This self-consciousness can be understood as self-reflection. The subject reflects upon *itself* being conscious of the object. For example, one reflects on his/her perceiving a cup of coffee on the table. Consequently, saying that “I am conscious of *the leaves* falling from the tree outside the window” is different from “I am conscious of *my perceiving* the leaves falling from the tree outside the window.” The former is world-consciousness and the latter is self-consciousness. In accounting for the pre-reflective engagement with the world, Sartre’s interest is in world-consciousness rather than self-consciousness.

Beside self-consciousness, which seems to be less relevant for Sartre, the notion of unconsciousness is rejected by him. It is widely accepted that consciousness is opposed to unconsciousness. In a broad sense, when one is in a deep sleep, one is not conscious. When one is awake, one is conscious. The notion of unconsciousness suggests that one can even simultaneously awake and behave unconsciously. If that is the case, then, for example, when one is playing the guitar and is in trance, such playing and performance can be regarded as unconscious behaviour. However, Sartre asserts that the unconsciousness is impossible. For him, consciousness is *always* conscious of *something* in the world. This is the world-consciousness I mentioned above. For Sartre, pre-reflective consciousness is also world-consciousness. He holds that if consciousness is directed toward the world, it is not directed towards itself. It does not typically reflect upon itself, even if it can do that. As Sartre argues, “it is certain that we can reflect upon our activity. But an operation *upon* the universe is generally executed without our having to leave the nonreflective plane.”<sup>165</sup> Thus, Sartre suggests that our activities engaging with world in everyday life are not unconscious engagement, nor are they self-reflection. Rather, it is pre-reflective consciousness engaging with the world. Primordially, I am pre-reflectively engaging with the world; I am first and foremost always engaged with the world *pre-reflectively* and *consciously*. Thus, while reflective consciousness is a second order of human consciousness, pre-reflective consciousness is the first order which makes us engage with the world in the first place. All our activity upon the world has been done without leaving the latter.

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<sup>165</sup> Sartre, 2002: 36.

Sartre gives an example of pre-reflective action and behaviour. When one is writing, and immersing him/herself into the continuity of the world of writing, the act of writing is not unconscious. In fact, one is conscious of the *world* (the words that are written) and not conscious of *him/herself* writing. Let us consider the following statement:

In reality, the act of writing is not at all unconscious, it is an actual structure of my consciousness. Only it is not conscious *of* itself. To write is to maintain an active awareness *of the words* as they come to birth under my pen. Not of the words inasmuch as they are written *by me* . . . .<sup>166</sup>

Moreover, Sartre contrasts the act of one's writing and the act of reading another person's writing. He suggests that the moment one is writing words he/she is conscious of such words but in a different way in which he/she reads the words which another person is writing. In the latter case, those words come under his/her pen as "a probable reality" for him/her, which is the same as one grasping an object like a chair or a table that it is what it is.<sup>167</sup> Let us imagine that I can see only some part of a table, I nevertheless can probably know that it is a table. Furthermore, when another person is writing "indep . . . ," Sartre states, "I intuitively seize upon the word [that person is writing as] "independent".<sup>168</sup> On the other hand, if I am writing the words, I have not known yet which word would emerge under my pen. Sartre suggests that the act of writing is a creative activity. While I am writing, such activity seems to force me to act; "the words that I am writing . . . are *exigent*."<sup>169</sup> Accordingly, Sartre stresses that "they [the words] are potentialities that *have to be realized*".<sup>170</sup> But, interestingly, they do "[n]ot . . . have to be realized *by me*."<sup>171</sup> In this regard, the words are "realizing themselves."<sup>172</sup> The act of writing is not realised by me as a self-reflective activity. It

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<sup>166</sup> Ibid.

<sup>167</sup> Ibid., 37.

<sup>168</sup> Ibid.

<sup>169</sup> Ibid.

<sup>170</sup> Ibid.

<sup>171</sup> Ibid.

<sup>172</sup> Ibid. 38.

is rather to continually maintain the active awareness of the world (the words written) realising itself and which I act pre-reflectively.

Sartre also emphasises on the first-person embodied experience of such an exigent demand regarding our activity. When reading what another person is writing, I can see that the words make demand on him but I cannot feel it. “On the contrary the exigence of the words that I am tracing is directly present, weighty and felt.”<sup>173</sup> He suggests that that feeling is felt through the live-body as per the exigence of the words that need to be realized by urging one’s hand, and that he/she is conscious of his/her hand as “present and lived.”<sup>174</sup>

Now, we shall step closer to Sartre’s theory of emotion. Sartre formulates the notion of pre-reflective consciousness to facilitate an account of intentionality in regard to emotion: emotion has its intentional objects in the external world. Accordingly, emotional consciousness is not directed at itself but the world. He stresses that “[i]t is obvious indeed that the man who is frightened is afraid *of* something.”<sup>175</sup> As we saw in Chapter One, the argument that emotions are intentional is plausible. As I said in the first chapter (section II.), the concept of intentionality in relation to AMI concerns representation as the content in the mind (precisely, in the head). Such content is directed to the world; it represents the world. This could also be interpreted as world-consciousness. However, Sartre has a different view of world-consciousness. He posits the structure of intentionality as active engagement with the world directly and pre-reflectively. This interpretation seems to be similar to the notion of Being-in-the-world in the Heideggerian sense. Hence, the notion of intentionality according to Sartre is indeed consistent with what I call PMI. This plausible interpretation shows that the concept of phenomenological embodied consciousness, whose activities are interwoven with the world, may be understood as E-perception.<sup>176</sup> Sartre’s notion of pre-reflective consciousness accounts for intentionality in terms of non-linguistic, non-analytic structures. It is a

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<sup>173</sup> Ibid.

<sup>174</sup> Ibid.

<sup>175</sup> Ibid., 34-35

<sup>176</sup> We will see what I mean by E-perception in Chapter Four.

phenomenological methodology which assumes that intentionality could be interpreted as the actively embodied consciousness engaging with the world.

## 2) Emotions as the magical transformation of the world

In this part, I will explore the Sartre's theory, which holds that emotions are the magical transformation of the world. Sartre investigates and formulates the theory of emotion by means of critiquing James's OFT. As many of the critics of James have pointed out, one of the objections to the OFT is that it cannot explain how to distinguish the different types of emotion based on physiological feelings. As we saw in Chapter One, this is to say that the OFT cannot account for intentionality and cognitive ability, the latter usually including evaluation and meaning (or signification). Sartre attempts to apply the phenomenological philosophy to his emotion theory, to explore emotions as they are experienced by us, having signification in one way or another. It is to say that emotions have the structure of intentionality containing evaluative properties. Sartre's theory aims to describe emotional consciousness and the way in which it is constituted by unification of consciousness and the world. Emotions have signification since they signify the way we comprehend the world.

For Sartre, as we are pre-reflectively engaging with the world, the world can manifest to us in two aspects: 1) as a "pragmatic intuition of the determinism of the world" and 2) as a magical "transformation of the world."<sup>177</sup> Hereafter, I shall call the former "Pragmatic-DW" and the latter "Magical-TW."

Let me start with the Pragmatic-DW. Engagement with the world can be understood as the *Umwelt*. The *Umwelt* is the world as it appears to us in one way or another. It is an aspect of the world which matters to us. In addition, it is experienced, engaged with, and acted upon by us. Sartre suggests that the *Umwelt* is "the world of our desires, our needs and of our activities."<sup>178</sup> It is not the physical world understood in natural science, which is separated from the subject. It is rather the world in which

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<sup>177</sup> Sartre, 2002: 39.

<sup>178</sup> Ibid..

we care.<sup>179</sup> I sit and study in my room. There are many objects in the room, for example, a bookcase, a desk, a chair, a cup, a laptop, a refrigerator, a picture of my parents on the wall, a backpack, a mobile phone, and so on. These objects are seen as having a relational character mattering to me in one way or another. In the *Umwelt*, I do not see such objects as having the Aristotelian quality—its form and matter. For instance, a cup made of ceramic and having a spherical shape. Rather, the *Umwelt* appears to us as having a certain pragmatic purpose. The desk needs to be realised, to be used. For example, to put a laptop, a cup of coffee, papers, and/or books on it. This desk has to be set up for my study. The books in the bookcase need to be searched for. While I am studying, if I want to read about the turbo dynamic, I would approach the bookcase and start to search for the engineering books. The chair needs to be sat on. The cup of coffee needs to be grabbed when I feel sleepy. The picture of my parents needs to be looked at when I want some moral support to succeed in my education. The refrigerator needs to be opened when I take a break from my study and would like to drink a soda. This is the world in which I care. It is significant for me and I would act on it in everyday life. Sartre states that

we can understand all those exigences [of our activities] and those tensions of the world around us; in this way we can draw up a ‘hodological’ chart [the path] of our *Umwelt*, a chart that will vary in function with our actions and our needs.<sup>180</sup>

Accordingly, the Pragmatic-DW equips us with the capacity to follow the usual path (or a “hodological chart” as Sartre puts it) to deal with the world. For example, if I want to cook dinner, I would go to the market to buy the ingredients. Then, I would prepare things in the kitchen, deal with many kitchen tools, and I would finally cook. If I want to drink a cup of coffee, I would go to the coffee bar and brew it. This is the way in which I can do it pragmatically.

One should keep in mind that these activities are pre-reflectively engaging with the *Umwelt*. For example, when I am brewing coffee, I am pre-reflectively engaged with the coffee stuff (coffee beans, coffee grinder, coffee machine, and so

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<sup>179</sup> Smith, 2016: 185.

<sup>180</sup> Sartre, 2002: 38.

on). These are the means to the end that is determined by the Pragmatic-DW. Sartre argues: “This apprehension of the means as the one possible path to the attainment of the end . . . may be called the pragmatic intuition of the determinism of the world.”<sup>181</sup> O’Shiel suggests that Sartre’s Pragmatic-DW is the way in which we “simply go about our business in an emotionless, step-by-step manner.”<sup>182</sup> This emotionless of the Pragmatic-DW implies that there is another way we can bring ourselves to be emotional, and that way is attained by the Magical-TW.

In Sartre’s theory of emotion, the Magical-TW comes to the centre where there are tensions which cause the Pragmatic-DW to be “frustrated, blurred, or even [break] down.”<sup>183</sup> In this respect, Sartre points out that “[t]his world is *difficult*.”<sup>184</sup> Sometimes the Pragmatic-DW cannot be possible. This means we are trapped and we must act urgently. Thus, Sartre asserts, we attempt to transform the world as if it is “not governed by deterministic processes but by magic.”<sup>185</sup> Therefore, we make ourselves emotional through suspending the Pragmatic-DW. Sartre states that emotion is “a transformation of the world” and this kind of transformation is magical.<sup>186</sup> In other words, emotion transforms the world of pragmatic determinism into the magical world.

It is very important to note that the Magical-TW does not *really* change the property or quality of the world. The world is not changed causally and structurally. We cannot really change it. Hence, instead, we try to change our consciousness by putting emotions on the world. This behaviour is called by Sartre “the magical transformation”; consciousness “tries to transform itself in order to transform the object.”<sup>187</sup> Consciousness transforms itself into a new aspect without altering the causal structure of the world. For instance, I am a coffee addict. I got up in the morning and the first thing I needed was a cup of coffee. I went to the kitchen and

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<sup>181</sup> Ibid., 39.

<sup>182</sup> O’Shiel, 2016.

<sup>183</sup> Ibid.

<sup>184</sup> Sartre, 2002: 39.

<sup>185</sup> Ibid., 40.

<sup>186</sup> Ibid., 39.

<sup>187</sup> Ibid., 40.



approached the coffee bar without knowing that the coffee machine was broken (one of my friends might have accidentally crashed it in the previous night's party). I found that the Pragmatic-DW was blocked; the coffee machine did not work as usual. Consequently, a cup of coffee could not be made. I felt that the situation was unbearable since I very much needed caffeine. At that moment, my consciousness started to transform itself by the Magical-TW. The coffee machine *appears* hateful to me. I clenched my fist and hit the machine. My heart beat like a drum. I shouted at that machine, "I hate you!". In fact, the coffee machine cannot be hated. But from the viewpoint of my magical world, the object seemed to me as something to be hated.<sup>188</sup>

To be clearer on what Sartre means by having emotion, I shall refer to some examples of emotion given by him. In sadness, Sartre says, we face difficulties and we cannot find a way out. We avoid the obligation to seek out a solution, so we transform the world into the "undifferentiated structure".<sup>189</sup> We take refuge as the world becomes bleak for us.<sup>190</sup>

The same can be said about fear. If, let us suppose, a tiger were approaching me very fast, I would most probably freeze and be unable to move; "my heart beats more feebly, I turn pale, fall down and faint away."<sup>191</sup> This behaviour is for taking refuge; it is to escape from the difficulty as I cannot use the Pragmatic-DW. I cannot demolish the world, that tiger. Therefore, I rather suppress my consciousness, shut it down from the world. In this regard, Sartre says, the bodily behaviour, such as fainting away, "represents an abrupt realisation of the bodily conditions which ordinarily accompany the passage from the waking state to sleep."<sup>192</sup> Here, one might conclude that Sartre's theory of emotion also focuses on bodily phenomena. This will be discussed later in section III. of this chapter.

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<sup>188</sup> O'shiel, 2016.

<sup>189</sup> Sartre, 2002: 44.

<sup>190</sup> Ibid.

<sup>191</sup> Ibid., 42.

<sup>192</sup> Ibid.

## Solomon on Emotion as the Engagement with the World

Besides being known as a cognitive theorist of emotion, Solomon is also recognised for taking seriously the existential phenomenological tradition, especially Sartre's existentialism, and adapting it to his work. Moreover, Solomon is considered a very important philosopher who has used phenomenological philosophy to make a dialogue with the current philosophy of emotion.<sup>193</sup> He declares a crucial inspiration from Sartre. In one passage he states: "You can appreciate just how beholden I am to Sartre, more than to anyone else."<sup>194</sup> Solomon developed and was obsessed with formulating a theory of emotion throughout his entire life. In his later works, he formulated a way to combine human emotional intelligence and reflection with an ethical theory in which it offers the idea of emotion and responsibility, and the emotional integrity.<sup>195</sup> However, for our present purposes, I shall explore his theory without dealing with ethics. Rather, I shall focus on his concept of emotion and what he means by an evaluative judgment engaging with the world. It is worth noting that to divide Solomon's work into early and late should not be done sharply. Instead, we should see that his late works clarify the early ones.

Solomon's early works seem to fit the SCT. His target was James's theory (or OFT) in which he always considered as the problem of his entire academic life. He admits, even in the late works, that such a "primitivist conception of emotions" always makes him unsatisfied.<sup>196</sup> This view, for him, is understood as "the idea that emotions are basically physiological or neurological syndromes conjoined with feelings that have only marginally to do with cognition or our engagements in the world."<sup>197</sup> He does not think it would make any sense if we talk about emotion without relating it to cognition.

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<sup>193</sup> Hatzimoysis, 2010: 216.

<sup>194</sup> Solomon, 2007: 155.

<sup>195</sup> Solomon, 2006a; Solomon, 2007.

<sup>196</sup> Solomon, 2004: 76.

<sup>197</sup> Ibid.

In Solomon's early career, he asserted the idea, with a strongly cognitive claim, that emotions are as much rational as judgments. He argued:

I would like to suggest that emotions are rational and purposive rather than irrational and disruptive, are very much like actions, and that we can choose an emotion much as we choose a course of action.<sup>198</sup>

On the one hand, this claim challenges the dominant Western thought that reason is opposed to emotion. On the other hand, it seems to be along the lines of traditional Western philosophy regarding the rationality of subjectivity and the philosophy of action, i.e. the subject forming a mental content regarding its intention or desire, which enables it to choose to perform an action caused by such a corresponding mental content. Solomon aimed to set up the project of rationalising emotion. He even refused to see emotions as having a content in the mind.

At that time, that is in the 1970s, the cognitive theory of emotion was more prominent than James's feeling theory. In this respect, Solomon seemed to neglect the physiological events connected to emotions. This led him to face the question of how to distinguish between the pure non-emotional states of judgment without the corresponding bodily feelings and the real emotional states. If one recalls the debate in Chapter One, the OFT asserts that it is unlikely for the subject to have certain emotions without the bodily feelings.

Solomon states that the term "cognitive theory of emotion" is "not a happy term".<sup>199</sup> His slogan that "emotions are judgments" is mostly considered by many as equal to the SCT. Solomon asserts that this was a misunderstanding. He points out that his position, which is that emotions are judgments, does not mean something "deliberative", "articulate", or "fully conscious" of the judgments; nor that emotions are propositional attitudes or contents in the mind.<sup>200</sup> In this regard, he reasserts, inspired by existential phenomenology, that "a judgment is not a detached intellectual

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<sup>198</sup> Solomon, 1980: 251-252.

<sup>199</sup> Solomon, 2004: 78.

<sup>200</sup> *Ibid.*, 77. (See also Solomon, 2007: 206).

act but a way of cognitively grappling with the world.”<sup>201</sup> Here, he uses the phrase “cognitively grappling with the world” to oppose a detached intellectual account implying a form of computationally and propositionally articulated judgment.

Importantly, Solomon later began to recognise the empirical evidence regarding the neurophysiological events of emotions. He, moreover, mentioned that his stance did not take issue with the empirical evidence since what he focused on was the ethical and philosophical concerns. He insisted that his stance and the recent neurophysiological discoveries “complement[ed] one another” and “face[ed] different kinds of questions.”<sup>202</sup>

Given that Solomon’s thoughts are said to be on the lines of existential phenomenology and, seemingly, the cognitive theory of emotion, I shall investigate what he means by “judgment” and/or “cognitively grappling with the world”. First, he asserts that emotions are not “in” our mind. Like Sartre, Solomon contends that all emotions are about the world. Intentionality is an essential characteristic of emotion, and the way emotions are directed is an engagement with the world. The concept of judgment in traditional Western philosophy involves the structure of intentionality understood as linguistic statement and the mind-content. Nevertheless, Solomon suggests adding a special feature which the concept of judgment and intentionality in traditional philosophy usually lack. This feature is “engagement”. The idea being that emotions are directed toward the world or intentional objects the way in which they, at the same time, are engaged or absorbed into it.<sup>203</sup> In this respect, Solomon points out that judgment is “a way of cognitively *grappling* with the world.”<sup>204</sup> Thus, this kind of judgment is not something “internal” to our mind, regarded as the propositional content inside our head. It is rather an activity of our consciousness, which is cognitively grappling with the world.

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<sup>201</sup> Ibid.

<sup>202</sup> Solomon, 2007: 203.

<sup>203</sup> Solomon, 2004: 77.

<sup>204</sup> Ibid.

Second, Solomon's concept of judgment emphasises an evaluative dimension, or, as understood in the psychology of emotion and cognitivism, a formal object.<sup>205</sup> Generally speaking, there are two kinds of objects in our emotion: a particular object and a formal object. My colleague might criticise me at a meeting and I get angry at him. My colleague is a particular object, and he appears to me in a certain way as "offending". The "offending" is a formal object; it is an evaluative property of my anger. I judge that my colleague is offended. Thus, I am angry at him.<sup>206</sup> The evaluative judgment in Solomon's formulation, however, is a cognitively non-intellectual engagement with the world—where intellect means any forms of propositional, consciously deliberative judgments.

Although the cognitively grounded theory of emotion dominated Solomon's early works, he admits having made a mistake earlier when he thought of the role of body as non-essential or secondary to emotion. Nonetheless, he later came to accept it as essential. Solomon states:

I am now coming to appreciate that accounting for the bodily feelings (not just sensations) in emotion is not a secondary concern and not independent of appreciating the essential role of the body in emotional experience. By this I do not mean anything having to do with neurology or the tricky mind-body relationship linked with Descartes and Cartesianism but rather the concern about the kinds of *bodily experience* that typify emotion and the bodily manifestations of emotion in immediate expression. These are not mere incidentals, and understanding them will provide a concrete and phenomenologically rich account of emotional feelings in place of the fuzzy and ultimately content-free notion of "affect".<sup>207</sup>

In appreciating the role of the body, Solomon emphasises the phenomenological understanding of emotional experience, including bodily expression and action, in accordance with a content-free or non-linguistic manner. In this regard, interestingly, Solomon suggests the possibility of integrating or pairing emotion and perception. He

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<sup>205</sup> Solomon, 2007: 204.

<sup>206</sup> Prinz, 2004b: 62. (See also Kenny, 2003).

<sup>207</sup> Solomon, 2004: 85.

argues: “I prefer the concept of judgment precisely because it maintains these close ties to perception but at the same time is fully conceivable apart from perception.”<sup>208</sup> In addition, he attempts to convince us that his statement “emotions are judgments” aims to connect emotion with perception.<sup>209</sup> He then talks about kinesthetic judgment and how it is the way our emotions evaluate the world:

And I insisted that we make nonreflective, nondeliberative, inarticulate judgments, for instance, kinesthetic judgments, all the time. Kinesthetic judgments are rarely deliberative and rarely merit conscious attention, but they characterize an essential aspect of our ongoing engagement in the world.<sup>210</sup>

The idea of “kinesthetic judgments”, “the judgments of the body”<sup>211</sup>, or “felt bodily engagements with the world”<sup>212</sup> seems very close to the idea of Affective Intentionality that I will discuss in Chapter Four, even though Solomon does not elaborate how this argument is possible. According to the existential phenomenological understanding, Solomon provides a possible formulation of how our emotional experiences may be understood and construed to have a special type of judgment and intentionality.

### **III. Construals and Criticism**

I shall expose more the Heideggerian and Sartrean theories of affectivity. This section includes the discussion about the attempt to combine Heidegger’s notion of mood with Sartre’s theory of emotion. Then, construals and criticism of Heidegger on the boundary between mood and emotion will be addressed. Finally, I will discuss the implication of Sartre’s theory of emotion in regard to bodily phenomena and emotional experience, which may be interpreted to integrate the bodily phenomenology with intentionality.

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<sup>208</sup> Ibid., 81.

<sup>209</sup> Ibid., 82.

<sup>210</sup> Ibid.

<sup>211</sup> Ibid., 87.

<sup>212</sup> Ibid., 88.

## Combining Heidegger's Notion of Mood with Sartre's Theory of Emotion

It is interesting to consider an articulation of the relationship between mood and emotion through the combination of Heidegger's notion of mood and Sartre's theory of emotion, as given by O'Shiel. As we have seen so far, to address the difference and the relationship between mood and emotion is a difficult task; however, O'Shiel offers a considerable formulation by attempting to combine Sartre and Heidegger's theories.

For Sartre, the Pragmatic-DW is the world that we are usually engaged with through a non-emotional state while the Magical-TW would provide an emotional state when the Pragmatic-DW is blocked. On the other hand, Heidegger asserts that in any case we cannot be moodless. The main point of difference between Heidegger and Sartre's theories of affective phenomenon is that Heidegger declares that we are always affective or mooded whereas Sartre's theory of emotion is consistent with the view that non-emotional consciousness can exist.<sup>213</sup>

Interestingly, O'Shiel nuances Heidegger's theory with Sartre's by proposing that mood is always faint while emotion is always stronger—being more intense in terms of bodily feeling, phenomenological richness, and the specific intentional object. O'Shiel offers a metaphor of mood being the extensive tectonic plate that causes a strong earthquake; such intense shaking is an occurrent emotional episode with a strongly intense bodily feeling and has a specific intentional object<sup>214</sup>; therefore, both mood and emotion form “two poles of the same dynamic”<sup>215</sup>.

In this regard, mood and emotion are under the fundamental structure of the *Befindlichkeit*. *Befindlichkeit* underlies both (mooded) non-emotional Pragmatic-DW and emotional Magical-TW. Therefore, Sartre's concept of non-emotional Pragmatic-DW can be regarded as being in the mooded world.<sup>216</sup> Accordingly, as to blending

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<sup>213</sup> O'Shiel, 2016. (See also Smith, 2016: 193).

<sup>214</sup> Ibid.

<sup>215</sup> Ibid.

<sup>216</sup> Ibid.

Heidegger with Sartre, O'Shiel suggests that there can be the mooded non-emotional consciousness that pre-reflectively acts through the Pragmatic-DW, in which the world always matters to it in one way or another. Hence, when the faintly mooded state in relation to Pragmatic-DW breaks down, the emotion would emerge stronger, shaking and breaking through the ground (tectonic plate) of mood. There could be a faint anxious mood while an anxiety attack, as an emotion, is always stronger. The mood could be strong but the corresponding emotion would be always stronger.<sup>217</sup>

O'Shiel's idea of combining Heidegger with Sartre could be illustrated as follows:

The *Befindlichkeit* → underlie (through ...) → [the two poles of the same dynamic from faint **moods** (as baseline) to stronger **emotions**]

This combination *seems* to hold that mood is a non-specific emotion in the same way as Goldie views it. Otherwise, emotion might be a specific mood. This view assume that mood is different from emotion in degree rather than kind; nevertheless, they form two poles of the same dynamic, as O'Shiel says that "mood and emotion are always of a piece".<sup>218</sup> Accordingly, the boundary between mood and emotion is very unclear. In what follows, we will see an alternative construal contending that mood is different from emotion in kind, the former existing in a distinctive category.

### **Heidegger: The Boundary between Mood and Emotion**

As we have seen, Heidegger substantially emphasises on the affective phenomenon; mood is an existential mode of the way one finds oneself in the world. Yet, some of his points may undermine the way to consider the distinction between emotion and mood. Heidegger does not make clear the relationship between emotion and mood. For example, he regards fear as a mode of Attunement, which means that it is a

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<sup>217</sup> Ibid.

<sup>218</sup> Ibid.



mood.<sup>219</sup> While it is widely accepted by emotion theorists that fear is an emotion having its intentional object, Heidegger regards fear as a mood. Surprisingly, he holds that fear has an intentional object, “as something that threatens us”<sup>220</sup>. Besides the nature of the difficulties to delineate the relation between emotion and mood, this may be another reason that several philosophers taking Heidegger’s existential dimension articulate that emotion and mood are not different in kind but degree (as we have just seen).

Notwithstanding such difficulties, mood and emotion should be considered as different. In Chapter Two, I mentioned the possibility of mood involving the structure of intentionality in its peculiar sense. Based on Heidegger’s concept of Attunement through mood, it could be construed that mood, as an existential mode, is an “openness” to the world. Mood absorbs us in-the-world at the outset; it is the ways we always find ourselves in in the mooded world. In other words, mood could be *part* of the structure of intentionality. It may be said that mood is the condition of possibility not only for emotions but also for other cognitive processes typically having specific intentional objects, like beliefs, desires, and so on.<sup>221</sup> Mood exists in its distinctive category in which it is a primordial structure of the existential mode of Dasein. This interpretation could be understood as follows:

The *Befindlichkeit* through **moods** → the condition of possibility → [**emotions** and other cognitive states like belief, desire, and so on]

Based on such an interpretation of Heidegger’s notion of mood, it could be said that mood is necessary for emotion. Hence, although we consider “fear” as an emotion, it can be regarded as having a corresponding background understood as mood. Put in another way, “fear” is an emotion and “fearfulness” is a corresponding mood. The latter conditions the possibility of the former to exist.<sup>222</sup> This view, however, seems to be weak since it is just about altering corresponding words to pair emotion with mood. Could it be also “anger” and “angriness,” “love” and

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<sup>219</sup> Heidegger, 2008: 179.

<sup>220</sup> Ibid. (See also Elpidorou and Freeman, 2015: 668).

<sup>221</sup> Elpidorou and Freeman, 2015; Freeman, 2014; Ratcliffe, 2005a.

<sup>222</sup> Elpidorou and Freeman, 2015: 668.

“loveliness,” “hate” and “hatefulness,” and the like? This articulation seems to be redundant. Moreover, one may ask whether fear, for example, can be conditioned by a mood other than fearfulness. Or, whether fearfulness can condition an emotion other than fear.

Even though this interpretation may not resolve the problem of the boundary between emotion and mood (fear, in Heidegger’s case) being obscure, it is still tenable, I believe, to accept the view that Attunement through mood is the condition of possibility for other cognitive states, including emotion. Again, this view shows that mood and emotion are different in kind.

Heidegger’s concept of Attunement through mood is very useful in understanding how we engage with the world in the first place. It could be said that the emotional episodes and other mental states cannot be possible if we are not able to attune the way the world matters to us.

### **Sartre: Bodily Phenomena and Emotional Experience**

I shall discuss Sartre and Solomon’s theories of emotion. I shall argue that their theories understood as alleged cognitivism is not as strong as the SCT suggested. Thus, I regard Sartre and Solomon’s theories as the “weak” cognitive theory of emotion.

Sartre’s *Sketch for a Theory of Emotions* was published in 1939. He seemed to foresee the criticism that followed James’s theory. Since the 1960s, the cognitivism of emotion has influenced emotion research significantly. Afterwards, it was criticised again at about the end of the twentieth century by the neo-Jamesians. However, if we look carefully at Sartre’s theory, it may not be as strongly cognitive as traditional cognitivism is. Furthermore, the phenomenological approach to emotion depicted by Sartre deserves to be reinvestigated as it may have the potential of being compatible with the proper theory of emotion today: emotions are intentional, evaluative, bodily felt in a certain way, and have their phenomenal character.

I mentioned in Chapter One that Sartre's theory of emotion could be regarded as a Weak Cognitive Theory of emotion, hence it will be hereafter called "WCT". By "weak", I mean two aspects. First, the theory does not require propositions or linguistic commitments to evaluate the subject's emotions. As we saw, Solomon, while endorsing Sartre, also subscribes to this view. Second, it does not totally neglect the role of the body. Therefore, it tends to be construed as considering the bodily phenomena to be an important, non-secondary, component. Having noting that, it could be said, in this sense, that Sartre's theory of emotion does not exhaust the WCT. There can be other forms of WCT. For example, as we will see in Chapter Four, the perceptual theory of emotion could be regarded as a form of WCT for it does not assert that the intentional contents of emotions are necessarily propositions or involve language, and it does not dismiss the bodily phenomenology.

It is interesting to look at the role of the body in Sartre's theory of emotion. As Sartre suggests, emotion is the magical transformation of the world. Since the world is difficult, we cannot at times apply the Pragmatic-DW. Therefore, consciousness tries to change the world by changing itself magically. In this respect, Sartre argues, consciousness requires an instrument to transform the world. Accordingly, the body becomes the instrument Sartre requires. He states:

In a word, during emotion, it is the body which, directed by the consciousness, changes its relationship with the world so that the world should change its qualities. If emotion is play-acting, the play is one that we believe in.<sup>223</sup>

The play, in this context, means the magical world. When we transform the world into a novel magical one, it becomes this new world in which we believe in or wish to be real, even though the structure of the world does not really change. Furthermore, the new aspect of the magical world, experienced by our consciousness and our bodily phenomena in regard to emotion, is *real* for us; it overwhelms us, and we *believe in* it.

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<sup>223</sup> Sartre, 2002: 40.

Sartre regards the body as the instrument or the means to attain the magical world of emotions. Emotions are “reducible to the constitution of a magic world, by making use of our bodies as instruments of *incantation*” (emphasis mine).<sup>224</sup> Sartre uses the word “incantation” to emphasise the way in which our bodily behaviour performs in our emotional experience. In such a transformation, our body incants the magic by changing the relationship between itself and the world. One should note that the “magic” here is not something supernatural or mysterious. It is just the way in which the new aspect of the world appears and is experienced through our embodied consciousness. Besides, that new aspect of the world can be understood as our refuge from a difficult situation or an unpleasant world. Thus, we use emotions to live in a magical world.<sup>225</sup> The bodily phenomena, moreover, are felt through our lived-body at the same time that we use them to incant the magical world.

In the philosophy of emotion, one tends to classify Solomon’s theory, whose formulation is highly inspired by Sartre, under the SCT, which overlooks the role of the body. The fact is that bodily phenomena are very important in Sartre’s theory since they inform us that we are having a certain emotion. Sartre stresses that “we can understand the part played by the purely physiological phenomena; they represent the *genuineness* of the emotion, they are the phenomena of belief.”<sup>226</sup> He also asserts that emotion cannot be mimed or fake acted. “Real emotion . . . is accompanied by belief.”<sup>227</sup>

Even though Sartre refers to the dual nature of the body—one is an object in the world, namely a physical body, and another is lived by consciousness, lived-body—many consider Sartre’s theory as a pure cognitively grounded theory in regard to belief. However, what Sartre means by *belief* requires more investigation since, as I mentioned, his theory of emotion can be construed as the WCT. So, the *belief* here may not be regarded in accordance with the traditional analytic philosophy, which is mostly concerned with the proposition and the truth condition.

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<sup>224</sup> Ibid., 47.

<sup>225</sup> In latter work, *Being and Time*, Sartre regards this way of transformation of the world as a bad faith.

<sup>226</sup> Sartre, 2002: 49-50.

<sup>227</sup> Ibid., 49.

What Sartre means by *belief* can be construed in the following way: in the emotional experience upon the magical world, we must believe that the evaluative property regarding the bodily phenomenon (the object appearing through our embodied consciousness as horrifying) is *real*. Although it is true that, “if emotion is play-acting, the play is one that we believe in”, such a play, which we believe in, is *real* for us. Sartre insists that “[t]he qualities ‘willed’ upon the objects are taken to be real”.<sup>228</sup> Mainly, the bodily phenomena inform us that such a magical world is real. When experiencing fear, our heart rate is increased, our muscle is tensed, our hands tremble, and so on. We are “spell-bound and filled to overflowing”<sup>229</sup> by our bodily feeling and behaviour in relation to emotion. Accordingly, our bodily behaviour is obvious; Sartre holds that in fear we faint away. The bodily phenomena in this case are the phenomena of *belief*.

In discussing Sartre’s notion of emotional experience, Smith interestingly insists that the role of the body is central to Sartre’s theory of emotion; however, he suggests that it is not clear what Sartre means by “emotional behaviour”.<sup>230</sup> We shall investigate what Smith argues here. He remarks that the bodily phenomena (which Sartre calls “emotional behaviour”) can be divided into three aspects: 1) bodily changes, 2) bodily expression, and 3) bodily action.<sup>231</sup> For instance, when I am happy, I feel that my body is changing and that it feels relaxed. I smile, expressing enjoyment, and I may act in a certain way, like going to the bar to celebrate my happiness, or play the music and move my body to dance. Accordingly, in attempting to analyse how Sartre places these three aspects of bodily phenomena, Smith concludes that: “In short, bodily expression and action confer the affective quality on the object; bodily changes constitute one’s ‘believing’ in it.”<sup>232</sup>

As Sartre, as a phenomenologist, is mostly inspired by Husserl and Heidegger, he believes that the body has two dimensions: the physical body and the lived-body. The bodily phenomena regarding emotion, for him, on the one hand, appear in the

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<sup>228</sup> Ibid.

<sup>229</sup> Ibid.

<sup>230</sup> Smith, 2016: 189.

<sup>231</sup> Ibid., 189-190.

<sup>232</sup> Ibid, 190.

observable subpersonal domain, like action and behaviour. On the other hand, they also have the first-person experience as it is lived. In this regard, emotions are felt through the lived-body.<sup>233</sup> Indeed, Sartre shares the common idea the theorists of emotion today hold. The emotion is not exhausted by external bodily behaviour—action and expression. There is more to emotion than observed behaviour. It is also about the first-person account of emotion—precisely for Sartre, the pre-reflective conscious experience through the lived-body.

Even though Sartre emphasises on the lived-body, he seems to suggest that consciousness directs and guides the body. He seems to place consciousness at the centre and regard the body as marginal; the body seems to be lived in somehow by virtue of the higher order of consciousness. By having emotions, the body is the *instrument* for consciousness to transform the world magically. It is not clear whether he places the lived-body as the centre of having emotion or he regards it as subordinate or secondary. Sartre is occasionally criticised by many for being, according to them, trapped in the Cartesian dichotomy for distinguishing, in his later work, the reality into the for-it-self and the in-it-self.<sup>234</sup> However, to be fair, this proposition suggests that Sartre's theory of emotion should be reinterpreted. As we saw, Solomon's latter formulation accepts the important role of the bodily phenomenon. This could be interpreted as the modified version of Sartre's theory of emotion. Solomon-Sartre's theory implies kinesthetic judgments, which require clearer articulation and amendment for the unification view of intentionality and phenomenology regarding emotional experience. In the next chapter, we will see such attempt which is influenced by an existential phenomenological philosophy.

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<sup>233</sup> O'Shiel, 2016.

<sup>234</sup> Sartre, 1992.

## Conclusion

In this chapter, I have explored the theories of affectivity in the phenomenological tradition; I have investigated Heidegger's notion of Attunement through mood and Sartre's theory of emotion.

I argue that, as to interpreting Heidegger's idea of affectivity, although it is difficult to say that mood is intentional, it can still be regarded as part of the structure of intentionality or the openness to the world. Crucially, Heidegger's philosophy suggests that Attunement through mood is an existential mode of the way one finds oneself in the world. This structure, thus construed, makes other mental phenomena and cognitive processes—including emotions—possible.

Sartre proposes that emotions are the magical transformation of the world when the normal pragmatically deterministic world is blocked; we magically transform the world by changing the relation between our body and the world. In this regard, we incant the magical world through the lived-body. Therefore, while the real world is not changed causally and structurally, the magical world *appears* to us as emotional. Solomon endorses Sartre's theory by asserting that emotions are the way we are engaged with the world; emotions are judgement in the sense that they are the felt bodily engagement with the world. Accordingly, Sartre-Solomon's theory could be considered a contribution to the contemporary philosophy of emotion as a way to unify intentionality and bodily phenomenology. However, warrants further elaboration as we will see in the next chapter.

In the following chapter, I shall focus further on the problem of emotion. I shall argue in more detail for the notion of embodied emotion to formulate an appropriate understanding of emotions, which are intentional, evaluative, bodily felt, and involve an experiential dimension within the phenomenological framework.

## Chapter Four

# Phenomenological Embodied Emotion and Affective Intentionality

While studying and trying to understand emotion, one should know that there are facts which are undeniable today. First, among different approaches of emotion theories, the scientific evidence provides non-trivial biological facts about the neurophysiological system involving the role of a physical structure such as the body. Accordingly, emotions are essentially involved in bodily phenomena. Non-human creatures, which have their own bodily functions, also have some kinds of emotion. Second, in the light of the philosophical and psychological methodology, it is inevitable to focus on the structure of the intentionality of emotion. It traditionally dignities human rationality, and involves the thinking processes of cognition. In this traditional view, when it turns to study emotion, it typically requires an ability to understand the meaning for conceptualising the intentional objects of emotions. Importantly, the structure of intentionality provides significations and evaluations in one way or another for the emotive subject.

I agree with these two facts, inspired by John Deigh. He asserts that there are two facts about an emotion that theorists of emotion today should hold: “[E]motions are intentional states in the sense that they are directed at something . . . [and] emotions are common to both humans and beasts.”<sup>235</sup> The first part of this statement is related to the rationality of human beings. In other words, it necessarily accounts for the structure of intentionality or some forms of evaluation. The latter involves (subpersonal) physiological events and includes primitive emotions or basic emotions such as anger, fear, disgust, and so on, that are shared by biological creatures like

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<sup>235</sup> Deigh, 2004: 9.



human beings and non-human beings. Deigh firmly believes that theorists must accept these facts to gain an appropriate theory of emotion.<sup>236</sup>

As we have seen earlier, the fact that emotions are intentional contradicts the fact that emotions are related to the physiological phenomenon. This contradiction is partly like the problem between the SCT and the OFT in the sense that it divides the problem into the mind-body split. To accept both aspects, the theorists of emotion typically enumerate the components of emotion that are related to various parts, i.e. physiological arousals, facial expressions, behaviours, subjective feelings, cognitive appraisals (judgments), and so on. Although there are recent theorists who regard these components as parts of emotions, the cognitively grounded and physiological nature is still considered as “separate constituents of emotion”<sup>237</sup>. This seems to be in the pitfall of Cartesian mind-body split.

Yet, those two facts are inadequate for a comprehensive understanding of emotion. There is a third fact in which emotional states typically are emotional experiences. To say that emotions are involved in the bodily events would also imply that they are experienced. To experience emotions is to feel what it is likeness of certain emotions. This fact partly converges with the OFT, in which the bodily feelings are regarded as subjective experiences. However, being different from the OFT, emotional experiences are directed at something in the world. At this point Slaby’s proposition sounds relevant. He argues that “it is now widely agreed that emotions are *experiential* with intentional content” (emphasis mine).<sup>238</sup> The “experiential” suggests an experiential aspect from the personal point of view—the first-person perspective or the conscious experience. Arguably, it could be said that the phenomenology of emotion is a constitutive part of emotions.<sup>239</sup> For a less radical claim, one may hold that most, but not all emotions are conscious experiences.

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<sup>236</sup> Ibid., 10. (See also Furtak, 2010).

<sup>237</sup> Colombetti and Thompson, 2008: 45.

<sup>238</sup> Slaby, 2008: 431.

<sup>239</sup> Kriegel also asserts that “emotions are essentially phenomenal”. See Kriegel, 2015: 35.

These three facts (that emotions are intentional, evaluative, and involve physiological and experiential aspects) are the crucial point of the present study. The task at hand is to formulate *how to reconcile these facts*. In this chapter, I shall attempt to provide a solution.

In section I., I shall explore the concept of embodiment or embodied cognition in both non-phenomenological and phenomenological approaches for setting up the formulation to reconcile the standard theories of emotion.<sup>240</sup>

In section II., I shall discuss the advanced theories of emotion which attempt to modify the standard theories. These alternative theories are 1) Prinz's theory of embodied appraisal and 2) the perceptual theory of emotion. I will reveal the ways in which these formulations are unlikely to succeed for an appropriate understanding of emotion since they treat the cognitive dimension and bodily phenomena as independent of each other. Thus, they are inadequate for a phenomenological insight.

In section III., I will offer a formulation that seems to be tenable for integrating intentionality with bodily phenomenology in a unification view.

First, I shall offer a solution for the tensions between the OFT and SCT by positing the special form of intentionality, which is called by Slaby "Affective Intentionality." To do so requires the unification view, which does not treat intentionality and bodily phenomenology as separate from each other. In this respect, I shall argue that the notion of Affective Intentionality enables us to claim that emotions are intentional, cognitively evaluative, and bodily felt.

Second, I shall argue that for a comprehensive understanding of emotion, it should be regarded as the embodied emotion. Importantly, this view needs the formulations which do not dismiss phenomenological accounts—the lived-body and

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<sup>240</sup> In a nutshell, the non-phenomenological approach of embodiment could be understood in another phrase as an empirical-scientific approach of embodiment, which refers to the concept of embodiment from all branches of science, for example, neurocognitive science, computer science, robotics and A.I. studies, psychology, and so on. This approach suggests that a conceptualisation of embodiment overlooks the phenomenology of embodied subjectivity and the role of lived-body.

the first-person perspective. I shall take up the phenomenological embodiment approach and combine it with an enactive approach. Therefore, an enactive approach to embodied emotion will be introduced. Moreover, I shall argue that the enactive approach to embodied emotion provides the phenomenological adequacy and is consistent with the notion of Affective Intentionality.

## I. Exploring the Concept of Embodiment

There is a common view that investigating the disembodied mind is the main road to understanding human mind and subjectivity—extending from self to belief, desire, intention, emotion, perception, action, behaviour, and so on. This view tends to articulate the relation between the mind and body in one direction. The disembodied mind/brain controls the body; the former overwhelms the latter. In other words, the mind causes the behaviour. It sees the bodily aspect as peripheral. The emphasis on the centrality of the mind has dominated philosophy of mind, psychology, and cognitive science. However, this view has been challenged recently.

There are scientific studies revealing that the body plays a more important role in our mental phenomena and life than we usually think. One might ask: Can the body affect our mind? Some scientists, for instance, Justin Sonnenburg and Erica Sonnenburg, are quite confident about it. Their research reveals that our gut or digestive system could be viewed as the second brain for it can affect or inform something to our mental life, for example, moods and feelings. There is an essential link between our brain and gut. This exposition is not a metaphorical connection but is real as pieces of scientific evidence have shown; the connections as such are neural networks, and chemical and hormonal mechanisms.<sup>241</sup> Justin Sonnenburg and Erica Sonnenburg point out:

The enteric nervous system is often referred to as our body's second brain. There are hundreds of million of neurons connecting the brain to the enteric nervous system, the part of the nervous system that is tasked with controlling the gastrointestinal system. . . . *The enteric nervous system is so extensive*

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<sup>241</sup> Justin Sonnenburg and Erica Sonnenburg, 2015.

*that it can operate as an independent entity without input from our central nervous system, although they are in regular communication (emphasis mine).*<sup>242</sup>

The gut, with an enteric nervous system, can perform independent operations, as the so-called second brain. Presumably, the communications between the brain and body are not a simple one-way direction as the brain commands the body. Conversely, the gut could perform the operations independently, and eventually affect the mind. Furthermore, a huge number of microbes in our digestive system also play a role in affecting our mental phenomena, such as our perception of the world and our everyday feelings:

Recent evidence indicates that not only is our brain “aware” of our gut microbes, but these bacteria can influence our perception of the world and alter our behavior. It is becoming clear that the influence of our microbiota reaches far beyond the gut to affect an aspect of our biology few would have predicted—our mind. For example, the gut microbiota influences the body’s level of the potent neurotransmitter serotonin, which regulates feelings of happiness.<sup>243</sup>

I am here trying to show how crucial the role of the body is. Importantly, one should bear in mind that I would not go too far by supporting the claim that bodily constraints and physical causations strongly determine human mind in terms of the core biological determinism which is opposed to the philosophical conception of subjectivity and individualism.<sup>244</sup> I am only arguing that we should not neglect the role of the body. As we will see, the crucial role of the body in cognition as

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<sup>242</sup> Ibid.

<sup>243</sup> Ibid.

<sup>244</sup> Recently, there are psychologists believe that human beings are rather superorganisms than individuals. We are determined by foreign microbes that in somehow have entered to our body, for example, the infections from foods or from mother’s womb at the time of birth. (See Faber, 2015). This view rejects the philosophical conception of subjectivity, self, agency, and even a personhood. Although I reject a traditional view of philosophy, which overmuch emphasises on a disembodied mind, I do not dismiss the view that human beings—as embodied subjectivity—are aware themselves as individual self and personhood.

understood today, that is the embodied cognition, is not just interpreted as a *causal* role but also as a *constitutive* role. Unfortunately, the role of the body has been marginalized by many philosophers for a long time; they have regarded the bodily realm involving the affective part of life as opposed to human rationality, which is based on the concept of representational mind in the brain.

In the recent decades, however, some researchers and scientists have considered the role of the body to be prominent in the theoretical and empirical understanding human mind, i.e. the theory of embodied cognition. Scientific disciplines are not the only ones to simultaneously consider the role of the body and the notion of embodied cognition. Phenomenologists, who propose the notion of lived-body and embodied subjectivity, are also responsible for this fashion.

In this section, I will explore the concept of embodiment which has been conceptualised in different criteria by the embodiment theorists. Nonetheless, these conceptualisations similarly aim to get rid of two views. First, they oppose the traditional Western philosophical view that conceptualises the mind (or cognition) as the disembodied mind, including the soul, which is the so-called Cartesian mind, or the Dualism standpoint. Second, they tend to reject the strong (reductive) materialism of the mind which considers the mind as nothing other than brain states; all mental states are reduced to the neural activities inside the mechanical brain.<sup>245</sup> This latter view is also consistent with the form of Cartesian mind. The embodiment theories attempt to dismiss such a traditional view. In other words, they aim to rule out the mind-body (or brain-body) problem.

Before exploring the conception of embodiment, we shall examine the notion of Cartesian mind responsible for the mind-body problem in the philosophical debate. One of the dominant philosophical ideas in Western thought is Dualism; there are two

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<sup>245</sup> I put the modifier “strong” for materialism to emphasise that it is understood as a reductivism about the mind; the mind is nothing other than the materiality of brain processes. There can be a “weak” materialism holding that the study of the mind through a non-reductive framework is possible. This view would be considered as naturalism in a *broad* sense. In other words, it is a *weak* or *non-reductive* naturalism. Some may think of a theory of embodied cognition as *weak* or *non-reductive* naturalism.

separate substances in a metaphysical sense. Even though human beings are composed of a mind and a body, the two are different things. The former is invisible and unobservable; only its subject can access and know it. The latter is visible and extends in space; an observer can objectively discover it in nature. The theory of Dualism has a long history. One reason is that it is compatible with religious thought, the eternal soul. On the other hand, in ancient philosophy, the very root of Dualism is a Platonic theory of Idea or Form, as a priori and innate idea which can be recollected by the mind.

The idea that “I am a thinking thing” was conceptualised by Rene Descartes in the early modern age, reinforcing the concept of Dualism. The idea of Dualism might be known later as Cartesian Split of mind-body. The proponents tend to focus on the mind in the brain and dismiss the role of body. This stance is quite different from what Descartes meant. For example, in explaining what the human being is, Descartes might not totally reject the role of the body as some of the later Cartesianism does. Furthermore, Descartes holds that even though the mind is invisible and nonphysical, it is probably located somewhere in the human brain, i.e. he assumes that the mind is located at the pineal gland. However, the pineal gland falls short of solving the mind-body problem. One should note that the notion of the Cartesian mind, suggests two facts: (i) the mind is nonphysical, and (ii) it is in the *head* or *brain*.<sup>246</sup>

Philosophy of mind has faced the tension with science, the question of whether it can be a science of mind. As we just saw, this issue has two sides: Materialism and Dualism. The former believes that the science of mind is possible; the latter contends that it is not feasible since science is the study of objects and mechanical worlds, and the mind is not just material. However, both sides have problems.

Materialism can be criticised by its opponents by contending that science could tell us what the brain *does* in the processes of thinking, but this does not mean it can tell us what the thinking *is*, or what the mind *is*. It could be said that the study of consciousness in the contemporary time is phenomenology; the study of conscious

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<sup>246</sup> Rowlands, 2010: 10-12.

experiences from the personal point of view. The strong materialist can respond by arguing that such an inner life or conscious experience is just an illusion; our mind mistakenly holds that there are experiences from the personal point of view. Hence, the idea of inner life should be eliminated.

On the other hand, the Dualism is also confronted with questions. Only physical things can be observed. How can we assure that the mind is not physical, if we want to gain objective knowledge of the mind? If the mind is not physical, how can a non-physical thing change a physical thing, the environment, and the world? How can we form the content of intention in our mind, then, move our hand to grasp a glass of water in the material world? Moreover, Dualism seems to be consistent with religious and spiritual beliefs, as in the soul remaining after the body is dead. However, the scientific enterprise takes issue with this.

One way to dismiss Dualism is to opt for Materialism. Since the nineteenth century most scientists as well as some philosophers have regarded the mind as brain activities, which is a strong materialist approach. As a result, a number of scientists hold the extreme view of the Cartesian split, although this division has shifted from mind-body split to brain-body split. The extreme case of this today is that some even believe that human head transplant is possible. This belief holds that the material mind is in the skull. Materialism, nonetheless, rejects only the fact that the mind is nonphysical while still holds that the mind is in the head (brain). Thus, it could be said that Materialism is still trapped in the Cartesian view of mind. The entire discussion in philosophy has been stuck in the problem of Cartesianism. In any case, Dualism and Materialism seem to neglect the role of the body. The notion of embodiment has been formulated to overcome the concept of Cartesian mind.<sup>247</sup>

It is essential to consider the word “embodiment” or “embodied cognition”, which has become part of common usage today among many researchers in the study of the mind. The word “embody” is the verb that—in general terms—means “to include or to contain (something) as a constituent part”. It may also mean to incorporate (something). The word is the combination of “em-” and “body”. The

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<sup>247</sup> Rowlands, 2010: 12-13.

morpheme “em-” means “in” or “into”. The body literally means the body of an organism; corporeality (which is derived from the Latin “*corporis*” and means body). It can also mean the main part of something. I think the word “embodied” as used in “embodied cognition” or “embodiment” implies there is something *in* the body. For example, cognition is in the body. In this regard, it could be said that an “embodied cognition” includes the bodily aspect as a *constituent* part of cognition. However, the concept of embodied cognition is not exhausted by the constitutive principle.

Many theorists discuss the concept of embodiment in phenomenology, philosophy of mind, psychology, cognitive science, neuroscience, biology, social science, and so on. The very broad conception of embodiment is that cognition is not exhausted by brain activity. This view is opposed to the standard conception of cognition in the traditional cognitive science and philosophy of mind framework, which holds that cognition is processed merely by brain activities or mind in relation to intentionality, language, and proposition.

It is fair to say that the concept of embodiment has a fundamental basis in phenomenological philosophy as well as cognitive science and psychology. Regardless of the way the concept is used, embodiment essentially has to do with cognition. The common view of embodied cognition is that cognition is an interaction between the brain, the body, and even the world. However, as we will see, there are different approaches to the conceptualisation of embodiment, and it is difficult to unify them under a single theory. The theorisation of embodied cognition is still scattered and flustered.

This section will explore the different approaches to embodiment theories. For the purpose of clarification on an analytical level, I would place them under two categories: 1) non-phenomenological approach to the embodiment (NPE) and 2) phenomenological approach to the embodiment (PE). One should bear in mind that I make such a distinction in order to differentiate the formulation which de-emphasises the phenomenological insight from another formulation which emphasises a phenomenological embodied subjectivity in regard to bodily experience and lived-body. Nonetheless, as we will see, to categorise completely the conceptualisations of embodiment is unlikely to be successful, and these different approaches may overlap.



## Non-Phenomenological Approach to Embodiment (NPE)

In general, the concept of embodied cognition is understood among researchers in different ways; the categorisations are very diverse. Kriegel recommends that using the notion of embodied cognition is sometimes conceptually confusing. He points out:

One pervasive confusion in this area [embodied cognition research program] pertains to whether the body's role in cognition is *causal* or *constitutive*: whether the body merely enables cognition that is strictly speaking performed by the brain, or on the contrary the body itself does the cognizing.<sup>248</sup>

The former regards the role of the body as a *cause* of cognition which primarily rests on the performance of the brain beneath the skull. In other words, the body can affect the mind but would not be a constitutive part of cognition. The latter counts the role of the body itself as the *constitutive part* of cognition, which is the cooperative interaction between brain, body, and environment. Kriegel proposed that there is no consensus over definition of embodied cognition among philosophers as well as scientists.<sup>249</sup>

Furthermore, Shapiro suggested that “embodied cognition” cannot be unified into a single formulation, i.e. there can be embodied cognition researchers holding the representational theory, whereas others endorsing the non-representational theory. Both sides are important to understand the embodied cognition theory.<sup>250</sup> Shapiro believed that the concept of embodiment can be categorised into three strategies. He also stressed that these categories can overlap.

Let me briefly draw Shapiro's three strategies regarding embodied cognition. First comes the hypothesis of Conceptualisation. It is the view that the different properties of the body of organisms determine the way they can understand the world.

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<sup>248</sup> Kriegel, 2014: 5.

<sup>249</sup> Ibid.

<sup>250</sup> Shapiro, 2011: 67.

Thus, the different types of the body (or organism) will provide the different worlds they engage with.

Second comes the hypothesis of Replacement. The aim of this hypothesis is to reject the standard view of cognition just as the hypothesis of Conceptualisation does. The standard view is that cognition is a computational and representational view of mind understood as input-output symbolic information processing. This orthodox view is replaced by a dynamical system theory which rejects the representational theory. It holds that cognition is the emergence of constant interaction or equal integration of the brain, the body, and the environment without recourse to representation and computation.

Third, the hypothesis of Constitution is an attempt to identify the constituents of cognition, the brain being not the only one to constitute the mind. It holds that the body is a constitutive part of the mind. Some go further to propose that the mind extends beyond the body, to the world. This view is not opposed to the traditional representational theory of mind. Therefore, it attempts to develop the standard view of mind in cognitive science instead of replacing or dismissing it. The aim is to understand the cognition in regard to the constituents of the cognitive process. Rather than taking place only inside the head, the cognitive processes can extend beyond the brain by combining with the body and the material world within the computational framework. This view could be understood as the theory of the extended mind as formulated by Clark and Chalmers. They propose that cognition can be processed upon the supervenience of the interaction between the brain, the body, and the material world. For example, when we use the Google Maps on a smartphone to cognise and compute the place we are going to.<sup>251</sup>

Shapiro clearly concludes about these three strategies that:

*Conceptualization* competes with standard cognitive science and loses.

*Replacement* competes with standard cognitive science and wins in some domains, but likely loses in others. *Constitution* does not compete with

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<sup>251</sup> See Clark and Chalmers, 1998.

standard cognitive science, but pushes it to extend its boundaries further than many of its practitioners would have anticipated (emphasis mine).<sup>252</sup>

I will here not discuss which one of Shapiro's strategies is reasonable. What I would remark on the other hand is that his categorisation of the concept of embodiment seems to overlook the experiential dimension. Precisely, it dismisses the importance of the phenomenological insight. Although the hypothesis of Conceptualisation refers to Varela, Thompson, and Rosch's work, which incorporates the phenomenological tradition, it seems to largely overlook the phenomenological dimension of lived-body and lived-experience.

Let me give an example of another formulation of the concept of embodied cognition which pays very less attention to the phenomenological tradition. Goldman divides the research on embodied cognition into two categories: 1) computer science, A.I., and robotics and 2) cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience.<sup>253</sup> These approaches seem to distance themselves from phenomenological philosophy and neglect the first-person experience of the lived-body.

### **Phenomenological Approach to Embodiment (PE)**

Our mind, as we have seen, determines our body and vice versa. It is hard to imagine that I woke up in the morning to find that I was conscious without feeling that I had a body, or that I was a body. First of all, the proof of me being there, in my room, is having the feeling or perception through my body, which is surrounded by the room and the environment. After I got conscious of the bodily feeling and was assured that I was alive, I would most probably suspend the body by pushing it to the background and sink in my mental thoughts: "What is the date today? Today is Monday. I have a meeting with my supervisor." Then, I would move my body to get off the bed and prepare for the meeting. On the other hand, let us suppose that I suddenly felt that I had fever. In that case, the bodily feeling would be prominent for my consciousness as a foreground. I might think, "Well, I have a high temperature." One may ask: What

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<sup>252</sup> Shapiro, 2011: 210.

<sup>253</sup> Goldman, 2014: 91.

is the “I” that has a high temperature? Is it the pure disembodied mind or brain? Of course not. It might be my physical body. Alternatively, it should be *me* who lives through the body that has a high temperature.

It could be said that feeling of bodily heat glosses my emotional life. For I am not separated from the body, the whole world seems to heat through my experience of it. The high temperature not only affects my physical body but also glosses my emotional feeling as lived. Then, I would not feel like getting up. I may think to myself, “I have a fever. I am not in the mood to discuss my work. I should call my supervisor to postpone the meeting.” Then, I grab my mobile phone and make a call. Afterwards, I go to the hospital. A doctor might measure my physical body’s temperature with a thermometer. However, it seems to be inadequate for him. He might ask me, “So, what do you feel?”. In such a situation, I would like to admit that I am quite not sure how to explain what I feel since it is my subjective feeling which I feel through the *lived-body*. I might say I feel not good but this cannot be my entire experience. The objectification of my physical body can not satisfy the doctor. Here, the body plays a crucial role as a *subject* rather than an object.

As the previous section shows, researchers may use the word “embodied” or “embodiment” in a different way from the one articulated in phenomenological philosophy. The word may be used to stress the role of an interaction between the physical body and the brain by neglecting *lived-body* and *lived-experience*. This formulation objectifies the body as a physical body just as the empirical science does. In fact, when the concept of embodied subjectivity is within the framework of the phenomenological tradition, it has to be committed to two notions. First, rather than being a mere physical body, it is the *lived-body* which is lived by the body-as-subject. Second, the *lived-experience*, which is the first-person experience of the embodied subjectivity, complements the *lived-body*.<sup>254</sup> Thus, the embodied subjectivity is understood based on an ontological ground.

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<sup>254</sup> Enactive approach formulated by Colombetti also emphasises on the notions of *lived-body* and *lived-experience*. See Colombetti, 2014.

The notion of embodied subjectivity emerged in the phenomenological tradition nearly at the end of the nineteenth century from Husserl's work and had continually developed afterwards by later phenomenologists in the twentieth century, like Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, and so on. The phenomenological approach to embodiment can be understood as the phenomenology of the body. Fortunately, the concept of embodiment has been more and more accepted since the end of the twentieth century by cognitive scientists, who have intensively produced more pieces of empirical evidence. However, the scientists have gradually dismissed the emphasis on the lived-experiential aspect.

Concerning the phenomenology of body, Husserl distinguishes between two meanings of the body. The body can be understood through two categories: a physical body and a lived-body. The former is the body that can be scientifically discovered, objectified, and observed from the third-person perspective. Thus, one could say: "I have a physical body." The latter can be accessed, felt, and consciously experienced by the embodied subjectivity—the lived-body as the subject—from the first-person perspective. So, one could say: "I am a living body."<sup>255</sup> The inquiry of PE regarding lived-body and lived-experience can expose many insightful dimensions of the embodied subjectivity. The embodied subject experiences itself as the sense of agency and as the subject of the ownership (the sense of ownness that undergoes certain experiences). Moreover, the embodied subjectivity experiences itself as an embedded or situated subject (the embodied subject exists or situates itself amidst the relation between itself and the world) and as an affective subject (by virtue of having embodied emotion).<sup>256</sup>

The idea of embodied cognition regarding the bodily experience as the *constitutive* part of cognition is not exhausted by the PE. For example, the AI studies and the idea of extended mind hold that the computational, informational character of cognition could be said to be embodied in terms of the constitutive part of cognition. Importantly, one should note that, in general, the formulation of embodied cognition,

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<sup>255</sup> See Husserl, 2000; Merleau-Ponty, 2005.

<sup>256</sup> Colombetti and Thompson, 2008: 57. (See also Gallagher, 2014: 13-16).

whether it be the NPE or PE, does not dismiss the role of the brain. Thus, it means that the brain is necessary but not sufficient for cognition.

For the time being, what I want to point out is that:

- Broadly speaking, the NPE is compatible with the computational and representational feature, while, not surprisingly, the PE rejects the representational theory of mind.
- To advocate the concept of embodiment, it is not necessary to reject the computational and representational theory of mind. At the same time, to oppose the representational theory of mind is not necessary to adopt the PE.<sup>257</sup>

Bower and Gallagher propose that there can be two approaches to understanding the notion of embodiment. First, there is embodiment as lived-body subjectivity, which accesses the conscious experiences pre-reflectively. In other words, it is the approach to embodiment from the personal or subjective point of view. This approach can be understood as the PE. Second, there is embodiment as physical body, which involves the neurophysiological and brain activities at the objective point of view. In this view, cognition requires the bodily processes, even though the subject is not consciously aware of these processes. This can be understood as the NPE. Bower and Gallagher also points out that these two approaches could be integrated to some extent, although they cannot entirely overlap.<sup>258</sup>

As we have seen, the concept of embodiment is very diverse and can be categorised by different principles. I am more convinced by Bower and Gallagher's categorisation since my work is concerned with the phenomenological approach.

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<sup>257</sup> For instance, James Gibson's ecological approach formulates the concept of embodied cognition without dealing with phenomenological philosophy, even though it is known that Gibson was aware of Merleau-Ponty's work at the time. (See Käufer and Chemero, 2015: 145).

<sup>258</sup> Bower and Gallagher, 2013.

According to his lecture on embodied cognition, Gallagher tries to re-categorise the concept of embodied cognition. Still, he emphasises that the embodied cognition is “an unsettled concept”<sup>259</sup>. He sketches five different approaches to embodied cognition:

(1) A weak or minimal form of embodiment defended by Goldman and others, where the body is equated to B-formatted representations in the brain. (2) Biological embodiment that emphasizes the contribution of anatomy and movement to cognition. (3) Semantic embodiment, which includes the work of Lakoff and Johnson on metaphor and higher-order cognition. (4) Functionalist embodiment (the extended mind hypothesis). And (5) Enactive embodiment which emphasizes sensory-motor contingencies, but also affect and intersubjectivity, and rejects representationalism.<sup>260</sup>

The first four approaches formulate the concept of embodied cognition by not engaging with phenomenological philosophy. I would not investigate them in detail. The point here is that the last approach, an enactive embodiment, is the only strategy which is related to the phenomenological tradition. Surprisingly, it seems to be a marginal approach in the embodied cognition research.

The Gallagher’s sketch on the various ideas of embodied cognition implies two points. First, the idea of embodied cognition in the research has been formulated more in relation to the non-phenomenological tradition than the phenomenological one. The empirical framework has dominated the way the theorists formulate the theory of embodied cognition, and considers that the phenomenological tradition has some limitations. Gallagher points out:

In this [scientific] context, one might think that phenomenology, on its own, is limited to an analysis of the consciousness of the body (the way that we are aware of the body) since strictly speaking phenomenology is not able to

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<sup>259</sup> Gallagher.

<sup>260</sup> Ibid.

penetrate beyond our experience of how things seem to us—the way the world appears, or the way one’s body appears in consciousness.<sup>261</sup>

Second, as the embodied cognition theorists have made important progress in a new direction in cognitive science, many of them have also neglected ontological, existential, experiential, and affective dimensions. To understand emotion, I would like to suggest that we should not dismiss the phenomenological dimension, including lived-body and lived-experience.

In the next section, I shall discuss the non-phenomenological approach to embodied emotion and show that it is inadequate to integrate intentionality with the bodily phenomenology.

## **II. The Advanced Feeling Theory and Perceptual Theory of Emotion**

Although researchers and philosophers in recent decades tend to agree with a cognitively grounded theory of emotion since it falls in line with a rational understanding of emotion in relation to intentionality, they confront a great tension. Once they go too far in taking the position of the SCT, the phenomenological lived-experience dimension of emotion is unfortunately neglected. The body mediating between consciousness and the world, not only in the sense of a physical body, but also as the lived-body—engaging with the world through the feeling of emotional experiences—is ignored as well. On the other hand, to take the position of the OFT as such cannot fall in line with the rationality of emotions. Furthermore, the OFT, given the feeling of bodily changes is essential to emotion, cannot accommodate structures of intentionality.

An appropriate understanding of emotion can best be grasped through the reconciliation of the SCT and the OFT. As I have mentioned earlier, both standard theories are out of date; they are inconsistent with the empirical evidence and contemporary philosophical debate today. The standard theories of emotion should be developed as some contemporary philosophers have done; they may be construed as a

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<sup>261</sup> Gallagher, 2014: 12.



weaker and yet more advanced feeling theory. Hence, it is necessary to recognise the importance of properly construing the bodily feelings of emotion within the modes of intentionality.

The study of emotion is related to the body at a substantial level. If we take into consideration a cognitive attitude such as belief, we would see that belief is a purely cognitive ability. It is not necessarily involved with the body. For example, I can close my eyes and still believe that the earth is round. Now, let us consider emotion. As a matter of empirical evidence, emotion is necessarily related to bodily activities: sensorimotor processes, neurophysiological processes, automatic nervous system, and so on. Even emotion though intentional (and cognitively involved), we cannot understand emotions without considering the role of the body.<sup>262</sup> This implies that one may understand emotion as embodied.

On the other hand, the perceptual theory of emotion is recently an interesting option for an alternative theory. It claims that emotion can be reduced to perception. There are several features that perception and emotion share. Perception is directed at something and, at the same time, is experiential phenomena and involved bodily sensation. In this manner, one might say that reducing emotion to perception seems to be tenable. However, I shall argue that this view may be inadequate for a full-blown understanding of emotion since the mere *passive* perception cannot be suitable in accounting for phenomenological embodied emotion.

In this section, I will discuss the advanced theories of emotion which attempt to modify the standard theories. These alternative theories are 1) Prinz's theory of embodied appraisal and 2) perceptual theory of emotion. I shall disclose the way these formulations are unlikely to be successful for an appropriate understanding of emotion. These alternative theories are inadequate for a phenomenological insight. Furthermore, they mistakenly perceive the cognitive dimension and bodily phenomena as separated.

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<sup>262</sup> Colombetti and Thompson, 2008: 52.

## **The Modification of Feeling Theory: Embodied Appraisal**

Around the end of the nineteenth century, the flourishing influence of physiology and natural science provoked scientists to posit the human body as an object of study. Although they would investigate the human brain, the inadequate technologies and knowledge at that time prevented researchers from examining brain activities at a neural level. Thus, another way to inquire into the mind was the introspection method. James was one example of that fashion. After James formulated the OFT, his theory dominated the work of later researchers of emotion. Both of them believe that emotions are the perceptions (or feelings) of bodily changes and accidentally happen to us.

On the other hand, in the first half of the twentieth century, the boom of behaviourism dismissed the way of looking introspectively in the inner mind (or consciousness). Every facet of human mind had to be studied from the objective point of view; the behaviour. However, around the 1960s, the theorists of emotion started to rationalise the role of emotion in human cognition. While other disciplines such as biology, physiology, and neuroscience were more capable to examine the micro-level of neurophysiological activities and gave pieces of evidence about neurocognitive activities in our brain in regard to emotions.

Simultaneously, the new pieces of evidence from evolutionary biology about emotion afterwards revealed that not only adult humans but also several animals and human infants, which cannot understand language, can have emotions.<sup>263</sup> From the evolutionary point of view, humans gradually descended from animals; they share the same lineage. In other words, they share the same origin. Human and non-human organisms have either the same organs or different organs but the same function in regard to emotions.<sup>264</sup> Unsurprisingly, they also have the same kinds of emotion, particularly basic emotions like anger, fear, disgust, happiness, and so on.

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<sup>263</sup> See Goldie, 2007; Griffiths, 2013.

<sup>264</sup> Griffiths, 2013: 216.

Since the end of the twentieth century, some philosophers have looked back to the OFT and reinterpreted it. Antonio Damasio, a neo-Jamesian philosopher and neuroscientist, developed his somatic theory building up on James's theory of emotion, though he went beyond James's formulation. Although Damasio conceded that emotions involve the feelings of bodily arousals, he admitted that the latter do not warrant inducing emotions. Emotions can occur without the feelings of bodily arousals. Nonetheless, the absence of bodily arousals could be possible only if the corresponding brain mechanism, i.e. chemical and hormonal activities, involving these emotions is active. This elucidation was the Damasio's notion known as "as-if loop"; the brain activities related to a certain emotion are active *as if* the relevant bodily changes in such an emotion occur. Thus, emotions can happen at the brain mechanism level even in the case of a subject imagining a certain emotion without the real feelings of bodily changes. This is also the reason why the patients suffering from spinal cord injuries still can have emotions.<sup>265</sup>

As we saw in Chapter Two, it seems that Damasio tried to embrace both the bodily aspect and the evaluative feature in the theory of emotion. In doing so, he proposed the secondary emotions, which build upon the primary emotions. However, the idea that there are two major classes of emotions raises some problems about adopting James's position. First, without a dependence on another type of emotion like secondary emotions, such primary emotions *alone* may not be able to account for intentionality. Second, accepting that emotions are evaluative or deliberative seems to clash with the innateness of primitive emotions, the view that emotions occur fast and automatically.

Jesse Prinz, another neo-Jamesian, criticised Damasio for deviating too far from James's theory. The reason is that Damasio accepts that there are secondary emotions possessing an evaluation.<sup>266</sup> Prinz offered the advanced theory called "Embodied Appraisal", which is a modification of the OFT and Damasio's theory in attempting to integrate bodily aspect with the structure of intentionality.

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<sup>265</sup> Prinz, 2004b: 5-6. (See also Damasio, 1995; Johnson).

<sup>266</sup> *Ibid.*, 59-60.

Prinz, as we saw in Chapter Two, did not divide emotions into two classes. He, rather, contended that all emotions are in the same category; all emotions are embodied appraisal. He stressed that the word “appraisal” is typically related to mental representation. As an advanced feeling theorist, he formulated the embodied appraisal theory by giving the notion of mental representation to the body. So, in applying an appraisal to emotion, Prinz pointed out that his theory takes up the concept of appraisal not in terms of intellectual evaluative judgment and propositional attitude in the head. Rather, it involves a mental representation in the sense that feelings of bodily changes carry some information. The embodied appraisal of emotion is about registering bodily changes, which causes the tracking of relational properties, the relation between the subject and the world. Prinz argued:

The answer marks a grand reconciliation between the appraisal tradition and the tradition inaugurated by James and Lange. I submit that emotions track core relational themes by registering changes in the body.<sup>267</sup>

Prinz followed James’s view that emotions *are* the feelings of bodily changes. Thus, for Prinz, these feelings can represent the core relational themes or the relational properties—a representation of an organism-environment relation, to inform about external things against the subject. For instance, in fear, the feeling of palpitation represents that there is something *dangerous* outside our body or near us.

At this point, one might ask: How can the body know such a dangerous thing? Prinz would answer that it is a biological adaptation which has been set up by our ancestors. Via bodily changes, emotions do not represent our bodily states. Rather, they represent relational properties—the relation between us and external things. Consider the following passage:

If this proposal is right, it shows that emotions can represent core relational themes without explicitly describing them. Emotions track bodily states that reliably cooccur with important organism-environment relations, so emotions reliably cooccur with organism-environment relations. Each emotion is both an internal body monitor and a detector of dangers, threats, losses, or other

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<sup>267</sup> Ibid., 68.

matters of concern. Emotions are gut reactions; they use our bodies to tell us how we are faring in the world.<sup>268</sup>

Prinz concludes that:

Emotions are states that appraise by registering bodily changes. I call this the *embodied appraisal theory*. Loosely speaking, palpitations serve as evaluations . . . Feelings can obviate the need for cognition, because feelings carry information. The discrete motions of our bodies convey how we are faring in the world.”<sup>269</sup>

As we have seen, in regard to the rejection of the propositional content of emotions, Prinz went quite too far into the physical realm. Moreover, he is likely to simplify the complexities of emotions such as cognitive engagement and their phenomenological richness. I agree with Prinz that emotions are not propositional attitudes. Nonetheless, I contend that his theory is flawed for the following reasons:

- 1) Prinz considered the body as a mere physical body; it lacks the aspect of lived-body and lived-experience. In other words, Prinz’s physical body with its embodied appraisal is a causal mechanism rather than phenomenological richness. Therefore, Prinz’s theory cannot account for an experiential, phenomenological dimension of emotion from the first-person perspective.<sup>270</sup>
- 2) Accordingly, he did not use the word “embodied” in a phenomenological approach. His theory is still a Cartesianist approaching to non-phenomenological embodiment, which regards the body as a physical body carrying information to the internal mind in the brain.

Prinz’s theory is an attempt to solve the tension between the OFT and the SCT. By doing so, he merges the appraisal with bodily feelings and explains that bodily feelings already carry information about the environment. This ability, which is a biological process, is set up by our ancestors. Prinz carries out the formulation in

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<sup>268</sup> Ibid., 69.

<sup>269</sup> Ibid., 78.

<sup>270</sup> Slaby, 2008: 443.

a different way by neglecting the role of the experiential aspect of emotional phenomena. Slaby, on the other hand, contends that “Prinz totally neglects the experiential nature of emotional states . . . Prinz illegitimately cuts the connection between how an emotion feels and what it is about.”<sup>271</sup>

Even though Prinz’s theory is an appealing modification of feeling theory and should be considered as one of the crucial initiations to formulate the embodied emotion theory in contemporary philosophy of emotion, it is inadequate in accounting for the phenomenology of emotion. Prinz regards the body as separate from brained cognition in the sense that bodily feelings inform the internal brain about something in the external world. In other words, he formulates the theory of embodied emotion from a standard conception of mind, i.e. the bodily changes inform the brain in the skull about something in the environment. His conception of mind is not embodied subjectivity, even though he named his theory embodied appraisal. Accordingly, such embodied appraisal is based on the concept of embodiment in a weak sense; the appraisals are *caused* by bodily activities.

I shall argue that articulating a proper embodied emotion theory is not tenable without embracing the concept of phenomenological embodiment, which emphasises on the first-person perspective and lived-body subjectivity with the constitutive principles—the bodily phenomena are *constitutive* of the cognitively evaluative abilities.<sup>272</sup> The notion of phenomenological embodiment posits the lived-body as the centre of emotional consciousness. This enables us to integrate intentionality with bodily phenomenology as a *unification* view.

### **Can Emotional Experience Be Reduced to Perceptual Experience?**

Considering the following situation, I am enjoying eating chocolate. I grab a bar of chocolate with my hand. My consciousness and enjoyment are directed at that chocolate. Eating chocolate is enjoyable. I feel the sweet taste through my tongue, which makes me enjoy. What remains of the chocolate appears in my *perception*

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<sup>271</sup> Ibid.

<sup>272</sup> Maiese, 2014: 235.

visually and tactilely. I *see* the chocolate bar in my hand and other pieces on the table. At the same time, I *feel* it with my hand. These chocolate bars (in my mouth, in my hand, and on the table) are the intentional objects of my enjoyment. They motivate me to finish eating it and to move my hand to take it to my mouth, repeatedly and continually. Emotions are not just accidental events or flawed adaptive evolution. Rather, they may motivate our life—to act or engage with the world. Furthermore, emotional experiences concern what matters to us and what does not. To investigate this ability, we shall look at where this motivational aspect urging an action could begin; the perceptual experience. The perceptual experiences are the door to open the world for us, i.e. to see, to hear, to touch, and to taste. In this section, I shall discuss the perceptual theories of emotion. The question about the relation between emotional experience and perceptual experience should be addressed.

I have stressed time and again that emotions exhibit some forms of intentionality. Additionally, emotions are experienced through the subject's bodily feelings. The emotional experiences are directed toward something beyond consciousness. As such, they signify and refer to something. Now, one might add the view that emotions also involve perceptual experiences.

When compared to other mental states such as belief, intention, and desire, emotion is quite a peculiar mental phenomenon. Perception could be another peculiarity. Emotions are intentional and (bodily) phenomenal; perceptions seem to be similar—they are also intentional and experiential. The perceptual theory of emotion is recently in focus and has the potential to be the new direction for the study of emotion.<sup>273</sup> The perceptual theory may be the promising alternative to account for emotions. Griffiths suggests that the outstanding parts of the feeling theory and cognitive theory may be potentially united by the perceptual theory of emotion.<sup>274</sup> Phenomenologically, Goldie also recommends that “perceptual theories can accommodate the phenomenology of emotional experience, drawing on accounts of the phenomenology of perception.”<sup>275</sup>

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<sup>273</sup> Griffiths, 2013: 220-221.

<sup>274</sup> Ibid.

<sup>275</sup> Goldie, 2007: 935.

The perceptual experience could be seen, even though it is not necessary, as having a non-propositional, non-conceptual, and even non-linguistic content. If we consider the colour red, we cannot express or define through language how it is red. The infants know the redness by the direct visual experience. The ostensive definition is needed to know colours, to *show* the red object to one who does not know what red is. In the case of emotion, the teenagers who have never been in love will never understand what it is like to be in love unless they have fallen in love. Moreover, in some cases, I may feel some certain emotions without an ability to refer to linguistic engagement. For example, when I am impressed by wonderful jazz music, I cannot describe such an emotional experience to others who have never heard that wonderful music. I might say that the jazz music makes me “impressed”, but I focus on the feeling of being impressed rather than the word “impressed”. This “impressed” seems to have its distinctive phenomenal character which does not require any statement of belief or judgment to feel impressed. Consider the following passage written by Maiese:

Classical cognitivist theories . . . hold that emotions are nothing but certain kinds of belief-desire pairs or evaluative judgments. However, given that someone can experience an emotion without any sort of corresponding belief, it is a mistake to think that the intentional content of emotion must be understood as the content of a judgment or as the object of a propositional attitude. Because the intentionality of emotions is neither reducible to nor requires the intentionality of belief or thought, some theorists have argued that emotional intentionality has more in common with sense perception.<sup>276</sup>

The present section investigates perception through the following question: Can emotion experience be reduced to perceptual experience? Let me draw the exploration of the perceptual theory of emotion. Even though Deonna and Teroni do not seem to concede the perceptual theories of emotion in a strong sense, they are at least elucidating the perceptual theory. It seems to be reasonable to compare between emotion and perception, and to show that perception cannot be reduced to belief or judgment as the SCT suggests. This clashes with cognitivism. In doing so, Deonna

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<sup>276</sup> Maiese, 2014: 234.



and Teroni list the reasons why perception cannot be reduced to judgment, as shown below.<sup>277</sup>

- 1) *Perception* has a distinctive phenomenology whereas a corresponding judgment does not have its phenomenology.
- 2) *Perception* does not necessarily require a concept to represent its content whereas a judgment needs a concept to represent its intentional content. This is to say that there can be a non-conceptual content in regard to perception.
- 3) *Perception* delivers various degrees of intensity which cannot be captured by judgment, i.e. the myriad shades of colour which are unlikely to have corresponding concepts.

As Deonna and Teroni show, if the similarity between emotion and perception is tenable, there is no reason to hold that emotion can be reduced to judgment as well. Let us consider the following points:

- 1) *Emotion* has a distinctive phenomenology whereas a corresponding judgment does not have its phenomenology.
- 2) *Emotion* does not necessarily require a concept to represent its content whereas a judgment needs a concept to represent its intentional content. This is to say that there can be a non-conceptual content in regard to emotion.
- 3) *Emotion* delivers various degrees of intensity which cannot be captured by judgment, i.e. the myriad degrees of anger which are unlikely to have corresponding concepts.

The cognitive theory of emotion with its reducible project seems to be inappropriate. On the other hand, the perceptual theory of emotion is likely to be reasonable to account for emotions. The purpose of perceptual theory is to integrate intentionality with phenomenology, which are the crucial features of emotion. The theory argues that the intentional content informs about evaluative properties via

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<sup>277</sup> Deonna and Teroni, 2012: 66-67.

perception, which is qualitative phenomenology. So, the idea could be that “emotions are not judgment but *perceptions* of values.”<sup>278</sup> This is to say that emotions can be reduced or identical to perceptions; emotions *are* perceptions of values.

To say that emotion is identified with perception is to say that emotion is “emotional perception”.<sup>279</sup> Emotional perceptions contain an evaluation with non-conceptual/non-propositional content. For example, to perceive *danger* in being afraid, to perceive *loss* in being sad, and so on.<sup>280</sup> This evaluative property can be seen as a formal object. In general, the notion of formal object is used by cognitivism and appraisal theory of emotion. It holds that emotional states have significant information about the world, i.e. in being afraid of snakes there is a property of danger as a formal object. So, when I see the snake I evaluate it as something dangerous, then, I feel fear. According to perceptual theory of emotion, a subject perceives a formal object as an evaluative property without depending on linguistic engagement.

As to Deonna and Teroni’s points to explicate the similarity between perception and emotion, it could be enumerated as the following:

- 1) *Perception* and *Emotion* have distinctive phenomenology.
- 2) *Perception* and *Emotion* do not necessarily require a concept to represent their content (still, they have intentional content).
- 3) *Perception* and *Emotion* deliver various degrees of intensity which cannot be captured by judgments or corresponding concepts.

As we have noticed, the theory assimilating emotion to perception is not novel. James’s feeling theory (or the OFT) is kind of a perceptual theory of emotion holding that emotions are proprioceptive perceptions.<sup>281</sup> For this view, emotions *are* nothing other than bodily perceptions. However, in Chapter One, I rejected the OFT

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<sup>278</sup> Ibid., 67.

<sup>279</sup> Goldie, 2007: 935.

<sup>280</sup> Deonna and Teroni, 2012: 67.

<sup>281</sup> Kriegel, 2015: 5.

and showed its flaw. The sense perception explained in the OFT is not the perception of *value* as recent perceptual theorists of emotion suggested. Rather, it is a sense perception that does not represent anything in the world but internal bodily events. Therefore, there is no point in discussing James's theory here.

We have seen how the feeling theory of emotion was put forward by Prinz. Briefly, he modified the feeling theory by saying that perceptions of bodily changes represent a form of evaluation—core relational theme—concerning the subject's well-being in regard to an evolutionary purpose. According to the idea that emotions are not judgments but perceptions of values, Prinz mentioned that “[w]hile beliefs aim at the True, emotions aim at Relations that Matter.”<sup>282</sup> So, emotions inform the subject with organism-environment relations. The subject perceives its bodily changes, which somehow detect and represent the core relational theme in the environment. For example, there is something dangerous nearby, so the subject felt fear.

Prinz's theory could be regarded as an “indirect” perceptual theory of emotion.<sup>283</sup> The evaluations of the core relational theme are perceived *indirectly* through the subject's direct perceptions of bodily changes; “we could be in *indirect* contact with evaluative properties by being directly aware of bodily changes”<sup>284</sup>. This view is emphasising on indirect perception as an evaluation of the external world. Prinz's theory could be classified in the perceptual theory of emotion since it also holds that bodily perceptions *are* literally emotions.

The perceptual theory of emotion may be generally classified in two ways:<sup>285</sup> a strong version and a weak version. The former is what we have explored above. It is to say that emotions are identical with, or can be reduced to, perceptions. In other words, emotions *are* perceptions. I call this view “Identification Thesis”. The latter draws the analogy between emotion and perception. I call this view “Analogy Thesis”.

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<sup>282</sup> Prinz, 2004b: 80.

<sup>283</sup> Deonna and Teroni, 2012: 71-74.

<sup>284</sup> *Ibid.*, 86.

<sup>285</sup> Salmela, 2011.

It is worth noting that such classification may not have a clear-cut boundary. We may consider Prinz's theory as either Identification Thesis or Analogy Thesis for he asserts that emotions *are* direct bodily perceptions (with representations), but, at the same time, the evaluations are indirectly perceived. There is more to say about the various ways of perceptual theories. I would not discuss this issue here.

Let me consider the criticism of perceptual theory of emotion. Is this attractive perceptual theory adequate to conclude that emotions are perceptions? Can it be that emotions are a kind of perception, or emotional perception? The criticism of the perceptual theory of emotion shows some challenges. Goldie points them out by suggesting that one might ask: What is the difference between emotional perception and other kinds of perception? How can we distinguish the former from the latter? Moreover, how can we draw the connection between emotional perception and other components of emotion like bodily events and motivations?<sup>286</sup> The bodily feelings connected to emotions such as heartbeat rising, blood pumping increasing, adrenalin increasing, and so on, is not the same thing as perceptions, such as seeing, touching, and so on.<sup>287</sup>

The above two questions lead us to the last challenge. Goldie states that perceptual theory seems to be opposed to the idea that “everything is what it is and not another thing.”<sup>288</sup> This implies the possibility of theorising or formulating a special form of emotional intentionality, that is the *sui generis* approach.

For the time being, in considering the perceptual theory of emotion, which involves conscious experience and perception, I shall recommend that there are two things to keep in mind. First, I submit that *most* emotions are emotional experiences—they are *typically* conscious experiences. It is also true that emotions may be conscious in a pre-reflective consciousness sense. I may not reflect that “I am stressed”, but I am conscious and feel that I am stressed about something in the world that I am engaged with. In case I am not aware of my feelings, it does not mean there

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<sup>286</sup> Goldie, 2007: 935. (See also Slaby, 2008: 440).

<sup>287</sup> Sajama and Kamppinen, 1987: 122.

<sup>288</sup> Goldie, 2007: 936.

are no bodily changes inside my organs. For example, there could be a tiny muscle contraction I could not be aware of. So, this is a case of my body changing without me being able to feel it.<sup>289</sup> However, I would be vividly aware of my stress when its degree is high when facing a significant problem. I may, for instance, feel increased rate of breathing, and the world seeming to be uncomfortable for me. In this regard, if we consider that emotions crucially impact our life—whether the emotions are positive or negative feelings—we should not reject that *most* emotions are conscious and emotional experiences, especially during highly intense bodily events.<sup>290</sup>

Second, when we consider the concept of perception, it is important to recognise that there can be two possible facets of it: *passive* perception and *active* perception. I shall make clear what I mean by “passive” and “active” in this regard.

In a nutshell, the “passive” implies non-active perception, that the subject does not move its body or act to change its position or even change the world to perceive things. Furthermore, such passive perception comes with the idea of mental representation. This is the view that we do not directly perceive an object. Rather, what we perceive is the mental representation that just “happens” to our mind (in our head or brain). This view could be considered as sense perception or a bodily sensation, which is the traditional view of the standard conception of mind in cognitive science and philosophy. I shall call it “a standard view of perception” (S-Perception). Thus, the passive perception is the S-Perception.

On the other hand, there has been an increase in the number of philosophers endorsing an alternative formulation of perception; active perception. The modifier “active” suggests that the subject performs an action to reach the optimal perception of the world. Rather than just processing in the brain, the active perception is achieved by means of a dynamic interplay between brain, body, and environment. Accordingly, the perception is not a mere representation in the subject’s head but embodied-activity engaging with the world, for example, reaching its hand to touch a

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<sup>289</sup> Goldie, 2002: 237.

<sup>290</sup> For Goldie, emotions are not *essentially* felt, but in a typical case they “involve feelings at some point during its existence”. Please see Goldie, 2002: 235.

thing, walking around the object to get an optimal grasp, and so on. The phenomenological approach introduced by Merleau-Ponty states that we need to move our body to take the position that can have a maximum grip while perceiving the piece of artwork at the museum.<sup>291</sup>

This idea is a view which I draw from an enactive approach, partly from Noë's proposition, formulating that perception and action are closely linked. Perception is the activity which we act or enact through our sensorimotor system with a skilful engaging with the environment.<sup>292</sup> This idea typically underlies the notion of embodied cognition (including an enactive approach). Wilson and Golonka recommend that "embodied cognition (in any form) is about acknowledging the role perception, action, and the environment can now play"<sup>293</sup>. I shall call this view "an embodied approach to perception" (E-Perception). The active perception, on the other hand, is what I call the E-Perception.

The idea of the E-Perception has its foundation in many approaches. They share a common ground that perception cannot be separated from action. In other words, the perception is constituted by the skilful bodily action. There can be approaches such as the ecological approach, enactive approach, sensorimotor contingency theory, phenomenology, and so on.<sup>294</sup> Indeed, the phenomenological tradition could also be counted among such approaches. For example, Merleau-Ponty states that "the theory of the body is already a theory of perception"<sup>295</sup>. He emphasises the essential role of the body in perception. It is precisely the lived-body that always acts to engage with the world. Thus, for Merleau-Ponty, the perception is acted by the lived-body, embodied subjectivity. As Colombetti and Thompson suggest, "[a] perceptual experience is an embodied experience because it is an experience of the body in the act of perceiving."<sup>296</sup>

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<sup>291</sup> See Merleau-Ponty, 2005; Dreyfus, 2005; Noë, 2002.

<sup>292</sup> See Noë, 2002; Merleau-Ponty, 2005.

<sup>293</sup> Wilson and Golonka, 2013.

<sup>294</sup> Noë and Thompson, 2002: 3-6.

<sup>295</sup> Merleau-Ponty, 2005: 235.

<sup>296</sup> Colombetti and Thompson, 2008: 62.

The distinction between S-Perception and E-Perception will be relevant to our investigation when I would link the E-Perception to the phenomenological and enactive approaches to embodied emotion. Also, this closely relates to the *sui generis* account regarding the “Affective Intentionality”.

We shall evaluate the question I raised at the outset. Can emotional experiences be reduced to perceptual experiences? In answering this question, I would remark that holding that emotional experiences can be reduced to perceptual experiences, where the perception in question is understood as the S-Perception, seems to be untenable. Most perceptual theories seem to be grounded on the S-Perception view. I claim that to reduce the emotional experience to the internal mental representational content of perception seems to be untenable.

Even though Salmela does not endorse the project of perceptual theory of emotion, he states that “[i]f none of these conceptions of perception is actually plausible, more adequate theories of perception might ground alternative analogies.”<sup>297</sup> Accordingly, I shall attempt to seek such an alternative. Only if the perceptual experiences in question are understood as the E-Perception may it be possible to say that an analogy between emotion and perception is more appealing. I tend to believe that the sort of perceptual theory may be sound only if it essentially applies the notion of E-Perception in drawing an analogy (this view is neither the Identification Thesis nor the Analogy Thesis I mentioned above). Furthermore, the sort of perceptual theory of emotion incorporating the idea of E-Perception would be tenable in the unification view in regard to the integration of the intentionality and phenomenality.

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<sup>297</sup> Salmela, 2011: 26.

### III. Phenomenological Embodied Emotion and Affective Intentionality

As to the recently prominent formulation of the theory of emotion, it offers that emotions could be reducible or identical to perception—thanks to perceptual features which are also intentional and phenomenal. However, one may contend that emotions cannot be reduced to such folk psychological attitudes at all. Rather, emotions may have the unique form of intentionality, which is known as the *sui generis* approach.<sup>298</sup> If we aim to articulate a proper theory of emotion, intentionality and phenomenality must not be treated separately. Moreover, one feature must not be regarded as being a mere add-on feature for another. Rather, both should be held as *constitutive* parts of emotion, understood as a unification view. This view, according to Slaby, can be formulated as the concept of Affective Intentionality.<sup>299</sup>

In this section, first, I shall offer the solution for the tensions between the OFT and SCT by articulating the unique form of intentionality which is called by Slaby “Affective Intentionality”. I argue that, to the idea of Affective Intentionality, it is seemingly tenable to claim that emotions are both intentional, cognitively evaluative, and bodily felt. This formulation fulfils the unification view.

Second, I shall argue that for a comprehensive understanding of emotion, the emotion should be regarded as embodied emotion. The concept of mind underlying this view needs a formulation which does not dismiss the phenomenological accounts—the lived-body and the first-person perspective. I shall merge the notion of phenomenological embodied mind with an enactive approach. Therefore, an enactive approach to embodied emotion will be introduced in this regard. Moreover, I shall remark that the enactive approach to embodied emotion provides the phenomenological adequacy and is consistent with the idea of Affective Intentionality.

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<sup>298</sup> Goldie, 2000; Goldie 2002; Döring, 2007; Montague, 2008; Slaby, 2008.

<sup>299</sup> Slaby, 2008.



## **The Affective Intentionality: Bodily Phenomenology + Intentionality**

Although many theorists of emotion today acknowledge that emotions involve intentional objects, evaluative properties, and bodily phenomena, they consider these as the components of emotion which can be independent from each other. For example, they hold that emotion has an intentional object grounded on cognition, such as belief and desire. They consider the internal bodily feeling as an afterthought rather than a constitutive part of emotion; the bodily feeling is added to the cognitive ability. This view is the “add-on view”<sup>300</sup>.

Goldie criticises the add-on view because it over-intellectualises emotions and regards the bodily feeling as a mere afterthought.<sup>301</sup> The main problem of the add-on view of emotion is that it neglects the bodily phenomenological richness and treats intentionality and bodily phenomenology as separate. In other words, it subscribes to the non-intentionalist view of bodily feeling; bodily phenomena do not involve the structure of intentionality.

The add-on view seems to be wrong especially for phenomenologists and even Jamesian theorists. It may cause to confuse the actual emotional feeling with the feelingless cognition, like belief and desire. In this regard, one can ask how we can distinguish emotional evaluations from non-emotional evaluations.<sup>302</sup> Therefore, the add-on view can be considered as nothing other than the cognitive theory of emotion considering the bodily phenomena as afterthought. James asserts that nothing would remain if we eliminate bodily feelings such as the heart beating, the blood pumping, the face blushing due to certain emotions. Thus, bodily phenomena should not be the afterthought of emotion.

Ratcliffe, as we saw in chapter three, also attempts to propose the unification view. Although he does it to account for mood or existential feeling rather than emotion, such a way to unify intentionality with bodily phenomenology is likely to

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<sup>300</sup> See Goldie, 2000; Goldie, 2002; Montague, 2008.

<sup>301</sup> Goldie, 2000: 3.

<sup>302</sup> Slaby, 2008: 432.

apply for emotion as well. Also, Sartre-Solomon theory proposes the idea of judgement of the body, considering the bodily phenomena in emotion as the phenomena of belief. Unfortunately, Sartre and Solomon do not expose the details. It is not exaggerated to say that the existential phenomenological approach can inspire the contemporary philosophers of emotion in articulating the inseparability of phenomenology and intentionality.

Recently, philosophers of emotion influenced by the phenomenological approach have formulated such an alternative view. As Salmela suggests: “This inseparability of phenomenology and intentionality . . . is the core idea behind arguments from phenomenology.”<sup>303</sup> Phenomenologists tend to hold the view that the contents of emotions, if the concept of “content” would be mentioned, are not a kind of propositions and mental representations. Rather, they are affective contents with a feature of embodied engagement with the world. If the contents of emotion are propositions, it would be very difficult, or even impossible, to distinguish emotional content from non-emotional content. Thus, affective contents are supposed to be the *sui generis* content.

Goldie is often referred to by many for setting up the unification view of intentionality and phenomenology of emotion. In formulating the intentionality of the bodily phenomena, Goldie suggests that there are two kinds of feeling in emotional experience: “Bodily Feeling” and “Feeling Towards”<sup>304</sup>. Both are intentional in the sense that they are *directed* toward objects. The former has the body as the object while the object in the latter is the thing in the external world. Goldie prefers to use the concept of intentionality in a wide sense understood as *directedness* rather than *aboutness*. He argues:

When intentionality is thus understood, in terms of directedness towards an object rather than in terms of *aboutness*, bodily feelings are unproblematically intentional, being directed towards a part of one’s body in a certain location.<sup>305</sup>

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<sup>303</sup> Salmela, 2011: 22.

<sup>304</sup> See Goldie, 2000 (ch. 2); Goldie, 2002.

<sup>305</sup> Goldie, 2002: 236.

According to Bodily Feeling, the internal bodily changes are the object of intentional states. When I am aware of my Bodily Feeling's location, my awareness is directed at the part of my body, which is felt in certain way. For example, when I feel anger, I feel my heart beating in a certain way. When I feel fear, I feel the hair on the back of my neck rising in a certain way. These bodily changes are intentional objects of Bodily Feeling. In this regard, Goldie argues, the intentional object of the Bodily Feeling is not beyond the body, although it can inform us that there is *something* in the external world.

Interestingly, Goldie argues for the Bodily Feeling in a way similar to Prinz's theory in the sense that such a Bodily Feeling in the emotional experience can reveal *something* about the environment to us. For example, in fear, the hair on the back of the neck rising reveals that there is *something* dangerous in the environment.<sup>306</sup> However, for Goldie, this subject-world relation can be held only in referring to the "determinable property" in which the Bodily Feeling itself is inadequate to identify *what* the emotion is directed at.<sup>307</sup> In other words, mere Bodily Feeling can tell me that there is *something* dangerous in the environment but it cannot identify the specific *object*—for example, the thing dangerous in question is the *tiger*. To determine the specific object of emotion in the external world depends on another kind of feeling, Goldie calls it "Feeling Towards".

The Feeling Towards is another kind of feeling which is also bound by the Bodily Feelings. The Feeling Towards is directed towards the object in the external world. The object of Feeling Towards includes objects, things, persons, states of affairs, facts, events, and so on, beyond the realm of the body. The Feeling Towards can be also understood as "evaluative feeling"<sup>308</sup>. The Feeling Towards, as Goldie states, is "unreflective emotional engagement with the world beyond the body"<sup>309</sup>. This articulation is partly close to Sartre-Solomon's theory of emotion in the sense that emotions are ways of pre-reflectively engaging with the world. This implies that

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<sup>306</sup> Ibid., 238.

<sup>307</sup> Ibid., 241.

<sup>308</sup> Salmela, 2011: 22.

<sup>309</sup> Goldie, 2002: 241.

the phenomenological approach tends to refer to the notion of practically embodied engagement with the world when taken into account. Accordingly, Goldie also points out the idea of embodiment saying that,

our entire mind and body is engaged in the emotional experience, and all the feelings are ‘united in consciousness’ in being directed towards its object: united ‘body and soul’, ‘heart and mind.’<sup>310</sup>

For Goldie, we experience the Bodily Feeling and Feeling Towards “almost as one”<sup>311</sup>. Both kinds of feeling can be called “emotional feeling”. He suggests a phenomenological aspect of emotional feeling in the unification view in the following statement:

What I want to expand on here is how emotions are not like the add-on theory suggests; rather, emotional feelings are inextricably intertwined with the world-directed aspect of emotion, so that an adequate account of an emotion’s intentionality, of its directedness towards the world outside one’s body, will at the same time capture an important aspect of its phenomenology. Intentionality and phenomenology are inextricably linked.<sup>312</sup>

Since I tend to hold that emotions are bodily feeling (indeed, understood as the lived-bodily experience), I will hereafter use the word “emotion” and “emotional feeling” interchangeably. This is not only to stress that emotions are typically felt but also, in this respect, to assert that such feelings are bodily phenomena.

The unification view could be strongly supported by arguing that emotional feelings are essentially bodily feelings which are a carrier of world-directed intentionality. Slaby asserts that “emotions are *experiences of significance*”<sup>313</sup>. He

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<sup>310</sup> Goldie, 2000: 55.

<sup>311</sup> Goldie, 2002: 247.

<sup>312</sup> Ibid., 242.

<sup>313</sup> Slaby, 2008: 430, 432-433.

advocates Goldie's notion of Feeling Towards to emphasise that certain feelings can go beyond the body—towards an object in an external world. Slaby states that,

*intentionality* and *phenomenality* of emotions are no longer seen as separate or even potentially separable, but rather as being essentially united in emotional experience. The term “affective intentionality” can, among other things, function to highlight this important fact—the fact that in emotional experience, intentionality and phenomenality stand and fall together.<sup>314</sup>

This capacity allows the subject to be aware of significant things, states of affairs, events, and actions in the surroundings through subject's lived-bodily feelings. Slaby points out that “*affective intentionality* is essentially bodily” and “the felt body is itself that *through* which we grasp what goes on around us”<sup>315</sup>. At this point, he acknowledges taking inspiration from Ratcliffe's notion of existential feeling, which is essentially bodily feeling, as we saw in chapter three.<sup>316</sup> The phrase “that *through* which” here indicates the sense of the vehicle of the body in which the body itself is not the object of awareness but is the lived-body in which we live *through* for grasping the significance in the external world.

Furthermore, in our emotional experience, the evaluative property of the object or state of affairs in the external world is indistinguishable from the phenomenological character or what it is likeness. In this regard, if the evaluative property of emotion is changed, the qualitative phenomenal character is changed too, and vice versa.<sup>317</sup> Accordingly, the qualitative phenomenal character or bodily phenomenology is not added to the cognitive judgment as the cognitivists propose. Rather, both bodily phenomenology and intentional content are *constitutive* of emotion. They are united. Slaby suggests: “In emotional experience, we are—sometimes quite physically—*moved*, even “shaken” by something, which thereby thrusts its specific significance upon us.”<sup>318</sup>

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<sup>314</sup> Ibid., 431.

<sup>315</sup> Ibid., 429, 436.

<sup>316</sup> Ibid. (footnote 12).

<sup>317</sup> Ibid., 432.

<sup>318</sup> Ibid.

The unification view requires a special theory of the mind other than Cartesian mind. It is the theory of phenomenological embodied subjectivity emphasising the role of the lived-body from first-person perspective. In this context, Slaby stresses: “To recover this basic sense of bodily experience is therefore a central task in the project of constructing a theory of the embodied person or embodied self.”<sup>319</sup> Therefore, it can be said that both Goldie and Slaby share a crucial phenomenological approach that respects the *personal point of view*—which enables the subject to have an emotional experience.<sup>320</sup>

The phenomenologically hedonically valenced of emotional feeling is also emphasised in the present articulation. For formulating the concept of Affective Intentionality related to the hedonically valenced, Slaby refers to Helm to emphasise the evaluative dimension of pleasure and pain or well-being and suffering, which is directed towards something in the world.<sup>321</sup> These feelings of pleasure and pain could be regarded as a fundamental structure of the hedonically valenced. Indeed, the qualitative phenomenal character of emotional experiences can also be described in specifically bodily phenomenology. For example, in fear, besides the pain or negative feeling, I also feel something in a certain way which is phenomenologically different from other emotions like anger, love, hate, happiness, and so on. Moreover, the phenomenologically hedonically valenced exhibits a motivational aspect involving action tendency; the pleasure and pain can motivate us to act in specific ways.<sup>322</sup>

To give an example of what Slaby articulates about emotional feeling which is essentially bodily, evaluative, hedonically valenced and has the evaluation of the external world, let us have a look at this passage:

Here’s an example: Imagine a colleague offends you; let’s say he drops a remark implicating your alleged lack of effort, while you think and, for that matter, know that you work as hard as anybody in your department. This remark of your colleague may hurt quite literally. You cannot truly separate

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<sup>319</sup> Ibid., 441.

<sup>320</sup> Ibid., 443. (Please see also Goldie, 2000; Goldie, 2002; Goldie, 2007).

<sup>321</sup> Ibid., 433. (See also Helm, 2002).

<sup>322</sup> Ibid.

the ‘hateful aspect’ of your emotional experience from the evaluative content of your anger. You feel offended—something that can quite literally feel like a slap in your face, so it is definitely a bodily experience, a bodily feeling in the sense just explained. But feeling offended by a remark is equally and simultaneously an experience of someone having deliberately wronged you, or of someone standing in a certain very negative relationship to you, or of someone taking up a hostile and unjustified stance towards you, etc. The correct way to describe an emotional episode like this is the one used by Bennet Helm: You feel literally pained *by the offence*—and this pain is inextricably both: felt in the body and intentionally directed at the offence and the offender.<sup>323</sup>

I shall argue that the Affective Intentionality seems to be tenable. It suggests the importance of appreciating the valuable articulation from the existential phenomenological tradition. This means that we may gain an advantage from phenomenological philosophy more than we what have expected. However, the formulation of the notion of Affective Intentionality may not be full-blown. It may face criticism for it still lacks the supporting empirical evidence.<sup>324</sup> It is rather a philosophical theorisation within a conceptual framework. So, we need a more elaborate discussion. More work needs to be done from philosophy, phenomenology, and corresponding empirical evidence. Nonetheless, I believe that it is the most efficient way so far to reconcile the SCT with the OFT without phenomenological inadequacy.

### **Phenomenological and Enactive Approaches to Embodied Emotion**

As to the different versions of the theorisation of embodied cognition, the recent cognitive science and philosophy of mind’s literature places embodied cognition theory in a broader approach—the 4Es cognition. These four Es are the core features regarding cognition and typically comprise of the embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended.<sup>325</sup> Although these features may be consistent as well as conflicting with

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<sup>323</sup> Ibid., 438.

<sup>324</sup> Deonna and Teroni, 2012: 70.

<sup>325</sup> The “4e” is coined by Shaun Gallagher and formally used in 2007 for the title of the

each other, the 4Es cognition can be roughly understood as the idea that cognition is caused or constituted by, embedded in, and even extended to, not only brain activities but also bodily and worldly engagements. In recent decades, the idea of the 4Es cognition is booming in philosophy of mind and cognitive science research in the sense that it encourages interdisciplinary research in regard to the mind and cognition. This section, however, will focus on the embodied and enactive approaches.

As we just have seen, the conceptualisation of embodied cognition is unsettled and remains unclear. As to the causal-constitutive principle, there can be a weak form of embodied cognition considering the bodily activities as the causal mechanism rather than the constitutive part of cognition. On the other hand, there can be a radical version of embodied cognition holding that bodily activities are the constitutive part of cognition.

On the other hand, as for the distinction between representationalism and non-representationalism in regard to embodied cognition theory, there can be a weaker version saying that embodied cognition is consistent with the computational and representational theory of mind. In contrast, there can be a radical version which rejects the computational and representational theory of mind.

This section will be restricted to the idea of phenomenological approach to embodiment (or PE) holding that cognition is *constituted* by the lived-bodily engagements (and perhaps *situated* in the social, cultural, and environmental structures). At the same time, this opposes the representational theory of mind. In this regard, an enactive approach and phenomenological embodiment theory could be regarded as closely linked. It seems unlikely to talk about the concept of the enactive approach without referring to the phenomenological embodied cognition. Colombetti points out:

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conference “4e: The Mind Embodied, Embedded, Enacted, Extended” at the University of Central Florida. See Rowlands, 2010: 3, 219.



In short, we can say that for both the enactive approach and several works in phenomenological philosophy, mental activity is deeply linked to the subject's embodied presence and performances, and cognition is grounded in embodied presence and experience.<sup>326</sup>

The enactive approach asserts that cognition is enacted or brought forth by the interaction between brain activity, bodily activity, and environmental engagement. It emphasises the active dimension of cognition. To couple the idea of phenomenological embodiment with an enactive approach is to encourage a radical form of embodied cognition theory, in the sense that it fits the constitutive principle and the non-representationalist view. Furthermore, this way does not neglect the first-person experience and the lived-body. I shall call this view "Phenomenological Embodied-Enactive Approach." Accordingly, I shall consider it as underlying Colombetti's idea of enactive appraisal.

For time being, let me explore Colombetti's general idea of enactive approach. Although a number of philosophers tend to endorse the idea of embodied cognition, many of them dismiss emotion and affectivity.<sup>327</sup> The main purpose of the enactive approach is "to correct this imbalance by using the enactive approach to bring emotion theory and embodied cognitive science closer together"<sup>328</sup>. Moreover, as we saw, the classical existential phenomenologists already emphasise the role of affectivity, where the embodied subjectivity engages with the world and is concerned about what matters to as well as affects it. To bring emotion theory close to embodied cognition theory partly implies taking phenomenological philosophy back to the study of embodied cognition. Such a project may be possible through an enactive approach.

In articulating the enactive approach to embodied emotion, Colombetti applies the enactive approach proposed by Varela, Thompson, and Rosch.<sup>329</sup> The enactive approach based on various disciplines, such as phenomenology, philosophy of mind, cognitive science, biology, and so on. It can also be connected to the empirical

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<sup>326</sup> Colombetti, 2007: 530.

<sup>327</sup> *Ibid.*, 528.

<sup>328</sup> Colombetti and Thompson, 2008: 63.

<sup>329</sup> Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, 1993.

findings at the subpersonal neurophysiological level. In short, for an enactive approach, cognition is not exhausted by brain activities in the skull. Colombetti states that,

the human mind is embodied in our entire organism and embedded in the world, and hence is not reducible to structures inside the head. Meaning and experience are created by, or enacted through, the continuous reciprocal interaction of the brain, the body, and the world.<sup>330</sup>

Besides characterising cognition or mind in the same way as the embodied cognition theory, an enactive approach formulates the origin of mind and life in biological terms. This can expand to all living systems. Additionally, it emphasises the idea of the lived-body and the lived-experience. It could be said that the project of the enactive approach is the development of phenomenological philosophy from a biological standpoint.

Colombetti argues that “all living systems are *sense-making* systems”<sup>331</sup>. They enact or bring forth the way the world matters to them. In other words, all living systems, even a simple one, bring forth their *Umwelt*. The *sense-making systems* involves the capacity of being autonomous and adaptive, understood as the self-organising system. Therefore, the lower-level organisms like bacteria can also possess the *sense-making* capacity. The *sense-making systems* with the autonomous and adaptive abilities could be understood in a very broad sense as the mind and life. In this respect, with such a broad definition, the enactive approach holds that all living systems are Cognitive (in this respect, I use the capital C letter to emphasise its special meaning). However, this does not mean they all are conscious. What Colombetti attempts to submit is that all living systems are Cognitive in a special sense, meaning that they are *sense-making* systems. They realise their relationship with the world; they can bring forth the *Umwelt* in regard to the concern and purposefulness of their existence. Although the simple living systems do not have a

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<sup>330</sup> Colombetti and Thompson, 2008: 56.

<sup>331</sup> Colombetti, 2014: 2.

brain, it could be said that they are Cognitive with a *sense-making* capacity. Their Cognition is enacted or brought forth by the whole organism.

The ability of *sense-making* indicates that Cognition is also Affective.<sup>332</sup> The “Affective” in this regard is not to be reduced to “emotional”. The Affective or Affectivity used by Colombetti here is understood in a very broad and deep sense (hereafter I would refer to it as “Affective” or “Affectivity” with capital A). Therefore, Affectivity could be broadly defined as “sensibility, interest, or concern for one’s existence.”<sup>333</sup> Affective Cognition in this sense exhibits the capacity to realise what matters to it and what does not. It evaluates the world, which has significance to it. It lacks indifference.

This characterization is consistent with the etymology of the term: “affectivity” refers to the capacity or possibility of having something done to one, of being struck or influenced (the term comes from the past participle of the Latin verb *afficio*, “to strike, to influence”—itself a compound of *ad*, “to”, and *facio*, “to do”). This influence is not merely physical or mechanical (as when one says that the daily amount of sunlight affects the air temperature) but psychological. It refers to the capacity to be personally affected, to be “touched” in a meaningful way by what is affecting one. In this broad sense, it is not necessary to be in a specific emotion or mood to be in an affective state; one is affected when something merely strikes one as meaningful, relevant, or salient.<sup>334</sup>

This articulation reveals the primordial structure, which Colombetti calls “Primordial Affectivity”. She asserts that “emotions and moods do not exhaust the realm of affectivity.”<sup>335</sup> So, it is not necessary to be emotional and mooded to be Affective. One should bear in mind that this “mood” is generally understood in the way it is used by most affective scientists, who regard mood as the internal mental state possessing both duration and bodily changes to a lesser degree than emotion. Thus, this definition

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<sup>332</sup> Colombetti, 2015.

<sup>333</sup> Ibid.

<sup>334</sup> Ibid.

<sup>335</sup> Colombetti, 2014: 1.

of mood is very different from Heidegger's mood (or *Stimmung*), which is an existential mode of the way one finds oneself in the world. In Heidegger's idea, mood could be rather construed as being in a distinctive category, as we saw in the previous three chapters.

Colombetti's concept of Primordial Affectivity seems to be close to Heidegger's Attunement through mood. Both are sort of an existential mode or something similar revealing the way one finds oneself in the world. However, there is a major dissimilarity between them. Contrary to Heidegger, Colombetti places this structure by expanding it beyond the human being; it includes non-human animals and even a simple organism like a single cell. This means that all living systems and all organisms possess the structure of Primordial Affectivity. However, for Colombetti, it does not mean that all living systems can have emotion and mood (either in Heidegger's sense or in a general sense as used in affective science). The Primordial Affectivity itself is not an emotional episode; rather, it underlies emotions. According to higher-level organisms like human beings, primates, and some animals, the Primordial Affectivity could be construed as the condition of possibility for them to have emotions and other mental states.<sup>336</sup> Colombetti's idea of Primordial Affectivity can be illustrated as the following:

The **Primordial Affectivity** (possession ranging from lower-level organisms, e.g. single cells, to higher-level organism, e.g. human beings) → the condition of possibility → **emotions** and other cognitive states like belief, desire, etc. (**only** in human beings, primates, and some animals)

It could be said that when Colombetti argues that Cognition is always "Affective", it does not mean that Cognition is always "emotional". This view is close to Heidegger's formulation that we are always attuned through mood (*Stimmung*). I tend to believe that Colombetti's idea of Primordial Affectivity is not inconsistent with Heidegger's Attunement through mood. Rather, the former complements the latter. Heidegger restricts his notion of Attunement through mood to account only for human beings while Colombetti expands her notion of Primordial Affectivity to non-

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<sup>336</sup> Ibid., 2-3.

human beings and all living systems. There has been a continuity from a very long history among lower-level organisms and higher-level organisms. Heidegger's notion of Attunement through mood may take place or emerge at some point in the continuity of the evolution of the highest-level organism; human beings.

Now, let us put aside the model of Primordial Affectivity and step closer to a formulation of embodied emotion in regard to the enactive approach. Colombetti proposes the notion of enactive appraisal in a unification view to reject any emotion theory which separates heady appraisal from bodily arousal and action:

From the enactive standpoint . . . emotions are simultaneously bodily and cognitive-evaluative, not in the familiar sense of being made up of separate-but-coexisting bodily and cognitive-evaluative constituents, but rather in the sense that they convey meaning and personal significance as *bodily meaning and significance*.<sup>337</sup>

The dichotomy of “appraisal-arousal” seems to be typically referred to by emotion scientists and psychologists. The “appraisal” is mostly considered opposed to the “arousal”. To take it in another way as per philosophical discussion, however, we might consider the dichotomy of appraisal-arousal as a mind-body split. The appraisal could be understood as the core feature in the SCT whereas the arousal might be regarded as bodily or physiological changes in emotion, which is related to the OFT. The former involves cognitive abilities (which are typically deliberative); the latter involves bodily events regarding the neurophysiological activities (which are typically automatic). The appraisal theorist (or cognitive theorist) traditionally considers a bodily event or arousal as secondary or a by-product of appraisal. Otherwise, some may regard it as the means to an end for achieving the appraisal.<sup>338</sup> Colombetti, however, challenges this view.

The non-phenomenological approach to embodiment, for instance, Prinz's theory, cannot account for a comprehensive understanding of emotion since it lacks a personal point of view in regard to the phenomenological richness. Prinz's theory

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<sup>337</sup> Colombetti and Thompson, 2008: 59.

<sup>338</sup> Colombetti, 2007: 532-536.

considers an embodied emotion within the physical domain, the causal mechanism. For this view, the body is separated from the brain at the outset. Even though he tries to eliminate the dichotomy of appraisal-arousal, his theory seems to fall short. He does not apply the concept of mind such as embodied cognition, and still uses the traditional concept of judgment in regard to a cognitive appraisal (mostly influenced by appraisal theory).<sup>339</sup> Thus, even though Prinz considers bodily feelings as primary and essential to emotion, and holds that the brain and body work together, this entails the view of dichotomy brain-body split, which regards the body as the causally mechanical instrument for the brain in the head. This view is potentially responsible for the “phenomenologically implausible account of emotion”<sup>340</sup>.

On the other hand, the notion of enactive appraisal aims to integrate the appraisal with arousal by applying phenomenological connections:

An enactive appraisal is one in which the phenomenological relation between appraisal and body is thus reversed when compared to traditional psychological accounts, i.e. the appraising experience is seen as constituted by the experience of one’s bodily condition and environment.<sup>341</sup>

This argument is supported by phenomenological connections in which the lived-body is central to the emotional experience. Although the specific location of bodily feeling could be occasionally detected during a certain emotion, the bodily feeling is diffused over the lived-body experience as a whole rather than a located one.<sup>342</sup> The enactive appraisal also involves the pre-reflective and lived-bodily experience.<sup>343</sup> The lived-body could be understood as the “zero point” in which bodily feelings are that *through* which our emotional evaluations are directed to the object of emotion.<sup>344</sup> A combination between phenomenological connections with a constitutive principle of enactive appraisal means, according to Maiese, that “the *living* body and its

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<sup>339</sup> Colombetti and Thompson, 2008: 54.

<sup>340</sup> Colombetti, 2007: 527.

<sup>341</sup> *Ibid.*, 542.

<sup>342</sup> Maiese, 2014: 232; Slaby, 434-435.

<sup>343</sup> Colombetti, 2007: 541.

<sup>344</sup> See Colombetti, 2007; Maiese, 2014; Merleau-Ponty, 2005; Thompson, 2007.

corresponding neurobiological dynamics play a *constitutive* rather than a merely causal role in emotional experience” (emphasis mine).<sup>345</sup>

According to Colombetti’s theory of enactive appraisal, it is to see “appraisal as constituted by bodily events such as arousal and actions.”<sup>346</sup> By doing so, the E-Perception could be drawn into the picture. This view proposes that perception is kind of an action. More importantly, the action is not only a cause of perception but a constitutive part of it. This means that action is not an instrument to perceive the world. It *is* a part of perception. In other words, as Noë states, “perceiving is the way of acting”, “a kind of bodily skilful activity”, and “we enact our perceptual experience; we act it out.”<sup>347</sup> Therefore, the E-Perception involves an action tendency and practical and skilful bodily engagement with the world—phenomenologically understood as “I can” in regard to Merleau-Ponty’s concept of motor intentionality.<sup>348</sup>

As I mentioned in the last part of section II., an analogy between emotion and perceptual experience may be drawn only if it applies to the E-Perception view. This view could be considered as the *sui generis* approach regarding the notion of Affective Intentionality. Furthermore, in this section, I have showed that the Affective Intentionality could be maintained by the idea of the phenomenological embodied-enactive emotion. In other words, the concept of Affective Intentionality may not be possible without recognising that emotions are enactive, embodied, and lived through the first-person experiences.

Last but not least, according to classical phenomenologists, Sartre emphasises the role of bodily phenomena in emotional experiences; the bodily feeling, bodily action, and bodily behaviour. Emotions are phenomena in which we act upon the world to change the relationship between ourselves and the world. This action is not understood as the traditional philosophy of action in the sense that we reflect the content of our desire in our mind, then, we consequently act. Rather, Sartre asserts

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<sup>345</sup> Maiese, 2014: 231.

<sup>346</sup> Colombetti, 2007: 529.

<sup>347</sup> Noë, 2002: 1-2.

<sup>348</sup> Maiese, 2014: 234. (See also Merleau-Ponty, 2005; Käufer and Chemero, 2015: 113-116).

that we should understand an action as a pre-reflective engagement with the world. In the case of Magical-TW in regard to emotion, the bodily phenomena could be construed as part of emotional experiences. Taking Solomon's words, emotional experiences are the way one is lived, embodied, and engaged with the world. This implies a way to see the bodily action as a kind of action readiness and action tendency. Solomon, in his later work, suggests that bodily preparations and postures in emotional experiences also have phenomenological manifestations.<sup>349</sup> He considers the bodily arousal as a kind of action readiness through the lived-bodily subjectivity. Therefore, the bodily phenomena in emotions are "not just sensations or perceptions of goings-on in the body. Both arousal and action readiness should be subsumed under the more general phenomenological rubric of *getting engaged in the world*."<sup>350</sup> The "getting engaged in the world" could be construed as involving the evaluative aspects in which the lived-bodily phenomena are that through which one's emotional experiences are directed at the world.

## Conclusion

By proposing embodied emotion as a central theme, I have argued about the framework of my present task where a cognitively grounded theory of emotion meets a feeling theory in regard to the bodily phenomenon. In other words, an embodiment approach is where rationality meets physiological constraints. This formulation is appropriate to propose a comprehensive understanding of emotions. However, I argue that the notion of embodied emotion must not ignore the lived-bodily experience from the personal point of view. Therefore, the phenomenological approach to embodiment is necessary in this respect. Although Prinz's embodied emotion theory is appealing in developing a feeling theory, and should be regarded as an important initiation to formulate an embodied emotion theory in the contemporary philosophy of emotion, his theory not only lacks phenomenological richness but also entails phenomenological inadequacy.

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<sup>349</sup> Solomon, 2004: 86.

<sup>350</sup> Ibid. (See also Frijda, 2014).



The recent perceptual theory of emotion is regarded as another interesting alternative theory that attempts to reconcile the OFT and the SCT. However, it seems to fall short when it adopts the S-Perception view. This cannot get rid of the appraisal-arousal or mind-body dichotomy. The treatment needs the unification view. Accordingly, I have proposed Slaby's notion of Affective Intentionality to show how an integration of intentionality, evaluation, and bodily phenomenology of emotion is possible in a unification view. Furthermore, I have argued that a phenomenological embodied-enactive approach is consistent with the notion of Affective Intentionality. They can provide us with a comprehensive understanding of emotion.

## Conclusion

The main purpose of this thesis has been to formulate how to understand emotion as bodily phenomena without neglecting the structure of intentionality and evaluative property. In other words, it aimed at reconciling the Orthodox Feeling Theory<sup>351</sup> with the Strong Cognitive Theory.<sup>352</sup> The second purpose was to investigate the distinction and relationship between emotion and mood. Therefore, this thesis suggested that an existential phenomenological understanding, especially with the notions of lived-body and embodied subjectivity, may strengthen and support these purposes to a substantial extent. Accordingly, beside applying an existential phenomenological approach in general as a methodology, the third aim of this study was also to explore original ideas of affectivity in the work of classical phenomenologists.

Even though the debate about the natural kind of emotion was not the key issue of the present study, I would suggest that it is worth surveying. Such a debate is largely exposed by empirical-minded philosophers. After all, I tend to be neutral when it comes to the debate about natural kind. Inspired by Colombetti, I have remarked that the concept of basic emotion should be abandoned without rejecting that all emotions are somehow entities.<sup>353</sup>

This conclusion begins with the problem of the difference and the relationship between emotion and mood. Most philosophers of mind typically hold that mood is non-intentional whereas emotion is intentional. On the other hand, as an interpretation of existential phenomenological philosophy, intentionalism argues that mood could be understood as having a generalised intentional object; it is directed at the world as a whole.<sup>354</sup> By doing so, it seems to shift the concept of intentionality from the angle of

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<sup>351</sup> James, 1884.

<sup>352</sup> Kenny, 1963; Lyons, 1985; Solomon, 1973; Nussbaum, 2003.

<sup>353</sup> Colombetti, 2014.

<sup>354</sup> Crane, 1998; Goldie, 2000; Solomon, 1993; Solomon, 2006a.

analytic philosophy of mind to the one of existential phenomenological philosophy—mood is directed at or engaged with the whole world in regard to Being-in-the-world. In this respect, however, the criticism is that the generalised intentional object cannot be regarded as a very intentional object of mood because an intentional object must be specified rather than generalised. Consequently, this way of interpretation seems to fall short.

I have argued that there is a way, by taking up existential phenomenological philosophy, to interpret mood as being related to the structure of intentionality in a different sense. This interpretation requires an investigation from the phenomenological tradition; Heidegger's idea of Attunement through mood.<sup>355</sup>

Heidegger formulates the concept of Attunement through mood, which is an ontological-existential mode of Dasein's Being-in-the-world disclosing the ways one finds oneself in the world. It discloses the world which always and already matters to us in one way or another. Therefore, we are never free from mood. This can be also understood as a "background" of our feeling of being.<sup>356</sup> Based on this interpretation, I have proposed that it is true that mood may not have a specific intentional object, but it can still be construed as part of the structure of intentionality.<sup>357</sup> Mood is the openness to the world.<sup>358</sup>

Moreover, this interpretation provides the way to understand the relationship between emotion and mood. Mood could be considered as the primordially existential structure in a distinctive category, different from emotion. In other words, mood is the ontological ground that conditions other mental phenomena such as beliefs, desires, including emotions, and so on. In this regard, mood contributes to the possibility of emotion (and other mental phenomena) having a specific intentional object.<sup>359</sup> Heidegger's idea of Attunement through mood is very useful in understanding how we engage with the world in the first place. It could be said that the emotional

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<sup>355</sup> Heidegger, 2008.

<sup>356</sup> Ratcliffe, 2005.

<sup>357</sup> Ratcliffe, 2005; Ratcliffe, 2008.

<sup>358</sup> Thompson and Zahavi, 2007.

<sup>359</sup> Elpidorou and Freeman, 2015.

episodes and other mental states cannot be possible if we are not able to attune the way the world matters to us.

As part of studying emotion, I have investigated the original idea from classical phenomenologist through Sartre's theory of emotion.<sup>360</sup> Sartre claims that emotions are a magical transformation of the world. In everyday life, we engage with the world pre-reflectively and pragmatically in a usual deterministic manner. This is a typical way we non-emotionally act upon the world. It is only when we face difficulties—when the deterministic world is blurred or blocked and we are forced to act—that we make ourselves emotional by magically transforming a quality of the world. In doing so, however, the structure of the world itself is not causally changed. Rather, we transform our consciousness into the magical world appearing to us as having an emotional quality.

Sartre's theory of emotion—including Solomon's idea which is essentially inspired by Sartre<sup>361</sup>—is considered by many as the Strong Cognitive Theory. However, I have shown that we should consider it as the Weak Cognitive Theory (WCT) for two reasons. First, when Sartre suggests that we make ourselves emotional it does not mean that we make a belief or judgment in terms of proposition and deliberative control as the strong cognitive theorist holds. We, rather, pre-reflectively and magically transform the world as the ways we are engaging with. Second, Sartre also emphasises the role of bodily phenomena in emotion. Only one other piece of research, to my knowledge, has suggested that Sartre emphasises the role of bodily phenomena, and this emphasis can make a dialogue with the contemporary debate in philosophy of emotion.<sup>362</sup> It could be said that, for Sartre, emotional experience involves a lived-bodily feeling, expression, and action. In emotion, we transform our consciousness into the magical world *through* our bodily phenomenon as the incantation.

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<sup>360</sup> Sartre, 2002.

<sup>361</sup> Solomon, 1980, 1993, 2003, 2004, 2006a, 2006b, 2007.

<sup>362</sup> Smith, 2016.

An indication of the importance of this interpretation is that it may encourage future research to revisit and reinterpret Sartre's theory of emotion. Also, Solomon's main idea is that emotions are ways we engage with the world and may be understood as an integration of intentionality and bodily phenomena. He suggests, in his later work, the possibility to formulate the idea of kinaesthetic judgment or the judgement of the body. However, he does not elaborate on that. In this regard, Sartre-Solomon theory implies that the existential phenomenological approach may be productively applied for a comprehensive understanding of emotion and make a dialogue with the contemporary debate of emotion. This may partially share the main purpose of this thesis as well.

Based on the exploration of two major competing theories of emotion—the OFT and the SCT, each theory holding indispensable components of emotion. The former regards bodily feeling as the essence of emotion whereas the latter focuses on the cognitive ability as central. However, these competing theories are not a very central theme of the debate anymore. Most theorists of emotion in recent decades tend to agree that emotions are intentional, cognitively evaluative, and bodily felt. The question is how to integrate them.

I have explored alternative theories for such an integration—Prinz's theory of embodied appraisal and perceptual theory of emotion. Prinz's theory of embodied emotion proposes that, in emotion, our bodily feeling carries information about a relation between a subject and environment to the brain. That bodily feeling is essential to emotion. So, emotion is embodied appraisal. The embodied appraisal of emotion is about registering bodily changes, which causes the tracking of relational properties, the relation between the subject and the world. The bodily feelings are a representation of an organism-environment relation. This kind of appraisal was set up by our ancestors for survival. However, Prinz's theory seems to consider brain and bodily activities as separated, and endorses the concept of Cartesian mind. Therefore, it seems that appraisals are *caused* by bodily activities. Prinz applies the concept of embodiment and tends to regard bodily phenomena as a causal mechanism of emotion.

Although Prinz's theory is an interesting development of feeling theory in attempting to integrate a bodily feeling with intentionality, I argue that it is inadequate for a comprehensive understanding of emotion since it lacks phenomenological richness and the first-person account in regard to the lived-body. The concept of embodiment applied in Prinz's theory is a non-phenomenological approach to embodiment; it neglects a constitutive principle and the lived-experience of embodied subjectivity.

Even though Prinz's theory may be subsumed under a perceptual theory of emotion, a perceptual theory in general has other ways of argument. In reconciling the OFT and the SCT, a perceptual theorist of emotion typically argues that emotion can be reduced to or, at least, be analogous to perception because emotion and perception share the same attributes. Perception is intentional, having a distinctive phenomenal character, and is not necessarily conceptual, just as emotion is. The perceptual theory of emotion seems to be appealing. However, I have argued that it would be flawed if perception is understood as the S-Perception. The S-Perception is referred to as a standard conception of perception (and action): bodily sensory input → brain → bodily motor output. In general, a perceptual theory of emotion seems to be grounded on the S-Perception view. This view eventually holds the Cartesian brain-body split and seems unable to be successful for integrating bodily phenomena with intentionality in a unification view.

I have pointed out that both Prinz's theory of embodied emotion and perceptual theory of emotion are unlikely to succeed for an appropriate understanding of emotion since they treat the cognitive/evaluative dimension and bodily phenomena as separated. A cognitive ability is in the head whereas a bodily feeling is in the body, even though both interact in the process of emotion. This leads to phenomenological inadequacy and would be defective as far as reconciling the OFT and the SCT is concerned. Rather, in articulating a proper integration of intentionality, the cognitively evaluative aspect, and bodily feeling, one requires a unification view.<sup>363</sup> This means that an evaluative dimension and bodily feeling in emotion should not be treated separately. Instead, an evaluative feeling is intrinsically *constituted* through

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<sup>363</sup> Slaby, 2008; Goldie, 2000, 2002; Colombetti, 2007; Colombetti, 2014.

lived-bodily phenomena. Thus, the concept of mind underlying this understanding must be phenomenological embodied subjectivity, as opposed to the non-phenomenological embodiment, which is trapped in the Cartesian split.

I have suggested that it could be better to adopt another view of perception such as the E-perception. The E-Perception is referred to as embodied-enactive perception, understood as a sensorimotor activity in a dynamic system as a whole.<sup>364</sup> An enactive approach asserts that perception is kind of an action while cognition is an interaction between brain activities, bodily activities, and environmental engagements. The idea of the enactive approach is closely linked to the notion of phenomenological embodiment in holding that cognition is *constituted* by an interaction between the brain and lived-bodily activities (including environmental engagements). At the same time, they reject a computational and representational theory of mind. So, I tend to hold that only if the perceptual experiences in question are understood as E-Perception may it be possible to draw an analogy between emotion and perception.

The lived-body and the lived-experience of emotion must be emphasised in formulating a unification view. The richness of distinctive bodily phenomenology provides us with an evaluative feeling not only of the hedonically valenced—pleasure and pain, positive feeling and negative feeling—but also of a specific phenomenal character of certain emotions.<sup>365</sup> In our emotional experiences, we are physically shaken or affected by something in the world which has a signification for us. Furthermore, the evaluative property of objects or states of affairs in the external world is indistinguishable from its phenomenological character or what it is likeness. Thus, if an evaluative property of emotion is changed, a qualitative phenomenal character is changed too, and vice versa.<sup>366</sup> This could be understood as a unification view of intentionality and bodily phenomenology referring to the idea of what Slaby calls “Affective Intentionality”.

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<sup>364</sup> Merleau-Ponty, 2005; Noë, 2004.

<sup>365</sup> Helm, 2002; Slaby, 2008; Smith, 2016 (ch. 10).

<sup>366</sup> Slaby, 2008.

In addition to this, the enactive approach suggests the notion of enactive appraisal. An appraisal in emotion is constituted by neurobiological dynamics—bodily arousal and action. Furthermore, an enactive appraisal also involves pre-reflective and lived-bodily experiences in the sense that bodily feelings are that *through* which our evaluative feelings are directed to the object of emotions in the world.<sup>367</sup> The enactive approach to embodied emotion fulfils the unification view and provides phenomenological adequacy. Besides, it is consistent with the concept of Affective Intentionality.

Finally, I have proposed that emotions are not merely sensations in a body, nor are they purely cognitive evaluations in a self-enclosed brain. Emotion, rather, is intentionally embodied and enacted as having an evaluative property in regard to the richness of its bodily phenomenology. Emotion is constituted by lived-bodily phenomena involving a bodily feeling and action readiness, and is phenomenologically hedonically valenced. Crucially, such bodily phenomena involve evaluative feelings in the unification view. The notion of Affective Intentionality suggests that bodily feeling is that through which one is directed to the external world and evaluates the object of emotion.

The main limitation of this study is that it did not discuss and take up pieces of empirical evidence in regard to the subpersonal level, such as neurophysiological activities. However, the study largely emphasised the role of subjective bodily feelings, which may supervene on neurophysiological activities. This touches on the hard problem of consciousness, which is really a hard one indeed.

This thesis may have contributed to emotion research in philosophy to the extent that it partly encourages to bridge the gap between analytic philosophy of mind and existential phenomenological philosophy. Furthermore, an existential phenomenological understanding may contribute to emotion science in proving and recognising the important role of the first-person account of emotion. At the same time, it may urge a traditional philosopher to acknowledge the essential role of bodily phenomena in emotion. However, concepts such as Affective Intentionality, Feeling

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<sup>367</sup> Colombetti, 2007; Maiese, 2014.



Forwards, enactive appraisal, kinaesthetic judgment, judgement of the body, magical transformation of the world, and so on, need more works to be done on them and a more developed understanding in terms of both theoretical and empirical research.

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