

**India and Interregional Groupings: A Study of the IBSA
Dialogue Forum and BRICS, 2003-2014**

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DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled "India and Interregional Groupings: A Study of the IBSA Dialogue Forum and BRICS, 2003-2014" submitted by me for the award of degree of Doctor of Philosophy of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of the University or any other university.


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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this thesis be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


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Naik Shraddha Shrikant

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific States
AEC	Asian Economic Community
AIDS	Acquired Immuno Deficiency Syndrome
AIIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
ANC	African National Congress
APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEM	Asia-Europe Meeting
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
ASSOCHAM	Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India
AU	African Union
BASIC	Brazil-South Africa-India- China
BBC	BRICS Business Council
BJP	Bharatiya Janata Party
BNDES	Brazilian National Development Bank (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico e Social), (Brazil)
BPC	BRICS Policy Centre
BRC	BRICS Research Centre
BIMSTEC	Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation

BRICS	Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa
BRICS-TERN	BRICS Trade and Economic Research Network
BRICSAM	BRIC plus South Africa and Mexico
BTTC	BRICS Think Tank Council
BREXIT	British Exit
BRAXIT	Brazil Exit
BWC	Biological Weapons Convention
CACs	Collective Action Clauses (CAC)s
CAN	Comunidad Andina (Andean Community)
CAR	Central African Republic
CARICOM	Caribbean Community Common Market
(CBDR&RC)	Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Capabilities
CCIT	Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CII	Confederation of Indian Industries (India)
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CIVETS	Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey, South Africa
CMIM	Chiang Mai Initiative
CPC	Communist Party of China
CPEC	China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
CPLP	Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries

CRA	Contingency Reserve Arrangement
CSBM	Confidence and Security-Building Measures
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
CONCOR	Container Cooperation of India
CBDR	Common But Differentiated Responsibilities
DA	Development Assistance
DC	Development Committee
DBSA	Development Bank of Southern Africa
DIRCO	Department of International Relations and Cooperation (South Africa)
DNA	Deoxyribo Nucleic Acid
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAS	East Asia Summit
EAEC	East Asia Economic Caucus
EAEG	East Asia Economic Group
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EEC	European Economic Community
EEU	Eurasian Economic Union
EMDC	Economics and Management in Developing Countries
EU	European Union

Euromed	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
EULAC	EU-Latin American Cooperation
FATF	Financial Action Task Force
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization
FGV	Fundacao Getulio Vargas
FEALAC	Forum for East Asian and Latin American Cooperation
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FICCI	Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
FTAA	Free Trade Area of Americas
FSI	Foreign Service Institute
G-3	Group of 3
G-4	Group of 4, Brazil, India, Germany and Japan
G-5	Group of 5, Mexico, Brazil, China, India and South Africa
G-7	Group of 7
G-8	Group of 8
G-10	Group of 10
G-20	Group of 20
G-21	Group of 21, G20+ 1
G-22	Group of 22
G-24	Group of 24

G-77	Group of 77
G-90	Group of 90
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
GTAP	Global Trade Analysis Project
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Countries
HS	Harmonised System
HST	Hegemonic Stability Theory
HIV	Human Immuno Deficiency Virus
IBSA	India-Brazil-South Africa
IBRD	The International Bank of Reconstruction and Development
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICT	Information Communication Technology
IGO	Inter-governmental Organisations
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMFC	International Monetary and Financial Committee
IPEA	Institute of Applied and Economic Research

IORA	Indian Ocean Rim Association
IOR-ARC	Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation
IORAG	Indian Ocean Rim Academic Group
IORBF	Indian Ocean Rim Business Forum
IPR	Intellectual Property Rights
JeM	Jaish-e-Mohammed
JCPA	Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
LAC	Latin American Countries
LAC	Line of Actual Control
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
LMG	Like Minded Group
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MEA	Ministry of External Affairs
MERCOSUR	Mercado Comun del Sur
MFN	Most Favoured Nations
MNC	Multi-National Corporation
MAVINS	Mexico, Australia, Vietnam, Indonesia, Nigeria, and South Africa
MINT	Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, Turkey
MMTC	Mineral Metals Trading Cooperation
MIST	Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding

MOF	Ministry of Finance (China)
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (China)
MOFCOM	Ministry of Commerce (China)
MRE	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerio das Relacoes Exteriores) (Brazil)
MSMEs	Medium and Small Enterprises (MSMEs)
N11	Next 11 comprising of (Next 11 Emerging Economies)
NAFTA	North African Free Trade Agreement
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NAMA	Non-Agricultural Market Access
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDB	New Development Bank
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NEPAD	New Partnership for African Development
NIC	Newly Industrialised Countries
NIEO	New International Economic Order
NSG	Nuclear Suppliers Group
NPT	Non Proliferation Treaty
NTBs	Non Trading Barriers
OAS	Organisation of American States
OBOR	One Belt One Road

ORF	Observer Research Foundation
OAU	Organization of African Unity
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPCW	Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
PPP	Public-Private Partnership
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PRC	People's Republic of China
PM	Prime Minister
PTA	Preferential Trade Agreement
PUC-Rio	Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro
R&D	Research and Development
RIS	Research and Information System for Developing Countries
RMB	Renminbi
RT	Russia Today
RTA	Regional Trade Agreement
RWP	Responsibility While Protecting
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
SACU	South African Custom Union
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

SABT	South African BRICS Think Tank
SADC	South African Development Community
SAGAR	Security and Growth for All in the Region
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
SDR	Special Drawing Rights
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SDT	Special and Differentiated Treatment
SEATO	South East Asian Treaty Organisation
SVE	Small and Vulnerable Economies
SME	Small and Medium Enterprises
TCDC	Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries
TRIPS	Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights
TPP	Trans-Pacific Partnership
TTIP	Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNOSSC	United Nations Organizations South- South Cooperation
UNPOA	United Nations Programme of Action
US	United States of America
USD	USA dollar
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VISTA	Vietnam, Indonesia, South Africa, Turkey and Argentina
WB	World Bank
WG	Working Group
WGTI	Working Group on Trade and Investment
WHO	World Health Organisation
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organisation
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organization
WWI	World War I
WWII	World War II
ZOFPAN	Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality

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Introduction

This study seeks to analyse India's interest and role in interregional groupings, with special reference to the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum and Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS). These two groupings occupy a significant position in India's foreign policy and also have drawn a great deal of attention of the international community in a short span of time. Their member countries are considered as emerging powers which seek to redefine the nature of international politics. This highlights the need for a comprehensive analysis of India's participation in interregional groupings.

IBSA is a special attraction for India mainly because its member countries enjoy democratic credentials. They are drawn from three different continents to promote *inter se* cooperation on various issues of national and international importance. BRICS can be considered as an important geopolitical entity in the new century. Its member countries have achieved significant economic growth; they share about 30 per cent of the global territory and 45 per cent of the world's population. At the time of the formation of BRICS in 2009, they enjoyed 15 per cent of the world economy and 42 per cent share of global currency reserves. Both IBSA and BRICS provide a suitable platform for India to address the issues regarding the establishment of a new political and economic order. They present a reformist outlook by demanding a key role for the developing nations in global decision-making.

India's foreign policy has incorporated interregionalism as an instrument to promote its cooperation with countries across the regions on various issues of national and international importance. The basic principles of India's foreign policy were framed by newly independent India. India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, is regarded as the architect of Indian foreign policy. Under his leadership, India convened the Asian Relations Conference in 1947, which later helped form the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and Group of 77 (G77). Indira Gandhi's foreign policy was based on *realpolitik* and Rajiv Gandhi sought to provide continuity in policy in the 1980s. India has emerged as one of the fastest growing economies in the world in the post-Cold War era. The report of investment firm Goldman Sachs in 2003 estimated that if India improved its physical infrastructure and basic facilities in health and education, it would emerge as a leading economy by 2050.

With the end of the cold war, India's foreign policy strategy has laid greater emphasis on multilateral interactions, enabling the country to evolve a strong identity in the global arena. This entails participation in interregional groupings to achieve political and economic power to influence international politics. Introduction of economic reforms and changes in strategies have produced new foreign policy options for India. It has achieved a modest economic growth with the introduction of liberalisation in the early 1990s. By the end of this decade, it was expected to enter the club of five largest economies of the world. Its growing stature can be associated with the emergence of powers in different regions.

Countries such as Brazil, Russia, China, and South Africa have also maintained steady economic growth. They have come together to check the domination of the West. India is a member of groupings such as IBSA, BRICS, Group of 20 (G20), East Asia Summit (EAS), Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), the Brazil, South Africa, India and China forum (BASIC), and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA).

The formation of these groupings should be seen in the context of the growing regionalisation of international politics. Interregionalism is an extension of the process of regionalism. Regionalism and interregionalism have seen gradual intensification across the world in the current century. Scholars define these as an instrument of regions. "New interregionalism" tends to have much greater impact on the current international system. Owing to globalisation and integration of economies, many countries now participate in different interregional groups, thereby making interregionalism an important feature of the international system. These groupings envisage objectives which the member countries aim to achieve collectively. Moving beyond old interregionalism, new interregionalism covers issues related to trade, investment, culture and security.

India actively participates in a number of interregional groups. G20 is economically and politically relevant for India. It provides New Delhi an opportunity to work with the key Western countries and develop an economic engagement between the developed and the emerging economies. Its main aim is to put an end to trade-distorting policies in agriculture that are exclusively maintained by developed countries. The group engages in strengthening the global economy that has been

affected by crisis. India is active in the grouping by pressing hard for ending the negative trade policies. It seeks to benefit from the EAS as the grouping brings the world's most dynamic economies together to promote sustained development at the regional and global levels. India is keen on monetary integration and cooperation among its members in the energy sector. Through BIMSTEC, India has sought to achieve complementarities in trade, investment and production between the member countries. The grouping strives to adopt an innovative and forward-looking strategy which aims at realising the vision for a free trade agreement (FTA). It engages in furthering cooperation in diverse areas such as tourism, poverty reduction, terrorism, drug trafficking and disaster management. India has also been a founding member of BASIC, which collectively participated in the Copenhagen climate change negotiations. Rejecting the measures for environmental protection advocated by the developed states, the group has laid stress on calculations of emissions reductions on a per capita basis to gain the benefit of margin. India has also shown keen interest in the development of IORA as a grouping that focuses on sustained growth of the Indian Ocean region.

IBSA was launched in 2003 in Brasilia, highlighting the promotion of South-South cooperation and a common position on issues of international importance, and to promote trilateral exchanges of information, international best practices, technologies and skills. The ensuing summits were in Pretoria (2007), New Delhi (2008), Brasilia (2010) and Pretoria (2011). IBSA countries attempted to accelerate the talks on a trilateral FTA involving India, the South African Custom Union (SACU) and the Mercado Comun del Sur (MERCOSUR).

Furthering its South-South cooperation agenda, India remains a significant member of IBSA. The three member states of the dialogue forum together lobby for reforming the United Nations and have taken a common stand on some global security problems. IBSA has also sought to eliminate higher non-tariff barriers to trade imposed by the developed countries. This forms a crucial aspect of reforming the Bretton Woods institutions – the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank – to make them more representative in structure and functions. IBSA has developed different Working Groups as a means to create trans-governmental networks. Through the IBSA Fund, the grouping strives to collaborate in the areas of poverty, hunger, disease, technology transfer, science and technology, defence, transportation, and civil

aviation in developing countries. IBSA can also be a trade booster for its member countries as it provides a platform to set an agenda collectively and achieve the common goals. It has launched a virtual platform, IBSA Centre for Exchange on Tax Information, for identifying and understanding of abusive tax schemes. The IBSA Editors Forum has launched the IBSANEWS website to provide news, reflecting how the media in IBSA member countries are reporting global issues like trade, environment, diplomacy and energy. The grouping has proposed to jointly work on an IBSA satellites project. The member countries have held two rounds of naval exercises, called IBSAMAR, which have helped them build stronger naval ties.

As regards BRIC (as it was then named), the Finance Ministers of its member countries met in 2006 to discuss the possibility of establishing an interregional grouping among themselves. The first BRIC summit was held in 2009 in Russia. In this summit the members laid emphasis on the need to develop an alternative financing system. In the second summit, held in 2010 in Brazil, the group pressed the need for a stable and predictable currency system. The third summit, held in Sanya, China, in 2011 was significant for the induction of South Africa in the grouping, which made BRIC into BRICS. The fourth summit was held in New Delhi in 2012. The fifth summit was held in Durban, South Africa, in 2013. BRICS preferred to focus on giving credits and making trade payments in each another's national currency, and also proposed for political negotiations to resolve the then prevailing crises in Syria, Libya and Iran.

In its fifth Summit in 2013, BRICS decided to set up the BRICS Development Bank to mobilise resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other developing countries. They also established a \$100 billion Contingency Reserve Arrangement (CRA) to forestall short-term liquidity pressures, provide mutual support, and further strengthen financial stability. BRICS member states have taken a common stand on various global issues such as the situation in West Asia and the global economic recession. BRICS has also created the BRICS Business Council and Consortium of Think Tanks.

India has used the interregional groupings to articulate its views on restructuring and reforming of international institutions. In order to make them more democratic and representative, it has been very vocal in demanding a permanent seat at the United

Nations Security Council (UNSC) for itself. It has tried to bring together emerging economies to stabilise the global financial market and create an enabling environment for rapid economic development by reforming the Bretton Woods institutions.

India's objectives in joining these interregional groupings may be related to gaining power and position in the international system. There is an indication that through these interregional groupings, India seeks to strengthen the cause of the Global South. However, India's initiatives in this context have been very limited, and the states from the Global South view the groupings as the emerging powers launching their own new imperial policy. Meanwhile, in order to increase its global influence, India has also sought to get closer to the developed world. It has developed strategic partnerships with a number of countries, including the United States.

IBSA and BRICS have experienced limitations in dealing with various global issues. They lack proper institutional processes of decision-making and rules to guide the member countries. There are differences of perspective and policy among their member countries as well. They have shown their divergent views on issues such as climate change, the NPT, UNSC reform, etc. For example, in BRICS, Russia and China have not openly supported the demand of India and Brazil for permanent UNSC membership. These countries have also recorded variations in economic growth and developments. For instance, the Chinese economy is far ahead of the South African and Indian economies. Russia and Brazil are large commodity exporters. Brazil is a non-nuclear state, while Russia, China and India possess nuclear weapons. Along with the social and cultural differences, the political backgrounds of the member countries are also different. There are democracies and authoritarian regimes in the BRICS grouping. China and India have an unresolved border dispute and have competing interests in the Indian Ocean.

While maintaining balanced relations with the developed states, India has joined the new interregional groupings. In this context, the proposed study seeks to evaluate the paramount objectives of India's policy in this regard. By assessing the concept of emerging powers in the current century and examining several recent interregional engagements, declarations and policies, the study seeks to examine whether economic and political goals have brought a new realisation in India's foreign policy to search for great-power status in the international system.

Review of Literature

The literature relevant to the subject is divided into five sub-themes, as follows: (i) emerging powers and interregionalism, (ii) power dimensions of India's foreign policy; (iii) India and interregional groupings; (iv) IBSA; and (v) BRICS. The purpose of this exercise is to demonstrate the existing gap in the literature.

- ***Emerging Powers and Interregionalism***

The concepts of power and regions form an important part of the study of international relations. States are classified in power terms into superpower, major power, great power or developed, developing and least developed states. This is based on their tangible and non-tangible capabilities. Slaughter (2009) indicates that a state's networking capabilities are considered as an important component in developing it into a power. Along with military and economic power capabilities, it is also a state's networking skills that can assist in making it a regional power, a major power or a superpower. Kappel (2010) and Ashizawa (2008) further stress that alliance formation among states is now developing them into networking agents, which can be further explained through rational choice and critical theories.

A state's political affiliations have a strong impact on its power acquisition in world politics. Emerging powers can be closely associated with the theory of realism as postulated by Thomas Hobbes in *Leviathan* and Hans J. Morgenthau in *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (1965). As far as the liberals are concerned, Philip (2010) notes that democracies engage in alliance politics and alliances of the rising powers are also expected to become "responsible stakeholders" to adapt to the existing norms. According to liberal institutionalists like Hurrell (2006), Ikenberry (1999 and (2008) and Friedmen (2000), the rising powers face a Western-centred system which is rule-based. They develop deep political foundations and regard "soft balancing" as a tool in limiting other states' influence in international institutions. However, Narlikar (2006) and Sikri (2007) believe that rising powers will not play by the West's rules, but expect them to use their new found status to pursue an alternative vision of world order and challenge the status quo by joining hands with other rising powers.

Mearsheimer (2006) and Jacques (2009) postulate that the “unpeaceful” rise of China as a fast emerging power will eventually lead to the end of the Western world. According to Khanna (2008), Kennedy (1999), Ingersoll and Frazier (2012), there will be new powers in the coming decades, comprising the rising pivotal actors, located on the fringes of the global institutions, such as China, South Africa, Turkey, Mexico, India and Brazil. These countries will showcase their importance as “swing states”, the defining characteristic of the international system in the new century. In further describing the role of these new powers, Zakaria (2008) and Mahbubani (2008) predict that the “Post-American World” and the “rise of the rest” of the new actors will lead to systemic consequences. Ikenberry (2001) and (2010) assert that these rising non-established players with their strategic choices will have game-changing effects on the international system as they approach great-power status.

It would appear, however, that the phenomenon of interregionalism lacks necessary academic insights. The genesis of interregionalism can be traced to the concept of regionalism. It is important to study the growth and theories of regionalism, which paved the way for the development and strengthening of interregionalism. Regionalism largely comes under the domain of political economy studies; it is defined as a way of linking it to globalisation. Page (2000) describes a region as a group of countries, which have created a legal framework of cooperation covering an extensive economic relationship, for an indefinite duration.

The transformation of old regionalism into new regionalism has been a very interesting phenomenon. Breslin, Higgott and Rosamond (2002) assert that a shift to new regionalism from the boundaries of old and traditional regional parameters is attributed to the advent of globalisation that has created a deeper relationship with the process of regionalisation. Hettne and Soderbaum (2002) affirm that the phenomenon of new regionalism has attracted more countries to come together, for it is more open and shares deeper interdependence of global political economy. Hettne (1991) further attributes this preference to its more comprehensive and multi-dimensional features. According to him, old regionalism is transformed into new regionalism because of the closed, inward-looking and protectionist measures adopted in the older process of economic integration.

Foque and Steenbergen (2005) and Hurrell (2005) claim that relations between countries can be elaborately studied by analysing the process of regionalism. Regionalism helps to increase bargaining power and political capacity. Increased regional and interregional interaction in the view of Breslin (2002) and Bhalla (1997) is primarily attributed to economic features such as liberalisation in tariff that brings states together. However, Acharya (2002) contends that this phenomenon moves beyond the economic perspective and is also derived from the realist notions of security dilemma and integration theory. The realist school explains security as the main reason for states to come together. States also come together in view of sharing certain common attributes. Social constructivists see regionalism as the politics of identity that acts in a way to prioritise shared experience, learning and reality, such as the Asian Way identity which led to the formation of ASEAN. Katzeinstein (2002), Mittleman (1999), Hettne and Soderbaum (2002) emphasise that neo-regionalism is linked to neo-liberalism as it highlights the process of world order transformation and the emergence of a multilevel pattern of governance.

The notion of regionalism has attracted the developing countries. Dent (2008), Ojendal (2000), Amin (1999), Winters (2001) and Page (2000) surmise that East Asian regionalism reflects the rapid change in the region, which can be a successful regional process different from the Western domain of regionalism. The authors suggest that regionalism is a process of polarisation of the developed countries, and through this phenomenon, the developing countries seek to move beyond trade and develop different relations with the member countries.

Soderbaum and Van Langenhove (2005) observe that since research in interregionalism is at the early stage of its development, the concept is still unclear and shifting. Roloff (2006) describes the process of interregionalism as a “method of widening and intensifying political, economic and societal interactions between international regions”. Interregionalism for Fawcett (2005) is a formation of a larger entity outside the single state and is smaller than an international system of states. On the genesis of interregionalism, Hanggi (2006) and Doidge (2007) observe that the earlier interregional relations were “old interregionalism”, where a specific mode of international cooperation was developed and dominated by the most advanced regional organisations. Old interregionalism was an actor-centric phenomenon of rather limited relevance for the international system, which was initiated by the

European Union by encouraging group-to-group dialogues during the 1970s and 1980s. Ruland (2006) proposes that interregionalism is a generic term covering the whole range of formats which regions have created for interaction. This may be subdivided into “bi-regionalism” or “bilateral interregionalism”, encompassing group dialogues and “trans-regionalism”, covering more diffused arrangements. Gratius (2008), Soderbaum and Langenhove (2005) and Barfeild (2013) argue that a combination of different states from different regions coming together with similar goals is called hybrid interregionalism. IBSA and BRICS can be the best examples of such interregionalism.

- ***Power Dimensions of India’s Foreign Policy***

There is considerable academic literature on determinants and principles of India’s foreign policy. Studies by Kapur (1994), Khilnani (1999), Dixit (2004), Bandopadhyay (2006), Ganguly (2010), and Dubey (2013) are noteworthy in this regard. However, literature on the power dimensions of Indian foreign policy is scanty. A country’s foreign policy is designed and influenced by its important leaders in a particular time period. Jain (2012) and Prasad (2013) highlight that Indian foreign policy too is a product of its time where Nehru played an important role in establishing its major pillars. According to Chacko (2012), the Nehruvian era in Indian foreign policy marked India as a post-colonial and moral power. Mohan (2006) demonstrates that India’s foreign policy has had three important phases, namely, 1947-1971, 1971-1991, and 1991 onwards. Phase I witnessed independent India’s arrival on the international stage. Phase II was highly influenced by Indira Gandhi’s leadership. Phase III emerged as a result of the advent of globalisation, end of bipolar world politics and the introduction of economic reforms within the country. This phase is marked by India’s growing engagement in multilateral interactions with the world. According to Hymans (2009), since 1998, India’s foreign policy is based on practical geopolitical considerations and not on Nehru’s peace policy.

Ollapally (2000), Mitra (2006), Mitra and Schottli (2007:19) and Ollapally and Rajagopalan (2012) see India as an extremely status-conscious power in the international system. In order to maintain balance of power, it always tries to project itself without necessarily using military or economic might. However, Nayar and Paul (2003) affirm that India’s foreign policy has maintained a balance between

multilateralism and bilateralism. According to Mohan (2006 and 2008), Singh (2008), Perkovich (2003), Nafey (2008) and Tharoor (2012), India aims to strengthen its relations with the major powers and countries from different regions of the world, including the United States and China.

Tanham (1992), Varma (2006), Luce (2007), Pant (2009), and Ganguly and Mukherji (2011) maintain that it is difficult to include India in the category of rising powers, for at times it adheres to its identity as a developing nation representing an anti-Western group, and at the same time, it follows the democratic ideology propagated by the West. Sidhu et.al. (2013) and Saran (2013) demonstrate that owing to its strong democracy and growing economic capability, India is emerging as a global power, being widely recognised and also institutionalised in the international system. Hurrell (2006), Ayooob (1989), Huntington (1993), Turner (1991), Mohan (2013), and Malone (2011) explain that India has identified with the developing states and extended support to Third World solidarity while opposing the liberal Western world order. Cheng (2007), Narlikar (2007), Cohen (2002), and Nayar (2005) argue that the liquidity crisis of 1991 and the subsequent deal with the IMF provided the context for India's economic reform. India's economic growth has played a significant role in raising its confidence in conducting its foreign policy.

- ***India and Interregional Groupings***

The literature on inter-regionalism largely covers the old groupings such as BIMSTEC, IORA, etc. There is hardly any full-length study done on India's participation in new interregional groupings like IBSA, BRICS, EAS, G20 and BASIC. Sengupta (1997) and Rao (2001) postulate that new regionalism is transcending geographical boundaries, going beyond the cold war strategy based on geographical lines. Chakraborty (2006) notes that since India's economic diplomacy proved ineffective at the Doha Round of GATT negotiations, it has sought to collaborate with other developing countries on the issues pertaining to its key interests. Ollapally (2011) claims that by participating in different interregional groups India can now shed its ambivalence in foreign policy and utilise hard- and soft-power options in achieving its national interests.

As far as India's engagement with South-East Asia is concerned, it has focused on deepening its partnerships. Mehta (2006), Malik (2006) and Kumar (2007) maintain

that India has made much headway in key Asian regional organisations such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), East Asia Summit (EAS) and Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), and that it seeks to create an arc of “Asian Economic Community” in the current century. Muni (2006) demonstrates that India is committed to increasing its economic engagements with the South-East Asian region through the EAS. Besides trade, India is also keen on monetary integration of the region and cooperation in the energy sector. EAS is an important strategic entity for India, which is interested in developing a multi-dimensional engagement with the group.

India’s participation in G20 aims at strengthening the international “financial architecture” and promoting “financial inclusion”. Wade (2011) and Dubey (2013) observe that by participating in G20, India firmly believes in strengthening the WTO. Stewart (2010), Chand et al. (2010), Cooper (2010), Knaack and Katada (2013), and Vestergaard (2011) argue that the formation of G20 underscores the ongoing diffusion of global economic and political power from the West to the developing world, particularly to Asia.

According to Hussain (2014), BIMSTEC has geopolitical leverage and geo-economic significance for regional and extra-regional powers. Chowdhury and Negi (2013) and Hossain (2013) claim that the group has a possibility of emerging as a business hub in the region. However, Batra (2010) and Yhome (2014) assert that the interactions among the group members have not been intense enough as they lack macroeconomic linkages and policy coordination. The group should therefore focus more on the viable complementarities on projects such as intra-state roadways, waterways, tourism and energy security that will address the developmental gap and foster trade.

Chakraborti (2007) argues that India considers BIMSTEC as a natural grouping because its members share common geography and history. BIMSTEC is designed to build a bridge between SAARC and ASEAN. According to Mohan (2004), the group can further complement SAARC’s efforts to develop a free trade area in South Asia. Out of 14 identified areas of cooperation, India leads in the sectors of transport and communications, tourism, environment and disaster management, and counterterrorism and transnational crime. India has also committed to contribute 32 per cent of the cost of building the BIMSTEC Secretariat in Dhaka.

In the view of Hagerty (1991), IORA holds significance for India as the country has developed deep strategic interests in the Indian Ocean region. Campbell and Scerri (1995) and Burrows (1997) affirm that India has shown a strong interest in developing Indian Ocean economic cooperation because South-South cooperation has not made much headway. According to Singh (2005), Chhabra (1996) and Michael (2013), India has become a main agenda-setter in the grouping and insists on excluding the security issues. Mehta (1997) claims that IORA has helped India to increase its economic relations with Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore without being a member of ASEAN.

- ***IBSA***

IBSA is regarded as a group that links the states from the Global South. The group is believed to have the capacity to bring the developing countries together. White (2009) argues that it is the collective size and relevance of IBSA in the global political economy that provides a unique opportunity to move the core countries of the South to the centre of the new and emerging global order. According to Flandes (2009), IBSA has been the launching pad for its member states in the global hierarchy of states and will also remain as a motor of global institutional reforms in the future. Alden (2010) and Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS) (2008) postulate that a newly assertive coalition of emerging powers in the South, such as Brazil, India and South Africa, seems to be presenting the North with a unified stance of resistance after a long period of South-South dis-articulation. Puri and Kumar (2007) and FRIDE (2007) demonstrate that democratic ethos, transparency, and the open and bottom-up nature of societies make the grouping a different entity. It is not regarded as a defensive coalition but a rule-maker within the existing international system, because the member states enjoy positive relations with the US and the EU. Fontaine (n.d.) reminds that the countries by coming together have not left their motive of promoting the interests of developing countries. The formation of the IBSA Trust Fund is an illustration of the group's leadership role in the South. Lal, Vaz and Chenoy (2009) believe that the group's interest in creating a balanced international intellectual property regime will lead to sharing knowledge on important drugs and also developing a greater common interest of the developing world.

The main reasons for India's participation in IBSA, according to Beri (2008), are related to its interest in strengthening global multilateralism. Bava (2009) adds that it is the realist pursuit of national interest that has brought India's foreign policy at a crossroads. Owing to its economic growth, India seeks to play a larger role both in regional and global politics. Jaffrelot and Sidhu (2013) maintain that IBSA remains an important grouping for India because it provides an opportunity to revive the Nehruvian model of South-South cooperation and help poor developing countries. The democratic credentials of the group will also strengthen India's position in international politics since it offers an alternative narrative to the global North and also countries like Russia and China. Antkiewicz and Cooper (2011) argue that the IBSA membership will certainly help India in building deeper economic ties with Brazil and South Africa, which can be further expanded to the bigger regions of Latin America and Africa.

- ***BRICS***

BRICS remains one of the most discussed forums. O'Neill (2011), an economist who coined the acronym BRIC, asserts that the countries in the grouping have changed the world of global investment. These countries have a historic opportunity in the post-global financial crisis period to create multilateral platforms. The group therefore should be viewed on par with G20 to better reflect the structure of the global economy.

For Laidi (2011) and Casella (2011), the formation of groupings such as BRICS is an indication that the global system will continue to grow over the next few decades. BRICS's main role is to counterbalance the existing power structure in the world by advancing in broader political and economic goals. The studies by Quercia and Magri (2011), Dailami and Masson (2009), and Keukeleire and Bruyninckx (2011) maintain that BRICS has transformed into an institutional entity from being an informal group of states. The economic growth of these countries enhances their political weight, thus transforming the world order. Arun (2014), Andrew and Harris (2014) and Zachary (2014) maintain that the group has also showed solidarity with Russia on the issue of sanctions imposed by the West.

Yan (2011) argues that BRICS has changed the growth trajectory of the world economy. The grouping has become a driving force for democratisation of

international economic relations. By opening their economies to global trade and investments, BRICS member countries have met with varying degrees of success. As they can sustain higher growth rates than the developed countries, the BRICS countries may become economic powers in the world. Cai Chunlin (2009) highlights the theoretical foundation for trade and economic cooperation among BRIC countries. According to him, a deeper analysis of economic and trade development of the four countries gives a positive picture for greater economic cooperation among the members. Saran (2014) suggests that the grouping should highlight the objectives of BRICS's New Development Bank (NDB). The main target of the NDB should be to give greater support to the borrowing countries in prioritising their projects to develop economic cooperation between the donor and the recipient countries.

Dikshit (2012), Singh (2010) and Saran and Sharan (2012) observe that India has given greater importance to its engagement with the BRICS grouping. It is considered as a platform for coordination, consultation and cooperation on contemporary issues having global as well as regional significance. India can immensely benefit from the BRICS states' commitment to multilateralism to deal with economic and political problems. Some Western countries such as Canada and Germany have shown interest in joining the grouping and enhancing their relations with the BRICS countries. As a European Parliament commentary (2011) has noted, there is a high level of interdependence between BRICS and the EU. It has suggested for a dialogue to achieve a new system of global governance based on shared responsibility, global stability and security risks.

There are several studies on India's foreign policy and also there is a growing body of literature on India as an emerging power. However, the interregional dimensions of India's foreign policy have not been studied comprehensively. Further, India's role in various interregional groupings such as IBSA and BRICS has not been analysed in any full-length study. The present study attempts to fill the gap and develop a more nuanced analysis of India's role in interregional groupings.

Definition, Rationale and Scope of the Study

India's rise as an Asian power is a distinct feature of the new century. Several analysts consider the current century as an Asian Century. India has undergone major changes in the post-colonial period. The adoption of policies of liberalisation and

modernisation, maintenance of democratic credentials, development of military prowess, etc., has enhanced India's standing in global affairs. The country has shown qualities of being an emerging power by establishing cooperation with a number of countries.

India, Russia, China, Brazil and South Africa have earned an identity of being influential powers in world politics. The growing influence of India and China along with greater involvement of the US in Asia is an indication of the power transition taking place from Europe to Asia. India's growing stature has made its position important on several issues like climate change, nuclear proliferation, and a whole range of non-traditional security issues. The rise of China and India has led to a new discourse on international order. International order, according to Hedley Bull (1995), is "the pattern of relations between states which leads to a particular result, goals or values, and they form a means to a certain end". These countries have come together to form interregional groupings such as IBSA, BRICS and BASIC, where they highlight their common concerns and work together to address them.

Interregionalism is seen as a significant instrument of foreign policy of many emerging powers. According to Heinner Hanggi (2006),

interregionalism has added layers to an already differentiated global order. It has become a popular factor in the international system for it is also described as an instrument of competition and cooperation between the countries. The regions and the states together engage in different levels of cooperation and confrontation with each other.

The current process of inter-regionalism is more complex and comprehensive than earlier, in which regions and states interact to become more proactive, engage in interregional arrangements, and aim at shaping global governance. The interregional groupings have substantial common objectives in their functioning. Louise (2005) believes that

interregional grouping has come about because of the presence of a certain identifiable system of states, but larger than any individual state or non-state unit. Their nature is of a permanent or temporary kind, may be institutionalized or not. It is a form of alliance which is directed against and only derivatively for someone or something.

India has shown an active interest in many interregional groupings and has become a member of several of them as part of its new foreign policy strategy. IBSA and BRICS together have raised a common voice on restructuring the global institutions and have made an attempt to provide a regional-level financial support to the group members and the countries from the Global South. IBSA was established with the aim of increasing its member countries' bargaining power, and it strives to build a strong voice for the developing countries in the international arena, while enhancing their cooperation and trade links. BRICS represents the five fastest growing economies from different regions. It aims at reordering the international system. The group also claims to work as defender of the interests of developing countries, while enhancing South-South cooperation and strengthening North-South dialogue. BRICS's Development Bank and the Contingency Reserve Arrangements create an alternative to the IMF currency reserves, highlighting the creation of economic institutions based on equality and inclusiveness.

India's engagement with various interregional groupings has provided a new dimension to the study of India's foreign policy. However, despite India's growing importance and the increasing role of these multiple interregional groups, relatively little has been written about its participation in various interregional groupings such as IBSA and BRICS. These interregional interactions involving the emerging powers can also be seen as a step to bring about structural changes in the international system. The rationale for the study comes from the fact that interregionalism has emerged as a major foreign policy instrument and strategy, and it is necessary to investigate how effectively India can use it to promote the country's foreign policy goals. Further, it must be noted that this theme has not been studied systematically. The study tries to examine whether IBSA and BRICS will be useful for countries like India to establish their influence in the international arena.

The present study covers the period 2003-2014. The year 2003 marked the formation of IBSA. In 2014, BRICS held the sixth summit in Fortaleza, Brazil. India perceives IBSA as an opportunity to build close cooperation among the countries of the South by coordinating their development efforts. Trade flows, since the creation of IBSA in 2003, have significantly increased between the three member countries: intra-IBSA trade grew from \$2.5 billion in 2003 to \$21 billion in 2012. In the 2011 summit, IBSA sought to accelerate the talks on trilateral FTA involving India, SACU and

MERCOSUR. India has participated in all the summits to date and actively contributed to IBSA's growth in various ways. Therefore, this study intends to examine IBSA's growth as an entity in a short span of 12 years and investigate how far this forum has helped India to realise its set foreign policy objectives of achieving a prominent position in world politics. Where BRICS is concerned, its member countries seek to improve their international status and achieve their individual and collective goals. In the 2012 Delhi summit, BRICS further broadened the issues of engagement, ranging from civil war in Syria to economic crisis.

Objectives

The main objectives of the study are to:

- Examine how interregionalism has become an agenda of India's foreign policy.
- Evaluate India's interests and goals in becoming a member of various interregional groups.
- Analyse India's specific objectives behind its active participation in IBSA and BRICS.
- Evaluate India's contributions to interregional groupings in general and IBSA and BRICS in particular.

Research Questions

This study seeks to answer the following questions:

- What is interregionalism and how has it influenced international relations?
- How does Indian diplomacy use interregional groupings as an instrument to promote the country's national interest?
- What are the basic parameters set by India for joining any grouping?
- How does India play a prominent role in interregional groupings?
- What are the principal agenda of IBSA and BRICS?
- Has India's participation made a significant impact on the functioning of IBSA and BRICS?

Hypotheses

These research questions are answered by testing the following hypotheses:

1. India's participation in interregional groupings is fundamentally governed by its strong desire to become a great power in the international system.
2. Interregional groupings have formed effective instruments of India's foreign policy to create a multipolar world order.
3. The overlapping membership in IBSA and BRICS and India's participation in both make an impact on its foreign policy goals and strategies.

Research Methods

The present study adopts the case study method. Case study is a form of qualitative analysis wherein a complete function of a phenomenon is elaborated to draw inferences. Case study can be a single case study or multiple case studies. It can be descriptive, exploratory or explanatory. This is an exploratory case study in the sense that interregional groupings such as IBSA and BRICS are systematically explored in the context of India's foreign policy.

The study uses the theoretical literature for developing a conceptual framework. The theories of interregionalism, power cycle and emerging power provide the basic theoretical arguments to understand India's role in the interregional groupings. The primary sources for the study include agreements and speeches of leaders, summit declarations, national plans, and interviews with diplomats, government officials and academicians. The websites of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs and different groupings provide rich data on various aspects of the study. The secondary sources include books and articles, policy briefings and news reportage.

Framework of Study

The present study is divided into five chapters plus conclusion, besides the current introductory chapter.

Introduction

The introduction provides a comprehensive background to the theme of the study and reviews the literature on the topic. It also presents the research problem, objectives, hypotheses and description of each chapter.

Chapter I: Interregionalism and Emerging Powers: A Conceptual Framework

This chapter first defines the concepts of interregionalism and emerging powers, and then examine how interregionalism has become a new phenomenon in international relations. Considering interregionalism as an instrument of foreign policy, the chapter analyses how emerging powers, in order to adjust to the changing power dynamics, have chosen to adopt interregionalism in pursuit of their foreign policy goals.

Chapter II: Interregionalism: An Agenda of India's Foreign Policy

Against the background of the evolution and nature of India's foreign policy, this chapter provides a comprehensive analysis of why and how interregionalism is incorporated as an agenda of India's foreign policy. This chapter is divided into two sections: the first section examines the major objectives and strategies of Indian foreign policy, which has experienced significant changes over the years. The second section provides a comprehensive analysis of India's participation in various interregional groups, such as the EAS, G20, BIMSTEC, IORA, SCO and BASIC. It examines India's interests and goals, and the strategies it has adopted to achieve them in the context of interregionalism. Further, while discussing the goals of each of these interregional groups, India's specific contribution to their growth is examined.

Chapter III: India's Role in IBSA

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section provides a comprehensive account of the origin, objectives and strategies of IBSA. It makes an assessment of various programmes of IBSA and the mechanisms it has evolved for implementing its agenda since 2003. The second section exclusively deals with India's participation in IBSA, and its main objectives and strategies to promote its interests. In the process, various areas of sectoral cooperation between the member countries and India's initiatives to strengthen the grouping are assessed. Finally, IBSA's usefulness in political and diplomatic terms for promoting India's global interest is examined.

Chapter IV: India and BRICS

While tracing the process leading to the formation of BRICS, this chapter critically assesses India's membership and role in the grouping. In the first section, the main principles and agenda of BRICS are highlighted. The second part covers India's role and contributions to achieve BRICS's goals. The chapter particularly examines India's participation in the formation and functioning of the BRICS Development Bank, and its demands for reforming the international institutions such as the UNSC, the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank.

Chapter V: Assessing India's Participation in Interregional Groupings

This chapter assesses India's participation in interregional groupings in general and IBSA and BRICS in particular. The first section evaluates India's contribution to interregionalism and how far the collective role of the various interregional groupings has redefined the world order. In the process, India's worldview and that of other members of various interregional groupings are analysed. In the second section, an attempt is made to examine the impact of interregionalism on India's foreign policy and how far India's participation in various interregional groupings has enabled it to promote its foreign policy goals and its impact on the regional grouping of SAARC and powers such as the US and the EU.

Conclusion

While summarising the main arguments in the previous chapters, the concluding chapter makes an assessment of India's role and contributions to interregional groupings, particularly IBSA and BRICS. It also examines how interregionalism has served as an effective instrument of foreign policy to achieve India's global interests. In the process, the hypotheses are tested and new insights on interregionalism are drawn.

CHAPTER I

INTERREGIONALISM AND EMERGING POWERS: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Introduction

Interregionalism is a new phenomenon in the discourse of international relations. The world has witnessed several forms of interregional groupings emerging in almost all the parts of world. Groupings such as Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), the Forum for East Asia and Latin American Cooperation (FELAC), the European Union-Latin American and Caribbean Countries (EU-LAC), and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) are some of the prominent interregional groupings. This phenomenon has added a layer in the international interactions conducted between countries. It can be called the third most favoured layer after the bilateral and multilateral-level interaction (Hanggi et al. 2006: 3). Almost all the regions and groups of states have generally adopted this trend of interregional groupings, which is the hallmark of the post-Cold War world system.

Acquisition, demonstration and maintenance of power have always been an important feature of international politics. Every state in the global system is categorised according to historical, political, economic, and strategic power capabilities. History has witnessed several power struggles among states, which are determined by Power Cycle dynamics. The emerging economies and rising powers from the Global South have become significant players in the current global system. With the adoption of several interregional forms of interaction these emerging economies have created a new voice in the global arena. The concept of interregionalism both as theory and process has advanced against the backdrop of the setting of the European Union (EU).

This chapter highlights details of the advent of interregionalism in the Global South especially among the emerging economies. The first section defines the concept of interregionalism as an extension of regionalism, and discusses its major historical evolution, theories and typologies. The second section highlights the concept of power in international relations, with special focus on emerging powers.

Regionalism as a Concept and the Historical Background of Regionalism

Interregionalism has its genesis in the concept of regionalism and becomes a kind of new regionalism. Interregionalism is an extension of regionalism and mainly covers the whole spectrum of regions in different parts of the world. Regionalism has become a pivotal factor in global decision-making and enhancing the regional as well as bilateral level cooperation. Regional groupings are also recognised by international bodies such as the United Nations, as they represent and address concerns of social, economic, political, related to climate change and ease the work of the multilateral organisations (Acharya 2014).

According to Sheila Page, “a region can be defined as a group of countries, which have created a legal framework of cooperation covering an extensive economic relationship, with the intention that it will be of indefinite duration, and with the possibility foreseen that the region will evolve or change” (Page 2000: 5). According to Farrell, Regions have always been there in existence in the world politics and have formed an entity of power, as empire, spheres of influence and dominated the world discourse as in the case with the Europe in the nineteenth century (Farrell 2005). Regionalism is also explained through the integration theory and political economy to explain the behaviour of states and the need for alliances between states.

The process of regionalism has mainly been witnessed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The current century remains one of the defining moments for the spread of regionalism to all parts of the world. Many new states have been formed after the cold war and many received freedom from colonial rule earlier. Thus, states could independently frame their foreign policies based on the national interest and adhering to the principles of integration that marks an important characteristic of building cohesive regions. Democracy has played a pivotal role in the formation of many groupings as most states with democratic credentials formed alliances together with the aim to achieve certain common objectives and goals.

Regional entities are basically formed on similar identities and goals. According to Louise,

interregional grouping has come about because of the presence of certain identifiable traits which regional units, zones, states or territories share. Such groupings are smaller than the international system of states, but larger than any individual state or non-state unit. Their nature is of a permanent or temporary kind, whether institutionalized or not (Louise 2005: 24)

Wunderlich notes:

The process of regionalism is further discussed with the phenomenon of regionalization.¹ It is seen as complementary to the process of regionalism.² Regionalism focuses on establishment of infrastructure and funds that will assist in the process of regionalization. The informal form of regionalization further boosts the process of regionalization that focuses more on state-oriented and issue-specific governance (Wunderlich 2007: 3).

The collapse of the Soviet Union brought about intensification and multiplication in the regional grouping of states that had joined either of the two power blocs during the Cold War. The process of integration and disintegration became a common phenomenon in international relations. States broke away from older alliances and tried to form new and multiple alliances to realise selected objectives. With the ideological freedom, many states that were colonised for long achieved full sovereignty and there was a rise in the number of new states on the world map. The newly independent states adopted a democratic mode of action that helped in increasing their participation and engagements, with other states forming a regional identity to achieve common goals and motives.

According to Breslin et al.,

The process of regionalism is witnessed through two main stages, the 'old-regionalism' and the 'new-regionalism'. It is also mapped as the two waves of regionalism. The first wave was witnessed in the 1940s to 1960s. This was a period where regionalism was mainly derived by the European Union. Security dilemma among the countries was the primary reason for

¹ Regionalisation defines a trade-driven, bottom-up process of intensifying interactions and transactions of private economic and other non-state actors, especially business firms that leads to increased interdependencies between geographically adjacent states, societies and economies (Hanggi et al. 2006: 4).

² Regionalism is a conscious policy of nation states for the management of regionalisation and a broad array of security and economic challenges originating from outside of the region (ibid.).

the countries in the region to come together to form a region. Due to the advent of the economic recession and Second World War, the period of the 1970s had relatively slower progress in the theoretical and practical interest among the states (Breslin et al. 2002: 4).

The second wave of regionalism began in the 1980s and it also introduced new-regionalism in the gamut of regional integration. This wave focused on globalisation and was highly system-centric (ibid.). According to Soderbaum, geopolitical reasons such as distribution of power and politics of alliance formation remain the two most important factors for the creation of new regionalism (Soderbaum 2005).

The two waves of regionalism, the old and the new form, are mainly differentiated through their periodic arrival. According to Hettne,

The major difference among the two forms of regionalism is that the old regionalism was formed and shaped by a bipolar cold-war context which was predominated by the United States (US) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). In contrast to this, the new regionalism is a product of the multipolar world system, with many players in the decision-making arena of the global system. The old regionalism was primarily closed and adopted protectionist policies in economic integration. Whereas the new regionalism is more open, comprehensive and applies more multidimensional features. New regionalism also has a more palpable and spontaneous process within the region and also includes participation of other actors. The old regionalism focused on the state as a single actor whereas the new regionalism comprises of non-state system actors as also the important body in the regional integration and decision-making process (Hettne 1999: 7-8).

This advanced phenomenon covers all the range of issues from political, economic, social, strategic, demographic, and ecological interactions within the states (Shaw et al. 2011: 5).

Various scholars of regionalism relate theories of realism, economic integration and constructivist identity as the criteria for forming a region. According to Acharya, the main factor for establishing a regional entity can be related to the realist school of thought, where security and power remains the most important concern for states. The notion of integration theory also forms a prime factor for states to come together. It

concerns states with a common concern towards the external dominant power that poses a threat to their security.

States operate through “bandwagoning” and balancing to integrate in a bigger region. States that secured freedom after the long-drawn colonial rule adopted regionalism to avoid threats to their sovereignty and autonomy from the bigger powers interfering in their internal affairs. The Third World states considered these regional groups as a means to attain collective security and political self-reliance (Acharya 2002: 21).

The liberals relate interdependence and institutionalism as the most important factor for the countries to come together to form a regional alliance. As Bel Balasa highlights, “It is the economic factor that binds the countries together. The period of globalization that has led to opening of the process of liberalization in tariff has been an important factor in forming a region” (Balasa 1961). According to the Liberals, integration theory assists in selecting the trading partners.

According to the social constructivists, the realisation of similar identities and the sharing of similar experiences, learning and reality promote regionalism. The Asian Way identity can be regarded as the best example of the constructed identity between the countries of ASEAN and the realisation of sharing similar features in comparison to other regions (Katzenstein 2002). The identity norm is also attached to the specific cultural identity shared by the people and shares a certain imagined set of belongingness and behavioural norms. The interaction among the states from the EU or East Asian states refers to the close identity the states share within themselves (Gaens et al. 2011). Asian regionalism or South-South cooperation is a mere construction of identity that brings the states and the regions together.

According to Hettne and Soderbaum,

New regionalism has brought various states and regions together to form a bigger identity and also represents the rise of globalization. The new regional phenomenon reflects the complex interdependence between the countries and it is more extroverted than introverted and represents a mixture of globalization and regionalization (Hettne and Soderbaum 2003: 33).

The new regional settings also accommodate non-state actors and NGOs and civil society groups and operate beyond regions and ideologies.

The neo-realists note that the new regionalism is adopted not as a counter against any state or region. As far as the central-neo-realists are concerned, they use the regional stabiliser both outside and inside the region as stimulating regional institutions in many different ways (Lombaerde 2011). There is a rise in the network of regionalism among the developing states, as they find the policies of the West domineering and discriminatory. The states and regions from the developing world have collaborated for drifting away from the domineering policies of the West.

This interaction is further progressed in the form of interregionalism where regions collaborate and form an interregional connection. For example, EU-East Asia, EU-Africa, and EU-Latin America has led to a further expansion of the theory of new regionalism and crosses the traditional or old regionalism (Sbragia et al. 2011).

Interregionalism: Definition and Evolution

Interregionalism is considered to be an extension to the study of new regionalism. It is highlighted as the institutionalised relations between different regions and of individual states from different regions coming together to form a new definition of a 'region'. This phenomenon has gained attention of the scholars and academicians and has become an important topic of discussion as this process has redefined importance of regions in study of world politics and has led to verification of the existence of a 'world of regions' (Gaens 2011: 69). Soderbaum and Langenhove defines interregionalism as being more evident and stronger and as leading to the creation of more proactive regions (Soderbaum and Langenhove 2005: 257).

The world has witnessed the gradual rise in the interregional groupings among different regions and states forming a cooperation that goes beyond the geographical region. The period since the 1990s observed emergence of interregional groupings which was also primarily a phenomenon operated to restructure the post-cold war international system. This also reflects the challenges the states trying to manage especially with regard to the process of globalisation and regionalisation in the world system. The existence of

multiple relations between the states and regions led to the creation of a complex interregional cooperation. Thus, Roloff defines these multiple ties as a process of interregional relations that forms a “method of widening and intensifying political, economic, and societal interactions between international regions” (Roloff 2006: 18) and independent states.

This definition also highlights the importance of interregionalism that is recognised by many countries, as Soderbaum and Langenhove points out, for example:

Regions formulate a type of a ‘cooperative relations’ that further leads to deepening the relations between the states and in achieving the objectives of power-sharing and distribution of resources among the members (Soderbaum and Langenhove 2005: 253).

This process of interregionalism has been also realised through the major goals of states, which was redefined with the formation of the nation state system through the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. This treaty led to the formation of a modern international political system that emphasised not just the internal and external security of the state but also delivering the welfare and civic engagements of the citizens (Soderbaum and Langenhove 2005: 253).

The emergence of interregionalism can be studied in the new context that is different from the Cold War period which was defined with the superpower and its satellites. The current system is more designed through the process of globalisation which addresses multiple dimensions of relations of states. The phenomenon addresses structural transformations that have global implications and also builds a deeper political, economic and social linkages, that represents the dynamic nature of globalisation.

The EU forms the most prominent practitioner of interregionalism. It shares interregional interactions with almost all the regions. The first kind of interregional interaction was observed at the Yaoundé Convention of 1963 and witnessed formation of important relations between the European Community and the Associated African States and Madagascar (Doidge 2007: 229). Later, in the mid-1970s and the early 1980s the EU strengthened the group-to group dialogues. This was mainly instrumentalised through the

formation of the European Political Cooperation and later with the economic and foreign relations.

In the later stages, the EU further progressed in leading the interregional engagements. The deeper associations with different regional groupings also raised the status and prowess of the EU which as a global actor. It initiated interregional dialogues with the Mediterranean countries with the formation of the Euro-Arab Dialogue. The relations with the African states were further enhanced with the signing of the Lomé Convention between the European Community and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states (ibid: 229-230). The EUs triad relation between North America, Western Europe and East Asia forms one of the world's most complex interregional interaction. These engagements between the three regions formulated a new structure to the process of new regionalism (Valle 2008). The attempts of deepening the interregional interaction with the ASEAN and other countries from Asia also led to the formation of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in the year 1996. It also covered profound interregional interaction with the African regions such as the Central Africa, Eastern Africa, Southern Africa, the Caribbean and in the region covering the Indian Ocean. The relations between Europe and Latin American cooperation culminated in the form of the Forum for East Asia-Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC), the Europe Latin America Cooperation (EULAC).

The period of after the Cold War led to the further intensification in the process of interregionalism. According to Roloff "the emergence of the US as a super power and the advent of globalisation leading to realisation of common challenges such as terrorism, organized crimes, trafficking of small arms, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, irregular migration. The rise in the process of regionalisation and the fragmentation of political order and the failure of states have led to greater interregional interaction among different regions and individual states" (Roloff 2006: 19-20).

The phenomenon of interregionalism can be further defined through the empirical understanding of different 'generations of regionalism'. The process of regionalism has been divided into two 'waves of regionalism' (Soderbaum and Langenhove 2005: 254). The process of interregionalism shot into prominence in the 1980s and 1990s and was implemented in the period which bypassed the two stages/ generations of regionalism.

The label ‘generation or waves’ refers to empirical qualities and has nothing to do with the ‘theories of new regionalism’.

The first generation of regionalism was evident in Europe and Latin America and in the second generation, the phenomenon of regionalism was spread to the other parts of the world. In the first generation of regionalism the political relations occupied primacy in terms of interactions, whereas in the second-generation focus shifted to multidimensional interactions addressing issues such as security, justice, environment, culture, identity etc (Soderbaum and Langenhove 2005: 254).

The interregional dimension of region-to-region and between states from different regions forming a grouping was identified in the third generation or third wave of regionalism. The complex relations according to Soderbaum works at three levels namely: (i) towards global and international regimes and organisations; (ii) towards other regions and (iii) towards individual countries (Soderbaum and Langenhove 2005: 256-257).

Types of Interregional Groupings

The growing participation in interregional groupings with the EU model as well as in the other regions have led to emergence of different typologies. Heiner Hanggi defines these typologies as “attempts to reduce the definitional complexities that is created with multiple layers of interregional interactions” (Hanggi 2006: 32).

According to Hanggi, “the initiatives by the European Union in strengthening interregionalism forms a most important phase. In the initial period, the European Community led to the rise in different types of interregional groupings in different regions. It was only the EU that dominated in interregional interaction and thus the calls for a distinct typology of “Old or Pure form of interregionalism” (Hanggi 2006: 32).

- ***Pure interregionalism***

The interregional interactions were primarily steered by the EU as there was no other region that engaged so extensively in conducting interregional cooperation with other regions. The Cold War scenario limited the interaction between the regions which were

drawn in the bipolar world system. Thus, it was only the European Economic Community that established informal dialogues with regions and states from different regions in the period from the 1960s to the 1980s. Even in the present times, the EU maintains a prominent position as an important hub of interregional cooperations and other regions and states interacting with the grouping formed a hub and spoke relations (Hanggi 2005). Soderbaum and Langenhove define such interregional interactions as actor centric as it is dominated by a single player. This kind of interregionalism which has relations with other regions and which shares Free Trade Area or Customs Union is also defined as a pure form of interregionalism. This form of interregionalism was also seen as a platform for the EU to establish its stronghold in the bipolar realities of the Cold War. However, according to Hanggi, the pure interregionalism did not bring much novelty and was not much effective in the Cold War scenario. As this form of interregional interaction only provided the EU with a model of regional cooperations, influencing other regional cooperation with ‘extra-regional echoing’ and the adoption of this phenomenon helped the EU to strengthen its internal cohesion and established itself as a Civilian Power (Hanggi 2006: 32).

Figure 1.1 depicts this so-called Old or Pure Interregionalism.




Figure 1.1. Old Interregionalism/ Pure Interregionalism

The adoption of interregionalism by other regions and states in the 1990s is regarded as a new interregionalism. It was used as a foreign policy tool to achieve certain common goals interacting with other regions. This form of interregionalism obtains a multidimensional character as it covers issues related to foreign policy tools as Gaens highlights ‘new-interregionalism’ as a process that dealing with political issues also covers issues with related to economy, security, cultural interaction. Thus, new interregionalism adopts a system centric approach (Gaens 2011: 73).

The new interregionalism observed emergence of many new cooperations that were operating side by side with EU dominated interregionalism. The grouping of ASEAN in Southeast Asia predominated several interregional interactions. This phenomenon has

obtained a significant attention from different regions and states that adopt interregional dimensions to cope with the complex interdependence among the countries and to avoid the negative effects of counter regional groupings.

Along with engaging with region-to-region interaction, interregionalism is also operated in borderline cases where relations among two or more states, group of states and regional organisations from two or more regions come together to form an interregional grouping. According to Hanggi, the EU and the ASEAN have developed relations with various groupings such as the Andean Community (CAN), MERCOSUR, and the Rio Group that covers in this category. These two groups have also developed external relations with individual states forming borderline relations (Hanggi 2006: 40).

In the third category of interregionalism, when a grouping is formed within a bigger interregional formation, it focuses on specific international relations. The case of East Asia Summit (EAS) can be regarded as an example of this interregional interaction. This form of interregionalism is also defined as ‘regional multilateralism’ as it engages with different states within different regions (Hanggi 2006: 40).

- ***Quasi-interregionalism***

The interregional relations where one dominant region interacts with an individual state is defined as quasi-interregionalism. This interregionalism is a narrow form of interregional relations. The relations such as the EU-India can be regarded as the example of quasi interregionalism (Hanggi 2006: 42; see Fig. 1.2). These ties can also be classified as bilateral interactions between the two states. The EU tops the list in quasi-interregionalism as it has developed relations with almost every country (Soderbaum and Langenhove 2005: 258-259).




Fig. 1.2. Quasi-interregional grouping

- ***Mega-regionalism***

The phenomenon of mega-regionalism is a much sought after form of interregionalism by the individual states and different regions. It is a form of interregionalism where two or more sub-regions from different continents come together to form a bigger grouping (see Fig. 1.3). One of the prime example of this phenomenon is the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) grouping which constitutes a large region bearing individual states and different regions such as North America, South America, Asia and Oceania, Australia participates to form a bigger grouping (Hanggi 2006: 42).




Fig. 1.3. Mega-regionalism

- ***Trans-regionalism***

In trans-regionalism, different regional actors collaborate to form bigger interregional interactions. The illustration of ASEM that is formed after the joint initiative of the EU and ASEAN can be regarded as the best example of the trans-regional grouping (see Fig. 1.4).




Fig. 1.4. Trans-regionalism

- *Hybrid-interregionalism*

Along with these interregional grouping at the region-to-region level, there are further extensions to the interregional cooperations with regard to individual states from different regions that come together to form state-to-state interregional relations. These interregional interactions of individual states are regarded as the hybrid form of interregionalism. According to Gratius, “these interregional interactions represent an extension to the borderline interregional interactions”. These states do not have any geographical regional coherence, but come together with the realisation for sharing similarities and having common objectives to achieve at the international level. This formation also presents a venue for deepening the bilateral and regional level interactions among member states (Gratius 2008: 28; see Fig. 1.5). The interregional groupings such as the IBSA Dialogue Forum and BRICS are the recent examples of this type of hybrid-interregionalism (Soderbaum and Langenhove 2005: 258). See figure 1.5




Fig. 1.5. Hybrid interregionalism: IBSA as an example.

This phenomenon of hybrid interregionalism is widely adopted by the emerging economies and the rising powers of the recent times. The hybrid interregional groupings such as the IBSA Dialogue Forum and the BRICS are classic examples of emerging powers collaborating and forming a grouping to achieve their common objectives. The next section will examine the emergence of emerging powers, power as a dominant factor in framing national interests and how these emerging powers have adopted the phenomenon of interregionalism to achieve their foreign policy goals.

Emerging Powers and Interregional Mechanisms

The world has witnessed the rise of several new emerging economies in the last few decades. The growth in the economic performance of these countries has led to the creation of Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs). These groups of new rising powers have initiated a new discourse in the study of international relations. With the growing interregional interactions between these countries have led to the formation of an interregional set of emerging powers that aspire to achieve common objectives. According to Shaw et al.; this form of grouping of emerging countries challenges the definitions such as developmental state, fragile state, the concept of regionalism and with these new players there is a notable change in the whole discourse of the Global North and South (Shaw et al., 2011:9).

This phenomenon has attracted major attention in the current times for its novelty. The world did not experience rise of many states together, as the world history has come to be occupied with bipolarity, leading to power contention between the two superpowers and with unipolarity that led to the emergence of a single leading power.

Emerging Powers and the World Order

The emerging powers are the group of nations that share the position of a growing economy, and also having political and strategic status in international relations. According to Andrew Cooper, the definition of an emerging power is much more fluid, expansive and contested. There are no fixed definitions to club the countries together, as several states with growing economies can be characterised as being the emerging powers of the current decade. States such as the BRICS countries, Mexico, Indonesia, Turkey,

South Korea, Argentina, Colombia, Vietnam, Egypt, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and Australia are seen as the emerging powers of the present times.

The power dimensions are also defined in regional connotations. The states that are economically and strategically superior to the neighbouring states in the region can be regarded as regional powers. India, Brazil and South Africa maintain economic advancement over the states in their regions of South Asia, Latin America and Africa respectively. However, not all the emerging powers are regarded as regional heads. For instance, South Korea and Argentina are not considered as the regional powers in their respective regions (Acharya 2014).

The economy of the emerging powers in the current decade has showcased a noticeable growth vis-à-vis the developed states as the United States. According to the IMF's reports, the developing countries will account for 60 per cent of the world's GDP by 2030. Relative to the Western economy, the developing countries' share of the global economy has increased dramatically. In the last decade, the estimates of the global economy show a rise in the developing countries' Gross National Income from 18 per cent in 2000 to 28 per cent in 2009 (The World Bank 2010). Their total share in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) also increased from 34 to 44 per cent, making China the second-largest economy after the United States. The emerging powers such as Brazil, Russia, India, and Mexico are among the world's 15 largest economies. The combined GDP of emerging countries such as China at 27.8 per cent and India at 18.2 per cent will also surpass the GDP of the developed Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries (The Guardian Datablog 2013).

According to Kissinger, there was never a world order in true form and whatever form of order that is witnessed now is primarily a result of the European upheaval in the form of the Thirty Years Wars, 1618-48. This led to the creation of the Peace of Westphalia that demarcated lines in the internal and external matters of the state. It focused on the establishment of independent states with restraints in interference in their domestic affairs and with a creation of a benchmark to check their power ambitions (Kissinger 2014). The period prior to signing the treaty of Westphalia did not observe a strict form of order either. The older order was not geographically unified. Neither was there technology to

keep note of the developments in the other regions. Thus, every region considered itself superior to the others.

The world order after the Cold War was dominated by the United States. The American world order is seen as a relationship among a group of like-minded countries, mostly Western, led by the Western countries counting the US as a global power. According to Huntington, the US may not be able to hold the dominant position as the lone superpower for long and there will be a hybrid system in the world order, with multiple powers acting jointly together (Huntington 1999, Ikenberry 2014). Acharya suggests that the scope of the American world order has been limited and its contribution has been much less benign to the countries outside of it (Acharya 2014). However, this same decline of American influence in international affairs will also lead to a rise in the regional powers and emerging powers. This will eventually create a multipolar world order as there is a lack of a single dominant power. In the current century, the lone superpower America unilaterally handled too many issues that have led to its major contentions among many countries that viewed it as the most dominating country in the world. The US has also suffered gravely from its over-involvement in the Iraq and Afghanistan crises. The two wars are noted as the costliest wars in the history of the US. The total spending in these two wars led to around US\$6 trillion in total direct and indirect costs. The Iraq war led to dollar two trillion in direct government expenditure (Blimes 2013). There are issues hampering the internal management of the country leading to its weaker stature in world politics. The issues hampering the full potential of the US mainly denote tax cuts, account deficits, grid-lock governance, growing healthcare costs and the forecasts of replacing the dollar as the reserve currency (Layne 2012). The gradual progress of technological advancement in several parts of the world has also decreased the over-reliance shown by several countries on American technological prowess.

According to Hettne, World order is defined as a 'present existing order or a desirable order' in the world system. After the period of first World War, it was Europe that occupied the dominant position in world system and initiated the establishment of the League of Nations, after the Second World War it was the establishment of the United Nations aspired for a just world order. In the late 1970s the introduction of a New

International World Order (NIEO), initiated an accommodative world order that would represent the developing and the Third World countries and lately after the first Gulf War the US President George Bush introduced the concept of ‘a new world order’ (Hettne 2005: 271). Ikenberry, thus, highlights this change of orders as a gradual shift of power, where no one country will remain powerful permanently and the change in economic, military capabilities of countries leads to new power contenders in the world system (Ikenberry 2014: 9).

The American world order is characterised differently from the Chinese world order. According to Fairbank, the Chinese world order was primarily centred on China, which was destroyed by the Western powers. The world order designed by the Chinese relied on the prowess of superiority and hierarchy and neglected the aspects of sovereignty, territoriality and balance of power (Fairbank 1968). As the Chinese world order was a suzerain system it was differently judged as a world order rather than the international order, which was not a world order in its true sense as it comprised a group of states around China, mainly in East Asia. The Chinese military prowess along with its economic progress has been one of the major reasons for the rise in the country’s stature as the potential next power moving ahead of the current dominant power. China has developed a military arsenal that can withstand the attacks of the developed states. Chinese dominance in the world will also be characterised by its large population that will rise from 1.3 billion to 1.4 billion by 2030. The current military expenditure programme has increased in the region, giving a boost to its powerful defence capability. China is also estimated to be building one of the world’s strongest aerospace technologies. The reformed economic policies under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping have led to China’s transformation.

This transformation can be also associated with the rise of Asia in the 18th century. The emergence of the “Asian Tigers” with growing economies of countries like Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand, Republic of Korea and Taiwan has brought new players into the international system. Japan and China’s gradual economic growth has shifted the focus to the Asian region (Kissinger 2014).

Russia remains one of the odd members in the grouping of the emerging powers. The country is also called an “outdated great power” for it has a legacy of having acquired superpower features. With the mighty empire of the Soviet Union having spread across several countries, Russia is seen as a traditional European great power.

With the focus on emerging powers and their role in international affairs, the world in the current form is described as a multiplex world by one of the scholars of International Relations, Amitav Acharya. The emergence of many new actors in the international economics, who also have an important say in world politics, has created a new world form as in the multiplex theatres where there are several movies projected at the same time. The multiplex world contains a more diversified and decentralised participation of many different actors from emerging powers, regional powers to non-state actors such as several international governmental organisations and transnational actors, including civil society bodies, entrepreneurs, and even terrorist bodies such as Al-Qaeda, drug traffickers, and weapon proliferation bodies acting as a villain in the show of the different movies (Acharya 2014).

According to Acharya the growth of the emerging powers has surpassed the American world order, leading to the formation of multilateralism. The American world order has to shape the current world system to accommodate and work in compliance with the other emerging powers for a strong formation of a multilateral world framework (Acharya 2014). The rise of the emerging powers does not guarantee the end of American dominance. It relies much on the basis of how effectively can these countries and regional groupings prevent the world from the American influence and emphasises on strengthening a multipolar world order.

The adoption of interregionalism by these emerging powers has led to the joint realisation of their demands and common objectives. This practice has gained ground as contrast to the earlier times where the powers acted in the individual capacity with very limited or no interaction with other powers and countries of the world. These interregional interactions have been enhanced through the advent of globalisation, introduction of advanced technologies in terms of communication and multimedia facilities and multilateral bodies such as the UN have supported the process of integration of the emerging powers.

The recent times have witnessed a noticeable gap in the global leadership. As Malhotra highlights the US is the predominant force in the current international system and will remain so for coming years (Malhotra 2016). However, the rise of the new powers in different regions have formed a crew of effective emerging powers that aspire to join in the major power club. There are many new groupings of the emerging economies such as India, China, Brazil, Russia, South Africa, Indonesia that have come together to increase their both hard and soft power capabilities. These initiations have led to the formation of the interregional groupings such as the IBSA, the BRICS, the G20, the SCO (Ferguson 2004: 35, Antkiewicz and Cooper 2011: 300) and these growing interregional interactions suggests the inevitable need for the inclusion of these emerging economies from the Global South in the club of influential countries.

As Antkiewicz and Cooper mentions these emerging powers are seen as a platform for the advancing economic engagements. Owing to this, there has been a gradual rise in the signing of FTAs between these countries. The emerging powers are also establishing themselves as hubs of Research and Development (R&D) and are turning as the frontrunner in innovation. Along with facilitating economic growth these emerging powers collaborate to address various issues of political, social, security related issues, that have made these countries the focus of attraction for both the developed and the Least Developed countries (ibid.: 297-298).

Emerging Powers explained by the Power Cycle Theory

The advent of emerging powers in the recent times can be highlighted through the power cycle theory. The theory defined by Charles Doran and Lahneman emphasises on the rise of new powers following a gradual decline in the power capabilities of the existing powers. This is evident from the examples of decline of dominant powers such as Great Britain in the 18th century, which led to rise of the bipolar world politics between the USA and the USSR. This further changed the US gaining superpower position in the post-Cold War period. According to Chellaney, the rise in power capabilities among the East Asian states along with Germany in the 1990s led to emergence of new players in world politics (Chellaney 2012: 8). The growing economic, political and strategic capabilities of the rising powers especially in Asia with regard to China and India and

other states from different regions such as Brazil, Russia, South Africa propelled them as the next contender in the power circle dynamics.

According to Doran, “Power cycle can be explained through other theories in international studies such as international and domestic regime theories, rational choice, bounded rationality and prospect theory”. This theory is best related with the theory of realism and can be explained through the theories of constructivism and idealism also. The current power cycle dynamics addresses post-Cold War scenarios which has implications on both the international security and international political economy (Doran 2003: 14). The power of state is defined through the declaratory roles and legitimisation of their role by other states.

Theoretical Understanding of Interregional Groupings

The emerging powers engaging in the interregional groupings of varied forms can be further defined in various functions and theories. These intrerregional theories also apply to the hybrid-interregional interaction among emerging powers. Jurgen Ruland defines interregionalism as a mix of realism, liberalism and the constructivist framework. There are five main functions ascribed to the phenomenon of interregionalism which can be applied to test different interregional groupings. The best example of application of the three theories can be studied through Roloff’s definition of the interregional relations shared between the Triad namely the US, the EU and the East Asia region. The interregional framework of Triad can be explained through the application of the theories of structural realism, interdependence and constructivism is applied.

According to Ruland “firstly, the theories of structural realism primarily gaining security related objectives, can be applied as the reasons for engaging in interregional interactions. This also highlights that the cooperative behaviour among the states in an interregional framework is the result of institutional balancing (Hanggi et. al 2006:11).

Secondly, the interregional interactions can be also highlighted through the liberal notions of complex interdependence. The advent of globalisation has led to intricate cobweb interactions among the states especially with regard to trade. Many of the interregional interactions primarily focus on the liberal notion of cooperation to gain

prominence in international world order and strengthen the economic relations among the member countries. Thirdly, the interregional engagements can be defined through constructivist understandings.

Thus, Roloff et al. highlights interregionalism as a

combination of both the neo-realism and neo-liberalism theories that aims to achieve power and attain maximum gain through economic relations. Through these interregional interactions states aims to gain comprehensive relations through balancing and bandwagoning (Roloff et al. 2006: 26).

The interregional groupings can be tested through the five functions as explained by Jurgen Ruland namely: balancing, institution building, rationalising the decision-making in global multilateral forums, agenda setting and collective identity building. According to Doidge, these functions highlights that interregional groupings are characterised by a complex mix of policies and processes which rely on theoretical approaches (Doidge 2007: 232).

According to Doidge,

The function of balancing can be related to the theory of realism where acquiring and demonstrating power remains an important feature. The groups design their major objectives to attain equilibrium between different states (Doidge 2007: 232).

Institutionalising remains one of the most important functions of every interregional grouping. This function is derived from the theory of liberalism where states collaborate together to manage complex interdependence. This relies on trust building and creating legal framework to carry on with the roles of the grouping. Majority of the existing interregional groupings attempts to institutionalise and establish rules of working as it ensures trust among the group members and also leads to strengthening and deepening the relations between the states (ibid.; Hanggi et al. 2006: 11).

According to Hanggi the function of rationalising as mentioned by Roloff has much bigger importance in the whole set up of the interregional framework. Through rationalising the member states aims to address the major objectives of the grouping. The

groupings also strive to ponder on the global issues of importance at the regional level (ibid).

Interregional framework also covers an important function of decision-making. As many a times, the multilateral interaction of countries fails, the interregional bodies help in addressing issues of importance to the member states. These interregional groupings' ability at decision-making on important global issues assist the global forums in reaching an agreement. According to Doidge this function serves interregional grouping as a clearing house for global forums (Doidge 2007: 233). Agenda setting is the fourth function of interregionalism. This function allows an interregional grouping to set an agenda of the grouping to function; this provides a broad-based platform to arrive at collective decision and allows for freedom of introducing new themes and issues of importance to the member states (ibid).

Finally, According to Roloff the identity building, that is sharing of similar identities, goals represent the fifth function of interregionalism. Every interregional grouping has a certain distinct identity. This function represents constructivist theory that emphasises realisation of similar identities between different states to an interregional grouping (Hanggi et al. 2006: 12).

Interregionalism as a Tool of Emerging Powers in World Politics

Interregionalism has been widely accepted and practiced by emerging powers of the current times namely: India, China, Russia, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, Turkey etc. These emerging powers have initiated the formation of many interregional groupings. Through these interregional groupings these states aim to attain the common goals at the international level and strengthen regional interaction among the group members.

These interregional groupings provide a platform for the emerging powers to raise a collective voice at the international fora. The member countries aim to raise their bargaining power and play an important role in global decision making thus, highlighting the arrival of these emerging powers in the domain of international relations.

The emerging powers actively engage in the interregional groupings such as: the G20, the EAS, the BIMSTEC, the SCO, the IORA and the BASIC. These groupings have overlapping membership that interact at group level, global level and bi-lateral level.

Group of 20 (G20)

The interregional grouping of G20 has gained major attention from the world leaders and media. It has established as a prominent grouping of the developed and the developing states. It was established on 20 August 2003, and comprises of the 23 most prominent countries of the world representing 80 per cent of the world's population, 90 per cent of the world's GDP and 80 per cent of the world's trade. This grouping has provided an equal forum for the emerging economies and developing states to stand at par with the developed states. This grouping engages in discussions related to economic cooperations. It played a pioneering role to initiate discussion on global governance.

The G20 was formed as a result of the global financial crisis of 2008. The group identity is deeply linked to the development dimensions of the Doha Round of WTO discussions. The G20 primarily focuses on the economic growth of the member countries, its population and the military expenditures. The grouping provides a platform for the member states to deliberate and hold discussions on world order and global governance (Acharya 2014). The emerging powers in the grouping have emphasised to put an end to trade-distorting policies in agriculture that are exclusively maintained by developed countries. Through this grouping the developing countries push for their overall growth and development and emphasise on their positive integration in the world trading system. The introduction of this grouping has enabled a new discourse in the world order that aims to create an inclusive and representative of all the regions and states. The advent of G20 has replaced the prominent grouping of developed states the G8 that dominated the world system as the decision maker especially with regard to global economic matters.

The G20 has been at the forefront in demanding for the reforms in the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), capricious cross-border capital flows, Eurozone crisis, and the excessive volatility in commodity prices are some of the areas of concern for G20 (Chellaney 2012: 8). However, the establishment of formation of this grouping is seen as

a mode to defer genuine reforms in the Bretton Woods system. The grouping has also been criticised for not being accommodative and representative of all its members and the overall functioning has not been very influential (Cooper 2012).

East Asia Summit (EAS)

The EAS is regarded as a prominent grouping of eight countries of the Asia-Pacific region. It was established in 2005 and comprises of total eighteen members. This is seen as a nuanced grouping which incorporates countries from different regions to deepen cooperation with ASEAN countries. The grouping aims to formulate a new economic integration by signing of FTAs with non-ASEAN members such as Japan, China and South Korea. With the inclusion of new members from different regions such as India, Russia, the US, Australia and New Zealand the grouping has enabled the broadening of the spectrum of the economic discourse.

The grouping aims to achieve cooperation in regional peace, security and prosperity. The members have stressed for the creation of a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) to form a regional framework for regional economic partnership. Along with economic relations the grouping has also focused on cooperating in areas of traditional and non-traditional security threat especially focusing on cooperation in curbing terrorism, piracy, protecting sea lines of communication and drug trafficking. The grouping aims to deepen its cooperation on issues such as energy, finance, disaster management, education, global health issues, and issues regarding transport, environment and climate change (ASEAN 2012).

Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC)

BIMSTEC forms an important grouping that joins South and Southeast Asia. The grouping was established in 1997 with the signing of the Bangladesh Declaration. There are total seven members in the grouping. It is also seen as a platform to strengthen cooperation between SAARC and ASEAN members. The total region represents 22 per cent of global population and GDP of 2.7 trillion combined economies. The member states highlight cooperation in major areas such as: trade, technology, energy, transport,

tourism, agriculture, public health, poverty alleviation, counter terrorism, environment and culture, people-to-people contact and climate change.

The grouping is regarded as a building block for the larger East Asian Community and the grouping has envisaged the framing of an FTA to strengthen economic relations among the member countries. The grouping has also led a greater focus on promotion of traditional and generic drugs for the poor and aims to cooperate in promotion of biodiversity, meteorological research and mitigation and management of natural disasters. As the region, also is affected by trans-national security threats, the grouping aims to extend its cooperation against terrorism, transnational crimes and trans-border problems such as HIV/AIDS. The discussion for a common business travel card/visa to facilitate the trade and travel among the member countries has also been an important point of discussion in the meetings of the grouping.

Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)

SCO was formed in 2001 and comprises eight members, four observer states, six dialogue partners and three guest states. This grouping was preceded by 'Shanghai Five'. The main objectives of the grouping are to strengthen mutual trust and neighbourliness among the members states, promoting effective cooperation in political, economy, trade, research, technology, culture, education, transport, tourism, and environmental protection. SCO is regarded as the only international organisation that is outside the sphere of the United States and its allies. It is the only grouping that has the power to influence events not only in Central Asia but also in Southern Asia (Kumar 2011). This is one prominent grouping comprising China, Russia and newly added India that demands for fair and rational new international political and economic order.

The Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA)

The Indian Ocean Rim Initiative was formed in 1995 and with the addition of total 21 members the grouping was renamed as Indian Ocean Rim Association in 1997. The grouping also comprises of seven Dialogue Partners. This grouping of the prominent littoral states in the Indian Ocean region was established mainly to enhance economic cooperation among these states. The member states aim to cooperate on human

development of human resources and have established the Indian Ocean Rim Business Forum (IORBF), Indian Ocean Academic Group (IORAG) and Working Group on Trade and Investment (WGTI).

The grouping lays emphasis on principles of open regionalism and inclusivity of membership with the objectives of trade and liberalisation and promoting trade cooperation. The main objectives of the grouping are to deepen cooperation in economic relations, promote foreign investment, science and technology, exchange of tourism, movement of natural persons and service provider on a non-discriminatory basis, development of infrastructure and human resources, poverty alleviation, promotion of training in energy, IT, health, protection of environment and addressing disaster management. Along with promoting cooperation in both traditional and non-traditional security threats, the grouping tries to achieve trade and investment facilitation and management of fisheries. The member states aim to strengthen cooperation and dialogue among member states in the international fora on global economic issues.

BASIC

The BASIC grouping was formed in 2007, comprising of four states namely: Brazil, South Africa, India and China. It is framed as an informal grouping within the UNFCCC negotiations and aims to play a major role in the climate change regime and in the outline of an effective and equitable global response to global warming. The BASIC has also adopted a 'BASIC plus' approach that also includes other developing states in the climate change negotiations.

The BASIC grouping demands for a joint action by the countries to sign the Paris agreement that will be determined according to the national potentialities and reflect each parties' highest possible efforts in accordance with its Common but Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBR&RC). This highlights the contribution of each party according to the different stages of development among the developed and the developing countries. The grouping has also called for a stronger and comprehensive declaration on pre-2020 ambition in Paris. The grouping demands for joint actions from the countries to develop an action plan that will guarantee to keep the world on a path to limiting the

increase in the average global temperature to below two degrees Celsius and to enable adaptation in response to unavoidable adverse effects of climate change.

The group members have also emphasised the need to address six major elements in the Paris Agreement that were identified in the Durban mandate, namely: mitigation, adaptation, finance capacity building, technology development and transfer, transparency of action and support. The four countries pressed for the need to accelerate the negotiations of the Paris Agreement. The countries also demanded to focus on core provisions to be included in the protocol that will be binding according to the legal force. The BASIC countries stressed for an agreement that will provide an equitable, inclusive and effective framework within all the parties.

The grouping has also urged for the greater support from the developed states to developing countries and LDCs in meeting their needs and costs of adaptation actions. The BASIC countries have also stressed that the developed countries essay a larger role to provide new, predictable adequate and sustainable public support to developing countries. The grouping has been pushing for larger support and early progress in operationalising Climate Change Fund, Adaptation Fund and Least Developed Country Fund and Special Climate Change Fund. It has also extended their support to strengthen the voice of the developing countries on United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations in other fora such as the UNGA, G77 and China, Rio+20, International Civil Aviation Organisation, International Maritime Organisation and the Montreal Protocol.

Along with these groupings the investment companies have projected the rise of many new countries and clubbed them together into the grouping. However, these are still projected collaborations and have not come together to form into an institutionalised interregional grouping. These emerging economies are considered to be the next potential investment markets because of their growing economic credentials, large working youth population, sophisticated financial system, controlled inflation and large stock of natural resources especially oil in countries such as Nigeria. Some of the countries from the prominent club of emerging economies are projected as potential investment hub of the 21st century. The prominent emerging economies are:

MINT: stands for Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey. This acronym was coined by the asset management firm Fidelity Investments in 2011 as the countries showcased capability in strong growth and high returns for investment.

Next Eleven (N11): is the nomenclature coined by Goldman Sachs for 11 countries, namely Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Turkey, South Korea and Vietnam. These countries are seen as next in line to attain the economy of the BRICS countries, having potential in investments.

CIVETS: is the acronym coined by economists from the Economists Intelligence Unit (EIU) in 2008. CIVETS stand for Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa. These countries are seen as the next emerging markets as their economies have gained sustainable prominence in the last decade.

VISTA: comprises of Vietnam, Indonesia, South Africa, Turkey and Argentina and was first proposed by the BRICs Economic Research Institute of Japan in 2006.

Conclusion

The phenomenon of interregionalism has gained prominence in the international system and has certainly added a new layer in the whole gamut of regionalism. The emerging powers of the 21st century have adopted the interregional interactions to gain prominence in the global order. These states have now joined various interregional groupings that is defined as the hybrid-interregionalism as the countries from different regions sharing similar identities and objectives to gain prominence in international system and cooperate at three levels mainly regional, global, and bi-lateral level.

The process of interregionalism is an extension to the process of new-regionalism addressing realist, liberal and constructivist theories as the formation of regional grouping was mainly realised through security issues, rising complex interdependence and sharing common identity. The new interregional groupings have attained more multidimensional nature that has developed into several forms of interregional typologies mainly termed as quasi-regionalism, trans-regionalism, mega-regionalism and hybrid-regionalism. The

emergence of interregionalism has certainly added new features to the traditional definition of region, which was primarily defined on the geographical proximity.

Through participation in different interregional groupings, the emerging powers aim to gain maximum benefits and cooperation in multiple sectors. The major goal of these countries is to obtain a prominent position in the international system that will also increase their bargaining power and give them a larger role in the global decision-making process. The formation of the groupings such as the G20, EAS, SCO, BIMSTEC, BASIC and IORA has introduced new actors from the Global South in the international system that was primarily dominated by the developed states. However, the interregional groupings are also faced with several limitations as these groupings are not permanent in nature and also do not follow any fixed rules of functioning.

CHAPTER II

INTERREGIONALISM: AN AGENDA OF INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

Introduction

India has observed a gradual rise in its power capabilities. The economic growth and the political stability in the country have led to the formation of bigger aspirations to be achieved at the global level. With the growing Gross Domestic Product (GDP) rates and setting itself as a major investment hub, India has been categorised as an emerging power in the current world order. This growing economic and political credential has also initiated in achieving major foreign policy goals. India has designed and adopted different strategies to achieve them aimed at realising its national interests.

After gaining independence in 1947, India has always strived to uphold its sovereignty and to maintain an independent foreign policy devoid of any external interference. The country has assumed a distinct worldview that upheld its identity on the global platform. The economic growth is mainly the result of the policy of liberalisation and opening of the markets that attracted major trade ties with different countries. The end of the Cold War too provided ample opportunities to the country to develop engagements with different countries devoid of any ideological linking.

Adhering to interregionalism has remained a significant step in asserting India's independent and growing world views. Interregionalism has been one of the new entrants in foreign policy of the country as it has been actively participating and has extended its membership to multiple groupings. Attempts have been made to develop close ties with the countries from different regions that share certain similarities and aims to achieve certain common objectives at the global and regional level. India showcases its willingness and moves towards developing new engagements. These groupings have provided India with an opportunity to highlight itself as a responsible emerging power that aspires to get into the great power position and also to lead the countries of the "Global South" in major global endeavours. The emergence of interregionalism is also considered to be a means to achieve peaceful transition of power, unlike the previous rise of powers which were dominated by military scuffle.

India has been actively engaging in different interregional interactions such as the BRICS, the IBSA, the BIMSTEC, the IORA, the G20, the G24, the EAS and the SCO. While examining India's major foreign policy framework and determinants, the chapter seeks to address changing dimensions of foreign policy, driven by economic growth and comprehensive developments in different sectors. The second section highlights India's participation in interregional groupings such as the G20, the BIMSTEC, the IORA, the EAS, the BASIC and the SCO. While examining the major reasons for participation in these groupings the chapter assesses India's role in these groupings and how these groupings have enabled in achieving the major foreign policy goals of the country.

India's Foreign Policy: Framework and Major Determinants

India's foreign policy was initially designed during the British colonial period. The foundations of foreign policy were laid during the freedom struggle. The Indian National Congress tried to maintain the autonomous identity of foreign policy by establishing a Foreign Department in 1925 to maintain overseas contacts (Balkrishnan 2010:1). The major determinants of its principles of foreign policy are based on its relations to its history, traditions, cultures, people's aspirations, moral, ethical, spiritual values and philosophy of life (Asopa 2006: 46).

Democracy and secularism both are regarded to be the basis for the territorial integrity and domestic stability in the country (Pardesi and Ganguly 2012). India is a strong advocate of general and complete disarmament. It has adopted a nuclear doctrine highlighting three principles: minimum nuclear deterrence, no first use and no use against non-nuclear state. The geography of the country with vast territory and natural resources, rich culture and history, technological advancements, economy, political accountability, role of leadership, relations with other states and its role in different international organisations form the major determinants of India's foreign policy (Mohanty 2012).

India's foreign policy is directed by national interests. According to Balkrishnan, "national interest guides the continuous efforts of the state, leading to the initiation of foreign policy which suffices the state in achieving its most pronounced interests"

(Balkrishnan 2010:1). Adherence to democracy has a significant impact in guaranteeing stable polity in India.

India's foreign policy has both continuity and change. As Raja Mohan notes the fundamental changes in foreign policy of the country either takes place only when there is a revolutionary change at home or in the world and most states tend to practice a conservative outlook about foreign policy that refrain from making major changes. India's foreign policy is thus, seen as both a continuation of the fundamental principles and determinants with certain periodic changes owing to both national and international events (Mohan 2006:1).

The foreign policy was primarily designed after the independence of India. Leadership in the government has played an important role in the framing and evolution of India's foreign policy. Prime Minister Nehru is credited for setting a world view for India that heightened India's sovereign identity and desire to seek autonomy in carrying out its external relations. Adherence to non-alignment, opposition to imperialism, racial discrimination were the major determinants of the foreign policy during this time. India pioneered the formulation of the principles of cooperation and coexistence also known as *Panchasheela*. The foreign policy under the leadership of Lalbahadur Shastri relied highly on collective decision making. India's ties with the former Soviet Union were strengthened under the Indira Gandhi government. a new phase of improved relations with the US was achieved during the Janata Party rule in 1977. The foreign policy orientation under the Rajiv Gandhi government focused more on economic, technological and cultural cooperation with major countries. The important contribution of the Narsimha Rao government was the new outlook towards the region of Southeast Asia, which was achieved through the Look-East Policy. The policy of non-reciprocity was introduced in the Gujral doctrine, where India provided unilateral concessions to the smaller neighbouring countries (Dixit 2004).

Foreign policy of the country did experience major changes after the 1990s. India's foreign policy has adopted more global outlook that seeks to achieve a multipolar world order. India's relations with the world experienced fundamental transformation which was mainly due to the events unfolding in the global arena such as the collapse of the old

political and economic order that was followed after the end of the Cold War and global economic changes (Mohan 2006). The adoption of economic reforms with the policy of liberalisation and open market, India witnessed a new foreign policy which was still in its evolving phase as the economy lagged behind many countries (Malone 2011:90).

India has engaged in bilateral and regional level bonding with the countries in South Asia where it is also regarded to be a leading power. As it possesses vast territory, large number of population especially youth and availability of natural resources makes it a prominent state in the region with both tangible and intangible power qualities. It has also encouraged the states from South Asia to institute FTAs that will strengthen economic ties and promote cordial and harmonious relations in the region. India also participates and contributes to the institutional mechanisms of SAARC, such as the SAARC Food Bank, the SAARC Development Fund, the South Asian University, the SAARC Arbitration Council and the SAARC Regional Standards Organisation.

Along with its membership in the regional grouping of the SAARC, India has extended its ties with different regions and regional institutions. It has developed expedient ties with the regions like Southeast Asia which was initiated through the Look East Policy and was further developed as the 'Act East Policy'.

Its relation with the region of Latin America has developed considerably with the introduction of the programme 'Focus LAC'. India has been actively engaging with the regional organisations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the European Union and North America. Along with these interactions India has been a member of different issue based fora such as the IAEA, and financial institutions such as the WTO, the WB, the IMF, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).

Under the leadership of Prime Minister Nehru, India had become a staunch advocate of promoting solidarity with the Third World countries. The promotion of South-South Cooperation remains a focus in its foreign policy goals along with these relations; India also adheres to strengthening its North-South ties.

India has established comprehensive relations with major powers of the world. It has formed close ties with the major countries such as the US, the EU, Australia and Japan and has also signed Strategic Partnership with these countries. In addition to engaging in bilateral relations, India also gives major focus to its role in the multilateral organisations such as the United Nations. In addition to these two levels of interaction, India has expanded its relations through the interregional forums that form a bridge between bilateral and multilateral level interactions.

India as an Emerging Power

India's growing credentials in economic and strategic sectors have opened a new topic for discussion among the scholars and practitioners of foreign policy of the country. The titles such as 'rising power' (Cohen 2001), 'emerging power' (Paul and Nayar 2003), 'emerging superpower' (Malone 2011), and 'new kids in the block' (Chellaney 2012) are widely used to define the country's current place in the international system. It is also noted for having acquired a position at the global high table (Schaffer 2016). According to Indian diplomat Ronen Sen, "India is in transition in a changing world. Its engagement with the world is evolving and changing and the process of globalisation and international development will have an impact on India's engagement in the process of integration in the global economy" (Sen 2016). These 'rising power' credentials have enabled India to envisage a great power position in the current world system as it also relates to the recognition of India as a major civilisation that still has significant impact all over the country and beyond the subcontinent (Pardesi and Ganguly 2012).

India's Planning Commission has envisioned that,


India by 2020 will play a big role in the global world order, a role which will stress more on achieving aims that are comprehensive and harmonious. India is trying hard to chart a course which will uphold the life of its people inspiring them to rise beyond the limitations of past trends, immediate preoccupations and pressing challenges (Government of India 2004: 29).

The growing economic credentials of the country has also led to change in the international outlook of India as now it portrays more confidence and accepts bigger roles

in international affairs. Raja Mohan describes this changed outlook as “moving from a porcupine into a tiger” (Mohan 2003: 260). Mitra and Schotli further highlight that, “India with its ever-growing power, vast resources and cultural richness have created its Brand India” (Mitra and Schotli 2007:19).

Along with the growing GDP, the per capita income of the country has doubled over the past 20 years (Government of India 2004). The projection of Price Waterhouse Cooper, a global consultancy firm, reveals that India will have the fastest growth among all the major economies over the next 50 years³ (Walker 2006: 22-30).

Table 2.1 India’s GDP Growth in %



Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF)

The GDP of India has observed a gradual rise since 2000, it experienced a steep fall in GDP to 3.89% in 2008 which was due to an impact of the Global Financial Crisis. However these numbers were soon recovered in the next year, with the GDP rising to

³ The projections do not answer questions regarding sustainability of India’s growing economy especially regarding the risk of national financial crises, insufficient diversification of economies, and rising difficulties in finding resources such as energy and raw materials (Antkiewicz and Cooper 2011: 300).

8.48% in 2009. According to the projection by the IMF, India's GDP will rise from 7.96% in 2020 to 8.12% in 2021 (IMF 2017).

India's growing economy has also led to higher military spending leading to military modernisation and possessions of the nuclear and conventional technology that enhances its hard power capabilities (Hagerty 2009: 40). India also became the fifth largest military spender and reached to 8.5 per cent in 2016, with outlay of \$55.9 billion (*The Economic Times* 2017). It is also projected that India would overtake China in terms of population and thus be in possession of the world's largest and young workforce. India also adheres to nuclear non-proliferation and operates efficient system of maintaining nuclear material, equipment and technology.

India shares significant partnership with the ASEAN regional grouping. Former Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee had proposed an Asian Economic Community (AEC) to further deepen the relations with the region of Southeast Asia. India is also a member of the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation⁴ (MCG), connecting it with several Southeast Asian countries since its establishment in 2000. India has also expressed interest in joining the interregional grouping of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) which was established in the year 1989 and focuses on strengthening economic relations among members mainly dealing with trade ties and the formation of regional economic cooperation.

Moreover, India also possess expertise in technologies and strives to attain environment friendly sustainable economic development that attracts deeper interaction with developing regions of South Asia, Latin America and Africa. The huge resources of coal, electricity and human resources boost its developmental aspirations.

According to Mohta, being one of the most promising emerging markets,

India has attracted large-scale foreign direct investments. India's large-scale requirement for investments in infrastructure sector including roads, power, ports and also the immense possibilities of safe investments with high yields in real estate, manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, etc., has made

⁴ The Mekong-Ganga cooperation comprises of Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam and India as its members.

India a hot favourite with international institutional investors (Mohta 2007: 43).

There is a notable rise in the soft power capabilities leading to an improved international image of India. The democratic credentials, secular values, cultural diversity, large number of English speaking population, art and handicraft, entertainment industry, sports, especially cricket, have the potential of asserting necessary influence (Malone 2011: 218). According to Pranab Mukherjee, this influence will also lead to positive development for international peace and stability” (MEA 2008a). The world community has also recognised India’s participation in virtually every major activity of the UN. It has contributed to over 36 peacekeeping operations involving around 90,000 troops (MEA 2008a).

As the current world order is more interdependent, India cannot stay in isolation. There is a greater need to merge and collaborate together to achieve the common global targets such as the permanent seat in the UN, Doha Development Rounds, Reforms in the IFIs, the interregional relations and enhance these cooperation (Viswanathan 2017).

However, along with the rising economic credentials and international recognition, India also has its limitations and has been criticised for shortcomings in its global governance policies. It ranks 131 in HDI as per the 2015 report and faces significant challenges in addressing concerns such as poverty, inequalities, women empowerment, the measures to address discrimination on the basis of race, caste, region and gender. The aim would be to achieve the targets of sustainable development goals to address these major challenges of development.

Interregionalism as a Factor in India’s Foreign Policy

Interregionalism has become a new agenda of India’s foreign policy. The rising aspirations of many countries have led to the formation of different interregional groupings. These groupings represent similarities among the states and also the common objectives that the members aim to achieve. Its growing interaction in interregional grouping also represents the principle of *Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam*, described as cooperative pluralism that suggests India’s willingness to accept and work with multiple

countries in realisation of the concept which highlights that the ‘whole world is one big family’ (Singh 2004).

According to Bandopadhyay, “the making of foreign policy is a choice of ends and means for any state and these are formulated in a broad end or goal giving a purpose to foreign policy. These goals are primarily long-term and are to be achieved through the short-term means (Bandopadhyay 2006:1). India’s aspirations in achieving bilateral, regional and multilateral level cooperation in various interregional groupings can be regarded as the short-term measures to achieve global prominence that is a bigger goal. These interregional interactions have created a period of ‘multi-alignment’ which is a redefinition of the concept of non-alignment and creates a cooperative network (Tharoor 2012). However, according to Pandit, these multi-alignments of the recent periods will benefit the countries as well as have certain limitations as the world system is governed by the nation-state system (Pandit 2016).

Highlighting the increasing interregional interactions, Yashwant Sinha, in 2004, noted that,

India is expanding its network of international relationships, preserving solidarity with traditional allies and strengthening new partnerships. India is working with like-minded nations for an equitable multi-polar world order which takes into account the legitimate aspirations of developing countries (Sinha 2004: 135).

According to Acharya, “these various interregional interactions have created an ‘alphabetical soup’ providing many choices for India with overlapping membership and objectives which India will have to select among to give more importance to” (Acharya 2010). These also reflect the current world scenario where no one country can individually solve and manage all the issues and problems of the world. Thus, India’s growing engagements with different interregional groupings can be considered as an action to address different issues concerning India and reframe the rules of the game (Vishwanathan 2017).

Along with the interregional interactions, India is a signatory in different economic trade arrangements and comprehensive partnerships. The process of interregionalism is

categorised as different from the other plurilateral cooperations. India has entered into strategic partnerships with several major countries based on complementarity interests in specific but vital areas that are primarily bilateral in nature (FNSR 2011). In the wake of enhancing its economic cooperation India has also joined several Regional Trading Arrangements (RTAs), Preferential Trading Arrangements (PTAs) and Comprehensive Economic Partnership Arrangements (CEPAs) with individual countries and regional groupings.

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was one of the early interregional interactions that India and other newly independent countries from the Global South had adopted. India played an important role in the formation of NAM which pressed for the establishment of an independent identity that would be different for the two power blocs existing during the Cold War period. This was indicative of India's readiness to accept a leadership position and adopt autonomous foreign policy choices (Rajan 1999: 171-187).

According to Narlikar in the recent times, India has emerged as a pioneer in formulating 'developing country diplomacy' where it leads in raising important issues such as development, decolonization, racism, etc., at global forums such as the UN. Through these interregional groupings India spearheaded issues affecting developing countries and the LDCs. It adopted hard-line position in the GATT and the WTO (Narlikar 2007: 983-996).

However, these groupings have limitations and are criticised for not been successful in addressing the internal challenges that India faces. According to Malone, these interregional interactions have not been very successful in responding to India's major challenges such as internal security issues, ethnic strife, corruption and major global governance goals (Malone 2011: 249).

India's Interests and Objectives in Interregional Groupings

India actively participates in different interregional groupings. They share different sectoral goals and adhere to developing bilateral, regional and global level cooperation. Many of these groupings also represent the emerging powers that aspire for bigger role in the international system. India has always been an active member and vigorously

participates in the framing of major objectives and functioning of these interregional groupings. Some of the interregional groups with which India is keenly associated are discussed below.

East Asia Summit (EAS)

EAS forms an important interregional cooperation for India. It joined the EAS at its second summit held in Cebu, the Philippines in 2007. It is considered as a strategic entity that provides multidimensional engagement with different emerging economies. Noting the economic potential of the grouping, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh highlights that Asia's growth and intra-ASEAN cooperation can make an important contribution to global recovery that was undergoing a major setback (MEA 2010b).

India considers the grouping as a strategic entity that also provides a multidimensional engagement with the emerging community (MEA 2005).

According to then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh,

this grouping provides a good option, and India is committed to the success of this process and believes that the economic weight is shifting to Asia and seen as an engine of global growth. The EAS process is creating prosperity in the region and helps to bridge gaps between sub-regions and nations in Asia (MEA 2011b).

Commending India's membership to the EAS, Naidu affirms that "inclusion of India in the EAS is attributed to its fast growing economic and political clout, as ingress to this grouping widens its scope to look beyond ASEAN, thus broadening the Look East policy" (Naidu 2005).

India aims to cooperate at different sectoral levels with the grouping. On the economic front India considers the grouping to be one of the economic hubs of the world, as it comprises membership from prominent economies and emerging economies to developed states such as the US. India aspires to gain maximum benefits from the market oriented economy that focuses on creating a common market through increased FTA agreements (ASEAN 2012). Through its membership in the grouping, India aims for comprehensive

economic partnership agreement (CEPA) with East Asia. It has been successful in signing CEPAs with Singapore, South Korea, Japan, and Malaysia.

In addition to trade related cooperation, India has also been successful in drawing a new relation with the region as it is included in the creation of the Mekong-India corridor as one of the third corridors for building infrastructure, connectivity and industrial activity. India also adheres to its security related cooperation with the EAS. The grouping aims to build an open security architecture in the Asia-Pacific region that can benefit India's security needs in the Southeast Asia region.

Highlighting the significance of the grouping Prime Minister Modi notes that,

no other forum brings together such a large collective weight of global population, youth, economy and military strength. Nor is any other forum so critical for peace, stability and prosperity in Asia-Pacific and the world. we have made progress in number of areas and worked on important issues. We have begun to establish a culture and habit of dialogue of cooperation.

India also tried to strengthen regional cooperation in the education sector by tapping the region's centres of excellence in education. For instance, India and the EAS are cooperating in reviving Nalanda University located in India as the centre of intellectual activity in Buddhist philosophy, mathematics, medicine, and other disciplines that attracted many scholars from South-East Asia, South Asia and East Asia (MEA 2011b).

BIMSTEC

India is one of the founding member of BIMSTEC. It is considered as an integral part of its Look East Policy (MEA 2010). By participating in BIMSTEC, India tries to bridge its relations with the South and South-East Asian states. India believes that a deeper cooperation with BIMSTEC can enhance India's position in the region. Through its membership in BIMSTEC, India aims to achieve cooperation in multiple sectors.

India considers the grouping has the potential to address the security related trans-national challenges that affects countries of both the regions of South and Southeast Asia (MEA 2008b).

On the economic front, India can benefit from the huge potential for trade and the investment sector that the group provides. The proposed FTA among the members aims to achieve these targets. The plans for establishing the Food Bank will assist India in addressing acute problems of hunger. Promotion of rapid tariff liberalisation in the BIMSTEC region has increased India's export to BIMSTEC countries.

India seeks to promote the objectives of social and economic development and to create an enabling environment for cooperation among BIMSTEC member states. It also gives priority to the fourteen areas of cooperation in areas like energy, medicine, and science and technology besides addressing security and environmental concerns. India will lead the cooperation in transport and communication, tourism, environment and disaster management and counter terrorism and trans-national crimes and has set up a BIMSTEC Information Centre and agreed to set up a BIMSTEC weather and climate centre at National Weather Forecasting Centre in India.

The grouping provides scope for bridging the connectivity between the two regions. India has sought to increase its connectivity through railways, highways and ports in order to increase trade activities among BIMSTEC members. In enhancing the quality in services among the member countries in connecting the regions, India has engaged in providing training to railway personnel and also extend training to highways and ports development programmes (MEA 2011).

By building better connectivity in the region, India aims to undertake development and integration of the North-east region which remains one of the fundamental reasons for joining membership in the BIMSTEC grouping (Malone 2011).

As a prominent country in the grouping, India has offered 450 scholarships and 150 training slots to BIMSTEC countries to encourage greater exchange of technical know-how in the areas of mutual benefit.

Establishment of the Nalanda University also forms one of the prime achievement of the grouping that brings the scholars from two regions together in creating a hub of education (MEA 2009c).

There is a strong demand for India to take a lead in re-energising BIMSTEC. India can promote and strengthen this interregional grouping as the absence of bilateral tensions between the countries provides larger scope for cooperation among the members. In deepening its ties with the grouping, India had declared the BIMSTEC as the 'BRICS outreach partner' and invited the BIMSTEC leaders to attend the eight BRICS summit that was held in 2016 held in India.

G20

India is a core member of the G20 which is the most prominent grouping of the current times. India adheres to the groupings main goals of strengthening the international "financial architecture" and "financial system" and promoting "financial inclusion" (Government of India 2012). According to then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh,

India's participation in this grouping has increased as India is a major developing economy that increasingly integrates with the global economy; India has a vital stake in the stability of the international economy and financial system. India put forward views on the need for greater inclusivity in the international financial system, the need to ensure that the growth prospects of the developing countries do not suffer and the need to avoid protectionist tendencies (Singh 2008: 259).

India's strong integration with the global economy has improved the environment for trade and investment flows and sustainable development. This aim has been all the more achievable because of India's active participation in G20. Along with the other G20 members, India demands a broader policy response based on closer macroeconomic cooperation to restore growth, avoid negative spill-overs and support emerging market economies and developing countries.

Its active membership in this interregional grouping act as an important medium to push for India's demands in the international trade regime like the Doha Rounds. The groupings such as the G20 provides the best platform to raise the concerns of the countries form the Global South. The grouping has been very important in collaborating with other developing countries on issues pertaining to its key interests (Chakraborty 2006: 150). The grouping brings other developing countries together to demand for the

creation of an open predictable rule-based traditional system and take the concerns of Indian large farmers abroad (Menon 2008: 125).

In its goals to achieve higher investments, India has made a strong demand for the need to eradicate tax havens and insisted the global community create an environment whereby the citizens of the member countries will not be allowed to store illegal funds abroad. To increase higher international investments India has announced hundred per cent foreign direct investment in multi-brand retail. India has been attempting to push for multilateral trade talks especially in the WTO (Sen 2012). The grouping also serves as a platform for India to demand a timely review of the quota according to a nation's economic weight and in a manner that is simple and transparent (Government of India 2012). India has been consistently demanding for the rebalancing of global governance by reforming financial institutions. As India claims, reforms in the international financial institutions will enable to provide for better financial safety nets especially to the developing countries. Further, India has been demanding to check global micro imbalances, ensure lines of credit and export finance to developing countries. It has demanded for measures on widening the current agenda and inclusion of more development agenda (Xavier and Shome 2011). To avert the possibility of a global financial crisis, India presses for a new architecture to include a credible system of multilateral surveillance which can signal the emergence of imbalances, that are likely to have systemic effects, and suggested to put in motion a process of consultation that can yield results in terms of policy coordination” (Singh 2008: 263).

The inclusion of investment in infrastructure in the developing countries as a major agenda in its summit discussion can advantage the infrastructural needs of the country (Raghavan 2012: 17). Along with these demands, India insists on G20 to focus on bringing regulatory reforms, pertaining to the food sector and agricultural productivity and anti-corruption measures. It has resisted the protectionist tendencies which increase in periods of high employment and low growth (Government of India 2012b).

As a growing economy India showcased its ability to contribute US\$10 billion to the IMF's US\$430 billion firewall to the eurozone. India also emphasised the need to provide liquidity to European banks without neglecting issues of solvency. Through G20, India

has furthered its demand to expand the resource base of Multilateral Development Banks to help developing countries pursue their development goals (Raghavan 2012: 1).

SCO

Membership in SCO forms India's latest interregional endeavour as it was promoted to a member from an observer in 2017. This grouping entails strategic significance to India. the grouping also provides a scope for cooperating in areas such as economic and energy. The grouping provides opportunity to engage with the region of Central Asia and Eurasia along with China thus, giving an opportunity to enhance multiple relations between these two regions. SCO forms an important medium to address traditional and non-traditional security threats. It has been actively engaging in addressing the issues of terrorism, trafficking in human and drugs.

These close relations lead to further deepening of the cultural ties between the states. India also considers the SCO as an alternative regional platform which can help in discussion on the rapidly changing situation in Afghanistan (Saran 2006: 118). As the grouping accounts for a major proportion of the world's resources, India seeks to forge deeper engagements with it in the area of economic cooperation. India aims to formulate a greater intra-SCO trade, development banking and financial services such as capital markets. This grouping will further provide an opportunity to enter in to the SCO Business Council and the SCO Development Fund

As the region of entire SCO countries do not share a sea route and are landlocked, enhanced connectivity was proposed among the member countries (Deora 2008: 38). Thus, to deepen these engagements India has proposed to re-energise the North-South transport corridor project linking India with Central Asia, Russia and will also pass through Iran (Krishnan 2012: 16).

The grouping provides India, an opportunity to deepen the relations with Central Asia. As Central Asia is one of the major producers and consumers of various goods and supplies, India has realised that having stronger relations with this region can also boost India's energy supplies. India aims to develop a people-to-people contact and greater cultural dialogue (Deora 2006: 1116).

BASIC

The participation in BASIC placed India as an important country to raise issues of significance and engage in negotiation. BASIC was created in 2009 at the UNFCCC summit during the COP 15 in Copenhagen. This consultative mechanism is different from the regular consultation mechanisms such as G7 and G20. The debate over COP 21 revealed that the developed countries would not agree to adhere to reduce greenhouse gas emission if developing countries failed to do so, which was mainly targeted at India and China (POYRI Report 2011). India along with the other BASIC countries stressed on following the framework of the UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and the recommendations of the Bali Roadmap. The grouping realised the need for a strong unified grouping of the developing countries to oppose the discriminatory policies that were imposed by the developed countries. India has adhered to the Brazil BASIC Summit Joint Statement that declared to build stronger unity among the group members in achieving sustained and inclusive results in future summits in the context of sustainable development that would adhere to the guidelines as described in the UNFCCC.

The states representing the Global North have led a policy of carbon emission cuts that are regarded as discriminatory by the states from the Global South and are considered as a hurdle to the economic growth and industrial development of the emerging economies. In the negotiations of the UNFCCC held in 1992, India along with the other members from the Global South countries initiated a position that laid down a demand for “common but differentiated responsibilities” for allocating responsibilities according to the countries that have caused the problem (Rajan 1999). India framed a grouping of 72 countries to defend the cause of the developing countries to support the proposed legally binding protocol but not to accept any addition in the responsibilities from the protocol that was initiated by the ecologically vulnerable states in the Kyoto Protocol (Dubhash and Rajamani 2015).

Through BASIC, India initiated a new discourse from the perspective of the emerging economies. The BASIC countries played a crucial part in the climate negotiations at the Copenhagen Summit. They agreed to initiate more stringent mitigation actions and greater transparency compared to the developed world that would ensure a positive

response to the Small Island Countries and Least Developed Countries from the Global South. Even in the BASIC, India has been tactical in adhering to the grouping interests and challenging the BASIC members when considered necessary (Dubhash and Rajamani 2015).

IORA

India is a founding member of the IORA, formerly known as Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC). India attained the chairmanship of the grouping in 2011 where it focussed on addressing the geostrategic challenges faced by the country and all the littoral states. There is greater emphasis to re-vitalise the grouping and India is considered to play a more proactive role in the functioning of the grouping. It has been active in setting up and the functioning of different working groups such as Indian Ocean Rim Academic Group (IORAG), Indian Ocean Rim Business Forum (IORBF), Working Group on Trade and Investment (WGTI). Under India's leadership the Chair on Indian Ocean Studies (CIOS) was revived after a gap of fifteen years that focuses studies on trade facilitation.

In further deepening the cooperation among the group members, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi initiated a strategic vision for the grouping called the 'Security and Growth for All in the Region' (SAGAR). India has also proposed to set up a virtual university in joint cooperation with Mauritius. It also offered the IORA partners various capacity building programmes such as: Remote sensing and Potential Fishing Zones (PFZ), Ocean Data Processing and Application, Ocean Climate Modelling, and Standard operating procedure for Tsunami warning and emergency. There was also a special training course organised for the IORA diplomats at the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) New Delhi. India organised workshops on women's empowerment, skill development of youths in India, and pushed for major themes such as institutionalising Blue Economy Dialogue, developing a comprehensive accounting framework for Blue Economy, fisheries and aquaculture, renewable ocean energy, ports, shipping, manufacturing and other sectors such as sea-bed exploration and minerals. India also launched Indian Ocean Dialogue to discuss maritime security challenges, strengthening regional institutions, information sharing, cooperation in disaster management and economic cooperation.

India, being a leading economy in the grouping, also contributes the highest amount, US\$1000,000, for IORA special Fund.

Conclusion

India's power capabilities have evolved over time. The economic transformation with opening of the markets to the outer world and following the policies of liberalisation, the country has achieved gradual growth in the GDP and the PPP, and improved drastically its economic standing from the period of independence to the present. Owing to the 1991 reforms and changing world scenario with the end of the Cold War, the options and aspirations to play a bigger role in the global system were made available to the country.

India interacts with several regional groupings to boost cooperation in different sectoral areas. Along with improved relations with the major powers such as the US, the UK, the EU, Russia, China, Japan and Australia, it also engages with regions of Southeast Asia, East Asia, Africa, Central Asia, Latin America and regional organisations such as ASEAN, MERCOSUR etc. The interaction in the interregional groupings is an added layer in the external relations of the country. India has obtained membership in interregional groupings such as the BIMSTEC, IORA, G20, EAS, SCO and BASIC which are some of the prominent groupings where India shares its membership with the countries that have certain similar identities and have common objectives to achieve. These groupings function at three different levels and cooperate to enhance their bilateral, regional and global level interactions.

India is considered to be a prominent member in these groupings as it also remains one of the founding members. Indian leaders and officials have been attending the group level summits, meetings and symposiums of these groupings. India leads these groupings in raising the issues of concern to the larger community of the Global South. India has been actively participating at the regional level interactions which are divided into broad areas of trade, security, global governance, sustainable development. India seeks to deepen its connectivity over both land and sea, as well as strengthen cultural bonding between the member countries. It has also performed well in terms of financial diplomacy, climate change negotiations as well as pushing for successful Doha development talks. Its

position as a leading negotiator in these important issues demanding for reforms in the IFIs have raised the country's initial perception as a developing state to an emerging power with potential to perform a greater global role.

CHAPTER III

INDIA'S ROLE IN IBSA DIALOGUE FORUM

Introduction

The emergence of IBSA has opened a new chapter in the discourse of the rise of the Global South. The grouping represents three prominent countries, namely, India, Brazil and South Africa from the three significant regions of South Asia, Latin America and Africa. The emergence of this trilateral engagement signifies a revival of South-South cooperation.⁵ The grouping stresses on the unique credentials that the countries share, such as all the three countries are developing countries, practising democracy, are emerging economies, are all multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, and multi-lingual societies. Upholding the values of participatory democracy, respecting human rights and rule of the law are defined as the major principles of the grouping (IBSA 2003a). White defines the grouping as “an alliance of like-minded countries sharing similar interests, skills, and needs, that is laced with a geopolitical framework that provides stronger political symbolism and a unique negotiating opportunity in multi-lateral fora” (White 2009). IBSA is also highlighted as a resurgence of the South (Stuenkel 2015; Beri 2008), a new non-alignment of the South (Nafey 2005) and a platform to serve as self-appointed interlocutors between the Global South and the North (Solomon 2012).

The three countries along with sharing similarities also have common goals and objectives. With the formation of IBSA, the three countries aim to bridge the gap between themselves and initiate deeper cooperation and coordination at the international level. The group members engage at three levels, namely, global, trilateral and bilateral. The systematic organisation of the grouping lays a foundation for enhancing cooperation in various sectors and strengthening intra-IBSA trade opportunities (IBSA 2003a). Along with this cooperation, the member countries are using the grouping to make an inroad in each other's regions and deepen their ties and spread trade relations among the members and the other countries in the regional zone. The IBSA countries try to build a network of multifaceted

⁵ South-South cooperation is a relation between the countries situated in the southern hemisphere that engage in strengthening mutual economic and other relations.

interactions that will enhance their relations at the group as well as global level (Puri and Kumar 2007: 467). With increased interregional trade and close cooperation, IBSA is rapidly transforming into a strategic partnership from a Dialogue Forum (*Outlook* 2008) and has also been an attraction for countries such as Turkey, Mexico, Egypt and China, which have shared an interest to join the grouping, highlighting its relevance.

The grouping has pioneered in setting an example for contributing to the developmental goals of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). The formation of the IBSA Trust Fund demonstrates the willingness and capability of the grouping to initiate financial assistance from the developing countries, that can relate closely to the growing needs of the countries in need. Kornegay explains that the formation of IBSA is mainly aimed at creating a multipolar and post-Western world order, where the powers from different regions will participate in the global affairs (Kornegay 2006).

As Celso Amorim, Brazil's then foreign minister, argued several years after IBSA's founding, it was "time IBSA forum can be regarded as the amalgamation of the emerging economies which are also defined as middle powers of the Global South". By forming the group, the three countries stress their power credentials and demands for recognition as important players in global decision-making. IBSA highlights the discriminatory policies faced by the developing countries. It emphasises the formation of an inclusive global system that will encompass the major countries of the developing world and represent their concerns at the global platform and include them as an important factor in international decision-making. This is evident from the statement of Brazil's Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, claiming that "it was time to start reorganizing the world in the direction that the overwhelming majority of mankind expects and needs" (Amorim 2008). Member countries of IBSA aspire for a bigger role in international affairs as they highlight their potential to work at the global stage. These ambitions of the grouping are clearly evident from the summit declarations which in 2006 urged the establishment of a fair and equitable global order, which was further enhanced by proclaiming a new desired world order in the summit declaration of 2011 (Kurtz-Phelan 2013). According to Sotero, "the changing economic scenario with declining US domination provides bigger opportunities to emerging countries and IBSA formation transcending geographical, historical and regional differences is a good

example to showcase a common interest of the countries from the global South” (Sotero 2009). IBSA is also regarded as the first grouping of developing countries that was mainly instrumental in setting up the Group of 20 (G20) of developing countries in Cancun (Singh 2009).

The formation of IBSA mainly highlights its democratic credentials and sharing identity of developing nations. Raja Mohan and Taylor have defined the union of the IBSA countries as an amalgamation of the middle powers which also share good regional positions. Along with these similarities, the IBSA countries also have similar challenges in the form of social inequities in their neighbourhood. According to Taylor, “India, Brazil and South Africa possess more capacity than the small vulnerable states but also lack the required structural position to influence the international system” (Mohan 2010; Taylor 2009: 19).

India is a core member of IBSA. It actively participated in the initial idea and formation of the grouping along with the other two countries from the regions of Latin America and Africa. The grouping’s potential of addressing the cause of the southern states and shared similar democratic values makes it an interesting addition in the foreign policy of the country. India acknowledged the rising economies of the three countries and adheres to achieving the common goals of the three countries. It has participated in all the heads of state summits and meetings held at the ministerial level and other sectoral working group levels. It leads the group in the areas of cooperation such as science and technology, tourism and defence ties.

This chapter will provide a detailed introduction of the IBSA forum. The first section highlights its origin, objectives and major functioning of its sectoral working groups. The second section provides a detailed analysis of India’s interests and objectives for joining IBSA. The chapter highlights the major contributions and the role India has undertaken in the grouping. There is a lack of analytical studies on IBSA and its impacts in the international system. There is also a dearth of study with regard to India’s participation and

its role and contribution to the grouping.⁶ This chapter will try to bridge the gap with regard to analysis on IBSA and India's interest in the grouping.

Origin of IBSA

The three member countries of IBSA are regarded as the big powers in their respective regions. Their large territorial possession, population, vast source of natural resources, technological advancement, and economic progress all combined suggest their arrival in the international arena. The idea of forming a grouping was initiated at the G8 summit held at Evian in 2003, where the developing countries, including IBSA member countries, were invited as observer states but were not fully included in all the meetings. The reaction to this treatment by the three leaders was notable, where the Brazilian President Lula symbolically claimed that “the developing countries are not only meant to have the dessert but will share the table with the developed states in enjoying the main course, dessert and a coffee” (Kurtz-Phelan 2013a).

The IBSA Dialogue Forum was formally established in 2003 with organising a first meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the three countries, namely, Yashwant Sinha of India, Celso Amorim of Brazil and Nkosazana Dlamini of South Africa, which was held in Brasilia, Brazil. This meeting was concluded with framing major goals and objectives of the grouping, which was enlisted in the form of Brasilia Declaration. The declaration introduced the grouping as an alliance of the three large and vibrant democracies that are active in international affairs⁷ (IBSA 2006b). The first meeting of the heads of state was held in Brasilia in 2006. This meeting was attended by Brazil's President Lula da Silva, South African President Thabo Mbeki and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, which was a pioneering step displaying the arrival of the grouping and the seriousness of the leaders in taking forward its objectives.

⁶ IBSA being a relatively older grouping as compared to BRICS (formed in 2009) has lesser focused interest among the academic community of the three countries and there are relatively lesser books written on the topic (Stuenkel 2015: 9).

⁷ The initial idea to create a new form of “G8 of the Global South” was introduced by South Africa's President Thabo Mbeki by inviting prominent countries from the Southern hemisphere, mainly China, Egypt, Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, India and Saudi Arabia, out of which India and Brazil accepted the proposal (Landsberg 2007; Stuenkel 2015).

Along with these summits, the grouping also conducts Trilateral Ministerial Commissions meetings of the Foreign Ministers. Till date seven ministerial meetings have been held in the major host cities of the three countries.

Objectives

The major objectives defined by the IBSA Dialogue Forum focus on its identity. It lays its core foundation on strengthening South-South relations and sharing an agreement to coordinate and promote common issues that have international importance. Promotion of trade relations among the countries and with the region they represent has been the second most important priority of the grouping. The grouping stresses on global governance issues. The trio, recognising its emerging-power status has accepted the responsibilities to address issues of poverty alleviation and social development of the developing countries and the countries with least development. Through IBSA, the three countries aim to coordinate and exchange information, international best practices, sharing of technologies and skills. The grouping aims to make the best use of each other's competitive strength into collective synergies. Along with these objectives, the members focus on deepening their cooperation in the areas of agriculture, defence, climate change, culture, energy, health, information society, science and technology, social development, trade and investment, tourism and transportation (IBSA 2003a).

Organisation and Summits

IBSA is designed on three levels of interactions heads of state, foreign ministers, and focal points, further streaming down to national coordinators of specific cooperation area. The grouping does not have a permanent headquarters or a secretariat. The absence of noted rules and regulations in its functioning highlights the need of a flexible and open grouping. The major interaction in the grouping is done through the Heads of State and Government meetings. In 2008, the first round of summits was completed. The second round of summits will be completed after the long-awaited meeting of the heads of state scheduled to be hosted in India. So far, there have been five summits held in Brasilia (2003), Tshwane, South Africa (2007), New Delhi (2008), Brasilia (2010), and Tshwane (2011). The heads of state issue a summit declaration noting the major objectives of the group. The grouping also

conducts a Trilateral Commission of the Foreign Ministers. There is also a provision for expanding the cooperation among the countries through enhancing interaction among the academia, civil society groups and business class (IBSA 2003b). There have been regular meetings of the Finance Ministers and Foreign Ministers of the IBSA countries on the sidelines of UNGA and other meetings. There is an issuance of the summit declarations and communiqués to consolidate and highlight the common objectives and the future action plan of the grouping.

IBSA activities

IBSA activities are monitored and coordinated through senior officers of the three countries. The activities are divided into four categories as

- ***Political Coordination***

The IBSA functions as an instrument to highlight the common positions the three countries share on several global issues. Along with organising meetings the group members have also met at the margins of several multilateral forums such as the Human Rights Council, the WTO, the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), the Antarctic Treaty and Conference for the Reconstruction of Palestine.

- ***Sectoral Cooperation through 16 Working Groups***

The establishment of the sixteen sectoral working groups has enabled the grouping to formulate deeper interaction among the members that will benefit from each other's expertise and experiences in sectors such as Public Administration, Revenue Administration, Agriculture, Human Settlements, Science and Technology (includes Antarctic Research), Trade and Investment, Culture, Defence, Information Society, Social Development, Education, Energy, Environment and Climate Change, Health, Transport and Tourism.

- ***IBSA Fund for Alleviation of Poverty and Hunger***

This is a novel initiative. The IBSA Fund aims to address core developmental issues in the LDCs and also achieve the major Millennium and Sustainable Goals.

- ***Other Initiatives***

Along with forming close cooperation at the political level, IBSA aims to deepen its understanding by organising the interaction through the involvement of other actors beyond the executive (e.g. Parliamentarians, Constitution Courts, Civil Society, Businessmen and Opinion Makers) which is conducted in the form of the Social Development Businessmen's Forum, Academic Seminars, Editors Forum, Constitutional Courts meeting and Cultural trends (IBSA 2003a).

Summits

The attempt to institutionalise IBSA was initiated by organising a joint Trilateral Commission attended by the Foreign Ministers of the three countries. The meetings of the Trilateral Commission were sequentially held as follows: New Delhi (2004), Cape Town (2005), Rio de Janeiro (2006), New Delhi (2007), Somerset West, South Africa (2008), Brasilia (2009), and New Delhi (2011).

At the third meeting of the Trilateral Commission it was agreed to strengthen the member countries' claims on the UNSC and also to institutionalise the IBSA Trust Fund. The meeting also agreed to the formation of a new working group for business coordination. The fifth meeting stressed on the commitment to form an FTA with India-MERCOSUR-SACU.

The Foreign Ministers of the IBSA countries also met on the side-lines of UNGA meetings. The first joint IBSA meeting on the margins of UNGA was held in 2004 in New York.

IBSA summits are held in one of the three countries on rotational basis. The first summit discussed cooperation in areas such as in the areas of trade, maritime security, agriculture, biofuels, information technology, etc. (IBSA 2006b). The second summit was held in Pretoria in 2007. Its major outcomes were signing of agreements on tax and customs, and furthering the relations in areas such as health, wind power and public administration. The subsequent summits were held in New Delhi (2008), Brasilia (2010) and Pretoria (2011).⁸ An important agreement to establish an IBSA satellite was undertaken during the Pretoria summit.

⁸ The sixth IBSA summit, to be held in India in 2012 was rescheduled several times due to several reasons, such as elections and political changes in government in the three states. It was rescheduled in 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016. According to the latest news reports, the summit will be held in 2017 in India.

IBSA as a Coalition for South-South Cooperation

South-South cooperation remains a primary identity of IBSA. Its member countries have insisted on relying on and promoting the objectives and benefit of the Global South discourse. In the summit declaration, they have agreed to adopt a proactive approach that will channel the forces of globalisation to achieve the development agenda of the South in the current century (IBSA 2005).

Stressing on the focus on the Global South, Brazilian President Lula in the first IBSA summit said that “the IBSA formation has led to overcoming historical, geographical, cultural and mental barriers that have always made us look to the North rather than the South” (Seligman 2006). According to White, the combined size of the three countries and their economic potential create an opportunity to bring the major countries of the South to the centre of the new and emerging global order” (White 2009).

IBSA can be regarded as a result of the ineffective performance of the traditional Southern groupings such as G77 and NAM. IBSA’s emergence is regarded to have worked to reinstate the discourse of the Southern states. The phenomenon of South-South cooperation and southern identity as portrayed in recent periods is different from the traditional framework, as the needs and aspirations of the three countries and their emergence is different from the traditional setting of the Southern understanding. However, the affirmation of South-South cooperation by the IBSA states does not stress on the divide between the North and the South countries. IBSA declarations stress on adherence to North-South engagements as the economic growth of IBSA member countries has reduced the gap in the North-South divide. According to Stuenkel, the three countries now stress on autonomy in decision-making and preserving their sovereignty and not strictly taking anti-West economic and political positions (Stuenkel 2016: 19).

Along with the new discourse on South-South cooperation, IBSA has been asserting its role as a representative of the three countries’ respective regions in international forums. The three countries’ engagement in cooperating at the trilateral level has brought them closer to each other’s region. IBSA has become a springboard to make an entry into the regions of Latin America, Africa and Asia. However, the claims of representing the regions in the

international forums have been used very cautiously by the scholars and officials of these countries as this claim has a direct impact on the sovereignty and autonomy of the regional countries.

A Grouping with Democratic Credentials

IBSA's democratic credentials remain one of its major highlights. All its three member countries practise strong democracy, giving this grouping a unique identity from that of the other groupings and forums, where members from different political affiliations participate. The opportunities for cooperation are strengthened by IBSA's democratic foundation. Its democratic identity is also a reason for IBSA to not include China as a member. It is also a good reason for IBSA to not merge with BRICS. According to Puri and Kumar, IBSA's "democratic ethos" has maintained IBSA's unique identity (Puri and Kumar 2007: 467). In addition to supporting and adhering to democratic features such as participatory democracy, the IBSA summit declaration has also emphasised support to a country's transition to democracy. The three countries have expressed their desire to assist these countries and guarantee better human rights records (IBSA 2011).

IBSA as a Result of Economic Growth

Krueger mentions that the IBSA countries fall in the category of developing countries. The list of developing nations consists of countries having different levels of development at the economic, political and social levels, and comprises states ranging from the poorest agricultural and food grain importing economy (for example sub-Saharan Africa) to advanced high-tech economies like South Korea (Krueger 2007: 11). IBSA's emergence can be seen as a phenomenon of growing economic trajectories in the three countries in the period 2000-2010. The upsurge in their identity as emerging economies can be seen as a part of various attempts of South-South cooperation, which was initiated from the Bandung Conference, further taking the shape of NAM (Doyaili et al. 2013).

IBSA Agenda

IBSA has framed sixteen working groups to engage in deeper cooperation between the member countries. Their agenda ranges from agriculture to scientific advancement.

Agriculture: The working group on agriculture was finalised with the signing of the Memorandum of Understandings (MOUs) by the Ministers of Agriculture of the three countries at the meeting held on the margins of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) conference held in 2005. As all the three countries' economies highly rely on agriculture, its development and exchange of research on the subject is aimed at providing successful results.

Culture: The working group on culture showcases IBSA's interest in exchanging information on cultural activities between the member countries and is an attempt to learn from each other's lifestyle through holding cultural activities.

Defence: The IBSA member countries do not share borders or have any security-related issues with each other. However, the grouping aims to strengthen their security-related cooperation. The IBSAMAR initiative of joint naval exercises between the three countries is a prime example of this initiative.

Education: The working group on education focuses on collaborating in open and distance education, higher and professional education and universal mass education with special emphasis on quality and gender equality.

Energy: This is an attempt to devise a mechanism to promote the production of bio-fuels that will assist in reducing the threat of climate change.

Health services: IBSA aims to learn from best practises, and exchange information especially related to epidemiology surveillance, sanitary regulations, traditional medicines, and related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.

Tourism: This is an endeavour to promote tourism between the regions through visits by specialised travel journalists from IBSA countries.

Information Society and Communication Technologies: This working group is also responsible for the design and configuration of the IBSA website, hosted by South Africa.

Science and technology: The working group on science and technology has nominated approved areas of research cooperation, namely: TB – South Africa; Malaria – Brazil;

HIV/AIDS – India; Nanotechnology – India; Biotechnology – South Africa; Oceanography – Brazil.

- ***Coordination at International Forums***

The three IBSA countries have agreed to coordinate on the issues of common concern that are discussed in the international forums. IBSA contributed crucially to the failure of the WTO Conference in Cancun by pressing for fundamental changes in the agricultural subsidies regimes of the developed world. The IBSA countries also coordinated their activities and voting pattern at the Geneva (2004) and Hong Kong (2005) negotiations on agriculture. The signing of the Non-Agricultural Market Access-11 (NAMA-11) initiated the Doha development negotiations.

The three countries coordinated at the WTO agreement on TRIPS that would have affected the developing countries especially with generic drugs. The trio also coordinated their voting pattern in the NAM conference held in Havana in 2006 and were also non-permanent members of the UNSC at the 61st UN General Assembly.

- ***UN Institutional Reforms***

All the three IBSA countries are non-permanent members of the UNSC. Being the major countries of South Asia, Latin America and Africa, India, Brazil and South Africa have been consistently demanding for their inclusion in the inner circle of the UNSC. They stress on the expansion of both the permanent and the non-permanent membership to the UNSC. The reforms in the international organisation such as the UN are sought to meet the changing global scenario. The three countries claim that the UNSC framework was designed in 1945 and was based on the post-World War II scenario and therefore requires a review. They have issued joint statements to reform the UNSC, emphasising on the co-sponsorship of draft resolution A/61/L.69 (IBSA 2007b). IBSA has consistently pressed on the UN to be more democratic, a legitimate representative and responsive⁹ (IBSA 2006). The three countries have supported each other's claim for a permanent seat. This has also led to the

⁹ However, the IBSA countries gave special consideration to the importance of respecting the international law, strengthening the United Nations and the Security Council and prioritising the exercise of diplomacy as a means to maintain international peace and security in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and with the legal instrument to which the three countries are parties (IBSA 2003a).

strengthening of the G4 demands and also adding a new member, South Africa, to the demands of India, Brazil, Japan and Germany (Dixit 2011d). However, the candidature of South Africa and Brazil depends upon the African Union and MERCOSUR and faces challenges from Nigeria and Argentina, respectively. India too faces challenges from the South Asian counterparts such as Pakistan. The three countries concurrently shared non-permanent membership of the UNSC in 2011, giving them a combined leverage to address their common goals in the international forum (IBSA 2011c).

Along with the expansion of the UNSC, the IBSA countries have also agreed to support and provide combined efforts to strengthening the two other bodies of the UN, namely, UNGA and ECOSOC. They have adhered to the formation of the Peace-building Commission and the Human Rights Council, which will assist and provide necessary support to the countries affected with conflicts and human rights violations. They have agreed to extend their support to the capacity-building efforts of these UN bodies (IBSA 2006).

- ***Reforms in the International Financial Institutions***

The IBSA countries have together raised a strong demand for the reformations in the traditional financial institutions such as the WTO, the World Bank and the IMF. They demand the inclusion of the countries from the South in the decision-making process of these institutions and to be granted a bigger role in the management of funds. This convergence of interest is one of the achievements of IBSA, as the unification of common interests from the developing countries has always been a weak factor. IBSA has emerged as a platform for the three developing countries to jointly demand reforms in these institutions. According to Stuenkel, this grouping can be seen as an extension to the institutional framework in the form of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) in the 1970s that was represented through the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (Stuenkel 2015: 23; UNCTAD). It made major demands for the improvement in trade terms, higher assistance in development and reduction in tariffs and protectionist measures by the developed states.

- ***Social and Economic Development***

The IBSA countries have adhered to guaranteeing social and economic development. They stress on promoting social equity and inclusion that has been achieved through different programmes on tackling hunger and poverty. They also try to achieve these goals by learning from each other's programmes and experiences that deals with generating support to family-run farms, ensuring food security, providing social assistance, employment, education, and environmental protection. IBSA has also proposed a trilateral food assistance programme and also insisted on achieving these challenges through maintaining equity by guaranteeing gender equality and resistance to racial discrimination (IBSA 2003). In order to achieve labour rights and social justice, the trio has pressed for guaranteeing sustainable social protection systems¹⁰ and agreed to foster dialogue between IBSA governments, workers and employers to achieve these goals (IBSA 2012a).

- ***Science and Technology***

IBSA countries have a great potential in the areas of science and technology. They have initiated a proposal to converge their interests in biotechnology, information technology, alternative energy sources, outer space, aeronautics, and agriculture, through which they can benefit from each other's expertise and also apply these technologies in promoting trade, tourism, investment and travel. They also insist on joint efforts in reducing the digital divide between the developed and developing countries (IBSA 2003). They have also agreed to cooperate with other developing countries to achieve Technical Cooperation amongst Developing Countries (TCDC) (IBSA 2006). In the fifth IBSA summit, an ambitious decision to establish an IBSA satellite was announced. To further their cooperation in the areas of science and technology and limit their reliance on industrialised states, the satellite was mainly focused for providing all-weather information that will assist in agriculture, detecting natural disasters and for scientific research (DefenceWeb 2010).¹¹

¹⁰ The Labour Ministers of the IBSA countries elaborated to implement the four strategic objectives of the Decent Work Agenda, that includes measures to accelerate employment creation, reduce informality and create sustainable enterprises (IBSA 2012a).

¹¹ The establishment of the IBSA satellite focuses primarily on the peaceful uses targeted for agricultural benefits (IBSA 2005).

- ***Environment and Sustainable Development***

The IBSA countries share a common orientation towards the protection and promotion of the environment and sustainable development. They recognise the measures adopted in the Rio Conference and its Agenda 21, the Millennium Summit and the Monterrey and Johannesburg Summits, and the Programme for the Implementation of Agenda 21. IBSA has shared the concerns of climate change and the effects of global warming, which will have a major impact on the developing countries. It has stressed the application of the emission reduction goals which have been set by the Kyoto Protocol and has also appealed to the developed countries to fulfil their commitments made under the Protocol in satisfying the targets for greenhouse gas emission reduction, expansion of technology transfer, capacity-building and financial support to developing countries. It has also made an appeal to uphold the right of protecting biodiversity with the implementation of the Convention of Biological Diversity. The grouping has also made a demand to render the relevant parts of the TRIPS agreement compatible with the Biological Diversity Convention that will grant the rights of countries of origin over their own genetic resources, and also provide protection of associated traditional knowledge. IBSA also aims to collaborate in the areas of disaster management. It has adopted the Hyogo Framework for Action (2005-2015) on disaster reduction. It also emphasises the importance of good governance at the national and international levels, which will assist in guaranteeing the Sustainable Development Goals (IBSA 2003; IBSA 2005).

- ***Peace and Security***

IBSA members have stressed on the significance of the multilateral disarmament agreements. They have emphasised the use of peaceful means of nuclear technology and management of its equipment and material under appropriate safeguards (IBSA 2004). They emphasise the use of nuclear energy in energy conservation and in reducing the effects of global warming. They also share a commitment to the universalisation and ensuring a balanced, transparent and effective implementation of the Convention for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and Biological Weapons Conventions (BWC). Along with these areas of cooperation, IBSA has mentioned the need for the implementation of the 2006 Review

Conference of the United Nations Programme of Action (UN-POA) to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (IBSA 2006).

- ***Addressing the Menace of Terrorism***

IBSA has jointly recognised the threat of international terrorism that is faced by almost all the states. India has been the worst affected by terrorism among the IBSA countries. The three countries have called for collective efforts to effectively address the problem (IBSA 2004). They have also pushed for the formation of a comprehensive convention on international terrorism introduced in the Document of the World Summit 2005, in UNGA. They have also emphasised on adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter, international law and relevant international conventions such as international human rights and humanitarian and refugee instruments in addressing terrorism (IBSA 2006).

IBSAMAR, the joint naval exercises undertaken by the IBSA member countries, has gained importance in guaranteeing security on the seas and curbing the threat of piracy. As India, Brazil and South Africa have a vast range of access to the sea, they also face a threat of piracy, hampering the smooth movement of ships and cargo. There is also a great risk of advent of terrorism through the sea routes, as was observed during the 26 November 2009 terrorist attack in Mumbai, India. IBSAMAR guarantees building stronger naval ties and sharing naval information with each other. Till now, three joint naval exercises under IBSAMAR focusing on anti-air submarine warfare simulations, visit-board-search-seizure operations and anti-piracy drills have been conducted, attracting significant attention from the international media (Dikshit 2011c).

- ***Situation in the Middle East***

Addressing the situation in the Middle East and resolving a solution in the region also showcases IBSA's willingness to address pressing global issues. The grouping urged the two states of Israel and Palestine to come to an immediate resumption of dialogue on the basis of the relevant UNSC resolutions, the Arab League Peace Initiative and the Quartet (the US-Russia-UN-EU) roadmap, to be monitored by the UNSC. They also shared their support to the settlement plan as postulated by UNSC Resolution 1397 of two sovereign states between Israel and Palestine to live side by side within the parameters of recognised

and secured borders and also expressed their support to accord observer state status to Palestine in the United Nations (IBSA 2004, 2012).

IBSA members have also raised a concern over the situation in Iraq. They have stressed maintaining unity and integrity of the country and urged a speedy restoration of security and stability. They have supported the transfer of full sovereignty to the people of Iraq (IBSA 2004). IBSA has also urged speedy resolution of conflict and setting up a peace mechanism in conflict-affected states such as Afghanistan, Sudan, Guinea-Bissau and Haiti (Dikshit 2011c). IBSA in its ministerial meeting held in 2011 also committed itself to support both Sudan and South Sudan, enabling them to avail the benefits of reconstruction and development through the IBSA Trust Fund (IBSA 2011c).

IBSA's role in initially handling the Syria crisis was an example of its interest in the global issues demanding pressing attention. It sent a delegation to Damascus in August 2011, to interact with the Syrian leadership and stressed on resolving the crisis through peaceful means and dialogue between all the stakeholders.¹² IBSA members also abstained on the UN resolution on Syria proposed by UN members led by the US, which led to the US staging its first-ever walkout from the UNSC. This was a minor victory to IBSA, which emphasised on maintaining the sovereignty and integrity of an independent state and insisted on using peaceful means of conflict resolution¹³ (Iyer 2011: 2). With the growing tensions in Syria, IBSA leaders in their Pretoria summit (2011) decided to send another delegation to Syria to engage in talks with the different parties concerned and avert the West's insistence on imposing Libya-type solutions (Dikshit 2011a).

- *Trade*

IBSA member countries share optimism for enhanced trade relations between themselves. According to Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, "the emergence of such a large

¹² The IBSA delegation organised a special meeting with the Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad and Finance Minister Walid Al-Moualem in Damascus, where the President reassured the delegation of establishing a multi-party democracy and undertaking a revision of the constitution (IBSA 2011d).

¹³ The Pretoria declaration asserted an inclusive, transparent and peaceful solution to resolve the Syria crisis. Rejecting the proposal to send troops to the country, it insisted on protecting the civilian population and culture and rich heritage of the country (IBSA 2011).

economic space would place India, Brazil and South Africa in a better position to face the North in a creative and competitive way” (Varadarajan 2007).

After IBSA’s formation, the trade ties between the three countries have improved greatly.¹⁴ Between 2001 and 2005 trade relations between India and the MERCOSUR¹⁵ region developed from less than \$1 billion to \$3 billion; and India’s trade relations with South Africa grew by 133 per cent from \$1.3 billion to \$3.1 billion (Seligman 2006). IBSA member countries initiated various steps to improve the trade relations, which focused primarily on reducing the non-tariff barriers between them. They also agreed to formulate a common action plan, which would address issues such as regulation. Sector-specific seminars and workshops were also organised focusing on the technical regulations and conformity assessment and to identify the possibilities of harmonising standards to facilitate trade. IBSA states have planned to introduce customs cooperation. They also envisage cooperation and sharing of expertise and experiences in the field of energy, agriculture and food processing, gem and jewellery, tourism, entertainment and animation industry. The financial sector and banking are the other prime categories. The three states also share complementarities in the areas of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) sector and micro-enterprises.

IBSA sees much of the trade prospects in the areas of technology and automobiles, as the three countries can complement each other’s expertise. For example, Brazil adopted a three-year pilot project of export and import of cars and spare parts from South Africa. South Africa has expertise in the area of luxury automobiles. MERCOSUR specialises in the production of compact cars. India can benefit from the bio-diesel technology from Brazil and South Africa can explore the solar and wind-energy producing techniques from India (Seligman 2006). One of IBSA’s fine achievements could be the signing of a PTA¹⁶

¹⁴ According to Vizentini Paulo from the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, “The trade relations of Brazil with India and South Africa improved because of the undeclared halt in the planned Free Trade Areas of Americas (FTAA) with the US. This was led due to the shifting of attention of the state ministry from trade relations to security aspects, mainly caused owing to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the US World Trade Center” (Seligman 2006).

¹⁵ MERCOSUR was formed in 1991 and became a Customs Union in 1995. It comprises Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay. Chile and Bolivia hold associate membership. Venezuela has expressed an interest in joining as associate member. MERCOSUR is a third-largest integrated market after EU and NAFTA.

¹⁶ Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) is a limited FTA, where partner countries reduce or eliminate import duties on a maximum number of products.

between MERCOSUR and India and MERCOSUR and SACU,¹⁷ which will help in the formation of a Trilateral Trade Agreement (TTA) among these three parties.

By 2011 *inter se* IBSA member countries reached US \$20 billion, the target set for 2012. IBSA has proposed a plan to improve the trade relations by addressing the main issues such as transport, and air and maritime connectivity. Proposals for direct flights have also been put forth, which would be conducive to promoting tourism and for business travel. A good potential is also foreseen in the service sector, which accounts for 50 per cent of GDP in all the three countries (RIS Policy Briefs 2006: 2). To enhance trade among the countries, IBSA trade ministers have also decided to set up a technical team under the IBSA's working group on trade and investment to reconcile trade data and devise a common reporting format (Dixit 2011e). In order to push demand, IBSA countries have sought to strengthen Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) and have established NAMA-11, whose two main principles are supporting flexible policies for developing countries and balance between NAMA and other areas under negotiation (IBSA 2006).

IBSA has stressed on achieving trade liberalisation, which remains one of the significant demands of the developing countries. IBSA member countries also collaborate and stress on carrying out the Doha Development Program. IBSA countries along with other developing countries have been successful in the rounds of negotiations that focused on the reversal of protectionist policies and trade-distorting practices. This was carried out by insisting on improving the rules of the multilateral trade system. IBSA has also demanded a reliable, predictable, rule-based and transparent international trading system in order to assist the developing countries in meeting the challenging fluctuations in global prices of commodities. This will also enhance the export of goods and services of their competitive advantage (IBSA 2003).

- ***Media***

Towards furthering the relations between the three countries, the IBSA Academic Forum, held in 2006, suggested the establishment of a common media house which will share news

¹⁷ SACU, the South African Customs Union, comprises South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana and Namibia as its members.

and important information aiming at the IBSA countries. It was agreed that in spite of a lot of commonalities there is a lack of information which will reduce the barrier of interaction among them.

- ***Partnership with Africa***

In addition to trilateral cooperation, IBSA has agreed to assist the African region in its developmental programmes and to adopt practical and concrete measures of supporting the implementation of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). It also aims "to explore opportunities for trilateral cooperation and promote trade, investment, science and technology exchanges, and in the fields of energy, ICT, agriculture, bio-technology, health, tourism and education in support of the African agenda" (IBSA 2005).

- ***Partnership with Latin America***

IBSA also aims to draw closer to the region of Latin America and Caribbean. It has recognised the significance of the creation of the South American Community of Nations (CASA) (IBSA 2005).

IBSA Trust Fund

IBSA Trust Fund is one of the most significant contributions of the grouping. The fund has been acknowledged as a pioneering instrument to further South-South cooperation. In the IBSA Trust Fund each country makes a minimum contribution of US\$1 million per year to UNDP to carry out the IBSA projects. The monetary contribution from the three states has given the grouping a necessary international recognition and leverage. The funds demonstrate IBSA's contribution in addressing the pressing needs of the developing countries and Least Developing Countries (LDCs) from the three regions that the IBSA countries represent. This IBSA contribution has been accredited as an example of niche diplomacy that also displays the IBSA's readiness to accept the responsibilities as aspiring powers of the Global South. According to Rathin Roy, "this initiative is much more valued as it deals with bottom-up development and SSC horizons that will transcend beyond three countries, thus constructing a new paradigm" (Osava 2010).

Commending the developmental efforts of IBSA member countries, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon remarked that “The lessons learned from the IBSA Fund and South-South partnerships in general should inform our efforts to renew the global partnership for sustainable development” (Ban Ki-moon 2015). This initiative was also acknowledged by the UNDP Administrator chair, noting that “UNDP greatly values its partnership with the IBSA Fund, which we feel makes full and appropriate use of UN department organisations to support South-South Cooperation” (Helen Clarke, UNDP Administrator, 2015). The IBSA Fund was also granted the UN South-South Partnership Award in 2006 and the Millennium Development Award for its efforts in addressing sustainable development goals (IBSA 2006a).

The IBSA Fund was established in 2004 and became operational in 2006. It has made a total contribution of US\$31 million. The fund is managed by a Board of Directors, Ambassadors and Permanent Representative and Deputy Permanent Representatives of IBSA member countries to the UN in New York. The projects are first approved by the Board of Directors, which further goes through open budgeting of UNDP’s Atlas System. Selection of the projects is undertaken mainly on demand-driven basis. The proposals are submitted by the Focal Points to UNDP’s UN Office for South-South Cooperation taking charge as a fund manager and Board of Directors Secretariat.

A distinct feature of the fund is its choice of delivery of projects to the neediest LDCs and the developing countries. IBSA member countries have also agreed to exchange and share their knowledge and experience in advancing developments in the countries that lack the facilities. The funds primarily focus on guaranteeing SDGs by preferring projects that are replicable and scalable (Puri and Kumar 2007: 469). The Fund tries to cover around 17 SDGs in the LDCs mainly focusing on poverty and hunger eradication, guaranteeing education, gender equality, child and maternal health, HIV/AIDS prevention and care, environmental sustainability, and global partnership, which are executed through partnership with UNDP, national institutes and local governments. Table 3.1 presents the budget allocations of the IBSA Fund by geographic regions. Fig. 3.1 presents the figures for sectoral allocations. Table 3.2 presents details of the projects undertaken by the IBSA Trust Fund.

Table 3.1. Budget allocation of IBSA Fund by geographic region

Region	Africa	Latin America and Caribbean	Arab States	Asia	Global	Least Developed Countries (LDCs)	Other Developing Countries
Budget allocation	28.9%	25.7%	23.7%	21.0%	0.6%	59.2%	40.8%

Source: IBSA Fund.

Table 3.2. Projects undertaken by IBSA Trust Fund

Country	Project
Cambodia	Empowering children and adolescents with special needs and their families
Cape Verde	Project I – Delivering safe drinking water Project II – Building of health centres
Guinea-Bissau	Project I – Development of agriculture and small animal herding Project II – Agricultural development and services to rural communities Project III – Rural electrification through solar energy systems Project IV – Support for low-land rehabilitation and for agricultural and livestock processing
Sierra Leone	Leadership development and capacity building for human development and poverty reduction
Lao People’s Democratic Republic	Support to integrated agriculture in two districts in Bolikhamxay
State of Palestine	Supporting programme opportunity in recreation and team sports Gaza–Project II – Rehabilitation of the cultural and hospital centre Nablus–Project III – Construction and equipping of a centre for persons with severe intellectual disabilities
Sudan	Creation of job opportunities for youth in Sudan through labour intensive work opportunities
Haiti	Project I – Promote the socio-economic integration of vulnerable children and youth Project II – Collection of solid waste as a tool to reduce violence
Timor-Leste	Conservation of agriculture, permaculture and sustainable fisheries management
Vietnam	An innovative learning approach for health

Source: IBSA Trust Fund.

India's Interest, Role and Strategies in IBSA

It is easy to see that India has a keen interest in IBSA. India has been very active in the formation of the grouping and has participated in all its summits and working group activities. India appoints a special Sherpa (diplomatic personnel) to handle its activities regarding IBSA, thus connoting its interests in the activities of the grouping. Highlighting the significance of the grouping, India's then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh described the grouping as "a unique model of transnational cooperation based on a common political identity. The three countries come from three different continents but share similar world views and aspirations" (Government of India 2007). It is these similar identities and sharing of ideologies that binds the grouping together and has attracted India's participation. The then Indian Labour Minister Mallikarjun Kharge highlighted that "the unique framework of the IBSA forum which focuses on democracy, pluralism, tolerance, and multiculturalism has drawn India's participation in the grouping that not only deals with government-to-government interaction but deeply engages with the people from the three countries" (Government of India 2012c).

India has stressed IBSA's unique identity and insisted on retaining its individuality and not to merge with other groupings such as BRICS or expand the grouping with non-democratic governments. India attaches special importance to IBSA, where it would not face competition and discrepancy with China's growing economic and political influence. This is also evident from the statements of then Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stressing the importance of IBSA countries' unique identity. He said that IBSA's outreach was one of the important items on its agenda (Singh 2011).

India was host to the third IBSA summit in New Delhi in 2008. The summit was held against the backdrop of the global financial crisis of 2008, which further stressed the arrival of the emerging countries and their importance in creating stability in world affairs (Stuenkel 2015). The summit stressed on making the structure of global governance more democratic and representative by inclusion of the developing countries in the global decision-making role. It also demanded global efforts to achieve the MDGs and gave a call to increase ODA support to realise its commitments towards global partnership. It reiterated the importance of South-South trade and its support to the Global System of Trade

Preferences (GSTP) and also affirmed its commitment to strengthen North-South trade relations.

IBSA also agreed to coordinate its positions on Financing for Development at the Monterrey Review Conference, which was held in Doha 2008. The summit committed itself to achieve the goals set in the previous meeting in the areas of human rights and gender equality, intellectual property rights, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and assuring food security (IBSA 2008). IBSA also witnessed the introduction of the first IBSA film festival as an attempt to bridge the cultural affinity amongst the three countries. In 2013, India also hosted the tenth meeting of the IBSA Working Group on Trade and Investment (WGTI) in New Delhi.

India's Objectives and role in IBSA Sectoral Cooperation

India's participation in IBSA is mainly based on its economic advancement and in the context of the changing political power structure in the Asian region. IBSA's international features provide India an opportunity to push for its regional and global ambitions.

India seeks to deepen its economic and political relations with both Brazil and South Africa. IBSA has helped in this. The grouping provides wide avenues of cooperation that were hitherto unexplored. The collaboration brings India close to the vast regions of Latin America and Africa, which can help it to benefit from the vast natural resources in these regions, take advantage of the technological advances and innovations, and also benefit from the advantage from the new vast markets to trade. Brazil and South Africa possess a good trading potential. IBSA can assist to make inroads where India can benefit from the immense energy and resource availability and a market to explore (Antkiewicz and Cooper 2011: 305). Along with trade relations, IBSA forms an important tool to push for India's global goals.

India's presence in IBSA has provided a positive contribution in addressing sectoral goals. Brazil and South Africa look up to India to provide technological support. India has been an active agent in initiating developmental assistance in the form of the IBSA Trust Fund. India agreed to initiate the spadework of the IBSA satellite that will provide all-weather

information with regard to space and ocean that will assist in agricultural activities in the three and other developing countries (Dikshit 2011b).

India has made the Palestine issue one of the prime concerns of IBSA discussions. IBSA has been vocal in extending India's support to the infrastructure development of the state. IBSA's contribution to the construction of the Ramallah sports stadium is considered as extension of India's policy towards development and infrastructure building in Palestine. It delivers full support to the cause of the state of Palestine and demand for its peaceful solution. In 1975, India was the first non-Arab state to officially recognise the Palestine Liberation Organisation and also rendered full diplomatic recognition to its office in New Delhi. It recognised the state of Palestine in 1988 and backed the steadfast membership of Palestine in the United Nations, along with its support for the Palestinian People's struggle for the inclusion of Palestine with East Jerusalem as the capital, in accord with UN resolutions, the Arab Peace Initiative and Quartet roadmap (MEA 2012). IBSA assistance in infrastructure development matches with the programme of funding of food to the schools undertaken by the Indian government. Both these programmes are acknowledged by the international community and by the international community (*The Hindu* 2011).

With regard to non-intervention, India has recognised the principle of "Responsibility While Protecting" (RWP), a principle adduced by Brazil. This was propagated as a response to the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P), which was adopted by the Western countries in their actions in countering the turmoil in Libya. RWP addresses the misuse to human rights and a defence of sovereignty stressing non-interventionism. It stresses on realising the responsibilities towards citizens that the R2P did not adhere to while justifying the intervention (Kurtz-Phelan 2013).

India's experiences in handling of IPRs and managing pharmaceuticals issues have been of help to Brazil and South Africa. According to Lal,

India's experience in building a competitive pharmaceuticals industry provides ample opportunities to Brazil and South Africa to enter in this sector. India has stressed on initiating a stronger link for developing a focus on neglected diseases that affects the countries from the Global South. The grouping together has agreed to modernise and innovate new

models leading to fuller development of production of medicines and easy marketing of these products. India has shared a special concern and aims to shift the focus to providing the drugs to the very neglected diseases such as African Trypanosomiasis, leishmaniasis and chagas diseases (Lal 2009).

This stand of the grouping of procuring important medicines to neglected diseases, which was initiated by India, was acknowledged by the small-income countries especially from Africa. The initiation of showcasing the concern for the basic needs of the LDCs also showcases IBSA's willingness in handling the pressing needs of the countries in their region. Lal claims that to achieve these goals, IBSA can operationalise by adopting the techniques of India's R&D in infrastructure done under the public sector and initiating a public-private partnership to lead in production that can initiate the creation of the production development model.

India leads the IBSA countries' cooperation with regard to sharing of strategies to utilise health-related TRIPS flexibilities, that includes compulsory licensing and Bolar provisions, assist in information sharing in selected critical areas, particularly with regard to drug prices, sources of low-cost drugs, co-effectiveness analysis of new drugs and training programmes that develop capacity in local production. This was evident in the negotiations led by the joint collaboration of the three countries at the WTO-led Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property. They have been successful in consistently opposing the granting of patents to key AIDS medicine such as Tenofovir (Lal 2009).

India also signed the Tripartite IBSA Declaration of Labour Ministers and the Declaration of Intent which will further the Decent Work Agenda that covers the labour law concerning the developing and low-income countries. India has also expressed similar views with the ILO Declaration on social justice for a fair globalisation and global jobs which will benefit all the countries from the South.

India has also emphasised the need for more comprehensive social policies and to address existing gaps. According to Lal and Soares, IBSA seeks scope to better integrate and expand the employment and social transfer dimension of its member countries' social development strategies. That will also lead to learning the right-based laws from each other and

entitlements to create and sustain a framework for basic social protection (Lal and Soares 2009).

IBSA as a tool to achieve India's Global Interests

IBSA's global orientation along with focusing on the regional and bilateral interactions gives India an opportunity to raise several international concerns. The grouping has enabled India to collectively put forth the issues affecting the global South and also to imprint its presence in the international decision-making process. Through IBSA, India has also developed a newly revised partnership with Brazil and South Africa and aims to explore different areas of cooperation benefiting the three countries and their overall regions.

- ***Restructuring of the UNSC***

IBSA forms a special alliance to demand reforms in the UNSC. India has asserted its claim to the inner circle of the powerful five that enjoys the veto power. It focuses on this claim which is based on the geopolitical realities. The trio has achieved various successes in joint collaboration. The vote convergence between the IBSA countries was nearly 96 per cent, showcasing a strong political coordination (White 2009: 4).

- ***Cooperation in WTO Negotiations***

India has been a frontrunner in asserting a functional leadership of IBSA in the international financial institutions, which are dominated by the developed countries. The IBSA coalition has been leading the G20 club of the developing countries at the Doha Development rounds. It has been vocal in demanding global market conditions favourable to the developing countries that will provide comparative advantages in agriculture, industry and service. IBSA has demanded the elimination of the protective measures and high non-tariff barriers posed by the developed states. India has also been demanding reforms in the IMF quota system to represent the emerging economies and also demanded a restructuring of the selection process for the leadership of institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank to represent the changing economic and geopolitical realities and not be dominated by the developed states (Flemes 2009: 404).

- ***Cooperation in Nuclear Security***

India also aims to gain maximum benefits from the IBSA in the areas of nuclear security cooperation. IBSA has showcased synergies with regard to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and have stressed the need for the development of considerate safeguards from the International Atomic Agency. India has been consistently garnering support from the two countries in its endeavour to expand the use of civilian nuclear energy. Brazil and South Africa strongly supported India in finalising the nuclear deal with the US. They have also supported India's membership in the Nuclear Suppliers' Group. This support is regarded as a shift from their principle-based approach to a pragmatic one that supports India's nuclear policy as a non-signatory of the NPT (Gupta 2008, Flandes 2009: 17).

- ***Cooperation in conventional arms trade***

Through IBSA, India has developed a new alliance in the procurement of arms. Both Brazil and South Africa have developed a strong arms industry and are the leading military powers in their respective regions.¹⁸ In the field of arms cooperation, India has strengthened its links with the two countries. India has developed access to training, exchanges, combined exercises, development, production, and marketing of defence equipment under the IBSA Plan (Annual Report MOD, 2003-2004: 184).

- ***Cooperation in Health Sector***

IBSA member countries seek to facilitate knowledge-sharing in health-related issues. As the three countries have a high number of life-threatening diseases such as AIDS/ HIV, they have been consistently demanding for universal and affordable access to essential drugs. IBSA has been a pioneer in the G21 lobby that stressed on the reduction of the negative effects of TRIPS-related pharmaceutical patents disputes for HIV medicines. According to White, this victory was further to declare the rise of the coalition of the South (White 2009).

The forum has also drawn a framework that will address the issues in the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) for all the countries to gain access to essential medicines (Lal 2009: 17). The members also seek to enhance their cooperation in innovation capabilities in the

¹⁸ Brazil's defence industry produces a wide variety of equipment, from small arms to aircraft. It also possesses a well-developed aeronautical and air defence surveillance system (Beri 2008: 820-821). South Africa has built a strong defence industrial base with an emphasis on land systems and aerospace. It is the only major arms manufacturer and arms exporter in Africa (ibid.: 820).

pharmaceutical sectors, and a licence to manufacture their own medicines in the domestic markets without the consent of the patent owners that would lead to increase in the price of the medicine (Flemes 2009: 411). India also adopts the policies of the member countries in acquiring health goals. For example,

Brazil's policy of prioritising access to healthcare in the patent process can be an important illustration of addressing healthcare goals for India and South Africa. India can advance its experience in modifying the patent models as done in South Africa. It operates on the flexibility arrangements for patents of 'non-voluntary' licences that operates through civil society and customary law (Lal 2009: 18).

- ***Cooperation in Research and Development***

IBSA cooperation provides India an opportunity to strengthen its engagements in Research and Development (R&D) and in building a stronger infrastructure within the member countries and in the region transcending IBSA. India's health sector facilities can be of major benefit to the IBSA countries. IBSA provides a new pressure group to India that addresses major issues in healthcare and (R&D) especially dealing with substandard medicines and drug counterfeits (Lal 2009: 18).

- ***Social Protection***

Through IBSA, India can closely connect with Brazil to benefit from its social schemes. In Brazil, a social policy is a constitutional right covering a BPC policy of income guarantee for the people living in extreme poverty and those who cannot work and live an independent life (Lal and Soares 2009: 5). The two policies of Bolsa Familia and BPC operated by Brazil have been successful in guaranteeing fall in inequality. South Africa also operates a social scheme based on unconditional cash transfer covering fourteen million people. India can cooperate with the two countries to develop stronger welfare schemes for the large population living under poverty (Dhar and Joseph 2009: 7).

- ***Economic Benefits***

India has engaged in trade relations with the IBSA countries and has supported the trade targets and accepted the recommendations for reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers on

imports and also to develop a mechanism to reduce the cost of doing business in the three countries (Exim Bank of India 2009: 38). India's then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had also advised the grouping to adopt a trade target of US\$15 billion by 2009 and double the same by 2015. India also aims to achieve deeper economic relations with the two countries through forming a Trilateral Trade Agreement (TTA). The Indian Prime Minister had stressed for the early conclusion of an India-SACU-MERCOSUR¹⁹ trade arrangement, bridging the economic relations between the three. India shares PTA with MERCOSUR, which was signed during President Lula's visit to India in 2011.

- ***Regional Prominence Enhanced***

India's participation in IBSA is also recognised for its regional impact. According to an UNCTAD report, IBSA's global and regional initiatives assist in the development of their respective regions. The report highlights IBSA's positive impact as a hub of South-South cooperation leading to regional developments. Many Indian academics predict that the region of South Asia can be the major beneficiary through India's experiences of engaging with developmental projects with the regions of Latin America and Africa (Puri and Kumar 2007: 474).

- ***Cooperation in Energy Sector***

India's energy sector can be immensely developed by engaging in cooperation with Brazil and South Africa, which have advanced oil and clean coal technology. There is scope to learn and explore the techniques of deep-water oil extraction from Brazil that has expertise in the area (ibid.: 475). Deeper cooperation in nuclear energy that provides clean and cheaper mode of energy can also prove a new era of engagements between the three countries.

- ***Maritime Security***

¹⁹ India's major exports to South Africa consist of vehicles and components, transport equipment, drugs and pharmaceuticals, computer software, engineering goods, dyes and intermediaries, chemicals, textiles, rice, and gems and jewellery. Imports from South Africa to India comprise of rock phosphate, precious stones, minerals, fertilisers, steel, coal, transport equipment, pulp and pulp manufacturing. India's major exports to MERCOSUR consist of processed foods, engineering goods, pharmaceuticals. India can get access to MERCOSUR products such as: organic chemicals, pharmaceuticals, essential oils, plastic, rubber products, tools and implementation, machinery items, electrical machinery and equipment.

India can benefit from extended engagements on land, sea and air security with Brazil and South Africa. India played a key role in the joint maritime exercises conducted by IBSA, which has redefined India's naval security relations both internationally and at the interregional level. The IBSAMAR exercises have created a new discourse of security in the Indian Ocean. According to Kornegay, the naval security interaction has become IBSA's second highest priority after demands on UN reforms. "By strengthening their naval ties, the three countries could potentially take the initiative in fashioning a southern oceanic security axis linking the Indian and South Atlantic oceans. This initiative could prove to be an alternative non-aligned collaboration within the context of an incipient South Atlantic-Indian Ocean security community" (Kornegay n.d).

- *Maritime and Air Connectivity*

Because of the distances involved in intra-IBSA trade, the estimated transport cost between India and Brazil amounts to around 12 per cent of the value of total trade and 10 per cent with South Africa. Indian think-tank Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS) has suggested an introduction of a common feeder structure between the three states as is done in the Mediterranean. It relies on using regional feeders and inter-island carriers as a pool with the main carriers. RIS has also suggested introduction of transshipment services that are operated through a geographically dispersed range of ports that will provide smaller destinations with access to increased regional trade. In establishing a closer air link, the launching of shared direct flights connecting Delhi-Mumbai-Johannesburg-Rio de Janeiro on a regular basis has been suggested. There is also a proposal for initiating a regime of open sky policy for national carriers to be introduced between the IBSA countries (RIS Policy Briefs 2006: 3).

IBSA has signed MOUs for a five-year action plan to enhance cooperation in the civil aviation sector and to increase connectivity and people-to-people contacts among its members. The MOUs for a five-year action plan on maritime interaction between the shipping organisation will explore the promotion of sea-borne tourism opportunities, cooperation between the maritime educational institutions, exchange of data and information on the flow of commercial goods at sea and ports, private sector cooperation in ship repair

and port handling technology and cooperation in port development and regional hinterland connectivity (Exim Bank of India 2009: 25).

IBSA has also designed a proposal for strengthening the tourism sector between the three countries. India can develop stronger ties between the state of Goa and Brazil, which share linkages, both being former Portuguese colonies and have considerable cultural and lingual connections. India and South Africa can also boost their tourism sector and cultural ties, with the presence of a large Indian diaspora in South Africa (RIS Policy Briefs 2006: 5). It is suggested to introduce a Schengen type visa²⁰ for the IBSA countries that will enable IBSA citizens to easily commute among IBSA countries by not having to apply for individual visa for each state (Exim Bank of India 2009: 23).

- ***Initiating South-South Cooperation***

India has been a major contributor in furthering the cause of South-South cooperation. India was a pioneer in initiating the NAM and G77 movements, which brought the developing countries together. However, with the economic and geopolitical changes these movements have lacked full attention and have also faced shortage of resources. IBSA is a new option for India to revive the southern coordination and assert its position and rights in the global arena. According to Ozkan, the South-South interaction was primarily focused on the development agendas of the countries from the regions of Africa and Latin America. However, India has been successful in emerging in this movement and has actively propagated the concerns of the countries from the South in the global forums (Ozkan 2010, 2006: 82).

- ***Deepening of relations with Africa and Latin America***

In its endeavour to expand its ties with African countries, India aims to explore its membership in IBSA as a launch pad to deepen its presence in the manufacturing and investments sector in Africa. India sees good trade opportunities in the resource-rich regions of Africa. India aims to benefit from the ample availability of uranium from South Africa (Dikshit 2011b). IBSA nations have also proposed for engaging in deeper African and Asian

²⁰ A Schengen visa is issued under the terms of the Schengen Agreement signed by the EU countries in 1985. It aims to facilitate free movement of persons within the EU area (Exim Bank of India 2009: 94).

partnership that will benefit both the regions. IBSA has also been a primary factor in bringing India and the region of Latin America closer (Kornegay 2017).

Challenges Facing IBSA

Although it has several complementarities and positive characteristics, IBSA is considered as an asymmetric and heterogeneous grouping with regard to territorial and demographic size as well as economic output and military capacities (FRIDE April 2007: 2). India has a population of 1.1 billion (UNDP 2011c), while Brazil's population is 192 million (IBGE 2010), and South Africa's is 47 million (UNDP 2011b). As IBSA does not share a traditional trade partnership, the trade and investment flows among the three countries have never been very significant. IBSA's South-South orientation is also seen as different from the traditional framework as it is led by the grouping, which is highly ambitious but has not been very successful in achieving its goals (White 2009). The geographical distance between India and Brazil is 9,188 miles and 5,121 miles from South Africa whereas the distance between South Africa and Brazil is 4,839 miles, which hampers communication among the three countries. IBSA countries also face language and cultural barriers, with diverse populations in all the three countries. Many analysts have doubted the emergence of IBSA and sceptics have been critical about its agenda, as the grouping was formed immediately after the global financial crisis, where major states were affected (Puri and Kumar 2007: 468).

Trade ties also remain a weak factor among the IBSA countries. Their political, economic and international interaction was historically insignificant. India-South Africa ties were formed in 1994 and South Africa and Brazil had limited trade ties since the apartheid rule. Stuenkel notes that trade ties between Brazil and India were at the lowest for quite a long time, where Brazil had strong ties with the neighbouring states and the US, whereas India was closer to the erstwhile Soviet Union and its neighbours and extended neighbourhood in engaging in trade relations (Stuenkel 2016).

IBSA member countries' identity as big regional powers has also been questioned. They are also considered to be reluctant regional leaders. Brazil and South Africa are bound with the regional bodies of MERCOSUR and African Union respectively. The existing trade barriers

between the three countries have prevented them from expansion of inter se trade. They are also close allies of the US and the EU, which is an impediment in raising the concerns of the Southern states. The three regional leaders are also criticised by the LDCs over the demand for removal of agricultural subsidies, which does not benefit the poor countries as they rely on food imports from the developed countries. The LDCs and small states hope for a bigger role from the big states in their respective regions.

IBSA is also regarded as a weaker organisation relative to BRICS. With South Africa joining BRICS, there was speculation of the merger of IBSA into BRICS, making it BRICSA. IBSA has consistently denied the notion of being an overlap of BRICS. It describes itself as a grouping of democracies from three continents and there is a difference in IBSA's accent on tackling socio-economic distress due to globalisation and setting in place a trilateral trading bloc (Dikshit 2011c).

The status of emerging economies such as Brazil and South Africa has also come under speculation as they are facing serious political instability and slow economic growth. The government in Brazil has come under charges of corruption, leading to the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff. The newly appointed Michel Temer government has also been charged with bribery cases. South Africa has also observed protest from its people over the corruption charges against the Jacob Zuma government.

India, Brazil and South Africa also have divergent positions regarding various international issues. For example, as per their regional orientations, they pursue different positions with regard to trade and tariff. Their stand on the WTO negotiations also differed where India took a very vocal position and did not adhere to bargaining whereas the stand of Brazil and South Africa was much more complex and adopted flexible bargaining approaches by balancing both the protectionist and offensive interests. These divergent positions are mainly because one-third of Brazil's commodities belong to the agricultural sector, whereas India demanded for protection against agricultural imports because 70 per cent of employment in India is located in the agricultural sector (Flemes 2009: 410). IBSA member countries' commitment to benefit from each other's expertise in trade is also doubted as no companies in these three countries will easily share their profit and technological expertise just because

the leaders of IBSA have signed a commitment to South-South cooperation solidarity (Husar 2016:14).

Conclusion

IBSA's formation as a trilateral interregional grouping comprising of countries from regions with geographical distances has set a mark in the international arena. Its very emergence after the meetings at the G8 summit was a resemblance of a rebellion move to assert the rightful place for the developing and emerging countries from the Global South. The similar identities of being democratic states with multicultural, multilingual identities have brought the countries together to formulate an interregional grouping moving beyond the regional interactions. The comment of the Brazilian President over participation in the G8 Summit as observer states and the subsequent formation of the grouping highlights the confidence the three countries share to declare their arrival in global affairs. IBSA denotes the readiness of the grouping in demanding higher recognition and a bigger role in the international forums. Through the grouping the member states aspire to form a multipolar world order that is inclusive and encompasses emerging powers (Kurtz-Phelan 2013a). Within a short period of IBSA's formation the cooperation between the three countries has strengthened. The speedy formation of a number of working groups and focal points, especially the formation of the IBSA Trust Fund and the IBSAMAR maritime exercises took the world community by surprise. Now other developing states such as China, Mexico, Indonesia, and Turkey also want to join the grouping. Many scholars have also suggested merging of IBSA with BRICS or with Japan and Germany, making it a coalition of G5 states and retaining its identity as a small but effective grouping (Flemes 2009: 17).

IBSA's identity as a mode to revive South-South cooperation has led to a new discourse in the study of the Global South. Its preference for developing states and LDCs and attempts to represent the common concerns at the UN have been noted as a novel step. IBSA's efforts in initiating a dialogue and heralding niche diplomacy with regard to the Syria crisis received good recognition. Along with initiating a close relation with each other, the grouping has raised issues of international importance especially affecting the countries from the South.

Its emphasis on democracy, developing South-South cooperation, adhering to peaceful means of resolving conflicts, and steps towards developmental projects have given IBSA an identity of a value-driven grouping (FRIDE 2007: 2). It is a different version of the existing alliances from the South such as NAM and G77. The grouping does not represent itself as a defensive coalition of states which are against the Western establishments; rather they share good relations with powers such as the US and EU.

However, IBSA has many shortcomings, which have limited its rise on the global stage. Although the three countries share many similarities which bring them together, the major challenge IBSA faces due to distance. The countries are diverse with regard to their culture and languages. They also differ on their political and security issues such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, rising population and managing employment. To make a significant mark in the international arena, IBSA will have to expand its horizons of cooperation.

The IBSA Trust Fund has got acclamation from the international organisations for it has tried to reach out to the poor nations and has been successful in bringing about a significant change in those countries. However, the funding has been done at only the basic level. The fund needs to enhance its contributions to play and demand a bigger role at the global level. The three countries are also criticised for focusing on upper (international level) issues and neglecting each other's comparative advantage and for lacking a deeper understanding of each other's national and regional politics (Ozkan 2009:12).

IBSA began its journey with great fervour but has slowed down its functioning in recent times. The three countries also share overlapping membership with other groupings such as BRICS, G20 and BASIC which also have similar objectives to achieve. In order to retain its unique identity as a grouping of Southern states with a progressive list of sectoral cooperation and working groups, IBSA has to give further momentum to its emergence. The delivery of IBSA's goals and trade pacts has been slow. There has been no progress in maintaining a good IBSA News website or setting up a joint satellite. The leaders of the three countries have not met as representing IBSA since the last summit held in Pretoria in 2011. The IBSAMAR joint naval exercises have also been stalled since 2011. However, the continuation of the IBSA fund and its projects through UNDP and meetings of the IBSA ministers on the margins of the UNGA retain IBSA as a functional grouping. The three

leaders have been meeting at different forums such as BRICS, UNGA, etc. but a separate IBSA meeting will rejuvenate the grouping, which seems to have been defunct for some time.

According to Husar (2016), Brazil and South Africa have shown more optimism about the IBSA grouping, whereas India gives more primacy to BRICS, which is considered to provide more global presence. To keep up the IBSA momentum, India should try to develop the transport linkages between the three countries. There is also a need for larger media attention and academic research, which has been reduced or shifted after the formation of BRICS, where IBSA members have an overlapping membership.

Closer IBSA interaction now can boost the discussions with customs-related issues such as means of standardising procedures regarding the tendering, importer registration, shipment, customs and port clearance, etc. (RIS, Policy Briefs 2006: 2).

Since Indian leaders insisted on the separate identity of the IBSA grouping, India has a bigger role to play in IBSA's rejuvenation. As the grouping had its last summit in 2011 in Pretoria, it is India's turn to regulate its functioning by organising a summit.

CHAPTER IV

INDIA AND BRICS

Introduction

The growing official, academic and media attention, both positive and negative, highlights BRICS as the next power to reckon with. Stuenkel claims BRICS as a defining movement that can be accentuated in the international politics of the current century (Stuenkel 2015). BRICS is also known as R-5, that stands for the combined currency of the countries, namely, Real, Rouble, Rupee, Renminbi and Rand (Chellaney 2012). The member countries mark BRICS's main goal as "to act as positive catalyst in forming an inclusive change in the transformation process that will enable in creating a new and more equitable global order" (BRICS Foreign Ministers Meeting 2014). According to Antkiewicz and Cooper, the growing economic cooperation among the BRICS countries has also led to the formation of the BRICS Model, that can be used to represent the emerging economies (Antkiewicz and Cooper 2011: 299). BRICS can be described as the hybrid form of interregional grouping, where countries sharing similar economic traits have drawn a strategy for achieving the combined objectives at the international level and cooperate to strengthen their regional-level engagements.

BRICS has consistently outlined its agenda as "not centred around any specific country or any specific country-related issues but aims to have a joint common vision that will enable the members to identify the common areas of cooperation" (BRICS Foreign Ministers Meeting 2014). However, the Western media has led a strong attack and tries to consistently devalue the grouping. Initially, the Western media and analysts described the grouping as a "mere talk shop" of emerging powers and cast doubts on its credibility in achieving sustainable results (The Independent 2015; Smith 2006: 21).

The rising power trajectories and emerging economies of the BRICS countries have enabled them to raise significant issues in international forums. BRICS members have joined together to form a strong voice and assert their position in the global system. In all BRICS summit declarations and communiqués, they have consistently stressed on

adherence to the multilateral organisations which go against the unilateral actions of any country and hinder the sovereignty and integrity of other countries.

The BRICS members have also strongly worded their opposition to unilateral practice of hostile language, sanctions, counter-sanctions, and usage of force. They stress on the adherence to the international law and principles ascribed in the UN charter for arriving at sustainable and peaceful solutions (BRICS Foreign Ministers Meeting 2014).

The five powers are also members of the G20 grouping, which has addressed the financial crisis as similarly done by the G7 countries earlier. The overt actions undertaken by BRICS showcase the rise of its member countries as political, economic and diplomatic powers which cannot be neglected in the current period (MEA 2009). Eventually, Brazil, Russia, India and China with their growing economic numbers have surpassed the G7 measure of wealth (nominal GNP) and wealth relative to purchasing power account of total 8 per cent of global GNP (Laidi 2011: 2), proving BRICS as a model to maintain economic growth and also a forum to exchange ideas in the larger political spectrum. The BRICS countries' economic growth has transformed them as the investment capital destination. Their large population size and growing consumer demand also makes these countries promising markets for finished goods (BTTC 2015: 9). Along with the improvements in BRICS economies, the flux observed among the major economies of the world provides an opportunity for these countries to rebalance the economic trajectories in their favour.

BRICS highlights its potential in intensive economic cooperation, which is described as non-confrontational and inclusive of not only the BRICS members but also to enhancing cooperation with non-BRICS countries, especially the emerging, developing countries and the international and regional organisations. Goldman Sachs also highlights that BRICS will be a major boost to the Asian region, as three of the BRICS countries come from the Asian continent. According to the report, this will eventually boost in economically sustaining the regional neighbours by providing growth opportunities (Wilson and Purushothaman 2003: 17).

BRICS has been significantly asserting its arrival on the international stage. The five powers have been accepting proposals and winning bids at organising big international events such as World Expo, which was held in Shanghai 2010, the Commonwealth Games, which were successfully organised in New Delhi in 2010, and the World Student Games, which were held in Kazan in 2013. Russia organised the Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games in Sochi in 2014. Brazil was the key host of the FIFA World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic and Paralympic Games in Rio de Janeiro in 2016.

The role of the BRICS leadership has been a prominent factor in its evolution and development of the grouping from an idea into a comprehensive partnership of like-minded countries. Heads of state such as Russian President Putin, Chinese Premier Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping, Brazilian counterparts Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff to current President Michel Temer to South African leader Jacob Zuma and Thabo Mbeki, with Indian leaders such as Manmohan Singh and Narendra Modi, all represent a strong and assertive arrival of the emerging economies from the Global South. They all have played a pioneering role in placing BRICS as a significant coalition in the gamut of interregional groupings. All the leaders have considered BRICS as an important facet of their foreign policy. President Putin describes BRICS as “one of the foreign policy priorities of Russia and considers it as a medium- and long-term goals in consolidating BRICS as a key part of global governance in the political, legal, financial and economic spheres” (Kremlin 2013). Chinese Premier Xi Jinping has claimed that “strengthening relationship with the BRICS countries is important to ensure peace and development in the world” (Xinhua 2013).

India’s post-liberalisation policies, leading to growing economic credentials and a stable polity, have been the most important factors in its successful inclusion in BRICS. This chapter tries to trace the overall inception of BRICS. It discusses in detail BRICS’s genesis, various objectives and declarations signed during the various summits. The second section highlights India’s presence in the grouping. Noting India’s important initiatives in the two summits it hosted in 2012 and 2016, the chapter highlights the major aspects of the speeches of leaders and other officials, and inputs from media reports, seeking to analyse India’s aspirations and reasons for joining the grouping. Along with

organising the annual heads of state meetings, India has also been active in conducting Track-I, Track-II and Track-III level dialogues. By tracking down these major engagements, the chapter attempts to analyse India's role in BRICS's major objectives of creating a multipolar world order, constituting reforms in the global institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and the UNSC and its role in introducing and carrying out the operations of the New Development Bank (NDB).

Genesis of BRICS

Jim O'Neill in the Global Economics Paper of Goldman Sachs projected the arrival of the BRICS countries in the global economy and introduced the acronym BRIC in 2001, that represents the emerging economies, namely Brazil, Russia, India and China (South Africa was later added by the members in 2010). In the paper, titled "Building Better Global Economic BRICs", O'Neill projected the BRICS countries to have a significant impact on the global economy. Together, the BRICS countries account for about 40 per cent of the global population, 30 per cent of the total land mass, and a rising share in GDP in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, which increased to 25 per cent in 2010 (O'Neill 2011).

BRICS was initially envisioned as an economic model that would create an alternative in the world's finance structure based on the growing GDPs of its member countries. Eventually, BRICS members broadened the scope and objectives of the grouping to more issues of international importance that also had relevance to the emerging powers of the Global South. BRICS stressed on enhancing cooperation among its member countries, namely in economic, political and cultural sectors. BRICS was popularised after the publication of Goldman Sachs's second report in 2003 titled "Dreaming with the BRICs: The Path to 2050", declaring it as both an economic and political entity to reckon with. The paper predicted the BRIC's potential to be larger than that of the G6 economies in US dollar terms and would reach half the figures of the G6 economies by 2025. The paper also suggested that the relative shift in the G6 economies would grow steadily with dramatic changes in the first 30 years, slow down the economies significantly. Their individual economic capacity would be much lower on average compared to an individual of G6 countries. The projection also highlighted that the increasing growth rate

in BRIC countries might lead to higher returns and rise in the demand for capital, which would eventually improve the investment opportunities and also in major currency realignments (Wilson and Purushothaman 2003).

With the inclusion of South Africa, BRIC attained a comprehensive characteristic by adding the region of Africa, which is relatively less represented at the global arena, making Goldman Sachs to declare the first ten years of the current century as “BRICS Decade” (Wilson 2010). Although South Africa possesses the largest economy in Africa and a population of fewer than 50 million, its GDP is far lower than the other BRICS countries (Flemes 2010). BRICS initiated an economic treatise especially stressing on the macroeconomic sections that has gained much prominence since 2012, as the member countries had a total \$15 trillion of GDP and the countries did not fall far behind the United States in terms of the official exchange rates in 2012 (Marino 2014: 3).

According to another Goldman Sachs report, the growth of the BRICS economies would surpass many of the developed countries’ economic stature. For instance, the forecast highlights that China’s economy would reach its zenith in the coming years and surpass the US economy. India’s economy will also rise sustainably and can be seen at the second position in the whole gamut of the economic standing of the countries. Brazil and Russia too will be leading economies that will pose serious competition to the economies of Japan and Germany by the year 2050 (O’Neill 2003). Goldman Sachs strongly presses for a change in the relative standing of the global economic players and has called for the inclusion of Brazil, Russia, India and China into the G8 grouping where Russia is part of the G7/8 since 1997, as the next major grouping (O’Neill 2001). BRICS countries were, however, recognised and included in G20, which was a major grouping formed to represent and address the financial crisis of 2008 (Jing Gu et al. 2016).

On the tenth anniversary of BIRCS’s formation, O’Neill pronounced that BRICS was a fallout of the 2008 credit crisis, these countries being directly affected by the crisis and their equity markets fell more than the developed countries. O’Neill claimed that “even after ten years I am even more eager to convince the world that they along with some other rising stars are the growing engines of the world economy, today and in the future” (O’Neill 2011).

Along with the economic trajectories there are geopolitical reasons for BRICS's establishment. It was with the formation and meetings of the RIC (Russia-India-China) countries that the idea for expansion and formation of a bigger grouping was initialised by Russian President Putin and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. RIC met regularly on the margins of the UNGA since 2003, and joint meetings of its foreign ministers were held since 2005. The BRIC idea was initiated during 2006, where Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim was invited at an informal lunch of the RIC foreign ministers in New York. Two more meetings of the foreign ministers of the BRIC countries were conducted in 2006 and 2007 on the margins of the UNGA meetings in New York (Jing Gu et al. 2016).

Table 4.1. BRICS Countries' GDP Growth Rate

	Average 1995- 2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Brazil	2.5	3.2	4.0	6.1	5.2	-0.3	7.5	2.7	0.9
Russia	2.8	6.4	8.2	8.5	5.2	-7.8	4.5	4.3	3.4
India	6.1	9.0	9.4	10.1	6.2	5.0	11.2	7.7	4.0
China	9.2	11.3	12.7	14.2	9.6	9.2	10.4	9.3	7.8
South Africa	3.1	5.3	5.6	5.5	3.6	-1.5	3.1	3.5	2.5

Source: World Economic Outlook, IMF (2011).

According to a joint report working towards strengthening BRICS's synergies,

in the aftermath period of the global financial deceleration and passive reactions of the established powers like the United States and the European Union, this would be the best time for the BRICS countries to forge a grouping of the sustainable emerging powers and play a leading role in recovering the global economic system (The BRICS Report 2012).

The improvements in the BRICS countries' economies have provided an upward growth in the areas of production, services and also in provision of market for finished goods. The ability to reduce poverty through employment generation and social inclusion has positively contributed in achieving the Millennium Development Goals (BTTC 2015).

Overview of BRICS Countries

BRICS countries share different political setups, reform endeavours and governance systems. China has a socialist Marxist political system. India is a democratic republic with a parliamentary system similar to that of UK. Russia and Brazil have a federal presidential republic while Russia has an authoritarian government. South Africa established democracy after the demolition of apartheid in 1994.

The BRICS countries enjoy a big share of land mass that also encompasses enormous a huge amount of natural resources. Russia's endowment of oil, natural gas and minerals

accounts for 20 per cent of the world total. Brazil is well known for its rich resources of bio-fuels, soybeans, crude oil and also products like sugarcane, iron ore and coffee. China shares about 12 per cent of the total mineral resources in the world. India also has a big land mass with rich natural resources such as coal, iron ore and other minerals. It is also rising as a strong service provider and a manufacturing destination along with China. South Africa's rich mineral base has been an attraction for rising trade transactions among the BRICS countries. By producing the world's largest share of manganese, platinum, chromium, vanadium and alumina silicates, it also provides the fourth-largest power generation with cheapest electricity in the world (The BRICS Report 2012).

China and India have the highest savings and investment rates, along with the huge middle class. Like Brazil, India has a much-sought-after demographic dividend, with more than 65 per cent of its population below 35 years of age. Brazil and India have promoted themselves from major net food importers to exporters of food grains and products (Wilson and Purushothaman 2003; The BRICS Report 9-11, 2012).

Table 4.2. Overview of BRICS 2010

	GDP in PPP		GDP (US \$ billion)		Share in World GDP (%)		Per Capita GDP (US\$)	
	Rank in World	GDP	1990	2010	1990	2010	1990	2010
Brazil	8	2,172	508	2,090	3.3	2.9	3,464	10,816
Russia	6	2,223	–	1,465	–	3.0	–	10,437
India	4	4,060	326	1,538	3.1	5.4	378	1,265
China	2	10,086	390	5,878	3.9	13.6	341	4,382
South Africa	26	524	112	357	0.9	0.7	5,456	7,158

Source: IMF Database.

Table 4.3. BRICS Countries' Rank on Global Competitiveness Index (GCI), 2010-2011

Country	GCI	Infrastructure	Macroeconomic Environment	Higher Education and Training	Market Size	Business Sophistication	Innovation
Brazil	58	62	111	58	10	31	42
Russia	63	47	79	50	8	101	57
India	51	86	73	85	4	44	39
China	27	50	4	60	2	41	26
South Africa	54	63	43	75	25	38	44

Source: Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011, World Economic Forum.

According to a BRICS report,

the BRICS countries follow essentially capitalist economies and are fast industrializing countries. Due to their growing economic credentials, the BRICS countries recovered faster from the financial crisis of 2008 compared to the advanced and the other emerging economies (EMEs). Known for their exports of natural resources, the BRICS countries have also surpassed as a major exporter of manufactured goods. There is a growth in the service sector of these countries (The BRICS Report 2012).

Table 4.4. BRICS Countries' Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP), 1960-2015

Country	1960	2015
Brazil	7.1	13.0
Russia	NA	29.5
India	4.4	19.9
China	4.3	22.1
South Africa	30.6	30.7

Source: World Bank.

In relation to the BRICS countries' growing GDP rates, their Human Development Index (HDI) figures are relatively lower to that of the developed countries. The BRICS

countries have to improve the overall development of their people covering literacy rates, mortality, National Poverty Line, life expectancy, and inequality measures. In the latest HDI report 2015, Russia, Brazil and China are the only two countries that come under High Human Development, whereas India and South Africa fall in the Medium Human Development category (Human Development Report 2015).

Table 4.5. Relative Human Development Index (HDI) of BRICS Countries, 2015

Country	Ranking	HDI Value	Life Expectancy at birth	Expected Years of Schooling	Mean Years of Schooling	Gross National Per Capita
Brazil	75	0.755	74.5	15.2	7.7	15,175
Russia	50	0.798	70.1	14.7	12.0	22,352
India	130	0.609	68.0	11.7	5.4	5,497
China	90	0.727	75.8	13.1	7.5	12,547
South Africa	116	0.666	73.0	12.3	6.5	12,122
US	8	0.915	79.1	16.5	12.9	52,947
Developing Countries		0.660	57.4	13.6	9.9	9,071

Source: UNDP.

BRICS Summits, Objectives and Summit Declarations

BRIC Finance Ministers met in 2006 on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York. The major points of discussion were to study the possibility of establishing an interregional grouping of the four countries. The Foreign Ministers again met on the sidelines of the UNGA in 2007 and 2008. The first formal meeting BRIC meeting attended by the foreign ministers was held in Yekaterinburg, Russia in 2008.

BRICS has had a total of eight summits, as follows: Yekaterinburg, Russia (2009); Brasilia (2010); Sanya, China (2011); New Delhi (2012); Durban (2013), Fortaleza, Brazil (2014), Ufa, Russia (2015), and Goa (2016). The country hosting the summit also conducts around thirty different meetings of cooperation in various sectors.

First BRIC summit: The summit declaration stated that “the emerging and developing economies must have greater voice and representation in international financial institutions and their heads and senior leadership should be appointed through an open, transparent, and merit based selection process”.

Second summit: BRIC pressed the need for a stable and predictable currency system.

Third summit: The summit theme was “Broad Vision, Shared Prosperity”. The Summit was significant for the induction of South Africa in the grouping.

Fourth summit: The summit theme was “BRICS Partnership for Global Stability, Security, and Prosperity”.

Fifth summit: The summit theme was “BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration and Industrialisation”.

Sixth summit: The summit theme was “Inclusive Growth: Sustainable Solutions”. With the goal of making BRICS an open group and enhance engagements with other emerging economies and developing countries from their respective regions, BRICS invited the leaders of the South American Nations representing the Union of South African Nations (UNASUR).

Seventh summit: The summit theme was “BRICS Partnership – a Powerful Factor of Global Development”. This summit conducted a joint engagement with the heads of state and government of the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union and SCO and observer states of SCO.

Eighth summit: This summit invited BIMSTEC to participate in its outreach programme. This was the first time a summit venue was shifted from New Delhi to other parts of the country to give it a more comprehensive character. The Goa Declaration was a comprehensive document comprising of total 109 paragraphs and a detailed Action Plan. There were many new initiatives and areas of further cooperation envisaged to further institutionalise the group.

Along with the annual summit meetings, the summit host state arranges meetings of ministers and officials on cooperation in various sectors. Since the fourth summit, BRICS Foreign Ministers have annually met on the margins of UNGA meetings to discuss and highlight major common concerns in the international arena. There has also been a regular joint meeting of the Finance Ministers and Governors of Central Banks on the margins of the G20 summits and IMF/WB. BRICS has also agreed to engage and have meetings of the ministers and officials in joint consultation at the permanent missions and embassies based in New York, Geneva, Vienna, Rome, Paris, Washington, and Nairobi. The group has appointed a Sherpa and Sous-Sherpa to manage and represent the working of the BRICS functioning. There have also been regular mid-term meetings.

BRICS tries to broaden its economic engagements by organising cooperation in various sectors such as meetings of the Board of Governors of the NDB, Labour and Employment Ministers, Trade Ministers, meetings of Cooperatives, Development Banks, Finance Ministers and Governors of Central Banks, Heads of National Statistics Institutions, competition authorities, customs issues, expert dialogue on e-commerce, heads of delegations to Finance Action Task Force (FATF), heads of tax authorities, BRICS senior officials of International Development Assistance and authorities responsible for the modernisation of the Treasury system of BRICS countries.

There have been regular meetings of Foreign Ministers, National Security Advisors and a meeting of the high representatives on the security issues of BRICS countries. BRICS has extended cooperation in global governance and sustainable development with regular meetings of the BRICS ministers of education, health, environment, social security, population matters, anti-drug experts, anti-corruption, and environment issues. There have been meetings regarding agriculture and agrarian development, exchange programmes for magistrates and judges, meeting of experts on combating trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, consultations on the security of outer space activities, meetings of ministers of culture, ministers of youth affairs, ministers of telecommunications, ministers of energy and energy efficiency, heads of national agencies responsible for disaster management, authorities responsible for legal

cooperation and international law, and conference on the modernisation of the Treasury Systems of the BRICS countries.

BRICS has developed working groups to engage in deeper level of sectoral cooperation among the member countries. These include the working group of agriculture and agrarian development, BRICS Friendship Cities and Local Governments Cooperation Forum, BRICS Multilateral Contingent Reserve Arrangement, Strategy of BRICS Economic Partnership, BRICS Parliamentary Forum, BRICS Think Tank Council (BTTC), BRICS Business Council, BRICS Academic Forum, BRICS Urbanisation Forum, working group on ICT Cooperation and Securities in ICTs, Education, Energy, BRICS Youth Summit, BRICS Business Council, Financial Forum, BRICS Young Diplomats Forum, BRICS Global Universities Summit, BRICS Universities League, BRICS Young Scientist Forum, and International Forum of Young Journalists, Bloggers and Photo Reporters.

BRICS has also envisioned to formulate a BRICS-UNESCO Group to develop common strategies among the BRICS countries (BRICS Third Summit 2011), consultations on the margins of relevant environment- and climate-change-related international fora, and a multilateral framework on energy cooperation among the BRICS countries. It has set up a BRICS Youth Policy Dialogue and sought to promote cooperation in population-related issues (BRICS Fourth Summit 2012). The fifth summit sought to advance cooperation in Public Diplomacy Forum, Anti-Corruption Forum, and cooperation in BRICS state-owned companies and enterprises. It set up a BRICS Virtual Secretariat and sought to promote cooperation in tourism, energy, sport and mega-sport events. The sixth summit accorded mutual recognition of higher education degrees and diplomas and sought to promote Foreign Policy Planning Dialogue, and Insurance and re-insurance. The seventh summit set up a BRICS Dialogue on Peacekeeping and BRICS Council of Regions.

Intra-BRICS Cooperation

BRICS highlights the consistently changing nature of the world order and highlights the need for recognition of these changes in its communiqués and joint declarations. In order to bring sustainable solutions in recovering from the global economic crisis, BRICS seeks

structural reforms to ensure economic growth and minimise creating excessive global liquidity.

BRICS has been vocal in raising a strong voice against the discriminatory and domineering attitude of the Western countries. Brazil under President Dilma Rousseff's government raised serious concerns of electronic espionage by the US National Spy Agency (NSA), which was revealed by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden. This was strongly condemned and raised at the UNGA as a serious breach of the international law in collecting personal information of the citizen, including tapping of phones. These concerns were equally shared by other BRICS members in the meeting held on the margins of the G20 meeting of the BRICS countries, and these activities were highlighted as an act comparable to terrorism (Reuters 2013).

Along with IBSA, BRICS has been vocal and has led a strong opposition to the discriminatory policies regarding life-saving drugs. The members commanded a strong resistance to the stricter intellectual property rights imposed by the Western countries. The countries stress on issuance of Compulsory Licences (CLs) in the WTO's Agreement on TRIPS for life-saving drugs, especially in the case of treatment of HIV/AIDS benefiting countries like South Africa (Ward 2014).

The BRICS countries have signed a deal for currency swap and limit their reliance on the US dollar and replace it as a reserve currency for intra-BRICS trade. The new trade system will reduce the transaction cost as the trade can be done in only two currencies, limiting use of the US dollar and will facilitate bearing the shocks of a future global economic crisis (RT 2012). Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, India-Russia trade and China-Russia trade were carried out in Rupee-Rouble and Yuan-Rouble respectively, which is now getting revived. This will also reduce the impact of adverse fluctuations of the local currencies, helping the uncertain volatility in trade. China and Russia are keen on dealing in trade in Yuan and Rouble as this will have less impact during sanctions. China and Russia have signed a currency swap deal worth of \$24.4 billion in 2015. India and Russia have set up a Working Group comprising representatives of Central Banks, EXIM banks and commercial banks of the two countries. South Africa and Brazil too

have signed a deal with China to trade in their local currencies (Upadhyay 2015; The BRICS Post 2014).

- ***Multipolar World Order***

BRICS has highlighted the need for the formation of a multipolar world order, which will have major countries of the world with stable polity and emerging economies to act as a collective decision-maker in world affairs. The group negates the unilateral handling of the crisis in other states and demands for adherence to international law and peaceful resolution of disputes (BRIC First Summit 2009). BRICS countries stress on the establishment of an equitable, democratic world order that stresses on the cooperative relations among the countries based on mutual respect and coordinated action (BRICS Summit 2009, 2010).

- ***Cooperation in International Financial Institutions***

BRICS member countries aim to play a bigger role in world politics through active participation in the forum in order to make international institutions like the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank more representative. In the very first BRICS summit the member states demanded to advance reforms in the global financial institutions that concern to all the states in the world. BRICS members also highlight their strong demands in making these institutions more accommodative and inclusive for the developing and emerging economies. They have been consistently demanding a greater voice and representation for the developing countries (BRIC First summit 2009). BRICS members demand an open, transparent and merit-based selection of the President of these institutions. There is also a proposal for an alternative candidate from the developing world, as the headship of these institutions is always appropriated by the developed Western countries.

Saran and Sharan have reported that “BRICS is trying to stay independent on discriminatory multilateral channels such as WTO; it is systematically trying to create frameworks offering policy and development options for the emerging and developing world (Saran and Sharan 2012: 11). BRICS has expressed concern over rising protectionism, especially subsidies in agriculture by a few developed countries. It has

discussed the impasse in Doha rounds of WTO and remains fully committed to an early conclusion of negotiation (ENS Economic Bureau 2012: 15).

BRICS agreed to cooperate in ensuring sufficient amount of resources that can be mobilised to the IMF to improve the institution’s governance and legitimacy. BRICS also extends support to the measures implemented to protect the voice and representation of the poorest of the IMF members (Fourth Summit 2012). In recognising the need for enhancing development finance to the developing countries, BRICS has pressed the World Bank to give greater priority to mobilising resources, reducing the lending costs and adopting innovative lending tools financing (Fourth BRICS Summit 2012). With regard to the World Bank, BRICS demands a shift in its traditional functioning from acting as a mediator of North-South cooperation and donor-recipient relationship to promoting equal partnership among all its members.

- ***BRICS and Special Drawing Rights (SDR)***²¹

BRICS has been consistently demanding for stability and certainty in the international reserve currency system (BRICS Third Summit 2013). It has made demands for reforms in the financial institutions such as the IMF to revise and accommodate the emerging economies’ currencies in this basket. SDR quota management was always handled by the top five board shareholders comprising of the US, the UK, Germany, Japan and France. BRICS considers this system to be unrepresentative and discriminative to the emerging economies. With the inclusion of the Chinese Renminbi in the SDR quota basket in 2016, BRICS has been successful in its demands.

Table 4.5. Quota share of selected countries in SDRs (as of 10 March 2017)

Country	Millions SDRs	Per Cent of Total
United States	82,994.2	17.46

²¹ Special Drawing Rights (SDR) is a potential claim on a usable currency that can be used in the IMF for the purpose of exchange of currencies among IMF members. Created in 1969, it comprises the currencies of mainly four countries – the US Dollar, Japanese Yen, British Pound and the Euro. China’s currency Renminbi was added in the SDR currency list in 2016. SDRs are allocated to members of the IMF according to the proportion of the quota that signifies the share of the economy and contribution in the IMF (International Monetary Fund 2013).

United Kingdom	20,155.1	4
Japan	30,820.5	24
Germany	26,634.4	6.48
France	20,155.1	5.60
Brazil	11,642.0	2.76
Russia	12,903.7	2.71
India	13,114.4	4.24
China	30,482.9	6.41
South Africa	3,051.2	2.32

Source: IMF.

- ***Cooperation in the Doha Development Rounds***

BRICS members strongly demand adherence to the Doha Development Agenda. Demanding the rightful share in the multilateral trading system, BRICS has been one of the pioneering voices in this regard.

- ***Reforms in UNSC***

BRICS denotes a strong commitment to multilateral bodies such as the United Nations that have the potential to deal with global challenges and threats. BRICS has stressed on a comprehensive reform of the UN for making it more effective, efficient and representative. BRICS countries have extended their support for the inclusion of India, Brazil and South Africa as permanent members with veto power. The year 2011 was special for BRICS countries, as all the five countries were in the UN as permanent and non-permanent members and extended their support to engage in its functioning.

BRICS considers UNCTAD as the central unit that engages in trade and development issues. All the BRICS countries have agreed to invest in cooperation to ensure improvements in its functioning of consensus building, and encourage technical cooperation and research on trade-related fields.

- ***Cooperation in Tackling Terrorism***

BRICS has led a strong crusade against the manifestation of acts of terrorism. In the Brasilia declaration of 2010 BRICS has condemned all types of terrorism that the countries face. It stresses on the combined effort of all the countries in handling terrorism through the UN premises and conventions. It stresses for the early conclusion of the negotiations in the UNGA of the Comprehensive Convention on International Informational Terrorism (CCIT). It also stresses on strengthening “international information security” to fight international terrorism and the need to combat cybercrime. It has also set up an emergency response team to tackle terrorist attacks.

- ***New Development Bank***

The formation of the BRICS NDB was initially derived from the urge of the BRICS countries to form regional monetary arrangements. The BRICS countries together contribute US \$50 billion. The NDB headquarters is located in Shanghai and it has a regional centre in Johannesburg. The bank also focuses on establishing of the CRA, worth US\$100 billion. The NDB maintains an open structure where more emerging markets will also be accommodated, which will strengthen and bring more funding to the bank. The bank focuses on hard projects especially in the underdeveloped regions of Africa. It has initiated infrastructure development projects such as railways, energy and social development projects.

The initiation of the NDB has been a major surprise for the world economic community. However, Charles Robertson, an economist at Renaissance Capital, London, has dismissed the NDB’s potential to have similar qualities as the IMF and the World Bank. The bank will require good expertise to handle high-end functions as performed by the IMF. Robertson has raised doubts over the willingness of the higher economic contributors such as China and Russia in bailing out unsustainable macroeconomic policies that are usually done by the IMF (Matlack 2013). It also remains a point of criticism that only those projects will be financed that will benefit the member countries’ economic gains.

The NDB is considered as a supplement rather than an alternative or as a competition to the established financial institutions. The share of funds and the total CRA contribution of the NDB is much lower than the bigger baskets of the IMF and the World Bank (Freemantle 2014).

Table 4.6. Voting shares of selected countries at the IMF and IBRD (as of 10 March 2017)

Voting Share (%)	IMF	IBRD
United States	16.53	16.43
United Kingdom	4.04	3.89
Germany	5.32	4.16
Japan	6.16	7.10
France	4.04	3.89
Brazil	2.22	1.84
Russia	2.59	2.87
India	2.64	3.02
China	6.09	4.59
South Africa	0.64	0.77

Source: IMF, World Bank.

- ***BRICS and G20***

BRICS has acknowledged G20 as one of the significant groupings of the current international system and appreciated its handling of the international financial crisis of 2008. BRICS called for joint action by the international bodies in implementing the decision adopted at the London summit of the G20 countries in 2009. BRICS has agreed to contribute in assisting the G20 in building the post-crisis economy. BRICS stresses on a bigger role for the G20 countries in increasing global economic governance (BRICS Second Summit 2010).

BRICS unitedly condemned the media statement on unilateral sanctioning and barring of Russia in attending the G20 summit in Brisbane, Australia in November 2014. The leaders strongly opposed the stance of the host country “stating their stand and position in the G20 as equal members and stated that no country is a unilateral custodian decision-maker to shape the nature of the grouping” (BRICS Foreign Ministers Meeting 2014).

- ***Focus on MDGs and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)***

BRICS has reminded the developed world of its responsibility to contribute 0.7 per cent of its Gross National Income (GNI) for ODA and has demanded further raising of the assistance and also to initiate debt relief and provide market relief and required technology transfer to the states most in need. BRICS has also stressed the implementation of the measures outlined in the Rio Declaration of 1990 to achieve SDGs and Agenda 21 and several multilateral environmental agreements.

- ***Energy Cooperation***

Intensive cooperation in the sector of energy among the main stakeholders such as the producers, consumers and the transit states remains one of BRICS’s primary goals. It presses for the diversification of energy resources and supply, especially in the renewable energy sector and also demands a greater level of security in transit routes. Member countries have agreed to cooperate in developing biofuels to reduce the excess demand on resources such as oil and other minerals. BRICS has been pushing for the creation of new energy investments and infrastructure development. BRICS has also stressed the need for international cooperation in the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. It considers the IAEA as the main body to ensure regulation, and guaranteeing nuclear safety standards (BRICS Fourth Summit 2012).

- ***Climate Change***

BRICS has expressed disagreement over the common policy of carbon emission that is seen as discriminatory to the developing countries. The group has urged all the parties to generate common consensus and build upon the COP18/CMP8 in the Doha Development Rounds. BRICS has given due importance to UNFCCC and the 6th Conference of the

parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. BRICS stresses on the “Principles of Equity and Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Capabilities” (CBDR & C) (BRICS Fifth Summit 2013). The group has articulated two specific demands –that developed countries parties to UNFCCC will provide support for technological and financial enhancement capacity building programme, which will be conducive to the developing countries’ national mitigation plans and actions and to enhance environment protection through the Rio+20 approach Agenda 21 and the Johannesburg Plan of implementation (BRICS Fourth Summit 2012).

- ***BRICS on Countries in Conflict***

- *Arab-Israel Conflict and Iran’s Nuclear Issue*

In its joint declaration, BRICS has called for a comprehensive and lasting solution for the Arab-Israel conflict. It presses for solutions that will be based on the international legal frameworks and UN resolutions, the Madrid Principles and the Arab Peace Initiative. BRICS has also stressed for a direct negotiation between Israel and Palestine in reaching to final solutions and discouraged unilateral actions especially dealing with the settlement activity in the Occupied Territories of Palestine (BRICS Fourth Summit 2012). The eThekwini Declaration stated that the world community should help Palestine grow as an economically viable country and also urged the international community to help both countries to find a solution in accepting Jerusalem as its capital and to recognise the border determined as per the 4th June 1967 draft and has also declared the occupation of the Israeli settlement in Palestine occupied territories as violation of international law (BRICS Fifth Summit 2013).

With regard to the conflict in Iran over the nuclear issue, BRICS has extended full support to Iran for possessing nuclear energy for peaceful use. The grouping insists on settling the issue through political and diplomatic means and adhering to a dialogue between IAEA and Iran based on relevant UNSC resolutions. It has agreed to the proposals put forth through the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA) which will be signed between China, Germany, Russia, the UK, the US, and the EU with Iran that would assure peaceful uses of nuclear energy and also provide in lifting of sanctions imposed on Iran (BRICS Seventh Summit 2015).

➤ *Iraq and Libya*

Raising concerns over the rising terrorist activities in Iraq that has led to killing and forced displacement of people and also in leading to destruction of cultural and historical monuments of Iraq, BRICS has extended its support to the African Union High Level Panel Initiative on Libya. It has advocated for all the parties in Libya to solve the crisis through peaceful means and dialogue and adhering to the UN and the regional organisation to engage in a constructive solution (BRICS Third Summit 2011).

➤ *Syria Crisis*

BRICS has condemned the process of militarisation of the conflict and serious human rights violations in Syria. It has stressed on following the Joint Communiqué of the Geneva Action Group and supported the UN League of Arab States Joint Special Representatives in resolving the Syrian crisis. BRICS lays insistence on broad national dialogue covering all the sections of Syrian society. It has extended its support to the UN League of Arab States Joint Special Representative (BRICS Fourth Summit 2012). BRICS has pressed for the adherence of UNSC resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014) and 2191 (2014) to allow access to the humanitarian organisation and agencies to function in the conflict-stricken zone (BRICS Seventh Summit). It has also condemned the use of chemical weapons in the conflict zone and commended the Syrian Arab League's decision to accede to the Chemical Weapon Convention, which is in accordance with the Organization for the Prescription of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and UNSC resolution 2118 (BRICS Fifth Summit 2013).

In the fifth BRICS Summit, the group backed the “Six Point Plan” proposed by former UN Secretary General Kofi Anan for an immediate and comprehensive ceasefire and to have a Syrian-led inclusive process to create a new environment for peace (BRICS Fifth Summit 2013). The group members jointly extended support to the Russian efforts in promoting a political settlement in Syria and in engaging with two rounds of consultations with Syrian parties (BRICS Seventh Summit 2015).

BRICS, along with IBSA, suggested the “Responsibility While Protecting (RWP)” procedure initiated by Brazil. It is seen as a mediator policy between the US-EU recommendation of military intervention and the Russian-Chinese stand on the issue (Stuenkel 2015).

- ***On Combating Terrorism and Drug Trafficking in Afghanistan***

In the Delhi Declaration of 2012 BRICS members recognised the importance of the Bonn International Conference and to engage with Afghanistan during the transformation decade from 2015-2024. In the eThekweni declaration, BRICS mentioned handling the drug trafficking issue through the framework of the Paris Pact (BRICS Fifth Summit 2013). The BRICS countries insisted on the broad and inclusive national reconciliation in Afghanistan, which shall be both Afghan-led and Afghan-owned to ensure peace, stability in rehabilitation and in the process of reconstruction (BRICS Seventh Summit 2015).

- ***Crimean Crisis and BRICS***

BRICS members showcased a unified grouping during the Crimean crisis. The members generated a strong support to the Russian government and foiled the attempt of the Western powers to oust Russia from the G20 summit of 2014. India, Brazil, China and South Africa also strongly criticised the policy of sanctions towards the Russian government and called it a discriminatory tool (BRICS Foreign Ministerial Meeting 2014).

- ***Conflicts in Africa***

BRICS countries have expressed their concern about the political instability in countries such as Mali, Central African Republic (CAR), Congo (DRC), Guinea Bissau, South Sudan and Republic of Burundi. They have commended the process of negotiation headed by the UN and regional units like the African Union, Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP) and ECOWAS for restoring sovereignty, territorial integrity and peace in these countries. Condemning the activities of terrorist groups such as ISIL

or Daesh, Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, BRICS has insisted on the international community to discourage their motives (BRICS Third Summit 2013).

Intra-BRICS Cooperation

BRICS stresses on deeper cooperation in global governance. Along with increased intra-BRICS trade in goods, manufacturing and services, BRICS has also advanced its cooperation in several areas of concern to the five countries. In easing intra-BRICS trade ties, it has approved simplification of visa procedure especially for business travel. BRICS countries have also agreed to create a favourable business environment by minimising the trade barriers involved with regard to administration and trade impediments (BRICS Seventh Summit 2015).

BRICS has also accepted its responsibility in addressing the special needs of the LDCs and the poor countries from the small islands and the African continent. The group has tried to raise an international appeal to fight against poverty and social exclusion faced by these countries from the Global South (Godfrey 2016).

BRICS has developed a consensus on the importance of the expansion of civil nuclear energy to contribute in sustainable development. It has stressed on the peaceful and equal use of outer space.

BRICS has also set up bilateral Social Security Agreements among the member countries. It has formulated a BRICS Network of Universities (BRICSNU) and BRICS University League (BRICSUL). Both are designed to facilitate higher education and enhance intra-BRICS collaboration (BRICS Eight Summit 2016).

- ***Intra-BRICS Trade Cooperation***

BRICS members aim to enhance and further intra-BRICS cooperation in the areas of customs cooperation, exchange of experiences in trade facilitation, investment promotion, SME cooperation and trade data collection, harmonisation, e-commerce cooperation and IPR cooperation (BRICS Report 2012: 39). The seventh BRICS summit agreed to boost

trade cooperation by initiating a dialogue between the BRICS Export Credit Agencies (ECAs). The group members meet annually to discuss possibilities of promoting exports among themselves (BRICS Seventh Summit 2015).

- ***Cooperation to Combat Diseases***

With agreeing to cooperate on production of quality assured drugs and diagnostics, the BRICS countries have set a 90-90-90 HIV treatment target which has to be met by 2020.

- ***Cooperation in the management of Natural Disasters***

BRICS has agreed to strengthen humanitarian assistance to the countries facing severe natural calamities and also to cooperate in the development of the technologies ensuring reduction in the risk factors of natural calamities (BRICS First Summit 2009) .

- ***Cooperation in the Agriculture Sector***

The first meeting of the BRICS Agriculture Ministers was held in Moscow in 2010, for discussing cooperation in the agriculture sector. It focused primarily on family farming, which will assist in contributing to global food production and security. BRICS has also decided to create a joint agricultural information system and engage in innovation in technology that will enable access to food for the vulnerable population and also help in reducing the impact of climate change (BRICS Second Summit 2010).

- ***Agreement to formulate an Alternative Rating Agency***

BRICS aims to formulate alternative rating agencies for the emerging markets that will explore the feasibility in the areas of (i) harmonisation and regulation of rating scales, (ii) alternative models for CRA, (iii) key performance indicators, (iv) partnership models, and (v) role of domestic CRAs (Exim Bank 2016).

Divergences among BRICS members

Along with several similar goals to achieve, BRICS countries also have several differences among themselves.

- ***Political Differences***

Brazil, India and South Africa have a well-institutionalised democracy with a parliamentary system. Russia on the other hand is inclined towards authoritarianism. The Chinese government remains essentially a Marxist republic.

- *Economic Differences*

The gap between the economic statistics among the countries in the group, for example, China and South Africa, is too big. In trade matters, the countries mostly share a non-traditional partnership among themselves. India and Brazil, Russia and Brazil and Russia and South Africa do not share trade complementarities and are non-traditional partners. However, China forms the main economic bond among the BRICS countries. It has a huge trade share among all the members, and its vast presence in Africa has also encouraged the other members to enter the potential market for the goods, services, and also to explore the resources of the region. China has been very active in trade with Brazil, which is now also seen as a major opportunity for the other BRICS members.

- *Geographic Distances*

Not all BRICS member countries share the proximity of borders, thus falling short of the stricter definition of a region. The large oceanic and continental gaps among the countries lead to difficulty in normal trade and regular meeting among the members. There is also strong trust deficit among the member countries. Countries like Brazil and India do not share any traditional relations, making it a difficult affair to rely on each other's empathy during a crisis or in the vote base in the United Nations.

- *Differences on UNSC Seat*

BRICS countries have asymmetrical power sharing in the international institutions such as the UNSC. Russia and China enjoy permanent membership, granting them a power to veto and decision-making on issues of international importance. Russia gained BRICS membership for being an erstwhile great power and China was granted the seat to represent the Asian region, a matter which is contested strongly by Japan. China and Russia are status-quoit powers that do not insist on the expansion of the UNSC (Subramanian 2011).

BRICS members also have disparity in their total security and nuclear possessions. China, Russia and India possess nuclear weapons. China and Russia have the privilege of being in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), whereas India being a non-signatory to the NPT has to pass certain hurdles to gain the status of a nuclear state, which was attained after successful signing of the Civil Nuclear Deal and its entry in the Missile Transfer Control Regime (MTCR). Brazil and South Africa have obtained the status of non-nuclear states after disbanding their nuclear weapons. This makes them less powerful states in comparison with the nuclear powers.

India and BRICS

The 'I' in BRICS can be considered as a connector between two different groups of countries, where we can club China and Russia in one group, with their combined membership in RIC, and Brazil and South Africa at another end with membership in IBSA together with India. In the international system, Russia holds a traditional power identity and China attracts a great amount of attention as a next superpower. On the other hand, Brazil and South Africa remain India's close allies, which reflects their strong conviction about strengthening South-South cooperation. India has been an active participant in all BRICS-related activities. The then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the current Prime Minister have in their turn in office attended all the BRICS summits. India has also hosted two summits.

In order to deepen its relations with the BRICS grouping and also to enhance its relations with individual BRICS countries, India aims to develop threefold engagements with BRICS as a grouping, focusing on the international issues of common interest, widening intra-BRICS cooperation with several working-group engagements and strengthening bilateral relations with each of the BRICS countries.

Setting up a multipolar world order remains a major reason for India to deepen its ties with the BRICS grouping and in engaging with a grouping that focuses on the rise of the rest. India aims to demand a rightful place for the emerging economies in the international decision-making process. India stresses on the importance of BRICS for its capacity of managing the global financial crisis, which was earlier managed by the G7

countries, but with the 2008 crisis it was the G20 countries, where BRICS forms an important part, which performed the role.

- ***BRICS and Prospects for India***

Through BRICS, India aims to achieve a major feat through deepening cooperation with the other member countries, with their decision to engage in financial integration by strengthening the market-related mechanisms and forming a club of their respective currencies. According to Saran and Sharan, this cooperation can lead to the creation of a BRICS Exchange Alliance, to ease out the stock exchanges among the countries which rely on the US dollar, leading to lengthening the process (Saran and Sharan 2012: 10).

India also sees BRICS as an option to gain an economic advantage in comparison to the developed states. As the economic crisis has slowed down the Western economies, the growing trajectory of the BRICS countries together can balance India's growth aspirations. India sees the BRICS countries as a factor of stability that will assist in its economic growth. These countries along with the growing economic numbers make up a huge store of natural resources (MEA 2009 d).

Through BRICS, India stresses on the establishment of democratic credentials in achieving the goals of globalisation and development and lay less emphasis on the unregulated free market. India, in its efforts in addressing the issues of global governance such as unemployment, tries to strengthen its cooperation with the other BRICS countries which also have major demographic challenges (MEA 2014 c).

Along with strengthening the international interactions, India has also led a strong intra-BRICS and bilateral cooperation. Through BRICS, India has tried to achieve the creation of customs cooperation among the members, enhance Small and Medium Enterprises cooperation, and enhance the prospects of e-commerce, investment promotion and strategies for trade harmonisation to achieve major benefits by creating customs cooperation.

India also aims to gain major bilateral advances through BRICS. This grouping has been one of the primary foundations to formulate a conducive environment and has provided some scope for healthy India-China relations both economically and politically. It has

strengthened its economic bonds with Russia in the procurement of deals in military modernisation and in developing nuclear technology. In 2014, India was the twenty-third largest import destination of Russia. India's relations with Brazil too have improved, with India positioning itself at the tenth place with regard to imports. With China India stood at the twenty-seventh position in import destination in 2014 (Chatterjee et al. 2014).

- ***India's role in and contribution to BRICS***

India has hosted two BRICS summits in 2012 and 2016. In the sixth BRICS summit held in Fortaleza, Brazil, the newly elected Prime Minister Narendra Modi had his first foreign visit and interaction in a multilateral forum. India at that time stressed on adopting a people-to-people (P2P) and business-to-business (B2B) approach. It conducted its interaction with the other BRICS countries at three levels, namely, summit level (Track-I), Academic Forum and Business council (Track-II) and meetings of ministers and officers concerned (Track-III). In its attempt to transform BRICS as a people's grouping India tried to transform BRICS from just the summit level to engaging people and the civil society of the country (MEA 2016 b).

India was the first to introduce the name and the proposal of establishing the NDB, formally known as the BRICS Bank, which was introduced in the agenda of fourth summit held in New Delhi. The Indian banker K.V. Kamath has been appointed the NDB's first head (BRICS Fourth Summit 2014).

India focused on the establishment of a multipolar world order, reforming the international financial institutions, encouraging global growth, cooperation with other economies, and discussion on climate change cooperation. India institutionalised the practice of holding academic forums.

- ***Fourth BRICS Summit, New Delhi***

Along with hosting the summit in New Delhi, India also engaged and organised meetings concerning cooperation in different sectors. This summit was held against the backdrop of various global changes that signified the arrival of BRICS in the global context.

Around this time, Brazil and India hosted the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (RIO+20) and Conference of Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity. The BRICS countries also attended the G20 Summit in Mexico and the eighth WTO Ministerial Conference in Geneva.

While continuing from the previous agreements on cooperation in various sectors, India also established certain new features to BRICS's functioning. The Delhi Declaration emphasised on jointly working with both developed and the developing countries to guarantee peace and economic progress among the countries. BRICS reiterated its demands to strengthen the representation of emerging and developing countries in the international institutions to legitimise the international norms and laws. India along with other BRICS members agreed to restore global growth by coordinating with international policy and maintaining macroeconomic stability. It was also in the New Delhi summit that the idea of setting up the NDB was mooted, with a goal to supplement the existing international financial institutions. In the Delhi summit a joint initiative of BRICS Exchange Alliance was also set up to encourage securities exchanges among the members.

- ***Eighth BRICS Summit, Goa***

The eighth BRICS summit introduced new areas of cooperation and led to further widening of BRICS's scope. India also hosted an outreach summit with BIMSTEC countries, where the heads of BIMSTEC states attended the summit. The main reasons for choosing BIMSTEC for the outreach programme is that BIMSTEC represents India's Act East policy.

In the eighth summit, a total of 115 events were held in 20 different states. India's interest in the event can be gathered by the year-long schedule of meetings it hosted to engage and further the BRICS partnership. There were a total of fifty-six senior-officials, Working Groups, Experts Group, twenty-seven Workshops, Seminars, Conferences, and three Track-II and five events of business pillars held throughout the year.

India initiated the hosting of the BRICS Trade Fair which is designed to develop a BRICS Economic Partnership and it was attended by the CEOs of the leading BRICS

corporate houses. The second round table on Medium and Small Enterprises (MSMEs) with special focus on technical and business alliances was organised by India. To enhance its cooperation in the areas of science and technology, the Goa summit initiated a BRICS Young Scientist Conclave. The formation of the following working groups was initiated during the summit.

1. The working group on counterterrorism was set up in New Delhi, 2016.
2. BRICS Women Parliamentarians' Network, 20-21 August 2016, Jaipur, India.
3. BRICS Trade Fair organised by FICCI, New Delhi, focusing on innovation, start-up, and manufacturing.
4. First meeting of the BRICS Universities League Members, Beijing, April 2016.
5. First General Conference on BRICS Network University, Ekaterinburg, Russia. 7-8 April 2016.
6. First Photonics Conference of BRICS Countries, Moscow, 30-31 May 2016.
7. First Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors of BRICS NDB, Shanghai, 20 July 2016.
8. First U-17 Football Tournament, Delhi-Goa, 5-15 October 2016.
9. Working group on BRICS Global Research Advanced Infrastructure Network (BRICS-GRAIN).
10. BRICS Task Force on Disaster Risk Management, Udaipur, 22 August 2016.
11. First BRICS Film Festival, New Delhi, 2-6 September 2016.
12. First BRICS Under-17 Football Tournament, Goa, 5-15 October 2016.

Along with focus on international issues, India in BRICS tried to deepen and achieve more tangible growth for the BRICS endeavour. India stressed on the early formation of a BRICS Credit Rating Agency, Railway Research Networks, Agricultural Research Platform and BRICS Sports Council (MEA 2016a, 2016c) and has also formed the UNIDO-BRICS Technology Platform to enhance partnership in achieving the goals of industrial development. In furthering intra-BRICS ties, the grouping has established different working groups and committees such as Customs Cooperation Committee of BRICS. The BRICS Anti-Corruption Working Group Act is designed on the framework

of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption and other relevant international legal instruments.

At the summit, the Indian Prime Minister also raised international pressure over the increasing involvement in terrorism by Pakistan. He declared Pakistan as the “mothership of terrorism” and demanded of the developing countries and the BRICS states to undermine such mindset which nurtures terrorism for its political gains and to stand against these forces. The Goa Declaration highlighted that “we strongly condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations” and reiterated that “there cannot be any justification for any act of terrorism based upon racial, religious, ideological, political, racial and ethnic or any other reasons” (Goa Declaration 2016).

A Critique

The projections for BRICS, according to Goldman Sachs, are viable only if the BRICS governments perform and implement policies that lead to economic growth that attracts new investments and better living conditions for their people. The BRICS countries’ economic performance may have risen but they lack major improvements to achieve major goals. Countries like India severely lag in HDI reports, where it stands as the 134th among the 169 countries (HDI 2010). India has to especially learn from the health policies initiated by Brazil in the form of “Bolsa Familia”, which has improved the health facilities in the country.

Reports on the BRICS economies’ slow growth have also raised speculation on BRICS’s future and its economic credentials as the investment hub. The changes in the macroeconomic environment and the rate of unemployment have also contributed to the uncertainty in the global markets, leading to the BRICS countries’ slow growth. As the BRICS agreements do not have any legal connotation and are not binding, the grouping is said to have a very loose formation and is not considered as a challenge or threat to the status quo of the existing financial institutions.

China’s role in BRICS overshadows the other members, with China’s economic superiority and soft-power capabilities. China has determinedly tried to influence BRICS. This was demonstrated when China was instrumental in the induction of South Africa

into the grouping, to which India initially objected. India opposed the idea of a bigger grouping, but as it shared good relations with South Africa, it later changed its stance. Now, as regards the 2017 ninth BRICS summit to be held in China, media reports have spoken of creating a BRICS-plus. In the initiative of BRICS-plus, an outreach programme, China has reportedly decided to invite Mexico, Argentina and Pakistan, which will antagonise India. Including Pakistan in BRICS will lead to BRICS's dysfunctionality. This will also lead to polarisation in the BRICS grouping, where India will try to build deeper relations with Russia and try to balance China and its activities in BRICS (Sputnik 2017).

The rise of BRICS countries is also criticised for their uncertain moves, which are at times cooperative with and also conflicting to the existing world powers. The claims of BRICS are also considered as antagonistic as it demands a larger space in the institutions that it considers as discriminatory and exploitative (Bond and Garcia 2016). The BRICS rising has been debated and critiqued for adopting neo-liberal practices leading to capitalism, which are based on a pro-corporate model of economic growth. These countries have been experiencing some of the largest protests and social resistance movements from their people. The advent of BRICS countries in the resource-rich regions of Africa and Latin America is considered as highly exploitative of the local people and an extension with the characteristics of sub-imperialism (Bond 2017), creating a new form known as the "highest stage of capital development" (Luce 2016), a process of "capital-imperialism", where BRICS countries have subordinate membership within the club of capital expansionist countries (Fontes 2016).

The sub-imperial instances can be noted from the functioning of the big corporate companies of BRICS countries. For example, mining companies such as Vale from Brazil have led to intense resource extraction, leading to environmental degradation in Mozambique and Brazil (Marshall 2016). The over-expenditure of public resources and denying access to the city to the poorest of the state was evident during the FIFA World Cup 2014 and Olympics 2016, where these cities were defined as "global cities" by the government of the state (Braathen et.al 2016).

According to Patrick Bond there is a need for the formation of “BRICS from Below” that will cover the third layer of the BRICS representation, the first two comprising “BRICS from Above” consisting of heads of state, corporates and elites, with the second level comprising “BRICS from Middle”, comprising academics, intellectuals, trade unions and NGOs, and the third level representing grassroots activists from the BRICS countries to share their experiences of movements and struggles.

Conclusion

Goldman Sachs with Jim O’Neill and his team identify BRICS as the investment destination for the world, as with the visible rising numbers in their economies, there is a projection of possible growing capital flows, increased dollar spending capacities and rising demographic strength. The projections give an opportunity to the BRICS countries to attempt to design and identify their capacities and develop. By forming themselves into a formal grouping, the BRICS countries have moved far from the economic projections and developed a list of comprehensive goals. The BRICS partnership has developed deep engagements and set itself as a grouping of the countries that highlights not the present economic potential but also demands a prominent political position in world affairs. Along with China and India, the growing economies such as Indonesia and Singapore give a glimpse of the rising Asia. The economy of the BRICS countries is still emerging while the prominence in economic, political and military strategic position in the world order is still constituted by the leading powers such as the US. Nevertheless, the outstanding figures in economic growth and its assertion in the global sphere indicates BRICS’s arrival, that has certainly created a new discourse in the study of power transition from a unilateral country to a club of interregional settings.

BRICS’s annual summits attract major international attention. The unification of countries from different regions collaborating on certain common goals can be recalled as a “comprehensive entity” from the South. BRICS can be one of the important agents in leading to the revival of South-South cooperation. According to a BRICS report, there is a need to further seek possibilities of deepening trade among the BRICS countries as

there can be linkages with regard to their production and consumer needs. BRICS has expressed its concern to the conflict-affected states and has appreciated the works undertaken by international authorities such as the UN and several multilateral and regional bodies assisting in the process to resolve and provide humanitarian aid and protect the human rights of the people of these countries. BRICS has to further participate in the reconciliation process, send troops for peacekeeping and also cobble a joint mechanism to handle the crisis that affects the countries in their region, especially concerning Africa.

BRICS has been derived from the euphoric projections of Goldman Sachs, which are criticised as dramatic and overhyped. The historical evidence of countries like Japan, Germany, South Korea and even China demonstrates a viable growth and changes in their economies, which can prove BRICS growth projection a possible endeavour. However, these capital projections according to Goldman Sachs also lead to many uncertainties, which can hamper the set numbers of growth. The BRICS countries have to achieve the determinants of growth. India along with the other BRICS countries has to meet the major criteria of higher education, establish rule of law, openness with economy, improvements in terms of trade, lower inflation rate and ensuring political stability. Meeting the MDGs remains a prime concern for the BRICS countries. There is need for major structural changes for them to achieve economic advancement. Brazil, Russia and India have to make their economy more inclusive, and develop their agriculture sector, infrastructural availability, and improvements in public policy. China has to minimise its reliance on the export-led market to focus on the domestic market. South Africa has to address the issue of unemployment and make its economy more inclusive (BRICS Report 2012: 77-78).

Speculation is rising over the decline of BRICS as the economies of Brazil, Russia and South Africa have taken a downturn. Many economic analysts, including O'Neill of Goldman Sachs, have identified this as a problem for BRICS as an investment hub. O'Neill in an interview with CNBC in 2016 highlighted that "Brazil and Russia have been mired in recession contracting a mere 3 per cent of GDP in 2015. Along with the economic slowdown Brazil also faces political changes that have created more challenges

to the new government to stabilise the economy” (Barnato 2016). However, the economies of China and India have seen sustainability, giving a stronghold to BRICS. The group leaders have also refuted the emphasis on the economic performance of the five countries as BRICS has a long-term and close relationship. They have expanded cooperation in several sectors, especially coordinating their decisions at the IMF and G20 meetings and want to protect the interests of the developing countries in these institutions (Kudrin 2015).

India has attached great significance to BRICS as a grouping and it has made efforts to make BRICS functional. With the common agenda of the five countries from different regional locations and with their economic sustenance, India can pursue its objectives of creating a multipolar world order. BRICS’s insistence on the main tenets stresses on principles similar to those of the Indian concept of *Panchasheela*, which stress on adhering to sovereignty and integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and cooperation for mutual benefit and resolving issues through peaceful means.

Along with handling multilateral assertion and intra-BRICS trade, India has also raised serious issues related to terrorism, which hamper sovereignty and peace in the world. By making such vocal comments, India has made an attempt to modulate BRICS as a more responsible player in international affairs.

CHAPTER V

ASSESSING INDIA'S PARTICIPATION IN INTERREGIONAL GROUPINGS

Introduction

Interregional interactions have developed India's options to come closer to the most potential economies of the current period. These groupings provide a third layer of interaction after the bilateral and multilateral level. The economic benefits along with the political aspirations have been a prime factor for India joining in these interregional alliances. Intra-trade among the group members and India has witnessed an increase in the past two decades.

Through participating in different groupings India aims to achieve the goals of increasing its role and position in the global system. The objectives and scope of different groupings fits well in the principles as noted in India's foreign policy and they also provide an opportunity to engage in a larger dialogue with both the developed and developing world (Panda 2012).

India displays an interest in all the interregional groupings it participates in. Interregionalism was mainly the result of the post-liberalised and the post-colonial phenomenon, drawing India closer towards large avenues of open economies to trade and enhance the economic, political and social interaction. These groupings also provide India a significant opportunity to jointly raise issues of global importance that concern the developing countries together.

There is a need to elaborate details of India's role and relation with major groupings such as BRICS and IBSA along with the other interregional groupings such as SCO, EAS, G20, and BASIC, which form a prime foreign policy goal of the country. Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa are the current major emerging economies. Along with their economies, the countries play a significant part in the international system. These countries together share an overlapping membership in different groupings. India has formed a new interregional partnership with these countries. Together, they have raised several important issues affecting both the developing countries and LDCs. These interactions are seen as an extension of regional and sub-regional engagements, thus leading Indian foreign policy into a complex dilemma of

interacting with three layers of engagements at regional, multilateral and trans-regional levels (Tripathi 2016).

Noting down the contributions and impacts of India's participation in various interregional groupings, the first section of this chapter highlights the major worldviews of member countries on different issues of international concern. The second section will provide major highlights of the BRICS and IBSA members' bilateral relations with India. The chapter analyses the bilateral engagements at the political, economic and strategic levels and their impact on the interactions of these countries both on their bilateral engagements with India and on the interregional groupings. The chapter further examines the impact of India's interregional endeavours on regional organisations such as SAARC and the views and impacts on the major powers' interaction with the US and the EU.

India's Contribution to Interregional Groupings

India has been a prominent member of various interregional groupings. India's growing economic credential has certainly helped in strengthening many of the interregional groupings. The country has proactively worked to initiate a voice from countries of the Global South that are mainly sidelined in the international decision-making process. Through these interregional alliances, India seeks to raise its bargaining power in the international forums and in decision-making.

These member countries' collective role has led to the formation of a third stage of negotiation, where the countries concerned try to manipulate after the bilateral and the multilateral interactions. Through these interregional groupings, India actively demands successful Doha negotiations and has raised a powerful voice in the climate change negotiations. India's demands for reform in the UNSC and IFIs have also been observed and noted by the other prominent world leaders. These features of the various interregional groupings of the emerging economies and developing states have led many countries from the developing world to express an interest in joining these groupings.

India adheres to its engagement with groupings such as BASIC, which demands "special responsibility with differential treatment" with regard to the climate change policies that are considered as discriminatory to the developing world. In order to

carry the climate change responsibilities India has initiated a National Action Plan on Climate Change that has been chalked out to meet the major climate requirements. India affirms its adherence to the climate change negotiations.

India along with its focus on achieving its global goals has determinedly pushed for strengthening bilateral interactions with member countries of interregional groupings, which has provided a leeway to engage in economic trade relations. The India-China interaction in these groupings has been one of the most discussed relations, as it seen to have created a relation of “cooperative competition”, where the two countries are seen as cooperating and competing both at the bilateral and interregional levels. Both countries share a membership in interregional groupings such as BRIC, EAS, SCO, BASIC and have formed a new discourse in India-China dialogue.

- ***WTO Negotiations***

India through these interregional groupings have been consistently questioning the WTO’s role and insist on adopting more representative characteristics. Stressing the representation of the developing states in these institutions, their interregional groupings seek larger representation and attention to the LDCs’ concerns. In the agricultural sector India has raised issues of food security and made demands for the sovereign states to have the right to decide food subsidies (Dhar 2017). According to the Tshwane Declaration 2006,

After the failure of the Doha negotiations leading to the clash between disagreements between corporate agriculture and large industrial enterprises of developed countries with that of the small and vulnerable producers of developing countries, the countries have together demanded for a fairer share in the negotiations. The leaders of the countries seek from the developed world to make the process of globalisation address the existing inequities and not perpetuate them (Tshwane Declaration 2006).

- ***Terrorism***

In all the interregional groupings, India has recognised terrorism as a threat in all its forms and manifestations. As the member countries such as India, Russia, China, and the Central Asian states are the worst affected by terrorism. India and the other partner members in the interregional organisations have stressed the need for the

implementation of UNSC resolutions on counterterrorism which will be free from dubious attempts and selective to any country. Adhering to the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT), the member countries have raised a demand for countering the provision of safe havens to terrorists by some countries and a check on the spread of terrorist ideology and radicalisation that leads to terrorism.

- ***Climate Change***

India and other member countries in all the interregional groupings demand a comprehensive solution for global warming and climate change. Through these groupings have India, has called for sharing responsibility by the developed states for their larger share of the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and ask them to ensure that the developing countries are enabled to carry on their developmental initiatives.

- ***Responsibility while Protecting***

India has objected to the military intervention in other states by the dominant powers. The R2P concept, which was adopted by the US, is seen as a narrow and one-sided solution, which neglects the concerns of the citizens of the state. The developing states, including BRICS and G77, adhere to the concept of RWP, which was initiated by Brazil. Focusing on prevention, RWP highlights that military actions should come after diplomatic and political ones. The initiative demands larger accountability and monitoring and accountability that is missing in the R2P concept (Tourinho et al. 2015).

Member Countries' Views on Issues of Common Concern

This section highlights the views of the principal member countries such as Russia, China, Brazil and South Africa in interregional groups. These views concern multipolarity and issues of international importance that also influence India's policy objectives.

The views of member countries on the current world order as derived from the speeches and comments from the leaders of Russia, China, Brazil and South Africa

denote the demands for a change in the world order to make it more accommodating and representative of all the regions and countries of the Global South.

President Putin of Russia commends interregional interaction as a tool which “promotes common multidimensional cooperation, strengthening trust and mutual understanding” (Putin 2016) and further highlights the important role the BRICS countries play in the global decision-making:

Our nations play a significant political role in the global arena as well. It is thanks to Russia and China’s firm stance in the UNSC, with support from other BRICS participants, that we were able to rally most international dialogue participants including the European Union and the United States and prevent a foreign invasion in Syria, achieving the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons (President Putin at the BRICS Fortaleza summit, 2014).

Member countries of interregional groupings seek reforms and a greater role in the international institutions. Through these interregional groupings they seek to create institutions supplementary to the existing ones. Expressing China’s support to the UN bodies, President Xi Jinping says:

China has been participant and builder and contributor of the international world system. We stand firmly for the international order and system that is based on the purpose and principles of the UN Charter. A great number of countries, especially developing countries, want to see a more just and equitable international system. But it doesn’t mean that they want to unravel the entire system or start all over again. Rather, what they want is reform and to improve the system to keep up with the times. This should serve the common interest of the countries and mankind as a whole (Xi Jinping 2015).

Brazil’s President, expressing Brazil’s support to the UN measures to strengthen the organisation’s development agenda, has pressed for reforms in the UNSC and has stated:

The UN Security Council needs to extend its membership, both permanent and non-permanent, to become more representative, more legitimate and effective. Most member states do not want a decision in this regard to be postponed forever (Rousseff 2015).

The South African leadership has also been persistent in demanding reforms in the international institutions. The then Minister for International Relations and Cooperation of South Africa has noted:

The UNSC is one of the global governance institutions that we believe, very strongly, should be more representative – in both composition and decision-making processes – of the international community (Nkoana Mashabane 2012).

India's Bilateral Interactions with Member Countries of Interregional Groupings

India shares overlapping membership with emerging economies such as Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa in several interregional groupings, creating a new discourse in the bilateral relations with these countries. Highlighting the basic perception of these countries on India's membership in different interregional groupings, this section examines the major impacts on the bilateral interaction with these member countries

These countries see India as a potential partner to engage in the interregional groupings. India's economic credentials have been a major factor in this attraction. India's leadership and its ability in demanding reforms in the IFIs, WTO negotiations, climate change, terrorism, and South-South cooperation match their aspiration.

Brazil: Brazil considers Indian participation as beneficial to the promotion of its foreign policy goals in the Asian region and for engaging with the South Asian region (Nafey2017) and according to Gangopadhyay, to spread deeper in the region India needs to engage proactively with other states as it has placed its major focus on Brazil, limiting its attention on the other potential partners in the region (Gangopadhyay 2016). Baroni from Argentina has also expressed reservation on the changes ensuing from India's presence in Latin America (Baroni 2016). The Chinese presence in the region is seen to be more beneficial as compared to that of India. Latin America recognises Asia more through China than India (Singh 2017).

Russia: Russia has always shown confidence in India's global aspirations and extended its support to India's membership in multilateral and interregional bodies. It has led a pioneering role in India's inclusion in groupings such as SCO. According to an India-Russia Joint Statement in 2016:

Russia has expressed a desire to strengthen the partnership with India and collaborate in various interregional groupings such as G20, EAS, SCO, ASEM, ARF, and ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia

and the Asia Cooperation Dialogue. Russia has also extended its support to India's application to join Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), (India-Russia Joint Statement 2016).

China: Chinese officials and academics have stressed on deepening of economic engagements in these groupings and have called for sidelining the political discords between the two states. Recognising India's potential in trade and development, through the interregional partnerships the Chinese leadership seeks to extend its relations with India at three levels, namely bilateral, multilateral and people-to-people. China affirms that India pursues an intention to "boost political communication, expand pragmatic cooperation and promote cooperation with China within the framework of interregional groupings such as G20 and BRICS that will help to safeguard the common interest of the two countries" (Xinhua 2015).

South Africa: South Africa recognises India's contribution and role in the interregional groupings. According to South Africa's then President Jacob Zuma,

Credit the membership of both the countries in various groupings for deepening bilateral cooperation. The leader also confirms to further explore new opportunities in both bilateral and multilateral environment (High Commission of South Africa to India 2012).

- ***India-Russia***

Russia is regarded as a time-tested friend of India. Enhancing relations with Russia forms a key pillar of Indian foreign policy (MEA 2016e). The two countries have shared close ties since the cold war period. It was Soviet Union that embraced India's independent identity free from the colonial rule. India has also laid its trust on the Soviet Union. India has appreciated Soviet support during the India-Pakistan war of 1971, when Pakistan was assisted by the American forces in the Bay of Bengal region (Menon 2015).

Along with strategic cooperation India and the USSR also shared close ties in defence sales. Present-day Russia is the major supplier of military technology to India. Several industries in India's initial stages of development were financially assisted by USSR-aided projects (Menon 2015). Russia and India seek to carry on trade in each other's currencies to conserve the hard currency reserves. The USSR remained one of India's leading trade partners in the early 1980s, sharing maximum export and economic aid.

In the 1990s India-Russia relations did face a gradual decline. Under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin, India was not considered as an important strategic partner and the focus was shifted to the newly economically advanced countries such as China and also to the US. But India-Russia relations have deepened and undergone newer interactions under President Vladimir Putin. The two countries have engaged in several multilateral groupings such as the G20, G24 and BRICS. Russia played a pivotal role in promoting India from an observer status to a full-time member of the SCO group in 2016. India and Russia have also joined the club of anti-unipolarity that questions the overemphasis of American influence on the international system.

Russia has shown firm support to India's claim for a permanent seat in the UNSC. Since the year 2000 the two countries have strengthened their mutual relations with regard to international political understanding. The two countries have built up common trust in enhancing the representation of the developing countries in the UNSC and expanding the membership to more stakeholders. Both countries maintain a policy of non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

Russia remains a primary supplier of arms to the Indian security system. Along with importing Russian arms, India has also engaged in joint production of weapons with Russia. It has successfully built a joint a T-50 fifth generation stealth fighter jet, the much powerful BrahMos hypersonic cruise missile and T-90 main battle tanks (Radyuhin 2011). Modi and Putin have also signed a defence deal of \$4-5 billion on the S-400 defence missile system. India has also expressed its support to the Russian efforts for arriving at a political settlement of the civilian crisis in Syria (Mishra 2016).

During the eighth BRICS summit, India and Russia signed a multi-billion-dollar deal for S-400 Triumf long-range air defence missile. The two countries also signed an agreement for building Project 11356 frigates for the Indian Navy and set up a Russia-India joint venture to produce Kamov Ka-226T helicopters and third and fourth power units of the Kudankulam nuclear power plants (Kamlakaran 2016).

Table 5.1. India-Russia trade statistics (In US\$ '000)

Year	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
India's Exports to Russia	2,780,484	3,041,456	3,088,799	3,172,157	2,067,339

India's Imports from Russia	6,079,836	7,915,553	6,981,503	6,341,109	4,797,351
Total Bilateral Trade	8,866,320	10,957,009	10,070,302	9,513,266	6,864,690

Source: Indian Embassy in Russia.

- ***India-Brazil***

Brazil plays a defining role in shaping the political and economic framework of the South American region. As the country occupies a huge territorial cover it is seen as an emerging 'threshold power' in the region (Almeida 2007). Along with Japan, Iran and West Germany, Henry Kissinger regarded Brazil as a stability point in the fluctuating multipolar world (Perry 1976: 89). The Brazilian economic sector is well equipped with modern agribusiness and ICT. Owing to its economic credentials Brazil has become the leader of the policy of regional integration of North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Free Trade Areas of Americas (FTAA) (Beri 2008: 814).

India and Brazil are distanced by oceans. The cultures and sociological settings of the two countries are widely different. However, both countries are multicultural, multilingual and multiracial nations. Both faced colonialism, and Brazil shares its correlation of Portuguese colonialism with the state of Goa in western India. There are a few Indian diasporas in the Caribbean region, who were brought as plantation workers by the British in the nineteenth century (Shidore 2013).

India and Brazil share similar economic indicators. They both aspire to work together in advancing the cause of South-South cooperation. Sahni notes the three phases of relations that India has shared with Brazil till date. The first phase is clubbed from the late 1940s to early 1960s as distant acquaintances. The second phase covers the period from the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s, which is described as the rhetorical solidarity period. The mid-1990s and onwards is the phase of strategic engagement (Sahni 2015).

With participation in IBSA and BRICS, India and Brazil have declared each other as strategic partners. They share similar goals to achieve in the multilateral forums such as the demand for a permanent seat at the UNSC and reforms in the international financial institutions. India supported Brazil's candidate Roberto Azavedo to head the WTO.

The two countries shared similar goals in UNCTAD, which was established in 1964. This alliance primarily focused on issues of development, trade and investment, which further extended in the form of G77 to represent the concerns and raise issues of the developing and LDCs of the Global South. Brazil and India also shared similar views on the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) from 1973-82 and also promoted the establishment of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) in 1974. According to Sahni, the participation of many countries from Latin America in these collaborations was instrumental in bridging the regional gap (Sahni 2015).

Official relations between Brazil and India were established after India's independence but were limited for a long time. The first trade agreement with Brazil was signed in 1963. President Lula reinitiated the ties between India and Brazil. The ties were further strengthened with the second visit of President Lula to India in 2007. To enhance economic cooperation between the two countries a joint Forum of CEOs of India and Brazil was held. The two countries aim to benefit from each other's areas of expertise. Brazil guides India with a programme to develop profitable small farms, and India is favoured by Brazil as it has offered its technology for affordable housing (MEA 2009d). Brazil also views India as a potential market for its defence products from its air-supply companies such as Embraer. India signed a deal in 2005 for procuring executive jets from Embraer. Brazil also seeks India's assistance in defence and security techniques and in advancing its space technology. In the IBSA declaration the two countries along with South Africa have agreed to increase tariff concessions on imports (Government of India n.d.: 4).

Indian companies such as Torrent and Bajaj Hindustan have invested in \$500 million in the sugar industry in Brazil. ONGC, the public-sector oil and natural gas company, has purchased a 15 per cent stake in the oil-rich Campos region in Brazil. Tata Motors is collaborating with Marco Polo, the Brazilian company, in body-building for buses and coaches (Beri 2008: 823).

In 2002, India signed a MoU with Brazil for understanding the technology of creating bio-fuels through sugarcane. According to scholars from RIS, India can avail major benefits from this technology as it is the largest producer of sugarcane in the world (RIS Policy Briefs 2006). Flemes claims that deepening of the commercial links with Brazil is considered as a gateway to enter the US market (Flemes 2009: 415).

Table 5.2. India-Brazil bilateral trade, 2008-2014 (US\$ in Million)

Year	India's Exports to Brazil	India's Imports from Brazil	Total Trade
2008	3,564	1,102	4,666
2009	2,191	3,415	5,605
2010	4,242	3,492	7,734
2011	6,081	3,201	9,282
2012	5,043	5,577	10,620
2013	6,357	3,130	9,487
2014	2,260	1,141	3,401

Source: Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India.

India's extended partnership with Brazil is further enhanced through its "Focus Latin America" programme. In order to facilitate trade and investment with the region, India signed a PTA with MERCOSUR in 2004, which came into effect in 2009. India aims to benefit from the fundamental changes in the Latin American trade policies. The region has adopted a policy of privatisation of the state enterprises and has engaged in the modernisation of the infrastructural facility. The alliance with the region in new trans-regional settings such as India-CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) assures greater benefits to deepen India's relations with all the thirty-three states of Latin America. India and CELAC have signed a partnership deal in energy, minerals, agriculture and science.

Table 5.3. Per cent share of India's trade with Latin America (in million US\$)

Year	Export Values	Per cent Growth of Exports	Import Values	Per cent Growth of Imports	Balance of Trade	Total Trade
2001-02	960.3	-1.85%	1,006.16	42.17%	-45.86	1,966.46
2002-03	1,295.80	34.94%	1,046.04	3.96%	249.76	2,341.84
2003-04	1,138.80	-12.12%	1,192.66	14.02%	-53.86	2,331.46
2004-05	2,160.71	89.74%	2,054.80	72.29%	105.91	4,215.51
2005-06	2,993.47	38.54%	2,662.74	29.59%	330.73	5,656.21
2006-07	4,265.41	42.50%	6,135.27	130.41	-1,869.86	10,400.68
2007-08	5,673.19	33.00%	6,557.34	6.88%	-884.16	12,230.53
2008-09	6,172.03	8.79%	9,963.96	51.95%	-3,791.93	16,135.99
2009-10	6,210.42	0.62%	10,403.40	4.41%	-4,192.98	16,613.82
2010-11	10,707.71	72.42%	13,883.00	33.45%	-3,175.29	24,590.71

Source: DGCIS&S.

The recent change of government in Brazil with the speculated coup and ouster of former President Dilma Rousseff did create an anxiety of a possible 'BRAXIT' from BRICS and the downfall of IBSA on the lines of BREXIT, but the new government has extended its support to these groupings.

- **India-South Africa**

South Africa values its membership in BRICS and IBSA as an asset to achieve its political, economic and strategic goals (Moosa 2016). South Africa and India together have engaged in groupings like IBSA, BRICS, BASIC, and G20. Both countries were colonised by the British, which has given them a common membership of the Commonwealth of Nations. South Africa also considers India as its potential partner in demanding a differential treatment to the developing countries over carbon emissions.

South Africa and India are both multilingual and multicultural states. India shares historical linkages with Africa, especially in its freedom struggle and in South Africa's anti-apartheid movement. The freedom movement was carried out through the peaceful means of non-violence and was instrumental in establishing the Non-

Aligned Movement in the region. This could be further continued with the establishment of non-racial democracy in 1994 (Sidiropoulos 2011; Yadav and Baghel 2010: 1). In 1946 India was the first country to raise the issue of apartheid in the UNGA and also imposed an embargo on trade with South Africa (Virk 2015).

India and South Africa have built a strong partnership in addressing the issue of piracy in the Indian Ocean region. The two countries have also initiated a close interaction among the navy officers. From 2003 the two navies have had regular naval exercises in the high seas and personnel exchanges and training programme designed to strengthen the strategic relations of the two countries.

India aspires to deepen its trade ties with South Africa, as it possesses a sophisticated market and well-developed infrastructural facilities. India can benefit from South Africa's highly developed synthetic fuel industry and explore the technical expertise of the coal liquefaction technology. The exports from South Africa to India mainly comprise of aircraft, inorganic chemicals, iron and steel products. South Africa holds the world's largest stock of gold and minerals and other precious stones. India as a world's largest jewellery producer can complement this complementarity by engaging on bulk trading in gold and precious stones, gems and jewellery (Sandrey and Jensen 2007: 5; RIS Policy Briefs, 2006).

Table 5.4. India's trade with South Africa (US \$ in Million)

Year	2005-06	2006-07	2007-08	2008-09	2009-10
India's Exports to South Africa	1,526.87	2,241.61	2,660.75	1,480.28	2,058.50
India's Imports from South Africa	2,471.80	2,470.14	3,605.35	5,513.58	5,674.50
Total	3,998.67	4,714.75	6,266.10	7,493.87	7,732.99

Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India.

With the establishment of the India-Africa business summit both regions aim to explore inter see business opportunities. India, China and Russia have many investment projects in the region. However, the African states and the critical theorists have criticised the government of South Africa and the investing countries such as India and China for initiating a newer form of imperialism and also leading to the

second scramble of Africa that focuses only on resource extraction from the region (Vines 2010).

- ***India-China***

China is a prime member of BRICS. It economically and politically strengthens the group with the growing economic support of the Chinese. China aims to promote the Yuan (RMB) currency as an international currency. China and Russia aim to encourage intra-BRICS trade in the Yuan and the Rouble (Renwei 2010).

The two countries share good trade relations. China remains one of the largest trading partners of India after replacing the US in 2008 (Government of India 2008). India primarily exports to China products like pharmaceuticals, electrical and electronic equipment, machinery, nuclear reactors, boilers, iron and steel and coffee, tea, mate and spices. However, Indian companies have accused the Chinese of dumping from the Chinese manufacturing industries. India and Brazil have implemented far-going protectionist measures against China.

Table 5.5. Trade statistics between India and China (In US\$ Million)

Year	Import	Export
2011-12	55,313.58	18,076.55
2012-13	52,248.33	13,534.88
2013-14	51,049.01	14,829.31

Source: DGCI&S.

➤ ***India-China Differences***

In the regional parlance, India and China are rival partners and natural competitors (Garver 2001; Tellis 2004). China is believed to have pursued a policy of containing the rise of other emerging powers. China is one of the prime trading partners in weapons such as nuclear and missile technology and is assisting in building military bases in Pakistan. China also has a heavy presence in South Asia, mainly in Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka (Pant 2006). India and China share a common notion of concentric circles, where they both perceive themselves to be at the centre of the realm, and believe in the saying that one mountain cannot accommodate two tigers (Dixit 2003).

On several occasions China has tried to stall India's attempt at joining the NSG. It has been stressing its claim over the territory of Arunachal Pradesh and has issued Chinese names for the places in the state and has followed up the exercise with several military incursions. The visit of the Dalai Lama to the state also antagonised China. The Chinese government vetoed the resolution designating Masood Azhar, the head of the Pakistan-based militant organisation Jaish-e-Mohammad, in the UN's official terrorism sanction list (Jaffrelot 2016). China has invested massively in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which runs through Baluchistan and the controversial areas of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK), which has antagonised India on the issues of sovereignty.²² India has also expressed its disappointment over China's plans to invest dollar 46 billion in various infrastructural projects in the country (Boone 2016). China has initiated a build-up of several ports and roads in Pakistan. The Gwadar port to be built in Pakistan is also being seen by India as a move by China to encircle India (Chellaney 2010). India has repeatedly mentioned concerns over China's over-involvement in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK).

India and China also have longstanding border issues with the borders such as Sikkim and Ladakh²³ (Dixit 2003). The two countries try to conduct the boundary discourse through different institutional designs: Special Representative (SR) level, the India-China Joint Working Group (JWG), and Expert Group. India is also considered as the Asian Pivot by the American strategists, which can create a strong counter to the Chinese in the region. The two countries also have serious contentions in the Indian Ocean region.

China's endeavour in starting new financial initiatives such as the AIIB and OBOR has put pressure on India. AIIB will engage in reducing the impact of the NDB in the international development arena. China and India have contested views on the climate change issue. Being members of BASIC, the two countries have put forward a common demand on differential treatment to the developing countries. However, their interaction does not have a unified understanding of the cause. Both the countries are

²² India has tried to counter this development by joining the Japan, Australia, US, and Vietnam maritime trade initiative and has also tested a long-range missile to deter and counter China both economically and militarily.

²³ India and China signed a guiding principle in 2005 to manage the border issue, which stated that the local population will be taken into consideration before any settlement with the region is undertaken. China has also made a proposal for the Indian side to make a concession on the territorial claims in the eastern sector as China makes a concession in the Western Sector (Panda 2013).

engaged in an ad-hoc and temporary cause rather than permanently initiating a credible argument to raise the issue of climate change and carbon emission (POYRY Report 2011). China and India also have disagreements over carbon emission. The burden of carbon emission in China's economic growth on the rest of the global economy is much higher than that of India (Jacob 2010). Despite the troubled issues, India and China seek to deepen their partnership at bilateral and multilateral levels. Replying to the concerns raised by India, the Chinese Premier stated that "the two neighbours should respect and care for each other on issues of major concerns and handle differences in a constructive way" (*The Wire* 2016). Further, Chinese leader Yang Jiechi notes that

By focusing the synergies of development strategies and pragmatic cooperation, the two countries can build ties and tap into the potential of cooperation for the good of their own peoples and this will help increase mutual political trust and understanding between the two countries in seeking a solution to their differences and disputes in future (*Xinhua* 2015)

According to Kondapalli, "the China-India issues can be resolved only through bilateral channel and should not be mixed with interregional interaction as it will lead to intangible outcome in the BRICS for both countries" (Kondapalli 2016).

➤ *The India-China Divide over BRICS and IBSA*

As IBSA was established way ahead of BRICS in 2003, the Chinese government was initially keen on joining the grouping (Stuenkel 2014). China is said to have been showing a keen interest in developments in IBSA. Many of IBSA meetings and developments within the grouping are reported in the Chinese media (*People's Daily* 2010; *Xinhua* 2010). According to Panda, it is ideological differences that have kept BRICS and IBSA separate (Panda 2013).

There are two main factors China focuses as regards IBSA. One primarily deals with the political discussions taking place in the IBSA summits. The second aspect is regarding the security issues. IBSA's insistence on identifying itself as the representative of the Global South gives it an edge in the regional order and also brings it closer to the least developing countries of the region. This is raising a concern in China. The IBSA members are proponents of the expansion of permanent seats in the UNSC, whereas China would not like India to have that prerogative.

China is also concerned with IBSA's activities in the Indian Ocean region, including IBSAMAR. China's presence in the Indian Ocean has also expanded rapidly in recent years. China's PLA Navy regularly conducts offshore military manoeuvres, escort missions and anti-piracy exercises in various parts of the Indian Ocean (*Xinhua; China Daily* 2012).

Impact of Interregionalism on India's Foreign Policy

India's adoption of interregional interaction in the multilateral settings has generated nuanced features to its foreign policy framework. These phenomena have attained roots in addressing the common interests of the group members, which deal with not just regional-level interactions but focus on achieving bilateral goals. Moving further from the traditional integration process with the extra-regional bodies such as NAM and G77, India has now been a member of G20, EAS, SCO, BRICS, IBSA, and sub-regional interactions such as BIMSTEC, IORA, and Mekong-Ganga Cooperation. These collaborations aim to address varied features that India aims to raise in the global forums.

India's interregional partners mainly belong to the developing states, and the emerging economies which aspire to initiate a revival of the international system and reform the international financial institutions. India's engagement with the interregional groupings such as BRICS and IBSA has primarily focused on economic relations and on working together on common issues such as terrorism, climate change, and people-to-people contacts. India also aims to gain bigger economic benefits of trade and investments in groupings such as BIMSTEC, EAS and G20. India's inclusion in SCO has been regarded as one of the bigger achievements to build stronger relations with the Central Asian countries. It also has deeper engagements on security aspects by joining with China and Russia in addressing the issue of terrorism.

However, India will have to manage with several issues that affect BRICS and IBSA. Both these groupings face external pressures. They also have weak cooperation mechanisms, a matter that needs to be addressed by the member countries. The countries concerned compete and have disagreements on several issues. These emerging economies also face competition in the market.

- ***Impact of India's interregional interaction on the region of South Asia and SAARC***

India's interregional interaction outside its regional domain has both a positive and negative impact on the region. As a big power in the region India has a major role in regional security and economic trade relations. However, cooperation within SAARC is mainly held back due to the India-Pakistan political confrontation. Given this fact, India's engagements with interregional groupings such as BRICS, IBSA, SCO, EAS, and G20 signify a broader outlook in its foreign policy orientation and a shift of focus to the countries beyond its territorial boundaries.

Thus, while regularly participates in the political events of these groups, SAARC meetings have been stalled for a long time. The invitation to BIMSTEC as a BRICS outreach partner in the eighth BRICS summit also indicates India's intention to sideline Pakistan. Meanwhile, India has helped in voicing the important issues affecting the South Asian countries, especially dealing with climate change, protective measures, Doha negotiations and subsidy on essential drugs through its participation in these interregional groupings.

- ***Implications of India's interregionalism on India-US Relations***

India and the US share common membership in groupings such as G20 and EAS, while groupings such as BRICS, BASIC, and to a great extent even the SCO make demands that challenge the basic structure of the international system which is led by the US.

India and the US share a strategic partnership. The two countries have deepened their trade relations and defence procurement. The two do not have any political conflict and uphold their democratic credentials. The US and India share similar concerns regarding China's rise and its growing influence in the region of South Asia and Asia as a whole. The US has claimed India to be its Asian Pivot to counter China's strategic interests especially in the Indian Ocean region. By deepening its relations with the US, India also seeks to achieve its support in its campaign for permanent membership in the UNSC and for membership in the NSG. The two countries have signed a Civilian Nuclear Agreement through which India aspires to enhance its cooperation in the energy industry that will also enable in managing the climate

change issues, and also to further its cooperation in security, especially related to maritime security (Singh 2009).

India also aims to extend its cooperation with the US in the field of education, health, energy, science and technology and agriculture. Especially in agriculture, India aspires to benefit from the advanced American technology. In return, India's progress in pharmaceuticals and medical services provides it a competitive advantage in assisting the American efforts in initiating reforms in the healthcare sector (Singh 2009).

Although sharing cordial bilateral relations with the US, India raises major issues of contention vis-à-vis the developed countries for practising discriminatory policies and adopting protective measures in trade. The US is seen as trying to pitch in G20 to dilute the effects of prominent interregional groupings from the South, especially to create a balance to BRICS (Varadarajan 2010). BRICS remains a major topic of discussion among the scholars and the media in the US.²⁴

In recent times, the protectionist trends of the US government with regard to trade and major exports in both goods and with immigration policies have led to negative impacts on the Indian economy and on the overall relations with the US. However, India constantly attempts to improve the scope of relations with the US in deepening trade and investments and creating strong bonds and cultural affinity with the Indian diaspora in the US.

- ***India's relations with the EU***

India considers Europe as one of its most important strategic and economic partners. Even with the economic crisis engulfing it, Europe is considered as one of the prime players in international relations. The contribution of financial aid to India's sustainable development projects is much higher from the EU than from any other region. India and the EU are also defined by their multicultural identities, which fact entails strengthening the relations and creating a liberal and democratic world order. The EU considers India as an effective partner in achieving the goals of global governance.

²⁴ The Left-oriented 'Larouchepac' movement has run a signature campaign to include the US in BRICS, as it believes that this will provide a unique opportunity to the US to join the 'New International Order for Mankind' and regain its founding identity (Larouchepac 2017).

The EU is India's largest trading partner and also India's largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) (Barroso 2012). Both India and the EU stress on the creation of an FTA to gain much closer cooperation and trade benefits. The proposed FTA is said to benefit 1.7 billion people and would be the single biggest trade pact in the world. The FTA will also help countries like Greece and Spain in recovering from the Eurozone financial crisis. It would also be an important tool of job creation and sustainable economic growth (Muenchow and Pohl 2013).

India can also seek to benefit from the current troubled trade relations of the EU and China and expand its ties with the region. The issues such as IPR and cases of human rights violations, textile dispute issues and arms embargo have stalled the trade between the two regions. The EU has also pressurised China to follow the WTO trading obligations over violations of IPR cases (Hellstrom and Korkmaz 2011). The EU has formed a special alliance with BRICS and has shown a positive interaction with BRICS and other interregional formations, which are based on the interregional framework initiated in the EU.

Critique and Limitations

India faces several limitations in deriving full benefit from interregional groupings. BRICS did get larger attention from India's Ministry of External Affairs, but India has to manage the big-power presence in the grouping. India's interregional interactions face some limitations as the group members have political confrontation and economic competition. Many Chinese scholars stress on economic engagements whereas India has been stressing on both political and economic interaction within BRICS. India has also been very vocal in highlighting the threat of terrorism affecting the member countries, especially India, with regard to Pakistan, which shares military relations with both China and Russia. India has to also try to maintain a balance between its relations with the US and China and Russia while engaging in their global goals.

BRICS member countries also have several territorial and regional confrontations and are seen as regional hegemons with big-brotherly behaviour in their respective regions. This will keep BRICS members engaged in the domestic and regional issues affecting their interregional endeavours. Brazil has traditional rivalry with Argentina, and is seen as influencing the economy in the region. The Russian government is

criticised for being a bigger bully in the region as far as the region of Chechnya and Ukraine is concerned. The African continent has been a victim of uneven development and unstable political regimes, and South Africa is seen as a decisive factor for the region (Zhaogen 2013). India's involvement in the territorial and ethnic discords in the region of South Asia also leaves it preoccupied. India will have to manage the close nexus between China and Russia with Pakistan. There is a need for an innovative solution for the bilateral tensions between India and China regarding border disputes (Pant 2017b).

Many Indian foreign policy practitioners and academics vouch for IBSA and its potential in guaranteeing India a bigger global role. Groupings such as BASIC, BIMSTEC and IORA also operate at a slower pace. India's active involvement in these groupings will guarantee deeper cooperation among the member countries. India with its growing economic credentials and political stability can engage with and achieve the desired common goals that are difficult to achieve through multilateral or bilateral interactions.

Along with these limitations, India also lacks certain structural requirements in achieving the interregional goals. The interaction between these groupings is undertaken at different levels and with different ministries, thus leading to poor coordination and overlap. There is also a need for a single website for collating information of the meetings and developments of the groupings. The language barrier between the countries have been a major hurdle especially when it comes to interacting with officials and entrepreneurs from Latin America, China and Russia. There is also a need to raise the economic funding and distribution of staff to engage with these varied sets of interregional groupings.

Conclusion

Saran claims that "the major objective of Indian foreign policy has been to develop and expand a diversified set of relations with all major powers and with countries in the developing world" (Saran 2015). India's engagement with different interregional groupings since 1991 has added a new chapter to its foreign policy. The spread of the process of new regionalism beyond EU brought many countries sharing similarities and having common goals together in the form of alliances. India tries to simultaneously pursue a dialogue with the emerging powers and major powers.

Identifying similar groupings with common objectives, India should build a strong interregional cooperation to guarantee for itself an important position in the international arena. The new Indian government has contributed to reinforcing relations with the member countries of regional groupings. These groupings provide a varied choice to India to achieve its goals ranging from economic, multilateral reforms, military alliance, and regional and sub-regional alliance.

For India, it was easier to join these interregional groups because of India's close partnership with countries such as Russia and South Africa. These groupings have also provided an opportunity to initiate a new phase of partnership with countries such as Brazil. The new relations formed through these groupings also have led to the infusion of new confidence in Indian diplomacy, which has, for example, reduced the over-reliance of Brazil and South Africa on the US.

India should now guarantee the transparent functioning of the NDB and IBSA Trust Fund to gain larger support from the developing countries. There should be greater care taken in addressing the issues of regional development and investment in the LDCs and not just to burden the markets with goods that will lead to further drowning of the local industries and employment. These groupings have provided India an opportunity to engage with China, which otherwise is mostly discussed as a rival.

Interregional groupings do not act as a deterrent in cooperating with other countries and regions. India, for example, has concluded a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with Japan and South Korea and an FTA in trade and investment with ASEAN. Excluding SCO, all the other groupings' major focus is on economic and political cooperation. Although IBSA led strong IBSAMAR joint naval exercises, the move was not directed towards any country. BRICS has not shown any interest in forming a military bloc and aims to achieve comprehensive relations. Other groupings discuss the security aspects but do not affirm for any anti-West or military-based cooperation that also showcase acceptance of principles such as non-violence and peaceful coexistence as adhered by India.

Conclusion

The preceding chapters have attempted to address various questions regarding interregionalism as a major factor in influencing international relations. These involve such questions as the meaning and significance of the phenomenon of interregionalism. The study has also tried to relate India's engagements in different interregional groupings as an instrument to achieve its national interest. The similarities of characteristics and common goals among the member countries are the basic parameters for India to join any interregional grouping. This analysis further has helped to assess India's role in different interregional groupings. Highlighting IBSA and BRICS as prominent groupings for Indian foreign policy, the chapters have detailed the reasons behind the formation and basic objectives of these two groupings and also attempted to examine the impact of India's participation in them and other bilateral and multilateral interactions.

The study of interregionalism is a novel subject in the whole gamut of study of regionalism in international studies. The phenomenon however, remains an understudied area of research. The scholars such as Heiner Hanggi, Ralf Roloff, Jurgen Ruland, Soderbaum and Langenhove have made major contributions to the theories and functionalities of interregionalism and their scholarly work do highlight importance of different interregional groupings. However, there is a gap in literature with regard to the study of hybrid-interregional interactions between different emerging economies such as India, China, Russia, Brazil and South Africa in the recent period. With detail analysis on India's interregional interaction with other emerging powers, this study highlights the significance of interregionalism to the emerging powers and its major agenda and contribution to foreign policy of India.

The advent of interregionalism is considered as a new tier in the international system. A gradual rise in interregional groupings in almost all parts of world indicates this phenomenon. From the available literature and analysing the journey of various multilateral interactions, it is evident that India's foreign policy has always possessed a significant capability for engaging in multi-alignments. The period of the 1990s witnessed the addition of several interregional groupings that focus on cooperation in different sectors. India's association with NAM and G77 are some of the initial interregional interactions that emphasised engaging with countries from different

regions coming together for certain common goals. BIMSTEC, EAS, IORA, G20, and SCO are some of the recent additions. India's membership in IBSA and BRICS has turned into significant engagements in contemporary times.

The advent of globalisation has brought major changes in the conduct of international relations. Over the years, the world has witnessed different patterns in the global order. The process of globalisation has led to interdependent relations among the countries, where no one country can manage unilateral interactions. The emerging economies and the rising powers have adopted this phenomenon to advance their global goals, thus adding interregionalism as a new element in the theories and process of international studies. It also offers an interesting topic of research.

The first chapter has highlighted the significance of interregionalism in the international system and its role in forming a complex web of interactions among the countries. These interregional groupings have added a third layer in the study of international relations after the bilateral and multilateral interactions observed by the states. Interregionalism is an extension of new regionalism, a phenomenon that drew major attention of almost all the countries and regions. The regional setting is primarily united through the geographical settings and represents all the three theoretical analyses, namely realist versions, liberals, and the social constructivist. The second wave of regionalism or new regionalism spread to different parts of the world, making the world more accommodative and multidimensional, for it operated at multiple levels. To sum up, the process of regionalism is a result of integration and interdependence.

The third wave of new regionalism began in the 1990s, which further progressed into old and new interregionalism. The interregional phenomenon surpasses geographical boundaries. It is a collaboration of regions and states from different regions that forms a grouping on the grounds of recognised commonalities and which share similar aspirations. It is strikingly different from the old form of regionalism or first wave of regionalism, which was highly Eurocentric. The old interregionalism was dominated by the actor-centric region-to-region interaction between the EU and different regions, which dominated the world scene during the 1970s and early 1980s. During the 1990s, the process of interregionalism spread to other parts of the world, turning into a key defining feature of the contemporary international system. Interregional

groupings such as ASEM, APEC, EUROMED, EULAC, Africa-Europe Meeting are some of the examples of new interregional groupings categorised under different typologies. In *quasi-regionalism* or old interregionalism one region forms relations with different countries. APEC is an example of *mega-regionalism* that covers the whole range of relations between different sub-regions from different continents. *Trans-regionalism* brings two regions together to form a larger complex region as in ASEM. The advent of individual countries coming together and forming an interregional connection has further led to a new version of interregionalism defined as *hybrid regionalism*. Groupings such as G20 and EAS are some of the prominent examples coming under this category.

The emerging powers of the current century, with growing economic credentials and rising power aspirations have widely adopted this phenomenon of interregionalism. They aspire to move beyond regional interaction and form interregional formulations with states traversing regional boundaries. The world order is always designed in a dominant-power framework. After the cold war, the United States claimed superpower status, creating a unipolar world order. However, the emergence of many emerging economies and regions with the formation of NICs, rise of Asia and in the economies of the countries, especially China, Russia, India, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Turkey have led to structural changes in the global system. This phenomenon is also described through the power cycle theory, where the decline of one power gradually leads to the rise of other potential powers.

The use of interregionalism and the importance of forming an extra-regional collaboration among the emerging powers form an important correlation. Interregional groupings have become an important tool to achieve a significant position in the current global world order as these groupings aim to acquire not just economic but comprehensive relations. The new interregionalism is more comprehensive and multidimensional and thus provides an opportunity for India to extend its partnership with the newly constructed regions that addresses varied issues of global importance.

India's growing power credential has initiated a new advent in its foreign policy. Along with continuity in its foreign policy, the country has also experienced changes especially with regard to different interregional engagements. India's economic

growth in the post-1991 liberalisation period has been a major factor leading to its economic model. India since independence aspired to play an independent role in the international system. Its foreign policy has been influenced by prominent leaders such as Nehru, Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi, Narasimha Rao, I.K. Gujral, Manmohan Singh and now Narendra Modi. The foreign policy is based on both idealistic and realist principles, where India aspires to improve its hard as well as soft-power capabilities. India has gradually attained good relations with almost all the regions and actively participates in multilateral interactions such as in the United Nations. India stresses to seek a major-power position through peaceful means that will be focused on the principles of non-violence as defined by Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi. It has also attained a significant position in the regional parlance with South Asia and the regional organisation of SAARC. India has also signed several FTAs with different countries, deepening its economic interaction with them, which has enhanced India's position in the global arena.

In recent times, India's foreign policy has engaged itself in various interregional interactions that focus on multidimensional relations. It has been active in groupings such as IBSA, BRICS, BIMSTEC, IORA, G20, EAS, SCO and BASIC. The Asian Relations Conference of 1947 forms one of India's first kind of interregional interactions. However, NAM and G77 too form important interregional cooperations between the states from varied regions. In recent times, India has engaged in interactions with multiple interregional groupings. These interregional groupings are formed on the realisation of certain shared similarities and certain common objectives and goals of the member states.

India's participation in groupings such as BIMSTEC and IORA is significant to focus on neighbouring and littoral states. BIMSTEC forms an extension of India's Look East policy that focuses on developing the connectivity between the regions from South Asia and South-East Asia. The groupings have formulated a joint interaction in the form of an FTA. The grouping forms one of India's major initiatives to engage in interregional ties that go beyond the regional settings of SAARC and South Asia. Along with economic engagements BIMSTEC has formed cooperation in fourteen areas, forming a comprehensive partnership. BIMSTEC was also recognised in the eighth BRICS summit's outreach programme, where all the heads of state from BIMSTEC countries attended the summit held in India in 2016.

IORA also forms an important setting to guarantee better security and movements across the Indian Ocean. India has tried to build a security network between the littoral states for easy transport of the vessels and for addressing impacts of rising sea level on the island states and the coastal region.

India joined EAS in 2007, for developing a strategic and multidimensional engagement and also strengthening its relations with the countries from East Asia, as this grouping provides an opportunity to look beyond ASEAN. India will benefit from the Mekong-India corridor and develop sectoral cooperation, especially in education. The revival of the Nalanda University in India is one of its notable achievements.

G20 forms an important financial architecture for both the developed and the developing countries. India demands support for emerging economies and aspires to achieve macroeconomic cooperation and avoid negative spill-over. It seeks to push for an open and predictable market system that will be favourable to Indian farmers.

India is a new entrant in SCO. Its association with the grouping has also enabled the country to strengthen its relations with the countries from Central Asia and Eurasia. India also seeks to address the issues of terrorism and drug trafficking by building a strong security network with the grouping.

Climate change remains the major factor for the formation of BASIC. India strongly adheres to represent the developing countries against the discriminatory policies in carbon emission.

India is a prominent member of the IBSA forum. The group members engage in cooperation in several sectors, managed through different Working Groups. Indian Prime Ministers have attended all the summit meetings of the grouping. IBSA has been considered as an important route to envision South-South cooperation among the countries of the Global South. The IBSA Trust Fund is a good instrument to address developmental projects in the countries which are most in need. This initiative strengthens India's identity as a traditional supporter of countries from the Global South. Although the amount dispersed for the fund is much lower in comparison to the big donors such as the EU and the funds from the developed OECD-DAC countries, it has enabled the creation of a new identity of the IBSA countries as a new group of donors from the Global South. The IBSAMAR initiative of the grouping also

provides an opportunity to tackle issues like piracy and guarantee safety at sea on some of the pressing issues for India.

BRICS has achieved a major feat in a very short period of time. The grouping has progressed from the Goldman Sachs projection and has moved towards a process of institutionalisation. BRICS is the most discussed and debated grouping of the current times. With the establishment of NDB and CRA, the grouping has reflected confidence and readiness to handle the growing demands of the current world system. Indicative of the popularity of the grouping are the growing demands to join from other emerging countries. India has been actively engaging in BRICS to realise its potential growth along with other member countries and it also strives to create an environment that will be beneficial to development. India considers BRICS as a grouping that would strengthen its position as a major decision-maker in the global arena. Through this grouping, India strongly objected to the unilateral practice of sanctioning and hostile language by the US.

The growth in the economic sector with GDP rising from 3.97 per cent in 2000 to 7.19 per cent in 2014 has enabled India to look much wider and focus on different political, strategic and economic relations with different interregional groupings. These groupings are defined as the club of emerging economies, which emphasises the growing economic credentials of the country, which differs from the title of a developing state or a third world country. Through its increased participation in these groupings, India aims to broaden its goal and achieve full autonomy without any influences and impacts from the developed states in practising its foreign policy. India aims to achieve both geopolitical as well as geo-economic prowess by deepening its interaction in these interregional groupings. These instances also predict a peaceful transition of power without any military skirmishes that were experienced in the past. India has been consistent in demanding and seeking cooperation in the expansion of the UNSC in both permanent and non-permanent membership.

These engagements with comprehensive objectives justify the first hypothesis, i.e.: “India’s participation in interregional groupings is fundamentally governed by its strong desire to become a great power in the international system”.

The very formation of IBSA was a response to the discriminatory behaviour towards the developing countries at the G8 summit. Both these groupings primarily target the

discriminatory policies of the current world system, which is dominated by the developed states from the Global North. The member countries objected to the unilateral actions taken by the developed states, especially the US, in conflict-affected states of the Middle East. India participates in the meetings of IBSA and BRICS held on the sidelines of the other multilateral and interregional meetings such as UNGA, G20, EAS, and SCO.

India through BRICS has been consistently demanding for currency swap and SDR reforms that will enable in changing the current dominance of the US dollar in the global financial architecture. India along with other group members has emphasised reforms in the international financial institutions such as the WTO, IMF and the World Bank. It has played an active role in pushing for the Doha Development rounds in favour of developing countries which fight against the protectionist measures adopted by the developed states. Through these groupings, India has been very vocal in asserting for Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) with regard to climate change measures. The demand for the adoption of the concept of RWP as an extension of R2P is seen as a significant contribution of these groupings to guarantee human rights and non-intervention.

Thus, these examples support the second hypothesis, i.e.: “Interregional groupings have formed effective instruments of India’s foreign policy to create a multipolar world order”.

Along with acquiring power credentials India aims to achieve the status of being a responsible power which is recognised by countries from the Global South. India’s contribution to the IBSA Fund has been highly acknowledged by the UN. The NDB of the BRICS also extends help to infrastructure projects in BRICS states.

With participation in these two groupings, India aims to develop several areas of cooperation and contribute in creating a global financial architecture with establishing policies of currency swap, and a global value chain. It also aims to achieve the goals of global governance. The regional-level interaction has focused on achieving the SDGs, which will assist in improving India’s Human Development Index and overall well-being of its people. The two forums have also assisted in raising the most pertinent issues of terrorism troubling the member countries. They also aim to address

issues such as the IPR regime that is dominated by the developed states, gender equality, etc. that are pertinent to the countries of the Global South.

The bilateral relations between the member countries have also gained a necessary boost through collaboration with IBSA and BRICS. The interregional engagements have also enabled India to build relations of “cooperative competition” with the member countries. India’s interaction with China in these groupings has especially led to the creation of a platform for the two countries to deepen their comprehensive relations. India has also deepened its relations with Brazil, Russia and South Africa where the bilateral trade ties have improved considerably and the countries are looking for a comprehensive strategic partnership. These groupings have also proved beneficial as a launch pad to the regions of Latin America and Africa.

Thus, these illustrations prove the third hypothesis, i.e.: “The overlapping membership in IBSA and BRICS and India’s participation in both make an impact on its foreign policy goals and strategies”.

IBSA and BRICS both qualify under the five functions defined by Jurgen Roland. Both follow balancing, as all the members seek to acquire, maintain and demonstrate power. These are moving closer to institution building with the introduction of the IBSA Fund and the NDB. Though the groupings do not possess a permanent headquarters, secretariat and staff, there is consistent effort to institutionalise them. The members also endeavour to address global issues of importance that respond to the function of rationalising. The groupings also follow the principle of agenda setting to be achieved by the members through cooperation at the regional level. Lastly, the two groupings follow the criteria of collective identity with shared similarities such as emerging economies, rising power aspirations and seek to develop a multipolar world order.

These interregional interactions have limitations and the political, economic, social divergences among the member countries also impact the effectiveness of these groupings. However, interregionalism is a gradual process, especially with regard to groupings such as IBSA and BRICS. Both are relatively new groupings and only time will tell whether the hopes of their achievements are justified. In spite of the differences the main goal of these groupings is to develop cooperations to explore the complementarities. India will have to strengthen its engagements with these groupings

and play a proactive role in achieving their different objectives and goals. These engagements, especially IBSA and BRICS, have supported promoting India's national goals and strategies globally. These partnerships also contribute in setting up tripartite interactions ranging from bilateral, regional and global, thus assisting in the creation of India's endeavour to formulate the version of a multipolar-interregional world order to augment its power credentials in the current global system.

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