Republic of Korea as a Middle Power:
Issues of Capacities, Constraints and Contributions, 2008-2013

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Dedicated to my lovely

Grandpa Mr Ginkhokam,
Grandma Mrs Chingzanian

&

My affectionate family,

the greatest gift

from God

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DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled *"Republic of Korea as a Middle Power: Issues of Capacities, Constraints and Contributions, 2008-2013"* submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this thesis be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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CHAPTER 3

I. Abstract

The present study examines ROK's middle power diplomacy in three selected areas - UN Peacekeeping Operations, Official Development Assistance and Green Growth strategy. The time taken is from 2008 - the year when Lee Myung-bak came to power, and covers till 2013 – the first year of Park Geun-hye's administration. The main purpose of the study is to evaluate the achievements and limitations of ROK's middle power diplomacy within the given time frame. Using Constructivism as the theoretical background, the author investigates how ROK has been constructing its middle power ambitiously since the coming of Lee Myung-bak and how the policy has been continued by the succeeding Park Geun-hye administration.

The ascension of Lee Myung-bak to power in 2008 was a significant landmark in Republic of Korea's foreign policy discourse. As leader of the conservative Grand National Party, Lee had a great determination to break away from the obsession of North Korea's military threat and pursue its national interests ambitiously as the engagement policy of the past decade under the Progressive administrations did not bring any peaceful solution to North Korea's problem. The year coincided with the formation of G20 in place of G7 which paved the way not only for emerging powers India, Brazil and South Africa, but also for middle power like ROK to enhance its leadership role at the global arena. With the catchphrase 'Global Korea', Lee envisioned ROK's expanding role in the field of peace and development as a contributing member of the global community.

Although the term 'middle power' or 'middle power diplomacy' has been used in ROK foreign policy discourse in the past, it become prominent with the coming of Lee Myung-bak. As an emerging middle power, Lee sought to expand ROK's involvement in UN peacekeeping operations, enhance its official development assistance (ODA), take proper initiative to combat climate change. On August 15, 2008, on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the ROK, Lee set "Green Growth" as a 60-year national vision and since then has appealed the international community for environment friendly development. In January 2010, ROK was admitted as the 24th member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC). It hosted G20 Seoul Summit in November 2010 -

the first non-G8 country, the fourth High Level Forum (HLF) on Aid Effectiveness in November 2011 in Busan, and Seoul Nuclear Security Summit in March 2012, which reflects the international community's recognition of Korea's efforts and capability to become a major global player.

'Middlepowerism' was promoted as a central pillar in efforts to pursue the Park Geun-hye administration's initiative of 'trust diplomacy'. Her administration also put 'responsible middle power diplomacy' as one of the major pillars of ROK foreign policy. Under the initiative of ROK, an informal grouping of middle power called MIKTA - Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey and Australia was created in 2013 on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. ROK has been playing an active role for global peace and security and has rendered development aid to various countries in Asia, Africa and South America.

Despite the success of ROK diplomatic skills at the global level, there has been severe geopolitical constraint on its foreign policy making. North Korea's provocations and military attacks remain the greatest security concern for policy makers in Seoul. The sinking of *Cheonan* on March 26, 2010 and the *Yeonpyeong* Island attack on November 23, 2010 show that North Korea continues to be the main obstacle to ROK's foreign policy. North Korea's increasing missile capability and nuclear development posed instability not only on the Korean peninsula but also to the whole of Northeast Asia. China's repeated shielding of North Korea's reckless acts downplayed the international community's efforts to denuclearise the isolated Stalinist state. This prevailing US-China competition for geopolitical influence resulted in the return of geopolitics, calling for ROK to effectively enhance its diplomatic skills and expand its middle power diplomacy beyond the region.

In view of the prevailing security complexity on the peninsula, the study also highlights the obstacles posed by North Korea's military provocations as well as the regional tensions that escalated due to China-US diverging response of the two incidents – *Cheonan* sinking and *Yeonpyeong* Island. Assuming its material capacities as commonly accepted, the thesis has evaluated the constraints and contributions of ROK for global peace and development within the confine of its middle power diplomacy.

Despite the various achievements on its green growth initiatives, Lee's construction of dams on the four major rivers – Han, Naktong, Geum and Yeongsan - came under harsh criticism from the environmental NGOs on the ground of ecological damages it caused and the unsustainability of the jobs that have been generated. Some fishing communities have not been able to continue their job, while some migratory birds are also affected by the projects. Also the use of the concept of 'green growth' has been criticised for accepting nuclear energy as part of the project. There have been strong discontents from environment activists groups as Lee did not consult them before taking the decisions.

The geopolitical constraint of ROK continues to be a main obstacle to its diplomatic maneuvers. At the time when it successfully enhanced middle power diplomacy at the global level, it has been constrained by its regional differences and the peninsular issues. If *Cheonan* sinking indicated the increasing US-China geopolitical rivalry, the *Yeonpyeong* Island attack was a clear indication of North Korea's brinkmanship. China's shielding of North Korea on the *Cheonan* sinking could be somewhat justifiable as there was not enough evidence to prove North Korea as the culprit. But China's continual diplomatic shielding of North Korea on this attack was a clear indication of its unchanging policy on Pyeongyang, which many observers see it as an obstacle to pressure the latter to change its behaviour. It further stood as a hindrance to Park Geun-hye's *trustpolitik* to engage North Korea.

The US rebalancing act against China's assertiveness also restrains South Korea to pave its own foreign policy which was best evidence when Washington warned Seoul not to join the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2013. Despite its convinced of the foreseeable financial benefits, Korea was unable to take a decision on fear of US negative reaction. It could decide to join it only after UK, another US ally declared its willingness to join the bank. The other constraints of ROK's middle power diplomacy at the regional level include Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiatives (NAPCI) and Eurasian Initiatives launched by President Park Geun-hye in 2013. These two initiatives too are at stalemate due to the lack of support from China and US, and the lack of reciprocity from North Korea. Cooperation among the Northeast Asian countries remains weak and unstable due to the territorial disputes.

Based on analysis of the three selected topics of study – UN peacekeeping operations, development aid and green growth, the author concludes that ROK has been constructing its international identity as a 'middle power' state. These diplomatic tools have boosted ROK's reputation and serve for its national interest. ROK has now been recognised as an important player of the global economic and financial institutions. ROK's diplomatic skill pursued through the prism of middle power enhances ROK's status as a responsible member of the global community. In spite of this, ROK's geopolitical constraints continue to hinder its middle diplomatic skills at the regional level, a hard reality it has not been able to overcome.

II. ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

A2/AD	Anti Access/Area Denial
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AIIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEM	Asia-Europe Meeting
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CPS	Country Partnership Strategies
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DAG	Development Assistance Group
DI	Doners' Interest
ECO	Economic Cooperation Organization
EDCF	Economic Development Cooperation Fund
EDS	Extended Deterrence Strategy
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
EIS	Environmental Impact Statement
EPB	Economic Planning Board
FROG	Free Rocket Over Ground
G20	G-20 or Group of Twenty
G7	G-7 or Group of Seven
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GGGI	Global Green Growth Institute
GNI	Gross National Income
GNP	Gross National Product
GSOMNIA	General Security of Military Information Agreement
HLF	High Level Forum
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
IMF	International Monetary Fund

KAMD	Korean Air Defense System
KOICA	Korea International Cooperation Agency
KOV	Korea Overseas Volunteer
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
LMICS	Lower Middle Income Countries
MD	Missile Defence
MIKTA	Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey and Australia
MNF	Multinational Force
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NAMA	Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions
NAPCI	Northeast Asian Peace and Cooperation Initiative
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEACI	Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Deveopment
OEEC	Organisation for European Economic Cooperation
OLICs	Other Lower Income Countries
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PFM	Prospective Founding Members
PFM	Prospective Founding Members
RN	Recipients' Need
ROK	Republic of Korea
ROKS	Republic of Korea Ship
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
TDS	Tailored Deterrence Strategy
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
THAAD	Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
TKR	Trans-Korean Railway
TSR	Trans-Siberian Railway
UMICs	Upper Middle Income Countries

UN ESCAP	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
UN MCED	United Nations Ministerial Conference on Environment and Development
UNAVEM	United Nations Angola Verification Missions
UNCSD	United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNFCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNIMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Government Group in India and Pakistan
UNOC	United Nations Operation in Congo
UNPKFC	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNPKO	United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group
UNTSO	United Nations Supervision Organisation
US	United States

III. Tables

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Mangzamuan

Mangzamuan   The 21st July 2017

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1.1 Background

The year 2008 marked a significant event for the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea, henceforth) owing to the several developments that unfolded at the domestic, regional and international arena which provided both challenges and opportunities. At the domestic level, Lee Myung-bak, leader of the conservative Grand National Party, who has a great determination to elevate ROK's diplomatic horizon came to power, after a decade of progressive rule. Lee's rise to power came on the heels of the global financial crisis 2007-08 which severely affected the western capitalist states, including the United States (US), which led to the formation of G20 from the existing G7. This paved the way, not only for the emerging powers like India, Brazil and South Africa to exert their leadership role, but also for a middle power country like ROK, which possesses the material capabilities to play a conspicuous role for global peace and development. At the regional level, China's increasing assertive behaviour intensified the US-China competition for dominance in Northeast Asia that added to ROK's diplomatic dilemma in dealing with the two great powers.

Squeezed between China, Japan and Russia, Korea, for centuries, had been a victim of great power politics, tragically referred to as 'a shrimp among whales'. It was invaded over nine hundred times in its two-thousand-year history. The Hermit Kingdom's closed-door policy could not prevent it from the Japanese colonisation in 1910, liberated only to be divided in 1945. Since its establishment in 1948, followed by the security ties with the US in 1953, ROK throughout the Cold War period played the role of a follower in Washington's containment against communist bloc led by the former Soviet Union. 'Its traditional inward-orientation made the task of venturing to others a strenuous task. Scholars have pointed out "weak power" mentality of ROK diplomacy – one that single mindedly pursue its own security in alliance with great power' (Yul 2012: 79). Roh Tae-

woo's *Nordpolitik* announced in 1988 enabled it to establish diplomatic ties with Eastern European countries and China after the end of Cold War, but not with North Korea.

However, ROK's economic growth coupled with its military power and political stability in past two decades gained her international recognition. The Gross Domestic Product of ROK in 2013 was $1.15 trillion - ranking 15th in the world, while its 50 million population ranks 26th. It has the 12th largest military personnel and its defence expenditure ranks in the 8th position. There is growing consensus that ROK should play greater role commensurate with its increased material capabilities, especially in the area of development cooperation, peacekeeping operations, human security and global governance. It was on this backdrop that ROK adopted 'middle power diplomacy' and committed itself to play greater global role.

Middle power was first mentioned during by the Roh Tae-woo's administration (1988-1993) and it was pursued by the succeeding administrations. However, middle power diplomacy has become prominent with the coming of Lee Myung-bak as the tenth President of ROK on February 25, 2008. Prior to that *"although there has been a mention about middle power or jung-gyun-guk diplomacy, both in government and policy experts, the term began to be widely circulated following the inauguration of Lee Myung-bak administration" (Lee 2012: 14).* In his inauguration address, "Lee laid out the beginning of a vision for Korea as a responsible and contributing member of the international community committed to global diplomacy and the global movement for peace and development" (Snyder 2009: 87). In 2009, Lee adopted ***Global Korea*** as a National Security Strategy which sought to restore the US-ROK alliance as the main pillar of his foreign policy, while at the same time strengthening its relationships with key regional powers and called for pragmatic approach to North Korea, demanding denuclearization as the precondition for engagement. In early March 2009, President Lee announced the 'New Asia Initiatives' (or New Asia Diplomacy) in order to strengthen relationship with Asian countries.

As an emerging middle power, Lee sought to expand ROK's involvement in UN peacekeeping operations, enhance its official development assistance (ODA), take initiative to combat climate change. On August 15, 2008, on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the ROK, Lee set "Green Growth" as a 60-year national vision and since then has appealed the international community for environment friendly development. In January 2010, ROK was admitted as the 24th member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC). It hosted G20 Seoul Summit in November 2010 - the first non-G8 country, the fourth High Level Forum (HLF) on Aid Effectiveness in November 2011 in Busan, and Seoul Nuclear Security Summit in March 2012, which reflects the international community's recognition of Korea's efforts and capability to become a major global player. Hosting of these international conferences is projected by ROK as an opportunity to showcase its economic achievements to the international community the way it successfully hosted the Seoul Olympic Games 1988.

Middle power diplomacy is regarded as an attractive foreign policy option at its disposal. In a keynote speech at the conference on *The Role of Middle Powers in 21st Century International Relations*, held at Seoul in April 2013, ROK Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kim Kyou-hyun stated that, *'Middlepowerism'* was promoted as a central pillar in efforts to pursue the Park administration's initiative of 'trust diplomacy'. Her administration also put 'responsible middle power diplomacy' as one of the major pillars of ROK foreign policy (Sohn 2016). Under the initiative of ROK, an informal grouping of middle power called MIKTA - Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey and Australia was created in 2013 on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. ROK has been playing an active role for global peace and security and has rendered development aid to various countries in Asia, Africa and South America.

Despite the success of ROK diplomatic skills at the global level, there has been severe geopolitical constraint on its foreign policy making. North Korea's provocations and military attacks remain the greatest security concern for policy makers in Seoul. The sinking of *Cheonan* on March 26, 2010 and the *Yeonpyeong* Island attack on November

23, 2010 show that North Korea continues to be the main obstacle to ROK's foreign policy. North Korea's increasing missile capability and nuclear development posed instability not only on the Korean peninsula but also to the whole of Northeast Asia. China's repeated shielding of North Korea's reckless acts downplayed the international community's efforts to denuclearise the isolated Stalinist state. This prevailing US-China competition for geopolitical influence resulted in the return of geopolitics, calling for ROK to effectively enhance its diplomatic skills and expand its middle power diplomacy beyond the region.

1.2 Literature Review

The available literature can be broadly divided into two: Identification of Middle Powers and ROK as a middle power.

ROK's middle power diplomacy dates back to the early 1990s, but it was in the post-2010s that a wide range of issues was undertaken under it. These works can be broadly divided into five themes: ROK as a traditional middle power, ROK as a new or emerging middle power, ROK's middle power role in UN peacekeeping operations, its green growth strategy and its contribution to help the developing countries through official development assistance.

1.2:1 ROK as a Traditional Middle Power

The concept of 'traditional' and 'emerging middle power' was based on the classification of **Jordaan (2003)** who proposes, *'that middle power first attain a middle power capacity, and then proceed on to a stage of exerting on its foreign policy behavior'*.

Using five objective indicators: GNP, per capita, military expenditure per capita, population, infant mortality rate, and adult literacy rate, **Neack (1992)** classifies ROK as a middle power since the 1980s. **Robertson (2007)** who conducts a study on ROK's middle power status based on *"capacity and behaviour"* concludes that ROK represents a dichotomy between emerging and traditional - having been evolved into a more *'traditional middle power'*. He argues that ROK, a middle power in terms of material

capacity since 1990s manifested it in its foreign policy behaviour following the agreement reached at the Six Party Talks in Beijing on February 13, 2007, with an aim to maintain status quo and its tendencies towards compromise, coordination and cooperation. **Kim (2009),** who classifies countries into four groups of powers – great, middle, middle-small and weak - argues that ROK has been a military power since 1995 along with Mexico and Turkey (Shin 2011: 143).

Choi (2008, 2009) argues that, despite its lack of material capacity, ROK has for long maintained a strong *identity as middle power*, although it may lag behind traditional middle powers like Canada, Australia and most of the Nordic countries, in terms of diplomatic capabilities and commitment to internationalism. His argument is based on ROK's continuous initiatives to promote regional institution building since Park Chung-hee era. The most notable case, in his view, was Roh Moo-hyun's ambitious diplomacy to enhance ROK's autonomy from the US, to secure North Korea's survival and institutionalise Northeast Asia. It resulted in a total disaster due to lack of support from US. **Saxer (2013),** based on his analysis on ROK middle power's *"capabilities and aspirations"* argues that, although measured by objective capabilities alone (GDP and population), Korea was a middle power by the end of Roh Tae-woo Administration (1988-1993), the crucial elements of aspirations of playing a role globally more in line with the capabilities were missing. In his view, aspirations in the direction of *middle power behaviour*, was a constant theme of ROK leaders since the adoption of *segyehwa* (globalisation) by Kim Young-sam (1993-1998) in 1994.

1.2: 2 ROK as a New or an Emerging Middle Power
Shin (2009) sees ROK's middle power identity during Roh Moo-hyun's administration as a self-promoted identity, which was understood as a 'thin' identity aspiration which represents Roh's strong self-willed understanding, not so firmly grounded in the regional and geopolitical reality to create the conditions necessary for 'thick' identity. However, this new identity was effective for ROK in pushing forward the space ROK occupied in regional politics, a self-conscious attempt to relocate ROK in the region – economically, diplomatically and militarily. **Shin (2016)** argues that, although both Roh Moo-hyun

(2002-2007) and Lee Myung-bak (2007-2013) strongly aspired to promote an idea of ROK as a middle power, they materialised the concept differently, adopting distinctive strategies and approaches. Whilst Roh pursued the concept in the regional context, focusing more on regional security and inter-Korean relations, Lee enhanced the ROK's place on the global stage, based on strong alliance with the US, and expanded its role at the wider global arena. **Kim (2016)** implies that Roh Moo-hyun (2003–2008), Lee Myung-bak (2008–2013) and Park Geun-hye (2013-2017) have inconsistently defined middle power in different ways in line with their own policy orientation. Roh conceptualises it to focus on the regional issues, Lee on global issues and Park on rethinking China. **Lee (2013)** argues that ROK's foreign policy behaviour during Roh Moo-hyun administration closely reflects that of a middle power, and achieved a level of capacity and behaviour consistent with its middle power status under Lee Myung-bak.

Lee (2012) cites ROK as "new" or "late comer" in the fourth wave of middle powers. She points out that though ROK has been a middle power for the past two decades, in terms of material capacity, its statecraft did not match its middle power status until it was adopted my Lee Myung-bak to enhance the country's national status. Soft power, network policy and public diplomacy are employed as ingredient in assisting ROK's middle power. She argues that although Roh Moo-hyun administration introduced the concept of middle power roles and important free trade networks, it did not set middle power as an umbrella policy vision. **Cooper and Dal (2016)** termed MIKTA – Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey and Australia – as a 'missing middle' belonging to the third wave of middle power by their inclusion in the G20 in 2008. In their categorisation, the first wave of middle powers was from 1945 to1980s, while the second wave covers between 1990s and early 2000s. Likewise, **Cooper and Mo (2011)** also contend that ROK's middle power diplomacy began with the advent of G20 in 2008. **Kim and Kim (2016)** argue that ROK's middle power performance or 'middlepowermanship' largely gained international attention with Lee Myung-bak's middle power activism under the slogan, 'Global Korea' mainly through the hosting of the G20 Summit in November 2010, the 4th High-level Forum for Aid Effectiveness in November 2011 and the Nuclear Security Summit in March 2012. They opine that ROK has been generally accepted as a

middle power both in terms of its geographical location - between China and Japan, and quantitative measurements since 1990s. Burt the initiatives undertaken for regional institutions such as Park Chung-hee's Asia and Pacific Council (ASPAC), Kim Dae-jung's East Asia Vision Group (EAVG) were not fully acknowledge as middle power diplomacy. **Vio (2012)** analyses ROK's regional leadership as a middle power in regional institutions in East Asia, starting from President Syngman Rhee. Based on Cooper, Higgot and Nossal's proposal that middle powers act as a catalyst, facilitator and manager, Vio concludes that, despite the criticisms on its leadership role in dealing with Japan, China and North Korea, ROK has displayed early signs of leadership in the wake of the 21st century.

1.2:3 ROK's Middle Power Role in UN Peacekeeping Operations

Ko (2012) assesses ROK's middle power activism in UN peacekeeping operations in an attempt to discover the reason for the drastic decrease of troops during the period 2003-2007. He concludes that: i) the economic growth of the state and defence budget stay relatively constant and do not match the fluctuation of the PKO activities in Korea, and ii) there is no correspondence between partisanship and the PKO policy, as the liberal governments of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun implemented different PKO policies. In another study on the motivation behind ROK's active participation in UN peacekeeping operations, **Ko (2015)** argues that 'a normative consideration is the main factor behind Korea's participation in UN peacekeeping operations' rather than economic or political factors. **Roehrig (2013)** indicates that Korea's economic take off and its ascension to a 'rising middle power' has changed the country's position 'from a sole consumer of security to more of a provider of global security.' He identifies UNIFIL in Lebanon, MINUSTAH in Haiti, and UNMISS in South Sudan as the three most significant specific missions of ROK over the past two decades. **Choi (2010)** notes that the participation of ROK in Haiti is considered to be an obligation as a middle power in compliance with Lee Myung-bak administration's initiative for Global Korea and New Asia, based on the guiding philosophy of transforming the country from an 'aid recipient to an aid provider' and from a 'nation being led' to a 'nation that leads.'

1.2: 4 ROK's Middle Power Role in Official Development Assistance

Lumsdaine and Schopf (2007) investigate reason for the significant increased of ROK's foreign aid in the post-2000s unlike the 1980s and 1990s. They argue that ROK did not emphasise strong support for aid like those countries whose motives were linked to humanitarian aid. Added to this, the weak development of Korean civil society resulted in the low level of support of aid in the 1990s. They are of the view that the rise in voluntarism, the expanded influence of NGOs, and strong popular support for assistance to the poor, both at home are the factors responsible for the changing values leading to the increase   in humanitarian aid to North Korea and other developing countries. **Yu (2015)** reviews DAC, the history of Korean ODA and explains the background of Korea's submission for membership. He constructs a meta-evaluation framework for comparative analysis of Korea's ODA programme with that of relevant OECD member countries. He opines that Korea's accession to DAC will prove mutually beneficial, improving effectiveness of Korea's ODA programme, and providing DAC with a new unique perspective to strengthen its partnership with developing countries.

Kim and Oh (2012) attempt to find the determinants of ROK's foreign aid by employing the donor's interests (DI) and recipient nations' needs (RN). Their findings presented more mixed signs which suggested that there is the possibility that ROK's ODA policy may have a dual-track structure - that it may pursue donor interest in the group of relatively higher-income developing countries, but adopt a humanitarian approach to the group of lower-income developing countries. **Watson (2012)** points out the uniqueness of ROK Official Development Assistance compared to other Asian and non-Asian donors because of its specific set of historical, cultural, geopolitical and domestic influences. Based on his study on the 'great aid debate' among the Neoliberals, Marxists and Poststructuralists, the author opines that the high-level debates marginalise key issues of education, public opinion and the long-term sustainability effectiveness of emergent Asian ODA. He argues that the activities of ROK non-governmental organisations are providing an alternative grassroots account of, and approach to, the contours of the aid debate in both theory and practice. **Oh (2014)** examines ROK's transition from being a primary aid recipient to a donor, which demonstrates a successful example of aid

effectiveness in terms of mutual priority between donors and recipient. He argues that ROK's proliferating of more recipient countries results in receiving only a tiny portion of aid from Korea, which shows that mutual priority is not observed. The country continues to be a minor donor many of its recipients. He suggests that ROK should focus on few sectors on which it has a comparative advantage and should have more coordination among similar projects to avoid duplication.

1.2:5 ROK's Middle Power Role for the Promotion of Green Growth

Low Carbon 'Green Growth' or in short 'Green Growth' was adopted as a national strategy by Lee Myung-bak on the 60th anniversary of the founding of ROK in 2008. It calls for combating climate change while at the same time addressing environmental issues and promoting sustainable development. As Lee succinctly declared: "Green growth is about addressing climate change in an aggressive manner, while at the same time, making the green technologies and industries needed to combat climate change the driver of national economic growth" (Lee 2010). There have been studies on the underlying purposes and strategies. The available literature on subject can be broadly divided into positive, ambivalent and negative aspects.

Choi (2013) opines that, due to the increasing emphasis on energy independence and sustainability, the green growth movement in the ROK appeared to be less an option than an essential path to achieving its vision of sustainable economic growth and the well-being of its people. In his view, Korea needed to embrace green growth to address (i) the need for a new economic growth engine; (ii) the need to improve the population's quality of life; and (iii) domestic concern about climate change and the importance of adapting to it. **Moon (2010)** examines the promise and pitfalls of green growth strategy in ROK with an aim to uncover their implications on the design and implementations of successful policy in this area. The government's initiatives to increase employment and reduce poverty and inequality have been criticised as 'just another name for the type of economic growth pursued in 1970s and 1980s, which focuses only on economic growth but neglects to green society.' Based on the analysis of the pros and cons, the author views green growth as an intermediate concept through which sustainable growth can be

achieved. **Kim and Thurbon (2015),** in an attempt to explain Korea's ambitious pursuit of green growth explores the various reasons for the adoption of the strategy. They argue that 'Korean style environmentalism is best understood as an extension of the long-held philosophy of developmentalism amongst the policy-making elite.' **Han (2015)** examines various low carbon green growth initiatives that the Lee Myung-bak government introduced to market ROK as a trendsetter in the global environmental arena. Despite Lee administration's production of various tangible outputs and the international recognition it obtained through diplomatic efforts, Han identifies a gap between the administration's ambitions and the domestic foundations upon which they were based. He concludes that: i) Korea currently lags behind the advanced countries in Europe or North America in terms of green technology and innovation, and ii) Korea's relatively poor domestic environmental performance over the years does not bode well for its intended aim of playing a leadership role on the global environmental stage.

Mazzetti (2012), based on the review of the past 30 years of ROK's economic growth and its subsequent cost on environment, examines the extent to which President Lee Myung-bak's green strategy has addressed the issues of the country's emissions problem and whether the policies truly represent a desire to adopt greener economic growth. She explores the positives and negatives of ROK's green policies. On the positive aspects, the strategy represents a notable departure from the government's earlier defensive position of promoting only those green policies that did not interfere with economic growth. In addition, it resulted in some visible achievements, with notable increases both in spending on green R&D and in the number of green industry players which indicates that green initiatives are developing in tandem with ROK's economy. But on the negative aspect, due to its heavy emphasis on dam construction and dredging, this project has been highly criticised by environmental advocates, who claim that it may damage, rather than restore, the waterways. The jobs created through the Four Major Rivers Project are short-term unskilled jobs rather than long-term sustainable ones. Also, the prescribed R&D spending places strategic emphasis on increasing industrial competitiveness in the global market, which is largely following ROK's traditional export-led model of growth.

Furthermore, judged by the international level, ROK's brand of green growth remains controversial due to its heavy reliance on nuclear energy.

Shim (2010) examines the objectives of 'Green Growth' and reviews the implications of this strategy on other policy areas. He argues that, in terms of economic theory, 'Green Growth' is rooted in the Keynesian economic model, after which instruments of the government's and the central bank's fiscal and monetary policies should be applied to ease the impact of external shocks on the national economy. He raises his doubts that whether 'Green Growth' provides a coherent policy concept, which might serve as a new international growth model, or it is rather a mere buzzword to 'green-wash' old policy practices. As the 'greening' of ROK appears to be double-edged, he identifies potential pitfalls and raises questions regarding the consistency of the concept itself. **Yun (2010)** criticises the green growth policy of ROK on the ground that the meaning of green for the government is different from the original meaning of "green," as understood in the field of political ecology, which meant direct democracy, non-violence, solidarity, feminism and self-determination as well as ecology. As a political movement it embraced diverse environmental, anti-nuclear, peace and gender equality themes. But for the ROK government, "green" growth means simply the reduction of CO2 emissions and environmental pollutants. Moreover, the Four Major Rivers Project and the railroad construction, which accounts for 36.8 percent and 24.5 percent respectively, are neither green nor prone to produce growth, which do not fit into the main strategies for green growth identified by the government. Similarly, **Yo (et. al 2011)** raise their concerns about the conflicts between 'green development' and 'habitat preservation' in ROK due to the construction of Ganghwa Tidal Power Plan and Songdo International City. They argue that although these projects will lead to creation of short-term jobs, it will lead to destruction of eco-system of migratory birds and fishes, and the decline of local fisheries and related jobs.

1.2:6 Debates on ROK's Middle Power Status
Kazuo (2013) analyses debates on ROK's middle power status on global stage in its attainment of economic prosperity, democratic and culturally attractive country as well as

its role. He points out that ROK's middle power strategy is silent on reunification. He argues that ROK's middle power strategy is an attempt to redefine its own position and strengthen its self-assertion while maintaining status quo on the peninsula. **Robertson (2013)** too argues that despite its qualification as a middle power, measured in terms of diplomatic activism, niche diplomacy, coalition building and good international citizenship, ROK leaders never talk about being a middle power unlike Australian and Canadian politicians. He also wonders why there has never been domestic public policy debate about South Korea's role as a middle power. **Douch and Solomon (2014)** refuse to admit ROK as middle power on the ground that 'ROK is economically qualified but not militarily as their main focus remains North Korea and regional security.' **Shim (2010)** also agrees to this argument and posits the need to develop middle power theory relevant to address the security issues facing ROK.

1:2.7 Gaps in Literature

The above review of literature shows that, so far most of the works done on ROK's middle power focus on single topic. There has not been any works done on ROK's role in UN peacekeeping operations, green growth and official development assistance as a combined topic. Moreover, most of the studies examine the positive role of ROK and its leadership role as a middle power in global and regional institutions. ROK's middle power diplomacy has been greatly hindered by rising tensions on the Korean peninsula following the *Cheonan* sinking of March 26, 2010 and *Yeonpyeong* Island attack of November 23 in the same year.

The US-China competition for influence in the region posed 'diplomatic dilemma' for ROK to maneuver its foreign policy to best suit its national interest. In addition, the green growth strategy of ROK has been under harsh criticism due to the ecological damage caused by the construction of dams on the Four Major Rivers Project and the non-sustainability of the jobs created. The author's main interest is to evaluate ROK's middle power status by examining the material capacities, geopolitical constraints and global contributions that it has made so far.

1.3 Definition, Rationale and Scope of the Study

This study is an evaluation of ROK as a middle power – its material capacities, its middle power foreign policy behaviour, its contribution to global peace and security, green growth, development assistance and the constraints it has faced at the region and global level. The time period taken is from 2008 - which marks the beginning of ROK's prominent middle power diplomacy under President Lee Myung-bak, and covers till 2013 - the first year of President Park Geun-hye administration. It also briefly highlights the regional and global factors which influences ROK to adopt middle power diplomacy.

The study has its limitations in that it is not an in depth study of ROK foreign policy as a whole, but it is a study of ROK middle power strategy in the selected areas. The various aspects of ROK foreign policy such as public diplomacy, network diplomacy and resource diplomacy are not touched upon by the researcher in this study. It rather explores ROK's middle power activism at the local, regional and global level. Moreover, other attributes of power such as soft power in the form of 'Korean Wave' (Hanlyu) and technological advancement will not be covered.

1.4 Research Problem

1.4:1 Research Questions

➢ What are the domestic and international factors that drive ROK to adopt middle power diplomacy?

➢ To what extend does changing leadership play role in the formation of its foreign policy?

➢ What are main constraints for ROK to play middle power role?

➢ What are the main domestic debates on ROK's middle power role?

➢ Will ROK's contribution to development assistance help in attaining its international political goals?

> Is ROK's middle power diplomacy an anticipation to indirectly engage the international community on North Korean nuclear disarmament?

1.4:2 Hypotheses

> ROK has attained a middle power status in regards to economic power, military strength and population.

> ROK's commitments to UN Peacekeeping Operations, Development Aid and Green Growth are manifestations of its middle power diplomcy.

1.5 Research Methods

The methodology used in this study is deduction method. The study investigates middle power diplomacy in general, and moves to a particular country of study, ROK. The independent variable taken in the study is the 'middle power diplomacy' of ROK government while its economic power and military strength are taken as the dependent variables. ROK government's construction of identity and the North Korea military provocations will be taken as the intervening variables.

The study uses constructivist theory, along with the realist and the liberalist approaches, for analysing ROK's rise as middle power. This theory best supports ROK's middle status as it was under Lee Myung-bak's administration that ROK adopted "middle power diplomacy and identified itself as a "middle power" and a "responsible global player". ROK's leadership rise affirms the country's middle power status. In terms of material capacity, ROK has been an economic power since late 1980s and was a military power since the late 1990s. While in terms of its foreign policy behaviour, ROK has been participating in various UN agencies and multilateral organisation since Park Chung-hee administration. However, it never adopted middle power as its main foreign policy goals to play greater role in global issues.

The study is descriptive and analytical, based on primary and secondary data. As it is a case study of a selected topic, the study analyses the primary and secondary sources comparatively within the existing framework to arrive at a decisive conclusion. The primary sources will include government documents - Ministry of National Defense (MND) Defense White Papers, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) Diplomatic White Papers, UN Website, OECD Website - archival materials, reports. The secondary sources include books, journals, articles, magazines, newspapers, online newspapers, magazines and personnel interviews.

1.6 Organisation of the chapters

The study is broadly divided into seven chapters, of which the first and the last are the introduction and the conclusion respectively. The introduction chapter comprises the background of the study including literature review, rationale and scope of the study, methodology, hypotheses and research questions.

The second chapter looks at the various theoretical approaches and debates on the subject, with a brief highlight on the concept of power in International Relations – Realist Liberalist and Constructivist. This chapter adopts Constructivists' approach to establish ROK as a middle power diplomacy which are supported by its material capacities - economic power, military strength, population as well as foreign policy behaviour. It then looks at the factors driving ROK's middle power diplomacy under Lee Myung-bak (2008-2012) - which is the main indicator according to Constructivists perspective.

The third chapter examines the geopolitical constraints of ROK's middle power diplomacy posed by North Korean military provocations in 2010 and diverging domestic opinions and the US-China's contrasting response. It concludes that despite its diplomatic success at the global arena, the geopolitical constraints continue to obstruct ROK's middle power diplomacy at the regional level. The greatest challenges to ROK's middle power role are military threat from North Korea and the US-China geopolitical competition for regional influence.

The fourth chapter examines ROK's middle power role in the UN Peace Keeping Operation and counter-piracy. It explores the main motivations driving ROK's dispatch of troops and the challenges faced by the country. Starting with a brief historical and theoretical background of UN Peacekeeping Operations, the chapter evaluates the status of ROK in terms of its troops and financial contributions in comparison with other great and middle power countries. The chapter also examines the main significant achievements undertaken by the Lee Myung-bak government in its pursuit of expanding its role for global peace and security. ROK not only involves in UN Peacekeeping Operations under President Lee but also dispatched the Cheonghae Anti-piracy Unit was deployed near the coast of Somalia since May 3, 2009 in order to protect its trade route.

The fifth chapter analyses ROK's middle power diplomacy in the context of providing ODA to developing countries in Asia, Africa and South America. As a country which has successfully transitioned from a recipient to doner, ROK pledged to bridge gap between the developed and developing world by transporting its developmental model for rural transformation. The chapter also investigates the achievements and the weaknesses of ROK's ODA.

The sixth chapter focuses on ROK's middle power diplomacy on the promotion of Green Growth strategy. Adopted by Lee Myung-bak on 15th August on the 60th anniversary of the country's independence, it was proclaimed as the new national strategy for the coming 60 years. With this adoption ROK became the first country to adopt Green Growth as a national strategy to combat climate change. The chapter looks at the successes and failures of this strategy.

The last chapter comprises the conclusion of the study. It summarises the findings and tests the hypotheses of that are proposed. It also lays down the weakness of the study and the areas for future research for the scholars who have similar interest with the author.

CHAPTER 2

Middle Power: A Theoretical Framework

2.1 Introduction

The concept of 'middle power' is an ambiguous term in the study of foreign policy, as it involves defining relational concepts of 'middle' as well as 'power' in social sciences (Yalcin 2006). Although the use of the term can be traced back to the sixteenth century, indepth theoretical approach has been neglected for long. The main reasons for this is the long predominance of the realist paradigm since the end of World War II, which has influenced the perceptions of scholars as to which issues and actors are worthy of study (Behringer 2012: 16). If most national histories have suffered from 'history of the kings', world history has focused similarly on 'great powers' (Wood 1987: 3). In his famous work *Politics Among Nations*, the classical realist Han Morganthau (1948) provided only a brief mention of small states and ignored middle powers completely (Behringer 2012: 16). Even a realist Kenneth Waltz (1979) classifies states in terms of dichotomy such as great powers and others.

Realists conceptualise the dynamics of international security as a zero-sum struggle between nation-states in an anarchic international system (Morganthau 1948). Great power states are considered to be the primary actors in the global system, while small states are regarded as followers. This is exemplified by Robert Gilpin's argument *"both power and prestige function to ensure that the lesser states in the system will obey the commands of the dominant states"* (Gilpin 1981:30). With the proliferation of independent states after World War II in Asia and Africa, the role of small nations has attracted a number of scholars and has been the subject of several books since the 1960s. But the part which the states that are neither great nor small play in international politics has been neglected comparatively until recently (Holbraad 1971: 77).

However, with the transition of power in the global system in the post-Cold War era and the emergence of new middle power countries, a number of works on middle power came out. Various concepts and new approaches have been explored in the study of middle

power since then. Although debates on its concept still persist, it has greatly enriched to the literature on middle power.

Starting from the concept of power, this chapter examines the various approaches and locates the position of ROK's middle power status in the international system. It also explores Koreans' perception of power and the geopolitical significance of Korea in international politics. The author applies constructivist approach, supported the realists' approach based on material power and liberalists' approach based on foreign policy behaviour, for this study, as this best supports ROK's middle power diplomacy as a self-created and self-promoted identity ambitiously pursuit under President Lee Myung-bak.

2.2 Concept of Power in International Relations

Power is one of the central, if not the most central, concept in International Relations (Diez et al. 2011: 173). It is the oldest and the most disputed concept in political science (Imai 2011: 23). In the words of Felix Berenskoetter, 'world politics is held together by power relations'. Yet, because of its centrality, the meaning of power remains highly contested. It means different thing to different people according to its interpretation. For millennia, the study of power has been an essential part of human philosophical endeavours. Since ancient times, Greek and Indian philosophers, as well as Roman and Chinese statesmen tried to answer questions regarding the nature of power, its source and how to use it wisely in order to keep and increase it (Fels et al. 2012: V). However, despite these efforts, the concept of power still continues to be 'one of the most troublesome in the field of international relations' (Gilpin 1981: 13). A useful definition of power in international relations remains a matter of controversy (Waltz 1986: 333).

But as Joseph S. Nye rightly argues, *'such problems do not make a concept meaningless'*. In his attempt to define power, Nye compares it to weather and love. 'Everyone depends on weather and talk about it, but few understands. In the same manner, power like love, is easier to experience than to define or measure, but no less real for that' (Nye 2004: 1, 2011: 3). Nye's introduction of soft power in international relations has contributed

immensely to field of diplomacy. This has given a paradigm shift departing from the traditional approach to power.

Although there has not been commonly accepted definition of power, three main definitions can be useful in distinguishing its different aspects: *power as resources, relational power and structural power*. In the first context, certain material and immaterial factors within a state can be used to measure its national power. These materials such as military and economic are known as hard power. This definition is based on the works of Waltz (1979), which emphasis on capabilities and attributes of units and Morganthau's (1954) approach towards elements of power, which includes geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national character, national morale, quality of diplomacy and quality of government. Interestingly Nye coined the term soft power based on the idea of 'creating influence through psychology' adopted by Morganthau.

The second definition of power is a relational concept, in which an actor can bring another actor do something against the latter's own will, using its own material and immaterial resources. Max Weber was the first person to conceptualise power in this regard. Therefore, it is sometimes called Weberian concept of power (Weber 1922). It was, however, made popular by Robert Dahl who formulates that '*A* has power over *B* to the extent that he can get *B* to do something that *B* would not otherwise do' (Dahl 1957:202, 1994: 290). Power in this case comes from an actual engagement between two or more actors, rather than mere resources. In this definition, power is equated with influence which could be exercised through both tangible and intangible. Hans Morgenthau (1965: 30) defined power as "anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man". Nye (1990), however, called it as soft power - attained through persuasion, ideology and cultural attraction. This has become a useful diplomatic tool for middle power countries.

The third definition of power is in its structural terms. In this approach, power is mainly related to the establishment of or control over structures in international relations.

According to Susan Strange, structural power is the 'ability to decide how things shall be done, the power to shape within which states relate to each other, relate to people, and relate to corporate enterprises' (Strange 1988: 25). This definition has two meanings. On the one hand the effects of power penetrate throughout the world. On the other hand, power holders include not only the sovereign states but other actors as well. Christensen emphasises the need to consider the setting in which the interactions between two or more actors occurs.

2.2 The Evolution of Middle Power Concept: A Historical Background

In order to define "middle" one has to first define "great" and "small", without which it is not possible define middle. The use of middle in 'middle power' is a state-centric conception. Therefore, the term 'middle' meaning 'equidistant from extremes' implies at least two types of powers − traditionally referred to as great and small (Chapnick 1999: 73). No two authors completely agree upon the definition of middle power. Moreover, no one agree on the exact origin of middle power concept in international relations.

While it may be difficult to reach to a consensus, the term's longevity and its common usage in diplomatic circles denote some underlying legitimacy (Rudderham 2008: 1). Thomas Aquinas (1225 −1274), an Italian philosopher and theologian in the thirteenth century, was the first person to distinguish states into three political units: *city, province and kingdom* (Ping: 2005: 25). Although there is no mention about the definition of middle or intermediate powers, his introduction of three classes of states prepared the way for the future speculation about the nature and role of members of the middle class (Holbraad 1984: 11).

In the fourteenth century, Bartolus Sassoferrato (1313-1357), the Italian post-glossator expanded Aquinas' classification one step further by incorporating the Aristotelian triad of constitutions into a grading of states based on territorial size. The first category was city states, which in his view, is ought to be ruled by the whole people. The second comprised of states, too large in territory for direct democracy and best governed by aristocracies. In the third came, a people or nation so wide in dominion that only a

monarchy can provide it with unity and good government. Bartalus' incorporation of territorial size for classification of states was a useful contribution for the study of middle power.

The first use of the phrase 'middle power' equivalent to its present usage can be traced back to the fifteenth century European state system (Yalcin 2012: 197). Giovanni Botero (1544-1617), the Mayor of Milan, in his book *Ragion de Stato* (The Reason of the State), which was published in 1589, divided the world into power hierarchy, rather than size: *piccioli (small states)*, *mezano (medium states or middle powers)* and *grandissimme (empires, great/large states)*. He defined middle powers as 'states possessing sufficient strength and authority to stand on its own without the need of help from others' (Welsh 2004: 585). He argued that the size of the state was determined by its requirement for external support. In response to his query on which states – large, small or middle-sized are most lasting, he came to the conclusion that middle sized are the most lasting, since they are exposed neither to violence by their weakness nor to envy by their greatness:

> Middle-size states are the most lasting since they are exposed neither to violence by their weakness nor to envy by their greatness, and their wealth and power being moderate, passion are less violent, ambition finds less support and license less provocation than in large state. Fear of their neighbours restraint them, and even if feeling are roused to anger they are more easily quieted and tranquility restored (Holbraad 1984: 12).

After Botero, there were no works on middle power in line with what he had started, until Abbe de Maply published text *Principes des Negociations, pour Servir d'Introduction au Droit Publica de l'Europe Fonde sur les Traites* [translated as: *Principles of Negotiation, to Serve as Introduction to the Public Law of Europe*] in 1757. Mably not only distinguished powers on three categories: the first, the second and the third order, but also how each type of power ought to conduct its affairs in various situations. In doing so, he came close to generalising about the roles of secondary powers (Holbraad 1984: 13). Within the second order of powers, he distinguished between upper and lower secondary powers on the basis of their ability to play the role of dominant (first order) power (Ping 2005: 26).

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In Germany, the term *'mittelmacht'* appeared in the writings of Herder as early as 1802. However, it referred to the 'central power' situated geographically in the middle of Prussia and Austria, not as to a state which occupied an intermediate position in the power structure of the states system (Holbraad). Even the use of the term itself differs from the present understanding of middle power. The notion of the German middle power was not at all in terms of a secondary state, but of a power strong enough to hold its own between Russia in the east and France in the west (Ibid. 1971).

Evans (2011) argues that "The modern idea of "middle powers" being potentially significant actors in international affairs has been traced back to Jan Christian Smuts' writing on *The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestions* in 1918." The term was institutionalised in the Canadian context in the 1930s with the writing of David Mitrany on world government and was popularised in Canada's persistent claim to middle power status and its firm embrace in its foreign policy after. The concept of a 'Middle Power State' originated at the 1944 Dumbarton Oaks Conference [1] where Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King called for the creation of a special position in the United Nations Charter for smaller, developed states (Collins 2012). Mackenzie, in this conference, insisted that middle power countries should co-operate with each other under '*middlepowerhood*' (Holbraad 1984). This concept was rooted in the 'liberal-internationalist' political philosophy shared by the main practitioners and practitioner-scholars of Canadian foreign policy, who in the formative years of the post-war international system were engaged in planning for and creating the institutions of that system (Ross 1991).

Australia, the most vocal of the middle powers alongside Canada had expressed its concern regarding the influence of great powers on the post-war peace negotiations. Herbert Evatt, Labour Minister for Foreign Affairs, first used the term Middle Power for

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[1] The Dumbarton Oaks Conference or the Washington Conversations on International Peace and Security Organisation was an international conference at which the United Nations was formulated and negotiated among international leaders. The conference was held at Dumbarton Oaks from August 21, 1944, to October 7, 1944. It was the first important step taken to carry out paragraph 4 of the Moscow Declaration of 1943, which recognized the need for a postwar international organisation to succeed the League of Nations.

Australia at the San Francisco Conference in 1945 with a view to securing the country's national interest in a new world order after World War II (Ungerer 2007, Scott 2013). The two countries claims for greater diplomatic recognition rested on three main points: (1) that the smaller Allied countries had made a significant military contribution to the war effort and therefore deserved an equal place at the peace negotiation table; (2) that diplomatic representation in any new international organisation should be based on geographic spheres of interest; and (3) that the ongoing maintenance of international peace and security would require a decision-making approach which utilised the specialised and task-related skills of all states, not just the great powers (Ungerer 2007).

The term *'middlepowermanship'* was first used by a Canadian diplomat and academic John W. Holmes at a conference in 1965, as a specific approach to diplomacy, which in the Canadian context meant reducing the tensions between the two political combatants of the bipolar Cold War (Lee 2016). Canada's contribution, in Holmes's thinking, is not just to claim a place for the assertion of particularist national interests, but going beyond these particulars to the extent of an overriding interest in the development of institutions and practices conducive to peace, tranquillity, and orderly adjustment in world politics (Cox 1989). Canada's self-proclaimed middle power status throughout the 20th century came to be understood as somehow distinct among middle powers, often referred to as middlepowermanship, which, between 1945 and early 2000s, represented Canadian grand strategy and defined Canada's place in the world (Murray 2013).

During the Cold War period, various countries which were all aligned with the US or friendly with the West, self-identified and adopted middle power diplomacy as their foreign policy. While there persists a debate on which countries should be included in the list, apart from Australia and Canada, Norway, Sweden and New Zealand are most commonly identified as 'traditional' or 'first generation' of middle powers (Christie and Dewitt 2006: 9). Interestingly, none of the countries under the Soviet Union were identified as middle due to the absence of independent foreign policy.

Cooper (1997) identifies the emergence of three waves of middle powers in the post-World War II. *The first wave* consisted of countries identified with the Non-Alignment Movement, such as India, Indonesia and Yugoslavia for its anti-hegemonic position in the 1960s. *The second wave* included Nigeria, Mexico and Algeria in the 1970s and 1980s, as critics of the international norms shaped by the advanced countries of the West. *The third wave* emerged in the 1990s, which includes the agricultural reformers of the Cairns Group, such as Malaysia and Argentina, as well as South Korea.

In his later work, Cooper (2016) identifies again middle powers as having gone through three distinct waves. *The first wave* started form the immediate post-1945 whose focus was on multilateralism via the United Nations and related bodies. The most notable countries during this period were Canada and Australia who attempted to curve out a new, upgraded position based on functional logic. *The second stage* is linked to high profile initiatives such as the campaign against anti-personal landmines, child soldiers, small arms, promotion of International Court of Justice and Responsibility to Protect. These countries include as diverse as Australia, Canada, India, Japan, Brazil Norway, Denmark, Sweden etc. *The third wave* or *the current wave* started with the formation of G-20 in 2008 in response to the financial crisis that greatly damaged the western capitalist states. Korea belongs to this wave of middle powers, which Cooper terms as *'the missing middle'* in the G-20, who attempted to exert their influence in the global multilateral through the formation of MIKTA.

In line with Cooper's (1997) earlier classification of the three waves of middle powers, Lee (2012) proposes ROK as a 'new' or 'late comer', which belongs to the emerging groups, regionally active in the fourth wave of middle powers. It thus becomes prominent that, ROK emerged as a new middle power at the global arena with her joining of the G20 in 2008 under the leadership of Lee Myung-bak. This has given ROK the platform to play the role of rule-maker from rule-follower. ROK sought to take greater active role for global peace and security, combat climate change through the promotion of green growth and increase its development assistance so as to act as a bridge between the developed and developing countries.

2.3 Various Approaches to Middle Power

Four main approaches have been deployed by scholars in defining middle powers: *positional approach* - locating middle power at the middle point in a range of bigness to smallness in terms of population, economic strength and complexity, and military capability; *geographic approach* - physically or ideologically locating a middle power between the system's great powers.; *normative approach* - viewing a middle power as potentially wiser, more virtuous, and more trustworthy with its recourse to diplomatic influence rather than to force, and less selfish when taking responsibility for the creation and maintenance of the global order. Realising the ambiguity of the above three Cooper et. al (1993) developed the ***behavioral approach*** - defining a middle power by its behavioral tendency to engage in *middlepowermanship*, such as pursuing multilateral solutions to international problems, embracing compromise positions in international disputes, or adopting the notions of good international citizenship to guide its diplomacy.

Finding loopholes in the previous four approaches, Adam Chapnick's (1999) adopted three models of identifying middle powers: *functional model* - based on a country's ability to influence certain areas and functions in international affairs to be considered as middle power; *behavioural model* identifying middle powers by their expressed desire for greater international status demonstrated in their foreign policy behaviour; *hierarchical model* - ranking states according to standards relating to their material capabilities such as GNP and population. Even though Chapnick's models have been useful in identifying middle powers based on material capacity and foreign policy behaviour, it does not however offer the list of countries which can be regarded as middle powers. Some scholars do not regard the functional and behavioural models as different entities.

Based on his critical view of the middle power concept, Shin (2015) points out two theoretical weaknesses of Chapnick's approach:

> First, it covers limited aspects and issues of international relations, which elaborated in the liberal-leaning political contexts of western countries, which postulate that the chances of building cooperation among states are high and, accordingly, seek to find the roles of middle powers in this context. In other words, "realist" issues such as survival, security and conflict are not considered as decisive factors in defining the concept of middle power by the functionalistic and behavioral perspectives. Second,

the three models all postulate that the main determinants of such power are individual state-level factors: a country's performance in certain functional areas, its behavior and capabilities calculated in a quantitative way. In other words, the established middle power perspectives presuppose that individual-level features of a country are the first judge of whether or not it meets the criteria of a middle power.

2.3 Some Useful Definitions of Middle Power

As John Ravenhill (2012) vaguely puts it, "middle power, by simple definition is what it is not – it is neither super power nor small power". This helps us to grasp the basic notion of middle power but does not give us a detailed description of the concept. Some useful definitions of middle power have been developed by different academicians and foreign policy practitioners. G.P.de.T Glazebrook (1947) defines middle powers as "countries which make no claim to the title of great power, but have been shown to be capable of exerting a degree of strength and influence not found in the small powers". Ravenhill (1989) defines middle power as comprising of the five 'Cs': *capacity, concentration, creativity, coalition-building and credibility*. Jordaan (2003) defines middle power as, "states that are neither great nor small in terms of international power, capacity and influence, and demonstrate a propensity to promote cohesion and stability in the world system."

According to Gilley and O'Neil (2014) "middle powers are countries with capabilities immediately below those of great powers, but still far above those secondary states in international system". Manicom and Reeves (2014) define middle powers as "states with tangible influence at the international (as distinct from regional) level that possess relative global material power capabilities behind the great powers but still in the top tier of small states (ahead of the vast numbers of states)

2.4 Theoretical Approaches

Three main traditional theoretical approaches have been adopted in defining middle powers: *Realist (Positionalist) Theory*, *Liberalist (Behavioural) Theory and Constructivist (Identity) Theory*. The realists define middle powers in terms of their material capacity, while the liberalists define it in terms of their behaviour. The

constructivists define middle power in terms of socially constructed identity through interaction with other actors. This theoretical approach gained popularity since the late 1980s and early 1990s through the writings of Nicholas Onuf and Alexander Wendt. The work of realist scholars, who wrote throughout the Cold War were found out to be ambiguous in defining middle power. The liberalists and the constructivists in the post-Cold War attempted to clarify the concept by adding its foreign policy behaviour and self-promoted or socially constructed identity.

2.4:1 Realist Approach
While the idea of middle ranking states has been around for centuries, the category was first popularised in modern International Relations Theory by Organski's (1958) power transition theory, which promulgates a four-tier international hierarchy consisting of dominant powers (now more commonly known as superpowers), great powers, middle powers, and small powers (Ping 2005, Cooper 2011). In terms of their international standing, Organski opines that middle powers fill both the requirements of perfectly peaceful nations as they are 'satisfied with the status quo', and 'if they did not desire to make changes upsetting others, they would lack the power to do so' (Organski 1958: 329).

The realist school with its main emphasis on material power-orientation, and it conceives of international politics as power struggle among great powers do not pay much attention to middle power. Nevertheless, the role of middle powers has attracted some attention in the context of great power rivalries during the Cold War period (Shin 2009: 5).

Carsen Holbraad (1971, 1984), **Martin Wight and Hedley Bull (1978)** who belong to English School, define middle power in a more traditional sense by ranking the states according to their power status in the international system based on geographical position, economic (GNP) and military power. This approach in other words is called positional/hierarchical approach. They categorised states based on their material capabilities and ranked them as great powers and small powers while some of them are left as neither small nor great powers. These states standing between the two points are recognised as middle powers.

Middle powers, in Holbraad's definition are *"states occupying an intermediate position in a hierarchy based on power, to a country much stronger than small nations though considerably weaker than the principle member of the state system."* Although Holbraad heavily emphasises the importance of material capabilities, he also takes note of the states' behaviour as a necessary criteria to be considered as middle power. He presents four characters of middle powers: *balancers of the international system, mediators between two opposing states, bridges between rich and poor states, and promoters of international understanding across culturally different states.* Holbraad's work is useful for two reasons. First, it helps us to know the role middle powers play in the international system. His use of GNP as an index to a barometer for a country's military and economic power helps us to identify middle power countries more concretely with quantifiable data. Taking 1975 statistics, he identified the following eighteen countries as middle powers from different geographical areas:

Table 2.1 Middle Powers - Measured in Terms of Material Capabilities

GNP at Market Price (1975)		Population (mid-1975)
Countries	**(US$ million)**	**(000)**
1. Japan	496 260	111 570
2. Germany (West)	412 480	61 830
3. China	315 250	822 800
4. France	314 080	52 790
5. United Kingdom	211 700	55 960
6. Canada	158 100	22 830
7. Italy	156 590	55 810
8. Brazil	110 130	106 996
9. Spain	97 140	35 348
10. Poland	88 320	34 022
11. India	85 960	608 072
12. Australia	77 010	13 500
13. Mexico	63 200	59 928
14. Iran	55 510	33 390
15. Argentina	39 330	25 383
16. South Africa	32 270	25 470
17. Indonesia	29 120	132 112
18. Nigeria	25 600	75 023

Source: Holbraad (1984)

He referred to the first five countries – Japan, East Germany, China, France and United Kingdom - as 'upper middle powers'. The other countries are mixed groups comprising of old-established states like Spain, Poland and Brazil, and newly independent states such as India, Indonesia and Nigeria.

Bernard Wood (1990) did a study similar to the work of Holbraad. He reviewed the historical dimension of middle powers and tried to define it using its GNP, classifying countries ranked between seventh and thirty ninth positions to be middle powers. In addition, he summed up the roles of middle powers in three points. Firstly, middle power has taken initiative in the region or sub-region. Secondly, some middle powers can act as leader in functional domains in international organisations, especially the United Nations. Thirdly, middle powers help to stabilise or mediate conflicts. 'Middle power influence in the Cold War environment', as some commentators asserted was, 'a civilising force amidst the tension generated by the superpowers' (Holbraad 1984). Using 1979 data, Wood (1990) listed 33 middle powers after removing the six great powers – US, USSR, Japan, West Germany, France and UK. They accounted for 65 percent of the world's populations, about one-third of the GNP and over 40 percent of the world trade.

Table 2.2 Middle Powers (1979)

1. Italy	18. Austria
2. China	19. Denmark
3. Canada	20. Turkey
4. Brazil	21. Argentina
5. Spain	**22. South Korea**
6. Netherlands	23. South Africa
7. India	24. Indonesia
8. Poland	25. Yugoslavia
9. Australia	26. Venezuela
10. Mexico	27. Romania
11. Belgium	28. Norway
12. West Germany	29. Finland
13. Sweden	30. Hungary
14. Switzerland	31. Pakistan
15. Saudi Arabia	32. Algeria
16. Czechoslovakia	33. Iran
17. Nigeria	

Source: Wood (1980)

Identifying middle power on the basis of quantitative methodological approach is commonly criticised due to its ignorance about certain factors beyond material capacities. There is no clear cut demarcation on the minimum requirement of GNP and the maximum limit. For instance, in the first list prepared by Holbraad, rich and powerful countries like Japan and UK are grouped together with much weaker countries like Poland and Iran. Likewise in the second list big countries like China, India and Brazil, and small countries Algeria, Finland and Norway are grouped together in the same category. This approach has proved to be almost of no value in predicting or explaining the behaviour of those states classed as middle powers (Ravenhill 1998: 323). Even though the quantifiable attributes of states are measured, the differences and similarities are left untouched. In spite of its popularity and wide acceptance, the realist approach has been criticised for generating few, if any common pattern of behaviour as to how a particular group of middle or intermediate powers will behave internationally, because the variation in the types of states involved, the categories of powers that they possess, and the arena within which they operate are all so various (Hurrel 2000: 1)

Unconvinced over the classification of middle power in the previous studies, Ping (2005) reclassified middle powers in the Asia-Pacific based on more sophisticated statistical analysis of nine separate national attribute criteria – population, geographic area, military expenditure, GDP, GDP Real Growth, Value of Exports, GNI per Capita Trade as a Percentage of GDP and Life Expectancy at Birth. The study was conducted on the 38 countries who are members of APEC, ASEAN, SAARC and ECO. Countries scoring 55 percent (5 out of 9 point) are regarded as middle powers. Based on this study, 14 countries are qualified to be middle powers in the Asia-Pacific for the year 2000 as shown below:

1. Australia
2. Canada
3. Chile
4. India
5. Indonesia
6. Iran
7. Malaysia
8. Mexico
9. Philippines
10. Singapore
11. South Korea
12. Thailand
13. Taiwan
14. Turkey

Although Ping's finding on material capabilities are widely accepted by the realists, advocates for behavioural or statecraft definition have criticized this statistical identification of middle powers in that it only delineates the potential candidates as middle powers who are not necessarily engaged in middlepowermanship (Lee 2010). For instance countries like Philippines and Taiwan may not pursue middle power foreign policy behaviour as other western traditional middle powers have done. Also categorising India along with other much smaller countries, both in terms of population and military expenditures is quite controversial, even if the country engages in other middle power activities.

2.4:2 Liberalists Approach

Liberalists focus on non-material and non-structural factor under the strong influence of functionalist and interdependence theory. This raises the issue of soft power and normative roles played by middle powers in international system (Shin 2009:5). John Holmes (1970, 1976) was among the earliest ones to define middle power in terms of its performance or behaviour, rather than its position or rank in world politics. In his opinion, "the designation of middle powers by performance beyond mere existence with intermediate-class statistics, one realises how fleeting and intangible the status is" (Imai 2011: 29). Robert Cox (1989) too defined middle power in line with Holmes' definition as, "Middle power is likely to be in the middle rank of material capabilities, but stands in the middle in major conflicts. It seeks to expand the area of common ground which will make it possible to curtail in the management of conflict".

Recognising the conceptual ambiguity of the previous approaches based on *position, geography and normative view*, Andrew F. Cooper, Richard Higgot and Kim Richard Nossal (1993) adopted the *behavioural approach* in relocating the role of Australia and Canada in the post-Cold War era. According to this approach, middle powers are defined primarily by their behaviour: their tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, their tendency to embrace compromise, compositions in international disputes, and their tendency to embrace notions of good international citizenship to guide their diplomacy (Cooper et all 1993: 19).

The behavioural approach of Cooper et. al is regarded as the most developed approach within middle power literature. It has had more acceptance in academic circles than the quantitative methodological approached (Shin 2015: 191). They divide middle power behaviour into three categories: *catalyst, facilitator and manager.* The main role of catalysts is to provide the intellectual and political energy to trigger an initiative. The main role of facilitator is to act as an organiser for agenda-setting, and to form associational, collaborative and coalitional activities. They also play the role of manager in the context of institution-building, which requires the technical skills of specialists and entrepreneurs. It is Oran Young who has expressed the entrepreneurial leadership of a state in the formation of international regimes (Lee 2012). Middle powers also concentrate on 'niche diplomacy' which major powers do not emphasise much, such as environment, human rights and arms regulations. Middle power like Sweden concentrate its diplomacy on foreign aid, while Australia, Canada, Norway, Sweden and recently South Korea actively engage in UN peacekeeping missions as well.

Despite its wide acceptance, the liberalist approach is criticised for its ambiguity. Merely adopting middle power diplomacy cannot make the country a middle power unless it has certain amount of material capacity. Not all middle powers have the same stand when it comes to human security and democracy. Moreover, even Australia and Canada which are considered to be traditional middle power committed to good international citizenship lack consistency in their foreign policy behaviour. There is also no detail mentioned about the process of how some states become middle power.

2.4:3 Constructivist Approach

Constructivism is not a theory of international relations, but a way of studying social sciences including those between states (Onuf 2002: 137). It is based on the belief that human life is constructed and the world can be only known through our interpretation and language. This approach when used in international relations is based on the powerful role that ideas play in the field of study. It focuses on three types of ideas: *interest, identity and norms.* States create their own identity through the process of social integration. Wendt (1999) contends *"that the structures of human association are*

determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature."

Proponents of constructivist argue that as identity change, interest and behaviour change as well. This approach adds to the analytical clarity to the middle power framework. In contrast to the dominant focus of power in realism, constructivism seeks to investigate purpose – the goals that actors pursue with the power they have. There is variety of constructivist approaches, but all of them share the focus on how ideas influence international politics (D'Anieri 2012: 95).

Countering the realist and liberalist approaches, **Hurrel (2000)** suggests that 'one potentially promising way of way of rescuing the concept is to go down a constructivist route'. He conceptualises middle power as a self-asserted identity or ideology. This, in his words, is one potentially promising way of rescuing the concept of middle power defines in terms of attributes (GNP, military resources etc.) or by objective geopolitical or geoeconomic circumstances. **Shin (2009)** too, is of the view that middle power identity is not tied to a set of objective attributes (the realist approach) or foreign policy behaviour (the liberal approach). She argues that, in order to internalise middle power identity, states in general go through three stages: 1) 'self-conceptualisation' – an understanding who and what they are, in which states self-assertively claim their identity as middle powers; 2) the formation of national interest – understanding what they want; 3) self-identification – acting on the realisation on those understandings in a continuing effort to (re-)produce the identity.

Neack (2003) who explores the possibility of constructivism as an alternative perspective notes that the social construction of middlepowermanship is formulated through social process. Statespersons promote their notion of middlepowerism, and academics examine these claims, addressing the ways in which a country does, or does not act as a middle power. The country internalises self-promoted roles which are understood to be those of middle power. In this way, Neack sees   middle power as self-constructed identity that is

intended to have a shaping impact on the nature of international society. In order for a country to be called middle power, it must self-identify as a middle power through speeches of head of the state or foreign minister, as well as through official documents (Bezglasnyy 2013: 12). Its identity has to be recognised by the international community.

Hurrel's introduction of constructivism refreshes middle power scholarship by examining the ideational variables that motivate middle power activism, but a weakness is that his suggestion does not fully investigate the social construction of middle power (Shin 2015: 192). Compared to realism and liberalism, constructivism not only addresses middle power behaviour most directly, but also offers the most lucid account of middle power behaviour (Manicom and Reeves 2014: 26).

It can be thus concluded that middle power concept has been ambiguous and there has not been commonly accepted theory on the subject. As Chapnick (2000) laments, "For all its importance, middle power is rarely defined and limited explanations are never specific". In spite of this ambiguity, the concept provides an important framework to understand the important roles played by the middle-ranking powers in world politics. Neack (1999) points out is that 'most discussions are ideographic of foreign policies by self-identified middle powers'. Hynek (2007) admitted that "defitional problems have plagued the middle power research programme since its inception". However, as Gilley and O'Neill (2014) have rightly noted, "If the middle power theory did not exist, we would have to invent because of the repeated intrusion of this class of states into the spotlight of international politics".

2.5 Limitations of Middle Power Concept and Its Alternative Approaches

Many of the theories and concepts of International Relations are essentially contested, and that of middle power is no exception. The above three theoretical approaches did not help us to reach to a systematic conclusion to the concept of middle powers. Which countries should be included in the classification of middle powers itself becomes controversy. Although middle powers have been strongly linked with political and economic advanced countries, Third World countries like India, Brazil, Mexico and

Algeria have also been referred as middle powers. According to some classification, there are 48 countries which are identified as middle power, including powerful countries like Japan, Germany and South Africa as well as countries like Singapore, Chile and Colombia whose roles in international are not significant.

The same problem arises in the theoretical approaches as well. Scholars like Robert Cox and Mark Neufeld proposed Gramscianism in the study of middle power. In contrast to the realist concept - where the distribution of capabilities (power) across the units (states) is the key variables in explaining outcomes in the international system, and where hegemonic international is seen as a precondition – in Gramscian notion, the relations between classes is a key explanatory variable. The role and activities of social structures, from firms to international organisation are understood in terms of class relations. According to neo-Gramscians (Mark Neufel 1995, Robert Cox 1995), it was in the context of the American-led hegemonic world order in the post-World War II that led Canada to adopt middle power diplomacy. Canadian capitalist enjoyed clear benefit in its association with American-led efforts toward trade liberalisation and investment regimes. This context, for the first time, led to the idea of Canada acting as a middle power in international affairs. Robert Cox (1989) listed four characteristics of middle powers: *an ability to keep a distance from major conflicts, a degree of autonomy from the major powers, a dedication to international stability, and commitment to gradual world change.* This theoretical approach, however, does not apply to many of the traditional and emerging middle powers.

Jordaan (2003) in an attempt to develop greater clarity on the concept seeks to distinguish between the traditional and emerging middle powers. In his view, ***traditional middle powers*** are mainly stable democracies which came to prominence during the Cold War, while emerging middle powers are unconsolidated democracies which emerged in the post-Cold War. According to his classification, countries like Australian, Canada, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, The Netherlands etc. are categorised as traditional middle powers, while Argentina, Malaysia, South Africa, Nigeria, Mexico, Japan, ***South Korea***, etc. are categorised as ***emerging middle powers.*** Bezglasnyy (2010), on the contrary,

excluded Canada - a traditional middle power according to many analysts - from the list of middle powers, on the basis that the country no longer pursues middle power foreign policy behaviour.

Finding middle power's approach by a country's *position (material capacity), behaviour and identity* ambagious, Andrew Carr (2014) proposed for *'systematic approach'* as the alternative comprising of two factors. First, to have some reasonable capacity to protect their core interests, including through military conflict – not necessarily to be able to defeat great power, but certainly to raise the costs such as to provide a significant discouragement to attacks on themselves or their core interests. Second, the ability to alter a specific element of the international order through formalized structures, such as international treaties and institutions, and informal means, such as norms of balances of power. This approach sounds to be quite attractive and justifiable, but seems to be too ambitious for small and traditional middle power countries like Norway and Denmark.

2.6 Changing Position, Behaviour and Identity of Middle Powers

One of the interesting characteristics of middle powers is their changing position, behaviour and identity according to the change in international system. In terms of material capabilities measured on the basis of GNP, the list of middle powers fluctuates according to the growth of the country's economy. As a result the list of countries identified as middle powers keeps changing as times passes. In terms of identity, self-identified middle powers like Australia and Canada emerged after the World War II when leaders of the two countries sought recognition and greater role in the post-war international security apparatus as a function of their commitment to the Allied war effort. They acted as mediators of disputes and builders of bridges during the early phase of Cold War. As détente emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, middle power behaviour took a normative behaviour aspects as these states reached out to develop links with the Non-Aligned Movement or tried to improve relations between Asia and the West. Finally, as Cold War wound down and international system became unipolar, middle power behaviour was characterised by coalition building within multilateral institutions, by a strong belief of liberal internationalism, and the pursuit of 'niche diplomacy' in areas

such and trade and commerce, rule and norm creation, and regime and institution building.

As has been discussed above, the list of middle powers prepared by Holbraad (1984) and Wood (1990) are different. In one of the latest lists of middle powers, measured in terms of their position (the power they have), Gilley and O'Neill (2014) identified 20 middle powers which are ranking roughly between the 10th and 30th in terms of their material capabilities. The US and China as well as the other six countries – Japan, India, Germany, Russia, Brazil, UK and France are regarded established or emerging great powers. The 19 countries below these ranks are identified as established or emerging middle powers. They considered these countries as the most consistently defined middle powers. The most controversial is Brazil which some regard it as a middle power while it is categorised as emerging power by others.

Table 2.3 Middle Power Level Using Cluster Analysis

Source: Gilley and O'Neill (2014)

2.7 ROK's as a Middle Power

The present study adopts Constructivist theory based on the analysis of **Shin (2009)** and **Robertson (2009)**. This theory best supports ROK's middle status as it was under Lee

Myung-bak's administration that ROK adopted middle power diplomacy and constructed an identity based on its middle power diplomacy in its pursuit to be a responsible global player. It is validated by the global community's recognition of ROK's role as middle power status – from rule follower to rule maker. How a state constructs its own identity through its interaction with other actors in the international system will be the one of the main topics of the study.

The author contends that middle power is a self-constructed and self-promoted identity based on the material capacity and foreign policy behaviour of the state. ROK has already attained the material capacity measured in terms of economy and military in the 1990s. Its foreign behaviour practice of multilateralism rooted much earlier than this, starting from the Park Chung Hee era. However, its self-identification and self-promotion of middle power diplomacy was prominent since the inauguration of Lee Myung-bak. ROK's construction of its international image was in line with the middle power diplomacy. By expanding and strengthening its role in peacekeeping operations, development assistance and combating climate change, ROK wants the international community to recognise it as 'a responsible middle power.'

Based on the above three theoretical approaches, this study will analyse ROK's geopolitical constraints and its global contributions in three main areas: UN Peacekeeping Operations, Official Development Assistance (ODA) and 'Green Growth' initiatives. ROK which has been constrained by its geopolitical location, surrounded by great power, which has been referred to as 'a shrimp among whales' was finally able to assert and self-promote its middle power identity and play and influential role at the global level.

The term middle power as a self-constructed identity in the context of ROK was first used by President Roh Tae-woo in 1991 in his speech at the Hoover Institution - American public policy think tank and research institution, located at Stanford University in California. Roh declared that *"South Korea in the 1990s would seek the roles as a middle power - between the advanced and developing countries"* (Kim 2014: 85). It was

used in the context of its economic status rather than its foreign policy behavior. His successor Roh Moo-hyun pursued a diplomacy for ROK to play balancing role between US and China, while actively promoting in a multilateral institutions in Northeast Asia. Although this resembles that of middle powers foreign policy behavior, there is no reference to the term 'middle power' neither from the political pundits nor from the academic circles. It was with the coming of Lee Myung-bak that the term gained popularity both among the Korean and international academias.

2.8 Factors Influencing ROK to Adopt Middle Power Diplomacy

Several factors are at play for ROK's adoption of middle power diplomacy, such as changing balance of power in East Asia, ROK's economic development, the failure of Sunshine Policy under Kim Dae-jung and Power Balancing Role under Roh Moo-hyun.

2.8:1 Changing Balance of Power in East Asia

The rise of China since the 1990s has been one of the greatest factors impacting the foreign policies of not only its neighbouring Asian countries but also the United States. The rise of China is most felt on the Korean peninsula due to historical and geographical factors. China has become an important trading partner since Korea established its diplomatic ties in 1992. For initial post-Cold War period, Korea had seen the rise of China as natural and did not see it as a threat to its national security, as it was a tributary state of China for centuries. David Kang argued that *"East Asian states view China's reemergence as the gravitational centre of East Asia as natural"*. The US which has been the largest trading partner of Korea has been surpassed by China in 2004. It has also been the largest destination for foreign direct investment and tourism (Snyder 2009: 2). As Snyder rightly noted: *"China's closest neighbours, including South Korea have primarily perceived China's economic rise as an opportunity to be embraced rather than a threat against which to balance"* (Snyder 2009:12).

However, in July 2004, the same year when it rose to be the largest trading partner of ROK, China started to claim the ancient Kingdom of Koguryo as China's vassal state. This sparked an outrage not only among the South Koreans but also among the North

Koreans. Due to China's continuous economic growth, the leaders became more assertive in its dealing with the territorial disputes with its neighbours. It has become even more aggressive after it successfully overcame the financial crisis of 2008. It was seen as military and economic threat by US and Obama administration had to launch its "Pivot to Asia" to counter China's rise. This competition for regional influence between the two great powers gave diplomatic dilemma to ROK.

In seeking to present itself as a newly advanced Asian country, ROK needed to develop new concepts to articulate its foreign policy posture and legitimise a more proactive diplomatic role (Kim 2016: 3). To successfully maneuver its diplomatic skill without taking any side between the two great powers, it had to chart out its own foreign policy while maintaining close ties with both countries. One way of doing this was to project itself as a middle power country which is committed to the global peace and development within the framework of liberal internationalism.

"The thinking of Korea's middle power diplomacy" in the words of Sohn (2013) "has been provoked by the dramatic shift in the nature of international system." The relative decline of US, the rise of China, the emergence of India, Brazil and South Africa have begun to change the global balance of power in the first decade of the 21st century. This has widened the space for ROK to play a "middle power" role in coordination with the traditional and emerging powers and the non-state actors. ROK is quite aware that it has to adopt a middle path foreign policy in order to overcome its 'diplomatic dilemma' between the two competing great powers.

2.8:2 ROK's Economic Development

The growing confidence of the South Korean people over its economic success plays an important role in foreign policy decision making. Studies show that a country's foreign policy changes in commensurate with its growing economic power. This may be true to many, if not most countries, except Japan who is often referred to as 'the power without purpose' (Katada 2013). Heo and Roehrig (2014) argue that ROK's economic development led to its greater involvement in international political and security affairs,

among several others. Many Koreans started to consider their country has transitioned from a *'shrimp'* to the status of a *'lobster'* or as a *'great white shark'* capable of playing a leadership role at the regional and global arena within the framework of international norms. Having gained economic success from an extreme poverty to an advanced economy in few decades, leaders in Seoul sought ROK to play the role of a bridge between the developed and developing countries. Compare t o its growing influence economically and militarily, the country's 'soft power' deficit among the international community has been quite evident in its low ranking (32nd in 2008) in the *Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index*. One effective way of enhancing this is through providing official development assistance to those specified developing countries for poverty reduction and capacity building.

During the election campaign, increased international contribution through more funding for the ODA and more visible participation in peacekeeping operations were advocated. The Lee government vowed to increase South Korea's ODA to the level of OECD Development Assistant Committee members and to send about 3,000 PKO soldiers abroad. "International contribution diplomacy" began to be taken more seriously as "Global Korea" emerged as the new brand of public diplomacy. If the Segyehwa (globalisation) slogan under the Kim Young-sam government (1993-1998) underlined the extension of market opening and catching up to international standards and norms, "Global Korea," which comes a decade later, reflects an advanced country's responsibility to respond to problems overseas that are threatening international peace and human security (Lee 2009).

2.8:3 The Failure of the Sunshine Policy under Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003)

Kim Dae-jung, also referred to as the "Nelson Mandela of Asia", who became the first elected president of ROK from the opposition party took office on February 25, 1998. Kim started to see the Korean Peninsula issue and its possible solution as a part of regional network including countries in Northeast Asia (Vio 2012: 55). Over the course of more than three decades, Kim had already developed a vision for addressing the problem of Korea's division and how to achieve national reconciliation, the issue which

he considered as the core strategic issue facing Korea since the division of North and South in 1945 (Snyder 2008: 80). The nuclear crisis which had intensified in the previous administration greatly impaired ROK foreign policy. On his inaugural address, Kim expressed his commitment to make the utmost efforts to bring the Four-Party Meeting to success. He advocated for ROK to take the lead role in resolving inter-Korean problems with the support of US, China and Japan. He called the need for the implementation of the Basic South-North Agreement adopted on December 13, 1991 based on reconciliation, exchanges and cooperation, and non-aggression between the South and North.

On coming to power, Kim initiated the Sunshine Policy with the objective of improving inter-Korean relations through peace, reconciliation and cooperation (MoU 2002: 15). It is a policy engagement rather than containment with the North, with the hope of gradual reunification. The analogy of the sunshine is derived from Aesop's fable on 'The Wind and Sunshine' who compete to make a man remove his coat. The North Wind blows forcefully, but does not succeed, as the man tightens up his coat instead of removing. However, the Sun warms up the air, enticing the man to remove his coat; thus winning the competition. Kim's argument was that sunshine was more effective than strong wind in inducing North Korea to come out of isolation. The policy was based on the belief that a soft approach would persuade the North to instigate large-scale reform more or less the similar to those undertaken by China and Vietnam (Lankov 2015: 197). In many ways, the Sunshine policy is similar to *Ospolitik* (Eastern Policy) launched by West German Chancellor Willie Brandt. It is therefore argued by some scholars as an extension of the *Nordpolitik* (Northern Policy) initiated by Roh Tae-woo.

The policy was based on 'three principles and three stages unification formula'. These three principles were 'peaceful coexistence, peaceful exchange, and peaceful unification, while the three stages included 'the union of the state, union by federalism and complete unification' (Koo and Nam 2001: 80). Learning a lesson from the Asian financial crisis, Kim publicly ruled out reunification by absorption, as that will be too costly for the South to pay for. The German reunification also served as a good example in which the West Germany had to pay a heavy price for the cost its reunification with the East Germany in

1990. He gained the support of the public as his gradual reunification policy was seen as a meaningful way to reducing tensions and promoting cooperation with the North. To meet these policy objectives ROK government established three basic principles: 1) ROK will never tolerate armed provocation of any kind, 2) It will not have any intention to harm or absorb North Korea, and 3) It will actively push reconciliation and cooperation between the South and North beginning with those areas which can be most easily agreed upon (Ministry of Unification 2002: 13).

The policy Kim Dae-jung government outlined two major components and five implementation guidelines. The two components were: 'the separation of politics and economics' and 'the requirement of reciprocity from the North'. The five principles were: 1) promotion of national security and inter-Korean cooperation and exchanges; 2) peaceful coexistence and creation of an environment for North Korean reform; 3) promotion of common interest; 4) adherence to the principle of self-determination while seeking international support; and 5) policy implementation based on consensus between the two Koreas (Heo and Roehric 2014: 38).

As part of separation of politics and economics South Korean government allowed the private sectors in ROK to invest in North Korea even if there is little or no progress in the relationship between the two governments. Most of the South companies that dealt with the North were directly or indirectly supported by the ROK government (Lankov 2015: 199). Seoul encouraged companies participating in the inter-Korean exchanges to stimulate inter-Korean economic cooperation by providing low interest, long-term loans. It received a positive response from the business leaders who saw it as an opportunity which will lead to political trust and gradual reunification between the two Koreas. Three of the most important projects were the Gaesong Industrial Complex, Mount Geumkang (diamond) Tourist Region and Gaesong City Tours. In fact, Chung Ju-young, the chairman of the Hyundai Corporation, who was born in North Korea had the plan to develop the Geumkang project as way back in 1989 when he first met Kim Jong-il. His dream could only come true with the launch of Sunshine Policy in 1998.

The improvements of relationship between the two Koreas culminated in the inter-Korean Summit Meeting between Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il at the North Korean capital of Pyongyang on June 13-15, 2000, the first ever since the division of the country. Recognising the meeting and summit talks were great significance in promoting mutual understanding, developing North-South relations and realising peaceful unification, the two leaders signed the joint declaration, the so called 6.15 declaration. The agreement comprises of five main points: Firstly, the South and the North have agreed to resolve the question of reunification independently and through the joint efforts of the Korean people, who are the masters of the country. Secondly, it was noted that a common element in the South's concept of a confederation and the North's formula for a loose form of federation. Thirdly, the two leaders promptly resolve humanitarian issues such as exchange visits by separated family members and relatives on the occasion of the August 15 National Liberation Day. Fourthly, they agreed to consolidate mutual trust by promoting balanced development of the national economy through economic cooperation and by stimulating cooperation and exchanges in civic, cultural, sports, health, environmental and all other fields. Lastly, the two countries agreed to hold a dialogue between relevant authorities in the near future to implement the above agreements expeditiously.

The summit brought news of great joy to the Korean people and gave them fresh hope for reunification in the near future. The rating of Kim Jong-il was rising up from 15.1 percent - 50.2 percent, among the young South Koreans, and he was described as 'cute' and 'cuddly' rather than as an evil dictator. The day after the summit the number of those who fear North Korean attack dropped from 40 percent to 10 percent. The international newspapers captured the event in the front page (Cha 2014: 372). Kim Dae-jung became more popular at the global level for this historical epoch. He was awarded the prestigious Nobel Peace Prize in October 2000, just four months after the summit 'for his work for democracy and human rights in ROK and in East Asia in general, and for peace and reconciliation with North Korea in particular'.

The summit indicated the centrality of 'Koreanisation of Korean peninsula'. One of the great remarkable achievements was the marching together of athletes under a single

peninsula flag at the 2000 Sydney Olympics. On August 15, 2000, the first ever family reunion was held in Mt. Geumkang, which was a memorable and emotional moment of meeting between long-lost brothers and sisters, family members and cousins. The event was widely covered by the local and international media. Various people-to-people contacts were made through the initiatives of the churches and NGOs. At the government level, a series of four inter-Korean ministerial talks were held in Seoul and Pyongyang alternatively, before the end of 2002. The two Koreas also agreed to construct rail link to the west travelling to Seoul and easing travel to the Geumgang resort. At the international level, North Korea's relations with Asian regional and security organisations increased, and the country established diplomatic relations with several countries including in Europe and moved toward opening to others (Oberdorfer 2001: 433).

Robertson argues that the election of Kim Dae Jung as President was a watershed in terms of South Korea's middle-power evolution. His argument was 'the Sunshine Policy, which sought engagement with North Korea, demonstrated that South Korea had evolved from a middle   power based solely upon capacity, to one which was beginning to demonstrate middle-power   foreign policy behavior. He further argued that Kim Dae-jung's successful holding of a peace talk with North Korean leader Kim Jong-il in June 2000 has been regarded by some scholars as a manifestation of its middle power role between great powers. However, the present author did not agree with Robertson on the ground that ROK leadership lack the recognition of other great powers. ROK politicians and academicians at that time were also not able to self-proclaim ROK as a middle power based on theoretical concepts.

At the international level ROK expanded its role in UN peacekeeping operations under Kim dae-jung by participating in combat operations. The first ROK combat troops called Evergreen Unit was sent to East Timor in 1999. The country was granted independent in 2002 through the UN intervention. ROK troops who engaged in regional reconstruction and restored law and order by supporting the independent government and monitoring the

elections stayed till October 2003. It was the first time that the Korean government sent 430 combat troops. The Dongmyoung Unit was dispatch to Lebanon in July 2007.

Although, the Sunshine Policy paved the way for closer cooperation between the two Koreas at different levels, it failed to achieve its ultimate goal of establishing long-lasting peace and eventual reunification. Starting from the second-half of Kim Dae-jung's administration the South Korean public started to criticise the policy for its failure to change the North Korean behaviour. The unconditional economic aid given to North Korea irrespective of its reciprocity was seen by the conservatives as 'a waste of resources because North Korea had no intention of opening its society (Heo and Roehric 2014: 80). The hope that the Sunshine Policy will produce mutual under-standing and reconciliation, leading ultimately to reunification in time, soon turned into uncertainty as North Korea refused to comply with South Korea's request for creating family reunion centre in exchange for its economic aid (Hogarth 2012: 103). Kim Dae-jung, a renowned human rights activist and democratic fighter was criticised on his silence on North Korean regime's human rights violations. He rather, strongly proclaimed that the greatest human rights violations was the separated families between the North and South.

Firstly, the Sunshine Policy was silent on the issue of security on the Korean peninsula. It failed to address the military provocations of the North Korea. Even during the peak years of the policy, in June 2002, North Korean navy intruded inside the South Korean territory into the Yellow Sea and fired one of its navy ships that resulted in the loss of six South Korean lives. The Kim Dae-jung government continued to pursue its soft stand on North Korea, rather than taking a hard line approach. In an interview with *Strait Times,* the Unification Minister Jeong Se-Hyun said. "We remain convinced that all issues regarding North Korea can be resolved through dialogue. A peaceful solution to the nuclear issues cannot be achieved through economic and diplomatic sanctions or by the use of military force".

Secondly, the North Korea started to play its nuclear card despite the improvements in the relationship between the two Koreas in the post June Summit. North Korean officials revealed about its development of uranium enrichment to the US Assistant Secretary James Kelly during his visit to Pyongyang in October 2002. Although North Korea justified its act as a response to US President George Bush's referring of the country as 'Axis of Evil' in his 2001 New Year's address, it rather reflected larger intentions. The Bush administration took a harsh approach to the nuclear issue despite Kim Dae-jung's persuasion of negotiating with the North. The lack of support from US has greatly weakened ROK engagement policy toward the North. It was also learned that North Korea paid $75 million to Khan Laboratories in Pakistan for technical assistance to develop its nuclear weapons. The money for this programme was suspected to be generated from the payments of Hyundai Asan which paid $600 million to North Korea from 1999-2002 for the right to operate Mt Geumkang tourist project (Kihl and Kim 2015: 105).

The revelation of ROK's payment of $500 million to North Korea to agree for the June Summit stood as another obstacle for the success of the Sunshine Policy. The story first brought into light by an American journalist Don Kirk in January 2003 caused uproar among the South Korean conservatives who claimed that 'Kim bought a Nobel Prize' (Cha 2014: 369). It substantially tarnished Kim's public image and achievements. While this payment was claimed to have made for the purchase of business licenses to start economic cooperation projects in the North, the truth became clear when the North delayed the date of summit from 12th to 13th of June as the North Korea had received only $400 million and $100 million was still outstanding. It turned out that the payment had been made but the North Korean top leaders were not informed of it due to faulty communication (OhMyNews 2003). The amount did matter much calculated in terms of its GDP percentage for South Korea, which ranked the 12th largest economy. However, it was a sizeable amount for North Korean economy; roughly equal its export earnings at that time (Lee 2009). A subsequent investigation by the special prosecutor in June 2003 concluded that Hyundai Group had paid North Korea around $100 million (out of the $500 million paid out by Hyundai to North Korea as fees to operate the Mt Geumgang

Tours and other business activities) to facilitate the summit. Chung Mong-hun, the fifth son of the founder and Chairman Chong Chu-yong of Hyundai Asan, that spearheaded the inter-Korean business committed suicide in August 2003 by jumping off from the twelfth floor of the Hyundai building in downtown Seoul (Lynn 2007: 163).

It could be argued that the Sunshine Policy which was launch with great expectations to bring economic interdependence between the two Koreas leading to peaceful unification fell short of its targets. The policy did not change the behaviour of North Korea to reform its economy. The various projects undertaken by South Korean conglomerates incurred loss rather than gaining. In the words of Lankov (2015) "As with the majority of the North-South Cooperation projects, the South did most of the work, while the North received the lion's share of the projects benefits" but "for the South Korean side, the project would hardly be called a success story." This was partly due to the lack of enthusiasm from the South Koreans to visit the tourist places. The Geumgang mountain tourist region has attracted much lesser people than estimated. In January 1999, Hyundai estimated 4.9 million visitors to by the end of 2004 but only 900,000 people visited the tourist region. The project nearly went bankrupt between 2001 and 2002, and it was saved only by the massive infusion of the Korean government funds (Lankov 2015: 200).

However, the Sunshine Policy proved to be an effort by South Korea to display its foreign policy based on its superior economy over North Korea. As Victor Cha pointed out, *"It reflected a confidence that South Korea had won the postwar and Cold War competition that had started between the two regimes since 1948".* It was a policy about patience to wait   for the perfect time to gradually unify the two Koreas, while recognising peaceful existence before the time comes. It was a policy about generosity rather than give and take policy. As Kim Dae-jung had rightly argued:*"East Asians do not practice give and take like the Westerners do. If someone feels like he/she is treated with dignity, he may cheerfully give two for one. On the other hand, if he is displeased, he might reject the deal altogether, no matter how advantageous the deal is for him (Heo and Roehrig 2014:38)."* Unfortunately, Kim Jong-il took advantage of South Korea's

economic aid for his own benefits without opening the economy for larger trade with the South, as expected by Kim Dae-jung administration.

2.8:4 The Failure of Balancing Role under Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008)

President Roh Moo-hyun took office in February 2003 at the time of the second nuclear crisis and heightened domestic anti-Americanism sentiments that rocked the country in the previous year. Roh was elected in a tight race with his opponent Lee Hoi-chang, a conservative from GNP due to his appeal to anti-American sentiment. In his campaign Roh, portrayed himself as more independent of American influence than Lee. Resolving the nuclear issues has become the urgent task for his government while at the same time promoting greater regional role for ROK. A self-taught lawyer from a humble family, Roh dubbed his administration the 'Participatory Government' and intent on introducing an ambitious new agenda. As the second progressive President, he continued the Sunshine Policy of Kim Dae-jung under the banner of 'Peace and Prosperity' for engagement towards North Korea. He sought to establish Korea as 'a business hub in Northeast Asia' between China and Japan. He advocated that his government would 'seek cooperative self-reliant defence' and 'balanced and pragmatic diplomacy' (Sheen 2008: 102,103). He adopted a policy to strengthen relations with China and Japan, while largely maintaining a degree of ambivalence about the role of the US in the region (Cho and Park 2014: 173).

On his inauguration address on February 25, Roh expressed the need for ROK to play active role internationally. He also proposed an ambitious regional plan, the Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI) which intended to build a regional community of mutual trust, reciprocity and symbiosis (Lee and Moon 2009: 48). This strong focus on regionalism was a departure of foreign policy from Roh Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam whose policy was based on 'internationalisation' and 'globalisation'. Roh's narrow focus on Northeast Asia was also reflected in the economic realm as ROK centered its plan for regional economic integration on the Yellow Sea basin encompassing northern China, the Korean peninsula and Japan (Cho and Park 2014: 174). It was narrower than the broad idea of 'East Asian Community' under Kim Dae-jung.

Since early 2005, Roh Moo-hyun advocated a new concept of 'ROK as balancer' in a series of his speeches. He coined the term 'regional balancer' in his second anniversary address of his inauguration on February 25, 2005. Later in his address to the 86th March 1st Independence Movement, Roh stated that 'we are now beefing up national power, enabling us to play a balancing role in Northeast Asia'. Further in his commencement speech at the Korea Third Military Academy on March 22, Roh said:

> We are more qualified to talk about peace than anyone else [in Northeast Asia].... We should play a balancing role not only on the Korean Peninsula but also for the peace and prosperity of Northeast Asia. He added that "the power equation in Northeast Asia will change depending on the choices we make."

The balancer role proposed by Roh has been criticised in various angles it lacks clarity in its concept and it practice. It could be taken that by 'balancer' Roh meant distancing the US while moving closer to China. It also confused many analysts as there was no proper mentioned of the countries that Roh was referring – either between China and Japan or between China and US. The harshest criticisms of the concept came from the Pentagon. Prior to President Roh's visit to the United States in June 2005, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless told Hong Seok-hyun, South Korea's ambassador to the United States, that "Korea's Northeast Asia balancer role is a concept that cannot coexist with the Korea-U.S. alliance. If you'd like to change the alliance, say so anytime. We'll do as you like" (Funabashi 2007: 255). Park Geun-hye, chairwoman of the opposition Grand National Party at that time, also criticised the balancer concept:

> At present, China, Japan, and Russia, as well as North Korea, do not recognise South Korea as a balancer in the region. Under the circumstances, any more isolation outside the framework of the Korea-U.S. alliance would not serve Korea's interests.

The new concept adopted by Roh was a reflection of ROK's achievement in economic development which added to the confidence of the Korean people. Roh Moo-hyun in his address to the 60th Session of the UN General Assembly in 2005 stated:

> The new world order of the twenty-first century should be defined by all nations, be they a great, big or small powers coexisting under a shared interest to achieve collective prosperity... It is when great powers work further to embed a higher cause of peace and common prosperity in global order that the tension between 'power' and 'higher cause' can be defused (Roh 2005).

The concept of balancing role which seeks enhanced ROK autonomy from the US, with the objective of securing North Korea's survival and institutionalizing regional politics in Northeast Asia. It turned out to be a disaster due to lack of support from US. The expectation was that ROK in coordination with China will be able to resolve the nuclear issue of North Korea if Seoul distanced Washington. China revealed its true colour when it attempted to incorporate a part of the ancient Koguryo into its territory. The true colour of North Korea also appeared when it conducted nuclear test on October 6, 2006 against the agreement reached at the Six-Party Talks on September 19, 2005.

ROK's sought for more autonomy during Roh Moo-hyun's administration as a self-promoted identity, which was understood as a 'thin' identity representing Roh's strong self-willed understanding, not strong firmly enough grounded in the regional and geopolitical reality to create the conditions necessary for 'thick' identity. However, this new identity was effective for ROK in pushing forward the space ROK occupied in regional politics, a self-conscious attempt to relocate ROK in the region – economically, diplomatically and militarily. It laid the groundwork for the Lee Myung-bak government, who learned the mistake of Roh by restoring US-ROK strategic alliance.

2.9 Conclusion

ROK has been seeking to play greater role at the international level since the Roh Tae-woo's administration but the concept of 'middle power' has been displayed under clearly under Lee Myung-back. The economic development of ROK since the late 1960s led to democratisation in the late 1980s. These two factors played great role in transforming domestic and ROK foreign policy. The *Nordpolitik* launched by Roh Tae-woo was successful in establishing diplomatic ties all communist countries accept Cuba.

The end of Cold war of the demise of communism paved the way for the two Koreas to get UN membership in 1991. The *Segyehwa* foreign policy adopted by Kim Young-sam provided new opportunities for ROK to involve in UN peacekeeping keeping operations. The Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine Policy for the first time displayed a successful leadership role in Korean peninsula, but this policy failed to achieve its ultimate goal. The balancer

role proposed by Roh Moo-hyun was an attempt to seek greater autonomy from the US with the hope to resolve the North Korean issue in closer cooperation with China. This concept turned out to be a disaster due to lack of cooperation from the US.

It was due to the failures of the previous two progressive governments' diplomacy that Lee Myung-bak earnestly pursued middle power diplomacy. Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine Policy did not bring any concrete outcome for lasting peace and security on the Korean peninsula. ROK's foreign policy has been pre-occupied with the North Korea's security threats. In the same manner, Roh Moo-hyun's power balancing policy has been entangled in the US-China regional competition, leaving both countries suspicious about the policy. Realising this regional constraints, Lee Myung-bak proposed to venture out to the global arena to enhance its middle power diplomacy under the slogan of Global Korea.

CHAPTER 3

Geopolitical Constraints of ROK's Middle Power Diplomacy

3.1 Introduction

The geopolitics is an important factor influencing ROK foreign policy as the country is surrounded by three major powers – China, Japan and Russia and the US, as a security provider. As Jules Cambon wrote in 1935, 'The geographical position of a nation is the principal factor conditioning its foreign policy – the principal reason why it must have a foreign policy.' No matter how far ROK expands its diplomatic horizon, it cannot do away with the reality that the geopolitical landscape plays in its foreign policy formulation. It is with this established fact the 'Northeast Asian state' along with 'the security complex characteristics of Korean peninsula' as the two main characteristics of ROK's national identity (Park (2013).

Despite the successes at the global arena, ROK's middle power diplomacy at the regional level faced various geopolitical constraints due to the great power rivalry. President Lee's middle power diplomacy has been tested by North Korean military provocations. manifested in the sinking of a South Korean navy ship *Cheonan* on March 26 followed by the shelling of Yeonpyeong Islands on November 22, 2010 which greatly impaired ROK's middle power diplomacy. Following these two provocative incidents, ROK government adopted a hawkish policy to strike back any future North Korean military attacks on the South.

Domestically, it intensified the ideological differences between conservatives and the progressives, who condemn the North Korea's blatant acts and the others who blame Lee government's hawkish policy on North Korea. Internationally, it led to greater animosity between the US and China whose divergent responses further escalated tensions in the region. China's reluctance to condemn North Korea on the two incidents led South Koreans to question the status of the existing 'strategic partnership between the two countries, while the US blamed China's failure to act as 'a responsible stakeholder' in the region which aggravated into mutual distrust between the two great powers.

If the *Cheonan* sinking incident indicated the increasing US-China geopolitical rivalry, the *Yeonpyeong* Island attack was a clear indication of North Korea's brinkmanship. Moreover, the Yeonpyeong Island attack shows the Chinese' stand on its relationship with ROK viz-a-viz North Korea. Although China's shielding of North Korea on the Cheonan sinking, to a certain extent, could be justifiable on lack of evidence to prove North Korea as the culprit. But China's repeated diplomatic shielding of North Korea on this attack was a clear indication of its unchanging policy on Pyongyang, which many observers see it as a hindrance to pressure the latter to change its behaviour.

To engage more effectively with North Korea, President Park Geun-hye adopted 'Trustpolitik' as its foreign policy strategy and launched two other multilateral initiatives - Northeast Asian Peace and Cooperation Initiatives (NAPCI) and the Eurasian Initiatives. The concept of NAPCI is an extension of *trustpolitik* which is the basic foreign policy philosophy of Park. It aims at building trust and cooperation among the six Northeast Asian countries - China, Japan, Russia, North and South Korea, Mongolia - and the US. The Eurasian Initiative was proposed by President Park on October 18, 2013, at an international conference on Eurasian cooperation in Seoul, under the watchwords of "one continent, creative continent, and peaceful continent". The initiative projects a unified system of transport, energy, and trade networks across the vast Eurasian continent via North Korea. This is another attempt by a Korean leader to lessen its dependence on the US and also to internationalise the inter-Korean relations as was propounded by Roh Tae-woo through his *Nordpolitik* initiative.

In view of the above prevailing situation, this chapter examines the constraints of ROK's middle power diplomacy with the main focus on regional and domestic factors. It highlights the impacts of North Korea's military provocations, the US-China rivalry in the regions as well as the lack of cooperation from other regional powers including Russian and Japan. The chapter concludes that ROK's middle power diplomacy has been successful at the global arena and enhanced Seoul's leadership status; however, there have been several constraints at regional level that continues to obstruct its diplomatic maneuvers

3.2 The Mysterious Sinking of *Cheonan* and the Contested Verdict

The ROK navy corvette *Cheonan* was sank in a mysterious way on the night of March 26, 2010 while conducting a patrol mission in the Yellow Sea (or West Sea) off Baekryeong Island on the west coast of the Korean peninsula. The Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) termed that fateful incident as 'the most terrible disaster in 30 years. The 1300-ton warship named after the South Korean city of the same name 'heavenly peace' split into two parts. Rescued efforts began quickly, but the sinking did not leave enough time for many to evacuate (Nam 2015: 251). As a result, out of 104 sailors, 58 were rescued while 46 were missing. The wreckage of the ship was found 600 metres away from the incident two days later, while the rear part, along with most of the bodies of the missing sailors, was recovered only on April 15. The front portion was recovered on April 24, while the other still missing sailors were declared dead. A four-day national mourning on this ferocious attack was observed from April 26-29, 2010.

Figure 3.1 (a) ROKS Warship; (b) Sketch of the Part Damaged During the Incident

Source: **Hwang and Mauro, 2014**

President Lee Myung-bak set up the Joint Civil-Military Investigation Group (JIG) comprising of 22 military experts, 25 experts from top 10 Korean expert agencies, 3 members recommended by the National Assembly along with 24 foreign experts from the US, UK, Australia, Sweden and South Korea. The team released its preliminary report on April 16, suspecting North Korea's involvement behind the attack, as the incident took place at the disputed territory between North and South Korea. The following day, North Korea denied its involvement in the attack, but this did not ameliorate the suspicion from the South Koreans due to any clear alternative explanation. The final report of the JIG released on May 20 concluded that the torpedo was fired by North Korean submarine. A key piece of evidence produced by the investigation team was the discovery of the torpedo on the seabed bearing a blue '1 bon' (No.1 written in Korean) ink mark consistent with the previously obtained North Korean torpedo (You 2015: 197).

Map 3.1 Two Different Military Demarcation Line of the two Koreas

NB: The blue line indicates the oceanic border as understood by South Korea; the red line indicates the border as insisted by North Korea.

Source: https://mouonekorea.wordpress.com

The JIG's conclusion, however, has remained the subject of intense controversy. An independent Russian naval expert team also reached a mark contrast conclusion from the findings of the JIG. The team concluded that it was not a torpedo but a floating mine in the water that was responsible for the ship's sinking. Before the sinking, the ship ran aground in the shallow water. They believe that two accidents occurred before the sinking. The reason for South Korea's invitation of Russian investigation team was prompted by the view expressed by Russia at the UN Security Council meeting that the *Cheonan* sinking might have been caused by North Korean torpedo. The Lee Myung-bak administration hopes that both the investigation team will reach the same conclusion which was never the case. The Russian team did not even make the report public to avoid negative consequences on the ROK government. When Donald Craig, former US ambassador to ROK asked to a Russian team member he replied that, 'Because it would do much political damage to President Lee Myung-bak and would embarrass President Obama".

In a documentary movie produced by *HaniTV,* the Video production division of *Hankyoreh,* ROK's leading independent daily, various contrasting views on the findings of the JIG were uncovered based on interviews to the political leaders, civil society leaders and engineering experts. Choi Moon-soon, National Assembly Lawmaker, Democratic Party on his visit to the site said that there are uncharted rocks near the coast of the Baekryeong Island. He added that there are also small rocks marked on the sea map. Another mystery was the difference in time of the shutting down of the CCTV. Although the JIG reported the all the CCTV shut down at 9.22pm, it was later found out that some of them shut down as early as 9.13pm which was at least eight minute earlier than the reported time of the JIG report. Choi expressed his surprise saying that "CCTVs are supposed to shut down together, but each of them shut down at a different time". 'It is unacceptable answer" he added. An expert on CCTV said that the possibility is just one in one thousand. This was a mystery to him. To add to the mystery, ROK's military sources also did not show all of the footage. They announced that six of the eleven cameras were stored. But the company responsible for the restoration gives a different

statement. All these inconsistency in the reports of the JIG and the contrasting reports left unresolved doubts and mystery to the general public.

Map 3.2 Possible North Korean Attack

Source: http://www.abovetopsecret.com

The explanation of North Korea's torpedo launch from a submarine was more of a mystery than the torpedo itself. According to ROK's Ministry of Defense, a North Korean Yono class submarine departed from the Bipa Cape base and passed through the international water stretching about 300 kms on its two-day journey, without getting by US and South Korean navies. Lee Tae-ho of the People's Solidarity for Participation Democracy strongly argues that, "This is not a fact, nor is it confirmed information. It is just widespread speculation".

As days went on, suspicions grew over the findings of the investigation team as to how the ink mark could have survived the enormous heat of the explosion, while the paint on the outer surface of the torpedo did not. In a survey conducted in 2011 by the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, 80 percent respondents trust the government's announcement that the *Cheonan* was attacked by a North Korean submarine. However, in another poll conducted by Media Research in 2012, of the 700 people, 71.3 percent believed that the ship was attacked by North Korea. This indicates that a growing number of people started to question the findings of the investigation team.

3.2:1 Conspiracy Theories and the Divisions of Domestic Opinions

In the absence of substantial evidence, various conspiracy theories have been circulating on the internet and social media. Some believe that *Cheonan* might have hit a mine laid by the South Korean military or collided with a US submarine, while some suspect that the warship may have been torn apart due to metal fatigue fractures as a result of poor maintenance. Some even believe that a team of US Navy Seals who had recently been involved in the joint US-South Korean Foal Eagle anti-submarine exercises, sunk the *Cheonan* using a magnetic 'rising mine' deployed on the sea bed. Others believe that the US carried out the sinking as a pretext to scare the Japanese into allowing them to keep their controversial military base at Okinawa which America says is essential for deploying marines to secure North Korean nuclear facilities in an event of war.

As numerous theories and conspiracies have emerged out, some experts have drawn parallels to the sinking of Cheonan and the explosion of the USS Iowa. The ship which exploded on April 19, 1989 killed 47 of the crew members. After three-month investigation, the US navy concluded that Clayton Hartwig, one of the members had intentionally caused the explosion after his homosexual relationship with another crew member Kendall Truitt had soured. However, after the reinvestigation by an independent scientific study, lasting nearly two years, the team concluded that the explosion was likely caused by an accidental overram of powder bags into the breach of the 16-inch gun. Noh Jong-myeon of National Union of Media Workers, points out "As demonstrated by a

number of cases internationally, military authorities always try to fabricate incidents related to them. The attention of the people and the National Assembly is essential for revealing the truth. He concluded that, 'There should definitely be reinvestigation".

There has been criticism from within and outside the investigation team. Noh In-sik, a member of the JIG argues that the joint investigation needs bigger budget and more time to investigate step-by-step. Lee Jong-in, CEO of the Alpha Underwater Technology Service share similar view. He complains that there were only ten days to conduct the investigation, which shows that the JIG team did not investigate any other possible causes of the incident, except for the torpedo attack.

The Lee Myung-bak government stuck to its stand and called for a hawkish policy towards the North. Many of the South Koreans argued that the Lee government's accusations of North Korea were aimed at avoiding heavy defeats at the June 2 local elections. Lee adopted the May 24th Measures, which among other things, called for banning of visits by South Koreans to North Korea, halting of all North-South trade, prohibiting business expansion by South Koreans in the north, halting of all aid projects, and prohibiting North Korean ships from sailing in South Korean waters. Following the adoption of these measures, all businesses in Gaesong Industrial Complex were stopped. Since then inter-Korean relations has been weakened and the two Koreas have become more hostile to each other. What followed was a scenario of confrontation between the two Koreas similar to the Cold War period. North Korea continues its tests nuclear weapons to draw the attention of the international community as well as to provoke tensions on the Korean peninsula.

3.2:2 The Impact of *Cheonan* Sinking on the Regional Politics

The *Cheonan* sinking not only widened the divisions between the progressives and the conservatives but also ensued regional split as the US took this opportunity to sustain its military dominance in the region to balance China. China's reluctance to condemn North Korea led to a mutual distrust and antagony between Beijing and Washington. With the increasing perceptions of military threat from North Korea, Japan's decision to relocate

the US military station from Okinawa was held back in the wake of the *Cheonan* sinking. China's diplomatic shielding of North Korea on the two incidents prompted South Koreans to doubt about the 'strategic partnership' between the two countries and China's status as 'a responsible stakeholder' in the region.

After the sinking of the Cheonan, the US and ROK conducted military exercises on the seas surrounding the Korean peninsula. As the tensions escalated, Chinese navy responded with their own military exercises. North Korea fired artilleries into the West Sea and threatened the South Korea for a large scale war. Some people went on to the extent of calling this as a new Cold War. Jeong Se-hyun, Former Minister of Unification of ROK argues that, "The sinking of the Cheonan occurred in the midst of the US-China competition for global power. Since the incident the South Korea-US and the North Korea-China alliances have entered into the new era of confrontation". The South Korean government uses the incident for political advantages, which prompted North Korea to draw closer to China for political and economic benefits.

The relationship between North Korea and China became much closer than before on the heel of the *Cheonan* sinking. The North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il made a secret visit to China for the first time in four years, on May 3, 2010 in a special train amidst the military tensions prevailing on the peninsula. Similarly, US-Korea alliance has been strengthened to prevent any future North Korean attack. Prior to the *Cheonan* incident, all clashes that had occurred were managed in a strictly inter-Korean context. However, the *Cheonan* sinking has become an intense issue at the international level due to the geopolitical rivalry between China and US.

3.2:3 Why did North Korea Deny the Attack on *Cheonan*?

Despite the previous denials of its involvement in the *Cheonan* sinking, it became clear recently that the attack was carried out by North Korea, and there was no doubt about the previous findings of the Lee Myung-bak government. One wonders as to why North Korea strongly denied suck violent act. The main reason, as told to the author by some Korean professors in June 2017 was that *'North Korea wants to avoid international*

condemnation'. As Hyun (2017) puts forward straightly *'if you are a thief will you tell it to others what you are not caught for. If it was North Korea, who will it be? China will not attack South Korean naval ship".* He opines that North Korea deny the attack because nobody saw them. The author asked the reason why North Korea denied the attack on *Cheonan* unlike their previous acts of violence such as the Blue House raid of 1968, the assassination of President Park Chung Hee's wife Yuk Young-soo in 1974 and the bombing of Korean Airlines Flight 858 in 1987. Yoon (2017) expressed similar view stating that *'North Korea denied it due to the absence of clear evidence. In the cases of the previous attacks, it was so clear that North Korea could not deny.'* They had to admit whether they like it or not.

On the question on why there are so many people in ROK who did not believe the verdict of ROK government on *Cheonan* sinking, Kim (2017) argues that it is due to the propaganda spreaded by the pro-North Korean supporters. For him, there is no room for debating on ROK government's verdict. It was none other than North Korea who attack the *Cheonan* ship. But he did not see the attack as North Korea's strategy to downplay ROK's middle power diplomacy.

The attack of *Cheonan* has had larger impact on the inter-Korean relations and the regional security dynamics as well. As Yoon (2017) in response to the author's question on what is the main obstacle to ROK's middle power diplomacy plainly stated that *"North Korea is the main obstacles to ROK's middle power. Every time it attacks us, we need to react it".* This has become a great security concern for the ROK government. The attack on Cheonan has a great implication for ROK's middle power as it escalated tensions on the Korea peninsula and created a sense of future similar attacks.

3.4 *Yeonpyeong* Island Attack and its Impact on ROK's Middle Power Diplomacy

Nearly eight months after Cheonan attack, he North Korean soldiers fired around 200 artillery shells at Yeonpyeong Island, which lies in the Yellow Sea, 50 miles off the South's northwest coast in an area close to a disputed sea border, on November 23, 2010. The shelling killed two South Korean marines, two civilians and hurt another 19, in one

of the heaviest attacks on its neighbour since the Korean War ended in 1953. The South Korean soldiers in return shelled North Korean gun positions. The incident is believed to have been sparked by South Korean military exercises in the area, which the North had objected to. It is also widely believed to bolster the North Korean army's support for the succession of the ailing Kim Jong-il's youngest son, Kim Jong-un. The North Korea's supreme military command, however, blamed the South for the incident and accused the South Korean army of firing first artillery shells, which the latter denied.

The islands were the scene of three skirmishes between the navies of North and South Korea in 1999, 2002 and most recently in 2009 when a North Korean patrol ship was set on fire by South Korean gunfire, but the latest comes at a time of rising regional tension. Seoul promised that it would be ready to respond strongly to further attacks. There was condemnation of North Korea from various countries including the US, Japan, Russia, EU and the UK, while China refused to apportion blame. Instead it blamed the US-Korea joint military exercise as triggering the North Korea's attack and appealed all sides to remain calm. China's refusal to criticise North Korea's violent act in the *Cheonan* sinking, to a certain degree was justifiable, considering the lack of evidence on the part of the investigation team.

However, China's silence on the North Korean shelling of the Yeonpyeong Island this time called into question of its status as a 'responsible stakeholder' in the region. China's attempt to restore its reputation as an honest broker in the Korean crisis by calling an emergency meeting of the senior representatives of the Six-Party Talks – US, China, North and South Korea, Japan and Russia did not receive positive response from the US, Japan and South Korea which further cast doubt on the efficacy of the Chinese initiative. South Korea on, its part, has been insisting North Korea's apology on *Cheonan* sinking and Yeonpyeong Island attack as a precondition to resume the inter-Korean peace talks.

3.5 The Impacts of the US Proposal to Install THAAD
The Terminal (formerly Theatre) High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) missile system is an easily transportable defensive weapon system to protect against hostile incoming

threats such as tactical and theatre ballistic missiles at ranges of 200km and at altitudes up to 150km. It can shoot down short, medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. The system consists of launchers, missiles, battle management/command, control, communications and intelligence (BMC3I) units, THAAD radars, and intercepts exo-atmospheric and endo-atmospheric threats.

The US proposal to install THAAD came in the wake of the third North Korean nuclear test on February 12, 2013. The primary purpose is to protect the soldiers and combat assets of US Forces in Korea (USFK) against increasingly direct nuclear and missile threats. In addition, in terms of a strategic military perspective, the implementation of the tailored deterrence strategy (TDS) by the deployment of THAAD to the Korean theater will reinforce extended deterrence strategy (EDS) to deter North Korean nuclear and missile attacks (Chung 2015).

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Despite the intense debates on the pros and cons of the missile defence, the majority of South Koreans are in favour of installing THAAD due to the growing fear of missile attacks from North Korea. The Defense White Paper 2014 published by the South Korean Ministry of Nation Defense estimated that North Korea is in a substantial position to obtain ballistic missile capabilities delivering nuclear warheads and develop KN-08 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threatening the continental US. In 2014, North Korea test-fired 111 missile rounds consisting of FROG, SCUD, ER, and Rodong Missiles in order to increase accuracy of their missiles. The February 2015 *Joongang Ilbo* poll showed that 56% of the respondents favoured the deployment of THAAD. South

Korean presidential spokesman Min Kyung-wook described Seoul's position as three 'no's'– "no [US deployment]   request, no consultation, and no decision."

However, many of the ROK policy makers are against to the installation of THAAD for fear of the Chinese reaction as well as to avoid US dictatorial handling of ROK security issues. US has been seen as interfering in the foreign policy decision making process of other countries by asking them to choose to be with the US or against it. There are some in South Korea who have asserted that an indigenous system, the Korean Air and Missile Defense System (KAMD), could equally meet South Korea's defense needs while avoiding being caught between Washington and Beijing. This has been greatly critised by many analysts as it could only triggered arms race on the Korean peninsula. Some 120 civic groups, including the People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy and the Solidarity for Peace and Reunification of Korea, in a statement also urged the government to reject any US attempt to deploy an advanced missile defense system on South Korean soil, saying it could destroy peace on the peninsula and hurt Seoul's ties with Beijing (Yonhap News).

Map 3.3 Map Showing how THAAD would Protect South Korea only from the North

Source: The Heritage Foundation Research

China has been raising its concern and strong opposition to the installation of THAAD on the fear that the radar will be able to detect military movements in China. Russia too considers the deployment of THAAD system in South Korea as a security threat to its security and the wider region. It further raises its concern over the possibility of sparking an arms race and hampering negotiations on North Korea's nuclear ambitions. US officials have continually insisted that THAAD would be aimed at guarding against only North Korea's growing ballistic missile capabilities. *"The THAAD interceptor has a range of 200 kilometers. Its range means that a THAAD interceptor - if based at Osan Air Base, a likely U.S. option (for the potential deployment) - could not reach as far north as Pyongyang - it would fall about 65 kilometers short,"* said Bruce Bennett, a senior analyst at the US think tank RAND Corp. However, China does not want to compromise on its stands, which observers suspect its fear of potentially weakening its A2/AD capabilities. There are also speculations that China wants to weaker the US-Korea alliance through its opposition to THAAD. There are some who suspect that China might want to see how South Korea response its pressure to take sides.

Map 3.4 Map Showing How THAAD in ROK Poses No Security Threat to China

Source: Heritage Foundation research.

BG 3024 ☎ heritage.org

Source: The Heritage Foundation

South Korea has been in strategic dilemma on whether it should go along with the US and install the THAAD or whether it should listen to China and oppose the plan. It neither wants to disappoint China, its largest trading partner nor the US, its security guarantor. There is a speculation that China may retaliate against South Korea in the form of banning trade and enhancing travel regulations, if it allows the US to set up THAAD. On the other hand, if South Korea listened to China and opposed THAAD installation, it can cause US abandonment when it needs US security protection in the future. ROK has been trying its best to maneuver its diplomatic skills to serve its national interest. The US has been raising concerns over ROK's inclination towards China which has been amplified by President Prak Geun-hye's attending of the World War II memorial parade in Beijing. China on the other hand blames ROK for its inclination to open a negotiation with Washington which it see as an indication of ROK's attempt to find a diplomatic balance between China and the US.

3.6 Constraint of Japan's New Assertiveness on ROK's Middle Power Diplomacy

The election of Shinzo Abe as Japanese Prime Minister in 2012 for the second time is nothing but a sign of the growing nationalism and militarisation in Japan. The issue of comfort women[2] and territorial dispute over Dokdo Island[3] are the two main bones of contention that hinder the two countries' path to peaceful cooperation. An estimate 200,000 Korean women, mostly under the age 18 were forced by the Imperial Japanese Army to have sexual relationship with 30-40 men each day in the military brothels before and after the World War II. Korea has been demanding sincere apology for the atrocity and compensation for the victims which the Japanese parliament did it by issuing an official apology on March 27, 2007. The situation took an ugly turn when Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and most members of his Cabinet who are openly supporting revisionist organisation, negated the existence of Japanese war crimes, including sexual slavery for the military. This created public anger among the South Koreans.

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[2]. Estimates vary as to how many women were involved, with numbers ranging from as low as 20,000 to as high as 360,000 to 410,000, in Chinese sources.

[3] The Liancourt Rocks, called Dokdo in Korean and Takeshima in Japanese, are a group of islets in the Sea of Japan that is occupied by South Korea but its ownership is still disputed between South Korea and Japan.

When the news of Lee Myung-bak government's signing of General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) with Japan came out in July 2012, it created public uproar in South Korea. The Lee government widely regarded as pro-Japanese, has long prepared GSOMIA which was aimed at formalising a long standing commitment to share intelligence and security information on North Korea and missile programmes. The signing of the agreement had to be cancelled due to the protest on Japan's unwillingness to apologise for their use of comfort women as sex slaves during the colonial period.

Faced by public anger over the issue of GSOMIA, Lee Myung-bak was left only with the Dokdo Island issue. The Island is a major source of nationalist tensions between the two nations. Lee made a visit to Dokdo in 2012 in order to regain the public support. This angered the Japanese government, which was considering filing a complaint letter against ROK at the International Court of Justice. It was also considering suspending a currency contract with South Korea that expanded the amount from $13 billion to $70 billion in an attempt to stabilize the foreign exchange market (Sohn and Kang, 2013). The two contentious issues between the two countries' constrained ROK's regional strategies for middle power diplomacy. It also hampers US Pivot to Asia, which Korea needs, in order to effectively balance against the influence of China.

3.7 ROK's Dilemma on Joining of Asian Infrastructure Industrial Bank

The proposal to establish the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) with headquarters in Beijing was made by President Xi Jinping's trip to Southeast Asia on October 2, 2013. It aims at providing finance to infrastructure projects as part of China's Silk Road initiative, with a focus on bolstering links across Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Europe. The shareholder structure grants 75 percent ownership to Asian members and 25 percent for non-Asian investors.

Initially, China's plan was to provide $50 billion of the $100 billion capital in total and claim 50 percent share of the voting rights. The US sees it as a rival to the World Bank and Asian Development Bank and fears that it could become an instrument of Chinese

foreign policy if Beijing ends up having veto power over the bank's decisions. The Obama administration has repeatedly expressed concerns about the AIIB's transparency as well as its environmental and social standards. Japan shares similar views with the US and does not express its interest to join.

Figure 3.2 Top 10 Largest Vote-Sharing Countries in AIIB

Source: South China Morning Post

China's move to establish the AIIB was partly in response to its frustrations with the US, with Congress blocking an important agreement to increase the resources of the International Monetary Fund and give emerging market nations a greater share in decision-making. It is also part of Xi's attempts to extend China's regional reach, boost Chinese exports and prop up his nation's flagging heavy industries, by enlisting them in a project to build infrastructure across the continent under a New Silk Road initiative (*The Washington Post 2015*).

The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) which it claims are dominated by American, European and Japanese interests. Since its foundation in 1944, the decision makings in World Bank has been influenced and dominated by the US and UK. The president of World Bank has traditionally been an American nationality. The US and Japan holds the most voting power of 15.85 percent and Japan 6.84 percent, while China holds 4.42 percent. In the same manner the IMF has also been greatly dominated by US and Europeans countries. Since its foundation in 1944, the IMF's managing director, who led the bank has been European, which has been under strong criticism from the BRICS countries recently. In regards to vote share US has the most voting power (17.6 percent) followed by Japan (6.56 percent) and Germany (6.12 percent), while China and India holds only 4 percent and 2.44 percent respectively. In the case of ADB, both US and Japan hold 15.57 percent, while China holds only 5.44 percent. Neither China's shareholding ratio nor its voting power fully reflects the country's economic power. The IMF and World Bank have been widely criticised for the US veto power over important decisions without having the majority share.

China's initiative to set up the AIIB is seen by many as Beijing's growing influence in the global economy and politics. The positive response from various countries shows that countries are ready to follow China if it serves their national interest. This move of China is interpreted by Rien T. Segers, a Dutch expert on political economy of East Asia, as the second wave of 'Asianisation'. He believes that it is much more comprehensive and deeper than the first wave led by Japan in the 1970s and 1980s because of the potential economy of China and other economies, such as ROK, Singapore, Taiwan and Japan (China Daily 2015). Some analysts welcome this new development bank with the hope of bringing competition to the World Bank, which has been highly bureaucratic. This will also ameliorate the absolute monopoly retained by the US in the last 70 years after the end of the Breton Woods System and promote multilateralism.

The AIIB was officially launched at a ceremony in Beijing on October 24, 2014 with a 21-country membership, all from Asia, which signed a Memorandum of Understanding

(MoU) on the establishment of the bank. Australia, Indonesia and South Korea skipped the launch under US pressure. No western government was involved at that time. However, the ice was broken when New Zealand was officially approved as a founding member on January 1, 2015. It thus became the first developed economy to join the AIIB (China Daily 2015). Luxembourg became the first European country to join it on March 11. UK, regarded as the best ally of the US, announced its joining on March 12 despite the US pressure. Switzerland joined on March 13 and France, Germany and Italy signed up together on March 16.

UK's joining of the bank despite US opposition was a great significant as it was interpreted as the decline of US hegemony and China's growing economic influence at the global level. The spokesman for the British Prime Minister replied to the US criticism, saying: *"There will be times when we take a different approach... We think that it's in the UK's national interest."* While UK's entry opened a flood gate for other European countries to join the bank, ROK's dilemma over whether to join a China-led development bank was deepening for quite some time. Until UK join the AIIB, America had been publicly denying that it was discouraging countries from joining the new bank, even though it was well known that it was doing so.

After eight months of deliberate consideration on the issue, ROK could finally express its intention to join the AIIB on March 26, 2015 for receiving "founding member" status – just five days ahead of the March 31 deadline. It thus became the last US ally to join it. It is the fifth largest both in terms of shareholding and vote sharing. As of the final ceremony of the launch on June 29, 2015, 50 countries have signed the Articles of Agreement (AoA) that form the legal basis for the proposed bank. Chinese Finance Minister Lou Jiwei said that the ceremony was a milestone and "a first step in an 'epic journey' meant to deepen regional cooperation, boost Asia's infrastructure and support the global economic recovery. He also announced that China supplied about 30 percent of the $100 billion initial operating capital and has 26 percent of the voting power (The Washington Post 2015). As of now, 37 regional and 20 non-regional Prospective Founding Members (PFM), except the Philippines, have signed the agreement.

The founding of the AIIB has been a welcoming step for ROK as its infrastructure industries are expected to play a significant role in the development projects. It will provide immense opportunities for infrastructure building projects while strengthening economic ties with China. Because the bank will finance diverse sectors in key areas including telecommunications, energy, and transportation, South Korea's development experience is seen as crucial to the development of Asian infrastructure as well as the loan and debt management of the bank (Global Risks Insights 2015). It will benefit local companies by allowing them to take part in lucrative road and bridge building projects (Arirang TV). Supporters say that Seoul's participation will also secure post-unification fund. "South Korea could take the lead in developing the northeast Asian region, including North Korea by participating in the AIIB" argues Professor Oh Jeong-keun of the Konkuk University.

Considering the lucrative benefits promised by the AIIB and the discriminatory acts of the IMF in the wake of the 1997 Asian Financial crisis, ROK should have been among the first ones to join the bank. Nonetheless, unlike other middle powers and other US allies, ROK has been constrained by the burgeoning US-China geopolitical rivalry. The country has already been torn apart on the controversial issue of US deployment of Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense as part of the US missile defense system. To join the China-led AIIB despite the US pressure could be interpreted as the weakening of ROK alliance with the US in favour China. Those who take a cautious stand argue that South Korea's joining of the bank could be a stumbling block for strong US-ROK alliance. Yun Duk-min, Chancellor of the Korea National Diplomatic Academy was reportedly saying "The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank goes against the US-led Asian Development Bank. There are concerns of a weakening S.Korea-US alliance" (Hankookilbo 2015). ROK's entry into the AIIB prompted concerns from the main opposition party that it could serve as a catalyst for a decision by Seoul to accept US deployment of THAAD in Korea (Snyder 2015). In regards to providing fund to the unified Korea, some analysts are of the view that the AIIB's role should not be exaggerated to that extent.

In a news report by Connie Kim, a correspondent of the Arirang TV, commented, *"With ROK mulling over whether to join the China-led development bank, experts are calling for diplomatic strategy that doesn't favour either Washington or Beijing, but is in Korea's best national interest".* Although ROK officials denied media's claim on its dilemma on taking sides over US-China strategic rivalry, it is undeniable that ROK has been in a difficult position to maneuver its middle power diplomacy. It was much easier for other middle powers like, UK, Germany, Australia and Indonesia to join the AIIB despite US opposition, due to their geographical location and their loose security ties with the US. It did not seem to be the case with ROK whose decision could be interpreted as taking sides on either China or US. The issue could have been much lighter if the US and China did not compete for geopolitical influence on the Korean peninsula. ROK's joining of the bank after such a long gap of time shows that the country could not make a decisive opinion on its own before the other US allies take the first step.

3:8 ROK's Constraints on Implementing NAPCI

The Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI) along with the Eurasian Initiative are parts of the larger foreign policy of Park Geun-hye's administration. Trustpolitik has been a longstanding policy of President Park before and since she was elected as president. The ultimate goal of trustpolitik is to lay the foundation on which neighboring countries can cooperate for the sake of peaceful Korean unification (Lee 2015). Park had published an article in Foreign Affairs in September 2011, titled "A New Kind of Era: Building Trust between Seoul and Pyongyang" when she was the leading presidential candidate for the Saenuri Party. It targets three geographical areas: the Korean peninsula, Northeast Asia, and Eurasia. Park aims to build trust on all three levels simultaneously to reinforce one another. In her keynote address at the 7th World Policy Conference on December 16, 2014 Park stated, "When the trust-building Process on the Korean Peninsula, Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative, and Eurasia Initiative move forward successfully and in sync with one another, a corridor of trust and peace will open,"

The idea of a NAPCI was developed during Park's presidential campaign and has continued since she took office (Snyder and Woo: 2015). It is a process for establishing an order of multilateral cooperation in Northeast Asia (MOFA: 2013). Park first discussed it with President Obama during her visit and officially announced it on May 8, 2013 in her address to the joint session of the US Congress. Her vision is to make Northeast Asia a more peaceful and harmonious region unbound by history and territorial tensions that can hamper the economic growth. NAPCI, she explained, is 'a process to build trust' and that trust will 'expand the horizons of cooperation' among countries in Northeast Asia, and will eventually replace a structure of conflict and discord in the region with an order of dialogue and cooperation. To start up this initiative, she suggests seven soft security agenda items: energy security, cyberspace regulation, public health, climate change, disaster relief, and nuclear energy. By achieving success in less politically sensitive issues, NAPCI hopes to translate that trust into broader cooperation on hard security issues (Kim: 2015).

The goal of the initiative has been to identify and implement steps necessary to address what Park calls the "Asian paradox." The paradox refers to the fact that the region leads the world in economic growth, but has not yet effectively addressed longstanding security dilemmas and political conflicts that potentially put that growth at risk. The Northeast Asian region, which includes the second and third largest economies in the world, accounts for around 20 percent of the global economy. Park identifies three main challenges that must be addressed to resolve the paradox: the possibility of an arms race or rising political competition between China and the United States, the failure of Japan to definitively address historical issues tied to its past aggression within Asia, and the failure to establish a stable inter-Korean relationship (Snyder and Woo: 2015).

President Park advocated NAPCI to be in a model of the Helsinki Process that led to the creation of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The Helsinki process was a peace initiative that provided much-needed momentum to encourage reconciliation, cooperation and ultimately an enduring peace in a divided Europe during the Cold War under the prevailing situations of security dilemmas and

conflicts. This multilateral forum started with a decision by Allies in 1967 to accept an invitation by the Soviet Union to a series of summits, structured to address a range of security issues. The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) was held in 1973. It led to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, with its statement of ten basic principles – The Decalogue – to govern relations between nations, and a list of specific confidence-building measures and cooperative projects. It led to the final establishment of a permanent secretariat, the Conflict Prevention Centre of the OSCE in Vienna.

Despite the initiates undertaken by Park for regional peace and cooperation there has been various constraints as efforts to overcome the paradox require cooperation from leaders in North Korea, Japan, the United States, and China. The NAPCI carries few elements that are objectionable to regional powers given its causes of trust and peace. However, the volatility in regional security and politics could dim its prospects. A series of issues in Northeast Asia and its adjacent regions have led confrontation to prevail over cooperation. They include the intensifying China-US rivalry over military primacy in Asia; an escalating sovereignty dispute between China and Japan; and territorial and historical conflicts between Seoul and Tokyo.

Russia's annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in March 2014 has exacerbated distrust among regional powers. Different strategic calculations of potential participants in the NAPCI posed hurdles to Park's peace initiative, although regional partners have positive expectations for the peace-making initiative. For the US, the initiative could become a source of concern should it conflict with its Asia-oriented external policy, in which it seeks to maintain security primacy based on its network of alliances with ROK and Japan. Some analysists are of the opinion that, although the NAPCI has not taken any concrete shape yet, the initiative could allow China, America's strategic rival, to flex more diplomatic and security muscles in a multilateral framework ─ apparently a disturbing scenario for Washington (Korea Herald April 4, 2014). The mutual distrust between the involving parties in Northeast Asia became a stumbling block to the success of the NAPCI. Although middle power Korea has a grand strategic plan, the implementation could not be materialised.

3.9 ROK's Constraints on Achieving Eurasian Initiative

The Eurasian Initiative was proposed by President Park Geun-hye on October 18, 2013, at an International Conference on Eurasian Cooperation in the Era of Eurasia in Seoul. It has the goal of building a new Eurasia as "a single united continent, a continent of creativity and a continent of peace." The initiative projects a unified system of transport, energy, and trade networks across the vast Eurasian continent. To this end, she suggested connecting the Trans-Korean Railway with the Trans-Chinese Railway and Trans-Siberian Railway. It presupposes a "Silk Road Express (SRX)," which would connect rail and road networks from Busan to Europe, as well as new sea routes through the Arctic Ocean. This transport integration is to be followed by the gradual elimination of trade barriers, leading to the establishment of a vast free trade zone. Once the SRX is connected, transportation time from South Korean Busan to locations in Europe will only take 14 days as opposed to the current 45 days, which involves travelling through the Suez Channel. Like the NAPCI, trust is at the core of the Eurasia Initiative.

The Eurasia Initiative has implications in at least three dimensions. The first is economic integration with the Eurasian landmass, calling for the participation of the countries in the region. The second is security dimension, which call for a practical proposal to improve on the security situation on the Korean Peninsula, particularly by involving North Korea in multilateral economic cooperation and eventually inducing changes. The third dimension has to do with ROK's geopolitical strategy to resolve the problem of "dual reliance" on the United States and China, as it becomes increasingly caught in their strategic rivalry (Kim 2015).

Progress on the Eurasia Initiative, however, has not been smooth with many factors interfering from different angles. Two main points are worth mentioning. The first is the return of geopolitics manifested by Ukrainian crisis. This is not only driving its relations with the West to new low not seen since the end of the Cold War, but also accelerating its pivot to Asia. Moscow and Beijing are forming a collaborative front to counter Washington's pivot to Asia. The two countries agreed to work together to create a basically new regional security system way back in 2010. This regional geopolitical rival

is pushing Seoul to opt for one or another of the contending blocs – either the United States and Japan, or China and Russia. Although Korea did not choose to side with the previous, it neither could not distance itself from it..

One of the main reasons for the success of Roh Tae-woo's Nordpolitik was its economic engagement with Russia. Apart from its huge oil and gas reserves, Russia's role in the project, as it is seen in Seoul, is determined by its geography – Russia's territory acquires a large part of Eurasia's landmass. Russia is considered a core country in the Eurasia Initiative, whose economic scheme centers on transport and energy networks to be built around the Trans-Korean Railways (TKR) and the Trans-Siberian Railways (TSR) running from Busan to Europe across Russia, and around oil and gas pipelines and electric power grids stretching from Russia's Eastern Siberia and the Far East to South Korea across North Korea. It should be recalled that in the landmark pilot operation of December 2014, 40,500 tons of Russian coal arrived in South Korea on a Chinese-flagged ship. Thus, given the geopolitical significance of Russia, ROK was unable to follow the US and its European allies in condemning Russia's act of aggression in Crimea, although it did not agree to it.

Secondly, North Korea's reluctance to open its territory for railway track greatly obstructs ROK's Eurasian Initiatives. According to the proposed plan North Korea is a ROK's gateway to Europe. Park explicitly expressed her willingness to take part in a summit with Pyongyang without preconditions at her annual press conference in January 12, days after Kim Jong-un in his annual New Year's Day speech said that there was "no reason why we should not hold a summit meeting if the atmosphere and environment for it are created." However, Park's proposals have fallen on deaf ears of North Korea regime. North Korea continues to behave in a hostile manner. The year 2014 recorded the highest number of military provocations. North-South relations have virtually stalled since the Lee Myung-bak administration. Although the Park administration tries to differentiate its North Korea policy from Lee's, inter-Korean relations- economic relations in particular - have fallen into a trap of the May 24 measures imposed by the Lee administration. Proposals and demands from both sides are running in parallel.

Without resolving the predicament, Seoul's proposals end in hollow echoes. It came to the basic that ROK has been under the strong constraint of North Korea.

North Korea has learned how to maintain its dictatorial regime. It has established closer ties with Russia to diversify its foreign policy. In this regard, Russia's pivot to Asia is helping North Korea in economic reconstruction. Moscow and Pyongyang agreed on the $ 25 billion Pobeda (victory) project for North Korean railroad modernisation to be carried out by Mostovik in exchange for access to such North Korean natural resources as rare earth metals, gold, coal, and titanium. A ground-breaking ceremony occurred at the East Pyongyang station on October 21, 2014. It was also reported that negotiations between Moscow and Pyongyang were under way on another grand project (estimate $20-30 billion) to repair the North's electric power grids to transmit electricity from the Russian Far East to North Korea and, eventually, to ROK (Kim 2015). Russia's minister for the Development of the Far East and the head of the Russian-North Korean Intergovernmental Committee Alexander Galushka was quoted as saying after his visit to the North last October that the North Koreans had already agreed to the idea of an energy grid stretching from Russia into South Korea. Also on the negotiating table in October 2014 was the possibility of creating a visa-free regime between the two countries to allow North Korean workers to come to Russia for ambitious development projects in the Far East. The two parties agreed to set up a North Korea-Russia business council. While Russian businessmen have shown interest in the development of the Kaesong Special Economic Zone, North Koreans have shown interest in the agricultural development of the Russian Far East. The growing economic and political ties between Moscow and Pyongyang is good for the stability the North Korean economy. However, this economic stability can become a hindrance for ROK to pressure North Korea for economic reforms and thereby an obstacle to implement its initiatives.

3.10 Conclusion

The geopolitical factor of ROK continues to be a hindrance for its diplomacy maneuvers. At the time when it successfully enhanced middle power diplomacy at the global level, it has been constrained by its regional issues. The greatest constraints has been North

Korea's military provocations manifested through the sinking of South Korean navy ship *Cheonan* on March 26 followed shelling of Yeonpyeong Islands on November 22, 2010. These two provocative incidents sharply divided a South Koreans on opposite political camps. China's reluctance to condemn North Korea on the two incidents worsened the situation which also raised the status of the 'strategic partnership' between the two countries. The US condemned China's failure to act as 'a responsible player' on the region which further aggravated the tensions between the two great powers.

If Cheonan sinking indicated the increasing US-China geopolitical rivalry, the Yeonpyeong Island attack was a clear indication of North Korea's brinkmanship. China's shielding of North Korea on the Cheonan sinking could be somewhat justifiable as there was not enough evidence to prove North Korea as the culprit. But China's continual diplomatic shielding of North Korea on this attack was a clear indication of its unchanging policy on Pyeongyang, which many observers see it as a hindrance to pressure the latter to change its behaviour. It further stood as a hindrance to Park Geun-hye's *trustpolitik* to engage North Korea. The US rebalancing act against China's assertiveness also restrains South Korea to pave its own foreign policy which was best evidence when Washington warned Seoul not to join the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2013. Despite its convinced of the foreseeable financial benefits, Korea was unable to take a decision on fear of US negative reaction. It could decide to join it only after UK, another US ally declared its willingness to join the bank.

The other constraints of ROK's middle power diplomacy at the regional level include Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiatives (NAPCI) and Eurasian Initiatives announced by President Park Geun-hye in 2013. These two initiatives are at stalemate due to the lack of support from China and the US, and the lack of reciprocity from North Korea. Cooperation among the Northeast Asian countries remains weak and unstable due to the territorial disputes.

CHAPTER 4

ROK's Middle Power Role in UN Peacekeeping Operations

4.1 Introduction

One of the main foreign policy objectives of Lee Myung-bak under the banner of Global Korea was to establish ROK as a responsible and contributing member of the international community committed to global movement for peace and development. To this end, he sought to increase dispatching of troops to UN peacekeeping operations and also involve in the counter-piracy activities in Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden. As a continuation of Lee's policy, Park Geun-hye proclaimed 'responsible middle power diplomacy' as one of the main pillars of her *trustpolitik* foreign policy initiative which seeks to contribute to the peace and development of the world beyond the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia in dealing with the rising security threats. ROK leaders are well aware of the importance of international peace and security for its export-led economic growth and thus they are committed to play a significant role for maintaining global peace. The most prominent role for this is to participate in UN peacekeeping operations, which is seen as an effective way to contribute to the global community.

The ROK is rightly called 'the first child of the United Nations' as it was established in 1948 under the supervision of the world's body. A Korean scholar succinctly called the UN as the 'mid-wife of ROK'. Whatever ways the term may be twisted, the meaning remains the same – that ROK cannot downplay the significance of UN and has its obligations to its cause. ROK was also the first country which was rescued through the UN military intervention when it was attacked by North Korea in 1950. It was, therefore, not surprising that ROK has ambitiously took part in peacekeeping operations since 1993, two years after its admission to the UN. There has been a strong sense of gratitude to repay back to UN for its involvement in Korean War and its post-war economic reconstruction. However, ROK's involvement in peacekeeping operations has also been driven by national interest and its aspirations for higher status in global affairs and the need for global community's cooperation in case of regime collapse in North Korea.

There are several reasons for sending troops to UN peace keeping operations depending on the countries involved in the mission. For some countries, it is driven by political motivations, while for others it is driven by financial benefits provided by the UN, which is quite often the case with developing countries. While for country like China, it is to protect their citizens and to safeguard the interest of their companies in the host countries. In some other cases, the leaders' pursuit of enhancing national image is what motivates the countries. Still there are countries whose motivations are neither driven by political interest nor economic gain, but driven by their commitments to protect international norms and values. ROK's involvement in UN peacekeeping operations too is driven by various domestic and international factors which serve its national interest directly or indirectly. One great important reason for ROK's active participation in UN peacekeeping operations has been the 'payback syndrome'. There is a strong feeling of the leaders that it is time for ROK to repay back the service rendered by the UN-led 16 nations during the Korean War in the post-war economic reconstruction.

This chapter examines ROK's middle power role in maintaining international peace and security. Beginning with the historical and theoretical background of peacekeeping operations, this chapter looks at the historical background ROK's involvement in UN PKO, its motivations and the future challenges. It will also look at ROK's expanding role for global peace through its involvement in anti-piracy. The chapter will not however, cover ROK involvement in other multinational forces (MNF) under the US-led peacekeeping operations.

After ROK became UN member in 1991, it increased its participation in various UN activities. As a follow up to ROK's commitments, Han announced that, 'Korea will take an active part in international efforts to tackle global issues such as international peace and security, disarmament and arms control, eradication of poverty, protection of environment and the efficient utilization of resources'(Kang 2011: 321, 322). He argued that ROK's involvement in peacekeeping operations and international peace and security will secure ROK's place in the international community.

4.2: Failure of Collective Security and the Origin of UN Peacekeeping Operations

By definition, peacekeeping operations are essentially a practical mechanism used by the United Nations to contain international conflicts and to facilitate their settlement by peaceful means (Ram 2008: 3). Peacekeeping has been the flagship enterprise of the United Nations since the first peacekeepers donned their 'Blue Helmets' (Dewan and Vermeij: 2014). It is also the main expense of the UN budget. It has become synonymous with the UN for the vast majority of devastated populations around the world (Hempson III: 2011). Yet, nowhere in the 111 articles that comprise the UN Charter, is there a mentioning of the word peacekeeping. The founders of the UN had not foreseen the possibility of engaging in peacekeeping operations (PKOs) and thus PKOs are not mention at all in the original text of the Charter (Ram 2008).

The primary purpose of the United Nations, founded in the aftermath of the World War II on October 24, 1945, was to maintain international peace and security. The basic principle of the Organisation was collective security system whereby an attack on any member is considered to be an attack on all, and member states are collectively responsible for the protection others' territory and sovereignty. Learning from the failure of the League of Nations, at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, the Allied leaders Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin envisioned a system of collective security by which the five great power, including France and China will be given veto power with the primary responsibility to carry out the mandate of the UN's primary purpose (Bloch 2010). It is a machinery for joint action in order to prevent or counter any attack against an established international order (Scharzenberger 1951).

In order to attain this, Chapter VI outlined an obligation for the involving parties in a dispute to seek peaceful means. If the peaceful means fail and the dispute escalates into an armed conflict, then under the provisions of Chapter VII, plans for the use of force must be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the UN Military Staff Committee. This constitutes the core of the UN Collective Security System. Under Article 25 of the Charter, Member States of the UN have agreed to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council. The leaders envisioned large military, kept at the

ready, and capable of moving against an act of aggression anywhere in the world (Filed 1993: 7).

However, due the ideological conflicts between the United States and the Soviet Union that emerged after World War II, what came to be known as 'Cold War' significantly affected the operation of the UN. The veto powers held by them in the Security Council prelude any multilateral cooperation against any acts of aggression regardless of their origin. So far there have been only two military enforcement actions in Korean War 1950-53[4] and Gulf War I 1990-91 under the provisions of Chapter VII. No enforcement actions were taken in armed conflicts areas in Indonesia 1946-49, Palestine 1947 and Kashmir 1948. What is now called peacekeeping came about out of necessity and was essentially an improvisation to respond to the growing tensions between the two superpowers. This led to the conception of Peacekeeping Operations (Ram 2008). The idea was that if UN could not deter acts of aggression through the threat of its own force, at least it will be able to maintain a short-term peace while a more lasting solution was worked out (Field 1993).

Peacekeeping arose largely from an urgent need to manage violent conflicts of Israel and its Arab neighbouring countries in 1948, followed by the Suez Canal Crisis in 1956 involving Britain, France, Egypt and Israel. The UN General Assembly President Lester Pearson, with the active support of UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld of Sweden, induced the UN to go beyond the role of passive dispute settlement to active peacekeeping by creating the UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) to oversee the post-conflict transition in Suez and the Sinai after the Israeli, British, and French withdrawal (Lee . The three basic principles of peacekeeping as laid down by them were: (1) the consent of the conflicting parties; (2) the non-use of force, except in self defence; (3) impartiality. These principles were in used until the mid-1990s as most of the peacekeeping operations were conducted to maintain peace in inter-state conflicts. The emergence of intra-state ethnic conflicts in the post-Cold War posed great challenge to the peacekeeping operations. The mission involves multidimensional tasks which include protection of

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[4] Military action on North Korea was possible only due to the abstention of Russia on the day of voting.

civilians, construction of roads, providing food and medicines to the victims, among others.

The peacekeeping operations have undergone various changes from the initial stage to present age. It is broadly divided into two generations – first and second generations. The first generation peacekeeping from its beginning to the end of Cold War has also been called 'truce-keeping', and 'traditional peacekeeping' based on the nature of work involved in the mission. The second generation peacekeeping has also been called 'wider peacekeeping', 'strategic peacekeeping' and 'multidimensional peacekeeping' by different authors (Sävström 2010).

4.3 First Generation Peacekeeping Operations

The traditional peacekeeping operation traced its origin in May 1948 when the Security Council authorised the deployment of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), unarmed military observers in Palestine in order to monitor the armistice agreement that was signed between Israel and its Arab neighbors in the wake of the Arab-Israeli War[5]. The UNTSO military observers continued to station in the Middle East to monitor ceasefires, supervise armistice agreements, prevent isolated incidents from escalating and assist other UN peacekeeping operations in the region to fulfill their respective mandates. Following the dispute erupted in 1947, a similar group, the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) was created in 1948 and was deployed in Kashmir since January 1949. It was renamed as the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) in 1951 as has been in active to this day, with offices in Islamabad (November-April) and Srinagar (May-October).

The first armed peacekeeping operation was the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) deployed in 1956 to resolve the Suez Crisis. As this was the first armed operations, some choose it as the date of the origin of peacekeeping operations. The crisis started off on July 26, 1956 when Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser announced the

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[5] As UNTSO involved unarmed military observers, some choose 1956 as the year of the first UN peacekeeping operations.

nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company, the joint British-French enterprise which had owned and operated the Suez Canal since its construction in 1869. Nasser's announcement came about following months of mounting political tensions between Egypt, Britain, and France. Israeli forces launched an attack on Egypt on October 29, 1956 and occupied Sinai and the Gaza Strip. A few days later British and French troops landed in the Suez Canal Zone. After the matter was discussed at the General Assembly, nine members of United Nations Security Council signify support of the resolution endorsing operation of the Suez Canal on October 14, 1956. Contingents from Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Brazil, Colombia, India, Indonesia and Yugoslavia were chosen from among the offers by 24 governments as they were considered more or less neutral in the Middle East (Basu 2004: 324). Following the dispatch of the Emergency Force to the area, the French and British forces left the Suez Canal Zone by December 22, 1956. The withdrawal of the Israeli forces was completed by March 8, 1957.

It was this Suez Canal Crisis that led to the formation of the peacekeeping operations to its present structure. The key role play by UNTSO in the difficult task of implementing the Arab-Israeli Armistice Agreements of 1949 and UNEF's success in diffusing led to further demand for the peacekeeping operations (Goulding 1993: 452). The UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC), launched in 1960, was the first large-scale mission having nearly 20,000 military personnel at its peak which demonstrated the risks involved in trying to bring peace and stability to war-torn regions. This was also the first UN venture into peace enforcement in which UN-led forces confronted a mutiny by Congolese armed forces against the government, sought to maintain the Congo's territorial integrity, and tried to prevent civil war after the province of Katanga seceded (Schaefer 2007). Until the end of the mission in 1964, 250 UN personnel died while serving on that mission, including the Secretary-General and Swedish diplomat Dag Hammarskjold, who was reported to have died on a plane crash while on a peace mission in Congo[6].

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[6] The Guardian and BBC reported in 2011 that his plane might have been shot down.

With one exception ONUC UN the first generation peacekeeping forces were used to monitor borders and establish buffer zones following cease-fire agreements. The peacekeepers played important roles in preventing escalation of conflict, keeping warring apart and dispute settlement in various parts of the globe. From 1948 and 1988, 13 UN peacekeeping operations had been established, which in their areas of deployment, contributed to peace and security. UN peacekeepers were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988 in recognition of their decisive contribution to conflict resolution around the globe. In the award letter, the Nobel Committee cited "the Peacekeeping Forces through their efforts have made important contributions towards the realization of one of the fundamental tenets of the United Nations. Thus, the world organisation has come to play a more central part in world affairs and has been invested with increasing trust".

According Karen A. Mingst (2001), the first-generation peacekeeping operations are most effective under the following conditions:

i) Clear and practical mandate or purpose for the operation.

ii) Consent of the parties involved as to the mandate and composition of the force.

iii) Strong financial and logistical support of the members of the UN Security Council.

iv) Acceptance by troop-contributing countries of the mandate and the risk that it may bring.

v) An understanding among the peacekeepers to resort the use of force only for self-defence.

Table 4.1 First Generation Peacekeeping Operations

Operation	Location	Duration
UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO)	Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon	June 1948-present
UN Emergency Force I (UNEF I)	Suez Canal, Sinai Peninsula	Nov.1956-June 1967
UN Operation in the Congo (UNUC)	Congo	June 1960-June 64
UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNPKFC)	Cyprus	March 1964-present
EN Emergency Fund II (UNEP II)	Suez Canal, Sinai Peninsula	Oct. 1973-July 1979
UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)	Syrian Golan Heights	June 1974-present
UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)	Ethiopia/Eritrea border	Sept.2000-present

Source: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

4.4 Second Generation Peacekeeping Operations

With the end of Cold War, the United Nations started the 1990s with high hopes as the US-Soviet rivalry that had paralysed the Security Council had become a thing of the past, supposedly freeing the UN to become more assertive (Moot 2000). Their cooperation in taking military action against Iraq over its invasion of Kuwait vindicated this hope. However, the problems that emerged out were more complex than the inter-state conflict or East-West divide that had been persisted during the Cold War. The rising intra-state ethnic conflicts, civil wars within weak or poorly governed states, resource and power struggles, violation of human rights, poverty and inequality called for more multidimensional peacekeeping operations. While there were only five traditional UN operations until 1988, in its peak period from 1989 to 1994, the UN authorised a total number of 20 new missions, raising the number of peacekeepers from 11000 to 75000 (Guttry 2011). The growth of the number of peacekeepers was accompanied by the expansion in the mandated tasks that the peacekeepers were expected to perform.

Depending on their mandate, complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions required the following tasks:

- Deploy to prevent the outbreak of conflict or the spill-over of conflict across borders;
- Stabilize conflict situations after a cease fire, to create an environment for the parties to reach a lasting peace agreement;
- Help to restore law and order and appropriate judicial processes;
- Monitor and advise on human rights and international humanitarian law;
- Liaise with host nations, internal and external parties, including regional organisations and NGOs;
- Monitor and report on developments within or in proximity to the area of operations;
- Protect civilians;
- Promote human security, confidence-building measures and power-sharing arrangements;

- Assist in implementing comprehensive peace agreements;

- Lead states or territories through a transition to stable government, based on democratic principles, good governance and economic development (UNDPKO website).

In response to the increasing demands of expanded peace operations, peacekeeping was institutionalised in the United Nations with the establishment of the Department of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) in 1992, although the UN General Assembly had established Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in 1965 (Caplan…). The purpose of DPKO was to plan, manage, deploy, support, and provide executive direction to UN peacekeeping operations (Schaefer 2007: 7). Anticipating the requirement to respond to conflict in the post-Cold World, and also in response to the request of the Security Council, the then UN Secretary-Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his seminal report, **Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (1992)** called for the establishment of peace enforcement units to deal with challenges that exceed peacekeeping, but such units have never been created.

The peacekeeping operations continued to operate on the principles of non-use of force except for self-defence. This prevents the peacekeeping troops to use force even for the protection of civilian populations. The peacekeepers remain silent spectators in the face of genocides and were unable to fulfill their mandates in some of the crucial missions. The best example was evident in 1994 when 2000 Tutsi people were mercilessly murdered by gun, grenade and blade in the school where they took shelter. The Belgian peacekeepers were asked to abandon the school in order to escort the foreigners to the airport and out of Rwanda, and thus the rebel groups were given a free hand to take the lives of innocent civilians. A year later the Dutch peacekeepers failed to stop the massacre of 8000, Muslim men and boys supposedly in a safe area in Srebrenica, Bosnia which was termed as the most notorious killing by the Serbs. Another failure was in Somalia where, the withdrawal of UN troops as a result to their killings, in 1995 led to the death of thousands of civilians and unending civil war. It was described at the time by one UN official as "the greatest failure of the UN in our lifetime".

UN Peacekeeping operations virtually collapse after several failed missions in the mid to late 1990s. However, despite these failures the support for UN peacekeeping grew again in the late 1990s. By 2000, UN peacekeeping operations and their budgets were again rapidly expanding. There has also been an urged to reform the principle of peacekeeping operations in order to effectively response to the challenges arising, especially in regards to protection of civilians. *The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (also known as the Brahimi Report), written by a panel of ten experts, was tabled in the year 2000 in response to the dramatic failures of UN peacekeeping in the 1990s, especially in Rwanda and Srebrenica. This report which aimed at renewing the commitment of UN member states to the "maintenance of international peace and security" (Durand 2012). The report recommends the use of peacekeeping forces robust enough to represent a threat to belligerents and deter them from dropping out of previously signed peace agreements (Khan 2002). The Brahimi represented an important turning point in setting out a renewed vision for peacekeeping in the 21st century.

Table 4.2 Second-Generation Peacekeeping Operations

Operation	Location	Duration
UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)	Namibia, Angola	Apr.1989-Mar.1990
UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR)	Yugoslavia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia	Mar.1992-Dec.1995
UN Operation in Congo (UNOC)	Congo	June1960-June 1964
UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia	Cambodia	Mar.1992-Dec.1995
UN Operation in Somalia (UNSOM I, II)	Somalia	Aug.1992-Mar.1995
UN Mission in Haiti (UNIMIH)	Mozambique	Dec.1992-Dec.1994
UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)	Kosovo, Yugoslavia	June 1999-present
UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)	East Timor	Oct.1999-present

Source: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

Debates surrounding the expansion of peacekeeping activities prompted the UN DPKO prompted to initiate a process in 2006 which led to the production of ***The Publication of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* or *"Capstone***

Doctrine" in 2008 which sought to introduce a guiding doctrine for peacekeeping across operations. This initiative forms part of a broader effort to develop a doctrinal basis for UN peacekeeping work, with the development of policies, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and guidelines to govern and support the work of staff. In 2009, a set of proposals to reform and strengthen peacekeeping were launched as part of the "New Horizon" initiative, with a view to defining a policy agenda for peacekeeping that reflects the perspectives of the global peacekeeping partnership and that seeks to make peacekeeping operations faster, more capable and more effective.

Table 4.3 UN Peacekeeping Missions, 2013

Sl. No	Mission	Police	Expert on Mission	Contingent Troop	Total
1.	UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINUSRO)	* 4	195	27	226
2.	Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)	*71	883	5,485	6,439
3.	UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)	*840	1,592	6,168	8,600
4.	Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)	**1299	929	526	19,373
5.	Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)	*4	21	-	25
6.	Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)	-	-	271	271
7.	UN Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID)	**4,674	325	14,443	19,442
8.	Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)	-	-	1,239	1,239
9.	Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)	*68	-	868	936
10.	UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	-	-	10,413	10,413
11.	Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)	*17	129	3,956	4,102
12.	Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)	*6	8	-	14
13.	UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)	**1583	133	5751	7,467
14.	UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)	*746	142	6,796	7,684
15.	UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)	-	41	-	41
16.	UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)	**1,270	185	8,489	9,944
17.	UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)	-	159	-	159
	Total in Peacekeeping Operations				**98,200**

*Individual
**Individual and formed police units

Source: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

By 2010, with nearly 100,000 uniformed personnel in the field (up from 14,000 in 1998), the United Nations was second only to the US in the number of deployed armed forces under its command (Caplan). As of December 31, 2013, there were 98,200 UN troops operating in 17 missions directed by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). This shows that peacekeeping operations have been given importance by the member countries irrespective of the geographical locations and the tasks involved with it. Since 1945, the UN has assisted in negotiating more than 170 peace settlements that have ended regional conflicts. More than 3,326 UN peacekeepers from some 120 countries have died while serving under the UN flag (UN Report).

Figure 4.1 Top 20 Largest Troop Contributors to UN Operations, 2013

Country		Male	Female	Total
1) Pakistan	....	8238	28	8,266
2) Bangladesh	....	7713	205	7,918
3) India	....	7706	143	7,849
4) Ethiopia	....	6217	402	6,619
5) Nigeria	....	4502	334	4,836
6) Rwanda	....	4523	228	4,751
7) Nepal	....	4457	123	4,580
8) Jordan	....	3243	11	3,254
9) Ghana	....	2705	300	3,005
10) Senegal	....	2961	37	2,998
11) Egypt	....	2742	0	2,742
12) Tanzania	....	2393	112	2,505
13) South Africa	....	1875	298	2,173
14) Uruguay	....	2042	123	2,165
15) China	....	2023	55	2,078
16) Burkina Faso	....	1938	51	1,989
17) Niger	....	1920	26	1,946
18) Togo	....	1788	19	1,807
19) Brazil	....	1729	19	1,748
20) Morocco	....	1587	0	1,587

Source: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

So far, small and middle power countries as well as developing countries contributed more troops than the more advanced and powerful countries mainly due to the economic benefits (See Figure 4.1). It is also due to their neutrality on the conflicting countries and their reputation of not being seen as a threat to the countries of deployment.

However, in terms of financial contributions, it is the richer and more powerful countries that contribute more funds than the major troop-contributing countries, as it is calculated based on the size of the economy as well as the per capita income. However, in some cases it also depends on their commitments. The top 10 financial providers of peacekeeping operations in 2013 are as shown in Table 4.4. US, Japan and France were the top 10 contributors, while ROK ranked in the twelfth position. The approved budget for the fiscal year 1 July 2015 - 30 June 2016 is about $8.27 billion. Although this seems to be huge amount, by way of comparison, this is less than half of one per cent of world military expenditures (estimated at $1,747 billion in 2013).

Table 4.4 Top 15 Financial Contributors to UN Peacekeeping Operations, 2013

Rank	Country	Percentage
1.	United States	28.38
2.	Japan	10.83
3.	France	7.22
4.	Germany	7.14
5.	United Kingdom	6.68
6.	China	6.64
7.	Italy	4.45
8.	Russia	3.15
9.	Canada	2.98
10.	Spain	2.97
11.	Australia	2.07
12.	**South Korea**	**1.99**
13.	Netherlands	1.65
14.	Switzerland	1.05
15.	Belgium	1.00

Source: United Nations (2013)

It is interesting to note that more than half of the UN member countries are involved in the peacekeeping operations irrespective of how big or small the number of troops contributions are. The majority of the peacekeeping operations take place in Africa and the Middle-East. Most of the peacekeeping troops come from developing countries from South Asian and African countries. Realising the failures of peacekeeping operations two decades ago, those responsible for peacekeeping – UN officials, countries on the Security Council assigning missions, militaries contributing the forces in blue helmets – say the lessons of the 1990s have been learned. Protection of civilian lives is now a priority (McGreal 2015). The role of the UN peacekeeping operations continues to be significant and relevant despite the existence of various regional security architecture and alliance system and it will continue to play crucial role for maintenance of peace and security in the future.

4.5 Why Do States Contribute to UN Peacekeeping Operations?

The active involvement of various small and middle powers in Asia and Africa make us more curious about their motivations for countries to send troops to UN peacekeeping operations. Is their participation a mean to gain economic benefits or attain political goal; or is it for both? Are some countries driven by their normative behaviors to involve in maintaining international peace and security, or are they also participating to promote their national interest and international status?

Based on the previous studies, there are four theories on peacekeeping operations: Realists, liberalists, impure public goods and civil-military relations. Realist-inspired explanation argues that states provide peacekeepers for self-interested reasons. This could be commonly expressed in two ways. First, because peacekeeping contributions are considered to be more traditional exercise of foreign policy than charitable act, states whose interest are mainly served by the prevailing status quo are more likely to participate in peacekeeping operations. Second, states are also likely to provide peacekeepers as a self-interested action to established, preserve increase their position and power base in the world. From this perspective, middle power countries like

Australia, Canada, Sweden and Norway took active part in peacekeeping operations during the Cold War period in order to enhance their position in the international system. The prestige that they gained from providing peacekeepers bolstered their influence on international security issues. Likewise, India, Japan and Nigeria actively participated in peacekeeping operations in order to enhance their international status and to validate their ambition for permanent membership in the Security Council.

The liberalists believed that states will cooperate for mutual gain, even when the burdens and benefits are distributed unequally. They also emphasise that democratic countries are more likely to participate in peacekeeping operations than the non-democratic countries and further argue that the increase in the troop-contributing countries in the post-Cold War is connected to the global spread of democracy. Democratic peace theory posits three reasons for the participation of democratic countries in peacekeeping operations. First, their legitimacy is derived from the liberal principles so they are more ready to accept the proposition that individuals have inalienable rights that must be promoted and protected everywhere. Second, they believed that democracy and humanitarianism can be exported and that these principles are not easily separated from self-interest. Third, democracies are thought to be more likely to join international organisations and to cooperate each other to achieve common goals, such as peace and security. Liberal institutionalists emphasise that multilateral cooperation through Un peacekeeping operations dilutes potential opponents and allows states to monitor and control the behaviour of other participants.

Public goods theory suggests that states might produce collective good through self-interest behaviour. This overcomes the sharp contrast of the self-interest and common interest of the realist and liberal approaches. Bobrow and Boyer (2009) argue that peacekeeping operations are pure public good as their purpose are to halt armed conflict and prevent its recurrence. There are those who disagree to this view on the ground that states contribute to the production of public goods only when it brings them private benefits. They also argue that the individual peacekeeping operations are deployed in geographical limited areas and as a result only those who are geographically closed

enjoyed more directly. States will contribute troops when the provision of a public good is going to produce public goods for the contributors. The increasing the number of participation from African countries is said to be due to the benefit they draw from resolving conflicts in their neighbourhood. The weakness of this theory is that in some cases many countries considered their participation in peacekeeping operations as their as contrary to their national interest.

The fourth theory and more recent one suggest that decisions to deploy troops to UN peacekeeping operations are due to the result of internal processes, specifically, civil-military and bureaucratic considerations. There are some armed forces which are reluctant to participate in peace operations due to several factors like their strong focus on internal security, national defence from external threats, lack of professional inducement, worries about UN command and control and force structure mechanism. Some countries like India, Pakistan, Rwanda, Nepal, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Indonesia and South Korea, which face internal and external threats are major contributors to UN.

There are several other reasons which cannot be explained theoretically because the reasons for each country are not all the same. Some countries see UN peacekeeping as attractive because it provides invaluable overseas experience for the personal concerned. For developing countries in Asia and Africa, participation in peacekeeping operations helps them earned hard currency as the salary is paid by the UN. In the cases of countries like Japan, Argentina and Ireland, peacekeeping serve as a form of insurance for its past militarism.

The attempts to develop general theory of UN peacekeeping operations have been found to be unsatisfactory. In order to fill the gap of this theoretical weakness, Allex B. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams (2010) explored the main motivating factors for countries to participate in the peace keeping operations. In their case study of several troop-contributing countries, they found out that there are multiple motivating rationales for contributing troops to UN peacekeeping operations, which fluctuated depending on the context and mission under consideration. Out of those, they identified five major

rationales to explain about the peacekeeping contributions: political, economic, security, institutional, and normative.

4.5:1 Political rationales:

Participation in UN peacekeeping operation helps the troop-contributing countries to fulfill their political goals. They argued that established and rising powers may see UN peacekeeping as a useful foreign policy tool, especially when it helps, support regional order or prestigious diplomatic and peacekeeping activities. The most prominent political reasons for providing peacekeepers are: pressure or persuasion by allies, great powers, or the UN Secretary-General or Secretariat, and perceptions that peacekeeping contributions enhance the county's prestige or might strengthen its bid to acquire a non-permanent seat on the Un Security Council (or for some states their bid for a permanent seat on a reformed Council) (Findlay 1996). Small country like Mongolia views its participation in peacekeeping allows its voice to be heard internationally, while bigger contributor like India considers that it has not only given recognition but also more decision-making power at the international architecture (Xenie Avezov 2014). Pakistan's contribution can be partly driven by regional and global competition with India (Krishnasamy 2002). Avinez (2014) further argues that domestic considerations such as public opinion or civil-military are also the driving factors for peacekeeping contributions. Public opinion can at times steal the altruism of governments and cause them to act, particularly in humanitarian crisis (Findlay 1996.

4.5:2 Economic Rationales:

Some countries participate in the peacekeeping operations for the economic benefit that they get as compensation of payments for member states that provide peacekeepers. There are four principal types of beneficiary. The first is national government in developing with small economy who used their participation to earn hard currency. Secondly, national defence and security sectors see UN compensation as an opportunity to augment their national budget. Thirdly, individuals such as the military and police officers, staff officers, military officers and police benefit from the monthly salary provided by the UN. Fourthly, private firms and national corporations can benefit from

UN procurement contracts for goods as like food items, bottled water, and air transportation. Some countries contribute troops to enhance their economic interest domestically and globally. Shimizu and Sandler found that troop-contributing countries are more likely to countries where they have an economic investment or connection. For low-income countries which are dependent on foreign aid, participation is sometime perceived as establishing goodwill and attracting foreign investment (Zaman and Biswas 2013).

4.5:3 Security rationales:

National and by extension regional security are the major motivating factors for participation in peacekeeping (Bellamy and Williams 2012). Although UN peacekeeping operations are not directly related to providing national security, some countries contribute troops in order to safeguard regional security. Countries are more likely to participate in the peace operations of the neighbouring states or region than those in the far off areas. The level of threat posed by a particular conflict could be a major driver of contribution decisions (Findlay 1996). However, great powers or those with larger international mindset might understand their security interest in more global terms.

4.5:4 Institutional Rationales:

The motives of a country's participation in the peacekeeping operations can be driven by its different institutions such as armed forces, security sector and bureaucratic dynamics. Decisions taken to participate in the peace operation are usually taken within the context of a nation's civil-military relations and are therefore affected by it. Some militaries see peacekeeping as attractive because they provide invaluable overseas experience for the personal concerned while others might view peacekeeping as a way of keeping the armed forces occupied outside the country rather than meddling in domestic affairs' or of rehabilitating them after a period of authoritarian rule. Civil-military relations may also improved domestically by socialising the army to international norms such as human rights and civil liberties, preventing a military from interfering in domestic affairs, and promoting a positive domestic image (Hunter 1996).

4.5:5 Normative Rationales:

Some countries provide peacekeepers for normative reasons such as promoting global peace and stability through international cooperation and contributing to the international humanitarian and development agenda (Avezov 2014). They intervene not because of their national security or national interest but on moral ground to do good work and provide helps to the people in need. States with self-images as 'global good Samaritan', 'good international citizens', or as a member of non-aligned' group of states that supports the UN as an alternative to great power hegemony might be disposed to provide peacekeepers in part because they believe that it is the right thing to do. As Alison Brysk rightly (2009) argues, 'good Samaritans identify with the sufferings of others and contribute to peacekeeping efforts because it promotes the greater good. However, although normative considerations are common, Findlay (1996) argues that 'altruism is today more likely to be outweighed by other factors'.

4.6 Main Motivations for ROK's Contribution to Peacekeeping Operations

Although, ROK could neither make into top 10 lists of the major troop-contributing countries nor among the main financial contributors, it has now committed itself to take more active part in maintaining global peace and security. In this section, I shall be discussing the major motivations for ROK to participate in the UN peacekeeping operations. Like many other troop-contributing countries, there are multiple factors for ROK's participation in peacekeeping operations. Different authors have contrasting views regarding the motivations of Korea's participation, ranging from the security perspectives to normative perspective.

Based on the findings of Bellammy and Williams, Lee and Park (2014) argue that Korea's participation to UN peacekeeping operations is driven by *political, security, institutional and normative* rationales. According to them, Korea views peacekeeping as a useful political instrument which it can use to enhance its national interest, national status, to expand its diplomatic outreach and perhaps most importantly securing support vis-à-vis North Korea. Secondly, participation of China and Japan is also seen as regional competitors by Korea. Another factor for ROK's contribution to peacekeeping is its

ambition to support the Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. Based on the observation of Egypt and Myanmar's experience, it was found out that there has been a tendency for contributing states to support the Secretary-General. Avezov (2014) concludes that *political and security* considerations are the primary motivations for ROK's participations in the peacekeeping operations. She argues that *normative and national politics*, like public opinions are imperative but secondary. According to her, the fluctuations in contributions under the past three ROK administrations demonstrate the primacy of political and foreign affairs considerations.

In contrast to Avezov's finding, Ko (2015) concludes that normative considerations are most important in making the decision to intervene in humanitarian crisis abroad. He argues that Korea has a very little economic interest and low levels of trade and investment in the conflict regions where it has sent large number of troops. Unlike many developing countries, the remuneration is no incentive to the Korean peacekeepers as only half the costs incurred are covered by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Korea also did not use its participation in peacekeeping operations in countries like Haiti, Angola, Lebanon and East Timor to established closer political ties with these countries. Lee and Park (2014) added to Korea's normative rationale by arguing that Korea sees its participation as part of its obligation and believes that it makes valuable contribution to international peace and security as a whole. They also rule out the economic motivation of ROK's participation in peacekeeping operations but, they at the same time admit that it is not entirely irrelevant, as there were times when Korea was not able to pay its dues on time. Moreover, due to its budget constraints, ROK's is unlike to increase it voluntary financial contribution.

In another study, Sesay (2002) finds out three main factors for Korea's participation in peacekeeping operations. The first is 'pay-back syndrome' as an act of indebtedness for three landmarks where UN played significant roles: General Assembly Resolution in 1948 which recognised Korea as an independent sovereign state, the collective security action led by UN in the wake of Korean War 1950-53, and the massive reconstruction works of UN from 1950-57. The second is its dedication to assist multilateral efforts

aimed at diffusing tensions, resolving conflicts, and healing the wounds of conflicts in any part of the world. The third factor is the realist or the power politics position which presumed that in international politics there is no free lunch; there is always something to give back in return sooner or later. An official in Ministry of Foreign Affairs succinctly stated that *"Nothing goes out or comes in for nothing"* (MOFA 5 August 1996).

Hong (2009) identifies two main colliding experiences of South Koreans' view on UN peacekeeping operations - *'paying back syndrome'* from the experience of Korean War and *'Vietnam syndrome'* from the Vietnam War. He cites two instances of Roh Tae-woo administration's inability to accept UN's request to send troops to Somalia (UNISOM I and UNOSOM II) in 1992 due to the lack of funds and lack of time for obtaining an approval from the ROK National Assembly. The government could only decide to contribute $2 million since it could not send troops. Although there was a strong will from the government, there was strong opposition from various sections of the society. ROK could dispatch troops to Somalia in 1993 only on the third request from the UN.

4.7 Historical Background of ROK's UN Peacekeeping Operations

4.7:1 Sending of Non-Combatant Troops

Contributing troops to UN peacekeeping operations has been a strong desire of ROK since its joining of the UN in August 1991. This was the time when the world witnessed 'the alarming outbreak of conflicts based on race, religion or ethnicity' signaled by the collapsed of communism in eastern Europe and Soviet Union. The UN peacekeeping operations faced great challenges both in terms of financial support as well as upholding its traditional principle using force only for the purpose of self-defence. It was President Kim Young-sam's implementation of *segyehwa* or globalisation that has been a driving for ROK global strategy calling for active involvement in UN activities to enhance its national status. As a newly elected president on May 24, 1993, Kim pledged his government by announcing that 'Korea will actively contribute to world peace by participating in UN peacekeeping operations and by taking a more prominent role in promotion of regional peace and prosperity' (Facts about Korea 1995).

Han Sung-joo, the then Foreign Minister of ROK listed *segyehwa* as a key component of Kim's administration's new diplomacy *(sin oegyo)*. In his speech at the luncheon hosted by Korean Council on Foreign Relations on May 31, 1993, Han announced the five fundamentals of Korea's new diplomacy: (i) *segyehwa* which he translated it as globalism not globalisation, (ii) diversification, (iii) multidimensionalism, (iv) regional cooperation and (v) futuristic orientation. Han made a commitment for Korea to contribute to international peace and security as: 'We will contribute to UN Peacekeeping Operations and international peace and security, thereby also securing our place in the international community' (Koh 2002).

However, despite its desire to contribute troops in the peacekeeping operations, Seoul on the other hand has been cautious about sending troops abroad due to its past experience in Vietnam, where 4400 military personal were killed. As a result in 1992, ROK had already declined twice the Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar's request to contribute peacekeeping operations on the ground of difficulties in raising necessary funds and a lack of time for obtaining an approval from the ROK National Assembly (Hong 2009).

ROK was finally able to send an engineering battalion of 504 personal known as *Evergreen Unit* to Somalia (UNOSOM II) for the first time in July 1993 to repair roads and other works of humanitarian assistance. This was barely less than two years that ROK joined the United Nations. The reason for sending a non-combatant troop was that it can be more visible and earn trust and respect from the local people. This was based on ROK's experience in Vietnam War in which a team of Taekwondo (Korean form of martial arts) instructors were sent to get public attention, followed by a 'Dove Unit' comprising of three engineering battalions who engaged in civil operations to build roads, schools and waterways for the benefit of the local people (Hong 2009). This was a breakthrough in ROK's broadening of its global role which in line with its commitments.

Han, in his address to the UN General Assembly on September 29, 1993 highlighted ROK's commitments in UNPKO as follows: (i) Korea will support UN peacekeeping operations and will actively participate in those operations; (ii) Korea will pursue a more

active role in tackling global issues such as international peace and security; it will seek to play its due part in the workings of the Un to make the world a safer, just and prosperous place; (iii) in order to contribute better to the maintenance of international peace and security, Korea will seek opportunity to serve in the Security Council in the near future (Sesay 2002).

In September 1994, Korea sent its first medical team comprising of 42 members to West Sahara to be part of UN Mission for Referendum in Western Sahara, and to assist in medical aid and epidemic prevention activities. In that mission, which consisted of 202 persons from twenty-six countries, the ROK contingent was the third largest (Koh 2002: 208). The unit comprised of 27 officers and 14 soldiers and provided medical services to around 700 peacekeepers from various countries stationed there. A 190-member of Filed Army Corps of Engineers was dispatched to Angola in 1995 who actively participated construction of bridges, roads and provision of humanitarian aid (Ikenberry and Mo 2013: 154, 155). In October 1995, another batch of engineering troop was dispatched to Angola to join the United Nations Angola Verification Missions (UNAVEM II). The unit engaged repairing roads, bridges, airfields and civilian operations by providing humanitarian assistance to the local people (Hong 2009).

Apart from the above non-combatant activities, since October 1994 ROK also sent military observers groups to several countries including Georgia, Liberia, Burundi, Sudan and Afghanistan. In November 1994 nine officers were sent to join the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) which had been operated since 1949. In this relatively small operation consisting of forty-five observers from eight countries, ROK was both the largest and the only Asian participant (Koh 2002: 208).

ROK's was elected as a member to the Security Council in for the period of 1996-1997. During its membership, the ROK focused on upgrading the Council's transparency, protecting humanitarian assistance to refugees and others, as well as enhancing the Council's capacity for resolving regional conflicts. While serving as President of the Security Council, the Republic of Korea initiated an open debate on protecting

humanitarian assistance to refugees and others in conflict situations, adopted four resolutions (1107-1110), and issued eight presidential statements (S/PRST/1997/25-32) (MOFA).

4.7:2 Sending of Combatant Troops

Korea sent the first combat troops to East Timor in 1999. This was the time that ROK government found it necessary to increase its contribution to peacekeeping operations. ROK involvement in military operations was also a significant moved towards Seoul's commitments to protect the civilians. In that year, President Kim Dae-jung made a bold statement at the APEC meeting urging the Asian neighbours not to remain as by-stander but be a protector of the people. Humanitarian cause and broader definition of national interest triumphed over traditional narrow national interest argument (Kim 2011). In 2007, ROK sent another combat troop called the *Dongmyeong Unit* to Lebanon. This infantry battalion consisting of 350 helps to oversee a ceasefire and maintain a buffer zone between Lebanon and Israel while providing a number of services to the local population including medical care, building repairing road, and school construction (ROK Ministry of National Defence 2012: 111-112).

Figure 4.2 ROK Military Deployment Abroad

Source: Lee and Park (2014)

As of December 31, 2013, ROK involved in 8 of the 16 missions of the UN peacekeeping operations contributing 614 troops and expert on mission. Although the number seems to be less compare to the top 20 contributions, it is not less compare to several powerful countries in Europe and Asia. Except China (2078) and France (952), the other three of the five permanent members of the Security Council - United Kingdom (289), United States (118) and Russia (103) - contribute lesser troops than ROK. Even the more economically advanced and militarily powerful countries like Japan (270) and Germany (251) also contribute less than that of ROK. Among the MIKTA members, only Indonesia (1,546) contributes more troops than ROK. Turkey (346) and Australia (52) ranks much lower than ROK, while Mexico did not contribute peacekeeping troops in 2013. In view of the prevailing North Korean military threat and the ongoing border tensions between the two countries, ROK is unlikely to increase its number of troop contribution, but it will continue to actively involved and maintain its current status.

Table 4.5 ROK's Participation in UN Peacekeeping Missions, 2013

Sl. No	Mission	Expert on Mission	Contingent Troop	Total
1.	UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINUSRO)	4	-	4
2.	UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)	-	2	2
3.	UN Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID)	-	2	2
4.	UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	-	320	320
5.	UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)	1	1	2
6.	UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)	2	273	275
7.	UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)	7	--	7
8.	UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)	2	-	2
	Total ROK in Peacekeeping Operations			**614**

Source: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

4.7:3 ROK's Middle Power Diplomacy and UN Peacekeeping Operations

Since the formation of Lee Myung-bak government, ROK's approach towards peacekeeping operations has been framed within the larger context of the country's middle power foreign policy goals. In his inaugural address on February 25, 2008, under

the catchphrase of 'Global Korea', Lee sought to expand ROK government's contribution to United Nations peacekeeping operations along with increasing development assistance and promoting green growth. In the first Defense White Paper published under his administration in December 2008, to 'pursue international cooperation and contribution corresponding to its economic size and diplomatic capability' and 'participating in international peacekeeping operations and reconstruction projects' along with 'advancing inter-Korean relation in a future-oriented way to achieve mutual benefits' are identified as the three tenets of national security strategy (ROK Ministry of National Defense 2010: 45-46). The Defense White Paper 2010 identifies 'contributing to regional stability and world peace' as one of the three national defence objectives, along with 'defending the national military threats and invasion' and 'upholding the principle of peaceful unification' (ROK Ministry of National Defense 2010: 41). The administration further expresses its intention 'to steadily expand its participation in international peacekeeping operations' (Ibid. 113).

Lee administration promoted ROK middle power diplomacy in order to enhance its global status as a good international citizenship actively participating international peace and development. Like many of his predecessors, his perception on peacekeeping operation has been greatly driven by the 'pay back syndrome'. This was reflected in his public proclamation of expanding ROK's role in commensurate with its economic size. In his address to the UN Assembly in 2011, President Lee expressed ROK's intention to repay back what the international community has done to his country:

> 'Now the Republic of Korea wants to give back to the international community even more than what it has ever received. The Republic of Korea stands ready to extend a helping hand to those who are in need, providing them with appropriate support and care. We are keen to closely cooperate with the UN and to play constructive role in combating various challenges the international community faces.'

To respond quickly to the demand for peacekeeping operations, Lee administration has undertaken several measures, of which three are worth mentioning. The first was the creation of 3000-strong military personnel for overseas deployment in December 2009. These units are divided into 1000 persons each: the first unit is designated to deploy

overseas mission within one month, the second is a reserved force, while the final group consists of separate engineering, medical, military police, and transport units among others (Roehrig 2013: 639). Until June 2010, a special mission team, under the Special Warfare Command, was designated and operated as such a unit. This unit was dissolved in July 2010 and was replaced by the newly established the International Peace Force (Onnuri Unit[7]), resulting in a stronger readiness postures for the deployment of troops (ROK Ministry of National Defense 2010: 113).

Another step undertaken by Lee administration was the passing of the *"Law on Participation in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations"* on December 29, 2009. This was the result of intense discussion among the officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Ministry of National Defense and the National Assembly over several years. The law authorised the administration to make provisional agreements with the United Nations on the scale of the forces to dispatch (i.e. within 1000 personnel each time, the location for peacekeeping operations and the duration of service, all of which require the approval of the National Assembly (Chung 2010). This law was supplemented by a related presidential degree in June 2010 (Lee and Park 2014). With the enactment of this law ROK, in compliance with the call of UN, will now be able to dispatched troop within 30 to 90 days after making the decision instead of the previous existing time of six to seven months. Although under the provision of Article 60, Section 2 of the Korean Constitution, the National Assembly has the right to consent to the dispatch of armed forces to foreign states, it does not, however guaranteed the approval of the houses and the timely dispatching of troops overseas. There have been cases where the government failed to get the approval of the house and thus was unable to send troops on the required time. The clearest example was the delay in the deployment of ROK troops in UNMISS, which took over a year to get approval, leading to a big engineering shortage in the mission (Lee and Park 2014). The enactment of the act was thus a breakthrough in the history of ROK which will enable to dispatch troops overseas at the required time.

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[7] *Onnuri* is a Korean word which is a combination of *'on'* meaning 'all' or 'whole' and *'nuri'* meaning 'the world' where we are living in. This unit spans the world, opting for peace and hope.

Thirdly, the Lee government strengthened the functioning of PKOs by moving the Peacekeeping Operations Centre from the ROK Joint Staff College to the National Defense University on January 1, 2010. It also increased the number of PKO Center staff from 19 to 29 in 2013. The PKO center provides pre-deployment education and training to military police personnel, writes up the 'after action' report to access the effectiveness of the unit, and gathers any lessons learned for future missions (Roehrig 2013: 639). The center also participates in exchange programmes with PKO military from other countries to improve training and coordination (ROK Ministry of National Defense 2012: 120-121).

ROK also actively involved in operations undertaken under multinational forces (MNF), which have included direct involvement in the settlements of conflicts and reconstruction efforts (Snyder 2012). Lee sees ROK involvement in peacekeeping operation as a necessity for Korea's peaceful trading with various countries. In doing so, ROK will be able to garner support for its gradual peaceful unification with the North. In case of regime collapse in North Korea, the international community will be able to respond to the necessary restoration of peace on the Korean peninsula.

4.8 ROK's Involvement in Counter Piracy

In addition to its involvement in UN peacekeeping operations, ROK also commits herself to combat the growing piracy in the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea and the Western Indian Ocean more prominently when Lee Myung-bak came to power. The deployment of these naval forces serves the economic interest and provides security to the crews. With the growing importance of ROK's trading with Middle East and African countries, the safety passage of commercial vessels to these sea routes are of utmost important. ROK imports approximately 98-99 percent of its oil and natural gas, of which Middle Eastern countries accounted for about 84 percent and 54 percent respectively in 2012 (Goggins and Kim 2014: 5). In view of the increasing energy consumption despite Korea's increasing nuclear power production and increasing coal imports, the Middle East will remain an important source of energy in the years to come. Any hijacking of oil carrying ships will be a threat to ROK's economic activities. Seoul thus takes serious note of the threats emanating from the pirates to safeguard its economic interest.

The Gulf of Aden is one of the world's most vital shipping corridors – 20, 000 merchant vessels pass through it annually (Ohn and Richey 2014: 84). As for ROK, approximately 29 percent of its maritime commerce traverses this region off the Somali coast; an estimated five hundred ROK ships pass through the Gulf of Aden annually, and approximately one hundred and fifty of these are highly vulnerable to pirate attack because of their slow speed (Korea Times 2009). For a long time, piracy in the Gulf of Aden, off the horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean has been undermining international humanitarian efforts in Africa and the safety of the gateway of the Suez Canal, which is one of the busiest and most important maritime routes in the world (NATO 2016). It started off from the rampant civil war in Somalia since the 1990s which destabilised the public order and brought about chronic economic hardships to the common people. As a result, from 2004, under the protection of regional warlords, pirate organisations were formed and began to conduct piracy activities in the vicinity of Somalia (ROK Ministry of National Defense 2012: 114). It became a global maritime security focus by mid-2000s, and by 2010 the number of maritime raids swelled to 176, of which 47 were successful hijacking (Ohn and Richey 2014: 84).

ROK has been one of the main victims of Somali pirates. Several cases of attacks have been reported since the mid-2000s. In 2006, Somali pirates hijacked two tuna boats owned by the South Korean company Dongwon Fisheries. The crew of twenty-five that included eight South Koreans were released after four months of captivity for a ransom close to $800,000. For some time, the reported $9.5 million paid to secure Samho Dream's release from Somali pirates held the record held for the highest ransom ever paid. There was a report of more often attacks on Korean ships than other countries with similarly sized merchants. As of 2010, the Netherlands has 744 ships in its merchant marine and faced approximately 64 pirate attack since 2000, whereas ROK which has 786 ships faced approximately 134 attacks (Coggins and Kim 2014: 4).

In response to the increasing threats of Somali pirates to the global shipping, security and the activities of the UN-led humanitarian aid to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), the UN decided to deploy military vessels and aircraft under Security Council

Resolution 1816 on June 2, 2008 and requested its members to participate in the mission. Under this Resolution, the UN provided the international mandate for intervention and authorised states to fight piracy in Somali waters in cooperation with the TFG. The newly-formed naval task forces were divided into Combined Task Forces 150 and 151 (ad hoc multinational), Operation Ocean Field (NATO-based), and Operation Atlanta (EU NAVFOR), carried out by the EU.

In order to accomplish the UN resolutions, states agreed to form CTF-151. In response to UN's call, the Blue House approved the plan to send navy for counter-piracy and the National Assembly of ROK approved the motion in early March. Seoul dispatched the *Cheonghae* Unit for the first time to operations to Gulf of Aden off Somalia on March 13, 2009 to protect and promote national interest (ROK Ministry of National Defense 2012: 115). It consists of one DDH-II destroyer, the *Munmu the Great* under the command of Commander Jang Sung-woo with a crew of three hundred that included thirty ROK seals along with a Lynx helicopter. ROK naval officers planned on rotating the DDH-II destroyers every six months.

4.9 Conclusion

Contributing troops for peacekeeping operations has been one of the objectives of ROK since joining of the United Nations in 1991. As a country which transitioned from security recipient to security provider, the country felt that it is her obligation to pay back the international community what it has received. However, due to the devastating experience during the Vietnam War, the 'payback syndrome' has been contrasted with the 'Vietnam syndrome'. Owing to this, ROK rejected UN's plea for contributing troops for some years during the 1990s. In some cases, ROK's troops dispatched abroad have been driven by its commitments towards its military ties with the US.

Under the slogan of Global Korea, Lee Myung-bak used the peacekeeping operations as a diplomatic tool to enhance Korea's reputation at the global arena. He sought to expand ROK's diplomatic horizon by creating a positive image to the global community. The motives behind ROK's involvement in UN peacekeeping operations have been not only

driven by normative behaviour but also to enhance Korea's national interest. ROK's dispatched troops to Somalia waters to combating pirates to protect the trade routes of Korean ships. ROK will continue to take active part in the activities of peacekeeping operations despite the various challenges as this serve ROK's diplomatic and economic interests.

Chapter 5

From Recipient to Doner:
ROK's Middle Power Role in Official Development Aid

5.1 Introduction

Terms, such as, *aid, foreign aid and development aid,* in many scholarly and policy discussions, are used to refer to Official Development Assistance (ODA) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Hlavac 2008). It was coined by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD to measure aid flows, including loans, to the designated list of countries and multilateral institutions. The concept has been rooted in the post-World War II economic reconstruction initiative of the US under the Marshal Plan (officially European Recovery Programme) to aid Western Europe. Earlier it was used to refer to the flow of financial and material aid from the North to the South. However, in recent years, various countries of the South such as China, India, Brazil, South Africa and Russia provided foreign aid for different reasons. India and China are both doners and recipients of foreign aid.

As such, providing ODA to developing countries is not a distinct foreign policy behaviour of the middle power states. Great powers and small powers alike contribute ODA for different motivations. In some cases it becomes an important tool for advancing foreign policy goals, while in others cases it is motivated by humanitarian works. Based on previous studies, four main motives have been identified for providing ODA - political/diplomatic, economic, humanitarian and interdependence. It be mainly determined by the doners' interest (DN) and recipients need (RN).

The history of ROK's contribution started in the late 1980s but it was not until the late 2000s that the country contribute significant amount of aid. ROK has become a donor of official development assistance by launching the Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF). In 1991, the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) was established to distribute and manage the affairs of grant aid. The country was admitted as member of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development in 1996 to become a member of the

advanced countries. Korea's ODA volume rapidly expanded under the Roh Moo Hyeon administration (2003-2008) and was increasingly targeted toward poverty alleviation.

Although increasing development aid has been one of the foreign policy goals of the previous administration, it was under Lee Myung-bak's 'Global Korea' strategy that the country ambitiously pursuits 'contribution diplomacy' to increase its reputation at the global arena. As a middle power, ROK aspires to contribute its material resources for the development and security of the international community. This was due to its acknowledgement of the role played by foreign aid from US and Japan for its economic transformation during the post-War reconstruction period. It is undeniable that the transformation of ROK's economy from poverty to an advanced country has been due to the effective economic policy of the developmental state and coupled with the strong bureaucratic institution to allocate funds in an effective ways. Yet, the role played by foreign aid cannot be rule out for what ROK is today.

As a country which elevated successfully from extreme poverty as a recipient to donor in 2010 by becoming member of the 24th member of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), ROK aspires to play the role of a bridge between the developed and developing world. ROK hosted the G20 Seoul Summit in November 2010 - the first non-G8 country and the fourth High Level Forum (HLF) on Aid Effectiveness in November 2011 in Busan. Through the hosting of these international summits, ROK has been seeking to play the role of leadership and has been pushing its agenda to effectively implement official development assistance that has been the topic of debate for several years.

With a brief highlight on the historical background of ODA, this chapter examines the objectives, achievements and challenges of ROK's development assistance through the lens of middle power diplomacy. It also examines the main regional focus and sectors of ROK's ODA. In an attempt to explore the uniqueness of ROK's ODA, the chapter highlights the significance of ROK's transition from aid recipient to aid doner. The chapter evaluates the status of ROK's ODA implementation in comparison with other OECD-DAC members.

**5.2 Historical Background of the Official Development Assistance**

The term Official Development Assistance (ODA) or 'development aid' is coined by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to measure aid flows, including loans, to the designated list of countries and multilateral institutions. For deeper understanding of ODA, it will be helpful to briefly highlight the historical background of OECD and DAC. The present OECD was established as Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in April 1948 by merging the Marshall Plan and the Conference of Sixteen (Conference for European Economic Co-operation) with its headquarter at Paris. The 18 original members of the OEEC sought to establish a permanent organisation to allocate American financial aid and implementing economic programme for the reconstruction after the World War II. The organisation was restructured in 1961 to extend membership to non-European countries and renamed as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. It thus became an organisation of the advanced countries with high Human Development Index (HDI), committed to promotion democracy and the market economy, providing a platform to compare policy experiences, seeking answers to common problems, identify good practices and coordinate domestic and international policies of its members.

Like the OECD, the DAC, was initially set up as Development Assistance Group (DAG) in 1960 in order to acquire accurate and comparable data reporting by its members on their aid flows to developing countries. The publication of the first comprehensive review of *The Flow of Financial Resources to Countries in Course of Economic Development, 1956-59* in 1961 by the former OEEC, which endorsed the necessity of developed nations to assist the developing ones was a significant move in this direction (Yu 2011: 35). Since then, the DAC has collected data on aid flows and identify countries that can be included in the list. The concept of ODA, however, was adopted in 1969 and the definition was tightened in 1972. This definition has been the key measure used in practically all aid targets and assessments of aid performance. According to the definition, the two key principles of ODA are: the primary objective must be the welfare and economic development of developing countries; and is concessional in character and

conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent (OECD 2017). The aid has to be provided by official agencies, including state and local governments or by their executive agencies.

At present there are 30 members in the DAC, of which, Japan and Korea are the only Asian countries. DAC members are assessed based on the existence of appropriate strategies, policies and institutional frameworks that ensure capacity to deliver a development co-operation programme; an accepted measure of effort; and the existence of a system of performance monitoring and evaluation (OECD). ODA remains the most important component of aid accounting for 70 per cent of all development and emergency aid. As of 2014, 28 countries of the DAC members contribute around 82.2 percent of the total volume of aid (OECD). There are some non-DAC members, such as China, India, Russia, Kuwait and Mexico who provide development assistance, as shown below:

Figure 5.1 The 30 Main DAC and Non-DAC Providers of Development Cooperation, 2014

Source: OECD online database

The recipients of ODA include all-low and middle-income countries (as defined by the World Bank, based on gross national income [GNI] per capita), except for those that are members of the G8 or the European Union (including countries with a firm accession date for EU membership). In addition, the list separately includes all Least Developed Countries (LDCs) as defined by the UN. As of 2013, there were 148 recipient countries (both members and non-members of the UN) with per capita income below $12,745 (DAC 2016). The DAC revises the list every three years. Countries that have exceeded the high-income threshold for three consecutive years at the time of the review are removed.

Over the years the DAC has continuously refined the detailed ODA reporting rules to ensure fidelity to the definition and the greatest possible consistency among donors. In order to prevent the misuse of funding, the boundary of ODA has been carefully delineated in many fields. These include exclusion of military aid, non-funding of peacekeeping expenditures and civil police work, anti-terrorism, supply of nuclear energy only for civilian purposes, and supporting of social and cultural programmes and research work relevant to the problems of developing countries (OECD 2008).

5.3 ROK as Aid Recipient, 1945-1999

The success of ROK's economic development is incomplete without the story of foreign aid it received in the post-Korean War reconstruction in the 1950s and 1960s. The devastation of the war was so severe that the US General Douglas MacArthur, who had led the UN forces in in defence of ROK commented that, *"unless there is a miracle, it will take 100 years for South Korea to recover from the Korean War"* (KOICA 2011). During the period following the armistice, ROK was almost entirely dependent on the US for food and consumer goods (USAID). It is estimated that more than 1.3 million South Koreans were killed and caused to the damage of $6.9 billion worth of infrastructures at current rate (Yi et al 2014: 198). US assistance to Korea which began in 1952 was vital to Korea's survival and played a significant role in its initial post-war reconstruction. Although various economic policies of the government and the efforts of the Korean people are responsible for the *'economic miracle of the Han River'* in the 1970s and

1980s, the role played by foreign aid cannot be ruled out. Korea, in the 1960s, was ranked among 125 countries as the 24th poorest, labeled by the UN as one of the world's Least Developed Countries (LDCs), belonging to a group which then included Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Uganda, Pakistan, and Togo (KOICA 2011).

**Table 5.1 ROK as Aid Recipient Country**

Year	Purpose	Modalities	Reliance on Assistance	Major Doners
1945 - 1952	Short-run Relief	Grant (100%), Relief Goods	Only foreign savings	United States
1953 -1962	Defence, Stability, Rehabilitation	Grant (98.5%), Commodities, Technical Cooperation	Heavily dependent on foreign aid	United States, United Nations
1963-1979	Transition, Long-term growth	Concessional loans (70%)	Diminution of the absolute and relative importance of assistance	United States, Japan
1980 -1992	Balance between stability and growth	Non concessional-financing	Graduation from IDA recipient countries	Japan, Germany and IFIs
1993-2003	Recover from Global Financial Crisis	Bail-out packages from IMF	Graduation from the ODA recipients	IMF, IBRD

Source: KOICA Online Database

ROK received ODA of $2.5 billion between 1945 and 1960, exclusively from the US (Lee 2004 cited in Oh 2014). In the 1960s, approximately 90 percent of the aid ROK received was from US and Japan, which continued until the 1980s (Ibid.). The total amount of aid that the country received from various donors, including the US, between 1945 and 1985 was estimated to be $26 billion (Steinberg cited in Yi 2014). Until 1980, US gave ROK the largest foreign assistance, after Israel and Vietnam (USAID 1981 cited Yi 2014). The country received $12 billion between 1945 and 1999, mainly from the US and Japan, 'which helped spur economic development and decrease poverty' (OECD 2008: 9). It was this realisation that ROK leaders are willing to pay back what they have got from the international community.

**Figure 5.2 Total Net ODA Flows to ROK (Constant 2010 USD)**

Source: OECD

With the success of Five-Year Economic Planning which started in 1962 under Park Chung Hee, ROK witnessed a remarkable economic growth, achieving an average annual real GDP growth rate of 8.5 percent from 1962-89. The per capita income during the same period increased from $87 to $5,199, while the GDP expanded from $2.3 billion to $220.7 billion, and exports increased from $55 million to $61.4 billion (Harvie and Lee 2003). The country's total GDP grew 16 times between 1965 and 1980 from $3.7 billion to $60.3 billion (Igbafen 2014). The US aid was almost phased out by 1975. It finally graduated from the list of countries eligible for US Agency for International Aid (USAID) in 1980, the Japanese Development Economic Cooperation Fund in 1990, and the World Bank in 1995 (Yi et al 2014). Korea was able to withdraw officially from the list of aid recipient counties in 1999 as shown in Figure 5.2.

Although ROK's history as a donor goes back to 1963, when it was asked by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to participate in a training project, it became an independent donor of ODA only in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Howe 2015). The country transitioned to democracy in 1987 after over two decades of

dictatorship under Park Chung-hee. In that same year, it has become a donor of official development assistance by launching the Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF), providing concessional loans of $25 million. The purpose of EDCF is promoting economic cooperation between Korea and developing countries (EDCF 2017). The Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) was established in 1991 to manage the affairs of the ODA. With the establishment of KOICA, ROK has steadily expanded its aid programme and the assistance it provides (Snyder and Choi 2012). The dual system of KOICA and EDCF makes ROK different from other doner countries. KOICA operates under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and controls grants and technical cooperation of Korea's ODA, while EDCF of Korea's Exim Bank, under the guidance of Ministry of Strategy and Finance, is responsible for the soft loans to developing countries.

Figure 5.3 ROK's ODA Implementation Structure

Source: Economic Development Cooperation Fund

5.4 ROK Joined the OECD, 1996

One of the main objectives of ROK to attain a first-class advanced country is to enroll as a member of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). To this end it undertook certain economic reforms required by the organisation. As part of *segyehwa,* the government encouraged greater competition, privatisation and deregulation within the booming Korean economy (Mansbagh and Rhodes 2012: 147). After having been actively participated in Asia-Pacifica Economic Cooperation and the Asia-Europe Economic Meeting (ASEM) ROK planned to join the OECD as a way to move forward to an advanced country. There were serious concerns raised against the premature full-scale globalisation, as many were fearful that ROK was not ready for a wide open-door policy either economically or politically. Although, there was a hope of economic benefit in the long run, there were so much of apprehensions about its possible outcomes in the short run. This was reflected in the heated debates whether the country will gain or lose by joining OECD. In the National Assembly voting on its ratification, 159 voted in favour while 100 voted against it. There were serious concerns about the premature entry of ROK to OECD, as many were still of the view that the country was not ready for 'wide-open' policy, either economically or politically (Oh 1996: 150).

ROK formally applied for membership in March 1995. Having confidence over its achievement, since 1990s, ROK aimed to translate its economic clout into global political influence (Kalinowski and Cho 2012: 243). ROK's admission to the OECD in 1996, barely a year after its graduation from aid recipient was a landmark. Although the Financial Crisis of 1997 greatly crippled its economy, with the bail-out package from of the IMF, it had recovered financial stability by 2000. The damage caused by the Financial Crisis was so severe that there was strong criticism on ROK government for joining the OECD. However, ROK's repayment of IMF loan in 2001, and its successful economic recovery gave ROK leaders the confidence to donate aid to developing countries.

ROK's intention of joining the club in the words of Kim Young-sam, was that '*Korea will be in the forefront of the move to implement the ideal of liberalising investment and trade and will help lay a bridge between the advanced and developing countries"* (Korea

Annual 1996: 363-364). ROK's application was accepted in October 1996 despite the organisation's reservation about ROK's pace of financial deregulation and its reforms of social and labour union legislation (Oh 1996: 150). ROK became the twenty-ninth member and the second country, after Japan, from Asia to join the club. Following its entry into OECD, the ROK leaders gained more confident and committed to extend development assistance to less develop countries in commensurate with its economic growth.

5.5 Korea Transitioned to OECD-DAC, 2010

Having fulfilled the criteria laid down for memberships based on its per capita income and human development index, Korea formally applied to join the DAC in 2006, and requested a *Special Review* in 2008. As per the request, a DAC Peer Review Team composed of examiners from Australia and Canada and three staff members from the OECD Development Co-operation Directorate visited Seoul from March 3-6, 2008. The team consulted officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT), the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF), the Korea International Co-operation Agency (KOICA), and the Korea Exim bank's Economic Development and Co-operation Fund (EDCF). They also met with representatives of selected non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and development co-operation academics.

A team of experts from the DAC Secretariat visited Korea in June 2009 to verify that its aid programme meets DAC standards. Based on their report, DAC members unanimously voted to admit the country as a member on the 25th November. This was in response to ROK's commitments to increase it development as required by the DAC. The team noted, among other things, Korea's sound aid volumes, strategies, policies and institutional frameworks, as well the country's reliable system for monitoring and evaluating performance. As a result the consensus among the existing members, ROK was admitted officially as the newest member on January 1, 2010 which coincides with the fourteenth year of its admission to OECD. The Committee made its decision in a special session, during which Mr. Oh Joon, Korean Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs,

Table 5.2 ROK's Transition from Recipient to Doner

| Period	Year	Activities	Organization in Charge
1960s	1963	Training program under the sponsorship of USAID	MOFAT, MOST
	1965	Training program funded by the Korean government	MOFAT, MOST
	1967	Implementation of the Experts Program, funded by the Korean government Training Program with the cooperation of the UN and other international organizations	MOFAT, MOST
	1968	Dispatch of experts through the Medical Experts Program	MOST
1970s	1975	Hosted the Technical Trainees Program	MOL
	1977	Cooperation Project with the UN and other international organizations-training by invitation, aid in-kind	MOFAT
1980s	1981	Research Cooperation Program	KAIST
	1982	International Development Exchange Program (IDEP)	KDI
	1983	Hosted training for construction workers	MOC
	1984	Technical cooperation in the construction sector	MOC
	1987	Establishment of the Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF) Outsourcing EDCF project to Ministry Of Science and Technology (MOST)	MOF, MOFAT, MOST
	1988	Grant services for communications technology in developing countries	MOIC
	1989	Dispatch of volunteers through the KOV Program, First expense of EDCF	UNESCO, EPB, EXIM Bank
1990s	1991	Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) established	
	1995	First dispatch of international cooperation personnel NGO Support Program	KOICA
	1996	Joined the OECD, EDCF $100M	
2000s	2001	Accumulated EDCF exceeds USD1.6 billion	MOFE
	2002/2003	Special Assistance Program to Afghanistan	KOICA
	2005	Rehabilitation projects following South East Asian Tsunami Korea joins IDB	KOICA MOFE
	2009	Korea joined OECD/DAC (November 25)	
	2010	First anniversary of DAC membership; International Development Cooperation Day proclaimed (Nov. 25), Enacted the Framework Act on International Development Cooperation, Launched the G20 Summit (Seoul Development Consensus)	KOICA
	2011	Hosted the Fourth High Level Forum (HLF)	MOFAT
	2012	Received the OECD DAC Peer Review	MOFAT
	2013	Launched the *Saemaul Undong* (New Village Movement)	MOFAT

Source: KOICA online data

noted Korea's eagerness to share its development experience and success to other developing countries. The Committee Chair, Eckhard Deutscher, on his welcome remark stated: *"We have had many opportunities to observe Korea's great progress, as a nation,*

as an economy and as a provider of aid to the world's poorest countries. Korea's joining us today has paved the way for a more open and inclusive Development Assistance Committee" (OECD 2017).

This marked another milestone in ROK's history which symbolises its entry to the rank of advanced countries along with US, UK, France and Japan. With its joining of DAC, ROK's ambitions of playing the role model for developing countries has been enhanced, owing to the strong sense of repaying among the leaders. By the time of the first DAC *Peer Review* of ROK in 2012, the country had tripled its official development assistance over the preceding five years to $1,325 million per year (Snyder 2015).

Figure 5.4 Net Disbursement of Korea ODA/GNI

Source: Kim (2016)

Korea's ODA volume has made remarkable progress since its joining of DAC in 2010. The total ODA of ROK amount in 1991 was just $58 million. This increased to $112 million in 1993, and to $403 million in 2004, which recorded a seven-fold increase. The Mid-Term ODA Plan (2008-10) of ROK in 2006 when it applied for ODA membership

was 0.06 percent of its gross national income (GNI) to 0.12 in 2010, which is $1.2 billion in net disbursement. This is a remarkable increase despite its failure to meet the target of 0.25 percent due to the global financial crisis. According to the data released by Ministry by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with 17.1 percent growth rate, Korea's ODA in 2012 recorded the highest rate among the by OECD members, where 15 of the 24 member countries of the OECD-DAC reduced their ODA volumes. In 2012, net ODA reached 0.14 percent of GNI at $1.55 billion. In 2013 ROK's ODA reached $1.74 billion ranking 16th among the 28 DAC member countries.

5.6 Objectives of Official Development Assistance: Theoretical Debates

Countries' motivations of contributing to ODA are driven by several factors such as, political/diplomatic, security, economic, humanitarian, internationalism and recognition of interdependence. Apart from the above given points, foreign aid doners are driven mainly by doners' interest (DI) and recipients need (RN). In many cases, foreign has been used as a tool to serve the interest of the doner country rather than the benefit of the recipient countries.

During the Cold War period both US and Soviet Union used ODA to support their respective allies. The West have been using development aid to put political pressures to the recipient government and at times employ it for democratisation. China avoids interfering in the domestic politics of the recipient countries and pursues economic interest through investment on infrastructures for which it has been strongly criticised. Japan has also criticised for using its development aid to reach out to its Asian neighbours to rectify its historical animosity.

Humanitarian motivation involves the realisation of moral obligation for poverty reduction and the promotion of universal human rights such as democracy and human security. Development aids are also not totally free from politics as countries are likely to contribute when it serves their national interest. Likewise, extending development aid to poorer countries can also be driven by the market opportunities that the recipient countries can provide to the doners. With the growth of globalisation countries are

becoming more and more interdependent thereby enhancing the need for helping each other.

Western middle powers have been motivated to provide development aid due to the concept of humane internationalism. Based on his analysis of five Western middle powers - Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden - Stokke (1989) argues *humane internationalism* was the main motivations for their development aid. This implies the recognition of the responsibility of developed nations to assist the Third World, a belief that a more *just* world is in the long-term interests of developed countries, and an understanding that this is *not* in the disinterest of their own national economic and social welfare policies. Stokke analyzes the foreign aid policies of these middle powers in relation to variations of this ideology, and concludes that there has been a general move towards *liberal internationalism* in these five nations within the period of study i.e. 1975-1986.

In another case studies on these five middle powers based on *humane internationalism*, Pratt (1989) identifies three reasons for the sensitivity of these middle powers to the development needs and aspirations of the LDCs, although none, bar the Netherlands, had any direct ties to them. These reasons are: 1) the internationalist orientation of their policies; 2) their responsiveness to cosmopolitan values, which he argues stems from an extension of the dominant political cultures of their domestic social welfare systems, based in Christian and social democratic ideologies; and the influence, to greater or lesser degrees, of reform internationalists in the political arenas; 3) the political considerations that caused them to attach greater importance to their relations with the global South, such as the domestic political gains and the favorable consideration of recipients concerning other international political issues.

5.7 Objectives of ROK's ODA: A Tool for Middle Power Diplomacy

The purpose of ROK's development aid as highlighted in the KOICA is *"to ensure that development assistance is not required for developing countries"*. This in other words means *"to develop a country that is in development as soon as possible so that it can live*

on its own strength without relying on other countries anymore". As a country which has successfully graduated from recipient to doner, ROK aspires to share its developmental experience with other developing countries by providing aid with an emphasis on their economic and social development and promote mutual exchanges and cooperation between donor and recipient at the same time. As a country which greatly depended on foreign aid, ROK regards that it has the moral responsibility to render financial and technological support to other developing countries who are in dire need of assistance.

The as member of the OECD-DAC, Korea's ODA follows the following five basic principles:

(i) reduce poverty in developing countries;

(ii) improve the human rights of women and children, and achieve gender equality;

(iii) realise sustainable development and humanitarianism;

(iv) promote cooperative economic relations with developing partners; and

(v) pursue peace and prosperity in the international community (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROK, 2010).

The main driving force for contributing development assistance is on humanitarian ground. ROK wants to give back what it has got from the doner countries during the post-Korean War reconstruction period. 'Most of the Koreans believe that Korea has an obligation to help other developing countries since Korea has received help from international community in the past, when the country was still in development '(Bondaz and Allard 2014). As Korea became a new member of its OECD-DAC, its ODA policy has been in line with the provisions of DAC. Of the three models of ODA based on Walz and Ramachandra's (2010) classification, ROK falls into the DAC model – the other two being Arab and Southern model.

ROK's transitioned from an aid-recipient extreme poverty to an advanced-donor country is a unique story. This goes closely in line with Lee Myung-bak's personal story of rising from extreme poverty to a successful businessman and finally to president (Snyder and Choi 2012). Lee seized his personal reputation at the global stage to make significant

impact on helping out the developing countries. At the UN General Assembly in September 2009, Lee declared that, 'We are striving to become a Global Korea, harmonizing our interest with others, and making our well-being also contribute to the prosperity of humanity.' (Hwang and Jo 2010: 54). As a country elevated from extreme poverty, no country can better take the place of ROK in assisting the developing countries. The success transition of ROK from aid recipient to aid donor can be best captured by the statement of President Lee (2010):

> In just one generation, the ROK has become a country that gives from a country that received. In just one generation, we are now in a position to provide help to those in need…. A young boy once stood in line to receive used clothes from foreign missionaries now stand before you as President of the Republic of Korea. I know what it is like to be in want, I have benefited from other people's compassion and so I know more than others what kind of help should be given.

In consistent with the above statement, in 2011 President Lee stated that:

> …now the Republic of Korea wants to give back to the international community even more that what it has ever received. The Republic of Korea stands ready to extend a helping hand to those who are in need, providing them with appropriate support and care.

While the above arguments have been established to validate ROK's obligation to help developing countries, there have been criticisms from various angles for its economic intentions. Foreign aid, on one hand, is an important tool foreign policy (Stallings and Kim 2016). Korea is no exception. Apart from poverty reduction and development of the recipient country, ROK, to employs aid for meeting its economic and political goals. Yoon and Moon (2014) argue that ROK's ODA, like many of the conventional doners has had dual purpose: to improve the welfare and to serve self-interest.

Watson (2011) argues that Korean ODA is one part of 'Global Korea' which includes multiculturalism and Green Growth politics. This was evidence in the establishment of the *Presidential Committee on National Branding* initiative on January 22, 2009. The Korean government realised the country's soft power gap compare to its military and economic power and sought to increase its political and diplomatic influence and relative to its national hard power (Lee 2009, Sohn 2017 cited in Hwang 2014). Not only that it is also used by Korean government to sell it 'selling its national brand name' of

development to lesser developed countries (Ibid. 2014). In some cases, ROK is also uses its ODA as a mean to promote democracy and its export and foreign direct investments (Yoon and Moon 2014). Hwang's (2017) finding suggests that ROK's ODA had positive impact on the voting of the UN General Assembly especially on the issue of North Korea.

According to Kalinowski and Cho (2012), the intention behind the increase in Korean ODA to Africa is to have greater access to natural resources in Africa, particularly, oil. Motivated by its own successful experience, ROK's foreign assistance programme has been aligned with the country's efforts to promote its international image go global, to attain political, economic and social stability as well as to become a leader in the region and the world (Snyder and Choi 2012). Kim (2014) argues that 'ROK's ODA is linked to Korea's national political agenda, but there is no particular motive behind it'. It came rather as a result of its own development and Korea's engagement towards international community (Bondaz and Allard 2014).

5.8 ROK's Bilateral ODA's by Regions, 2008-2013

Like many other doners, most of ROK's ODA flows to towards its neighbouring Asian countries, because of shared historical background and geographical proximity. Some of the relevant reasons for ROK's tightening cooperation with Asian countries include strengthening diplomatic ties, endorsing its obligations as regional player, increasing human exchanges, enhancing trade and investment, and cultural proximity (Bonndaz and Allard 2014). In 2013, Asian countries occupy 53.83 percent, followed by Africa (20.75 percent).

The aid share of Asia between 2008 and 2015 was 46.3 percent followed by Africa (23.9 percent), America (7.9 percent) and Middle East (4.3 percent) (See Chart 5.1). At this current trend, the percentage of aid in Asia outnumbers the percentage of Africa, America, Middle East and Oceania which comes to 36.7 percentage. As has been discussed above, this is mainly due to the historical ties and geographical proximity.

Figure 5.5 ROK's Bilateral ODA by Regions, 2008-2013 (Net disbursements, USD million,%)

|	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Asia	250.82 (46.51%)	292.09 (50.26%)	553.01 (61.4%)	583.88 (59%)	637.66 (53.89%)	731.11 (55.83%)
Africa	104.08 (19.3%)	95 (16.35%)	139.89 (15.53%)	178.34 (18.02%)	261.02 (22.06%)	271.72 (20.75%)
Middle East	30.53 (5.66%)	21.38 (3.68%)	34.28 (3.81%)	41.27 (4.17%)	42.26 (3.57%)	40.6 (3.1%)
Europe	12.89 (2.39%)	46.37 (7.98%)	38.73 (4.3%)	20.66 (2.09%)	16.56 (1.4%)	2.58 (0.2%)
America	68.69 (12.74%)	55.83 (9.61%)	64.46 (7.16%)	64.42 (6.51%)	76.2 (6.44%)	96.48 (7.37%)
Oceania	2.23 (0.41%)	1.53 (0.26%)	5.6 (0.62%)	4.89 (0.49%)	3.43 (0.29%)	3.92 (0.3%)
Unallocated	69.98 (12.98%)	68.91 (11.86%)	64.66 (7.18%)	96.12 (9.71%)	146.06 (12.34%)	163.16 (12.46%)
Total	539.22 (100%)	581.1 (100%)	900.63 (100%)	989.57 (100%)	1183.17 (100%)	1309.58 (100%)

Source: Korea ODA online database

Chart 5.1 Regional Aid Share Of Bilateral ODA, 2008-2015 (Net Disbursements, %)

Source: OECD online database

The top ten largest bilateral ODA recipients of Korea receive 61 percent of the total ODA. Except Tanzania and Senegal, the other eight recipients are from Asia. Seven recipients are among the 26 priority partner countries.

Figure 5.6 Top 10 Bilateral Korea's ODA Recipients, 2012

Source: OECD

5.9 Selection of Priority Partner Countries

Korea selected 26 priority partner countries, out of 140 recipients, as per the recommendations of the *DAC Special Peer Review* in 2008. Following the enactment of Framework Act on International Development Cooperation in 2010, the Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) was introduced for each priority partner country and was used as the basic guideline for delivering aid at the country level. According to the Strategic Plan, minimum 70 percent of bilateral ODA shall be distributed to the 26 priority countries for greater impact with limited ODA budget. Under this, two or three core sectors are identified for each country to meet select and focus principle to enhance aid effectiveness. This is to be revised every three to five years for better alignment with the national development plans of the partner country. This is an important step taken by Korea to monitor its aid in more effective way for the benefit of the recipients.

Table 5.3 Focus Sectors of 26 Priority Partner Countries *Source:* Korea ODA

Region	Country	Focus Sectors
Asia (11 countries)	Nepal	Vocational Training/ Health and Medical Care/ Agriculture/ Electricity
	East-Timor	Education Training/ Health and Medical Care / Social Infrastructure
	Laos	Water Resources and Electricity/ Human Resource Development / Health and Medical Care
	Mongolia	ICT-based Public Administration/ Urban Development/ Agriculture Development
	Bangladesh	Water Resources and Electricity/ Health / Education/ Public Administration
	Vietnam	Environment and Green Growth/ Vocational Training/ Transportation Infrastructure
	Sri Lanka	Basic Infrastructure/ Human Resource Development/ Public Administration
	Indonesia	Public Administration/Economic Infrastructure/ Environment and Resource
	Cambodia	Rural and Agriculture Development/ Transportation and Green Energy/ Human Resource Development / Health and Medical Care
	Pakistan	Industrial Energy / Education / Health and Medical Care
	Philippines	Transportation Infrastructure / Agriculture and Water Resources / Health and Medical Care
Oceania (1 country)	Solomon Islands	Fisheries / Forestation / Health and Medical Care
Oceania (4 countries)	Bolivia	Transportation / Agriculture / Health and Medical Care
	Colombia	Rural Community Development / Productivity and Competitiveness of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises / Public Administration
	Paraguay	Basic Social Services/ Productivity Improvement and Capacity Building for Vulnerable Social Groups Transportation
	Peru	Health and Medical Care/ Rural Development / Information and Communication
Middle East and CIS (2 countries)	Azerbaijan	Industrial Energy/ Public Administration
	Uzbekistan	Human Resource Development / Health and Medical Care/ Administration Informatization and Improvement of Economic Institutions
Africa (8 countries)	Ghana	Expansion of Strategic Infrastructure / Improvement of Health and Sanitation, and Medical Environment/ Improvement of Vocational Training Environment
	Nigeria	Human Resource Development/ Public Administration
	Rwanda	ICT / Human Resource Development / Rural Community Development
	Mozambique	Electricity and Transportation/ Agriculture Development / Human Resource Development
	Ethiopia	Material and Child Health Care/ Drinking Water Supplementation/ Agriculture and Rural Community Development, Vocational Training for Farmers/ Technical Edn. and Voc. Training/ Electricity and Road Infrastructure
	Uganda	Agriculture/ ICT / Economic Infrastructure
	Cameroon	Human Resource Development / Social and Industrial Infrastructure/ Rural Development
	DR Congo	Health Environment and Medical Care/ Rural Development

Table 5.4 Selected List of ROK's 26 Priority Partner Countries, 2011-2013

Year	Country
2011 (3 countries)	• Vietnam, Ghana, Solomon island
2012 (11 countries)	• Bolivia, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Mongolia, Azerbaijan, Ethiopia, DR Congo, Cambodia, Bangladesh, the Philippines, Uzbekistan
2013 (12 countries)	Lao, Mozambique, Peru, Cameroon, Colombia, Nepal, East Timor, Rwanda, Uganda, Paraguay, Pakistan

Map 5.1 Map Showing the List of 26 ROK's Priority Partner Countries


Source: OECD online data base

Based on the income group, in the year 2013, the least developed countries (LDCs) recived the highest funding (39.3 percent) of Korea's ODA, followed by lower middle income group (LMICs) which received 38.4 percent. The upper middle income group (UMICs) received 7.8 percent while other lower income countries (OLICs) received 0.7 percent. In 2008, it was the lower middle income contries which got the highest percentage of funding followed by least deeloped countries. In fact, the lower middle income group got the higshest percentage of funding from 2008 until 2012.

Table 5.5 Bilateral ODA by Income Group, 2008-2013

(Net disbursements, USD million, %)

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
LDCs	143.49 (26.6%)	161.03 (27.7%)	333.26 (37.0%)	346.72 (35.0%)	417 (35.2%)	515.31 (39.3%)
OLICs	4.1 (0.8%)	5.82 (1%)	7.25 (0.8%)	10.82 (1.1%)	10.91 (0.9%)	8.72 (0.7%)
LMICs	194.32 (36.0%)	222.3 (38.3%)	354.79 (39.4%)	366.59 (37.0%)	472.48 (39.9%)	502.4 (38.4%)
UMICs	106.81 (19.8%)	91.49 (15.7%)	109.1 (12.1%)	120.97 (12.2%)	107.7 (9.1%)	101.86 (7.8%)
Unallocated	90.5 (16.8%)	100.46 (17.3%)	96.22 (10.7%)	144.47 (14.6%)	175.08 (14.8%)	181.28 (13.8%)
Total	**539.22 (100.0%)**	**581.1 (100.0%)**	**900.63 (100.0%)**	**989.57 (100.0%)**	**1183.17 (100.0%)**	**1309.58 (100.0%)**

Source: Korea ODA online database

Chart 5.2 Income Group Aid Share of Bilateral ODA, 2008-2015

(Net Disbursements, %)

Source: ODA Korea online database

5.10 ROK's Bilateral ODA by Sector

Bilateral ODA allocation by sector is dived into nine areas including the unallocated/unpspent in Social Infrastructure & Services (45.5%) and Economic Infrastructure & Service (30.2%) received the highest funding. While under Social Infrastructure & Service education (15.7%) and health (10.6%) received the highest fundings.

Table 5.6 Bilateral ODA by Sector, 2010-2013, (Net disbursements, USD million, %)

	2010	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**
Total	**933.24 (100.0%)**	**1,034.26 (100.0%)**	**1,232.19 (100.0%)**	**1,375.01 (100.0%)**
Social Infrastructure & Services	**408.33 (43.8%)**	**436.26 (42.2%)**	**582.45 (47.3%)**	**626.07 (45.5%)**
Education	150.12 (16.1%)	183.38 (17.7%)	210.14 (17.1%)	215.85 (15.7%)
Health	136.22 (14.6%)	98.84 (9.6%)	127.79 (10.4%)	145.88 (10.6%)
Population & Reproductive health	4.76 (0.5%)	4.22 (0.4%)	7.34 (0.6%)	9.64 (0.7%)
Water supply & Sanitation	56.97 (6.1%)	77.87 (7.5%)	126.44 (10.3%)	106.31 (7.7%)
Government & Civil society	49.31 (5.3%)	53.81 (5.2%)	92.53 (7.5%)	114.00 (8.3%)
Others	10.94 (1.2%)	18.14 (1.8%)	18.22 (1.5%)	34.38 (2.5%)
Economic Infrastructure & Services	**269.30 (28.9%)**	**331.10 (32.0%)**	**332.03 (26.9%)**	**414.86 (30.2%)**
Transport & Storage	127.81 (13.7%)	241.78 (23.4%)	222.35 (18.0%)	256.34 (18.6%)
Communications	67.36 (7.2%)	45.12 (4.4%)	52.33 (4.2%)	45.49 (3.3%)
Energy	69.68 (7.5%)	40.76 (3.9%)	54.24 (4.4%)	108.38 (7.9%)
Banking & Financing Services	2.04 (0.2%)	1.54 (0.1%)	1.46 (0.1%)	1.41 (0.1%)
Business & Other Services	2.42 (0.3%)	1.90 (0.2%)	1.65 (0.1%)	3.23 (0.2%)
Production Sectors	**65.66 (7.0%)**	**78.54 (7.6%)**	**97.46 (7.9%)**	**128.94 (9.4%)**
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing	50.64	57.09	71.96	100.18

	2010	2011	2012	2013
	(5.4%)	(5.5%)	(5.8%)	(7.3%)
Industry, Mining, Construction	12.71 (1.4%)	13.65 (1.3%)	16.30 (1.3%)	19.54 (1.4%)
Trade Policies & Regulations	2.03 (0.2%)	7.37 (0.7%)	7.99 (0.6%)	8.14 (0.6%)
Tourism	0.28 (0.0%)	0.43 (0.0%)	1.21 (0.1%)	1.08 (0.1%)
Environment	**14.42 (1.5%)**	**17.43 (1.7%)**	**42.83 (3.5%)**	**27.64 (2.0%)**
Multi-sector/ Cross-cutting	**104.63 (11.2%)**	**56.00 (5.4%)**	**73.39 (6.0%)**	**44.61 (3.2%)**
Commodity aid/General Program Assistance	**- (0.0%)**	**1.90 (0.2%)**	**1.98 (0.2%)**	**0.02 (0.0%)**
Acting relating to debt	**2.36 (0.3%)**	**- (0.0%)**	**- (0.0%)**	**- (0.0%)**
Humanitarian aid	**17.88 (1.9%)**	**24.12 (2.3%)**	**16.64 (1.4%)**	**26.84 (2.0%)**
Administrative costs	**38.39 (4.1%)**	**53.60 (5.2%)**	**59.40 (4.8%)**	**57.19 (4.2%)**
Unallocated & Unspecified	**12.26 (1.3%)**	**35.29 (3.4%)**	**26.00 (2.1%)**	**48.86 (3.6%)**

Source: **Korea ODA online data base**

Chart 5.3 Sectoral Aid Share Of Bilateral ODA, 2010-2015 (Net Disbursements, %)

Source: ODA Korea online database

5.9 Main Weaknesses of ROK's ODA

i) Small Amount

Despite recent increase in the amount of aid, ROK's ODA/GNI ratio is remains the lowest among the OECD members. In 2008 the ODA disbursement of ROK was 0.09 (0.086 percent to be more accurate) of GNI while the average for DAC members was 0.31. For instance, Portugal, which is a DAC member with a similar level of GNI per

Figure 5.7 Ratio of DAC's ODA to GNI, 2000-2013

	2000	2005	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Australia	0.267	0.248	0.316	0.294	0.323	0.344	0.361	0.204
Austria	0.234	0.522	0.428	0.302	0.322	0.267	0.280	0.274
Belgium	0.358	0.526	0.479	0.550	0.640	0.536	0.475	0.453
Canada	0.255	0.337	0.325	0.303	0.336	0.320	0.316	0.275
Denmark	1.061	0.812	0.817	0.880	0.909	0.852	0.830	0.852
Finland	0.311	0.461	0.438	0.542	0.550	0.531	0.534	0.535
France	0.305	0.474	0.385	0.471	0.495	0.460	0.453`	0.406
Germany	0.270	0.360	0.383	0.355	0.387	0.387	0.372	0.381
Greece	0.202	0.172	0.211	0.189	0.171	0.147	0.131	0.099
Ireland	0.295	0.420	0.590	0.545	0.523	0.512	0.470	0.462
Italy	0.128	0.290	0.218	0.158	0.148	0.198	0.137	0.167
Japan	0.281	0.281	0.190	0.183	0.196	0.182	0.173	0.225
Korea	**0.042**	**0.095**	**0.086**	**0.097**	**0.116**	**0.119**	**0.141**	**0.134**
Luxembourg	0.696	0.793	0.968	1.043	1.047	0.973	1.004	1.002
Netherlands	0.837	0.819	0.805	0.821	0.815	0.753	0.710	0.669
New Zealand	0.252	0.271	0.304	0.278	0.255	0.276	0.277	0.262
Norway	0.764	0.940	0.889	1.059	1.051	0.964	0.929	1.075
Poland	0.018	0.068	0.075	0.089	0.084	0.084	0.090	0.096
Portugal	0.261	0.211	0.270	0.234	0.294	0.309	0.281	0.227
Spain	0.216	0.272	0.447	0.459	0.428	0.286	0.156	0.174
Sweden	0.801	0.942	0.980	1.121	0.970	1.019	0.974	1.014
Switzerland	0.324	0.422	0.422	0.442	0.393	0.458	0.468	0.459
United Kingdom	0.317	0.473	0.430	0.508	0.573	0.562	0.562	0.705
United States	0.100	0.226	0.183	0.206	0.203	0.204	0.186	0.182
DAC Countries	0.220	0.320	0.300	0.310	0.310	0.310	0.280	0.300

Source: The OECD online database

capita to ROK's ($ 18,890), contributes about 0.27 percent of its GNI to ODA, which is three times greater than that of Korea (Chun 2010). The net ODA of ROK in 2013 amounted $1.74 billion, which ranked in the 16th among the 28 DAC member countries. In 2014 (see figure 51), ROK ranked in the 20th among the 30 main DAC and non-DAC members. The ODA/GNI ratio in 2015 was 0.14 percent, which was way below its target of 0.25 percent, as shown in Figure 5.9.

ii) High Percentage of Tied Aid

Tied aid refers to loan or grant that a doner provide to a recipient country but mandate that the money be spent on goods or services produced in the selected country. The grant ratio of ROK in 2008 was 63.7 percent, while that of DAC members marked a level of 87.5 percent (Chun 2010). As of 2014, the percentage of ROK's tied aid was 46.8 percent which is relatively high compare to other DAC members (19.4 percent). The percentage of the untied ODA in the same was 53.2 percent, which was down from 55.1 percent in 2013, while it was 80.6 percent average among the DAC members. The grant element of total ODA was 95.1 percent in 2014 (OECD).

There are also some authors who criticise ROK for placing too much importance on its own development model and not enough on the real needs and context of the countries it is assisting (Cools 2016). Many of Korean aid agency KOICA's overseas aid projects are said to lack appropriate pre-surveys, monitoring and evaluation and long-term sustainability strategies. In a bid to become a recognised global power, ROK has rushed to take charge of implementing a greater number of development assistance projects and has set goals that are sometimes too broad and unfocused.

5.10 Conclusion

The transition of ROK from aid recipient to doner is a remarkable achievement which has been attained in a matter of five decades. ROK has been, so far, the only country that has attained this remarkable success story. The country which received $12 billion between 1945 and 1999, mainly from the US and Japan was admitted to the OECD in 1996, barely

a year after its graduation from aid recipient. ROK felt is has the moral responsibility to repay back the international community. The main objectives of ROK's ODA as highlighted by Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade are poverty reduction and promote cooperative economic relations with developing partners

Under the slogan of Lee Myung-bak's 'Global Korea' middle power diplomacy, ROK has increased its volume of aid in order to enhance its international status and also to promote its middle power diplomacy. Following the voting in its favour on the 25th November, ROK was admitted officially as the newest member on January 1, 2010. Korea's ODA volume has made remarkable progress since its joining of DAC in 2010. The total ODA of ROK amount in 1991 was just $58 million. This increased to $112 million in 1993, and to $403 million in 2004, which recorded a seven-fold increase. The GNI percent of ROK's ODA increased from 0.06 in 2006 to 0.12 in 2010, which is $1.2 billion in net disbursement. This is a remarkable increase despite its in view of the global financial recession that hit the Korean economy.

However, compare to other OEDC-DAC members, the amount and ODA/GNI ratio of ROK's ODA remains way below the average of the members. The percentage of its tied aid also remains high compared to other members. Of the 0.025 ODA/GNI target, ROK could barely manage to contribute 0.014 percent of its GNI toward ODA the target of 0.25 percent due to the global financial crisis.

CHAPTE 6

Promoting Green Growth as ROK's New National Strategy

6.1 Introduction

Promoting 'Low Carbon Green Growth (Green Growth in short)' has been ambitiously pursuit by Lee Myung-bak under the buzzword 'Global Korea' to bridge the gap between the advanced and developing countries. Snyder (2012) opines that Global Korea is a new form of South Korean public diplomacy which promotes international peace through a non-threatening and shared experience middle power credibility. It was against the backdrops of global financial crisis and the domestic environmental damages that Lee proclaimed Green Growth as a national strategy on August 15, 2008 in commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Republic of Korea and set it as a new vision for the coming 60 years, succeeding the 'Miracle on the Han River' (Lee 2008). The main goals of green growth strategy include combating climate change, promoting environment-friendly economic growth and creating more jobs.

ROK became the first country to adopt green growth strategy as a national policy goal. Prior to 2008, climate policies were protective of narrow economic interests, but with President Lee a shift occurred with both domestic and international focus on green growth significant greenhouse gas reductions. Several factors were responsible for ROK to adopt green growth. Firstly, the export-led economy that started since the 1990s achieved rapid economic growth through the development of heavy chemical industries, but suffered low and jobless economic growth since the second half of the 1990s, which required the quest for a new growth engine. Secondly, green growth was necessary in ROK not only for economic growth, but also to improve the quality of life. Finally, it was necessary to set a GHG reduction target in order to satisfy domestic interest in policy shifting as well as contribute to international efforts to respond to climate change.

The concept of green growth, a wider approach to combat climate change, had originated in the Asia and Pacific Region's Fifth Ministerial Conference on Environment and Development (MCED) held in March 2005 in Seoul during which 52 Governments and

other stakeholders agreed to move beyond the sustainable development rhetoric and pursue a path of 'green growth'. The concept officially emerged in June 2009, when all 30 country-members (plus Chile, Estonia, Israel and Slovania) of the OECD signed a Green Growth declaration. The concept has been widely advocated in various international venues such as UNED, World Bank, IEA as well as at the G8 and G20 meetings.

Green growth is one area where ROK aspires to lead the world by setting an example. Like many traditional middle powers' initiatives for environmental protection, ROK strives to promote the green growth at the global level by closely working with the UN and other institutions. By adopting the green growth strategy, ROK set an example of 'me first approach' in combating climate change which has been a deadlock owing to the disagreements between the developed and developing countries on limiting green house gas into the atmosphere. Due to Lee's ambitious pursuit of green growth, ROK has been recognised as leader of the global combat for green growth, the clearest of which is the establishment of Global Green Growth Institute in June 2010.

However, despite its achievements in implementing its green growth strategy, there have been strong critics from environmentalist and civil societies due to ecological damaged caused by the Four Major River Projects (FMRP) and the Sihwa Tidal Power Plant (TPP) that the government has undertaken. The construction of dams on the four major rivers are said to be causing environment pollution rather than resolving the issue. Moreover, the jobs created by the project are short-term ones such as construction works on the dam sites. The tidal power plants are also said to have destroyed the ecosystem of plants and animals especially the water plants and migratory birds. It also disrupts the profession of the fishing community who are living in near the project. Lee Myung-bak government is harshly criticised for not conducting discussions with the civil societies and make aware people aware about the projects.

Due to this controversial issue, the Park Geun-hye government which took office in February 2013 shifted its policy from green growth towards 'creative economy'. Against this background, this chapter analyses ROK's green growth and the damage caused by

the strategy on its ecology. The following section will give the conceptual background on green growth as a niche diplomacy, while the third section will raise the ecological concerns. The author concludes that Korea can become a model of green growth only if it can incorporate explicit policy to address the ecological concerns.

6. 2 Green Growth: A Conceptual Framework

Despite the widespread use of the term 'green growth', there has not been a universally agreed definition, but only a broad consensus on it. It means different things to different countries in different contexts, such as, 'improvement of living standard without increasing carbon footprint', 'overall development planning process by reducing deforestation', and 'reducing dependence on foreign sources of energy by investing in renewable sources of energy' (Boer 2014). Many authors often interpreted synonymously with sustainable development – first popularised by the *Brundtland Report 1987* (World Commission on Environment and Development) - which differs in several ways (See Table 6.1).

Table 6. 1 Comparison of Sustainable Development and Green Growth

Classification	Sustainable Development	Green Growth
Organ	UNCSD	UNESCAP
Impetus	Our Common Future (1987)	UN MCED (2005)
Objects	Countries around the world	Countries in the Asia-Pacific
Background	Eradication of environmental pollution, a result of growth	Prevention of environmental pollution at the growth stage
Purpose	Simultaneous pursuit of economic growth, social development, and environmental protection	Securement of both the overcoming of poverty and environmental sustainability

Source: Ministry of Knowledge Economy, Korea (2008)

The term is also closely related to 'green economy[8]' which was first coined in a report for the Government of the UK in 1989 by a group of leading environmental economists,

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[8]The term was revived in 2008 in the context of discussions on the policy response to multiple global crises. The UNEP championed the idea of 'green stimulus package' and identified specific areas where large-scale public investment could kick-start a 'green economy' (Atkisson 2012).

entitled *Blueprint for a Green Economy*. "Green growth", or "environmentally sustainable economic growth", as defined by the Ministerial Declaration at the Fifth MCED in 2005, "is a strategy of sustaining economic growth and job creation necessary to reduce poverty in the face of worsening resource constraints and climate crisis". A term rarely heard before 2008, has burst onto the international policy scene over recent years and it now occupies a prominent position in the policy discourse of international economic and development institutions (Jacobs 2012). 'Green growth' was often used interchangeably with the term 'green economy' at the United Nations Rio+20 Conference on sustainable development held in Brazil in June 2012, which was at the top agenda (Brettonwoods Project).

There are at least 13 separate definitions for green growth which were indentified in recent publications, including definitions by key international actors involved in green growth work. OECD (2011) defines it as *"fostering economic growth and development, while ensuring that natural assets continue to provide the resources and environmental services on which our well-being relies."* The World Bank (2012) regards it as *"growth in that it minimises pollution and environmental impacts, and resilient in that it accounts for natural hazards and the role of environmental management and natural capital in preventing physical disasters."* The Asian Development Bank (2012) defines it *(low-carbon green growth)* as *"a pattern of development that decouples economic growth from carbon emissions, pollution and resource use, and promotes growth through the creation of new environment friendly products, industries and business models that also improve people's quality of life."* The Presidential Committee on Green Growth, Korea (2009) defines it as *"harmonised development of the economy and environment."* As for GGGI (2010), *"green growth is the new revolutionary development paradigm that sustains economic growth while at the same time ensuring climatic and environmental sustainability."*

ROK's President Lee Myung-bak defines green growth as *"sustainable growth which helps reduce greenhouse gas emissions and environmental pollutions"* (Global Asia 2009: 9). He further elaborated it as "*about addressing climate change in an aggressive manner*

while, at the same time, making the green technologies and industries needed to combat climate change the driver of national economic growth" (Ibid). It is a shift in thinking that no longer pits "green" against "growth." He identified three key requirements in order to make "green" and "growth" compatible. The *first* is that, there needs to be strong political will and leadership to make the transition to a new paradigm. *Secondly*, the public needs to embrace the new paradigm and discard old habits of thinking and acting. *Lastly*, there needs to be technological revolution to support the first two requirements (Ibid: 10).

6.3 Initiatives for Combating Climate at the Global Level

The major reason for climate change is carbon dioxide (CO_2), whose emissions humans have caused (Jung 2015). With the alarming threat of global warming and the increasing environmental degradation, policy makers and economic planners around the globe have been looking for new ways to stimulate economic growth in harmonise with the environment. The increasing natural disasters such as floods, droughts and windstorm can trigger climate change and the destruction is alarming for generations to come. To tackle these challenges, green growth strategy has been advocated in the recent past in different international forums such as Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), United Nations Economic Programme (UNEP), World Bank, International Energy Agency (IEA), Group of Eight (G8) and Group of Twenty (G20).

Prior to the adoption of green growth strategy, there have been serious discussions and negotiations on reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), an international environmental treaty, was negotiated at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 (which entered into force on March 21, 1994) with the objective to stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere. The treaty, however, set no binding limits on greenhouse gas emissions for individual countries and contains no enforcement mechanisms. It only outlines how specific international treaties (called 'protocols' or 'agreements') may be negotiated to set binding limits on greenhouse gases.

As a follow up, the first initiative for greenhouse gas reduction action plans at the global scale was prepared and implemented with the signing of Kyoto Protocol in 1997 to resolve the crises of climate change. The signatories of the 38 Annex I countries agreed upon mandatory commitment of an average reduction of carbon emissions by 5.2 percent from 1990 levels by the year 2012. Each individual country specified its own target reductions as required per the agreement. The Kyoto Protocol came into force in 2005. The UN Climate Change Conference held in Bali in June 2007 called on to agree on a road-map, timetable and 'concrete steps for the negotiations' with a view to reaching an agreement by 2009.

Table 6.2 Economic, Social and Emissions Indicators for Developing Asia in Context

	Population (billions)	% Population <$2 a day	GDP (trillion)	Cumulative CO_2 Emissions (1895–2008) (Mt CO_2e)	CO_2 emissions (metric tons per capita, 2007–2011)	Carbon growth rate from between 1990 to 2010 (%)
People's Rep. of China	1.39	36	10.10	113,144	5.3	65.0
India	1.17	75	4.20	30,362	1.5	60.4
Indonesia	0.24	51	1.03	7,35	1.7	63.2
Thailand	0.07	27	0.59	4,175	4.2	66.5
Viet Nam	0.09	38	0.28	1,761	1.5	83.2
Japan	0.13	0	4.33	46,866	9.5	9.4
Australia	0.02	0	0.87	13,456	18.6	28.0
Rep. of Korea	0.05	0	1.42	10,836	10.5	52.1
World	6.86	–	76.30	1,465,852	4.8	30.7

Notes: Gross domestic product (GDP) is adjusted for purchasing power parity and measured in international dollars (see World Bank 2011 for further details). All data are current unless other-wise specified. GDP growth projections originate from the International Monetary Fund and are adapted from IEA (2011). '% population <$2 a day' indicates the percentage of a country's population estimated to live off $2 dollars a day, adjusted for purchasing power parity

Source: Asian Development Bank Institute (2012)

The concept of green growth, a wider approach to combat climate change, had originated in the Asia and Pacific Region's Fifth Ministerial Conference on Environment and Development (MCED) held in March 2005 in Seoul during which 52 Governments and other stakeholders agreed to move beyond the sustainable development rhetoric and pursue a path of 'green growth'. To implement this, they adopted the Seoul Initiative

Network on Green Growth (SINGG) which aims to promote Green Growth principles and improve policymakers' capacity building of the concept in the region through various activities, including annual policy forums, leadership training, and pilot projects.

It is no wonder that the concept of green growth originated from Asia. As highlighted by the report of the Asian Development Bank Institute's *Study on Climate Change and Green Asia 2012,* 'the pursuit of growth has been for several decades and remains today the single most important policy goal of emerging Asian countries'. It further states that, 'emerging Asia is increasingly moving towards becoming a middle income region' which records a rise in 'resource extraction for economic from 9 billion tons in 1985 to 13 billion tons in 1995, and further leapt to almost 18 billion tons in 2005, much faster than the global average'. It was with this realisation that the Asian leaders set out strategies to combat climate change, while promoting economic growth.

Promoting green growth as a mean to combat climate change has also been a concern for the developed countries. At the OECD Ministerial Council Meeting in June 2009, 30 members and five prospective members, comprising approximately 80 percent of the global economy, approved a declaration acknowledging that green and growth can go hand-in-hand, and asked the OECD to develop a green growth strategy bringing together economic, environmental, technological, financial and development aspects into a comprehensive framework (UNESCAP, 2012). Since then, the OECD has become a major proponent of green growth and supports efforts of countries to implement green growth.

The green growth initiatives at the inter-governmental level continued to expand in different part of the globe. In April 2010, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit in Hanoi adopted the ASEAN Leaders' Statement on Sustained Recovery and Development. In May 2010, at its sixty-sixth session, the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP or ESCAP) adopted the Incheon Declaration on Green Growth. In June 2010, the ROK was instrumental in the establishment of the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) as a non-profit foundation

(which was elevated to a new international organization at the Rio+20 Conference in June 2012). In November 2010, at the G20 Seoul Summit, leaders also recognised green growth as an inherent part of sustainable development which could enable countries to leapfrog old technologies in many sectors. In February 2012, the World Bank along with UNEP, OECD and the GGGI launched a new international knowledge-sharing platform in Mexico - the Green Growth Knowledge Platform (GGKP).

6.4 Green Growth as a New National Strategy – A Choice or Necessity for ROK?

The massive industrialisation which started with President Park Chung-hee's launch of the First Five-Year Plan in 1962 continued till the end of the Seventh Plan in 1996, causing enormous damage to environment and ecosystem. Park's developmental model paid less attention to protection of the country's environment. The air quality, in particular, in the capital city of Seoul and the surrounding provinces deteriorated significantly throughout this period of rapid industrialisation. According to predictions by the National Institute of Environmental Research (NIER), by 2050, the country's temperature, annual precipitation, and sea level are expected to increase by 3.2 °C, 15.6 percent, and 27 cm, respectively. While the Earth's average temperature has risen by 0.89 °C over the past 112 years, the temperature rise for ROK during the same period has been 1.7 °C, twice as high as that of the world (Jung 2015).

Energy use in ROK had increased at 8.8 percent between 1971 and 1997. Moreover, it imports 97 percent of its energy from other country (Jung 2015). Green house gas (GHG) emissions almost doubled from 1990 to 2005 – highest among OECD countries. Korea's GHG accounted for 1.3 percent of the world in 2005, making it the fifth largest emitter in the OECD and fifteenth largest emitter in the world. The number of premature deaths caused by outdoor air is projected to almost triple by 2060 (OECD 2017).

In view of this serious environmental damage and its high energy dependence on others, it may not a surprising to many that ROK adopted green growth as a national strategy, as it was among the countries of non-Annex I (developing) to the UNFCCC. ROK ratified the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC in 2002 as a non-Annex I country, which means that

it had no obligation to set a specific GHG reduction target for 2008 to 2012. In spite of that, as required by all parties under the Framework Convention, ROK implemented polices to combat climate change since the establishment of its Committee on Climate Change Response in 1999 (Jones and Yoo 2011).

Figure 6.1 Annex I and Non-Annex I Countries under the Kyoto Protocol

Note: EIT stands for Economies in Transition while OPEC means Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

Source: Global Green Growth Institute (2015)

President Lee in his address to the 64th UN General Assembly in 2009 re-emphasised that, building on its past achievements, 'Global Korea' will also be 'contributing to the world' and reaffirmed its commitment to climate change:

> '…we affirmed our commitment to making the Copenhagen Conference a success. Korea, while not included in Annex I of the UNFCCC, plans to make a voluntary announcement before the end of this year, its midterm target emissions cut by the year 2020.
>
> Korea has proposed to establish a Registry of Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) of developing countries at the Secretariat of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), with a view to inviting developing countries to voluntarily participate in mitigation actions and providing the international support that they need. We hope that our proposals and efforts will contribute positively to successful outcomes at Copenhagen' (Lee 2009).

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Choi (2014) outlines three reasons for the necessity of green growth strategy in1 ROK:

1) Firstly, the export-led economy that started since the 1990s achieved rapid economic growth through the development of heavy chemical industries, but suffered low and jobless economic growth since the second half of the 1990s, which required the quest for a new growth engine.

2) Secondly, green growth was necessary in ROK not only for economic growth, but also to improve the quality of life. According to a Gallup World Poll conducted in 2010, showing the average self-evaluation of life satisfaction on a scale from 0 to 10 in 34 OECD countries, Korea ranked below average, at position 27, which shows that government policies aimed at improving quality of life were sorely needed in Korea.

3) Finally, it was necessary to set a GHG reduction target in order to satisfy domestic interest in policy shifting as well as contribute to international efforts to respond to climate change. In this regard, the target - mid-term GHG mitigation to be reduced by 30 percent by 2020 from the business as usual baseline - set by the ROK government, was the highest level of mitigation recommended by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) for developing countries in order to stabilise the global temperature increase at less than 2°C.

It was against the backdrops of global financial crisis and the domestic environmental damages that Lee Myung-bak proclaimed 'Low Carbon[9] Green Growth' as a national strategy on August 15, 2008 in commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Republic of Korea and set it as a new vision for the country for the coming 60 years, succeeding the 'Miracle on the Han River' (Lee 2008). The 'green growth' initiative was an ambitious and comprehensive national project, which sought to initiate an economy-wide transition away from the decades-long commitment to fossil fuel-based 'brown growth' (Kim 2015). It is a paradigm shift in development from quantity-oriented fossil-fuel dependent economic growth to quality-oriented growth that relies on new and

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[9] The concept of low carbon development has its roots in the UNFCCC adopted in Rio in 1992, which in the context of this convention, is now generally expressed using the term low-emission development strategies.

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renewable energy sources (Jung and Ahn 2011). According to government documents, ROK's green growth policy is based theoretically on sustainable development and ecological modernisation[10], which gathered ground in the 1980s as environmentalism departed from its negative views towards modernisation (Jung 2015).

Table 6.3 Mid-term Reduction Goals and Measures of Major Countries

Country	Brief Description
EU	20% reduction from 1990 levels by 2020 Effectuated EU climate-energy legislative package containing relevant directives in April 2009 Introduced and implemented European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) in 2005 Introduced regulation on automobile GHG emissions in 2009
UK	Adopted the world's first Climate Change Act and specified reduction target in December 2008 Target reduction of 34% from 1990 levels by 2020
US	January 2009 plan to invest $150 billion in new and renewable energy industry for next 10 years Waxman-Markey Bill requiring a 17% reduction of carbon emissions from 2005 levels by 2020 passed by House of Representative in June 2009
Japan	Announced a Cool Earth 50 plan in May 2007 for establishment of a low carbon society Announced J Recovery Plan in April 2009 incorporating a revolutionary low carbon strategy Announced target reduction in June 2009 of 15% from 2005 levels by 2020

Source: The Presidential Committee on Green Growth

The EU demands developed countries, including OECD members to reduce emissions by 25 percent from 1990 levels by 2020 and developing countries to cut the levels by 15-30 percent compared to Business As Usual (BAU). Korea, as an advanced developing country, has voluntarily presented a reduction target and demonstrated global leadership by proposing a Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action (NAMA) Registry that developing counties are able to engage in. It shows how the leaders of ROK take a global responsibility to reduce green house gas emissions and promote green growth.

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[10] However, there are many debates and differences among researcher as to whether the Lee Myung-bak administration's green growth was a concept that had inherited sustainable development and could be evaluated as a part of ecological modernization.

Table 6.4 Comparison between Brown Growth and Green Growth

Brown Growth	Green Growth
Quantitative (GDP-focused/economy-centric)	Qualitative (holistic - economy, environment, society)
Resource-intensive (more input = more output)	Resource-efficient (less input = more output)
Production factor-intensive (labor, capital, natural asset)	Innovation-based technology, (value-added knowledge)
Energy dependency (fossil fuel-driven)	Energy self-sufficiency (renewables)
Climate-vulnerable (high risk, low adaptive capacity)	Climate-resilient (high risk, high adaptive capacity)
Unsustainable growth	Sustainable development

Source: Global Green Growth Institute (2015)

Table 6.5 Three Main Strategies and Ten Directions of Green Growth

National Strategies	Policies Direction
I. Measures for Climate Change and Securing Energy Independence	1) Mitigate greenhouse gas emissions 2) Reduction of the use of fossil fuels and the enhancement of energy independence 3) Strengthening the capacity to adapt to climate change
II. Creating New Engines for Economic Growth	4) Development of green Technologies 5) The "greening" of existing industries and promotion of green industries 6) Advancement of industrial Structure 7) Engineering a structural basis for the green economy
III. Improvement in Quality of Life and Enhanced International Standing	8) Greening the land, water and building the green transportation infrastructure 9) Bringing green revolution into our daily lives 10) Becoming a role-model for the international community as a green growth leader

Source: Presidential Committee in Green Growth (2010)

ROK became the first country to adopt green growth strategy as a national policy goal. Prior to 2008, climate policies were protective of narrow economic interests, but with President Lee a shift occurred with both domestic and international focus on green growth significant greenhouse gas reductions (Yun et al, 2011). "If we make up our minds before others and take action, we will be able to lead green growth and take the initiative in creating a new civilization" Lee added in his speech. The most important driver of this vision was public recognition that high levels of carbon-dependent economic growth were not sustainable (Choi 2014). During the global financial crisis in 2008, the country dedicated 80 percent of its fiscal stimulus plan to green growth projects, particularly infrastructure and transportation.

The underlying goal of green growth strategy is '*to market Korea as a trendsetter in the global environmental arena*' (Han 2015: 731). Lee administration discovered a 'niche[11]' in the specialised area of climate change, along with development aid (Snyder 2015), and made diplomatic efforts for Korea to take on a leadership role, where it could spread its 'diplomatic' wings and went for it with full force, leveraging all relevant national capabilities (Kim 2014, emphasis added).' There are three main national strategies and ten directions of green growth strategy as shown in figure 6.4. By implementing these strategies, ROK aims to become the world's seventh largest green economic power by 2020, and fifth largest by 2050.

Lee's adoption of green growth strategy can also be understood on the background of the trend that has been going on in Korean political leaderships. Since the presidents are elected for a single five-year term, each of them wants to set a political legacy in their short span of time. Any Korean president's *illusio* seems to be remove to remove the former presidents' symbols and set one's own agenda. Even thought green growth was

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[11] The term 'niche diplomacy' is linked to middle power behaviour which refers to 'concentrating resources in a specific area which best able to generate returns worth having rather than trying to cover the field' (Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, 1993: 25-26). Some middle power countries are renowned for their roles in niche areas, such as Canada in the domain of peacekeeping and peace-building that led to the Ottawa Treaty, Sweden on the issue of foreign aid, Norway for its conflict mediation and Denmark in the area of green ODA (Behringer 2012, Kim 2014).

art of Korean politics before 2008, it is largely seen as synonymous with President Lee, due to his own strategic actions of timing and communicating (Blaxekjaer 2015).

Chart 6.1 Share of Budget, 2009-2013

Source: Choi (2014)

Chart 6.2 Breakdown of ROK's Green Stimulus

Source: World Bank (2017)

Three Main Pillars of the Institutional Framework for Green Growth are: i) New Green Deal Plan launched in January 2009, ii) The Presidential Committee on Green Growth established in February 2009 and iii) Framework Act on Low-Carbon Green Growth passed in December 2009.

i) New Green Deal Plan 2009

The Lee government introduced a New Green Deal plan on January 6, 2009 laying an estimate budget of $38.5 billion to be invested over the next four year in selected areas such as transport, recycling and infrastructure, and expected to create about 950,00 jobs (Shim 2012). There are nine key projects that were announced under this New Green Deal Stimulus Package which include:

1. Revitalisation four major rivers

2. Building green transportation

3. Building database on national territories and resources

4. Water resource management

5. Green car and cleaner programme

6. Resource recycling programme

7. Forest management and biomass programme

8. Green home, office and school

9. Greener landscape and infrastructure

6.5 The Four Major Rivers Restoration Project

The core project of the 'New Green Deal' focuses on infrastructure development with the restoration of the country's four main rivers: *Han, Nakdong, Geum and Yeongsan rivers.* These four rivers extend for more than 1500 km and their catchments accounts for 63% of the South Korean peninsula (Shin and Chung 2011). As such there is high hope that the benefits of this project will be shared with most South Korean people. The project covered 36.8 percent of the total New Green Deal with the budget amount of $18 billion (22 trillion won) and targeting 16 dam constructions on the four rivers. The project was started on November 10, 2009 and was completed on October 21, 2011. This project serves multipurpose including irrigation and flood control.

Map 6.1 Showing the Four Major Rivers and the 16 Dam Sites

Sources: Shin and Chung (2011)

Repeated flooding and droughts have caused human casualties, ecosystem loss and habitat degradation, property damage and forced displacement of riverine residents. Extreme weather events that lead to flooding and droughts are expected to worsen in frequency and intensity due to climate change impacts. In the case of the Yeongsan River, toxic contamination from domestic and industrial waste disposal has resulted in water quality levels unfit even for agriculture and industrial use. These environmental challenges have dramatic economic consequences.

Table 6.6 Details of the Four Major Rivers Project

River	Catchment area: km²	Overall length/ project length: km	Average width of basin: km	Discharge coefficient	Annual discharge: billion m³	Average annual precipitation: mm
Han	35 770	494 / 114	72·4	395	160	1208
Nakdong	23 384	510 / 334	46·2	380	157	1178
Geum	9912	398 / 130	25·1	300	70	1227
Yeongsan	3468	137 / 112	24·9	680	28	1336

Source: Shin and Chung (2011)

Table 6.8 Details of the 16 Dams

River	Dam	Length of dam (fixed + moveable): m	Dam height: m	Sluice gate type	Cost: £ million
Han	Ipo	591 (296 + 295)	6·0	Lift shell	56·5
	Yeoju	480 (000 + 480)	8·0	Lift plate	43·7
	Gangcheon	440 (090 + 350)	8·0	Rising sector	32·7
Nakdong	Haman	567 (421 + 146)	10·7	Rising sector	82·6
	Hapcheon	322 (104 + 218)	11·4	Lift truss + flap	53·1
	Dalseong	579 (459 + 120)	10·5	Rising sector	51·1
	Gangjeong	953 (833 + 120)	11·5	Rising sector	91·6
	Chilgok	400 (168 + 232)	12·0	Lift plate + flap	46·1
	Gumi	640 (537 + 103)	11·0	Lift shell + flap	46·0
	Nakdan	286 (144 + 142)	11·5	Lift plate	35·2
	Sangju	335 (230 + 105)	11·0	Lift plate + flap	40·8
Geum	Buyeo	620 (500 + 120)	7·0	Lift multi-shell	63·0
	Geumgang	260 (039 + 221)	7·0	Lift truss + flap	31·9
	Geumnam	360 (180 + 180)	4·0	Flap	17·5
Yeongsan	Seungchon	607 (423 + 184)	8·9	Lift plate	40·6
	Jjuksan	512 (336 + 179)	9·0	Lift truss	42·9

Source: Shin and Chung (2011)

With the government at the center to provide policy direction, funding, and incentives for economy-wide green investments and lifestyle changes, the National Strategy for Green Growth contains three overarching objectives:

1) effective climate change mitigation and energy independence;

2) new engines for economic growth; and

3) improved quality of life in Korea and enhanced international standing.

For the Lee administration, green growth is much more than a vision. It is a long-term, top-down national strategy (O'Donnell 2010). Green growth is not just another environmental programme to remediate environmental pollution or mitigate greenhouse gas, it brings new paradigm to economic development. This long-term economic strategy also calls for environment-friendly sustainable development which will in turn create new jobs.

Although President Lee's declaration of green growth as a new national development paradigm only six months after taking office came as a surprise to many, it was hardly a departure from the policies he had adopted during his tenure as Seoul's mayor. And just as he had used the public's charged sentiments toward the *Cheonggyuecheon* stream to fuel his political objectives, his announcement of his Low Carbon and Green Growth Strategy on the country's 60th anniversary appealed to South Korean nationalism (Mazzetti 2011). In fact, he got elected to the Blue House largely based on his reputation for having restored Seoul's iconic *Cheonggyuecheon* stream. In 2007, *Time* magazine named him one of its Heroes of the Environment, alongside former US vice president Al Gore, for Lee's efforts to show that "environmentalism can go hand in hand with development." It is thus, not surprising that Lee ambitiously pursued green growth strategy as a new model for economic development.

A number of positives stand out in ROK's green economic growth strategy. First, the policies in the Five-Year Plan and the targets in the Comprehensive Plan on Combating Climate Change represent a notable departure from the government's earlier defensive position of promoting only those green policies that did not interfere with economic growth. There remains significant room for improvement, but by declaring national GHG reduction targets, establishing a detailed short-term plan to achieve these targets, and creating an effective institutional framework, ROK now has a more proactive stance toward transitioning to a greener economy. The government's adoption of the GHG and Energy Goal Management System in September 2011 further imposed concrete reduction

targets on 497 major enterprises responsible for more than 68 percent of the country's GHG emissions.

The policies enacted since 2008 have resulted in some visible achievements, with notable increases both in spending on green R&D and in the number of green industry players. According to an Industrial Bank of Korea report, green technology investment by the country's top 350 companies rose by 34 percent in 2009 compared to 2008; and between 2009 and 2010 there was a 13.5 percent increase in total spending on green R&D. According to the UN Environment Program, ROK has been incredibly efficient at distributing funds, with almost 20 percent disbursed in the first half of 2009 compared to the global average of 3 percent during the same period.

ii) The Presidential Committee on Green Growth, 2009

The Presidential Committee on Green Growth was established in February 2009 as a follow up of the national strategy. This committee is formed by integrating an existing sustainable development commission and two other committees on energy and climate change entrusted with the following tasks:

Figure 6.2 Organisation Structure of the Presidential Committee on Green Growth

Source: Presidential Committee on Green Growth

- deliberate on the Government's major policies and plans related to green growth and matters concerning the performance of such policies and plans
- coordinate appropriate central administrative agencies and local governments
- discuss various subjects relevant to pursuing green growth as a national think tank
- participate in the global green growth dialogue and international negotiations

With the passage of the Framework Act on Low Carbon Green Growth in 2009, ROK became the first Asian country to pass national laws to transform overall legal and policy architecture towards low-emission development. With this initiative, *'Korea took on the self-designated role of a bridge, which is highlighted in the first Five-Year Plan for Green Growth (2008-2013) as follows: Serve as a bridge between developed and developing countries by making constructive proposals at climate change negotiations'* (S. Kim 2016: 146).

In July, the National Strategy for Green Growth and the first Five-Year Green Growth Plan[12] (2009-2013) were announced by Lee in order to implement this vision. This plan is a demonstration of the political commitments as well as a blueprint for government actions, which contains specific budget earmarks and detailed tasks assigned to line ministries and local governing entities. The government, under the plan, will spend about 2% of the annual GDP on green growth programmes and projects that comprise the construction of various green infrastructures as well as spending plans for research and development of green technologies.

In November 2009, ROK announced some ambitious goals, including:
- Developing the world's first nationwide smart grid system by 2030.
- Increasing the country's renewable energy to 11% of energy supplies by 2030.

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[12] China became the second country to adopt five-year green growth strategies in 2011, which promise not just renewed industrial development and the creation of an export platform for the next decades, but also effective action to deal with carbon emissions at a national level (Mathews 2012)

- Reducing its greenhouse gas emissions 30% by 2020, relative to business as usual (BAU) scenario - 4% less than the green house gas emissions of 2005 with the total amount target of $86 billion.
- Building 1 million green homes by 2020.

The five-year conception is a reminiscent of ROK's early development period of the 1960s and 1970s, when the then government under Park Chung-hee formulated economic policies for the promotion of specific industry sectors (Shim 2010).

Figure 6.3 Breakdown of 2020 Greenhouse Gas Emission Goal

Source: The Ministry of Environment.

Source: The Ministry of Environment

iii) Framework Act on Low-Carbon Green Growth

The Framework Act on Low Carbon Green Growth was passed by the National Assembly in December 2009 after 10 months of debates. It creates the legislative framework for mid-and long-term emissions reduction targets, cap-and-trade, carbon tax, carbon labeling, carbon disclosure, and the expansion of new and renewable energy. The Framework Act requires the government to establish and implement a national strategy,

action plans, and a detailed 5-year plan for a planning period of 20 years, which will deal with various aspects of climate change mitigation and adaptation. The Decree sets a target of a reduction in total national GHG emissions in 2020 by 30 percent from the business-as-usual projection for 2020. This Act was followed by the introduction of Basic Law for Low Carbon Green Growth in January 2010.

6.7 The Establishment of Global Green Growth Institution

The Global Green Growth Institute was founded on June 16, 2010 as a nonprofit organisation with 18 member nations - Australia, Cambodia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ethiopia, Guyana, Indonesia, Kiribati, Mexico, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, the Philippines, Qatar, the Republic of Korea, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and Vietnam - under Article 32 of the Civil Code of the ROK. It was made an international organisation on October 18, 2012. Headquartered in Seoul, GGGI is dedicated to pioneering a new model of environmentally sustainable economic growth. It was in recognition of Lee Myung-bak's effort for ROK to play the leadership role in green growth initiatives.

Lee expressed his hope for the effective role of GGGI as:

> All countries must find their unique strategy to achieve green growth. And because there is no clear map to follow, we must help each other as we go along. This is why I announced the creation of Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) to serve as a global 'hub' of ideas, new technologies and policies for the green growth initiative. Drawing on our unique experience of having moved from being a beneficiary of international aid to becoming a major contributor of it, I believe that Korea can play a meaningful role in helping the Institute bridge the divide between the developed and developing countries on climate change (Lee 2010).

The mission of GGGI is to disseminate the green growth model started off in 2010 in Brazil, Ethiopia, and Indonesia. Later its work expanded to other countries such as Kazakhstan, the United Arab Emirates, and Cambodia in 2011 and then to the Amazon Basin, China, India, Jordan, Mongolia, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Thailand, and Vietnam in 2012. This has been quite a remarkable success touching different continent within a short span of time. In recognition of these efforts, GGGI, in less than a year of

its status change to international organization, was awarded ODA Eligibility Status 36 at the OECD - Development Assistance Committee meeting on June 13, 2013 (Kim 2016).

6.8 Critiques on ROK's Green Growth Strategy

Despite efforts to frame his national strategy for green growth as an engine for economic initiative, President Lee administration has been fiercely criticised from different circles. As O'Donell (2010) stated:

> "The green growth vision is not backed by unanimity of opinion within the Korean government, or among key industry players, on how quickly the national strategy can or should be implemented. Some in Korea's environmental movement are also critical of the green growth plan, claiming that the government is 'green washing' or simply recasting existing projects as 'green'. Furthermore, the government's investments outside of the green growth strategy underscore the reality that securing reliable supplies of traditional fossil fuels will remain a necessity for Korea for some time".

Watson (2014) listed five points of criticisms on ROK's green growth strategies:

> Firstly, "the Korean Federation of Small Businesses argues that its members are trapped by competition from the selected state-backed big businesses and the problem of sudden state regulation (green tape) which means that 'that green growth is a continuity of the old developmentalist state". Secondly, "green growth has merely served as a public relations platform for South Korean elite efforts to bolster the country's global soft power image" which "created economic and political competition between local communities and regions and local and regional governments for government funds." Thirdly, "chaebols still tend to monopolise the green technology sector with selected government support and therefore often crowd out smaller businesses as part of five-year plans." Fourthly, "the spontaneous execution of policies with no accountability or ability to locate where and why decisions are actually made is a continuing concern that obscures vested interests. Fifth, "there is still a continuing reliance on state–chaebol construction projects that have characterised South Korea's economic development."

There are some people who doubt whether ROK government's proposed policies and projects are really 'green' or not (Yun 2009). This is so, because the meaning of 'green' for the government is different from the original meaning of 'green' as understood in the field of political ecology. In the case of the German Green Party, from which the symbolic term 'green' originated, green meant direct democracy, non-violence, solidarity, feminism and self-determination as well as ecology. As a political movement it embraced diverse environmental, anti-nuclear, peace and gender equality themes. But for the South Korean government, 'green' growth means simply the reduction of greenhouse gas

emissions and environmental pollutants. Green has been significantly narrowed. For instance, nuclear energy has become an example of green energy because it generates relatively low CO2 emissions even though the problem of the disposal of spent fuel has not been solved. The government looks to nuclear energy as a cornerstone of green growth. The government is accused of using the word 'green' as a modifier to hide the active pursuit of growth. Green is accepted as a significant factor only when it contributes to economic growth. Consequently, the original concept of green has been distorted, while the government has preempted the green discourse of the domestic environmental movement and created what amounts to a growth-biased green discourse.

There has been a harsh criticism on ROK government's policy of constructing 16 dams on the Four Major Rivers Restoration Project due to the ecological damages that this project is predicted to cause. This project accounts for 36.8 percent of the budget for the government's Green New Deal, the highest share, followed by railroad construction jobs (24.5 percent). It is no wonder that President greatly emphasised on these two mega projects. These two projects are both land development related, and are neither green nor prone to produce growth. In this respect, they do not fit into the main strategies for green growth identified by the government. "The most problematic aspect of the four-river project is that it has been promoted without any social consensus or support from the public". The ROK Government claimed that it had conducted an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) project and announced the results on November 6, 2009. Following this, the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was prepared by the Regional Construction Management Administration after gathering the opinions from various stakeholders. It was reported that the draft was shared with the local residents, environmental organisations, and relevant experts to gather diverse opinions for 20 days (Cha and Kim 2011).

Despite the government's claim of receiving the people's consent, "polls show that more than 70 percent of Koreans disagree to the project and as accusing it as a project not for restoring but for killing the ecosystem of the four rivers" (Yun 2009). Also, the way the government's moved to effectively ramming it without respect for due legal processes is

suspected of violating a number of laws, including the Korea Water Resources Corporation Act, the River Act, the State Finance Act and laws relating to environmental policy, environmental impact assessment, cultural asset protection and so on.

Another point of criticism is the damaging ecosystem due to the construction of tidal power plant. This is reported as the only tidal power plant built so far is Sihwa Tidal Power Plant (TPP) near Incheon. It is the smallest of the six proposed but, it is the highest capacity tidal power plant in the world so far. It is situated about 20 km on the southern part of Incheon. The power plant was opened in August 2011. It has a capacity of 254 MW and overtakes the 240-MW Rance Tidal Power Station in northwest France, the earlier record-holder, which was opened in 1966.

Figure 6.4 The Trade offs of Tidal Power Projects Toward Climate Mitigation

	PROS	**CONS**
Local	•Secure, non-polluting energy supply •Creation of short-term, construction related jobs	•Destruction of ecosystem •Decline of local fisheries and related long term jobs • Lost opportunity for long-term jobs in ecotourism and related fields • Increased risk of flooding • Impact on natural landscape
National	•Achievement of national goals to reduce greenhouse gasses (GHGs) • Fiscal saving from reducing imports of fossil fuel • Immediate stimulation of employment	• Large initial cost for construction •Decline or extinction of legally protected species •Decline of fisheries and eco-tourism along the west coast and associated possible long term net loss in employment • Disruption of tidal processes in Yellow Sea
Global	•Achievement of global goals to reduce GHGs • Delay in the depletion of fossil fuels	• Decline of biodiversity •Destruction of globally unique ecosystems and natural landscapes

Source: Ko and Schubert 2011

Various civil societies and environmentalists organised protest rally raising their concerns on the protection of environment and preservation of the eco-system. The Birds Korea raised their concerns that the Four Major Rivers Project will cause and the long-term negative impacts on several bird species, on eight Bird Life designated Important Bird

Areas, and on at least one Ramsar site (Upo wetland). Religious organisations such as Protestants, Catholic Church, Jesuits and Buddhism are also strongly protested the project due to the environmental damage that the project is going to cause. The Bishops Conference released a public statement opposing the project in March 2010.

Map 6.2 Showing Important Bird Areas

Source: http://www.birdskorea.org/Habitats/4-Rivers/BK-HA-4-Rivers.shtml

The Lee Myung-bak administration's adoption of green growth has been one of the significant landmark that Korea has accomplished as it enhances Seoul's leadership role at the global arena, even to the extent of influencing policy makers at the OECD and United Nations. This is so because the policy initiatives came at a time when government officials, policymakers and environmentalists have been convinced by the alarming threat

of global warming and have been searching for an answer to combat climate change and environmental degradation through their combined efforts. Although no countries denied the threat posed by the increasing greenhouse gas emissions into the atmosphere, none of the leaders are willing to lead the initiative to reduce the carbon gas emissions. With his 'me first' approach, Lee demonstrated his commitments to implement green growth economic growth proclaimed to be in harmonise with the environment.

However, the policy initiatives did not turn towards its desirable end. There have been enormous criticisms from the environmental groups and civil societies on the revitalisation of the four major rivers project and construction of tidal power on the six designated coastal areas. The plan to construct 16 dams on the four major rivers have been criticised on the ground of damaging the ecology and the livelihood of the farmers living by the river side, while the tidal power construction was criticised for its destruction of the home of the migratory birds and fishes, thereby damaging the livelihood of the fishers and eco-tourism. Lee policy of providing employment through the construction of dams was heavily criticised as providing only temporary jobs to the construction workers, falling short of his promise of providing sustainable job.

The shift in the policy of economic development from 'green growth' to 'creative economy' under the Park Geun-hye's administration unfolded the undeniable facts on the failure of the Lee's green growth strategy. What remains to be watch is the progress of the Global Green Growth Institute and the Green Growth Knowledge Platform which were established under the pioneering work of Lee, as a non-profit foundation, which was elevated to a new international organization at the Rio+20 Conference in June 2012. Korea's green growth strategy may be revised to resolve the current controversies that it has confronted. It can become a role model for other countries only if it can incorporate explicit policy to address the ecological concerns. Debates on the positive and negative impacts on Lee Myung-bak's green growth strategies will continue in the days to come. As Kim (2017) pointed out *'Someday people will look back history and they may say that Lee Myung-bak did the right thing. The dams control flood and provide irrigation.' 'It makes Korea beautiful and makes biking much more convenient"*

6.9 Conclusion:

The launched of Green Growth by Lee Myung-bak on the 60th anniversary of ROK's establishment was a significant step undertaken by the government. It was in partly response to the international community's pledge for developing countries to cut greenhouse gas emissions for effectively combating climate change. It was also in response to the environmental degradation caused by Korea's industrialisation since the 1970s. The goals of this have been to combat climate change, to promote environment-friendly economic growth and to create more jobs. As a commitment to this, ROK has announced its plan to cut down greenhouse gas emissions to 30 percent by 2030. Korea has been allocating huge budget and funding to establish various institutions. It is worth appreciating that the Lee Myung-bak government strived to achieve such commitments. This is an exemplary move by a country which is not bound by the Kyoto Protocol. ROK's image at the international level has been greatly enhanced by its green growth initiatives. The establishment of Global Green Growth Institute and Green Climate Fund are is a remarkable achievement which enhances ROK's middle power status.

However, at the domestic level the strategy has been greatly criticised by the environmentalist and civil societies. Initially, it was appreciated at different agencies of the UN, but by the end of Lee's tenure, the green growth policy has been seen a failing to meet its promises. One reason for the failure was the absence of deliberate discussion with the civil societies which have been playing an influential role in the domestic politics of ROK since its transition to democracy in 1987. As rightly criticized, Lee has been acting as a 'bulldozer President' adamant to listen the voices of various sections of the society. All in all, the much acclaimed green growth policy has received mixed responses from the South Korean citizens and has become a contested issue since then.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

The present study has examined the Republic of Korea's middle power diplomacy in three areas of viz. UN Peacekeeping Operations, Official Development Assistance and its promotion of Green Growth strategy from the year 2008 to 2013, with an aim to contribute to the existing literature on the subject. In view of the prevailing security complexity on the peninsula, it also highlighted the obstacles posed by North Korea's military provocations as well as the regional tensions that escalated due to China-US diverging response to the two military attacks in March and November 2010. Assuming its material capacities as commonly accepted, the thesis has evaluated the constraints and contributions of ROK for global peace and development within the confine of its middle power diplomacy.

This chapter serves to offer conclusions based on the investigation from the present case study. In order to articulate, it is necessary to return back to the main goal of the study that has been laid down in Chapter 1. The first section of this chapter tests the two hypotheses, followed by the research questions analysis of the topic of study in more detail. The third section examines the original contribution of the study, while the fourth will discuss the limitations and the weaknesses of the study. The final section will address the key areas for future research that could be profitable avenues for those who are interested to take up similar topic.

7.1 Hypothesis 1:

ROK has attained middle power status in regards to military power, economic strength and population

As has been argued in Chapter 1 and 2, ROK has attained middle power economically since the late 1980s and militarily by early 1990s. However, it was with the coming of the

Lee Myung-bak administration that the country's middle power diplomacy has been pursued ambitiously and gained international recognition. Although, there has not been any mention of the term 'middle power' in the defense and diplomatic paper, many scholars started to term Lee's 'Global Korea' strategy as synonymous with middle power diplomacy as it embodies non-military foreign policy behavior. This diplomacy has been carried out by the Park Geun-hye administration in an aspiration to play the role of 'a responsible middle' power. Although there are some scholars who argued that ROK middle power diplomacy started from Kim Dae-jung or Roh Moo-hyun's administration, the author opines that the middle power diplomacy was promoted enthusiastically by Lee Myung-bak, which in turn gained international recognition.

The theoretical framework in Chapter 2 provides the basis on which ROK's middle power identity has been constructed by the Lee Myung-bak's administration. The author has employed constructivism as the theoretical background for analysing ROK's middle power diplomacy, as this best explain the context. Constructivism alone does not satisfactorily explain Korea's middle power identity since its claim has to be supported by its material capacities such as the size of its economy, military and population. Although there has not been any commonly accepted definition on middle power, countries between the economic size of $10^{th} - 30^{th}$ are widely accepted as middle powers. By this parameter, ROK has been recognised not only as having attained the required material capacities but also in the upper ranks among the middle powers. But the fact that ROK has fervently promoted this identity shows that its wants to overcome the traditional small-power mentality and venture out to the global arena from the narrow North Korean-centric foreign policy.

7.2 Hypothesis 2:

ROK's commitments to UN Peacekeeping Operations, Development Aid and Green Growth are manifestations of its middle power diplomacy.

Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations:

Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations, providing Development Aid and promotion of Green Growth are not the specific foreign policy behavior of middle powers. As has been noted, great powers and small powers alike active involve in all these activities. Nevertheless, traditional middle powers like Australia, Canada, Netherlands, Sweden and Norway take active part in these areas as a mean to enhance their status at the international level.

Contributing troops for peacekeeping operations has been one of the objectives of ROK since joining the United Nations in 1991. As a country which transitioned from security recipient to security provider, the country felt that it is her obligation to pay back the international community what it has received. However, due to the devastating experience during the Vietnam War, the 'payback syndrome' has been contrasted with the 'Vietnam syndrome'. Owing to this, ROK rejected UN's plea for contributing troops for some years during the 1990s. As the country became more prosperous in its economic power, there has been a growing consensus for expanding its contribution to peacekeeping operations as an act of repaying back the international community what they have rendered to Korea. Other motivations which drive the ROK government to participate in UN peacekeeping operations include political rationale and national interest. As Lee Myung-bak has vividly proclaimed, ROK's participation has been a determination to enhance ROK's status as middle power at the global level.

The Lee Myung-bak administration has undertaken three important measures in order to increase and strengthen ROK's contribution to UN Peacekeeping Operations. The first of these was the creation of 3000-strong military personnel for overseas deployment in December 2009. This was followed by the passing of the "Law on Participation in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations" on December 29, 2009. Another significant step undertaken by Lee to strengthen the functioning of the peacekeeping operations was the shifting of the Peacekeeping Operations Centre from the ROK Joint Staff College to National Defense University on January 1, 2010. All these steps show the strong commitment of the Lee Myung-bak administration for global peace and security. Due to

the prevailing military threats from North Korea, ROK may not be able to enormously increase the number of its troop personnel, but it is not less in comparison with other traditional middle power countries like Australia, Canada and even its rival neighbour Japan.

Under the slogan of Global Korea, Lee Myung-bak used the peacekeeping operations as a diplomatic tool to enhance Korea's reputation at the global arena. He sought to expand ROK's diplomatic horizon by creating a positive image to the global community. The motives behind ROK's involvement in UN peacekeeping operations and anti-piracy have been not only driven by normative behaviour but also to enhance Korea's national interest. ROK's dispatched troops to Somalia waters to combating pirates to protect the trade routes of Korean ships. ROK will continue to take active part in the activities of peacekeeping operations despite the various challenges as this serve ROK's diplomatic and economic interests.

Enhancing Official Development Assistance:

Increasing the volume of Official Development Assistance has been another ambition of Lee Myung-bak government for ROK to bridge the gap between the advanced and developing countries. As the only country which successfully transitioned from recipient to doner, ROK believes that it has the moral duty to provide ODA and also believe that ROK could be a model for other developing countries. Its joining of the OECD Development Assistance Committee in 2010 is the result of its economic success and the other members' recognition of ROK's increasing leadership role. Even before joining the DAC, ROK had pledged to increase its aid volume equivalent to 0.25 percent of its GDP by 2015. This target has not been achieved but reached to a remarkable level despite the financial crisis that hit the country in 2008.

In an attempt to enhance its national branding, Lee Myung-bak government inaugurated World Friends Korea, the Korean version of Peace Corps, on May 7, 2009. Under this programme over 3000 Korean volunteers, both young and old, are sent to over 40 countries to work in different sectors such as teaching in education, providing health care,

providing technical training in information technology and teaching farming techniques. This is the second largest such programme after the US Peace Corps. Several countries in Asia and Africa are interested to learn from the success of *Saemaul Undong* (New Village Movement) in South Korea in order to transform their rural economies. As a middle power, ROK puts great efforts to elevate poverty and increase the economic growth rate. Although there have been criticisms from different angles that ROK is providing its ODA to improve political ties and gain economically through the multinational company's investment in the recipient countries, many in the developing countries of Asia, Africa and South America have benefitted from ROK's development aid.

On the other hand, ROK faces challenges in implementing its ODA objectives due to the historical background of the recipient country's economic growth. For instance, Saemaul Undong, which has been the brand name of ROK's rural economic transformation is not applicable to many developing countries who have not attained certain level of literacy as well as who have not practice the culture of competition. Another challenge for ROK's ODA is how to increasing the percentage of untied aid for the benefits of the less advantage groups of people.

Green Growth as a New National Strategy:

Chapter 6 has evaluated the positive and negative impacts of ROK green growth strategy. President Lee Myung-bak proclaimed 'Low Carbon Green Growth' as a national strategy on August 15, 2008 in commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Republic of Korea and set it as a new vision for the country for the coming 60 years. This strategy was in part in response to the international pressures on Korea's greenhouse gas emissions to combat climate change and promote sustainable economic growth. It was also in response to the environmental degradation caused by heavy industrialization in Korea since the 1960s. It is a paradigm shift in development from quantity-oriented fossil-fuel dependent economic growth to quality-oriented growth that relies on new and renewable energy sources (Jung and Ahn 2011). ROK became the first country to adopt

green growth strategy as a national policy goal. Prior to 2008, climate policies were protective of narrow economic interests, but with President Lee a shift occurred with both domestic and international focus on green growth significant greenhouse gas reductions. During the global financial crisis in 2008, the country dedicated 80 percent of its fiscal stimulus plan to green growth projects, particularly infrastructure and transportation.

Despite the various achievements on its green growth initiatives, Lee's construction of dams on the four major rivers – Han, Naktong, Geum and Yeongsan - came under harsh criticism from the environmental NGOs on the ground of ecological damages it caused and the unsustainability of the jobs that have been generated. Some fishing communities have not been able to continue their job, while some migratory birds are also affected by the projects. Also the use of the concept of 'green growth' has been criticised for accepting nuclear energy as part of the project. There have been strong discontents from environment activists groups as Lee did not consult them before taking the decisions.

7. 3 The Main Constraints of ROK Middle Power Diplomacy

Chapter 3 has examined the main constraints of ROK's middle power diplomacy. The geopolitical constraint of ROK continues to be a main obstacle to its diplomatic maneuvers. At the time when it successfully enhanced middle power diplomacy at the global level, it has been constrained by its regional differences and the peninsular issues. The greatest constraint has been North Korea's military provocations manifested through the sinking of South Korean naval ship *Cheonan* on March 26 followed shelling of *Yeonpyeong* Island on November 22, 2010. These two provocative incidents sharply divided the South Koreans on opposite political camps. China's reluctance to condemn North Korea on the two incidents worsened the situation which also raised the status of the 'strategic partnership' between the ROK and China. The US condemned China's failure to act as 'a responsible stakeholder' in the region which further aggravated the tensions between the two great powers.

If *Cheonan* sinking indicated the increasing US-China geopolitical rivalry, the *Yeonpyeong* Island attack was a clear indication of North Korea's brinkmanship. China's shielding of North Korea on the *Cheonan* sinking could be somewhat justifiable as there was not enough evidence to prove North Korea as the culprit. But China's continual diplomatic shielding of North Korea on this attack was a clear indication of its unchanging policy on Pyeongyang, which many observers see it as an obstacle to pressure the latter to change its behaviour. It further stood as a hindrance to Park Geun-hye's *trustpolitik* to engage North Korea. The US rebalancing act against China's assertiveness also restrains South Korea to pave its own foreign policy which was best evidence when Washington warned Seoul not to join the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2013. Despite its convinced of the foreseeable financial benefits, Korea was unable to take a decision on fear of US negative reaction. It could decide to join it only after UK, another US ally declared its willingness to join the bank.

The other constraints of ROK's middle power diplomacy at the regional level include Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiatives (NAPCI) and Eurasian Initiatives launched by President Park Geun-hye in 2013. These two initiatives too are at stalemate due to the lack of support from China and US, and the lack of reciprocity from North Korea. Cooperation among the Northeast Asian countries remains weak and unstable due to the territorial disputes.

The sixth chapter assess ROK's middle power diplomacy under the green growth strategy of Lee Myun-bak government. Promoting 'Low Carbon Green Growth (Green Growth in short)' and increasing its share of development aid are the two non-traditional security areas where ROK committed itself to bridge the gap between the developed and developing countries. It was against the backdrops of global financial crisis and the domestic environmental damages that Lee Myung-bak proclaimed 'Low Carbon Green Growth' as a national strategy on August 15, 2008 in commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Republic of Korea and set it as a new vision for the country for the coming 60 years, succeeding the 'Miracle on the Han River' (Lee 2008).

Green growth strategy aims to combat climate change, promote environment-friendly economic growth and to create more jobs

Based on the assessment of ROK's green growth strategy, this chapter concludes that Korea has been a great pioneer for promoting green growth and has committed to the cause by allocating huge budget and funding establishing various institutions. It is worth appreciating that the Lee Myung-bak government adopted green growth and made promises to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions. This is an exemplary move by a country which is not bound by the Kyoto Protocol. By undertaking various green growth initiatives, ROK has been able to display an exemplary role at the global arena. The establishment of Global Green Growth Institute is a remarkable achievement which recognises ROK's commitments to green growth.

However, at the domestic level the strategy has been greatly criticised by the environmentalist and civil societies. Initially, it was appreciated at different agencies of the UN, but by the end of Lee's tenure, the green growth policy has been seen a failing to meet its promises. One reason for the failure was the absence of deliberate discussion with the civil societies which have been playing an influential role in the domestic politics of ROK since its transition to democracy in 1987.As has been rightly criticised Lee has been acting as a 'bulldozer President' adamant to listen the voices of various sections of the society. All in all, the much acclaimed green growth policy has received mixed response from the South Korean citizens and has become a contested issue since then.

Based on analysis of the three selected topics of study – UN peacekeeping operations, development aid and green growth, the author concludes that ROK has been constructing its international identity as a 'middle power' state. These diplomatic tools have boosted ROK's reputation and serve for its national interest. ROK has now been recognised as an important player of the global economic and financial institutions. ROK's diplomatic skill pursued through the prism of middle power enhances ROK's status as a responsible member of the global community. In spite of this, ROK's geopolitical constraints

continue to hinder its middle diplomatic skills at the regional level, a hard reality to deal with.

7.4 Weaknesses of the study

No study is perfect and this work is no exception. There are several weaknesses in this study despite the author's effort to do his best investigation. The main weakness lies in the theoretical framework of middle power which is ambiguous and highly contested. As there has not been commonly accepted theory among the scholars and foreign policy practitioners, any study on the subject is bound to suffer from this weakness. The realist approach suffers from the loophole of failing to meet the normative behaviour of middle power such as the tendency to cooperate in multilateral forums in the areas of peacekeeping operations, development aid, human security agenda and environmental issues. Militarily powerful countries such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq may not meet the required assets of international good citizenship which has been regarded as the core value of the traditional western middle powers. They also do not cooperate with other like-minded countries in multilateral framework to resolve the crisis prevailing at the regional or global level.

In the same manner, liberalist approach fails to address the material capabilities required for countries to exert their influence at the international level. Small countries such as Norway, Denmark and Sweden which were once regarded as traditional middle powers who were actively involved UN peacekeeping operations and provided foreign aid generously do not longer possess the material capabilities to play the role of middle powers. This brings us to the realist approach on classifying middle powers on the basis of their material capacities. Yet as has been argued, realist approach has been unable to explain the concept of middle power satisfactory. Since both the two approaches have their own limitations, the concept on middle power and middle power diplomacy will continue to suffer from limitations.

It was against this backdrop that the present study adopted Constructivist approach as the theoretical frame work, arguing that ROK's middle power diplomacy is a self-created and

self-promoted identity to enhance its image at the global arena. The claim made by ROK leaders has been widely accepted and it has gained international recognition as a middle power, both in terms of material capacity and foreign policy behavior. However, this could be contested on the ground that ROK has not been able to maintain its sovereignty unlike other traditional middle powers. ROK is the only sovereign country whose war time military command or operation control (OPCON) is in the hands of an external power − US. As has been mentioned in the first chapter, Douch and Solomon (2014) refuse to admit ROK as a middle power as its main focus still North Korea's military threat. In line with this argument, Shim (2010) too posits the need to develop middle theory relevant to address the security issues facing ROK.

7.5 Future Research

The author has not been able to accommodate the public opinion on ROK's middle power diplomacy. Although the study employs Constructivist as a theoretical framework, survey has was not conducted to investigate how the educated South Koreans see their country's self-promoted middle power identity. Neither was there an opinion poll on how Korean people locate the ranking of their country at the international politics and how does this public opinion impact the foreign policy decision making.

In this regard, the study could have been more concrete if the role of civil societies has been taken into consideration especially on the issues of peacekeeping operations, development aid and green growth. Although the impact of dam constructions on the four major river projects have been partly touched but the issue have not been dealt in detail. Any researcher who is interested in the same topic can look these issues in the future. With the new Moon Jae-in government promising to reengage North Korea unlike the previous two conservative administrations, it will be an interesting to articulate ROK's foreign policy within the framework of middle power.

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