ROLE OF DIASPORA IN STATE-BUILDING IN AFGHANISTAN, 2001-2013

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DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled **"ROLE OF DIASPORA IN STATE-BUILDING IN AFGHANISTAN, 2001-2013"** submitted by me for the award of the degree of **DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this university or any other university.

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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this thesis be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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ACRONYMS

AlA	Afghan Interim Authority
AlA	Afghanistan Interim Authority
AIHRC	Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission
AIPDA	Afghanistan Industrial Parks Development Authority
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANDS	Afghanistan National Development Strategy
AREU	Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
ARTF	Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
ATA	Afghanistan Transitional Authority
AUP	Afghan Uniformed Police
Bro	Border Roads Organisation
CENTCOM	Central Command

CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CJTF	Criminal Justice Task Force
CLJ	Constitutional *Loya Jirga*
CTC	Central Training Centre
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and the Reintegration
DFID	Department of International Development
EC	European Community
EFT	Electronic Fund Transfer
ELJ	Emergency *Loya Jirga*
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EUPOL	European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan
EUSR	European Union Special Representative
GDP	Gross Domestic Product

I-ANDS	Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INCB	International Narcotics Control Board
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence
KMTC	Kabul Military Training Centre
LOTFA	Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan
MAAH	Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MOF	Ministry of Finance
MOI	Ministry of Interior
MRRD	Ministry of Irrigation, Water Resources and Environment
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NWFP	North-West Frontier Province
PDPA	People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
SNTV	Single Non-Transferable Vote
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan's
UNDP	United Nations Development Program's
USAID	US Agency for International Development

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1 INTRODUCTION

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Introduction

This thesis engages with the participation of Afghan diaspora in the state-building process in Afghanistan. It, seeks to explore the significance and implications of the participation of the diaspora in the process. In order to attain the state objective, the thesis delves into the triangular interaction between the diaspora as distinct group, the international community and the local society in Afghanistan. It seeks to identify the type and patterns of politics that emerge out of this interaction.

The state-building process in Afghanistan which was started by Amir Abdul Rahman in 19th century still continues. Different Amirs used different methods for centralization of state power and to build a strong nation state in Afghanistan. Abdul Rahman used brute force to create a strong state, while Amanullah employed the model of constitutional monarchy and Nadir Shah and Zahir Shah tried oligarchy with the support of religious group and tribal leaders to secure the strengthening and legitimacy of the state. During the course of all these periods one thing remained the prominent feature of everyday life of people in Afghanistan: the migration of people both in and out of the country which over period of time created a global community of the Afghan diaspora. The diaspora in general and its specific members have from time to time took participation in processes related with the project of state and the determination of its social and cultural characters—encapsulated in ideology and identity of the state.

Both the size and attributes of the Afghan diaspora experienced a gradual shift —owing largely to the three decades of conflict and displacement that characterized the Afghan polity after the 1960s. The process further accelerated with Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, which opened the door for power struggle that continued till now. Afghan diaspora emerged as highly transnational group around whom there was an accelerated flow of money, goods and information (Braakman 2005). The diaspora community found itself assuming immense political significance in aftermath of end of Taliban rule bringing in US led international community's engagement in Afghanistan for reconstruction and peace-building effort. At, the heart of this process of healing and recovery was the project of revival and strengthening of

the Afghan state, albeit cast on a Western model of democratic polity. The social and political efforts that were part of this project of change created demand for linkages/conduits between the Western agents of change and the Afghan society. Afghan diaspora, particularly those located in West were looked as the most natural group capable of filling this space. As a result, they became involved in the project of peace-building assuming several kind of roles: advisors, local experts, translators, mediators, negotiators and technical experts. Overall, the Afghan diaspora became actively involved in development and state-building process in Afghanistan. The references of homeland and host suddenly assumed significance in post 9/11 era, when the NATO countries began engaging their resident Afghan population for state re-structuring in Afghanistan.

The Afghan Government, international governments and INGOs involved in the reconstruction effort have encouraged the participation of diaspora and skilled Afghans to returns to assist in rebuilding the country. The Afghan diaspora ended up playing important role at the very onset of the reconstruction process. This was evident in their presence as interlocutors between Afghanistan and the International community at the Petersburg talks and Bonn process, which were vital for conception and shaping of frameworks of the reconstruction efforts (Zunzer 2004).

The use of diaspora for activities of reconstruction and other efforts related with countries of the developing world has emerged as the mainstay of contemporary global politics of reconstruction and peace building involving cases like Iraq and Afghanistan. The reconstruction efforts in Iraq saw the members of Iraqi diaspora assuming important positions of the Iraq's formal politics: members of the diaspora occupied important positions in the Governing Council and Cabinet of the Interim government (Jazayery 2002). The case of Afghanistan stands out in terms of the scale and significance the member of diaspora have assumed in every sphere of the state-building process. Both in terms of volume and significance of the positions, the Afghan diaspora had marked presence in the interim government.

The understanding of the trajectory and prospect of state-building process in particular and the peace-building process in general in contemporary cases like

Afghanistan requires a strict assessment of the role that diaspora plays. More broadly, such an assessment is also pertinent for detection and assessment of new trends in world politics in the aftermath of cold war, particularly with the onset of contemporary phase in history of globalization. This thesis seeks to make a small contribution to this broader knowledge quest, by exploring how the new pattern of politics of state-building involving the international community, the diaspora and the local society unfolds in the context of Afghanistan.

1.2 Review of literature

There has been a sudden upsurge in literature relevant to current study. This growth can be attributed to the growing interest in issues related to identity and diaspora, particularly from sociological point of view. Issues of identities and role transnational communities like the diaspora have become significant particularly due to the onset of contemporary phase of globalization. Likewise, the shift in global politics post cold-war made issues like peace-keeping, peace-building and reconstruction the catchphrases of global politics. This corresponded with the change in patterns of conflict, rise in number of refugees—facilitated both by global connections and new conflicts and also the increased production of cultural and political boundaries (Demmers 2002). This has brought a sharp rise in the volume of literature produced in this regard.

Overall, there has been an expansion in the volume of literature dealing with themes of diaspora, migration, and state-building. This literature review engages with the body of literature relevant to present study in three broad sections. The first two sections engages with works which are largely conceptual in nature. The third section deals with the body of work which are empirical in nature.

1.2.1 Conceptual Understanding of Diaspora

The concept of diaspora itself has been the major preoccupation of large volume of studies produced in this regard. The extant literature reveals the various aspects associated with conceptual mapping of diaspora. The literature reveals a gradual shift from a case based approach of engaging with cases of dispersal of Jews

or forced diaspora like the Armenian, African, Palestinian etc to a more generic conceptualization with the onset of globalization. Scholars like Safran (1990) and Cohen (1997) were the main proponent of this approach to study of diaspora that emerged during 1990s. Safran argued that the concept of diaspora is associated with those communities who share certain characteristics like having the experience of dispersal from homeland due to war or forced migration and then spread to many locations, carries the hope to return to the homeland whether real or imagined, and maintains a strong relation with the homeland or ethnic communities in the homeland. Cohen has moved the argument further by not only re-emphasising the transnational character of the diasporas but also pointing out the significance of their trans-nationality in the production of their notions about identity and home.

Engaging with the question of identity, new currents in the literature put an emphaisis on the connection among groups that has a commonality in terms of having a notion of "removed homeland" and thus have assumed an identity which is "constructed on a world scale which crosses national borders and boundaries" (Hall 1990:10). These insights have allowed an understanding of how diaspora construct their own identity in host land and how those identities are reflected in homeland. Another strand, points out the functional aspect of identity of the community. That is, diaspora then represents the de-socialised group of interest in the host country which uses the relation or reference to the homeland for their own interest in host land. Further, the community also serves as forum for organization of everyday social life in host land. In this regard, diaspora often develop varieteis of association that last upto their third generation (Toloyan 2004).

In the literature, major shift from the traditional way of looking at the diaspora as distinct from other transnational groups like migrants, exiles, and refugees with a focus on the nature of migration, dispersion to two or more host land, and relation with homeland has also undergone change. This shift also came largely due to the change in the pattern of migration and increased communication and globalisation. Thus there emerged a change in conceptual and definitional application of the concept. So, new writings produced in this regard have expanded the scope of the definition of diaspora by including almost any population on move without any

reference to the specific context of their existence (Scnapper 1999, Castles and Miller 2003).

Further, with the growing involvement of diaspora in transnational economic and political participation, there has been a need to understand its social and political implications. Making sense of such developments demands an understanding of the historical context, interests and motives behind. This has opened up debates about the nature of their participation, their forms and ideological/ethnic inclinations. The debate basically has been about whether the diaspora can be treated as monolithic homogeneous group. Being cast as unitary actors, raises the problem of "groupism" (Galipo 2011). A way out has been shown by Brubaker (2005) who has suggested that the concept should be de-substantialised by treating it as a category of practice, claim and stance rather than as a bounded definition. Adopting diaspora as a category of practice means to make use of diaspora in order to make claims, to articulate projects and to mobilize energies. This then allows a grasp over complexity of diaspora involvement by the identification of diaspora as a heterogeneous group divided on ethnic, regional and ideological lines. A similar stance has been propounded by Kleist (2007), who recommended that it is more useful to view diaspora as moral and political communities that can in certain contexts be mobilised towards certain common goals. This approach allows an understanding of diaspora mobilization and utilization in exercises like state-building. By emphasizing the contexts, the conception gives due significance to issues like relation between homeland and host land, which figures prominently as factor in mobilization and utilization of the diaspora.

The literature has further responded to the issues emanating from the recent growth in linkages that have emerged between the diaspora and affairs of homeland. Important queries have stemmed up about the nature of position of diaspora with regard to issues in the homeland and the strategies it employs. The first insight in this regard argues that diaspora groups do not maintain a single position vis-a-vis their homeland. On the contrary, they can reflect different visions of change according to the different components within the community (Horst 2007, Zunzewr 2004). Further there is an argument that the objectives and strategies adopted by the diaspora are

prone to change with time(Kleist 2007 and Ostergeerd-Nielsen 2006). There always is a plurality of voices within the diaspora, especially when different waves of displacement are taken into account.

Overall, the strand of literature engaging with the conceptual mapping of issues related with diaspora tactfully covers areas of definition of diaspora as category, its form, strategies it employ while engaging with transnational affairs. However, the literature falls short of making an inroad into the more specific aspect of linkage between the diaspora and state-building.

1.2.2 State Identity Formation

The end of cold war re-introduced issues of culture and identity into the semantics of political assessments after long time. The sudden prominence that culture and identity assumed in international political life was an outcome of the liberation of spaces for cultural and identity expressions, which were earlier occupied by strict ideological currents associated with the two dominant poles during the cold war. The end of cold war, created a new wave of formation of nation-states along ethnic and cultural lines. This made identity and the quest for national identity the dominant norm of political conduct in the life of nation-state particularly in the context of developing world. State identity formation was seen as a vital component of the process of state-building itself. In the domain of academic engagements, such changes in the level of praxis, opened up questions related to content of national identity, process of its formation, actors involved in it and factors involved in politics of identity formation.

An operation definition of state identity as propounded by Alexandrov describes state identity as a set of broadly accepted representation of states, in particular in its relation to other states, together with corresponding beliefs, appropriate behaviour, rights or responsibilities (2003). Within the broader literature, there are two approaches in the literature in the basic engagement with the issue of national identity. First approach use "national" identity as an obvious representative of what can be called the total "state identity" (Berger 1996). While, other approaches are in cognizance of the two dimensions of the identity: internal and external

(Banchoff 1999, Alexandrov 2003). The distinction addresses the different theoretical concerns and research priorities across the disciplinary fields of political science and international relations. Those scholars concerned with domestic politics, nationalism or ethnic conflict see identity as 'national' while scholars of foreign policy and international relations emphasise the external dimension of identity. The internal dimension of state identity refers to the corresponding beliefs held by the elites and public within the state itself, while the representations of and beliefs that state among the elites and public in other states belong to the external dimension of state identity (Alexandrov 2003). The approaches dealing with the internal dimension of the state identity often highlights how the state uses its power to create or suppress the different identities within the state. In most of the cases the majority identity is chosen as the state identity to create a homogeneous state. The Kurdish question in the Turkish state discourse was seen as a reactionary politics, tribal resistance or regional backwardness, but never as an ethno-political quest for national identity. This is an example of states homogenization policy (Yegen 1996). That is, this strand emphasizes how, the politics of exclusion of certain identities are outcomes of a political project of building of a modern, state—a project of transforming an a-national, de-central and disintegrated political, administrative and economic space into a national, central and integrated one. This process of integration is often casted not on the basis of any culturally neutral identity, but that of the dominant ethnicity. The case of domination of the Turkish identity over others—that includes Kurdisih identity in the project of nation building in Turkey exemplifies the domination of the majority ethnic group over the process of constitution of the national identity (Yegen 1996). Reflecting upon the means used by establishment to secure a homogenized national identity, Rae (2002) argues that leaders use various forms of persecution which she terms as "pathological homogenisation" as a strategy of state building. She explains that leaders draw on available cultural resources, such as religion to gain popular support for their policies. Further she gives the example of Jews, Armenians and few other to show how state have used religion to create a homogeneous state identity.

The argument of the majority community dominating over the project of state building has its resonance in more particularistic literature engaging with the case of

Afghanistan. Mousavi in this regard argues that, the question of state identity in Afghanistan also reflects the domination of Pashtuns over other ethnic and tribal groups in the country (1998). That is, the project of creation of national identity in Afghanistan is associated with Pashtun nationalism. This as a result has created a sense of identity crisis among group belonging to the minority ethnicity. Mousavi further observes, that the marginalisation experienced by non-Pashtun majority coupled with other forms of discrimination underlines the crisis that the project of national identity faces and thus represents the main obstacle to the evolution of Afghanistan into a modern nation state (Mousavi 1998). The quest for national identity as a part of state-building as observed by Dupree (2002) has led to a major rupture in the Afghan identity matrix involving all the communities. Dupree observes that Afghans were able to maintain an innate sense of the essence of their culture throughout the period of civil war and conflict. Although they continue to cherish the diversity of regional differences, individuals cling tenaciously to their national identity, upholding traditional values and custom that distinguishes them from their neighbours (2002).

The extant literature engaging with the theme of state identity treats the project of identity formation as a one dimensional exercise involving only ruling elite derived from dominant ethnicity and a process of identity constitution treating the dominant ethnic identity as its source and the minority identities as its recipients. However, recent exercises of state-building reveals a dynamic picture of the project of state-identity. Further, the process involves not only the domestic agents but also actors who are trans-national in their origin and reach. Further, it also is not a process of interaction between the state and the civil-society. Rather as the experience of Afghanistan reveals, the process has involved both state actors, non-state actors and international organizations. The failure to capture this aspect in general and the case of Afghanistan in particular is then a major shortcoming of literature engaging with state-identity, particularly with respect to the case of Afghanistan.

1.2.3 State building in Afghanistan

The final group of literature engaged in this literature issues basically engages

with the project of Afghan state. The project of state—involving issues of centralization power and determination of the ideological character of the state and the regime had perennial presence in the politics of Afghanistan. The whole of 20th century saw Afghanistan emerge as the political laboratory witnessing experiments of different kind of political models.

The process which began with Amir Abdul Rahman continued and in a course of century, Afghanistan experienced different kind of political models: Monarchy, Republic, Communist rule and finally the Islamist rule of Taliban. A common defining aspect of all these systems were that they all emerged out of political processes which were top-down in their origin. That is, the conceptions of various models of polity were seldom in cognizance of the nature of society and were acts of impositions from the top (Saikel 2004). The issue of building of state became pronounced once again at the very beginning of this millennium—in the aftermath of the end of Taliban rule. Afghan citizens and members of the global community have been wrestling with the question of how to build a state that can fill the void created by decades of conflict and civil war. The peace-building prominently introduced the question of state building.

The concept of state-building is complex. The term describes both an internal process and external involvement; it requires short term action as well as long term vision. Their is no fixed rule or model for state-building. There are historical precedents and models of state-building expressed and employed by great powers in different parts of the world. Most of these exercises were undertaken in the backdrop of cold war. Some aspects of state-building can be transferred to different contexts. However, there are no universal lessons or models that can be easily applied without generating any contradictions. The state-building process involves fundamental re-structuring of many facets of society and changes the way that state relates to both the people/citizens and also how it deals with other states.

There is a vast body of literature dealing with the project of Afghan state. They however, are not uniform in their focus and deals with different aspects of Afghan state.

The first theme that appears prominently in the literature is the role of external actors in the project of Afghan state. There has been an international component of state-building in Afghanistan, that has evolved as result of series of international interventions/involvement in the country in last two centuries. The academic engagements on the theme of external intervention/involvement revolves around issues like the cause of involvement, nature and forms of involvement and its implications for the project of state. External intervention/involvement in Afghanistan assume forms of political and economic assistance and support. The political dependence on external powers has been prominent in modern phase of Afghan history. The Afghan Amirs depended upon the external powers to face internal instability and revolts. Reflecting on the economic dependence, Roy (1985) observes that the traditional nature of the Afghan society restricted the development of modern institutions like uniform taxation system or state controlled economy, which has enhanced the economic dependence of the state on external powers.

So far the question of implication of external involvement is concerned, a section of literature (Saikal 2004, Misdah 2006), maps the history of state-building in Afghanistan and argues that the failure of state in Afghanistan to a large extent was due to presence of regular episodes of external interferences. The events like Great Game and cold war had deep impact on the stability of the Afghan state before 2001. The rivalries between British India and Tzarist Russia during the Great Game made Afghanistan a buffer state. So strategic positioning often made state heavily dependent on external powers for both political support and economic assistance. This how ever, negatively impinged on the state capacity ans thus hampered the prospect of the state in the long run. Mapping the developments in the specific context of cold war, Roy (1986) has shown that the cold war rivalries between Communist Russia and Capitalist USA complicated the Afghan state-building process from 1950s onwards. The growing economic influence of Russia finally led to political intervention in Afghan politics during the 1970s, which ultimately culminated in the Russian invasion in 1979. This made Afghanistan and the question of control over the state a central concern of Cold War political interaction between the two camps. While, Soviet had a more direct control, US exercised its influence in forms of material and economic help to the mujahideen leaders through Pakistan. While, once Soviet left,

such assistances on American part also dried up, severely hampering economic capacity of the state. In similar vein with Roy, Barakat (2002) has captured the complexities that the Afghan state experiences due to involvement of external powers/actors in the post 9/11 context. Barakat asserts that the support both in term of political and economic is very necessary for the success of reconstruction in post conflict countries. But, the success of international assistance very much depends upon the nature of financial aid and the consistency of the donor country towards the reconstruction and state-building process. International aid however has its own limitations in the determination of overall policy. Making a similar argument, Atmar (2001) argues that international efforts to use conditionality on humanitarian assistance have proved ineffective in influencing the Taliban's policies, and have been implemented despite the negative impact on welfare of the whole population.

Among the various actors involved with the Afghan state, Taliban got maximum academic attention. The strand of literature focussed on Taliban usually engages with themes like its rise, reason for its influence and they further situate Taliban in the context of current state-building process. Shahrani (2002), traces the history of the Taliban's rise to power. The author explains that the problems of internal division and increasing interference at regional level caused the emergence of extreme Islamic fundamentalism in the form of Taliban in Afghanistan. To some extent the emergence of Taliban also the outcome of growing dissatisfaction among the younger generation of Afghans living in refugee set-up in Pakistan. Rashid (2000) puts an emphasis on the presence of infighting among traditional Afghan leaders along ethnic and sectarian lines as the prominent cause bringing in the rise of Taliban as the main challenger to these leaders who had occupied the political space after the departure of Soviet force.

Reflecting upon the current process of state-building in post-2001 period in Afghanistan, Suhrke and Harpviken (2002) expresses their concern over the absence of participation of Taliban in the processes. For them, the Bonn Agreement in 2001 is a new beginning in the history of Afghan—with the project of state-building conceptualized integral to the wider commitments to bring peace and security to the region also. But the only major problem with the new state-building process

according to them, is the exclusion of Taliban from the Bonn Accord. This first would leave out a major power group and in the process bring a shadow over the effectiveness of the process, particularly at the stage of implementation of policies. They have also observed that, the rebuilding of the coercive capacity of the state is essential to overcome strong centrifugal tendencies. However, they recommend that efforts to build the coercive capacity of the state should only come after the restoration of legitimate political authority.

Moving beyond the body of literature engaging with general themes associated with the Afghan state, the main body of work relevant to the present study revolves around the particular theme of state building. The literature in this domain also can be sub-categorized on the basis of specific themes they engage with: the context of the process, issues involved in reconstruction and the role of diaspora. Drawing upon the socio-political milieu in which the state-building process takes place, Shahrani (2006) seeks to take the explanation of context by introducing more variables into it. That is for him, the context of encompasses more than cliched descriptions about the Soviet withdrawal, external interferences in the domestic politics and the regional politics. The understanding of the situation in which the project of state is being situated for Shahrani, requires appreciation of the local socio-cultural and socio-political dynamics of Afghanistan. This context for him is responsible for the more general hostility towards modernisation—of which the project of modern state is part of. He further highlights that the current communal conflicts between different ethnic groups inside the country was to a large extent due to the historical legacy of state-building project on the lines of European countries. Shahrani also stresses the need to have a lessons from experiences of past. The loopholes or the drawbacks associated with previous attempts at state building for him would bring range of corrections in policies that are part of current state-building.

Another strand of the literature looking at the more specific issues deals with the nature and pattern of interaction between international economic assistance and the social, political and economic processes associated with state-building. Barakat and Chard (2002) explores the normative universe in which execution of policies related with international assistance takes place. They, highlight that there exist a

problem of dis juncture between the work culture inside the country and international norms and practices associated with assistance and its implementation. Further, there has been differences in the objectives of the political leaders in Afghanistan and the international agencies.

Another important aspect of the state-building process has been the role and impact of informal economy on the reconstruction process. Hayau-Din (2003) has made a stand out contribution delving into this aspect of the current process. He has studies the informal economic system especially the *hawala* and explored its impact on the reconstruction of the country. He has explained how the initiatives on part of the state to create a formalized economy involving modern practices of banking and other financial institutions threatens the traditionally prevalent norms and practices. He highlights that how, people in both homeland and host land still uses the *hawala* system for money and remittances exchanges rather than modern Banks. In a way, there exist a major contradiction in the reconstruction effort. That is the quest to build a formalized economy actually threatens the smooth functioning of Afghan economy —which would negatively impinge upon the very process of reconstruction.

Another aspect of the reconstruction process has been the sudden upsurge in the numbers of Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on the scene. Monshipouri (2003) draws on the importance and significance of role of NGOs and International Non-governmental organizations (INGOs) in the process of reconstruction. He argues that role of non-governmental organisations are crucial for the development of welfare programmes. (2003). Further, the role of International NGOs (INGOs) and local NGO becomes important for their potential to act as link between the state and the people. As he documents, the INGOs involves both local and diaspora members in their programmes and their main areas of engagements are health and education sectors, which to a large extent are ignored by the government. While, Monshipouri brings a positive discourse about the participation of NGOs, another work by Winthrop (2003), warns against the excessive involvement of NGOs. Winthrop argues that, the dependence of state on NGOs for the welfare programme becomes problematic in long run as NGOs invest only in those areas, which attracts foreign donors and their target of actions are mostly in cities. Another problem which he

points at is that, with the mushrooming of NGOs, the government faces problems in streamlining their efforts in the long run.

The final strand of literature around state-building engages or touches upon the aspect of diaspora participation. There is very few works produced engaging this aspect. Gooijer (2010) stands out as one of its kind, dealing more generally with the transnational activities of the Afghan diaspora involving both the host land and the homeland. Some of the important activities that Gooijer maps are private investment, knowledge transfer, temporary or permanent return of members of diaspora to Afghanistan and the process of political lobbying. He further analysis the implications of such exercises on conflict and peace-building activities. Another important work that comes within this strand has been produced by Braakman (2005). This is more specific case study of the role of Afghan diaspora in Germany. The work's basic quest is to explore the motivation behind the participation of the Afghan diaspora in Germany in tarns-national activities between the host and home land. Braakman draws the historical background of migration from 1973 up to the beginning of 21st century and is more useful for understanding of the cause of migration and how different ethnic groups migrated to the host country.

The available body of literature engaging with the question of state-building in Afghanistan brings out the story and explanations about the history of political experiments associated with the project of state. They give a detailed narratives of the political history of various phases of state-building in Afghanistan. Further, they have also engaged with specific themes associated with state -building, thus covering its various aspects like the nature of the process, kind of factors involved and type of actors involved in the process. A greater focus is devoted to international actors—state and non-state. Likewise, engagements with social and cultural aspects are there. For the conceptual understanding of process in Afghanistan, insights are there in the extant theoretical literature. However, even the theoretical literature also does not brings out much insights on specific issues like linkage between diaspora and the state-building. Likewise, it falls short in capturing the interplay between multiplicity of actors in recent exercises of state-building as that in Afghanistan.

There is shortcoming in the extant literature engaging with recent practices of state-building in contexts like Afghanistan and Iraq. The shortcoming is evident at both the theoretical and empirical front. More specific problems like engagement of diaspora in state-building has been ignored in general. In the particular case of Afghanistan, there is no comprehensive account of diaspora participation in state-building and the implications it produces. This study aspires to fill in this gap by making an attempt to explore the linkage between diaspora, the project of state-building and the wider politics that operates around the project.

1.3 Definition, Rationale and Scope of Study

The involvement of transnational groups like diaspora in political activities located across national frontiers has brought in new practices and norms in the praxis of politics in contemporary world politics. The particular case of study of association between diaspora and state-building is vital for the understanding of the new practices of state-building. Their understanding is also important at the policy level for bringing in prescriptions leading to better policies and frameworks of state-building and more generally peace building. This study by exploration of role of Afghan diaspora in state-building seeks to make contribution to broader literature on state-building and peace building in Afghanistan.

The importance of the role of the diaspora in Afghanistan is evident from the fact that in the post-2001 process, diaspora has emerged as an important group with influence over the process of state-building both in qualitative and quantitative terms. An estimate of one study has put the number of Afghan officials in the interim government formed following the Bonn process at 80 per cent of the total number of officials. That suffice to establish the significance and importance of assessment of role of diaspora in the overall understanding of state-building in Afghanistan. The present study becomes relevant in this regard. It, will seek to fill in the gap in the available body of literature on the project of state-building in Afghanistan by exploring the role of diaspora and its implications.

The study will bring out a general outline of the project of state in Afghanistan. It will briefly map the history of the processes associated with formation

and centralization of the state in Afghanistan. It will explore themes of nation-building and state identity formation in Afghanistan. Further, as a part of the larger quest of definition of the Afghan diaspora, the study will map the history of migration patterns in Afghanistan. A more focussed engagement with the association of migration with different phases of state building will be made. Then, an understanding of the political significance of the diaspora will be sought by looking at the interaction between the state and the diaspora in the pre-Bonn and the post-Bonn period. In drawing the context of contemporary phase of state building and the diaspora participation in it, the study will explore how traditional social system and structures of power interact with modern processes of constitution making and state-building. The role of diaspora in nation- building becomes more important and interesting due to the changed Afghan social structure due to the three decade of civil war and displacement. As the traditional source of power and legitimacy like saints and tribal heads are replaced by new warring leaders and western educated diaspora. Therefore, this study will focus on the relation between the old and new power groups and their impact on the ongoing nation-building project in the country. Drawing upon the final objective of the research, the study will map patterns of diaspora involvement in Afghanistan. Further, the study situate this functions in the broader matrix of interaction between the international community and the local society in Afghanistan. In doing so, the study will draw the implications of diaspora participation in Afghanistan.

1.4 Objectives of the Study

The present study has following objectives

- To highlight the challenges before the Afghan government and the international community in rebuilding the country.

- To explore the role of diaspora participation in the transformation of the socio-cultural base of the Afghan politics.

- To analyse the set of interests and motivations of diaspora involvement the state-building policies.

1.5 Research Methodology

This study is exploratory in nature. It involves conceptual understanding and location of the Afghan diaspora in context of fluid nature of Afghan state. Therefore, the study undertakes both inductive and deductive approaches to address the research problem. Being exploratory in nature, the study deals with diversity of sources to develop the narrative about Afghanistan and its diaspora communities.

The study has utilized a vast array of primary sources. It has used reports of international organizations as UN, UNDP, IOM, ILO etc. It has also made use of reports by policy institutions and other non-governmental organizations. Certain writings by officials associated with the policy making in Afghanistan, which were anecdotal in nature have also been used. Apart from these, the study also relied on news papers, and other reports available online.

Besides the body of primary sources, a large amount of secondary writings in forms of books, magazines and reports have been consulted during the study to fill in the gaps in the narrative of diaspora participation in state building and other historical episodes associated with the project of Afghan state.

1.6 Organisation of the Study

This study explores the association between the diaspora, the international community and the process of state building in Afghanistan. It delves into the theme of role of diaspora in state-building in Afghanistan. The study aspires to attain the objective by exploration of various themes through the different chapters. The second chapter following this introductory chapter will make a conceptual engagement with themes of diaspora, state identity and state-building. A brief engagement with the theoretical body of work that is available will be made. This will set the conceptual background to the more empirical questions that will be addressed in subsequent chapters.

The third chapter of the study discusses the historical evolution of the Afghan state in context of majority- minority relations between the Pashtuns and rest of the groups. It makes a brief mapping of the history of Afghan state. The chapter draws the

pattern in which the centralization and the determination of its ideological character has been pursued as a top-down process through out the history of Afghanistan. It this maps the social and political matrix in which the current project of state-building in Afghanistan is situated.

The antepenultimate chapter draws the history of migration of Afghans. It identifies the process that has led to the formation of the global Afghan diaspora. Further, the chapter outlines the form and character of the Afghan diaspora by making a country specific survey about the quantity of the Afghan diaspora, their social and economic position and forms of association with homeland. The chapter brings out the forces that have been responsible in the process of migration in the history of Afghanistan. Further, it also allows the determination of the rational in diaspora participation in the politics of homeland.

The penultimate chapter explores the pattern of interaction of the diaspora and the process of state building in Afghanistan. The chapter maps the forms and nature of diaspora involvement in various spheres of Afghan social and political life that are related with the broader process of state-building. The chapter draws the patterns of diaspora involvement in various projects of state-building and reconstruction. It further assesses the implication of interaction between the diaspora, the international actors, the local society of Afghanistan and the process of state building. Both positive and negative impact of the diaspora participation is made.

The final and the concluding chapter makes an attempt to bring a crystallized output of the study. Based on the thematic journey undertaken in previous chapters, the chapter will attempts to bring out arguments associated with the participation of Afghan diaspora in the process of state-building in Afghanistan. The chapter also makes certain normative prescriptions for a more successful policy of state-building in general and in context of Afghanistan in particular.

CHAPTER 2

DIASPORA AND STATE -BUILDING

2 INTRODUCTION

2.1 THEORIES ON STATE-BUILDING AND DIASPORA

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2.4 SUMMARY

Introduction

In the aftermath of Cold War and post 9/11 developments, State-building as a concept has come to dominate heavily—both in the academic and policy domain. In the policy domain, State-building has found an exhaustive application particularly by practitioners of international relations and officials of international organizations. However, what is missing on both the fronts—academic and policy, is a consensus on what exactly State-building means and what as a process it entails. Besides state building, both as a concept and project is often used interchangeably with nation building. The project of state-building involves multiplicity of both governmental and non governmental and, domestic and international actors. Among the diversity of actors, diaspora has emerged as distinct and prominent group participating in state-building activities in post-conflict scenarios like Afghanistan and Iraq. That is, in the recent in the period since 9/11, there has been a gradual increase in the utilization of the members of diaspora communities in projects related to state-building.

Diaspora in general has emerged on of the important study area in context of contemporary globalization. Diaspora emerged as key focus area for the understanding of numerous issues: identity, economy and polity. In the domain of politics, there has been an increase in diaspora studies both in academic sphere and in policy sphere in recent years. Demmers (2002) attribute this expansion to several factors; rise of new patterns of conflict, the rapid rise of war refugees; the increase speed of communication and mobility and increased production of cultural and political boundaries.

This chapter will explore key themes in the theoretical literature on the role of diaspora in state-building. The chapter will seek to reach a coherent conceptualization of diaspora in reference to the process of state-building. Through the survey of theoretical literature, explorations of issues involved in state building, role of diaspora in the process, and its capacity to make contributions will be made. The chapter will aim to reach the stated objective through a thematic study divided in four sections. First section will explore conceptualizations of diaspora and state-building. Second section will delve into explanations/rationalities on the linkages between diaspora and state building. This section will also identify key areas/processes and means through which diaspora involves itself in participating in the larger process of state-building. The penultimate section will look at the implications of the involvement of diaspora in the process of state

building. The final section as part of concluding exercise will summarize the key theoretical insights derived from existing literature

2.1 Theories on State-building and Diaspora

2.1.1State Building

The concepts of state-building and nation-building assumed importance in the aftermath of Cold War. The concept saw a greater application in contexts of the international community's engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan. These engagements have drawn multiplicity of actors: governmental, non governmental, academicians and journalists. The involvement of such vast array of actors produced one expected resulted: lack of any singular and coherent application and understanding of these concepts. The confusion is evident in the interchangeable usage of both the concepts.

Nation-building and state-building often with an interchangeable usage in policy practices and academic conceptions have a key distinction in their generic meanings despite an organic unity between the two in the both the domains of theory and practice. Nation-building is the quest to create and impart a cultural identity to both the state and its citizenry—thus bringing in an ideological and imaginative uniformity among the citizenry facilitating their acceptance of the state.

State-building on the other hand involves interventionist strategies for establishment or restoration of various institutions of the state like military, bureaucracy and legislature. The confusion in the semantic usage of the two concepts arises from the association between the two. State building is often considered to be an essential component of nation building. Further the overlapping employment of the two categories also arises due to prioritization of technical aspects of the building of state capacity and the neglect of the aspect of building of cultural identity as part of the grand policy of nation-building (Hippler 2004, Goldsmith 2007).

In the Cold War period, nation-building was part of the Grand strategy of the Superpowers, applied as a tactic to counter the domination of the "other"—defined in ideological terms. However, the policy exercise of nation-building lost its charm following US' involvement in Vietnam. The immediate aftermath of Cold war saw a return to nation-building/state-building with a growing emphasis of international community on 'good governance', which was contingent on capacities and structures

of the state (Fukuyama 2004). The epistemic shift that 9/11 brought in the domain of national security re-introduced nation-building in a different limelight. The event of 9/11 strengthened the assumption that the discontent around the problems in third world countries can find an expressions in developed countries. State-building or the strengthening of the state in developing world was seen as the effective measure for neutralization of threats to national security of the developed world from sources located in the developing world. The nation-building efforts of the international community in Afghanistan was conceived as part of the exercise of peace-building addressing the concerns of stability and peace both in Afghanistan and globally. A larger part of the security literature in this regard came to view peace building as synonym for state building (Paris 2002, Barnett and Zuercher 2006). The international community intervening in a country as peace builders did not pull out immediately after the end of violence. This policy is outcome of the policy and academic understanding that peace-building entails creation of sustainable peace and not just an end of violence. This approach has pushed the peace-builders (acting on part of international community or the external actors intervening for peace) to undertake series of activities which are understood to be constitutive of state-building: democratisation and development of state like bureaucracy, legislature and the justice system (Paris 2002). An important aspect of state-building as part of the peace-building is the imperative of exit strategy. At one level international community put emphasis on an early exit from the country in where they are involved in peace-building/nation-building exercises. However, this objective is in contradiction with the broader emphasis on creation of sustainable peace—which involves a prolonged stay facilitating the restoration of state—which will then bring on stability and security (Fearon and Laitlin 2004). The need to push for an early establishment of state, brings in the role of native and international experts who can readily work with state institutions. It is here, that the diaspora community as a group of experts are looked up to undertake the functions.

State-building once acknowledged as a policy measure under the wider exercise of peace-building, opens up the conceptual issues related with the process itself. At the core of the process is the 'modern' assumption that considers nation-state

as the foundation of the international system. Their creation and preservation is considered vital for the stability of international system (Brock 2001, Ottaway 2002). Here, nation state and state sovereignty are considered as foundational principles of international relations. However, interestingly, these very principles get compromised, when an intervention (with no respect of the state sovereignty) is made in a weak state for peace.

2.1.1.1 State-Building and the Local Context

The practices of intervention for peace by great powers in post-cold war period were based on a strong liberal consensus of peace. Liberal conception of a democratic model of the polity has been considered as the panacea for problems of violence. Accordingly, the political project of state building then involves the transfer of Western values (democracy and human rights), institutions and norms to political systems outside West (Samuels 2004, Paris 2002). However, these conceptions have been often found wanting at the stage of their implementation in the local social and political contexts. The state-building process depends heavily on the local social and political contexts. Both the state and the society heavily impact each other. That is, state-building as a process must not be viewed as a technical process completely divorced from the socio-political context (Migdal 2001). This is a departure from the approach of nation-building followed in 1950's and 60's, that treated ethnicity as pre-modern and assumed its automatic disappearance with the emergence of the modern state. This, then led to ignorance of cultural factors as a problem/road blocks in the transition to modern state from pre-modern political forms. However, the attempts to homogenize the society to suit the monolithic patterns of state has been both resisted and challenged (Ottaway 1999). At the local level, the project of state-building faces some challenges from local power structures. The problem appears at regular interval due to the poor conception of the context of state-building process at the very onset. That is, there is an assumption of the presence of an apparent power vacuum—that can be easily filled by the authority of the modern state, thus doing away with the anarchy responsible for instability and insecurity. However, the assumption has been a misguided one. In contexts where there is a weak or no state, the power space is

occupied by 'shadow states'—extremely strong informal networks (Reno 2000). These informal networks, often involving the local rulers act as a major deterrent against the state-building processes. So, the success of the process depends on recognition of local socio-political context, bringing in the participation and not opposition of local players in the process. This is vital for any state-building process facilitated by international community. The participation of international community itself becomes a hurdle in path of state-building process. The dilemma at this front is that, historically, state-building has been more successful as a process to create a polity free of external/great powers. Which is contrary to a process facilitated by the external powers (Etioni 2004).

Apart from the power configurations at the local level, issues of culture and ethnicity also plays prominent role in the determination of the success of state-building process. The plantation of a universal model often misfits with the normative and social structures present locally. Further, the change in context made the cold war era approaches to state-building inappropriate. The UN centred nation-state model of the cold war period has lost relevance particularly due to the onset of US hegemony and the change in security environment and geopolitical situation in the aftermath of 9/11 (Berger 2006).

Two kind of academic interventions appears to be coming in response to policy of implementation of a monolithic model. First, there is a prescription, that state should be allowed to follow a natural trajectory in sync with the local cultural reality. Accordingly, state has to be left to emerge or dissolve in accordance with its configuration with the society. Thus, a model of state which satisfies the priorities of local communities and not the demand of the international community (Ottaway 2002). Secondly, there is growing emphasis on the need to replace the historical analyses of the state with an assessment, that situate the state in a temporal contexts and pushes for its establishment in cognizance with patterns of the past (Berger 2006). In this regard, the US experience of state-building projects in Japan and Vietnam serves an important lesson on how, the monolithic approach to state building did not yield the expected result. While Japan is a successful case and Vietnam is a failure but

US approach and strategies to both was same and the reason for failure was lack of consideration to context and environment (Berger 2006).

2.1.2 Diaspora

The recent change in the world political and economic order have generated large movement of people in almost every region. Some of the movement was due to economic factor and globalisation, and these movements were peaceful. On other occasions, political instability and civil war forced people to leave their home, thus causing migration which was essentially painful and violent. The pattern of migration very much shapes how the migrants will respond to issues of identity, assimilation in the host land and their relation with the homeland. One important way to understand transnational movement of people is through the study of diaspora.

The word diaspora is derived from the Greek verb *speiro* (to sow) and the preposition *dia* (over) which means dispersal of seeds and when applied to humans, the ancient Greeks thought of diaspora as migration and colonisation. But for the Jewish, Armenians, Africans and Palestinians etc. the word signified the trauma and banishment where one dreamed of home but lived in exile (Cohen 1997). Other people living abroad also maintained strong collective identities also defined themselves as diasporas, though they were neither active agents of colonization nor passive victims of persecution. Therefore, some scholars define diaspora as a people with a common origin who reside, more or less on a permanent basis, outside the borders of their ethnic or religious homeland (Sheffer 2002). Diaspora members identify themselves, or are identified by others (inside and outside their homeland) as part of the homeland's national community, and as such are often called upon to participate, or are entangled, in homeland related affairs (Shain 1989).

As a conceptual category, diaspora is used to describe those communities which share experiences of dispersal from homeland due to war or forced migration, spread to many locations, the hope to return to the homeland whether real or imagined, and maintain strong relations with the homeland (Safran 1990). It therefore makes an identity or is an identity reference, wherein the commonality among different groups dispersed across several nation states share commonality derived

from their affiliation with an original yet removed homeland. This commonality then paves for an identity constructed on world scale (Hall, 1990). Based on the common identity affiliation, the groups which are scattered among two or more destinations develops further interactions and multifarious linkages involving flow and exchanges of people and resources with the homeland (Vertovec 2004). In concrete terms, diaspora therefore has several characterising features which include presence of a commonality in terms of identity, presence in more than one one host country, and presence of a strong connection with the homeland.

In providing a more specific definition, scholars like Chaliand and Regeau (1991) uses four criteria to define diaspora: forced dispersion, retention of a collective historical and cultural memory of the dispersion, the will to transmit a heritage, and the ability of the group to survive over time. Similarly, Van Hear and Vertovec (2004:65), provide an all encompassing definition of diaspora as 'population of migrant origin who are scattered among two or more destination, between which there develop multifarious links involving flows and exchanges of people and resources: between the homeland and destination countries and among destination countries'.

Overall, even though the definition may vary, 'diaspora' as a concept tends to build on three common criteria: dispersal; settlement in multiple location; and the idea of a 'homeland' (Wahlbeck 2002). These criteria are very important for understanding the whole idea of diaspora formation and its role in host or homeland. As the nature of dispersal or migration from the homeland decides the typology of the diaspora: victims, refugees, migrants labours etc. (Cohen 1997). The second criteria settlement in multiple location helps in the development and structural growth of diaspora as a global community. The final idea of a homeland gives the diaspora a sense of identity in the host land and sustains an imaginative or real connection with the homeland. So, a collection of transnational migrants become a diaspora when its members develop a physical distance from their nation and yet continue to care deeply about it not just on grounds of kinship and affiliation, but by commitment to certain chosen affiliations or due to some de-socialised interests. Due to it in recent years, the focus has shifted from the more limited definitions of who should be considered as part of diaspora, to take into account the complex processes of mobilisation and the heterogeneous nature of diaspora.

2.2 Diaspora and State-building in Post-conflict

The state-building process in the post-conflict homeland involves both state and non-state actors. The general theory of state-making or state-building outlines three key components of the process: development of the administrative capacity for extraction of resources, creation of coercive capacity and formation/creation of strong national identities among the population (making nations) (Tilly 1996: 28). These components can be discovered in much of the state-building experiments undertaken in the aftermath of cold-war. The quest to make a quick push for process and the need to find acceptable actors at the help of the push, made diaspora a natural participant of state-building exercises. The assessment of the linkage between diaspora and the process of state building is vital for understanding of the wider process of peace-building and reconstruction.

2.2.1 Linkage between Diaspora and State-Building

The diaspora participation in the homeland usually confined to identity formation and nation-building process. As identity is considered as a social construct which works in respect of the 'other' and is very context specific in nature. Identity appears as a prominent explanation of the linkage between diaspora and the state. That is, identity not only motivates the diaspora but also decides the areas of influence of the diaspora in both the homeland and host land. More specifically, among the three pillars of state-making that Tilly identifies: raising resources, building army and making nation, diaspora is often considered to be effective in their involvement in the third domain involving identity—the project of making nation or national identity. The diaspora experience of living with the 'others' helps the homeland to construct a national identity in post conflict countries. With, this experience of an identity associated with home, diaspora becomes a natural agent working for realization of the identity in its actual context when given a chance in homeland politics.

The idea of national identity or state identity depends upon the point of reference and utility i.e. internal and external. The national identity is used for domestic purposes and helps in the homogenisation of identity in inside the state. The internal actors and majority plays its role in the formation of such identity. Scholars

like Cohen (1994) and Giddens (1985), use the term national identity for the domestic and state identity for the international type. In terms of its utility, an acceptable national identity brings in legitimacy and acceptance of the regime domestically among population. Likewise, state identity serves the purpose internationally by establishing a recognition among the nation-states. The most basic manners in which the state expresses its identity is through the institutionalization of identity in the form of constitution, in terms of the national and foreign policy, in terms of state identity. At, the international level these processes of identity expression are reinforced by diaspora participation.

An important factor that has mobilized diaspora participation is the presence of majority-minority politics in host lands. In such political discourses, minority has been on the receiving end. However, there has been shift in such conceptions of majority-minority relations. Minority groups as a response to such discourses have embraced diasporan discourse as an alternative. That is for a minority member in host land, the membership of diaspora brings in an overall empowerment with the ability to influence politics both in host land and the homeland. In a way, association with a diaspora community serves an alternative basis of power (Clifford 1997). Those people who migrate to host land due to majority minority conflict most of the time uses the discourse of diaspora politics to improve their condition in host land.

It is well established that diaspora members are able to make diaspora specific contribution to their countries of origin in post conflict situations. The evidence generally focuses on economic contributions of remittances and investments but there is increasing evidence also of non-economic contributions of diaspora to human rights, good governance, and capacity building. Due to their transnational activities diaspora play important role in creation of national identity in the homeland. The importance of diasporas involvement and role increases in post-conflict countries due to the weak political and social institutions. As groups ostensibly external to the state, what interests do diaspora have in the foreign policies of their homelands? There are four possible motivations for wishing to exert influence on the homeland. These motives are not mutually exclusive and are often intertwined. First, diasporas might view the homeland's foreign policy as having an impact on the interests of the

people (the entire kin community inside and outside the homeland). For some diaspora, the people's identity is not the starting point to be captured in order to influence interests, practices and policies; identity is both the starting and the end point. In such cases, the only interest is to assert, through the homeland's foreign policy, a preferred version of kinship and national identity. Second, diaspora may have a strong stake in the way the homeland's foreign policy affects the homeland's future (as separate from the people). Obviously, the interests of the homeland, its existence, its well-being, and its international alliances are ultimately the concern of its government, and thus diasporas are mostly reactive in this domain (Butler 2001).

The role of diaspora also varies form context to context depending upon the conditions like relation between host land homeland, nature of migration, position in host land etc. In theory the diaspora sometimes acts as peace-makers and sometimes peace-breaker depending upon the condition in the homeland and host land. But in practise it is not so simple and is much more complex than this black and white role the diaspora plays. According to Bercovitch (2007:21), 'the best way to conceive the role of diasporas in conflict is to think of the various phases or stages of a conflict (conflict emergence, continuation, escalation, termination and post-conflict reconstruction) and then to evaluate the possible role diaspora may play in each phase'. The example of Tamil diaspora in Europe is an example of diaspora as peace-breaker in homeland. The Tamil diaspora mostly fund the LTTE movement in Srilanka and India for the creation of an independent Tamil Land.

Diasporas have both the motive and opportunity to exert influence on the identity construction process, especially in its foreign policy domain. Moreover, constructivists theory are sometimes applied to diaspora study to understand the role of diaspora in moulding national identity. As the diaspora are those political actors who are highly motivated and able to engage in the competition over identity construction. But then, as Katzenstein (1996:25) puts it, 'often social environments that affect state identity link international and domestic environments in a way that defies the reification of distinct domestic and international spheres of politics'. The degree of motivation depends mainly on the interaction between the basic identity-motivating elements and the experience the community has with the host country.

The traditional peace-building literature suggest two key variables to explain

progress and stagnation in building peace after war: the war-torn country's own capacity and the level of international assistance. This ignores those with strong ties to the country who are living outside ie the diaspora and migrant communities. Diaspora networks and individual remittances are increasingly identified as important new resources to promote development and bring change in the social set up of the homeland.

Diasporas are also mobilised, in part to express their identities. They felt need to actively express and mobilise identity due to various of marginalisation they face in host land. The members of diaspora coming from traditional societies faces more the problem of marginalisation in host land and tries hard to maintain link with homeland to keep their own identity alive. Some may also be motivated by a sense of obligation or guilt as they seek to reconcile their preference for the adopted country with their strong allegiance to a disturbed homeland through humanitarian and political participation (Brinkerhoff 2011).

Diaspora also exert direct influence through political proxies at homeland (eg. Armenian or Taiwanese parties). They may achieve leverage at home by economic means, whether through investments in national projects or through political contributions e.g. in Israel the political participation of diasporas influences the electoral result in favour of those who support diaspora participation in homeland politics (Butler 2001). Remittances are of great importance for the reconstruction of homeland in post-conflict situation due to its ability to change the balance of power both economically and politically (Horst 2008). The diaspora can provide basic services and livelihoods through remittance which could help in the establishment of peace and reconstruction in the homeland. Most importantly, remittances may be one important factor in preventing disarmed and demobilised combatants from re-engaging in violence especially when jobs are scarce in the aftermath of conflict (Brinkerhoff 2011). But, the actual effect of diaspora remittance is very context specific and needs more research. As sometimes, remittance are used for conflict escalation and for armed resistance in the homeland, example is the role of Tamil diaspora support to LTTE. One of the reason is that diasporas are more reliable source of income for armed groups than states and international actors. But on an average the role of diaspora remittance in reconstruction and state-building in the homeland is

positive with some exceptions.

2.2.2 Areas and means of Involvement

In post conflict countries, once peace is established the process of state-building also picks momentum. Diaspora then becomes an important part of reconstruction and state-building process. The role of diaspora becomes more important in post-conflict reconstruction due to the unstable nature of aid and external support by donor countries. The maintenance of long term support by the donor or international actors is not fixed and depends more on the global situation and internal conditions (Brinkerhoff 2011). Thus in comparison to foreign help diaspora help is more stable and reliable source of income for the people in homeland.

The diaspora members are able to contribute to the reconstruction of the homeland through economic and social remittance. The evidence generally focuses on economic contributions of remittances and investments but there is increasing evidence also of non-economic contributions of the diasporas to human rights, good governance, and capacity building. Due to their transnational activities the diasporas play important role in creation of national identity in the homeland. The importance of diasporic involvement and role increases in post-conflict countries due to the weak political and social institutions.

Diaspora participation in the areas of state-building is very important in post-conflict countries. They may pressure the homeland parties and leaders to participate in peace negotiations. The expertise and knowledge of diaspora members have been used to mediate in national reconciliation conferences and workshops around the country. One example is the "Somaliland Peace Committee", an informal and spontaneous team of largely expatriate Somalilanders who have joined forces using their own personal resources in a commitment to peace. The group involved members of all the main warring clans and disbanded once the peace agreement was achieved. The aim of the Committee was threefold: 1) to achieve a cease-fire; 2) to prepare a framework and venue for dialogue; 3) to prepare a report on lessons learned that could be useful in preventing or mitigating similar conflicts in the region (Bryden and Farah 1996, 35). In this context, the contribution of diasporas was fundamental in settling the conflict and restoring the peace among different groups.

Diaspora participation can also inspire trust and confidence in conflicting groups and international facilitators alike, in part, by providing insight into the conflict and the actors (Hall and Swain 2007). The example Burundi and Sudan, where the diasproas groups and leaders have supported the implementation of peace agreements. They also lobbied with their host government to facilitate peace negotiations in the homeland. However, diaspora directly participating in conflict resolution in the homeland can inadvertently lead to disastrous outcome when potentially out of touch (Vorrath 2011). For some diasporas, the homeland conflict and humanitarian emergencies inspire new or renewed interests and actions on behalf of the homeland, for others, the resulting psychic pain can lead diasporans to seek further integration into the host land. Diasporans also sometimes feel compelled to express their homeland identity and engage in related activities due to a sense of marginalisation in the host society, rooted in a psychological need to be a part of a collective identity (Brinkerhoff 2011).

The lack of institutional mechanism encourages the participation of non-state actors like diasporas in post-conflict situations because of the lack of free flow of information between national authorities and international community. Diaspora communities may be explicitly maintained and mobilised for the purpose of influencing international public opinion and building political support for human rights and political freedoms and also for particular partisan agendas. Those who reside in relatively open and democratic societies can capitalise on new-found freedoms to do so (Brinkerhoff 2011)

In fragile and post-conflict states diaspora philanthropic organisations can acts as mediators between traditional development actors, diasporas and local communities. They can help in identifying need and priorities of local communities and then communicating those to donors organisations, NGOs and also to diaspora members for funding and expertise (Brinkerhoff 2004). Also, the diaspora organisational skills and innovations can be used in homeland to initiate administrative and developments programs for reform in traditional social set up without challenging norms and customs in the homeland. The example of Somali women in Mogadishu organised an Education and Livelihood project. This project was basically for education of young combatants and giving them skills in-order to

remove them from violence. The project was later fully adopted by Somalis in Norway and were successful in raising approximately $ 10,000 and even engaging in significant lobbying to government agencies and NGOs. The final result was that this project was fully funded by the Norwegian Government (Horst 2008). Thus, like remittances diaspora philanthropy can also be used as a tool for advancing political and conflict agendas in homeland.

But the motives for diaspora philanthropy may not be solely philanthropic, as could combine the aspiration of peace with individual or host land political motives. The involvement of Iraqi diaspora in regime change in Iraq was the best example of individual diaspora motives helped by host land (Horst 2008). Diaspora as interest groups can also assist in reconstituting legitimacy for the post-conflict government campaigning in both host land and homeland. For example the 2005 Liberian election was probably more intense in the United States than in Liberia itself (Brinkerhoff 2011). Diaspora campaign contributions can also yield formalised political influence in the homeland. For example, $4 million in contribution to Franjo Trudjman's campaign earned the Croatian diaspora 12 of the 120 parliamentary seats (Demmers 2007).

Diaspora political involvement also falls within social remittances. Transfers of new political practices and ideas which Somalis in the diaspora experience can be very useful in re-framing the political system at home, especially in the post-conflict phase. As diasporas live in different countries peacefully and have already experienced democracy. One third of the Ministers are from the diasporas; two out of three political parties in Somaliland are also led by diaspora members clearly shows the intensity of diaspora involvement in homeland politics. The Somali government also encourages the return of diaspora members, especially qualified people with professional skills (Horst 2008). However, the question of social remittances, especially ideas about the promotion of democratization in countries of origin, raises different concerns. The idea that migrants have experienced democracy in their countries of settlement is quite questionable.

Political activism can also take the form of advocacy and lobbying from abroad. One example is the Somaliland Forum, a virtual space where Somalilanders

can take action. Major issues that they advocate for are international recognition, elections and the peace process. The Somaliland Forum is very effective in bringing people together to talk. Since its inception, the Forum has organized a number of conferences and panel discussions about the education system and the development process in Somaliland. These meetings have been fundamental in addressing issues such as education in homeland. But diaspora sometimes also mobilise to influence the homeland in order to acquire power resources, and these behaviours may manifest in a range of actions, form violence to meaningful contribution to peace, stability and quality of life (Brinkerhoff 2011). Also the diaspora can offer a new alternative voice in national affairs during the post-conflict phase. However, whether this voice is loud enough to be publically heard and to enable diaspora members to take part in national political processes, depends on the willingness of the homeland government. It also depends upon the relationship between the homeland and host. The efficiency and extent to which diaspora communities can be empowered to pro-actively work towards peace depends on the following factors: organisational structures and their geographical locations; living conditions and legal status in the host land; political attitudes towards the homeland. It also depends upon the diasporas motivation and contact with key political actors in both host and homeland Zunzer (2004).

2.3 Implications

Diasporas are obviously playing an important role in the reconstruction of homeland through financial and social remittances. Projects sponsored by diasporas are helping to restore health system, create schools, empower civil society, include vulnerable people in the community and create income-generating activities. They are addressing some of the economic and social aspects of the conflict by setting up community and welfare projects at the local level that are dedicated towards the rehabilitation of public assets.

The remittance are essential for sustaining livelihoods during conflict in homeland is well researched fact. The example is the remittance send by Liberian diaspora which almost equalled to GDP in 2007 (OECD 2007). But an important

question is how much of this amount is spend on conflict escalation? According to Mohamoud (2005), the diaspora involvement in the politics of the homeland is most likely to lead to negative consequences if they support rival groups and do not encourage reconciliation. If diaspora members support violent rebel groups, for instance, they can contribute to perpetuating violence by helping the warlords stay in power. Therefore, diaspora contribution to state-building and reconstruction needs more research to evaluate its role in homeland. The example of LTTE and their support to free Tamil land is the classic case of diaspora support to rival groups which created civil war and opposition in Srilanks.

Like the diaspora's involvement would help the homeland in providing skills and expert knowledge in various fields of administration. But on the other hand the influence of new ideas and ideologies of the host country upon the diaspora creates new political elites within the country. This contestation for political space increases the chance of civil war rather than peace. The review of post-conflict state-building confirms that the repatriation of diasporans can lead to the emergence of new political elite, which can give rise to new political tensions(Chesterman et.al 2004). The example of Eastern Europe in drawing from its diaspora to staff key political and governmental positions was short linked as Western diasporans came to be seen as threats to the local political and economic elites (Brinkerhoff 2011). When diasporans aspire to political power and influence these tensions are exacerbated. Locals perceive diasporas as perilous actors which are eradicating local cultural values by bringing immoral conducts, including social misbehaviour. The local people in Somaliland thinks that the diaspora brings with them the cultural influence of the host land. The problems in marriage and finding bride and grooms due to diaspora involvement in Somliland is creating a negative image of diaspora in homeland.

An important areas of concerns between the diaspora organizations and international development actors relation is the misuse of financial aid in the homeland. The rise of diaspora organizations in European countries makes us reflect on the fact that, to be operational and receive financial aid, these organizations must adhere to certain standards laid down by the international community (Hansen 2007). Thus, it happens that diaspora associations are susceptible to be resource dependent upon international organizations and their agendas. In so doing, there is the risk of

overlooking the real needs of the people they pretend to represent, their activities reflecting international and policy interests rather than local ones.

Even the physical return of diaspora members represents a big problem for many locals. The high rate of unemployment in the country generates frustration among the population. This frustration is worsened by the fact that, due to their experience abroad, returnees have more chances of finding a job, compared to locals. Also the diaspora investment in construction also brings along negative consequences – the price of land has increased phenomenally in Somaliland over the last ten years. Today, land-based conflicts are a big issue in Somaliland (Hansen 2007).

Sometimes the aim of diaspora identity politics is simply to keep the ethnic identity alive; often this objective combines with more political aims to create and sustain an ethnic homeland. The example, in 1990s the Kurds in London broadcasted _ Kurdish language television throughout Europe and into Turkey at a time when Turkey did not permit Kurdish language television. The program featured folk dances and children's programs and alternative news reporting including issues of Kurdish human rights (Brinkerhoff 2011).

 Moreover, the ways in which diasporas influence conflict dynamics is very context specific and the impact can change over the course of the conflict and through changes to political contexts as well. They contributes to stability, sustained peace and development. In post-conflict scenarios, tapping the diaspora may at once be necessary and unavoidable, given the drive among some diasporans to insert themselves into rebuilding process.

Negative claims about diasporas often fail to take into account the diversity of diaspora groups. Mahmoud (2006) suggests that, while often the most visible, diaspora members engaging in extremist activities are generally a part of a minority and not representative of the broader group. He further says that the key issue for consideration is that diasporas are "stratified by class, caste, education, occupation, religious affiliation, cultural interests, urban or rural background" (2006:34). Therefore they cannot be labelled as one homogeneous body of diaspora members who work towards the same political goal in the common homeland. Due to significant political differences and cleavages, the heterogeneity of diasporas groups

generally has to be taken into account in any analysis undertaken in the field.

2.4 SUMMARY

The concept of diaspora was earlier used to refer the pain and trauma of forceful migration especially the Jewish and Armenian diaspora experience. The coming of globalisation in 1990s also changed the emainig of word diaspora as the movement of people to various host land with a constant link with homeand. The idea of return to a real or imagined homeland with trans-national links becomes the new features of diaspora. The concepts of state-building and nation-building assumed importance in the aftermath of Cold War. The concept saw a greater application in contexts of the international community's engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is well established that diaspora members are able to make diaspora specific contribution to their countries of origin in post conflict situations. The evidence generally focuses on economic contributions of remittances and investments but there is increasing evidence also of non-economic contributions of diaspora to human rights, good governance, and capacity building. Due to their transnational activities diaspora play important role in creation of national identity in the homeland.

Moreover, the ways in which diasporas influence conflict dynamics is very context specific and the impact can change over the course of the conflict and through changes to political contexts as well. They contributes to stability, sustained peace and development on one hand and civil war and conflict on the other. The lack of knowledge and skill in the post-colonial country further enhances the role of in the homeland. But the participation of diaspora in certain areas like politics and state institution is more risky and could lead to contestation of power in both homeland and host land.

CHAPTER 3

ONTOLOGY OF STATE POWER IN AFGHANISTAN

3 INTRODUCTION

3.1 BRIEF HISTORY OF POWER STRUGGLE IN AFGHANISTAN

    3.1.1 Early Influence

    3.1.2 Centralization, Modernization and Independence, 1747-1929

    3.1.3 Decentralisation of State Power and Emergence of Religious and Tribal leaders 1929-1970

    3.1.4 Republican Experiment and New Phase of State-building 1970-2001

3.2. BONN ACCORD AND STATE-BUILDING 2001-2013

3.3 EVOLUTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY OF THE STATE

3.4 SUMMARY

Introduction

In the history of Afghanistan, from its onset the state was for most time monarchical with some form of consultative mechanism—*jirga* representing various communities. In the year 1880, the monarchical system was elevated in the cosmic order by Amir Abdul Rehman when propounded the notion of divine kingship, which combined both communitarian and religious authority in the position of monarch. A move towards the path of modernity came with Amir Amanullah, who in his constitution of 1923 sought a separation between the state and the religion. Religion reasserted itself through the second constitution of 1933, which was promulgated by Amir Nadir Shah. The dialectic again made a gradual shift under Amir Zahir Shah, who introduced several key reforms for modernization of the state. The process culminated in 1964, when the third constitution was adopted by him, which established the model of constitutional monarchy and a modern bureaucratic state. This dialectic between modern reforms and its counter forces brought regular shifts in the nature of Afghan state in 20th century.

The Soviet entry of 1979 made Afghanistan the theatre of cold war, ushering in global forces influencing the project of Afghan state and the regime. As a result another cycle of conflict over control of Afghan state emerged. The departure of Soviet at the end of cold war did not bring an end to conflict over power in Afghanistan. The celebrated moment of cold war became the harbinger of decade long civil war in Afghanistan. The struggle brought Taliban into the driver seat of the state juggernaut with objective of removal of all traces of the modern. Global forces returned to Afghanistan with the incident of 9/11. Global War on Terror (GWOT) made Afghanistan its main theatre and Taliban and Al-Qaeda the nuisance to global peace. The war ended Taliban's control and led to the beginning of West supported and guided project of state-building—an essential component of its post conflict peace building process.

An understanding of the problems of state-making or state-building in Afghanistan requires an understanding of the historical background of the country,

which will reveal the mosaic of forces in operation around the question of the state in Afghanistan. Further, it will bring an understanding of the interaction of state and the masses and will allow the identification of key interests at stake in the process of state-building. The present conflict among ethnic groups is rooted in developments that were related with the project of state—making and control during the different phases of Afghanistan's history.

This chapter will discuss the historical evolution of the Afghan state. It seeks to identify the trajectory of the process of modernization of the state and outline the various forces involved in it. The understanding of the process will be made in reference to relations between different communities and the configurations between the traditional and the modern forces. A special attention is devoted to the developments in the immediate vicinity of Bonn accord and after it. The quest of the chapter is based on the premises that understanding of the general historical and the immediate background will allow identification of fault lines in state-building in post-conflict situation and would allow us to reach at informed conclusion and prescriptions about state-building in a post-conflict situation and multi ethnic social context.

3.1 Brief History of Power Struggle in Afghanistan

Afghanistan with a history of invasions, waves of migrations and shifts in the nature of polity has emerged as a complex socio-political entity characterized with the presence of a pronounced cultural plurality. The socio-cultural plurality has been the main roadblock in the path of modernization based on assumptions of a presence of the necessity of political, economic and cultural unification for the realization of the project. Unlike the Western experience of unfolding of ethnolinguistics unification as the precursor to political unification with territorial integrity and singular imagination of the political community, the quest for modernization in Afghanistan had to operate with the presence of perennial diversity. The geography of the country with pervasive presence of deserts and mountains created additional geographic road block for any kind of unification—cultural and political. The process of state-building in Afghanistan which relied heavily on support of external powers was not grounded in

the local socio-political mosaic. It was seldom based on the actual considerations of the preferences of people. The building of a unified nation-state required accomplishment of dual objectives: the mobilization and centralization of power at material level and the transformation of political and cultural attitudes at the ideational level (Newell 1972). While the process in Afghanistan was largely determined by the objective to transform the very ontology of state power, there was seldom a quest for generation of harmony within the perennial political and cultural diversity. The history of power struggle in Afghanistan is as much a question of preservation of normative and cultural practices (both societal and related to state) as it is about the question of who controls the state.

3.1.1 Early Influence

Migration has been the historical force responsible for ethno-liguistic diversity in Afghanistan. Indo-Aryans are considered to be the first group to invade the region around 16th century BC. They were followed by Persians who conquered most of the region and opted to settle down in fertile parts of the country. Couple of centuries after the Persian invasion, Alexander came to Afghanistan as part of his ambition of world conquest. Greek political dominance in form of Indo-Greek rule over most parts of subcontinent lasted for almost two centuries. The presence of Greeks fostered the formation of semi-Greek culture in Afghanistan, which prevailed for sometime before gradually getting absorbed into other local cultures (Wahab 2007). After their decline, the political scene was dominated by the Kushans. The Kushans left their mark on all aspects of social, economic and political system in the whole region. They built an empire which included most of northern India and Central Asia and lasted for nearly 400 years (Newell 1972). The Kushan polity facilitated an amalgamation of the various strands of all the leading cultures flourishing in the region at that time. The elements of Greek culture can be seen in the Kushan's coinage system, where they used Greek language and their legends on the coins. The Kushan also adopted the local beliefs of even Zoroastrians and Buddhists (Wahab 2007).

With the global emergence of Islam, several small semi-independent Muslim principalities emerged especially in the eastern provinces of Afghanistan in 9th

century. Turkish armies from Central Asia played vital role in making Islam a significant political force. Their most significant accomplishment was the creation of Muslim state of Ghazni in 961. Under the leadership of Muhmud often referred as its greatest Sultan, Ghazni became the capital of an empire which dominated most of Central and Western Asia and Northern India. An elaborate court and intellectual life developed with the employment of many eminent Muslim scientists, historians, poets and philosophers and engineers of the era. The Ghazni state was replaced by the Ghurids of the Western Afghanistan. The Ghurid generals were able to conquer northern India by early 13th century. However a new waves of invasion of the Mongols from Central Asia destroyed the Afghan base of Ghurid (Newell 1972). The Mongol campaigns led to large scale plunders. An important loss of was the breakdown of the *kankut*—the large scale irrigation system developed over centuries in cognizance of the topography and which had supported the sophisticated culture of Balkh, the middle Helmand Valley, Herat, and Ghazni areas. The Mongol invasion broke the cultural and economic structure of Afghanistan which developed over the millennium. The Mongol invasions proved more destructive to urban areas as compared to rural ones in Afghanistan. The difficult terrains of the country saved the rural people from the wrath of Mongols (Wahab 2007).

The late medieval period saw tussle among many powers for the control of Afghanistan. After brief dominance, Mughal were defeated by the Safavids in Afghanistan. Eventually Pashtuns under the Ghilzai seized the power in 1709. Subsequently, they destroyed the shaken Safavid Empire and controlled the Persian land for around seven years before Persians under Nadirs Shah wrest back Persian control and extended their sphere to Afghanistan. Persians recruited Pushtun chieftains and their followers into his army. Ahmad Khan of Sadozia clan of the Durrani tribe was one such Pashtun who rose to high rank. He made use of the chaos that ran in the Persian empire following Nadir Shah's assassination and lead the Afghan forces back to their homeland (Newell 1972). Ahmad Khan secured the acceptance of his claim of leadership over all Pashtun tribes and became the ruler under the title of Shah.

 3.1.2 Centralization, Modernization and Independence, (1747-1929)

The establishment of the first independent Afghan state in 1747 under Ahmed Shah was based on formation of a Tribal confederation of leading Pashtun Tribes. This tribal confederation was later developed into a dynastic state. The binding factor in this confederation was the conquest of neighbouring areas of Persia and Indus and the wealth brought by these conquests. Amir Ahmad Shah quickly captured Ghazni from the Ghilzai Pashtuns and Kabul from its Qizilbash ruler (Wahab 2007). Thus, he was able to unite all the Pashtuns, who had began to develop a national consciousness, under his rule. However, the regions of eastern and southern Pashtuns did not became part of confederation as they were under the control of the Sikh empire. Later, these areas came under control of British empire before their incorporation into independent Pakistan in 1947 following the partition of India.

The unified state created by Amir Ahmad Shah was based mostly on sheer force and his personal charisma. His simple living and accessibility to the people created a large following for him and kept the state intact till his death. However he lacked political skills and imagination required for transformation of the tribal confederation into a modern nation state (Wahab 2007). After his death, the war for successions among his sons eventually made Timur Shah the youngest the next Amir. Issues of succession became a major block in the process of strengthening of the state. It created divisions among Pashtuns with different group supporting different claimant of the seat.

Alongside the internal divisions among various groups, the Afghan state had to adjust to the hostile international environment with the presence of the two empires: Great Britain and Tzarist Russia entangled in a situation of great power rivalry—the Great Game in 18th and 19th centuries. They viewed Afghanistan as the buffer between the two and pursued diplomatic exercises to control it (Newell 1972). Afghan state thus faced challenge on two fronts: contestations for power internally and attempts of control by great powers internationally. In 1809, Amir Shuja Shah became the first Afghan ruler to receive a formal British mission (Wahab 2007). Under the arrangement, the resident would only advice the Amir on foreign policy issues and maintained a position of no interference in internal politics.

The trajectory of state-building in Afghanistan took a turn in direction of modernity with the appearance of Amir Sher Ali on the scene. Amir Sher Ali pushed in reforms for strengthening of the military arms of the states. He raised the numerical strength of army to 50,000 and arranged it on modern lines with professional outlook and uniform. The recruitment was done from all parts and communities and not only Pashtuns. This gave the security organ of the state a legitimate acceptance among masses at large (Wahab 2007). Amir Ali created range of institutions to put the Afghan state in sync with modern patterns. He formed a council of elders to advice him. Further a cabinet with several ministers were formed. As the reflective of a modern governance, a postal service and a nascent and a rudimentary monetary system was established. A path to financial and monetary modernization was adopted with the replacement of the system of collection of tax in kind with taxation in cash. Another major economic reform initiative was the introduction of light industries. The first government school imparting modern education was his initiative. Other features of modernisation were also introduced by the Amir like light industries and printing press. The first Afghan newspaper *Shams-al Nahar* was introduced during Amir's rule (Wahab 2007).

Amir Abdul Rahman, built on the foundations of modernization that were laid by Amir Sher Ali. His grand approach to state-building revolved around the twin objectives of prevention of foreign intervention and maintenance of internal control. After initial delay, British accepted Amir Abdul Rahman as the new king of Afghanistan only after he signed the Treaty of Gandamak in 1879, which allowed the presence of a permanent British Resident in the Kabul Court in return for payment of an annual subsidy and arms to Afghanistan. The Treaty also established Durand Line (1893) as the border between Afghanistan and British India. Following the Britishers, Russians also signed various treaties like Amou Darya (1888), Pamir treaty (1895) and the St.Petersburg (1907) which demarcated the Afghan borders with Russia (Roy 1990). The frontiers that came out of negotiated settlements with the two Empires was not in sync with the various zonal limits of ethnic communities in Afghanistan. They rather were purely reflective of security and strategic considerations of the two Imperial powers. Thus the borders of Afghanistan, which were an outcome of imperial demarcations were purely strategic and did not correspond to any ethnic or historical

boundary.

After the legal settlement of boundaries with the two powers, Amir Abdul Rahman completely focused on the internal reforms and consolidation of his power. Amir Abdul Rahman here made a perfect mix of coercive power, incentives and other *realpolitik* methods for dealing with the various challengers of powers internally. Abdul Rahman followed into the footsteps of Amir Sher Ali in building up various branches of the state. He also invested heavily in effort to build a bureaucratic, centralised state. A special focus put on strengthening the security apparatus. He made effort to build a strong army utilizing available resources and subsidies secured from the British (Giustozzi 2010: 90). The Amir also created a powerful network of intelligence service to keep an eye on each and everything happening inside the country (Saikal 2004). This created suspicious environment in the state and failed to build strong institutional base for the creation of modern nation state.

A general shortcoming of Amir Abdul Rahman's approach towards state-building was the presence of a narrow scope—confined purely to bureaucratic institutions and army which were related with centralization of power in one hand. He did not pay sufficient attention to the issues of creation of economic resources, improvement of legal system and other social initiatives like issues of position of women thus conceding sufficient ground for continuation of traditional patterns and institutions. Amir Abdul Rahman delved upon a process of state-building which was narrow in focus—confined to centralizing institutions and therefore was not cognizant of politics at large.

Amir Habibullh Khan succeeded his father Abdul Rahman in one of the most peaceful takeover in the history of Afghanistan (Newell 1972). He retained the later's twin goal of preventing foreign intervention and maintaining the royal grip on internal power. However, in engaging with the internal challenges to sovereignty, he toned down on the harsh methods used by Abdul Rahman. Amir Habibullah borrowed several clues from traditional norms to bring in what can be called a soft power approach towards the traditional centres of powers. He employed symbolic measures —traditional means of giving honours to leaders. Also, certain appointments were

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given to pacify some of the tribal and religious leaders. A relaxation was introduced in the tribal military recruitment. Further of a Council of State for dealing with Tribal affairs was established (Rameen n.d.). In pursuit of policy of goodwill, two important families: Tarzi and Musahiban, who were forced into exile by Amir Abdul Rahman were invited back to the homeland. The return of the two families, their subsequent rise to responsibilities in the government and their influences on the policies and ideological currents presents the early narrative of the role of the diaspora in the process of state building.

The Tarzi family also known as Kandhar Sardar found exile in Ottoman. In their host land, they witnessed the revolutionary movements within the Ottoman Empire. The Musahiban family was exiled into British Empire, where they were privy to the gradual modernisation programme of Britishers and also saw the nascent modern Indian nationalism. The return of both the families in certain sense represented "importation of modernity". While Mahmud Tarzi of the Tarzi family became proponent of revolutionary modernization, Nadir Khan of the Musahiban family espoused a gradual modernization (Sungur 2013). Apart from the two prominent families, there were several other families: Charki family, Naqshbandi Hazrats from Shor Bazaar in Kabul, Mujaddidi family (Sufi) and the Gilani family (who were related to the Qaderiya Sufi order of Iraq) who came back from exile to play role in shaping the trajectory of state-building Afghanistan. They all represented the diversity of the political currents and contributed in the formation of base of future political divisions in the country. Despite the presence of basic incompatibility in their ideals of modernity, there was a unifying thread in their political positions: they all had an anti-imperialist position directed against the Britishers—a position that had a defining role in the Third Anglo-Afghan War. Overall, the path of return of the prominent Afghan diaspora (in exile) became an important channel through which the transnational modern political ideals, norms and institutions found their way into Afghanistan. This was in certain sense a beginning of a pattern which continued throughout the 20th century coming right up to present exercises of state-building in Afghanistan.

Carrying forward the project of military modernization of his father, Habibullah harped on a process of both professionalization and modernization of the military organization. In pushing forward the professionalization, *Madrasse-ye-Harbi-ye Siragieh*—Royal Military College was founded for the training of officer corps (Rameen n.d.). However, he made marked departure from his father in his projection of the face of the state and policies it pursued. To begin with, he did away with the system of espionage employed by his father which had instilled fear at every level. Further, a major administrative reform introduced by him when he divided Afghanistan into six provinces of Badakhshan, Afghan Turkestan, Farah, Herat, Qandhar and Kabul. For the governance of theses provinces, a hakeem with both judicial and civil functions was appointed in each of these provinces. Amir Habibullah expanded the narrow focus of governance to centralization to other areas presenting welfare face of the state. He brought in series of reforms for the improvement of the Afghan economy. Important progresses were made in key industries: tannery, boot making and textiles. A major marker of modernization in machinery—the first hydroelectric plant of the country was established by Habibullah in 1910 (Rameen n.d.). In field of education, Amir Habibullah is credited for laying the foundation of Afghanistan's modern education system, which was based on Anglo-Indian system of education (Rameen n.d., Newell 1972). Similarly, in the sector of health, Habibullah laid the foundations for public health programme. In this regard the first state hospital came in 1913.

Though an eclectic combination of measures directed towards security and welfare, Amir Habibullah in certain sense succeeded not only in ensuring penetration of the state in domains of traditional society, but also presented a welfare face of the state. His adoption of new measures was due to his general openness to modern influences. With the support of the Amir, a modernist and nationalist elite developed for the first time in Afghanistan. This small group advocated sweeping social, cultural and economic changes. The greatest progress was made in education, journalism, and technology.

Despite adoption of an overarching softened stance of the state along with welfare programmes and other developmental initiatives, the project of state-building

and related policies of Amir Habibullah faced oppositions. Within the premises of the Kabul court, the contestation was organized along lines of two groups: the supporters and the opponents of the Amir. The Amir found support among the group headed by Mahmud Beg Tarzi. It comprised of nationalists, reformists, Islamic modernists and the the Young Afghans. On the opposing side was the group called *Jami'at-i-Siraiyi* (Secret Society of Nationalists) with its call for democratic and constitutional government. The group drew its membership from mawlawis and mullahs (Shahrani1987). The support for Amir however, gradually waned. The adoption a pro-British policy in first World War I lead everyone into coalition of opposition. This opposition finally led to the assassination of the Amir in 1919. The assassination opened up door for next round of clash between the traditionalists and the modernists over the question of succession in which modernist prevailed and Amanullah Khan was chosen over Nasrullah (who was supported by the traditionalist).

Amir Amanullah from the very onset was keen on strengthening his position and consolidation of sovereignty of the state. He assumed the title of King and not the Amir of Afghanistan (Shahrani 1987). He was convinced that Indian unrest will gave him an opportunity both to solidify his internal support but also to win complete independence from the British. In order to end British control over Afghanistan's foreign policy, Amanullah made recourse to militaristic confrontation and launched the Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919). After series of sharp encounters, the war eventually pushed Britishers for negotiations which were largely in favour of Afghanistan. Afghanistan secured sovereignty over its external affairs (Newell 1972).

After securing complete sovereignty over its external affairs, Amir Amanullah pursued the projects of societal reformation and modernization. Amir Amanullah himself was product of the new modern education system created by Amir Habibullah. Based on his ideological inclinations, Amanullah pursued an unadulterated modern approach towards the question of authority and legitimacy. He sought a clear distance from traditional affiliations: both tribal and religious (Newell 1972).

Amir Amanullah and his efforts towards the modernization of the society constitutes the first defined phase of the process of evolution of the contemporary Afghan society. Amanullah envisioned modernisation primarily as educational, social, and cultural change. He emphasised new attitudes, idea, knowledge and style of behaviour. Among the various domains of social life, his approach towards the question of law stands out. Under him, the authority of Shariah and the tribal codes saw a gradual erosion in face of modernized laws and ordinances which sought humanization of criminal punishments and restrictions of the authority of the Muslim jurists. His efforts were largely directed at norms and fall short in bringing corresponding changes in institutions of government. That is, his provocative changes were not accompanied by effective efforts to improve the army or the government bureaucracy.

The nature of reforms introduced by king Amanullah Khan reflects the change in outlook of ruling class. The ruling elite now different from traditional elite and were influenced by modern ideals: pan-Islamism and nationalism. However, the strata of ruling elite was not entirely devoid of traditional influence. The relationship between the king and the prime minister in fact represented the wider clash between tradition and modernity. The prime minister was the custodian of interests of traditional groups—tribal and religious groups (Shahrani 1987). Alongside the main tussle in the Centre, modernization and reform programs were challenged by religious and tribal heads in various parts of the country. A major crystallization of the challenge came in 1923, when due to disenchantment with oppressive rule of governor and other provincial officials, two mullahs from the important tribes of Paktya and Zadran registered the official reaction in form of two petitions. However, the expressions of discontentment soon shifted from formal and peaceful to a violent form. The resistance which was initially coming from specific tribes for the tribal cause soon were became unified—this time under the overarching appeal of religion and thus the resistance against Amanullah assumed the connotation of *jihad.* Amanullah responded to the revolts with force. He also employed diplomatic overtures to secure support of Hazaras and segment of Paktya population. With the successful employment of the force along with diplomatic exercises targeted it different communities, the government succeeded in defeating the rebels and re-

establishing its control (Olesen 1995). Following the suppression of armed revolts and securing its power over these rebels, Amanullah attempted to correct the legitimacy deficit. Here he harped upon the historical institution of *jirga*. However, the resolution of the problem was temporary one. Next round of traditionalists opposition emerged in 1928-29. It was mobilized by Sufi leaders and found the military support of the Tajik leader Habibulah Kalakani. They finally forced Amir Amanullah to abdicate the throne and leave the country for ever. With the exit of Amir Amanullah, the phase of state-building process which was started by Amir Abdul Rahman came to an end.

3.1.3 Decentralisation of State Power and Emergence of Religious and Tribal leaders 1929-1970

With the departure of Amir Amanullah from the political scene, quest of modernity ceased to be an objective of the Afghan state. Political contestation was now casted along the traditional parameters of purity and ethnicity. With the success of revolt, for the first time in the history of the country a Tajik from northern Afghanistan became Amir. Habibullah Hakkani as the leader had two major shortcomings for the main ethnics group: first he was not Pashtun and second he did not come from a royal background. For the absence of a royal lineage, Habibullah Kalakani, was referred to as Bacha-i Sachao (son of water carrier) by the Pashtuns (Newell, 1972). As expected, the ethnic tension surfaced forcefully and led to instability in the country. Nadir Khan successfully mobilized opposition against Kalakani and replaced him. Nadir Khan's Pashtun ethnicity and royal lineage (connected to Sadozia and Mohammedzai) fulfilled the traditional criteria of purity and ethnicity (Newell 1972).

The success of Nadir Khan (1929) in the battle of throne over Bacha-i Shachao not only ended the brief span of Tajik rule but also ended the hope of Amir Amanullah's comeback. Nadir Khan declared himself as the new Amir and changed his name as Amir Nadir Shah. Further he secured legitimacy and acceptance of his rule through the *jirga* of 1931 (Newell 1972). After coming to power, Nadir Shah revoked the policies and reforms introduced by Amir Amanullah. Further a modus vivendi was reached between religious leaders and the government which effectively

removed Islam as a subject of debate for the next three decades (Voggelsang 2008). Nadir Shah fully understood that outward symbols of policy plays an important role in Afghanistan. The religious and tribal leaders regained much of their former influence but the constitutional provisions of the Constitution of 1931 were vague due to which the king and state retained their importance. Following Nadir Shah's assassination, his three brothers ran the government as the guardian of Nadir Shah's young son Zahir Shah who succeeded him as the Amir. The period from 1933 to 1950's the religious groups lent their support to the state and did not cause any trouble to the state. Due to this Olesen (1995) called this period as the disappearance of 'activist' mullahs. In absence of the support of religious leaders, several key attempts of revolts: Safi Rebellion (1945-46), Mangal unrest (1959) and the troubles of Kandhar withered away (Olesen 1995). This short period of alliance between state and religious groups weakened the tribal capacity of creating instability visa-vis the centre.

Despite the fact that the 1931 constitution was formed under the influence of traditional powers groups of the Afghan society, the economic development and expansion of state control led to the emergence of a new urban middle class. This group gradually rose to claim share in politics under the leadership of Daoud, who himself was cousin of King Zahir Shah. This group was not a homogeneous in the sense that it was not a Pashtun dominated one and had equal number of Tajiks and other ethnic groups. The earlier vertical kinship and ethnic affiliation was changed into horizontal class division (Gopalakrishnan 1982). The King also supported this group and replaced his uncle with Daoud as the new Prime Minister in 1950s. One significant difference between the old and new generation of Musahiban family was influence of modern education on the second generation and the economic development of the country. Due to these two conditions King Zahir Shah and Daoud Khan where more confident to assume that time has come for the next level of state-building and modernisation of Afghan society.

Zahir Shah's rule had three phases (Kakar 1995). In the first phase (1933-46), Zahir Shah had nominal authority with actual control being exercised by his uncles who served as Prime Ministers: Muhammad Hashim (1933-46) and Shah Mahmud (1946-53). Second phase (1946-1963) begins with the replacement of Shah Mahmud

by Daoud Khan, who was Zahir Shah's cousin. Third phase (1963-1973) saw the emergence of strong parliament, free press and an organized civil society around groups like *Wish Zalmayan* (the Awakened Youth), the Fatherland and the National Club (M.Kakar 1995).

The end of World War II globally, brought in new world order led by US. The immediate onset of rivalry between US and USSR in form of the cold War changed the context in which Afghan state operated. An important aspect of post-second World War global politics was employment of aid as foreign policy tool. Great powers and international agencies began using aid to influence policies and behaviours of poor countries. Afghanistan also became receptive to global aid. Prime Minister Daoud accepted aid and used them to modernize and strengthen the army. The measure proved useful as the strength of army was used to suppress the 1959 Mangal tribe revolt and it allowed the centre to strengthen authority over tribal leaders (Saikal 2004, Ewans 2002). Further, the aid was employed to foster economic growth allowing economic independence from the tribal leaders and making tribes economically dependent on the centre (M. Kakar 1995). It also weaken the tribal leaders source of revenue and make them dependent on central authority.

An important turn came in 1963, when Zahir Shah made Daoud resign due to their differences over the Pashtunistan issue, thus bringing in a temporary end to the role of Musahiban oligarchy in Afghan polity. This marked the beginning of final phase of Zahir Shah's reign, which lasted till 1973 (Kakar 1995).

3.1.4 Republican Experiment and New Phase of State-building 1970-2001

The most defining aspect of the last phase of Zahir Shah's reign was the formation of new constitution which combined monarchy, traditional tribal institutions and strong parliamentarism (Saikal 2004). The Constitution ensured a simultaneous existence of both the traditional institution of Loya Jirga and Shura—the parliament (Ewans 2002. Alongside the democratic and parliamentary reforms, Zahir Shah also brought in restrictions on the participation of the royal family in politics. Restrictions on the royal family was basically intended to prevent Daoud and his brother Naim from gaining any political influence (Ewans 2002).

An important group that emerged during this period was *Hezb-e-Dimkratik-e-Khalq-e-Afghanistan*—People's Democractic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). It was amalgamation of leftist groups (a legacy of *Wish Zalmayan*) that came up in 1965 under Nur Muhammad Taraki on the eve of parliamentary elections (Ewans 2002). The party later split into two factions: Khalq and Parcham. In the influence of Soviet ideology, PDPA gradually attracted army officers to the extent that eventually both the army and the party became synonyms for each other (Sungur 2013).

Despite the attempts of reforms through constitution, Zahir Shah started facing legitimacy crisis, particularly in face of attacks from the intellectual class—exposed to Western ideas (Siddiqi 1989). The challenge of the authority of his government accentuated and eventually led to his ouster through a bloodless coup led by Daoud in 1973. The coup found supporter in the communist party (PDPA) especially the Parcham Faction. The coup brought an end to monarchy in Afghanistan and made it Republic and Daoud became its first President. A defining aspect of this transition was shift in strategy of securing legitimacy by the regime. Daoud shifted the appeal from traditional centres to modern institutions and organizations like political parties and the army (Sungun 2013).

Like the monarchy under Zahir Shah the Republic also depended on foreign aid and assistances to carry on economic reforms and modernization programmes. The shift in in American Foreign policy priorities brought a transfer in assistance from Afghanistan to Pakistan. Early on, Daoud responded by bringing an end to traditional policy of neutrality by approaching USSR. As a result series of treaties and agreements was signed with USSR. USSR responded with assistances in industrialization and big constructions project. However, there was a price to Soviet support: ideological influences also followed the material support. Several pro-Soviet agents started finding top governmental positions (Sungur 2013, Brigot and Roy 1988). Many in the intellectual circle and civil society started looking at Communism as better model of modernization for Islamic state than the Western model of Liberal-Capitalism (Sungur 2013).

The growing Soviet influence created concerns for US and its allies: Iran and

Pakistan. US succeeded in employing "attractive aid packages" through Iran to influence Daoud. Daoud started retracting on his initial policy of flirting with the Soviets. Around the mid-1974 he began the exercise of removal of Leftist—the Parchamis from his government. By the end of 1975, Daoud had dismissed all Parachami ministers from the cabinet and removed them from other official positions. General Qadir Nuristani, a hard line anti-communist was made the Minister of Interior. The clearance exercise was extended to Army as well, when Moscow trained officers were removed or dismissed or moved aside. Training of officers was shifted from Soviet to Egypt, India and US (Sangur 2013). A major step was the establishment of one party state. Both the factions of Left, Parcham and Khalq were outlawed.

An attempt at reconciliation with Soviet with the Moscow visit of Daoud in April 1977 failed when Daoud marched out from his meeting with Leonid Brezhnev and cancelled subsequent meetings. This pushed Soviets to finally reconsider its policy to control Afghanistan. With the assistance of Iranian and Indian Communist parties, Soviet managed to reunite Kalq and Parcham. Nur Muhammad Taraki became the General Secretary of the united PDPA and Babrak Kamal his deputy (Ewans 2002). Political developments took a radical turn, when prominent Parchami Mir Akbar Khyber was murdered in April 1978. The PDPA responded by turning his funeral procession into large demonstration. This led to the arrest of PDPA leadership Taraki, Kamal and Amin. Developments eventually culminated into coup on 27th of April 1978, in which Daoud and his entire family was killed (Saikal 2004). The coup brought a change in regime. Taraki became the President and Prime Minister Karmal Deputy President and Deputy Prime Minster, and Amin Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs.

An interesting experiment at reshaping state and state-society relationship was undertaken after the coup. The policies under it were based on existing theories of Marxism. PDPA government sought to remove the power of Tribes by policy of elimination of the Khans by arresting or killing them. The Khans as the landowners were seen as the exploitative class. Further, series of reforms were imposed to remove the vestiges of tribal system: land reforms, abolition of usury regulation of marriages

and universal literacy campaigns. With the land reform, the attempt was to take land forcefully under state control and redistribute it to peasants. However both land reform and the policy to put and end to usury did not produce desired result as they were not in sync with how the production process operated on ground and other social norms. It did not fill in the gaps of old system which was based of communally organized and owned production. Also, due to social norms many refused to accept the transferred land rights as it was seen as "un-Islamic to accept property that had been expropriated from another" (Ewans 2002). The casting of reform in ideological framework of a class struggle against the exploitative class could not relate with the tribal peasants everyday experience (Roy 1990). Overall, the state could not create a model which would replace the system of irrigation, water rights which were communally managed under the tribal system. So, the policies were not successful in breaking the tribal system and bring in true reforms—in Marxist parlance. What they actually yielded, was a discontent among tribal Pashtuns for states interference in tribal affairs. The discontentment gradually crystallized into revolt against the new regime, when other policies to do away with religious influence over state was attempted. PDPA attempted to replace the symbolically Islamic green stripe in Afghan flag with red—representing socialism (Sungur 2013). So, the experiment to reshape the society as part of rebuilding the state in Socialist fashion proved to be counterproductive for the state.

The political situation in Afghanistan started a reversal from the moment, the coup was executed to remove Zahir Shah. The infighting within PDPA and the resistance against it took the form of Jihad. The situation invited Soviet into Afghanistan to be followed by American influence. The resistance against PDPA and the Soviets were backed by US. The conflict completely reversed the positions that state had achieved through a gradual and an incremental process in the whole of 20th century. The resistance against PDPA had severe implications for state-society relations. Further, it strengthened the religious and ethnic divisions.

3.2. Bonn Accord and State-building 2001-2013

The end of Cold War with the departure of Soviet followed by American

presence did not bring in any stability. With Soviet gone, Mujahideen government came that lasted till 1996. The government was headed by Rabbani and comprised of other parties that were formed during the war against Soviet. However, the rule never had any semblance of stability. There was acute infighting within the leadership. Most prominent was the conflict between Pashtun leader Hekmatyar and the Tajik leader Masood. This period proved fatal for Afghan state and its institutions. Gradually the state degenerated into rampant war-lordism creating a situation of anarchy. Many migrated from country to Iran and Pakistan in quest for security of life on everyday basis. The instability eventually paved for the rise of Taliban backed by ISI. Taliban rose between 1994 and 1996 securing control over Kandhar, Herat, Jalalabad and Kabul (Newberg 2007). Due to the presence of prolonged chaos, Taliban's appearance on the stage was accepted by common people as they saw it as a way out of the everyday insecurity. However, situation soon entered the next cycle of violent exchanges between Taliban and the Northern alliance for the control of the turf.

The rise of Taliban in certain sense was the final blow for the project of modernization of Afghan state. All institutions were destroyed. A shift from Constitution and other legal provisions to *Sharia* under Taliban had severe implications for women and minorities. The quest to push everyone into ideological conformity was detrimental to a society representing ideological diversity. Alongside the social and ideological stringency, there were nothing in terms of welfare and development. Taliban's diversion of resources for its quest to wrest control over territory held by United Front pushed the economy and society to a breaking point (Newberg 2007). The continued conflict and lack of developmental opportunities further pushed Afghans to migrate to Iran and Pakistan. Ethno-religious minorities facing direct attack of Taliban in particular took the path of migration.

The fall of Afghanistan into the hands of Taliban was essentially a craft work of Pakistan. Saudi Arabia soon followed Pakistan in establishing diplomatic relations with Taliban—thus legitimizing its right to rule Afghanistan. However, the epoch making event of 9/11 and the Global War on Terror—the new paradigm for quest of global security led by US made international environment inhospitable for existence of Taliban. Taliban due to its proximity with Al-Qaeda, which was behind the conduct

of attacks on Twin towers and Pentagon found itself on the wrong side of the fault line of the War on Terror. US led military attack into Afghanistan with the stated objective to end terrorist training and breeding ground. US in alliance with Northern alliance defeated Taliban and removed it from main control of Afghanistan.

The defeat of Taliban came with a promise of stability with the end of decade long civil war. The international community under the ambit of United Nation got itself involved for post-conflict peace building in Afghanistan. The framework for the post-conflict peace building was laid down in the Bonn Agreement, which was reached at the end of the negotiation process facilitated by UN. Unlike other interventions, US led intervention in Afghanistan received a massive electronic media coverage. That is there was a constant watch on the developments by the international community.

Bonn negotiations were taking place with two kind of pressure operating in the backdrop, First, there was the watch of international community. Second, the developments on ground: after the war the Northern Alliance is moving fast to get control over the state, and if this happens than the possibility of another civil war is sure. So America wants to establish a system in which all stake holders except Taliban gets a chance to represent itself. So has to move fast to get things under control and shape the future of Afghan politics.

Responding to the situation, Germany stepped in as the host of the Bonn negotiations. Responding to the demands of urgency, the talks commenced in a hotel close to Bonn and were taken to its logical culmination within two weeks. The delegates that made their participation in the talks comprised of Northern Alliance, the Cyprus groups, Peshawar group and the Rome group. The Northern Alliance, also known as United Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan was a Tajik dominated military alliance of of the non-Taliban armed formations that resisted Taliban. The Cyprus group comprised of the Shia Hazara minority residing as diaspora in Iran. It acted as a channel of influence of Iran in the post-conflict peace building process. The Peshawar group were representative of the Pashtun speaking diaspora residing primarily in Pakistan. Lastly, the Rome group comprised of moderate Pashtuns from

whole of Western diaspora and who were supporters of Zahir Shah (Afsah and Guhr 2005, Rashid 2008). Of the four groups, apart from the Northern alliance, rest were all representing the Afghan diaspora.

The Bonn agreement was crafted under the supervision of UN through the participation of individual actors representing their own groups. The agreements were meant to bridge the considerable physical, political and ideological distances between warriors and the victims of war, refugees and returnees, majority and minority ethnic groups and tribes, ideologues and technocrats, entrepreneurs and labourers and poor and poorest. The agreements tried abstractly, if not practically, to balance the ideas of restitution and opportunity for political groups with very different historical memories. Given these conditions, an outline for future political and judicial bodies could only be indicative and not prescriptive (Newberg 2007).

The challenge of rebuilding post-Taliban Afghanistan had been immense and multifaceted. It has required the creation of a broad based national government, the establishment of security throughout the country, and the reconstruction of war devastated economy. Moreover, the process was influenced from the outset by the legacy of the protracted war in Afghanistan, the way the Taliban regime was overthrown, and competing internal and external interests.

In terms of the convergence of the interests of the different groups, there was no common point other than their opposition to Taliban. However, apart from Northern alliance no other group had any militaristic presence on the ground in Afghanistan. This then allowed the absence of contradictory interests among the participants, thus making the acceptance of the agreement a non arduous task. However, the absence of Taliban meant that the issue of transitional justice did not appear on the agenda: the agreement did not had any provision on accounting of past atrocities (Afsah and Guhr 2005).

In the Bonn Conference, though there was the dominance of Northern alliance and through them the Tajik ethnic group, there was also the realization of the need to make it representative. In order to rectify the ethnic asymmetry, the representation of Pashtun community was sought through the Rome group as well a the Peshawar

group. Among the various measures, the selection of Hamid Karzai—a Kandhari Pashtun leader was one such move to curtail the Tajik dominance. The formation of an interim administration with a Pashtun as its head was necessary to bring the Pashtun majority within the fold of peace process and to avoid the shifting of their allegiance to Taliban, thus depriving the interim administration of legitimacy component.

The Agreement, which was the result of the Bonn negotiations was signed on 5th December 2001. The agreement called for the transfer of the state authority in Afghanistan to an interim government on 22nd December 2001. The Agreement laid down an ambitious time frame for the realization of state building and establishment of state institutions. Despite, the presence of ethnic diversity as the Bonn, the limitations in calling it representative and thus legitimate was recognized in the agreement. The course for correction of the legitimacy deficit was identified in the provision for traditional institution of the representation of the tribes: *Loya Jirga*. So, the Bonn agreement laid down the time framework of six months in which *Loya Jirga* would be convened for recognition of the Transitional government and thus provide it with legitimate basis (Afsah and Guhr 2005).

As an interim authority, the mandate of the transitional government was the establishment of institutional structure of the government in the assigned two years period. In this regard, it was expected to form a Constitutional Commission for the preparation of the draft constitution, conduct elections for formation of a constitutional *Loya Jirga* within 18 months of the formation of transitional government for the adoption of the new constitution. Through the election, the traditional institution of *Jirga* itself found a modern outlook (Afsah and Guhr 2005).

In the broader picture of peace building, the initial high of post conflict unity and peace soon waned. The UN sponsored process of peace building and unification of Afghanistan under the legitimate central government soon faced odds in the form of factionalism intensified on the eve of elections to the *Loya Jirga* in June 2002. Unlike in the past, factional rivalry did not transform into armed clashes due to the presence of coalition forces and other international peacekeepers. The state building

process did created a constitutional centralization of the country under central authority. However, the security arm of the state did not evolved to find a unified shape: military power continued to be fragmented. Further, a crude and a hurried integration of ethnic factions into a unified structure did not yield neither a real unification nor structures in sync with the prevalent diversity. Factions stayed and asserted themselves at the cost of institutional inefficacy and policy deadlocks (Jalali 2007).

The emergency meeting of *Loya Jirga* of June 2002 expected to bring in a balanced and a legitimate government ended up producing contradictory results. It was expected that the *Jirga* would promote democratic processes, take away the authority from regional leaders, thus strengthening the state and above all would broaden the base of the government. However, it ended up reinforcing the control of *Shura-i*-Nazar—the Tajik dominated party of the Northern alliance which was founded by Ahmad Shah Masoud. It reinstated the controls of *Shura* over security arms of the state: intelligence agencies, police and the army. On the other hand the continuum of Pashtun control over financial institutions did not yielded any satisfaction for them from their participation in the government through these institutions as financial position of the country was weak. So, these institutions hardly had any role in the overall governmental policy outreach to the society. The concentration of the real influence and political powers in the hands of Tajiks expectedly created resentment among Pashtuns. Pashtuns did convey their discontent over the conduct of Bonn political process. Further, their grievances intensified owing to the domination and growing influence of non-Pashtun armed factions in the interim administration (Ripherburg 2005).

The international community—various international organizations and states expected that the *Loya Jirga* would correct the ethnic imbalance that resulted from the Bonn meeting. This expectation in certain sense was misplaced and was not in due cognizance of the attributes and history of *Loya Jirga* as a traditional mechanism of representation and decision making. *Loya* Jirga was the outcome of a process of a linear expansion of tribal and local *jigras*—council into a national institution by the Afghan rulers. However, at the national stage, owing to diversity of groups and

corresponding interests and the preponderance of the ruler, *Loya Jirga* lacked the necessary autonomy and cohesion to produce coherent and independent decisions on national issues. It was prone to manipulation by the convening rulers. Though the *Loya Jirga* of 2002 was considered to be different in its facilitation of a free debate among the participant delegates, soon it assumed the negative path: regional strongmen and warlords influenced the course of the process through employment of political pressure, intimidation and money. The futility of the *Jirga* was compounded by the media directed stage management approach of the international community (Jalai 2007).

Pashtun anxieties where further increased due to the government composition dominated by the Tajiks. The best example was the ethnic representation of large number of Tajiks and other minor groups in the nation's security organs. Defence Minister Fahim acted unenthusiastically to the charge by the international community that Panjshiris are disproportionately represented. In 2003, he reported a rearrangement within the Defence Ministry, placing Uzbeks, Hazaras, and Pashtuns in post previously held by Tajiks. The Ministry even appointed Gul Zarak Zardan as the Deputy Minister of Defence. Zardan was a supporter of the *Itttihad-i-Islami* leader Abdul-Rasul Syyaf. Zardan also believes that Mujahiddin should form the basis of the new Afghan National Army(Riphenburg 2005).

The ethnic discrimination in the national army also point towards the domination of Tajiks on the government and marginalization of Pashtuns. Most of the appointments within the Ministry of Defence during 2002 were biased towards a single ethnic group, the Tajiks. Of the generals chosen by Defence Minister Marshal Fahim in 2002, to constitute the general staff of Army, 37 are Tajiks and one is Uzbeks. But scholars like Antonio Giustozzi see this is not so much ethnic discrimination as political favouritism, as of the 37 Tajiks generals 35 are indeed associated with *Shura-i-Nazar (*Riphenburg 2005).

The state-building process in Post-Bonn scenario faces the problems ethnic biasness towards Tajiks and not giving equal representation to the majority ie Pashtun. The biasness was more due to the alliance during the fight against Taliban by Tajiks

with international forces (NATO) and UN. The nature state-building project was decide by UN and other international powers involved in their fight against Taliban. The external powers involvement in the process of state-building added one more factor to it ie the participation of Afghan diaspora in it. The diaspora is coming up as a new pressure group in the country along with ethnic and religious groups. The history of Afghan diaspora and their role in the current state-building project will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.

The discussion in the Emergency Loya Jirga concerned mostly about question of dual citizenship for cabinet ministers, ie the role of returning diaspora Afghan were to play in the future, the place of Islam in the legal system and the denomination of the country as an Islamic Republic; as well as the position of minorities and women. (at the time it most concerned the American-Afghan finance Minister Dr Ashraf Ghani and interior minister Ali Ahmad Jalali). The compromise worked out at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, namely that parliament (House of people) can opt to approve a candidate despite his foreign citizenship did not help those ministers nominated by Karzai after his election in 2004 because there is yet no parliament to prove them under article 72(1). A number of senior officials have refused to serve as ministers due to this constitutional requirement that under the present circumstances would have required them to renounce their adopted citizenship (Afsah and Guhr 2005).

As the central administration's authority barely extended beyond the capital, regional strongmen played their power games. Throughout the Bonn process (2001-2005), sporadic clashes between regional commanders continued. The conflicts stemmed from old rivalries or desire to control or consolidate more territory. In 2002-2003, the troubled provinces of Paktia and Khost were often the scene of violent stand-offs between the government appointed governors and rebel forces under Bacha Khan Zardan. In the North tension between forces loyal to Rashid Dostum the leader of Junbish Mili Islami and militia units controlled by the Tajik commander Atta Mohammad frequently developed into bloody fighting that kept the region unstable (Jalali 2007).

Meanwhile, the post-Taliban Reconstruction was strongly influenced by the ongoing war on terror and fighting insurgency. While most of Afghanistan in post-conflict situation, large areas in the south and east are plagued by insurgency. Competing demands of fighting insurgency and rebuilding the post conflict communities have had a major impact on political, social and economic reconstruction. In the absence of an effective central security establishment, the transnational administration has depended on the military muscle of factional militias, an arrangement that was institutionalised in the Bonn agreement. The accord stipulated that "upon the official transfer of power, all mujahideen, Afghan armed forces and armed groups in the country shall come under the command and control of the Interim Authority, and be recognised according to the requirement of the new Afghan security and armed forces (Jalali 2007).

However, to operationalise the dream of a modern state in post-Taliban Afghanistan, there was a need for strategic documents that would explain how to reach this goal and hence the first national development strategy was developed in 2002 for the Interim Government of Afghanistan and some national priority programmes were identified for the emergency period. The first ever post-Taliban development strategy was called the National Development Framework. The NDF was followed by a series of strategic planning exercises and after two years, another document was produced by some 100 international experts from the United Nations and multilateral development institutions in collaboration with their Afghan colleagues. This was called "Securing Afghanistan's Future" (SAF) and was aimed at putting forward a programme of investments designed to lay the foundations for the sustained economic growth needed for a financially sustainable state capable of undertaking social development and poverty reduction (Shah2006).

The Afghanistan Compact (AC) and the Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy (I-ANDS) process began in early 2005 with a discussion of Afghanistan's Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which the Government of Afghanistan envisioned to improve the well-being of its people. An Oversight Committee headed by the Presidential Advisor on economic and social development and seven key ministers of the Afghan cabinet worked throughout 2005-2006 to

develop and refine the contents of I-ANDs and to oversee the process. Based on the MDGs, the I-ANDS was elaborated (Shah 2006). It was followed by the London Conference, held from 31-jan to 1ˢᵗ feb 2006, which brought together 60 delegates from the Government of Afghanistan, the UN and the international community. The delegates met to agree on the AC and I-ANDS with the Government of Afghanistan and subsequently pledged US$10.5 billion in Funds to support Afghanistan's reconstruction. The event was a precursor to the development of a full ANDS which would lay out the strategic priorities and mechanism for achieving the government's overall development vision and would serve as the country's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP).

In January 2010, again in a conference on Afghanistan in London, there was re-emphasis on Afghan Government's accountability and transfer of security matters to the Afghan Government as well as the announcement of the planned reconciliation and reintegration initiative to end conflict. It was followed by another conference in July 2010 in Kabul with the attempt to recommit to the priorities of the ANDS and embark on a process of refining and improving the ANDS document through the clustering of its sectors and developing National Priority Programmes (NPPs) under each cluster. This process of developing the national Priority Programmes is on-going and it has been named the Kabul process. From the National Development Framework in 2002 up to the Kabul Process in 2010, many strategic documents were produced that defined state building plans and activities but ironically, none of them have been implemented in a way that could be counted on to achieve. The failure to implement one strategy led to the starting of another process to develop yet another strategy and this cycle is currently moving on. This failure has reinforced a common pessimism about the time and resources spent on policies and programmes which do not get implemented (Shah 2006).

The current state-building discourse in Afghanistan is dominated by a general belief that priority agenda of the United States and its allies is the war on Terror and fighting the Taliban insurgency. State-building was only a by-product of the war on Terror and success in that has necessitated the formation of a functioning state able to provide its citizens with certain benefits on an inclusive basis. The foundation for

formation of such a state was laid through the UN sponsored Bonn Agreement in December 2001, in which the representatives of Afghanistan's political and social arena decided to end conflict in the country and promote lasting peace, stability and respect for human rights. They reaffirmed the independence, national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanistan, acknowledging the right of the people of Afghanistan to freely determine their own political future in accordance with the principles of Islam, democracy, pluralism and social justice. This agreement contained all the key elements of modernity including social justice and women's rights. Thus a dream was set to modernise a country which had never been truly modern and which even functioned in anti-modern ways (Shah 2006).

3.3 Evolution of the Constitutional Identity of the State

The evolution of constitutional identity of the state can be clearly seen from the development of two institutions which were earlier under religious control, these two are education and justice departments. The education and justice institutions played pivotal role in Muslim states to get legitimacy among the people and establish monarchy or central authority of the king. Secondly these two institutions were filled by religious personalities who were coming from the people and acting as a bridge between the people and state. Based upon the wider relationship between the religion and the state, the role of these people changed from time to time. The example of this is the four Constitutions of Afghanistan which reflects the changing role of Islam in the country. All the constitutions agree on Islam as the state religion of the country. However the difference between all of them was on the emphasis on any particular school to be followed. Like the 1923 and 1931 constitution specifically emphasised the use of Hanafi school of Sunni jurisprudence, while as by the time of 1977 no mention has been made of any particular school of Sunni Islam nor even Sunnism (Naby 1987). This development reflects on one hand the decline of the role of religion in state affairs as perceived by the Kabul educated elite who drafted the constitutions and on the other increased jurisdiction of secular law. This dropping of Sunni Islam helped the state to develop a national identity by including the minorities also. The example of this changing nature of the state can be seen in the inclusion of non-Muslims in military services. For example the non Muslim religious minorities,

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specifically the Hindus and Jews, have enjoyed tolerance of their beliefs and practices, they paid the jaziyah (poll tax for non-Muslims) (Constitution 1923: Article 2). Payment of jaziyah and exclusion from the military were deleted in later constitutions to reflect the reduced attention to Islamic Law.

The decreasing jurisdiction of Sharia laws in both family and criminal laws helped the state to secularise the justice department in various ways. At first, the rulers tried to increase their discretionary legal powers by removing from Sharia those crimes that they wished to adjudicate personally. For example, the stoning of a married adulterer or adulteress no longer occurs (Dupree 1973). Later taxes on polygamous marriages and the like marked the entry of secular courts into areas reserved for Islamic law. Thus the state started using justices department for its own benefit. In most of these cases the crimes were of a civil nature where the Sharia did not prescribe the death penalty but the ruling group wished to do so (Naby 1987).

Moreover, in order to control the qazis (religious judges) the Afghan rulers introduced uniform legal codes by instituting national penal codes that would subject the Pashtunwali to the Sharia and later to secular courts. Certain basic rules of the Pashtunwali are clearly contrary to Islamic law and moreover, endanger the establishment of a stable government. This was the reason that since 1920s Afghan government has attempted to limit and control *badal* (blood feuds and clan or tribal vendettas) a primary element of Pashtunwali for which an elaborate code exists. Another example was the change in inheritance law *rajaw* (sole male inheritance). *Rajaw* was essential to the social structure of Pashtun tribes, though modified by Islam has not been discarded in tribal areas without government intervention. The government has justified this intervention into tribal law by drawing upon Islamic law where personal vengeance is codified and estates are inherited by females as well as males (Naby 1987; Constitution 1964, 1977).

Thus, the secularisation and codification of the legal system have offered rulers an opportunity to weaken the powers both of the religious establishment and of the tribes by fostering reliance on the ruler as the final arbiter of law. The periodic *darbar*s of the rulers where people can personally present petitions helped them to

raise his personal prestige and damaged that of qazis. As the country moved towards secularization and erosion of legal jurisdiction of the ulama, the need to create in the ruler a religious figurehead declined (Naby 1987). Instead, the monarchy shifted towards becoming a military figurehead enjoined to defend the independence of the country and, only by extension, Islam. This tradition, begun at the time of Nadir Shah and continued in the Musahiban family were both Zahir Shah and Daoud had military training. With the creation of Pakistan and contention over the issue of Pashtunistan, the military issue became more important. The government was more concerned with the Pashtuns in 1960s rather than the disaffection with the religious establishments.

Like the legal system the education system which was also under the religious control showed gradual transformation to a more secular and modern one. The Islamic clergy depends upon the network of religious schools and upon charitable endowments to build and secure followers, develop ideas, and disseminate them among the people. In absence of a viable madrasa system in Afghanistan, the individuals aspiring to higher education especially religious education have to go abroad to either central Asia or India, barred the scholars to create their followers in the country. Due to this they acted individually and not as a group without any state control. The state from 1900s tried to create a regulated madrasa system in Afghanistan so as to use the Sharia laws to centralise the state power over tribal areas. In 1944 the government began to exert its influence by establishing a school for the study of Islamic law. Six year later this faculty became the Faculty of Islamic Studies, a part of Kabul University, and is held in high regard as the centre for training of young religious leaders and teachers (Naby 1987). It is interesting that, this centre provided leaders to both leftist and Islamist and many resistance leaders came from the faculty of Islamic studies and other centres.

Another useful method followed by clerics traditionally to gain and keep followers was through the disbursement of funds from charitable endowments. This avenue was shut to Afghan clergy by Amir Habibullah (1901-1919), who took over the control of *waqf* system. The Afghan government continued to administer the purse since that time. The controlling of funds thus became one more method of government control over the religious establishment as mullah and mosque had to be

maintained at the pleasure of the ruling class (Naby 1987). This isolated the Afghan clergy from the people as they received their training at a government institution were paid by the government and their jurisdiction curtailed. The educational system, especially the secondary educational system, was beyond their control although the curriculum still includes Islamic subjects. The Sharia courts operated within reduced spheres. In fact, the clergy had become part of the government bureaucracy. Its ability to mediate between the government and the people or to form bridges between the Kabul elites and the country side diminished.

3.4 Summary

The nature of state-building process in the 18th-and 19th century was not monotonous and consistent. Its evolution very much depended on the nature of leadership and the context in which it assumes the leadership. The leadership tried to control the tribal and religious authorities in order to bring peace and stability in the country. The state used religion as a tool in controlling the warring tribes and give legitimacy to its rule in Afghanistan. The reliance of state on religion was only symbolic but still proved very effective from time to time. The example was the complete control of state over religion during Amir Abdul Rahman and Amir Nadir Shah. In both cases religion has been used in different ways to suppresses the tribal revolts against the state. As Amir Abdul Rahman followed the policy of complete suppression of religious leaders and bringing them under state control as subordinates. While as Amir Nadir Shah used religious leaders and institutions as collaborators in the state functioning with full freedom to them in religious issues and justice dispersion.

Moreover the state-building process was also influenced by the ideas in the neighbouring countries. The leaders in Afghanistan are very receptive to various ideas and ideologies. The carrier of these ideas and ideologies in Afghanistan during the 19th century was the small Afghan diaspora members like Tarzis. and Musahibans. The host country's internal condition also plays important role in how the diaspora behaves in the homeland. The migration of Tarzi family to Egypt makes it more progressive and pro-modernisation of state. While as the Musahiban family migrated

to British India makes them gradual promoter of reforms and modernisation.

The state-building process in the country was also very much influenced by the global level political developments at particular points in history. These development shaped the course and direction of Afghan state-building project. The example of Great Game rivalries during the 18th and 19th century was very evident that how the two global powers at that point forced the Afghan rulers to accept the borders. These borders created the country as a buffer zone between Britian and Russian. Therefore, external powers played significant role in the nature and composition of Afghan state and its state-building project. The Post-2001 state-building project was fully supported by Western powers both militarily and financially. This increases the role and participation of Afghan diaspora in the state-building as more crucial and important. It will also help us to understand the current nature of the state-building due to the influence of host country on homeland politics. This we will look into the next chapter.

Therefore, the success and failure state-building process in Afghanistan before the Post-Bonn Agreement (2001), depended on many factors like leadership, alignment with religious and tribal leaders, influence and interest of neighbouring countries especially Iran and Pakistan, and finally the role of external intervention of Super powers due to the global level political developments.

CHAPTER 4

ETHNOGRAPHY OF THE AFGHAN DIASPORA

4 INTRODUCTION

4.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF MIGRATION

4.2 COUNTRY WISE PROFILE OF DIASPORA AND MIGRANTS

    4.2.1 Iran

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4.5 SUMMARY

Introduction

The geographical location of Afghanistan at the intersection several routes of the Silk route system made it the melting pot of different cultures over the millennium. This interaction and inter-mingling of people created various forms of cultural and political norms and practices in the country. These norms and practices of different communities and cultural groups were unique and often in contestation with each other, thus creating the occasional tension among the groups, who were divided into ethnic and sectarian lines. The parallel existence of multiple sources of power traditionally and fluidity of authority allowed coexistence of multiple ethnicities and corresponding centres of power and authority. However, the ethnic tension became prominent from the 19th century onwards, when the Afghan Amirs pursued the project of shaping state on modern lines: with singular and indivisible notion of sovereignty. Problems of conflict and tension between ethnic groups increased during the 19th and 20th century when the Amirs of Afghanistan tried to create a modern nation-state (Hanifi 2006). The project of nation building assumed a synonymity with the gradual domination of the majority: Pashtun over others. However, the minority ethnic groups forcefully resisted any such domination. This resistance of the minorities against any form of unification was the main hurdle for the state-building process in the Afghan society.

The push to the process of establishment of a centralised nation-state made the regime to interfere with the norms and practices of the society established over centuries. The traditional nature of the society and economy was not compatible with modern institutions like education, military, justice, taxation, etc. Therefore, a tension between state and society was a natural outcome of the state building process in the 19th and 20th century. The tension often manifested itself violently. The recourse to coercive measures on both sides made violence a prominent feature of state-society interaction. This tension further escalated when foreign powers started interfering in the internal politics of the country due to various global level developments: Great Game rivalries, ideological difference, economic recessions, cold war, etc. However,

such situation created insecurity for people, who often adopted the path of migration to neighbouring countries as the way out of the insecure environment. Therefore, migration in Afghanistan is an important aspect related to the story of the state-building process in the country located over a couple of centuries of the modern era. Migration induced by the state-building process also highlights the change in the migratory pattern of the people, especially in the 21st century.

Migration historically has been the key measure used by people to escape the onslaught of all kind of disasters, both natural and man-made. In this regard, people in Afghanistan have migrated to different regions both within the country and other places outside the country. Migration as a process had different phases and was based on both internal situations like war and instability and external attractions in forms of economic opportunities and the promise of better life. The former accounts for the push factors and later for the pull factors of migration to Afghans. Reflecting upon the phenomenon of migration in recent past in Afghanistan, Westcott divides Afghan migratory pattern into two phases: 1979-1989 and 1996-2201. The first one was a migration triggered by Soviet invasion and related armed contestations. The migrants during this phase comprised of all sections of society and from both urban and rural areas. Quantitatively, around 2.6 million Afghans migrated to Iran and 1.5 million migrated to Pakistan during this period (Monsutti 2006, UNHCR 2005). Migration in the second phase was an outcome of policies of Taliban regime—, particularly towards minorities. Migrants in this phase comprised of minorities like Shia Muslims, Sikhs, Hindus, women and children, who moved out of Afghanistan to escape the religious persecution policy of Taliban (Westcott 1996). Westcott's assessment best captures the story of Afghan migration during the phases of Soviet invasion and Taliban's rule. However, the migration of mass scale people during the Mujahedin period (1990-1996), has not been considered by Westcott. A large chunk of people migrated mostly from urban areas especially the ruling class and educated section migrated to neighbouring countries during Mujahedin's rule particularly in the face of civil war. A rough estimate of 6 million people migrated to Pakistan during this phase (UNHCR 2005). This will be discussed in details at the later stage in the chapter.

Moving beyond Westcott's classification, understanding of the story of Afghan

migration in relation with the regime is contingent on: understanding of the differences between voluntary and forced migration and historical significance of migration of the people in Afghan state-building process. This chapter then will focus on the history of migration to understand the link between state-building and migration of people both inside and outside the country. It further attempts to explore migration as an aspect of governmental policy for the creation of a centralised state. Based on the premises that migration has led to the formation of a huge Afghan diaspora globally and the diaspora has been involved in the state-building process, this chapter further will map the formation of Afghan diaspora and conditions that associated them with the state-building project. As a part of the quest, the chapter will delve into the intricacies of the social and political organisation of the diaspora. Further, an exploration of transnational links that connects diaspora with both the homeland and host land will be made—an aspect critical for the understanding of the diaspora formation and their relation (social and political) with the homeland and the host land.

4.1 Historical Background of Migration

The geographic space which is now known as Afghanistan was historically divided into small areas occupied by different ethnic groups with different culture and norms to regulate their social existence. The word Afghans were used only for Pashtuns by other ethnic groups. Till the end Mughal rule in India, there was no single term of reference for the entire region now known as Afghanistan. Rather the region comprised of different parts like Kandahar, Herat, Khurasan. The areas where either directly governed by independent rulers or were under the control of other bigger empire like Mughals or Safavids (Dupree 1977). There was a frequent movement of people from these areas of Kandahar, Herat, Khurasan, etc. towards the leading empires of that time: India and Persia. People migrating during that period primarily came from the upper strata of the society: religious leaders, military commanders, nobles, traders and prominent artisans. Their contact with homeland was maintained in forms of cultural activities and economic transactions taking place at regular intervals (Green 2008). In the Indian case, medieval dynasties like Lodhi and Sur experienced the constant flow of Afghans and had their large-scale presence.

Afghanistan began acquiring a prominent geopolitical significance only in early modern period. It was only in 19th century, during the Great Game rivalries between the British India and Russia that the region is earlier known as Zabulistan, Kabul, Herat, Kandahar came to be described as Afghanistan in the geopolitical lexicon of the imperial powers (Wahab 2007). The reason why Afghanistan assumed prominence over other references such as Zabulistan, Kandahar, etc. is that Britishers first came in contact with Pashtuns who called themselves Afghans. Further, the term gained more currency due to Amir Abdul Rahman's usage of the term as a referent for the whole country when he pursued his project of modern state-building in the 1880s (Hanifi 2006). Later to assign a definite form to the fluid geographic space called Afghanistan, Britishers created the Durand line demarcating the sovereign limits of the Amir of Kabul and the British Raj in the 1890s.

Despite the creation of a border through the Durand line, the social and ecological practices of people with no cognizance of the limits that an international border sets continued. The formulation of borders by Britisher also could not stop the Afghans from migrating to British India during natural calamities and internal feuds and wars. Pashtun living on both sides of the Durand lines continued to migrate seasonally along with their families and animals. Likewise, migration of Afghans in the immediate neighbouring country and towards the West also was prominent during this period. A rough estimate of around almost 15000 Afghan families settled down in the Torbat-e-jan areas in the east of Mashhad from 1880 to 1903 (Abasi-Shavazi et.al 2005). A key mover of migration towards the end of 19th century was the state-building project of Amir Abdul Rahman. Migration was used by people to avoid confrontation with the state. The suppression of minorities during the state-building process started by Abdul Rahman in 1880s forced many vulnerable groups to migrate to the neighbouring countries of Iran and Pakistan. The most suppressed are the Hazaras who were Shia Muslims in the central parts around Kabul. The other most suppressed and vulnerable group was of the Nuristanis who were not Muslim and are know as *kafirs* and their area *Kafiristan.* The name Nuristan was itself given to the people by Amir Abdul Rahman after their conversion to Islam. One major reason of

these policies by the state was to establish the new state on the theory of *Divine kingship,* which will give the king full authority to rule the whole country and not only the Pashtun areas (Roy 1986). The Hazaras and Nuristanis migrated to Iran and Pakistan to escape the atrocities committed by the state. The centralisation of the state was the foremost priority of Amir Abdul Rahman, due to which the tribal and religious structure came under direct attack from the state for the first time in Afghan history (Abbasi- Shavasi et.al 2005). This tussle between the state and traditional power structures, i.e., tribal leaders and religious heads also led to the migration of people to neighbouring countries along with their leaders. Some of the important families and brothers of the King also migrated to Persia and British India, who later came back and played an important role in the course of Afghan history. So by the end of Abdul Rahman's(1880-1903) reign around 15,000 families migrated to Iran mostly Shi'a Hazaras (Abbasi- Shavasi et.al 2005). This phase in Afghanistan also saw a significant movement of people within the country. The impetus to the internal migration, however, was state policy: state used migration as a tool for centralising its authority in peripheral areas. Amir Abdur Rahman forcefully migrated Pashtuns of eastern Afghanistan to Herat and Kuransan (non-Pashtun areas), so as to create a strong support group of the centre among the population in the periphery(Saikel 2004). The Amir believed that it would help the state in two ways: first, the eastern Pashtuns who were creating problems for the centre through revolts and constant ethnic feuds with one another will be removed from their strong area. So putting them in the non-Pashtun areas will make them loyal to the state to protect themselves from other hostile ethnic groups. Secondly, for the state presence of a loyal group in the non-Pashtun areas will help in strengthening its control over these areas and would facilitate the unification of the country under one rule—with Pashtun as the dominant group (2004).

The pattern of interaction between the state and the society underwent significant change with the death of Amir Abdul Rahman. This had a substantial effect on the pattern of migration. The succession of Amir Abdul Rahman by his son Amir Habibullah marked the beginning of a new era in the state-building process in Afghanistan. The new Amir Habibullah inherited from his father a much stable and centralised state with a modernised army and bureaucracy. This stability allowed Amir

to gradually shift the focus of the project of state from centralization to modernization: education and judicial system emerged as two areas where the resonance of the modern quest was felt. The king opened new schools for both girls and boys based on western curriculum along with religious education (Roy 1986). Likewise, a more accommodative approach towards religious leaders, tribal leaders was adopted, thus reducing contestations. The policy of accommodation not only brought a reduction in the volume of migration but also reversed its direction. The policy of accommodation attracted back young Afghans who had migrated to foreign countries. This also brought in a modern link from the overall perspective of modernization. The case of return of two prominent families: Tarzi and the Musahibban and the roles their member subsequently assumed exemplifies the linkage they brought to the project of state-building and its modernization. Mahmud Tarzi of the Tarzi family and Nadir Khan of the Musahibban family were two prominent diaspora members who came back and contributed towards the modernization. These two families were in a certain sense the first diaspora members in the 20th century who came back to the country and played a significant role in the modernisation of Afghan state (Roy 1986). Mahmud Tarzi's family was settled in Turkey, and he had his education in Turkey. The influence of Kemal Attaturk the leader of Young Turk had deep marks on the mind of young Tarzi. After coming back to Afghanistan, Tarzi got full support for his ideas of modernisation from the Amir Habibullah and his son Amanullah Khan. One of the important contribution of Tarzi to the modernisation process and state-building in Afghanistan was given a modern platform for debates and discussion through his newspaper *Sheraj-al-Akhbar* a bi-weekly started in 1911. It became the base for all kinds of intellectual discussion and created a small group of intellectuals who worked for spreading awareness about nationalism and modernisation among the Afghans. The debates and discussions also appeared in his newspaper, and most of the articles were around the topic of reforms and modernisation of the Muslim world, and special focus was on Afghanistan.

During exile, the Tarzi family established a close relationship with the Sultan of Turkey. Ghulam Muhammad, the father of Mahmud Tarzi, had a friendship with Sultan Abdulhamid—the king of Turkey during the 1880s. Mahmud Tarzi even presented the King the work of his father "*Anlak -i-Hamidiya"* (Tarzi 2006). During

their stay in Damascus, Mahmud had the opportunity to meet the nationalists, idealists and young turks/jon turks. This proved to be a turning point in young Tarzi's life as the interaction with Turkish littérateurs, academicians and nationalists changed his outlook about the state and religion. Tarzi's interaction with the young Turks and nationalists established in him a deep concern about the association of the degenerating political situation in the Islamic world with imperialism. Tarzi was also influenced by other political developments in his immediate context. Reforms in Turkey: constitutional monarchy and formulation of the constitution, which was quite bold for an Islamic state tilted Tarzi's intellectual orientation towards the acceptance of reforms and incremental modernity as the solution for development of Islamic world (Tarzi 2006).

The period of Amir Amanullah (1919-1928), was the golden time for the Tarzis. Tarzi plays a prominent role in fomenting the support of the Amir for the cause of national freedom of Afghanistan from the British influence. This culminated in the 1919 third Anglo-British war and final declaration of independent Afghanistan(Roy 1986). During all these development Tarzi played an active role in helping the Amir Amanullah Khan to reform and modernise Afghanistan on the line of modern nation state. To implement the new reforms, Tarzi used his old friendship with Turkish nationalists and invited them to Afghanistan to help the Afghans in implementing key reforms in different sectors. Some of the prominent Technocrat Turks who came to Afghanistan during this period were: Elmi Fahmi (accountant), Munir Izzut Beg (doctor) and Raba Beg (engineer). Tarzi also invited teachers from Turkey to teach in Afghan schools (Tarzi 2006). This innovation in the education system resulted in the growing number of urban intellectuals in the country. Tarzi's contribution to reform in education and modernization in other fields, however, was confined to urban spaces regarding impact. Rural areas with their strong roots in tradition were averse to these changes: people in the rural space believed that these ideologies and reforms are foreign in origin and have no place in Afghan society and history.

Like Mahmud Tarzi, Nadir Khan of Musahiban family was also exposed to modernity, albeit in a different context. Musahibans were the other prominent diaspora family who came to Afghanistan at the end of Abdul Rahman's rule. Unlike

Tarzi, Musahban family migrated to India and had a deep influence of Indian system. Nadir Khan of Musahiban was born in British India. He belonged to the Mohammadzia branch of Barakzai Pashtuns. His great grandfather was the brother of Dost Mohammed the Amir of Afghanistan. Nadir Khan rose to power and was the general under Amir Amanullah during the third Anglo-Afghan war in 1919. Nadir Khan's approach towards modernization reflected a British Indian imprint. On several occasion, he opposed the reforms and modernisation process for being too fast on the traditional nature of Afghan society. He believed that reforms should be introduced in a gradual manner like the Britisher did in India (Roy 1986). Amir Amanullah's period was the most modern in its orientation in Afghanistan's history. Two important pillars of modernization: Constitution and the urban intellectual emerged during this period. These transformations were possible only due to the modern and intellectual orientation of Amir in the first place and the support of the team he had in Tarzi and Nadir Khan. However, despite an overarching commitment to modernization, Tarzi and Nadir Khan differed a lot on the question of how to go about it. The difference in their orientations is a marker of how host land situations influence the behaviour of the diaspora in homeland politics. That is, put it another way it also reinforces the influence of host land on the politics of homeland acting through the agency of diaspora.

During the Amanullah's period, their was an inflow of migration as people were coming to Afghanistan for better job opportunity and growth. The country was emerging as the new Muslim centre along with Turkey as a progressive state. But, this pace of modernisation and centralisation of state power could not carry the common people along with itself. The traditional Afghan society saw the progressive King and his supporters as enemies of tribal and religious practices. Among the various policies, the push to the participation of women in public sphere without the veil created major discontent in the traditional corridors. The grudges against the modernising King and his supporters in the traditional and religious segment of society crystallised into revolt against the king and finally led to his ouster from power in 1929 (Roy 1986).

The political upheaval of 1929 created a major setback for modernization efforts and their proponents in Afghanistan. This led to the migration of small intellectual

class which developed due to modernisation to Western countries including the King and his family. Amir Amanullah spent rest of his life in exile in Rome and finally died in 1960. Mahmud Tarzi left for Turkey and never came back. Nadir Khan already a sceptic of the paced modernization, played *realpolitik* by supporting the rebel Pashtun tribal leaders during the revolt and manipulated the developments to become the next Amir of Afghanistan in 1930 and assumed the title, Amir Nadir Shah. In the face of the revolt, The migrations of Afghans in a small scale albeit of the elite and intellectual strata to developed countries marked the beginning of Afghan diaspora formation in the West. Neither the king Amanullah Khan nor his supporters ever tried to come back and play any role in Afghan politics; this is quite contrary to what is happening at present when diaspora and their involvement is very active in the homeland. The answer to such question lies in the context of diaspora involvement in both host and homeland politics. Prominent among them is the role played by the American Afghan diaspora. The reason for the active participation of Afghan-American in the post-2001 situation also highlights the importance of the host land in the diaspora's approach towards the homeland politics, especially in post-conflict scenarios.

Apart from the migration of the elite to West in the 1930s, those in the lower strata also had recourse to the migration to immediate neighbouring countries in the face of natural calamities, tribal feuds and economic opportunities. This kind of migration was a continuation of the patterns that existed historically. Moreover, for economic opportunities, only male members move out and send remittance back home. This type of migration increased during 1950 and 1960s with the oil boom in Gulf countries (Stigter 2006, ICG 2009). The migration of people from Iran and Pakistan to Gulf countries created a vacuum in the labour economy in these countries. Afghans used the opportunity fill in these gaps by migrating to these countries.

Migration continued as a routine economic activity in Afghanistan till the 1980s. The 1980s however, brought a paradigm shift in Afghan migration patterns. The peace and stability at that came with Amir Nadir Shah's reconciliation between state and the traditional authority created an environment of peace (in the absence of any competition or contestation for power) that lasted for around two decades.

However, the rise of Daoud (Prime Minister) threatened the stability of the power equilibrium by his emergence as an alternative centre of power in the 1950s and 1960. The power tussle with King Zahir Shah ushered in a legitimacy crisis for the authority of the state. However, it eventually climaxed when Zahir Shah took complete control of the state by compelling Daoud to resign. These tussles resulting in de facto coups and counter-coups did create an environment of uncertainty for people, thus pushing them towards the path of migration ending in immediate neighbouring countries. However, the onset of a transformed political scene in the 1980s ushered in by the Soviet invasion brought in a radical change in the Afghan migration history: the scale at which Afghans migrated to Iran and Pakistan was unparalleled in the history of Afghanistan (Stigter 2006).

The migration during the 1980s was quite different from all the previous migration in the history of Afghanistan. The uniqueness of this migration was its forced or involuntary character caused by external interference and invasion. The compulsion for the migration came out of the incompatibility between Afghan society and the socialist project following the imperial invasion by Russia. The traditional Afghan society was not ready for any form of reforms that came in the name of Communism. The Afghan populace believed and was convinced by their traditional leaders to believe in that there is no compatibility between Islam and the atheistic Communism, so people must wage a holy war (Jihad) against the Soviet (Monsutti 2006). The way out of the nascent Communist structures that came in Afghanistan was a war against it or to migrate thus escaping its influence. The war against the Communists and other contestations that followed following the departure of Communists created situations impelling people to migrate. Therefore, the number of migrants and refugees also ran into millions, and such large-scale migration never happened before in Afghan history or any other parts of the world. A rough comparison of the refugee migration between Afghanistan and other conflict areas during the 1980s and 1990s indicates the paradigm shift in the Afghan migration history regarding the cosmic proportion it assumed numerically. During the 1980s and 90s, the number of Afghans refugees outnumbered all other figures of refugees globally. A preliminary comparison with the case of Mozambique reveals that, at the peak of Mozambique refugee crisis in 1992, the number of refugees was 1.3 million,

while at the same time the Afghan refugees were numbered at 4.6 million. Similarly, the Rwanda refugee crisis of 1994 created a population of 2.3 million refugees, and during the same period, the crisis in Afghanistan produced 2.3 million refugees. This establishes the sheer magnitude of the forced migration of Afghans during the 1980s and 1990s (UNHCR 2000).

The main destinations of the migrating Afghans between 1979-1989 were the immediate neighbouring countries: Iran and Pakistan. A rough estimate places that over 2.6 million Afghans migrated to Iran and over 1.5 million to Pakistan between 1979-1989 (Monsutti 2006; UNHCR 2005). Several factors were responsible for the emergence of Iran and Pakistan as the destinations for the refugees. These include geographical proximities, cultural similarities and religious affiliation (Ashrafi and Moghissi 2002). Afghans migrated to both West and countries in the immediate neighbourhood. However, those migrated to West belonged to the urban and upper strata of the society. While most of the people who migrated to neighbouring countries were from rural areas and were very poor to migrate to western countries.

An important factor that not only facilitated the dynamics of politics during Soviet period but also accentuated migration of Afghans was the interplay between global geopolitical realities and local political developments. Afghanistan emerged as an important theatre where the Cold War between the Great Powers was played out through local agents. The Russians came to Afghanistan to support its protégée government PDPA rule, and the American's started supporting the rivals of PDPA the mujahideen. The significance that Afghanistan assumed as a political landscape is evident from the fact that the political situation in Afghanistan immediately found itself coupled with other geopolitical issues in the larger region. The problems between India and Pakistan over Kashmir and other border issues between them assumed significance in the context of the situation in Afghanistan. On the other hand, the Islamic revolution in Iran made its contribution to the problematic regional political dynamics with its resonance in Afghanistan. Overall, the emergence of a turbulent politics in the wider region and their linkages with Afghanistan—regarding the game of Great power interests—made Afghanistan the battleground where Great powers competed to secure their respective material and ideological objectives. The

great power involvement magnified the already present contests on the ground at the local level and thus took the situation out of control and made violence the order of the day. All these processes cumulatively contributed to the escalation of the process of mass scale migration of Afghans.

The mass scale migration of Afghans to the neighbouring countries of Iran and Pakistan was determined by the internal dynamics of these countries. The Shia population among Afghans opted for Iran for their migration destination. Iran emerging as a nascent state based on ideology responded with warmth. The Iranian government adopted the policy of provision of blue card to Afghan refugees to facilitate the provision of essential services: the blue card meant that an Afghan refugee could have free access to social services like education and health. Further, legally, the refugees were assigned the status of *mohajirin* (religious migrants) and were given the permission to work in certain fixed sectors of the economy (Abbasi and Shavazi et.al 2005).

The Pashtuns and Sunni population among Afghans opted for Pakistan and the destination of migration because of cultural and religious reasons. The Pashtun tribes of southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan found it natural to move to Pakistan inhabited by fellow Pashtuns just across the Durand line. Apart from the Sunni Afghans, few among Shia Afghans also migrated to those areas of Pakistan, which had a substantial Shia population (Monsutti 2006). The Pakistani idea of gaining strategic depth in the region by controlling the Afghan politics was the main objective behind its support of large-scale migrant. The manner in which Pakistan approached and managed the Afghan refugees indicates the coupling of its Afghan refugee policy with wider foreign policy objectives. Moving beyond the immediate warmness of its approach to Afghan refugees, the Pakistani state also displayed certain form of anxiety in its approach towards the refugees. Unlike Iran, the Afghan in Pakistan were settled in refugee camps and were forced to register with any of the six Afghan war parties to get assistance. The main reason for doing this was to keep the refugees under control and ensure that they couldn't form a government in exile in Pakistan (Roy1986). Formation of government by the refugees in exile would have created a problem for Pakistan in the management of its Pashtun population. Further,

it would have also created a problem for its sovereignty.

In Iran the Afghan refugees were in better condition in comparison with their counterparts in Pakistan. Unlike in Pakistan, where the refugees were settled in refugee camps in and around urban spaces, the Afghan refugees in Iran were mostly settled in rural areas, which were far more hospitable than the harshness of the camps in Pakistan (Abbasi and Shavazi et.al 2005).

The end of the Cold War corresponding with the exit of Soviet from Afghanistan, thus marking an end to the Soviet period of Afghanistan did not usher in a period of peace and stability. The departure of Soviet from the political scene of Afghanistan opened it up as the stage for next round of confrontations—this time however domestic in nature. The conflict was the outcome of the incompatibilities among different tribes and ethnic groups. The incompatibilities of the groups, especially the leaders had grown due to their polarisation in the host countries: Iran and Pakistan during their stay as migrants and refugees. The polarisation along ethnic and sectarian lines eventually led to civil war during the 1990s. The civil war recreated the cycle of migration to immediate neighbouring countries first and then to Western countries. However, the migrants this time comprised mainly of urban elites and the supporters of the previous regime—the PDPA. This time the migrants mostly migrated to Western and developed countries (Stigter 2006).

Moreover, within Afghanistan, in response to the civil war, another movement by the Talib or Taliban gained momentum. Initially, Taliban succeeded in bringing peace and ensuring some form of security. However, the religious nature of the movement with its policy of implementation of Sharia laws to govern the country did not find many buyers among the Afghans. Islam had always provided a binding element during external invasions and internal political instability caused by modern ideologies (Roy1986). However, application of Islam was never stretched in Afghanistan beyond the binding function. Islam never became the governing principle in Afghanistan. The society was governed by tribal norms and tradition. *Pashtunwali* —the tribal code had the final say in the governance of day to day life of the tribes. The Taliban's attempt to change the basis of governance from *Pashtunwali* to

religious laws was not acceptable to the people. In the Taliban rule based on Taliban's interpreted *Sharia*, women and minorities were at the receiving end. The rule compelled minorities group to migrate. Thus the transition to Taliban rule from the half decade of civil war did not bring an end to the process of migration in Afghanistan.

The series of migrations of the Afghans in the 20th century led to the development of a substantially big community of the Afghan diaspora (near and wider) located in various parts of the world. The Afghan migration story in 20th century revolved around the project of the Afghan state. Quests of building a strong state attempts to transform its ideological character and involvement of Great powers to control the state through different regimes as part of larger global struggle created confrontations, disorder and series of violent interactions among groups. The situation of insecurity that resulted from it created the push factor for series of migrations. The assessment and understanding of the migration patterns of the Afghans are crucial to the understanding of the process of formation of Afghan diaspora. It also helps in revealing the complexities within Afghan diaspora and in understanding the experiences of Afghan diaspora visa a vis both homeland and the host land. Further, understanding of the migration will also help in the development of the Afghan diaspora. The subsequent sections will attempt to bring this understanding by drawing a wise country profile of Afghan diaspora in key countries that were important destinations of Afghan migration.

4.2. Country Wise Profile of Afghan Diaspora/ Migrants

The immediate response of Afghans to external invasion and civil war was the migration to safer areas in the neighbouring countries of Iran and Pakistan. Their decision of either staying in the neighbouring countries or moving forward depended upon the situation in these countries. Their financial conditions also played an important role in their decision-making capabilities. Apart from the civil war and the invasions, individual Afghans migrated to different places for different reasons. In host countries, there is diversity in patterns of assimilation of the migrants. Some countries displayed hospitality towards the migrants while others were hostile or

insensitive towards them. In case of the West, integration of Afghan has been easier in British and American society due to cultural factors. Regarding treatment, Afghan received friendlier treatment in Germany as compared with France, despite their uniform integrationist immigration policy (Sadat 2008).

The patterns of migration relied heavily on past experiences, knowledge and cultural ties with host countries. Migration of elite Pashtuns to Great Britain, Tajiks to Germany and Hazaras to Austria and Sweden following the Soviet invasion were based on such ties and connections developed with these countries in pre-Soviet period itself. So, the presence of transnational information circulation and links among the members of the Afghan diaspora acted as the key influence shaping the selection of destination countries by the elite Afghan migrants. Along with the transnational connections, the migration policy and social benefits of the host land also played an important role in the determination of migration destination. Norway, Finland and Sweden were preferred destinations only because of their migration policies (Dimitriadi 2012).

The Afghan diaspora within the host countries across globe encountered a diversity of experiences regarding living conditions, social support and assimilation in the host societies. Several factors influenced the shaping of the form of the diaspora in the host countries. These include the geographic, linguistic and cultural background of the migrants and their political and religious affiliations in the homeland context. Alongside these factors with their roots in the homeland, several factors associated with the host land: political culture, economic condition and location also contributed to the determination of the character of the diaspora. Taking the case of location, Afghans living in Germany displayed a sense of superiority as compared with those in America, who was viewed by them as people merely interested in business and pleasure. At times perceptional views of each other in terms hierarchy were evident even among the diaspora within a host country. Afghans living in Virginia perceived themselves to be more refined and educated than those living in California, despite the presence of best universities in California (Sadat 2008).

Overall, the Afghan diaspora itself emerged as a complex entity characterised

by the presence of a multiplicity of ideological and cultural preferences and economic interests. Within a host land, the diaspora never appeared as a singular entity organised around a consensus about identity, responsibility and function. The best way to understand the sociological and political forms of the Afghan diaspora is by undertaking a destination specific ethnographic mapping of the diaspora. The next few sections aspire to draw the outline of the form of the Afghan diaspora by ethnographic mapping of the Afghan diaspora in Iran, Pakistan, US and Europe.

4.2.1 Iran

Among the different Afghan groups, the Hazaras found Iran as the most preferred destination in times of crisis throughout their history. The Hazara community in Iran belonged to an officially recognised tribal group called Khawari (Abbasi-Shavazi et.al 2005). The presence of traditional links between the Afghans in general and Hazaras in particular with Iran allowed Afghan migrants and refugees in the 1980s and 1990s to move to Iran, thus escaping the insecurities and impacts of the war and other confrontations related with internal rivalries. The huge volume of Afghan refugees is evident from the fact that in 2001, UNHCR registered around one million Afghans in Iran (UNHCR 2011c). Apart from the registered refugees, at its peak, an estimate of the Iranian government placed the number of illegal Afghan migrants at around 2 million of which 340.000 were expected to live in Tehran provinces alone. As late as 2005, the total number registered Afghans living in Iran by Iranian official statistics was little over one million, of this 54.7 % were males and 45.3% female (Abbasi-Shavazi et.al 2009).

Despite the high number of Afghan migrants and refugees in Iran, very few Afghans managed to obtain Iranian citizenship. According to Article 2 of Iranian Civil Code, anyone born to an Iranian father, no matter if born in Iran or abroad is considered as Iranian citizens. In paragraph 6 of Article 976, according to which, once a woman of foreign citizenship get married to an Iranian man, she will automatically be considered as Iranian citizenship. In general, the Iranian Parliament rejected the idea of granting citizenship to the Afghan spouses of Iranian women. However, in certain circumstances, the Iranian government allowed the issuance permanent residence

permits to some Afghan nationals under specific conditions (Ashrafi-Moghissi 2002). An important aspect of the legal administration of the Afghan refugees by the Iranian government was that, despite being a signatory to the UN's 1951 Refugee Convention, very few Afghans were granted the status of refugee (legally) and given the right of assignment of settlement in Iran. Even those who came in the early 1980s as refugees were granted only a temporary stay permits (Wickramase Kara et.al 2006). So far the period spent by Afghan refugees in Iran is concerned, from the total number of Afghans who returned to their home country with assistance of UNHCR from 2002-06, 58% have lived in Iran for less than 10 years, 20% had lived in Iran for 10-19 years and 22% had lived for more than 20 years (Abbasi-Shavazi 2005, Glazebrook 2006). This shows that despite a prolonged period of stay in Iran, the Afghans were granted neither citizenship status nor the refugee status.

The practice of the Iranian government of not granting citizenship or refugee status had a greater impact of the second generation Afghan migrants. Being completely detached from the homeland in the absence of any experience of having lived there and the absence of status clarity within Iran, they faced an immense identity crisis as they were not accepted in host land and found the problem of assimilation in the homeland. Upon their return in Afghanistan, they were considered more Iranian than Afghans due to their greater command over Persian. The identity confusion associated with the linguistic usage also surfaced in other contexts —in host lands. That is in West, due to the usage of Persian language, Afghans were treated as Iranian. In Greece, there were incidents when Afghans were recorded as Iranians because of the language usage, despite their declaration of themselves as of Afghan origin (Abbasi-Shavazi et.al 2005). The problems for the second and third generation of Afghan refugees further accentuated with the changes in Iran's policy towards Afghanistan after 2001. The new legislations brought in Iran to administer Afghan refugees in Iran brought in series of restrictions. One such legislation banned Afghans and other foreigners from enrolling in the University to study certain specific subjects: defence, IT and energy. Further, they were allowed to study in certain specified regions only. So those studying in other places had to migrate to the permitted places (UN Dispatch 2012). Also in the field of education, Iranian state came with certain other harsh measure. In 2002, the government repealed the license

of Afghan schools, which were considered to be encouraging the presence of Afghans in Iran. By 2004, the education subsidy, which was provided by the government to Afghans in Iranian schools was also abolished. Further, several Afghan schools were closed (Saito 2009).

Iran's policy towards the Afghan migrants and refugees changed from time to time depending upon the internal and the external condition of the country. With the freshness of the initial high of the Islamic revolution, Iran granted Afghans the status of "religious" migrants in 1980. The move was part of Iran's larger quest to secure legitimacy and gain popularity in the Muslim world. Therefore, Iran easily granted Afghans entry into Iran and provided them with the blue card. The blue card meant that they have full access to social services like education and health care like the citizens of Iran (Monsutti 2006). However, towards the end of the decade with growing burden on the Iranian economy due to Iran-Iraq war, Iran brought in a shift in its Afghan refugee/migrant policy. The Afghans migrants who came in the 1990s were given the status of economic migrants only, thus taking away the access to social benefits which the religious migrants had. Further, Iran also started the process of repatriation of the Afghan refugees with the help of United Nations (Abbasi- Shavazi, MJ, D. Glazebrook et.al 2008).

A further change in Iran's policy towards Afghan refugees came in the context of the post-2001 scenario. The Iranian state cancelled all previous cards issued to Afghans and began the process of registering the migrants as fresh. The objective behind the move was to draw an exact estimate of the number of Afghans in Iran and start the process of large-scale repatriation of them to Afghanistan. The process of repatriation finally started from 2005-6 and thousands of Afghans are forced by the Iranian government to repatriate to their homeland.

4.2.2 Pakistan

Pakistan had the largest concentration of Afghan refugees among all the host countries. However, the exact figure of Afghan refugees that were present in Pakistan is not available due to the huge variance in the figure of different agencies. The extant literature on Afghan refugees in Pakistan put the estimate between 3 to 5 million

(Punjani 2002, Turton&Marsden 2001, Dimitriad 2013). In Pakistan, most of the Afghan refugees were stationed in refugee camps located along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and in other urban areas. Overall, it is estimated that approximately 400 refugee camps were set up, mostly in North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan. The camps were near big cities like Peshawar, Karachi and Quetta. Just like Iran, religious and tribal affinities played an important role in the attraction of Afghan refugees into the country. The large part of the chunk of Afghan refugees that were welcome into Afghanistan in the 1980s were Sunni Pashtuns. The refugee count of 2002 made by UNHCR showed that 81percent of the refugee population belonged to Sunni Pashtun tribes. Of the total population of refugees then, 42 percent lived in camps while other 58 percent lived in urban areas (UNHCR 2002). The Afghan refugees upon their entry in the 1980s found substantial administrative support on the part of the Pakistani state. They were freely allowed to work and mix with the local population (Dimitriadi 2013). The level of support is evident from the fact that, the second-generation Afghans that grew up in Pakistan were habituated to a standard of living (comprising of accessibility to services, food, shelter and employment) not available in Afghanistan (Strigter 2006, Dimitriadi 2013). In the domain of education, all Afghan migrants in Pakistan were allowed access to education regardless of the fact that whether they had a residence permit or had refugee identity. Further, the Pakistani government permitted the establishment of Afghan schools to impart teachings about Pashto and Dari in the camps and cities (Edwards 1986, Saito 2009).

Several factors were responsible for shaping and bringing in regular shifts in Pakistan's Afghan refugee policy. Apart from the religious and ethnic similarities, the geopolitical considerations of having greater influence in Afghanistan than India determined Pakistan's approach towards the Afghan refugees. The strained relation of Pakistan with India and the conception of India as the rival in Pakistan's Grand strategy, made it allow Afghan refugees—viewed as a medium of influence into Pakistan (Dimitriadi 2013). However, apart from the strategic positioning of Afghanistan vis a vis India, the changing policies of Great powers towards Afghanistan also shaped Pakistan's policy towards the Afghan refugees. In the changed context of 2001, Pakistan pushed forward its policy shift of 1ˢᵗ January 2000, whereby, the government announced that it would no longer consider the new arrivals

of migrants from Afghanistan as *prima facie* refugees. Post-2001, Pakistan adopted the policy of issuing of arrest and deportation order to deal with newly arriving Afghan refugees. It also directed UNHCR to stop issuing identity cards to migrants in the refugee camps citing that: the new residents of camps are economic migrants and not refugees fleeing from the political situation (Saito and Hunte 2007).

However, following Indian attempts to make an outreach to Afghanistan, Pakistan in 2007 toned down on harsh measures that it sought after 2000. To 'safeguard the refugee status' the registration card (Proof of Registration POR) was adopted in 2007. The card was valid for three years. It enabled the identification of the refugees and offered them protection from deportation. The card set 2009 as the limit of legal stay of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. That is, the refugees were made free to participate in one of the voluntary or assisted return programmes started in 2002 or were supposed to leave Pakistan on their own by 2009. Until 2007, when first registration took place, and Afghan refugees in Pakistan were provided with POR cards, Afghan refugees lived in Pakistan without any legal documents for 28 years (Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 2009). In a nutshell, the POR card was a policy measure to give the Afghan refugees a sufficient time to prepare and arrange the logistics for their return to Afghanistan (Turton and Marsden 2002).

So far the issue of legal assimilation in the host country is concerned, the citizenship rules of Pakistan created sufficient road block for Afghan attempt to secure Pakistani citizenship. A total of 110 Afghans were given Pakistani citizenship in 2008. The number drastically reduced to 7 in 2009 and 9 in 2010 (Pakistan Today 2010). Article 14 of the Pakistani Citizenship Act was a major hurdle: accordingly, Pakistan does not recognise dual citizenship. Despite the presence of the act, it is interesting to note that Pakistan signed dual citizenship agreements with UK, Canada and Australia. Another important aspect of the Pakistan Citizenship Act concerned with the assignment of citizenship in the rule allowing a foreigner marrying a Pakistani man to get Pakistani citizenship. This act thus allowed women among Afghans the option to get Pakistani citizenship in the case of their marriage with a Pakistani man. In order to facilitate a greater integration of Afghans into Pakistani society as its citizens, there have been regular advocacy of changes in Pakistani citizenship laws in accordance

with international practices, thus making Afghans staying for more than seven years in Pakistan eligible for citizenship and also allowing any Afghan child born on Pakistani soil the entitlement to citizenship (Khattak et. al 2006). But these suggestions are not taken seriously by the Pakistani government and Afghan are still treated as outsiders despite spending half of their lives in the country.

4.2.3 Europe

The Bonn process of 2001 that took place in Germany was driven by the objective to find a framework for post-conflict peace-building and reconstruction in Afghanistan. The process led to Bonn agreement of 2001, which was signed by all the Afghan parties except Taliban. The participation and role of Afghans situated in Europe during Bonn process displayed the activation and significance of Afghan diaspora in Europe towards the political process of the homeland. Bonn process also became a moment to delve into Europe to find the size and form of Afghan diaspora in Europe. It was discovered that the Germany had the largest chunk of Afghan migrants. That is, a total of 7,21,999 Afghans were living in Germany (Baraulina et.al 2007). After Germany, around 55,000 Afghans were in Britain (Minority Right Group Inst. 2009). Finally, there were microscopic Afghan communities in Netherlands, Sweden, Norway and some of the other European countries. Beside some small number in other parts of Europe like Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, etc.

The Afghan diaspora in Germany has a substantial component of those Afghans who have acquired German citizenship apart from the refugees. According to the data of the Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development, approximately 100,000 Afghans migrants have settled in Germany. It includes all people of Afghan who have gained Germany's citizenship during over a period. Since this category is no longer registered with the Foreign Central Registry, the official number of Afghans (by nationality) was 488752 in Germany till 2009 (Statisticches Bundesamt 2009).

The maximum chunk of Afghan migrants in Germany consisted of the educated elite: students and teachers fleeing the repressive Communist regime (Bauralina et.al 2006). A study conducted by Change Institute found that majority of Afghans in Germany were Pashtuns followed by a small presence of other communities: Tajiks,

Uzbeks and Hazaras (Change Institute 2009). The Afghan Diaspora in Germany was a very well organised community with some community and cultural associations (Zunzer 2004). The community was connected through the online website of "Afghan-German Online". It acts as a key forum of exchange and provides the medium through which the Afghan community interacts with each other and give a shape to the "imagined" community of the Afghan diaspora in Germany—thus reinforcing the Afghan identity in host land. The commitment, network and identity association made the Afghan-German diaspora a natural group engaged with the Bonn process of 2001-2002.

Apart from Germany, the number of Afghan diaspora in other European countries were small. In Netherlands, very few asylum applications were submitted by the Afghans. As per the statistics of Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), only ten asylum applications were submitted in 1980. This count reached to 140 by 1985. This expansion was because of the increase in mass scale migration caused by the Soviet invasion and related developments. In the post-Soviet period, there has been an increase in the number of application for asylum between 1998 to 2000 (Seigel 2010). Netherlands had a relatively relaxed policy towards Afghan refugees. Between 1994 to 2002, it accepted asylum requests without a greater deal of individual scrutiny and residence permits was issued with relative ease (Bevelandes and Veenman 2006, Seigel 2010). There has been a gradual one directional expansion in the size of Afghan migrants in Netherlands since the 1990s. In the early 1990s, the numbers of Afghan registered as living in Netherlands was 600. The number expanded to 4916 by 1996, and it went up to 37709 in 2009, which includes both first and second-generation Afghans (CBS 2009).

Though asylum seeking has been the main mode through which Afghan have entered Netherlands, a minuscule number of Afghans have also had recourse to other forms of migration: for work and education. That is, between 1995 to 2007, 28 Afghans entered Netherlands for work, 20 for study and 67 entered Netherland for other purposes (CBS 2008 and Seigel 2010). An interesting reason for which Afghans have moved to Netherlands has been family reunification. Family reunification was a mechanism through which existing Afghans of Netherlands brought in their family members to

Netherlands. In this regard, around 800 claims for family reunification with partners and around 180 claims for family reunification with children were filed in Netherlands between 1996 to 2001 (Nicolas et.al 2004).

Greece despite being frequented by Afghans served more as a transit country than destinations for Afghans (Bathaie 2009, Dimitriadi 2013). The reason why Greece served as a transitory country was the presence of pre-existing preferences for alternative destinations. The system of reception and settlement of asylum seekers that Greece had also contributed to the emergence of Greece as more of the transitory country. The Afghan Migrant and Refugee Community in Greece classified Afghans coming from Afghanistan into three broad categories. The first category comprised of political refugees, who have migrated due to the threat to their lives due to their political beliefs. The second category comprises of minorities facing the threat of persecution due to their religious beliefs and identity. People in this category have largely migrated from Ghazni and Kandahar. People from the Hazara community have opted the path of migration due to such concerns. The final category comprised of people who have migrated due to different pull and push factors. Economic opportunity was an important pull factor. That is, the decision of migration by Afghans in this category was shaped by their quest for better working opportunities that were available in Europe (Dimitriadi 2013).

The Afghan diaspora in Greece was not very well organised socially. The Afghans in Greece participated in diaspora activities at a very small scale. There were several initiatives intended in the direction of providing the Afghan community in Greece a definite form by creating registered organisations. Two such important organisations were the Community of Afghan Migrants and Refugees and the Association of United Afghans. However, despite the quest for an organised effort, the initiatives could not attract the participation of a great number of Afghans. Only 160 Afghans registered as members of both the organisations. Afghans in Greece opted out of the definitive forms of participations that came through formalised bodies. They rather preferred the flexibility of informal an ad-hoc based initiatives (Dimitriadi 2013). So, they did not register themselves with any of the organisations. The extremely low participation of Afghans in the organisation was due to their poor

integration with the society—a fact which can be attributed to the treatment of Greece as a temporary base for their final movement to other destinations in Europe.

Alongside it, the tendency of this associations to reproduce the fissures of the traditional lifestyle of Afghanistan also acted as a deterrent. That is, organised associations often reproduced the tribal ties and associations which fragmented them and isolated them from their peers in different ethnic groups within Greece (Dimitriadi 2013).

4.2.4 United States America

The United States, over a period, emerged as one of the important destination for Afghan migrants. The exact estimates of Afghans living in America vary from source to source depending upon the parameters taken into consideration. According to the survey of American Community Survey (ACS) in 2006, 65972 registered Afghans were present in the country at that time. However, the estimates by other sources put the number of Afghans in the country to be around 300,000 (Embassy of Afghanistan Washington D.C 2006). Most of the Afghans who emigrated to the US in the early 1980s, mostly arrived from either Pakistan or Western Germany. That is, US emerged as the second destination for Afghan immigrants. Many Afghans have also preferred to move further to Canada. The number of Afghan immigrants in Canada was around 40,000 (Sadat 2008).

The Afghan migrants in America entered in different phases. The survey of 2006 of American Community Survey revealed that of the total 65972 registered Afghans, the majority(53%) entered the U.S before 1990. Further, an equal proportion of around 18.5% arrived in between 1990-1999, and around 18.5% arrived in the U.S in 2000 or later. Regarding gender representation, of the 67,972 Afghans living in U.S in 2006, around 49.2% were male and 50.8% females.

The selection of a particular country by Afghan migrants depended heavily on traditional links with the country, knowledge of the social and economic conditions of the destination country and the official citizenship and refugee policies. These parameters made the US an important and preferred destinations for the Afghans.

Unlike Pakistan and Iran, where a huge chunk of Afghan refugees flocked, the relaxed policy of citizenship of the US made it an important destination for upper middle class and urban elite who opted for the US after their initial migration to Iran and Pakistan (Dimitriadi 2013). Alongside it, the economic conditions of US became an important attractor for ambitious Afghans from rural areas as well. This is evident from the fact that many Hazaras moved to Washington DC, New York and New Jersey, where they worked as taxi drivers and found work opportunity in the catering industry (Monsutti 2007).

Apart from migrations during the Soviet period and subsequently in search of protection, security and economic reasons, family reunification also served as an important mechanism through which Afghans immigrated to the USA. As per US laws, the US citizens are allowed to sponsor married children, siblings and parents. This clause allowed the legally permanent Afghan residents of US to sponsor the migration of their family members to the US. In this way, family reunification served as an important source of migration of Afghans to the US even after Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan (Oeppen 2009).

Within America, the Afghan diaspora was scattered across different states. The prominent states where Afghan migrants lived were San Francisco (40,000), Northern Virginia (20, 000) and Southe California (10,000). New York and Virginia, had very few but prominent Afghans, who had been politically engaged in their home country and who wanted to continue to support their political stance in Afghanistan (Oeppen 2009).

Unlike the countries in Europe, Afghans in the US have found easy to legally integrate with the society. That is the 2006 census of US revealed that out of 65972 Afghans who were counted at that time a total of 29,672 persons had been naturalised US citizens. Out of these 29,672 48% were male, and 51.5% were female (U.S Census 2006). The legal assimilation of Afghans in the US was facilitated by the extant citizenship laws of the US. According to the US citizenship rules, every child that's born within the United States, regardless of their parent's race, citizenship or place of stay obtains US citizenship automatically. This then means that the second

generation among the Afghan diaspora in the US had a very loosely defined distinction between the homeland and the host land. The ambiguity is also evident in the various estimates of the Afghan migrants in the US. That is these surveys of Afghan migrants do not make a clear distinction between people of Afghan origin and people having US citizenship.

The event of 9/11 brought in a drastic transformation in the context of existence for the Afghan diaspora in the US. In the first place, it created a fear of hate crimes among the Afghan communities throughout the Afghan diaspora in the US. However, it also forced in a transformation in the manner in which Afghans approached their culture and identity vis a vis the host country. Before 9/11, adoption of an Americanized identity was relegated as taboo among the Afghan communities of US. However, the functional necessity of projecting themselves as American in response to the fear of hate crimes brought in a transformation in this approach. They began integrating into the American society. Further, they started projecting themselves as Americans and began participating in events in support of tolerance and started campaigns in support of US missions in Afghanistan. Further, they adopted the "hyphenated identity of Afghan-American" to also garner aid for Afghanistan (Sadat 2008). Of the various Afghan communities of US, those from Virginia and Maryland, in particular, had a greater influence on Us policy towards Afghanistan (Naby 2005). Gradually, over the next decade, The Afghan diaspora of US made a significant contribution to the Afghanistan reconstruction project. The education sector, in particular, saw a prominent influence of the Afghan diaspora in the US. They helped in the reconstruction of schools and which allowed around 6 million Afghan children to register for school (The Embassy of Afghanistan USA 2009).

4.3 The Present State of Afghan Diaspora

The onset of contemporary globalisation after the 1990s with corresponding space-time compression has transformed the form, character and role of the diaspora in transnational transactions and exchanges. Until then, diaspora as a concept and category was confined in its application to few homogenised groups like the Jews—historically a forced migrant community and the Greeks—with experience of

migration for economic purpose. The post-1990 saw a rapid global movement of groups and their inter-connection with homeland thus activating several migrant communities as active diaspora across the globe. This phase coincided with the second phase of mass migration of Afghans, triggered due to the civil war in post-Soviet context. Afghans initially opted nearer destinations like Iran and Pakistan for migration and from there headed for countries in West and other parts, depending on the socio-economic conditions of the prospective destination countries. The global integration combined with the civil war in Afghanistan to affect both the formation and the form of Afghan diaspora. It brought newer dynamics, affecting the nature of Afghan migration—how they would migrate and where they would migrate. That is it had an impact on their condition in the host countries, the interest of the host countries on the issue of Afghan migration and the relation between the homeland and the host land. These issues: pattern of Afghan migration, their form and feature in host-country, and the relationship between the homeland and the host land determined the kind of role that the diaspora played in the homeland politics particularly in the context of the post-2001 state-building process.

The migration in Afghanistan historically been a life strategy of people—used to escape both the natural and man-made difficulties. Man-made conditions that pushed for migration were associated with inter-tribal rivalries, conflicts emanating from political and ideological differences within the agents controlling the state. The confrontations emerging from the interaction between domestic politics and global political situations—involving great powers led to migration to mass scale migration of Afghan people. Migration has been both short term and long term depending upon the nature of push and pulls factors causing them. Finally, the destination of the migration depended upon both the factors causing the migration and on the ethno-religious and class composition of the migrants.

Migrations of Afghans which were caused by political developments related to the project of the state led to the formation of first Afghan diaspora in the 19th and 20th century. Here, the state-building project, which was started by Abdul Rahman in 1880s caused the formation of the Afghan diaspora in British India and Turkey. The Tarzi and Musahiban families along with many others migrated outside due to the

harsh policies of Abdul Rahman towards Turkey and British India respectively. The second generation members of these families came back only after the death of Amir Abdul Rahman. The Tarzi's and Musahiban's played very crucial role in the state-building process and modernisation of the country under Amir Amanullah Khan.

The political developments in the 1920s and the final exit of the great reformer king Amir Amanullah in 1929 again fuelled a new cycle of migration of a large chunk of Afghan elite. These include the King and his supporter and some urban intellectuals who had a political difference with the new ruling family. King Amanullah settled in Rome, and Mahmud Tarzi went back to Turkey, and neither of them tried to play any role in Afghan politics. An important reason for it was the absence of any opportunity to play any role due to the political stability and peace in the country established by the Musahiban rule. The religious and tribal leaders were also satisfied at that time, who otherwise always created problems for the state and thus created a political space for exploitation—by an alternate leadership.

After 1929, it was the political developments associated with the de facto coup of the last Afghan King Zahir Shah and his exile in the 1970s, that caused another wave of migration of Afghans due to political reasons, thus contributing to the formation of the Afghan diaspora. However, like in the past, there was a homogeneous composition of the migrants, that is the migration involved only the Afghan elites who moved in small number towards the West. King Zahir Shah himself migrated to Rome and settled there. He, however, kept track of the political developments in Afghanistan, especially after the Soviet invasion in 1980. He also formed a group along with other Afghan diaspora know as Rome group and tried to appeal to the international powers for the help of Afghanistan in the fight against the Soviets.

The nature of Afghan diaspora changed after the Soviet invasion due to the change in migration pattern. It fuelled the migration of both the elite as well as masses at large scale. The mass scale migration continued in the post-Soviet period. Further, the onset of contemporary globalisation based on new technologies of communication, digital media and liberalisation of global trade and exchanges has

brought in a shift in the scale, location and form of the Afghan diaspora. Apart from the political crisis and reasons related with insecurities, economic opportunities emerged as an important pull factor of the Afghan migration. The paradigm shift in the information and communication technology—the digital revolution has allowed the activation of Afghan diaspora in different parts of the globe. Today, the Afghan diaspora has emerged as one of the highly transnational groups equipped with money, goods and information. Through the digital world (social media) and other means of communication the Afghan diaspora has successfully established contacts with one another and with the homeland, thus making them an effective stakeholders in political processes in the homeland (Braakman 2005). From the contemporary vantage point, it has become an imperative to have a distinction between the 'near' and the 'wide' diaspora for an effective understanding of the interaction of the Afghan diaspora with politics in the homeland.

The near diaspora is those living in neighbouring countries of Iran and Pakistan. The absence of a provision for acquisition of citizenship for the 'near' Afghan diaspora has brought in a political uncertainty—identity wise for second and third generation Afghans, who could neither ascertain their identity in the host land country and nor could relate with the homeland in the absence of any real experience of having lived there. That is, their greater association with the host land culture, despite the political treatment of being from the homeland has made their identity more complex. The problem further escalates due to the regular changes in foreign policy of these neighbouring countries towards Afghan refugees and due to the transformations in the political conditions of Afghanistan. The 'near' diaspora due to their sheer number and superior skills and knowledge than Afghans inside homeland, plays a crucial role in the state-building process. Their role, however, is more of bottom up in orientation—they play a crucial role at ground level and not at the higher level of policy formulation. The extant literature, however, does not engage with the day to day engagements of the Afghan diaspora in the state-building activities at the ground level. Understanding of presence and functions of the near diaspora in the state-building activities is crucial for the understanding of the role of host land in the near vicinity of the homeland land politics. That is, it will bring a sense of how Iran and Pakistan use the near diaspora to influence both internal and the foreign policy of

Afghanistan.

The 'wide' diaspora comprises of those Afghans, who have mostly opted countries in the West as their host destinations. This type of diaspora is smaller, but, are more heterogeneous in nature as people migrated to these countries in different phases throughout the 20th century (Marieke Van Hout 2014). Further, the recent additions of members from different ethnic backgrounds with the onset of contemporary era in the history of globalisation have made the wider diaspora more complex in nature. Regarding skills and knowledge too, they display greater diversity. The western foreign policies, immigration and refugee policies of Western countries have made the life of the 'wide' Afghan diaspora easier with an easy accessibility of full citizenship and other rights particularly for the second and the third generations. These rights make a whole difference in their attitude towards both the host land and homeland, unlike the near diaspora who are denied any citizenship rights. The wider Afghan diaspora is more organised than, the nearer one regarding their structural and organisational skills (Koser& Van Hear 2003).

A rough estimation of Afghan diaspora is 2031,678 (including both near and wide diaspora) (World Bank 2007). Country wise, the highest number of Afghans lives in the neighbouring countries of Iran and Pakistan. Both of them account for around 2.5 million registered Afghan refugees and also an equal number of unregistered refugees. Moving beyond these two countries, approximately 300,000 have settled in the USA, 125,00 in Germany and a smaller number of other countries like Canada, Denmark, Germany, etc. (Figure 1 shows a clear distribution of Afghans in other countries).

Afghan Diaspora In Host land

Figure 1

Source: World Bank 2007

The extant literature—both policy and academic, while engaging with the theme of diaspora's role in state building in Afghanistan primarily focuses on the wide diaspora—located in West. This bias towards the wide diaspora is the outcome of the presence of a greater influence of the wider diaspora on the process of state-building. The wide diaspora has been able to exercise greater influence on the process of state building due to the presence of several factors these include: the host land's foreign policy towards Afghanistan, better education (English) of Afghans in host countries, improved economic conditions and influence of liberal democratic ideas in the Western world. Among the Afghans of various countries of West, the Afghan diaspora in Germany and US had greater visibility regarding their participation in activities and processes related to state building. The concentration of Afghan population in Germany was the result of Germany's liberal asylum policies that attracted a

substantially large number of Afghans in the 1970s (World Bank 2007). Germany continues to be a country of preference, as it has a large Afghan population—acting as connector inviting more Afghans (Braakman 2005). The Afghan population in the US is diverse, reflecting the various ethnic backgrounds of Afghan society. Most of the Afghans in the US belongs to the Pashtun and Tajik origin. Apart from them, a small number of Uzbek (in New York) and Hazaras (scattered around the country) are also there in the US (Robson and Lipson 2002). The Afghan refugees who are naturalised Swiss, German, US citizens also display a prominent presence in the diaspora space. Their participation is largely confined to the field of Afghan identity. On the one hand, constitutionally and legally, they take an active part as citizens in the political life of their countries. They are integrated into the economy of the country and in the social life of their immediate neighbourhoods. On the other hand, the cultural universe they belong to is in good part related to their community of origin regarding the use of the mother tongue, home food and concerns about the marriage of the young generation. Whatever their official nationality be, they spontaneously declare themselves to be Afghans. Afghan cultural associations, religious practices, ceremonies like weddings or funerals are favoured occasions, or loci where an ' Afghan culture' an Afghan way of life are produced and reproduced in exile with their religious and community life, and socio-cultural dimensions (Centlivers 2000). 'Afghan culture' and 'Afghan ways' are representations which are transmitted and activated by the existence of networks and the experience of living together and sharing of same norms and codes for several generations. Moreover, associations and ceremonies are also evidence of changes and adaptation to the host country. That is, with the passage of successive generations, integration with the host society comes in naturally. For instance, the more recently arrived Afghans parents try to keep the practice of speaking in Dari and Pashto in their children. However, the children face the problem of coping with two different culture i.e., one of their parents and other of their host society (Centlivers 2000).

The Afghan diaspora has been highly involved in the reconstruction efforts (Zunzer 2004). The diaspora played a significant political role in organising a peaceful transition after the NATO's military intervention in 2001/02. The diaspora members played an important role during the Petersburg Talks and the Bonn Process of political transition. They acted as connectors between the international community

and national administration, international civil society and private sector (2004). Some Afghan in exile have launched their peace processes, with the help and support of foreign governments, like the Rome process—focused on the former King Zahir Shah (funded by Italy and indirectly supported by the US) and the Cyprus process supported by some factions in Iran. The Rome process is the most important of these alternate peace processes. Since 1983, Zahir Shah periodically articulated the idea of resolving the Afghan conflict through the traditional means of convening an Emergency *Loya Jirga*. The *Loya Jirga* (Great Council) is a traditional institution of the Afghan political system. It is a state supported/facilitated system of consultation of the leaders of the tribe, thus, bringing in the tribal legitimation of the regime (Barnett 2001).

Contrary to the idea that people who have settled in Western countries (with their acquaintance and familiarity of democracy and human rights) may play a mitigating role in quelling the conflict in their home country, the ethnic fault lines are sometimes exacerbated in the wider Afghan diaspora, particularly in absence of the traditional homeland practices of agricultural and commercial cooperatives (Weiss Fagen and Bump 2006). Although the Afghan migratory networks have acquired a transnational dimension, they seem to be divided along the ethnic lines: Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks and others (Monsutti 2010). Further, the notion of diaspora as the stabiliser and peacemaker is also challenged by the possibility of the presence of powerful interests operating against peace with lobbies within the governments of both host land and homeland. These actors (spoilers) can become rich and powerful by exercising violence in a lawless environment, and they will attempt to subvert any peace process. Those benefiting from the drug trade, smuggling, and gem trade could fell into this category. Such spoilers are typically few, but they have clear interests and resources to pursue them, while the much larger number of the people suffering from the conflict lack resources and organisational capacity (Barnett 2001).

So far the question of participation in reconstructions efforts in concerned, despite their heterogeneous nature the Afghan diaspora have come together to assist in the reconstruction effort. There are four key initiatives that were established to engage the Afghan diaspora:

1) The World Bank has allocated US$1.5 million for a fund to hire qualified Afghans to return to Afghanistan and assist in the reconstruction effort.

2) The World Bank has established the World Bank Afghanistan Directory of Expertise, which is a database of skilled Afghan and non-Afghans with experience in Afghanistan.

3) The International Organisation for Migration (IOM)established a Temporary Return of Qualified Nationals Programme to engage the Afghan Diaspora in returning to work on training and capacity building projects

4) The Swiss Peace Foundation has established internet forum to create a dialogue between Civil society, the Diaspora and Government regarding peace in Afghanistan (Zunzer 207).

The role of Afghan diaspora in the state-building and reconstruction process through these programs will be discussed more elaborately in the next chapter.

4.4 Identity Experiences of the Afghan diaspora

Identity by framing the meanings and expectations associated with a role shapes the behaviour of an actor. However, the meanings and experiences related with identity are not static and are in constant state of flux. This dynamism associated with identity becomes more prominent in the case of diaspora due to its context of existence and multiplicity of referents in its cultural world of meanings. That is a member of diaspora has to negotiate with a multiplicity of factors and roles associated with its presence in the host land and several sets of practices and norms associated with the homeland. In diaspora space, the member of Afghan diaspora assumes several roles as a citizen or a migrant/refugee in the host country, as a member of the immediate social neighbourhood, and as a member of particular Afghan ethnic group. Above all these referents, the Afghan diaspora both participates in the creation of universal Afghan national identity at the global level and associated with it as a recipient of the identity. So the Afghan identity in the diaspora spaces is a complex

phenomenon dependent upon the host and context, the various Afghan ethnic groups and the Afghan national identity.

The social and political aspects of Afghan society related with community and group identity have also found expressions in the diaspora space. The competitive relations between various components of the Afghan society often has become more pronounced in the diaspora space. There has been a gradual change in the various Afghan communities. Forced migration has led to a process of urbanisation and de-tribalisation. At the macroscopic level, such transformations created an affiliation with the broader identity concerning the Afghan national identity. However, the day-to-day social actions and existence remain contingent on narrow social ties. That is, there is a line of tension between an abstract sense of Afghan-ness developed in exile and the particularistic group identities of the various Afghan ethnicities. So, at the operational day-to-day level, Afghan diaspora operates in a complex universe of identity matrix—depending upon a number of criteria: kinship, residential proximity, religious affiliation and educational level (Monsutti 2010).

4.5 Summary

Migration in Afghanistan has been the key adaptive strategy employed by people to escape hardships and disasters—both man made and natural. The people in Afghanistan migrated both inside and outside the country. These migrations came in phases depending upon the internal situation (war and instability) and external attraction (economic opportunities).The migration of people in Afghanistan had a historical association with the state-building process in the 19th and 20th century. The project of modern state and its concomitant processes of centralization and modernization often have yielded insecurities and socio-political uncertainties, thus pushing people from different sections and ethnic groups to undertake periodic migrations both within the country and internationally. The state-building process and formation of Afghan diaspora in the different host lands were closely related to each other. In the early 1880s, the centralisation of state power—pushing control of centre over the peripheries for the creation of a modern nation-state led to the migration of people. Subsequently, urban elites had to migrate due to their opposition to the

policies of Amir Abdul Rahman. With it, the effective process of the formation of Afghan diaspora in the neighbouring countries of British India, Iran and Turkey began. Those migrating during this period formed the first members of the global Afghan diaspora in the 20th century, who later came back to play an important role in the homeland politics. The very reasons that caused their migration outside the country—the state building project facilitated their return. This has been a repetitive pattern associated with later stages of the project of state in Afghanistan—which saw regular inflow and outflow of people. In a way, we can say that formation of Afghan diaspora and their role in the state-building process to a certain extent depended upon: how the state-building project was carried out by different rulers from time to time.

The migration of Afghans during the 1980s was different from all the previous migrations that took place in the history of Afghanistan. The uniqueness of this migration was that the compulsion that generated the movement of Afghans at this stage was external interference and invasion. Both the cause and the scale of migration of Afghans during this phase was distinct in the history of Afghanistan. According to rough estimates over 2.6 million Afghans migrated to Iran and over 1.5 million to Pakistan between 1979-1989 (Monsutti 2006, UNHCR 2005). Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran were the main destinations for Afghan refugees. The reasons that determined the migration of Afghans were geographical proximities, cultural similarities and religious affiliations (Ashrafi and Moghissi 2002). Apart from it the class dimension also played a prominent role in the determination of the migration destinations. That is educated, and upper-middle-class Afghans from urban areas opted for different countries in West as the final destinations of their migration.

The migration of Afghans over the decade led to the development of Afghan diaspora (near and wider) in various parts of the world. Today the Afghan diaspora is a transnational group equipped with money, goods and information. Members of the Afghan diaspora have been on a constant move from one host country to another. The members of Afghan diaspora are connected with each other through community associations linked mainly through digital connections and the internet (Braakman 2005). As an identity group, Afghan diaspora exhibits and at times exacerbates traditional and ethnic fault lines. Despite having acquired a transnational dimension,

the Afghan migratory networks are often divided along the ethnic lines (Monsutti 2010).

CHAPTER 5

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT OF AFGHAN DIASPORA IN STATE-BUILDING

5. INTRODUCTION

5.1 SOCIO-ECONOMIC REMITTANCE

    5.1.1 Social Remittance

    5.1.2 Economic Remittance

5.2 POLITICAL DIMENSION OF DIASPORA PARTICIPATION IN STATE-BUILDING

    5.2.1 Diaspora In Host-land Politics

    5.2.2 Involvement In Homeland Politics of State-Building

5.3 IMPLICATIONS OF DIASPORA PARTICIPATION IN STATE BUILDING

5.4 SUMMARY

Introduction

The US-led War on Terror in 2001 to end the Taliban rule in Afghanistan began a new chapter in the state-building process of the country. The series of developments that unfolded since the Soviet invasion of 1980s have weakened both the significance and meaning of the Afghan state in the Afghan political life. However, the aftermath of 9/11 saw US led international community's participation for state-building in Afghanistan as a part the larger peace-building process. On 27 November 2001, all the Afghan factions gathered at Bonn to discuss the future of Afghan state under the supervision of UN. The objective of this conference was to choose an interim government and a new leader who is acceptable to all the parties involved in the peace-building process except the Taliban. The new phase of State-building was a complex one trying to accommodate many actors within its fold: Northern Alliance, Rome Group, Peshawar group, and Cyprus (Rashid 2008).The internal problems within each group involved in the state-building process further complicated the state-building process. The best example was the growing difference between the older and younger generation leaders of Northern Alliance. A main issue of contention was the nature of the state. The older generation comprised of warlords wanted to maintain their political status and positions, hence, were opposed to any kind of reforms. The younger ones on the other hand wanted a broader approach which involves the inclusion of Pashtuns also in the state-building process. Alongside the internal actors, range of international actors like US, Pakistan, Iran and other regional powers came with their own baggages of diversity of interests.

Moving beyond the internal and international actors, diaspora and transnational actors with their location at the liminal space between domestic and international added the third dimension to the Afghan state-building process. Most of the cabinet ministers during the interim government formed in 2001 under President Karzai's leadership comprised of diaspora members. So, a consideration of the role of Afghan diaspora in the post-Bonn process is vital for any understanding of the state-building process in Afghanistan.

The supply of skilled actor is vital for the revival of the state in a post-conflict set up. Diaspora and migrants are employed in the homeland to fill in the gap caused by skill deficiencies that have come in the country due to its relative underdevelopment or due to the destruction of those institutions in the conflict, which were producing skilled manpower. Alongside the skill factor, diaspora also comes in prominence due to the function of remittances. The process through which material and social remittances are constituted is multifaceted and operate within a dynamic global system involving multiple state, non-state and transnational actors (Hanifi 2006). Material remittances include cash transfers, as well as non-monetary donations such as used books, clothes and sports equipment. A survey conducted by the Afghanistan Investment Support Agency (2004) found that around 50,000 Afghan living in USA and Canada send approximately $1500 per person or a total of $75 million per year to Afghanistan. Most of the cash transaction is done through informal channels like *hawala* run by Afghans with transnational organisational structure and links. Among various other aspects of social and political life, remittances have significant impact on the very process of formation of the state. The involvement of various actors in the operation of remittance helps in state-building, especially in post-conflict situations.   Remittances and migration are intimately linked to the characteristics of the migrants, and the nature of their migration choices—which affects the development of subsequent remittance flow (IOM 2014). Several key economic activities in which the diaspora participates, influences the process of state building. Some of these important transnational activities are: the private investment (of money into a business or developmental projects, knowledge transfer, etc.), economic remittances (transfers of money to individuals), political lobbying and temporary or permanent return to the homeland (Gooijer 2010).

This chapter seeks to highlight the scale and significance of transnational activities associated with the diaspora that have their bearings on the state-building process in Afghanistan. The chapter will try to map the involvements of the diaspora in the social, political and economic spheres, which have effect on the various aspects of state-building process. The chapter further explores the significance of remittances and other activities like political lobbying and the identity politics on the state building process in Afghanistan.

5.1 SOCIO-ECONOMIC REMITTANCE

The emergence of a relatively strong state in the 19th century generated constant tension among different ethnic groups in Afghanistan. And these ethnic rivalries and hostilities led to the migration of people to neighbouring countries of Iran and Pakistan and then to other parts of the world. During migration people also carried the cultural practices to the new host lands. As seen in the previous chapter the migrant community and the diaspora itself is divided along ethnic, sectarian, class and regional lines in host land. Therefore, the involvement of the Afghan diaspora in issues of culture in homeland and the mode of the involvement of their remittance in thee Afghan state-building process is not uniform and is a complex exercise.

In the post-2001 the need for skilled people in Afghanistan increased many times, and in response there was an increase in the participation of the skilled diaspora in the reconstruction and state-building process also. Among the various sectors of social life, economy became the most immediate domain where diaspora began leaving its mark. At present, the industrial and corporate development in the private sectors saw a domination of foreign companies and diaspora members. Some of the important industries that are receiving funding from the diaspora are mining, telecoms, financial services, banking and construction. In these sectors, the need of skilled people is high which is not available in the country due to the decades of war and conflict. Moreover, the significant amounts of foreign aid into the country is also accompanied by the presence of International and national NGOs, which also need skilled labours mainly having training from foreign countries and have knowledge of the English language for communication. Therefore, both economic and social remittances associated with the Afghan diaspora are important for operation of social, political and economic processes related with the larger project of the state.

5.1.1 SOCIAL REMITTANCE

Social remittance can be defined as ideas, know-how, practices and skills that the diaspora contributes to the host land societies. They send back social remittances that promote development in the homeland (Levitt 2010). The various types of social remittance that diasporas transfer are norms, practices, identities, and social capital to

the homeland. The Afghan diaspora (both near and wider) has made contribution to the homeland through social remittance especially skill transfer, norms and practices, non-monetary contribution like books, sports equipment, innovative educational practices, health care to name a few.

The knowledge transfer by the Afghan diaspora mainly falls into two categories: one is professional associations and second is philanthropic non-profit organisations through which they contribute to the reconstruction and state-building process (Hanifi 2006). The example of the growth of Afghan professional association in the US was slow and relatively ineffective till the reconstruction process started. Before 2001, these professional bodies like the Afghan Physician Associations of America was divided into two groups one on the east coast and other west coasts. They were facing the problem of internal differences due to politics and personality clash. This hindered the ability of these groups to contribute to the development of homeland progress before 2001. But the younger generation of Afghans are more professional, and they somehow managed to overcome the problems of ethnic, sectarian and political differences among themselves. They even started engaging in a dialogue process with all the people involved so as to help the country in reconstruction project. These young Afghan diaspora members have helped the homeland with their skills of efficient use of human energy and have developed smaller groups to coordinate their work of reconstruction (Nawa 2003).

The Afghan 4 Tomorrow (A4T), is a philanthropic organisation of Afghan-Americans, dedicated to the service of reconstruction and state-building process. It was established in 1999, for the Afghan in diaspora setting and also those who are in Afghanistan. A4T is a creative, productive and promising organisation dedicated to the development of homeland. The organisation is unique for its policy of "open door, " allowing participation of a broad range of professionals and practitioners with various skills in different sectors in the US in its initiatives. It also engages other diaspora organisations, non-Afghan individuals, long established aid and development organisations, NGOs and government agencies in the homeland (Brinkerhoff 2004). The A4T mainly focus on young Afghan professional for their contribution and involvement in reconstruction and state-building. The programs and activities of A4T

are organised flexibly so that it can be tailored according to individual need and capability to meet the larger goals. The flexible schedule suits the members to contribute towards reconstruction work, who otherwise would have been deterred by the fixed time frame. The flexibility helps the diaspora members to plan their work according to their work in host land. They can bring in their participation during vacations for shorter time periods. This helps them to achieve both the goals of securing their future and helping the homeland to recover by using their knowledge and skills (Brinkerhoff 2004). Some important works that the A4T takes are: Seed for Afghanistan Project that partners with the NGO Physiotherapy and Rehabilitation Support for Afghanistan, new school reconstruction in Bastan with specialised roofing achieved in partnership with Engineering Without Borders- International and Microsoft office computers Software training for the Ministry of Finance Staff. Its organisational structures include Department of Agriculture, Commerce, Education, Energy, Health, Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, Land Management, Transportation, Finance and Treasury (Brinkerhoff 2004).

Alongside the direct efforts of Afghan diaspora groups and individual, the host countries on several occasion have also helped the Afghans to play its role in reconstruction and state-building process. Diaspora members have participated in both conception and execution of these projects. One such project is promoted by the Denmark government to help the Afghan and Somali diaspora in Netherlands through their Diaspora Fund (DRC). The non-profit organisation 'From Street to School' (FSTS) is a Denmark (Odense) based voluntary work funded initially by the Denmark government. The main objective of the association is to support primary school education for street children in Afghanistan through its financial assistances. The organisation came into existence in 2001 and is a result of DRC's outreach to the Afghan community in Denmark. FSTS applied for funding to build up the association including funding website, marketing materials, collecting boxes and establishment of 6 local branches of FSTS in Afghanistan. They were granted 37500 kr in the pilot phase. Since 2011 the association has not received any external funding but relies on membership fees only. According to the chairman, the association went from an

income of 120,000 kr in 2012 to 400000 kr in 2014. The association has 330 Afghan members and few others also who pay a self-determined monthly fee ranging from 20-500 kr. In 2015, FSTS had around 60 children in their education program in Afghanistan, for whom they financed materials, school uniforms and mostly school fees. The program is directed at three large cities of Jalalabad, Bamiyan and Kabul. The association also works for humanitarian works during natural calamities (DIIS 2015).

The Denmark government has also sponsored programme of Tolana (Danish Afghan Cutural Association), which is the largest Afghan Association in Denmark with around 400 members. It was established in 2000 with the aim to gather Afghans in Denmark to help the Afghan refugees and migrants. Tolana initially arranged sports activities, homework cafes and mother tongue education in Pashto to the new members of Afghan diaspora in the host land. In 2006, the association under took a visit of Afghanistan to investigate how to assist people in Afghanistan. In 2008, the association associated itself with the Danish Diaspora Development Fund for the reconstruction of the Afghan state. In 2011 Tolana applied for funding for a library and cultural centre in Alingar province in Afghanistan. They received a grant of 483880 Dkr for the project in the pilot phase and further 364240 Dkr from the programme in 2013 (DRC 2015). It is estimated that 2000 students and 500 local families are beneficiaries of the project. The chairman of Tolana collaborated with its relatives in Europe and North America to create their development fund, the Naemi Educational Helping Program. Because interests have grown in the development projects funded by the family fund, it has changed its name to that of the region where they originated, the Alingar district in north-eastern part of Afghanistan to send the message that they support the whole community. The Alingar Educational Helping Programme has contributed 10% of the own contribution in 20% of the DRC funded project. The local community of Alingar province raised the remaining 10% (DIIS 2015:52).

The role that host land plays in the development of diaspora driven programs related with the state-building project in homeland depends upon the relation between the homeland and host land. The US support to the involvement and projects of the

Afghan-American diaspora associated with the state-building process in Afghanistan is due to the growing association between the host land and the homeland. The US military and multiple other non-military government agencies have employed a large number of young, educated Afghans (Oeppen 2010). The host land have used these diaspora members to act as a mediator for providing the necessary knowledge and information to host land without creating any problem in the homeland. The highest number of Afghan diaspora members are hired by the US Department of Defence (especially its Defence Language Institute) and Voice of America. The reason for this shows the international need for more skilled people after 2001. Another reason for the employment of diaspora members in activities of state-building in Afghanistan is the presence of trust over members of the diaspora community. This trust can be attributed to the fact that the members of the diaspora community are in most instances the naturalized citizens of the host countries (Hanifi 2006).

An important aspect of the association of social remittance and the processes related with state-building is the question of how much actual skill and technical expertise the Afghan diaspora is transferring to the homeland. A related aspect that often comes up is the issue of mismatch between the nature of skill that Afghan diaspora has and the actual job he ends up doing. These has been a major deterrent in the diaspora participation in state-building in Afghanistan. An important aspect of the association of social remittance and the processes related with state-building is the question of how much actual skill and technical expertise the Afghan diaspora is transferring to the homeland. A related aspect that often comes up is the issue of mismatch between the nature of skill that Afghan diaspora has and the actual job he ends up doing. These has been a major deterrent in the diaspora participation in state-building in Afghanistan. In mid 2000s, the highest ranks of the Afghan government (Ministerial and Deputy level) were populated by Afghans with higher education training in the US and Europe. These appointments were a repetition of the historical pattern of disconnection between professional skills and job profile. An interesting case of skill wastage was the appointment of the Finance Minister with a PhD degree in Political Science from Northwestern University (Hanifi 2006). The problem of skill

wastage is further compounded by the presence of market of translators and interpreter skills and services, which often attracts skilled diaspora members away from their areas of expertise. Towards the mid-2000 when the demand for the diaspora in Afghanistan was on rise, translation job could fetch up to $146,000 per year translating (Hanifi 2006). This then has been attracting several Afghans with advanced technical degrees(e.g., engineering, computer programme), working with NGOs and Afghan government serving at the local wage rate to the jobs of translations.

Apart from the skill wastages, the participation of the diaspora has often been part of the process through which the flow of aid money takes place in the reverse direction—out of the country. This aspect is associated with the problem of absence of internal capacity to absorb significant aid money given by Western countries in the aftermath of 2001. To solve the problem the Ministry of Finance of the new government then decided to raise the absorption capacity through the involvement of international consultants which also comprised of members of the Afghan diaspora working international contracts. The experts assumed responsibilities in much of the regular works of ministries selected for reform. The Ministry of Finance was prominent among them. By August 2004, around 224 advisor were working within the Ministry of Finance. They were hired through a contract made with the international consulting firm Bearing Point for an amount 95.8 million dollar acquired under the USAID contract (United States Government Accountability Office. Afghanistan Reconstruction. GAO-05-742, July 2005 p 26). This amount basically was the aid money flowing in the reverse direction due to the absence of capacity within Afghanistan. A substantial number of advisor being members of Afghan diaspora, such exercises then creates a negative image of the diaspora and also undermines the real contributions made by the Afghan diaspora to affects the processes related with state-building. Further as has been observed by a European delegation in April 2006, all the ministries continued to be "full of external advisor", among whom many were Afghans, who were from abroad on short-term contracts and often had insufficient knowledge of conditions in the country (Hanifi 2006). Such exercises on part of the government employed to enhance the capacity were effective in absorbing aid money, but did not lead to any real programmes bringing in transfer of skills. On most

occasions, the consultants worked in office quarters separate from those of the regular Afghan employees. This then checked any opportunity of interaction and prospect of learning by seeing it among the regular Afghan employees.

Overall, the jobs and other tasks, which the Afghan diaspora undertook, created a negative perception of the diaspora members among local Afghans, who thought that the diaspora members were impinging upon jobs that belonged to them. The case of Rina Amiri substantiate the claim of negative local perception. Rina Amiri gave up her her position at Harvard University to work with UN on Afghan Loya Jirga in 2002. After initial appreciation for her position of working with the Loya Jirga, locals gradually started expressing sense of disapproval, which grew with the increase in the arrival of numbers of diaspora members to work with projects related with the state-building. The feeling of discontent further accentuated due to presence of sense of superiority among the diaspora members, who looked down upon local Afghans relegating them as inferiors (Nawa 2002).

The complex nature of Afghan diaspora has also created problems in the transfer of social remittance to the homeland. Most of the people who migrated during the 1960s and 70s were either from the ruling family or the urban elites who were the Kings supporters. Few of them are also migrating due to economic reasons like the technocrats, merchants and businessman (Hanifi 2006). All of them more or less migrated to developed countries in Europe or USA. Therefore their position and condition in the host was much better than the late comers. They also have citizenships and where naturalised in host land. But most of the people who migrated during the 1980s and 1990s were war victims, and their condition in host land was not so good. This created wide gap both socially and economically among the Afghan diaspora in host land. It led to the heterogeneous nature of the Afghan diaspora in which they are divided on ethnic, sectarian and even class lines. This heterogeneity of Afghan diaspora has its share of effect in the determination of the nature of diaspora contribution towards the homeland particularly in the domain of social remittance: the transfer of skill, knowledge, norms and practices.

Among the various variables shaping the patterns of Afghan politics, ethnicity

has a perennial presence. However, there is no critical examination of ethnic identities in academic and policy assessment of Afghanistan (Hanifi 2006). A generic examination treats Pashtuns as the key ethnic group with political domination over the course of politics of the country. However, these assessments and analyses often hinge on reductionist and static views of Pashtun ethnicity. But in reality, Pashtuns as well as Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Qizilbash, and other communities represent complex and intertwined ethnic histories and cultures. In Afghanistan ethnicity is only one of the many identity options. It is a political or strategic choice and overlaps with other identities such as class, region, religion, gender, generation and even ideological conviction (Hanifi 2006). In addition to sectarian and other differences, Afghan carries with them a notion of a class structure, built on socio-political and socio-economic hierarchies: Kabul versus non-Kabul, urban versus rural, royal versus non-royal blood ties. Such considerations were also carried to the diaspora spaces. This is evident from the fact that, even after having formal education, many Afghans were relegated as those from inferior origin/class by some of their compatriots in Afghanistan, because their families were not considered wealthy back in Afghanistan (Sadat 2008). The migration patterns of the Afghan themselves were often shaped by ethnicity. So, an assessment of the migration patterns of the Afghans would contribute to the understanding of ethnicity particularly in its interaction with wider forces of globalization. Often ethnic identity through its interaction with migration motives, patterns and conditions, served the vehicle facilitating or hindering the very process of transnational migration of the Afghans. Likewise, it also acted as an important factor in the determination of the patterns of transnational flows getting back into Afghanistan. That is, the flow of various components of social remittances back into Afghanistan depended heavily on channels and gates that were shaped by ethnic factors.

5.1.2 ECONOMIC REMITTANCE

The economic remittance is an important aspect of diaspora involvement in the homeland as it helps in the development of infrastructure and economic base, especially in conflict areas. The cash flow sent into Afghanistan both through formal and informal (*hawala* system) contributes a good amount of the total GDP of the

country. The Afghan Investment Support Agency(2004), offers a high estimate of 500,000 Afghans in the US and claims an average remittances of $1500 per person or a total of approximately $75 million per year to Afghanistan. Most of these amount are transferred through *hawala* system. In its study of the remittance in year 2006, The International Fund for Agricultural Development reports that remittances to Afghanistan amounted to nearly USD 2.5 million for that year, which was roughly 30 percent of the GDP in 2006 (Orozco 2007).

The development of an Afghan Chamber of Commerce, Independent trade organisations and joint public-private partnerships are all examples of coming of different communities together along with the diaspora communities. The diaspora helped these institutions through their knowledge, skills and know-how about the external markets and by creating awareness in host country about Afghan products. An important sector within economy where diaspora has been on the forefront is the infrastructure development. The diaspora has been playing path-breaking works in infrastructure developments by initiating different projects in their home town based on kinship relation. The hydropower project in Logar district developed by the Afghanistan Development Organization is an example of such infrastructural developments (Oeppen 2010). At one level, by helping the developmental processes, diaspora members contributes in the overall reconstruction process. However, alongside it, because of the role that kinship and other ethnic factors plays in conception of such projects, there has been an increase the ethnic issues in the country.

A more direct involvement of the diaspora in the domain of economy has been in activities of fund-raising for the people of Afghanistan during natural calamities like drought and earthquakes. In many instances, political elites at home go a long distance to keep the diaspora politically and financially interested in the home country matters. Particularly when the country faces a difficult situation, they make various efforts to call upon solidarity among the diaspora members. Afghan governments have regularly made repeated request to the Afghan diaspora all around the world to contribute to the state-building project. Opening a seminar on trade and investment in July 2002, President Hamid Karzai appealed to Afghans who are living abroad and

investing in other countries to invest in Afghanistan (Baser & Swain 2008). The Afghan diaspora also responded in a positive way to such calls from the leaders of homeland and many of them also invested in the developmental projects and business adventure inside Afghanistan along with local people.

The diaspora participation in the homeland very much depends upon the homeland- host land relation. The better relationship between the two countries means a better position of the diaspora in host land. Therefore, it is important to look into the diaspora condition in a particular host land so as to understand the state-building projects. Some of the important host countries are as under:

Iran

In 2006, for the first time, ILO-UNHCR conducted a study among 1505 Afghan families spread across 10 Iranian cities. The result of the study showed that the remittance sending capacity of the Afghan living in Iran is very low with approximately 7% of the diaspora population having such capacity. The report highlights two main factors due to which the remittance rate is low. The first factor is that, most of the people living in Iran are accompanied by their families and relatives. Due to which they don't have to send a regular and large amount of remittance to Afghanistan. Secondly, the overall cost of living in Iran is high. This can be attributed to the uncertain legal position they have in the country. Further, the uncertain legal status and the constant threat of repatriation forces many Afghan to pay large amounts of their income to the police officer as a bribe (ILO-UNHCR 2006). Besides, these two factors another aspect of the low remittance rate among Afghans in Iran is the nature of the job and the income they earn. Most of the Afghan in Iran works in un-organised sectors mostly as a daily wager, construction worker, load carriers, etc. which automatically curtails their sending capacity.

In the year 2006, among those who reported sending economic remittance, the average amount remitted was approximately USD $960 (Wickramasekar 2006). But the problem with measuring remittance flow to Afghanistan from Iran is not consistent and varies from year to year. Also, the exchange through the *hawala* system makes the calculation more difficult as calculation mostly depends upon estimation

and not accurate data available. The data for the year 2008, estimates that Afghan labourers, working in Iran sent roughly USD 500 million annually to their families in Afghanistan. It roughly amounts to around 6% of the GDP in the year 2008 (Majidi 2008). On an average Afghans from Iran send economic remittances four to six times a year, and those areas which are close to border regions receive more. Most of the time all the economic remittances are sent through informal channels operated by *hawaladar*, who are both Afghans and Iranians.

The condition of Afghans in Iran was depended heavily on the fluctuations that Iran experienced in the aftermath of 1980s. The Iranian government initially, during the 1980s issued blue card to the Afghan and declared them as religious migrants with full state support for their welfare. The Afghans received free education and health services in Iran during the initial phase of migration. But later on, with the situation getting better in Afghanistan after 2001, the Iranian government also started treating the Afghans as economic migrants and removed all sorts of social security to them. Due to the changed position of Afghans in Iran from religious migrants to economic migrants, the remittance sending capacity also changed.

Another important reason for the small remittance, especially in the post-2001, was the relation between Iran and Afghanistan. The close relation of Afghanistan with the USA was not liked much by Iran due to the growing tension between Iran and the USA. This created more problems for the Afghans living in Iran. Even the Afghan students studying in various Iranian universities also faced problems, as they were permitted to study in only a few Iranian colleges and universities (Stigter & Monsutti 2005). This forced many Afghans to either return to Afghanistan or migrate to Western countries, bringing in a further reduction in the overall remittance flow from Iran to Afghanistan.

Though the remittance sent from the Afghan diaspora in Iran is very low, it has been very significant for everyday life of Afghans in Afghanistan. It constitutes a constant source of income for the family in Afghanistan who receives it four to six times a year. The remittances constitute a significant portion of the family income in the Afghanistan, thereby increasing their purchasing power as compared to those who

don't receive any remittances. Most of the time these remittances are used for the social purpose (like dowries and wedding), for household consumption (food, clothes, medical emergencies), for investments (land, houses, cars). In post- 2001, people have been using the economic remittances for starting business (shop, workshop, transport vehicles) with the general improvement in the economic condition of people inside the country (Abbasi-Shavazi 2005).

<u>Pakistan</u>

Despite a large number of Afghans residing in Pakistan, relatively little information is available on the nature and pattern of remittance flow between the two countries. According to the report of Collective for Social Science Research (2006), the flow of remittance in case of Pakistan is in reverse direction. That is people from Afghanistan would send money to family members residing in Pakistan. Moreover, the study revealed that the surveyed migrants regard movement to Pakistan as part of a low risk and low cost of living strategy. The movement in this regard has been frequent and in both directions. Depending on the situation in both countries the Afghans decide where to go for work in Pakistan for a short or long period. This strategy has been prominent in the Post-Bonn era. The reverse direction of the flow of remittance can be attributed to fact that there has been an increase in the involvement of International powers and aid groups bringing in an expansion in well paid job opportunities for the Afghans in Afghanistan. The increase brought in a betterment in the job scenario in Afghanistan as compared with that of Pakistan, thus creating condition for reverse remittance flow (Majidi 2008).

Another important reason for low remittance send by Afghan in Pakistan is the monopoly of Pakistani businessman over the Afghan carpet industry. More than one million Afghans are involved in this sector, but their income is meagre as most of them work for Pakistani traders and businessman. The Pakistani merchants and traders buy carpet from the Afghans at low prices and sell them in the international market at higher prices with Pakistani brand name (Tolo News 2014). Therefore, despite putting efforts, the Afghans in Pakistan are unable to earn much which they can send as remittance to help their families or relatives living in Afghanistan. The

Afghan weavers in Pakistan have been requesting the Afghan government after 2001 to push of relocation and growth of carpet industries within Afghanistan so that it can help both the weavers and the country grow economically. However, the lack of security and infrastructure within the country have been cited by Afghan government officials as the difficulty and road block in shifting these industries from Pakistan to Afghanistan (Tolo News 2014).

One important aspect of economic remittances send from both Iran and Pakistanis is that it helps the Afghan families to sustain themselves both in the homeland and in host land or whenever migrants move from one host to another host land. As migration for Afghans is not only survival strategy but also a way to diversify their family income and risk management. Remittances also help in the maintenance and expansion of social ties among families dispersed in various places (Stigter & Monsutti 2005).

Overall, trough various channels of remittances, Iran and Pakistan play important role in the state-building process in Afghanistan. The significance of their role is largely due to the presence of large sized Afghan diaspora in both the countries, which creates heavy traffic networks of remittance flow between these countries and Afghanistan. The association of remittance and the state-building however, is indirect one. It act as informal source for economic improvement and skill development. Both of which in the long run, feeds into the emergence and development of institutions vital for both functioning of state and its legitimization. as the highest number of Afghans are living in these two countries as refugees and migrants. We need more and more research on the effect of remittances both social and political set-up in homeland.

United States of America

Besides Iran and Pakistan, the next important host land for Afghans is the USA. The role of Afghan American's diaspora was prominent in the state-building process in the post-2001. The political and economic processes associated with peace-building that unfolded with the war on terror led by America against Taliban and Al-Qaida in Afghanistan gave the Afghan diaspora in the USA diversity of opportunities to take

part in homeland politics. The size of Afghan diaspora in US cannot be determined exactly. Different estimates give different number of total Afghans in the US. The 2011 American Community Survey enumerated around 89,040 Afghan- born resident in USA (Census Bureau 2013). The size of the population also roughly shows the amount of remittance that they could send to the homeland. The Afghanistan Investment Support Agency(AISA) estimated that around USD 75 million per year was transferred to USA and Afghanistan in 2004, in the form of remittances (Hanifi 2006).

The exact nature of remittance flow between the two countries is still not very clear as there is a gap between the actual exchange and the available data. The most recent in-depth study on the patterns of cash flow from the USA to Afghanistan in the form of remittance is done by S.M Hanifi (2006). The source he consulted was a register maintained by one *hawaladar* in the USA, who also provided an access to his clients for conducting interviews. Hanifi's study highlights that a large volume of remittances is transferred to Afghanistan via channels that are not monitored or through informal means. The Afghan diaspora in the USA is better placed than those in Iran and Pakistan to send more remittances due to better working conditions and the legalized status of citizenship of Afghans in the USA. Another reason for the improved conditions of Afghan is that most of the a substantial population of the Afghan diaspora comes from the migration of those urban elites, who migrated to US during the 1960s and 1970s. Most of them very wealthy form the very onset of their stay in US. The Karzai family is one such family from the diaspora with wealth and influence and is very active in all areas of the state-building process. The President Hamid Karzai stayed in the USA for long time and played an important role in unifying the Pashtun of Kandahar during Bonn Accord. Economically, the family has a well-settled chain of restaurants in various cities of America. The family invested a huge amount in the developing Afghanistan's infrastructure. According to one source, Mahmoud Karzai (elder brother of President Hamid Karzai) and his partner invested $5 million in developing a residential complex in Kandahar (New York Times 2009). Mahmoud claims that he took a loan of $5 million from the Overseas Private Investment Corp., a US government agency established to help American businesses invest in oversea emerging markets. The exact impact of such large scale investments

on state-building can be established only in the long run. The impact will depend on their association with the existing political and economic institutions and norms prevalent in Afghanistan. The nature of such interaction will impinge heavily of state's own capacity to conceive and control economic affairs of the country.

Germany and Netherlands

The Afghan community in Germany is the largest among all the European countries. The German Federal Statistical Office estimated approximately about 145,0000 Afghan-origin migrants were resident in 2011 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2012). The data of remittance flow from Germany to Afghanistan is available from 2001- 2011. This is however, based on the official means of money transfer. This data does not count the money transferred through informal and unofficial means like *hawala*. The data on remittance has been taken from the balance of payment statistic provided by German Federal Bank. The balance of payment comprises of workers remittance and pensions, donations, aids, grants and official assistances. The table below shows both the balance of payment (including remittance) and remittance from 2001 to 2011.

Year	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Balance of payment transfer	21	52	38	39	47	65	56	67	74	114	115
Remittances	18	20	21	22	21	20	20	23	23	20	22

Source: German Federal Bank, 2012

In: Million Euro

The above data show that the balance of payment over the years is fluctuating ranging from 21 to 115 million Euro in ten years. But when we look at the remittances sent by Afghan from Germany to Afghanistan it remained more or less stable and consistent. The range of remittance is from 18 to 23 in ten years. We can say that one of the reason could be the improved condition in Afghanistan due to which the amount of remittance needed is not much as we have seen in remittance flow from

Iran.

The actual estimation of remittance flow from Germany to Afghanistan is also difficult to calculate as besides the formal and informal means of transfer many Afghans carry cash with themselves up to certain limits. According to German law, any person can carry cash up to EUR-15000 without even declaring at the time of travelling to the customs authorities. This can automatically increase the amount of actual remittance flow to Afghanistan. Also, the estimate given by the German Federal Bank doesn't include the data about the naturalized Afghans who are German citizens and send money to the homeland (Vadean 2007). Thus, a significant portion of potential remittance sender is excluded from the data. Nearly all Afghan immigrant households in Germany support their relatives in Afghanistan financially. The reason they give is the poor financial condition in Afghanistan. Money is mainly sent for daily consumption (Bommes 2007). A recent study confirms this fact, estimating that about 15% of the rural households in Afghanistan receive remittance from relatives abroad, covering about 20% of their daily expenditure (World Bank 2004). Some use the remittance for repairing houses or starting a small business.

Therefore, the remittance flow both social and economic from all over the world not only helps the individuals who receive them but also highlights the migratory pattern. As an important aspect of the Afghan seasonal pattern is that trans-national relations are very strong among the Afghans all over the world. People not only sent remittance to their immediate families but also to their extended relatives and friends in need of money (Monsutti 2006). This could also apply to the naturalised Afghan-Germans that, they will also send a good amount of their income as remittance to their Afghan relatives and friends. But it still needs data proof about the exact nature of both formal and informal transfer from Germany to Afghanistan. One more reason for sending money by Afghan-German's could be the investment in business and other activities in the post -Bonn situation.

The number of Afghan in Netherlands is negligible as compared to Germany. Only few asylum application was submitted by the Afghan in Netherlands due to which their number is small. Moreover, according to the statistics available with the

Central Bureau for Statistics, only ten asylum application were submitted in 1980. And the number reached up to 140 by 1985—the phases of mass scale migration of Afghan due to the Soviet invasion. Throughout the 1990s the number of Afghans filling for asylum increased with the greatest application filled between 1998-2000 (Seigel 2010). It has been noted that between 1994 and 2002 asylum requests were granted without a greater deal of individual scrutiny and residence permits were thus issued with relative ease (Bevelandes & Veenman 2006 cited in Seigel 2010).

While asylum has historically been and consistently remained the greatest mode of migrations of Afghans into Netherlands. But other types of migration have also occurred: family reunification and formulation has been the second-largest avenue for entry of Afghans into Netherlands. Between 1996 to 2001, 800 claims for the family unification with partners were claimed and 180 claims for family reunification with children were filled (Nicolaas &Spangers 2004). In addition to asylum and family reunification, limited numbers of Afghans have entered the Netherlands for other purposes as for work or study. Between 1995 to 2007, the number of individuals entering for the purpose of study was 20, for the purpose of work was 28 and for other purposes 67 (CBS 2008). In the 1990s only 600 Afghans registered as living in the Netherlands. In 1996 that number grew to 4916, and by 2009 it reached to 37709, comprising both first and second generation (CBS 2009).

There is very little data available on the remittance flow from other countries like Russia and Australia. The general data provided by World Bank on the total remittance transfer to Afghanistan is available only from 2008. The below table shows the rough estimation of remittance transferred and the increase or decrease in its quantity:

Remittances Flow in the Country:

2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
104	228	460	460	460	543

Source: World Bank 2013

In: US$ Millions

The above data shows that the amount of remittance transferred varies from time to time. The figures stabilized somewhat after 2010. In the initial years: 2008 and 2009, the figures were comparatively low. This can be attributed to the appearance of recession that had greater impact on US and Europe—the two destinations accounting for most of the remittance to Afghanistan. The gradual increase in the volume of the remittance flow can also be ascribed to the improvement in the security environment within Afghanistan, which has enabled the confidence of diaspora members to make investments into business and other economic activities.

Apart from remittances, the Afghan diaspora of US served as the agency through which economic transactions of US with Afghanistan was carried out. Out of the $5 billion USD of FDI into Afghanistan since 2002, over 75% investment was channelled through Afghan Diaspora. Of $3 billion USD invested in the construction of real estate (both commercial and residential) 90% came from Diaspora and in the Telecom sector of the $700 million investment, 40% was invested by Diaspora while the rest was FDI. In the manufacturing sector, out of $850 million invested over 90% came from Diaspora while the rest came from locals and foreigners. In services such as banking, civil aviation leasing travel and tourism hospitality, etc. over $400 million investment was recorded of which 50% came from the diaspora (Bommes 2007). That is the Afghan diaspora of US emerged as the most powerful agency involved in external investments in Afghanistan.

Remittance on the other hand, despite being less in its volume carried immense significance for the operation of everyday economic life in Afghanistan. The amount of remittance flow though not very high, is consistent in its flow and helps a lot in the family income. For example, the amount remitted by Afghans from Germany is usually Euro 200 and are sent many times a year to the families and relative for the household purpose (Bommes 2007). Moreover, skilled migrants that have successfully built up business in Germany seems to be willing to invest in Afghanistan. However, those of them who did not invest, have done so largely due to fears arising due to the presence of an unstable political system and the threat of re-emergence of Taliban

(Vadean 2007).

Despite, their contribution in the realm of economy and society through remittances, the role of Afghan diaspora often gets undermined in the larger contestation of cultural and social values. With the increase in participation of the members of Afghan diaspora in political and economic affairs related with state-building, there is a growing sense of insecurity among local Afghans, particularly with the increased focus and limelight that the Afghan returnee gets. Further, with the increased participation of the diaspora in modernization projects, there has been a surge in confrontation with traditional elements. For their contribution to the modernization processes, local Afghans often refer to members of diaspora working in Afghanistan as *Afghan-ha-e kharijee* (foreign Afghans), a term which carries derogatory connotations. There is a general understanding that Westernisation in Afghanistan is carried not only by non-Afghans, but also by members of diaspora—often considered as westernised Afghans. This conflict has given rise to the potential clash of Afghans versus non-Afghan values as well as contestation between supporters of reforms and its opponents (Sadat 2008).

5.2 Political Dimension of Afghan Diaspora Participation in State-building

5.2.1 Diaspora in Host-land

Before 9/11, the Afghan diaspora was only involved in some fund-raising and humanitarian activities in the host land for damages in Afghanistan caused due to the Soviet invasion. During that period, the wider Afghan diaspora in Western countries was more organised than those living in neighbouring countries of Iran and Pakistan. The wider diaspora organisations were involved in organising cultural activities in the host land like Eid, musical shows and food festivals, etc. Besides the cultural activities, the Afghans diaspora before 2001 was also involved in refugee welfare program in both host land and homeland. During the Soviet period in 1980s, the Afghan-Americans mainly directed its energy towards lobbying for the ending the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (Eigo 2012). The diaspora organisation like Free Afghanistan tried to influence American policy towards Afghanistan. They also tried to put pressure on US government to force Russia to withdraw from Afghanistan.

9/11 brought in a major shift in the diaspora involvement in activities related with the homeland. In the post 2011, when state building began as part of the broader exercise of peace-building, a major qualitative as well as quantitative shift came in the nature of political involvement of the diaspora vis a vis the politics of homeland. Unlike the Afghan diaspora of immediate neighbouring countries, the Afghan diaspora located in the West became more active in mediating the talks between the Afghan parties and international forces. As substantial involvement of the Afghan diaspora in the Petersburg talk on a peaceful transition in post-war Afghanistan in 2001 is a good example of diaspora participation in the state-building process. The participation of different diaspora groups like Rome, Cyprus, Peshawar groups in the Bonn Accords 2001 was very crucial for the success of the new state-building process in the country (Rashid 2008). Moreover, the active participation of the diaspora in the host land politics on behalf of homeland depends upon the conditions of the diaspora community in the host land and the relation between host and homeland. If the relation between the two countries is stained, then the diaspora's influence in host land is minimum. On several occasions, the host land has also displayed suspicion over the involvement of the diaspora in homeland politics with a particular fear that the diaspora involvement in homeland politics might end up in them taking participation in illegal activities (Hein de 2006).

Diaspora members involved themselves in the policy formulation of the hostland with respect to the process of state-building in numerous ways. One of the method employed by them has been, the tactics of influencing the foreign policy decision making of the host land towards the homeland (Shain & Barth 2003). Among the various members of diaspora communities in West, those with relatively higher education have been able to exercise disproportionate influence over the policy making. The trend has been prominently evident in the case of USA. The case of Ashraf Ghani and Zalmay Khalizad shows how prominent members of the Afghan diaspora have reached the very centre stage of state-building process.

Zalmay Khalilzad used his influence on Bush Administration to create a pro-Pashtun government in Afghanistan in the post-2001 period (Rashid 2008). It was also Zalmay Khalilzad who played the role of mediator in the process that saw the

transfer of headship of the Afghan interim government from King Zahir Shah to Hamid Karzai, who himself was another member of US Afghan diaspora (Hanifi 2004). Zalmay Khalilzad was born in Mazar-e- Sharif in 1951. The family then migrated to Kabul due to his father's government job. Khalilzad got a scholarship in 1970 for higher education in American Universities in Beirut. Then he did his Doctorate from the University of Chicago. It was during his doctorate that he was very much influenced by neo-conservative (neocon) ideologies. Khalilzad became a professor at Columbia University and one of the founding members of a small group of neocon intellectuals there. He made his marks in government in the mid-1980s when under Wolfowitz (who was then director of policy planning at the state Department), he wrote several papers on US policy towards Afghan Mujahedin (Rashid 2008). In may 2001, Khalilzad becomes senior director for the Gulf and South-west Asia division of the National Security Council. However, 9/11 was a moment of great shift for his career. In the days, that followed the epoch making event, he was caught in a whirlpool of endless calls coming from Northern Alliance's warlords and other Afghan tribal leaders. The moment of change to a post-Taliban system of rule had finally arrived. During the American campaign in Afghanistan, Khalilzad managed and coordinated a substantial part of the war efforts—with the help of mobile he convinced Northern Alliance's warlords to cooperate with their rivals or to help the US SOF teams. Even CIA and the Pentagon had to go take him him in the loop to influence or push individual Afghan leaders. Eventually, the influence he had on actors in Afghanistan eventually saw him being appointed as a special presidential envoy to President Bush on Afghanistan (2008).

With the gradual progress of international community peace building efforts in Afghanistan, many countries joined US with their own particularistic policies and approaches towards peace-building and state building in Afghanistan. With it, many other host countries also began pushing for the return of their respective skilled diaspora to Afghanistan on either temporary or permanent basis. The Swedish government put a special emphasis on the return of skilled Afghan diaspora residing in Sweden to Afghanistan. The Swedish government thought that Afghanistan needed skilled persons like health care personnel, engineers, economist, teachers and administrators for the progress of reconstruction efforts in these respective sectors

(Oeppen 2010). The Danish government started the initiative of supporting Afghan diaspora by providing funds to social welfare programs in the homeland. The initiative like school for street children was funded by Danish government through their diaspora fund for Afghan and Somali diaspora living in Denmark. The main focus of these programmes was involvement of diaspora in the reconstruction of their homeland. They promoted the diaspora participation because of the knowledge and connection which diaspora members had with people living in the homeland.

The return of Afghan professional was also encouraged by the governments of main countries of the European Union (EU). The European Union governments encouraged the return of Afghan professionals by funding the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) to operate programmes of assisted return of the skilled members of the Afghan diaspora. It included programmes focusing on Afghan professionals and skilled persons living in Europe (IOM 2008)). The program was mainly for refugees and migrants, but it also attracted diaspora members having citizenship to work on various reconstruction projects for either short or long term. The IMO program assisted the return of some 800 Afghan professionals between 2002-2007 (IOM 2008). This program seeks to provide additional assistance to Afghan nationals returning to Afghanistan from EU member states (IOM 2007). Moreover, the IOM has been working with the Afghan refugees and their return process. They have been providing various facilities and program to provide emergency post-conflict migration management. Some of the important programs are:

a) Rapid Response Humanitarian Assistance: under it, assistance have been provided for   the   return of refugees and migrants to Afghanistan.

b)Afghan Civilian Assistance Program: the program assists people affected affected   with   temporary and medium term displacements. The program assists, those who   have   experienced   such   displacements   due   to   military activities.

c) Construction of health and education facilities..

d) Return of qualified Afghans.

e) Support to voter registration

f) Assisted voluntary return and reintegration.

g) Counter-trafficking initiative

h) Passport and visa issuance capacity building

i) Border management

j) Support to provincial governance

The IOM also coordinates the return of qualified Afghans to participate in the reconstruction process. According to IOM, 846 Afghans experts living abroad have returned to Afghanistan from 32 countries with IOM assistance to participate in the rebuilding of their nations. Many of the experts are working with government ministries as advisers and technical experts (Oeppen 2010).

Overall, alongside the institutions of the host land, international organizations like the United Nations also have worked to create platform for participation and contributions of the diaspora members in the state-building process in Afghanistan. These efforts have allowed the coming together of traditional Afghan leaders of various tribes and ethnicities and the young modern leaders from the diaspora communities to come together and collaborate in policies and programmes associated with the state-building process (Baser and Swain 2008: 19). The effect of these initiative was the formation of transnational government in Kabul. Due to this, the diaspora groups have assumed significant role after the US intervention and the process of institutionalization of the state-building project through assistance in the formulation of Constitution and its drafting. Moreover, the diaspora members have been playing the role of mediator between the international powers and tribal leaders for a smooth transition in the post-Bonn era. The basic strength of the diaspora participation is their strong ethnic and kinship relation with the people living in the homeland. The World Bank also has established Afghanistan Directory of Expertise and also coordinates the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund Expatriate Service

Programmes. Both the programmes focus on linking Afghan professional with the homeland, where there is a need for more skilled people for the reconstruction and state-building process (Oeppen 2010). However, all these programmes whether run by UN or World Bank have not taken into consideration the problem of ethnic division inside the country due to external interference and civil war before 2001.

Another important reason created condition for the participation of the Afghan diaspora as technical experts in the policies associated with the state-building was the change in the counterinsurgency doctrine of the US army in Afghanistan. The US army in 2006 brought in a change in the military strategic paradigm from hardcore war tactics to winning heart and minds (WHAM) of the people of Afghanistan. A fundamental component of the strategy was to shift the centre of gravity of counter insurgency (COIN) strategy back to the people (Nagl 2007). Winning the confidence of people, became a strategic objective—as apart of the larger of objective to bring and end to the conflict. This, entailed conduct of series of civic action activities and cultural initiatives on part of the US army to gain confidence of the local populace within Afghanistan—thus curtailing the prospect for any support among people to the opposition forces. This change in policy made the US government to rope in the Afghan-American diaspora members in various positions. For the execution of the program CORE of the COIN, the US military had to learn how to interface with Afghans in a socio-cultural context which is very much different from their own culture. In this whole process of winning heart and confidence of the Afghan people by the US, the Afghan-Americans became *de-facto* experts on Afghanistan. This, then led to massive effort to recruit members of diaspora as proxies and interlocutors (Zafar 2015).

Overall, the numerous reasons have allowed diaspora presence in Afghanistan in connection with the process of state-building. They assumed responsibilities in all sectors associated with the reconstruction. Some of the Important Programmes for the Diaspora involvement:

Diaspora Participation In Various Program

S.no.	Program Name	Countries	Priority sectors	Objectives	Number of participants	Start Date	End Date	Duration of assignment
1	Reconstruction, capacity building and development of Afghanistan through the transfer of qualified and highly qualified Afghan nationals from European Union members states	UK Sweden Netherlands Germany France Finland Denmark Austria Belgium	Health Education Public Administration Public infrastructure	To contribute to the recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan	150	2002	2005	6-12 months
2	Reform implementation management unit-technical assistance	Northern America Europe Australia Africa Pakistan India Nepal Iran Afghanistan	Ministry of education-Reform information management unit	To provide assistance to develop the ministry of education into an effective accountable fully funded and functioning public institution that facilitates education for all	5	2007	2009	6-24 months
3	Return of qualified Afghans from neighbouring countries	Pakistan Iran Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Europe Northern America	Education and health construction and rural transport development and agriculture	To contribute to the reconstruction of Afghanistan through capacity building in the	210 (and 750 family members)	2005	2008	

		Australia	commercial development	country's administration restoration and development of essential social services such as education health transportation construction agriculture rural development				
4	Placement of Afghan Expatriate professionals from EU countries into public administration	EU	Public administration	To enhance the contribution of Afghan expatriate professionals residing in member states of the European Union in the reconstruction efforts of Afghanistan by enhancing policy and institutional capacities within the public administration		2005	2008	156
4	Temporary Return Of Qualified Nationals Project 1 (TRQN 1)	Netherlands	Education, Health, Infrastructure			2006	2008	309
5	Temporary Return Of Qualified	Netherlands	Education, Health, Infrastructure		68	2008	2011	3 months

	Nationals Project 2 (TRQN 2)							
6	Return and Reintegration of Qualified and Skilled Afghans from Iran	Iran	industrial skills, mechanical qualifications, construction and renovation skills	to contribute to the reconstruction of Afghanistan through capacity building.	300	2010 march	2010 December	7 months

The employment of the diaspora to fill in the knowledge and expertise gap for conception and execution of policies has both advantage and fillip side to it. At one level, provided opportunity to the members of Afghan diaspora to play a part in the political process in the homeland. This has addressed the problem of skill deficiency within Afghanistan. Alongside it has also allowed a partial reduction the legitimacy deficit which foreign players had in their engagements as outsiders in Afghanistan. However, due to prolonged presence outside the country in the diaspora spaces, the diaspora members often do not have an up to date knowledge and information of the changes in the political situation caused by the decade long civil war. Further, the Afghans who migrated in the first phase came from the upper middle class—and hence carried a different perception of Afghanistan. The perception and the knowledge gap has often led to severe limitations in policies and their implementations. The difference in knowledge of Afghan-American and the real ground situation was highlighted by those military officers who were trained by Afghan -Americans during COIN programs. Further, old perceptions have often acquired forms of biases. This is evident in the narration of experience by once such officer:

….overall, it was great to get some kind of familiarisation. But there wasn't much consistency. Some of the instructors seemed to have a certain bias or maybe even a dislike for certain ethnic groups and tribes…. The story you got depended on who was talking   (Quoted in Zafar 2015:9).

Such experiences apart from demonstrating the gaps and bias in opinions, also reveals the heterogeneous nature of Afghan diaspora, that they are also divided on ethnic, religious and regional lines—reflecting the wider picture prevalent in the homeland.

The host countries and international organisations have given due consideration to the nature of Afghan diaspora before involving them in the reconstruction process. As the heterogeneous nature of Afghan diaspora is reflected in their motives and goals both in the host and homeland politics. The policies and actions related to the involvement of the Afghan diaspora despite being collective in nature are often based on multiple motivations. Such considerations do figure in the involvements of the diaspora through the Afghan Government, International Organisations, host/ donor countries, NGOs and Aid Agencies(Oeppen 2010). That is evident from the fact that, each organizations or individuals have their own view about how and where to involve the diaspora in the state-building process. Likewise, the diaspora themselves exemplifies diversity of motivations, expectations and priorities when getting involved in any project. This is evident in the difference in the approach of the Afghan diaspora from US and the Afghan diaspora from Pakistan. The participation also brings in ruptures as multiple notion about identities, culture and nation comes into conflict. Migration with its potential to disrupt "place based nationalist feelings" often brings in "explosive result[s]". That, is once dislocated, migrants get immersed into the temptation to play the identity politics through the available means of propaganda, money and often votes vis a vis the homeland.

However, their participation is devoid of any accountability in the country of origin, due to absence of their presence on the scene (Anderson 1992: 13). Such, situation often gets counterproductive for the project of state and reconstruction as they often bring in more radicalized and rigid narratives and assumptions about

identity, thus creating hurdle for any kind of reconciliation—vital for the process of post conflict peace building. More practically, it gets easy for trans-nationals to support political movements and extremist groups in the homeland, if they don't have to live in that condition. The same thing is true about the Afghan diaspora members who enjoy the benefits of access to the course of politics without the liability of the outcome of such a politics—as that of supporting either Taliban or Mujahideen groups. For example, certain professional women groups in US have been supporting Taliban as Pashtun nationalist movement and have hosted Taliban representatives coming to US for mobilization of support of the diaspora. However, in a contradiction to the position of their support, they have also admitted their own unwillingness to live under Taliban when given any such choice (Oeppen 2010). This is the outcome of practical dislocation with the actual site of politics, while emotionally and ideologically being connected with. So, such convenience which diaspora enjoys due to their location, tend to brings in policy positions from their part, which are often divorced from the actual political dynamics prevalent at the ground.

5.2.2 Involvement in Homeland Politics

The onset of new highways of digital communication and the revolution in mass media has provided the Afghan migrants and the diaspora members to maintain constant connection with developments at the home front and thus created interests in political developments without the presence of nay kind of geographical proximity. Apart from the broader interest in politics, transnational connections have facilitated an easy and smooth flow of other items: goods and capital across continental frontiers and international borders between family members and relatives. This connection between the diaspora and the home society through transnational connectors have assumed a greater significance in the society of Afghanistan. By the middle of 2000, despite heavy participation of various actors of international community and the concomitant aid that it brought, economic remittances sent through recorded channel exceeded than the amount that came under the official global development assistance (Ratha 2007). The volume of remittance if combined with the unaccounted remittance coming through unofficial and hawala channel highlights the economic significance of diaspora and migrants in the everyday Afghan economic life. The increase in the

economic importance of the diaspora also came along with the its growing influence in the domain of politics. The exercise of the influence of the Afghan diaspora in the general politics of the homeland came in the forms of political lobbying, spread of awareness in host countries, and most importantly influence over the foreign policy of host country towards homeland situation (Levitt 1998). This was also true of Afghan diaspora both living in neighbouring countries of Iran and Pakistan or the wider diaspora members residing in Western Countries. The significance of the Afghan diaspora in the post-conflict state-building at the very early stage is capture by Jazayery, who points out that half of the total Afghans involved in the U.N sponsored talks on the future of Afghanistan during the Bonn Conference 2001 were exiles and members of diaspora (2002). Apart from being direct participants, members of the Afghan diaspora also played an important role in Petersburg talks and the Bonn process by acting as interlocutors between Afghanistan and the International community (Zunzer 2004).

The complexity involved in the involvement Afghan diaspora in the post 2001 process was evident at the talks in Bonn over the agenda of transitional government for post-conflict Afghanistan. Four factions or groups represented the Afghans at international level are: i) the Northern Alliance or United Front; ii) Rome-based delegation of the former king Zahir Shah; iii) Cyprus grouping of exiled intellectuals, supported by Iran; iv) Peshawar grouping, with its base among the Peshawar Pashtun refugees (Rashid 2008). The effect of this initiative was the formation of transnational government in Kabul. This opened up the door to heavy influence of the diaspora in the processes of institutionalization of state-building—the formulation of Constitution and other drafting measures. In the interim government, maximum number of the Ministers were members of the Afghan diaspora. The members of the Afghan diaspora in the interim government were mostly from USA and Europe than from neighbouring countries. The reason was that most of the people had the trust of donor/ host countries (Oeppeen 2010). Like in many other post-conflict situations, in Afghanistan also the donor to the reconstruction programme and host countries of the diaspora are the same. The main donor countries which have been supporting the Afghan reconstruction and state-building processes are the USA and other European countries. They are also the host lands for a large number of Afghan diaspora.

The Afghan diaspora taking part in state-building process is not the only narrative of the diaspora participation in the homeland politics. Many among the diaspora groups have been supporters of various armed groups and even Taliban during various stage of conflict and state-building. The Afghan refugee settlements in Pakistan have been used as the resting place and headquarters for various mujahideen groups during the Soviet invasion and also later during the civil war in the 1990s. This is a classic example of direct participation of near diaspora in homeland politics. The wider diaspora also played indirect role during the Soviet invasion through fund-raising and by arranging opportunities for resistance leaders to visit western countries to try to gain political and financial support from both diaspora and non-Afghan sympathisers of the resistance movements (Ansary 2002; Naby 2005). The causes and perpetuation of the conflict are usually very complex, and it is difficult to measure the exact impact of the diaspora participation in extremist activities in the homeland. However, the argument of diaspora as playing the sole role of peacemakers is flawed one. Based on ideological, identity and ethnic alignments, diaspora have contributed to both interplay of factors that have both contributed in creation of peace and have caused escalation of the violence.

The narrative of diaspora members as agent of positive change also has been challenged for their inability to bring in implementation of several policies. Despite the presence of large number of the members of diaspora have failed to influence and assist the political decision making in Afghanistan due to the presence of strong powerful tribal and kinship bondings (Kleist 2012). Such tendencies were clearly evident in famous tension that brew between the Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani (Afghan-American) and other warlords like Atta Muhammad and Gul Aga Sheraiz over the customs duty collection in provinces from 2001 to 2004 (Rashid 2008). The main problem was that Ghani wanted to improve the economic condition of the country by introducing reforms in the taxation system, which will bring the provinces under direct control of the centre and thus lead to centralisation of state power. The reforms by very nature of centralization would weaken the warlords and tribal chiefs by removing their source of income collected from customs duties, which they would use for the maintenance of their militia. Thus it lead to a major confrontation between the tribal leaders and Karzai over a policy that was promising to curtail both power

and source of income of the traditional leaders. Such differences in nature of priorities of the leadership drawn from the diaspora and the traditional leaders and failure to bring on any compromise between them was one of the main reason for the failure of Karzai government in delivering the people peace and development to the people of Afghanistan could be the difference in the way of working with the diaspora and tribal leaders. The trend which was evident at the top most level had its reflections at every level of power structure involving interaction between positions of influences occupied by member of the diaspora and traditional authorities.

Further, diaspora participation has also failed to produce positive impact due to the individual-centric attitude of the Diaspora leaders. The leaders on several occasions, have been driven by personal agendas of business interests: seeking profit from short-term projects rather than any larger or broader community concern.

Further, there exist a major trust deficit among the diaspora members and local Afghan leaders in case of Afghanistan. The position and ability of wider Afghan diaspora to access high-status titles in the Afghan government or well-paid employment in International aid agencies have caused resentment and distrust amongst those who stayed in Afghanistan during the conflict (Sharifzada 2004). On the hand, the diaspora members also mistrust those who stayed as collaborators in crime during civil war as warlords, criminals and drug smugglers. This eventually has hampered the scope of collaboration and consensus among leaders of the diaspora origin and the local leaders. This, then had negatively impinged upon the prospect of success of policies nad programs of reconstruction.

The political narrative of the involvement of Afghan diaspora is also not complete without consideration of one political implications it has. That is through the very act of of involvement in the processes, members of Afghan diaspora, who were mostly educated and belonged to the elite strata have emerged as a separate interest group in the homeland politics of state-building and reconstruction. From 2001 to 2004, almost 80% of the government Ministers and officials were from different diaspora groups (Oeppen 2010). Their rise has been viewed by political elites inside the country as challenge to their authority. This has added a new dimension to the

already existing 'contestation' of power in Afghanistan: diaspora has emerged as a new power group challenging the political position of the traditional tribal and warring leaders and the traditional urban elites.

5.3 Implication of Diaspora Participation in State-buiding

The participation of the diaspora in state building processes as we have seen in previous sections have impact on the state-building process in more than one way. Among the various factors that comes as constituents of the direct and indirect interaction between the diaspora and the state building participation in state-building, the role of remittance is most fluid one. Measuring the impact of remittance is a complicated exercise, particularly in absence of defined and large scale data about migration and remittance flow in Afghanistan. Remittance to begin with acts as an important source of income for the recipients. Further, it is vital for the operation and functioning of the financial systems of the homeland. That is, when economic remittances are transferred via formal channels, the Central Bank in the homeland gains access to the capital which can be used to secure future loans, thus bringing in an expansion in the potentials of financial institutions in the country to borrow loans from international lenders (Ratha 2006). According to Thompson (2006), the economic remittances send during 2005 amounts to the third largest source of income generated externally beside unregulated trade and opium production/trafficking in Afghanistan. Moreover, in countries like Afghanistan where political and security situation is still volatile, remittance transfer is very stable and can play an important role in the overall development of the country. The other external sources of funding to the country like Foreign Direct Investments(FDI) may increase or decrease depending on the market and security conditions inside the country. But remittance sending and receiving is more stable and consistent (Siegel 2010). The interviews among Afghans living in European countries conducted by various scholars revealed that flow of remittances often increases during times of crisis such as during winter, drought, and political upheavals. Most of the time remittance are used for daily consumption needs like food expenditures. Besides, basic consumption expenditures remittances are also used to repair houses, special occasion like marriage and deaths, medical bills, etc. The remittances are also spent upon children education, but only

when there is surplus. Education is least prioritised sector for remittance spending (Siegel 2010). More importantly, remittance transfer trends are intimately linked to migration patterns as both are very selective in nature. In migration who will migrate and who will stay in the country is decided by the family and the overall situation inside the country. Similarly, who will receive remittance and on what areas it will be used is also selected depending upon the amount transferred and the family position in homeland (Hanifi 2000).

The economic remittances have both positive and negative effect in the homeland. As seen above the families who receive remittances are better prepared for worst situations like drought, famine and other household problems than those who do not receive any remittances. While on the other hand, those who have no relative or family member outside to send economic help are having a difficult life. As their source of income is very limited and thus creates social conflicts in society among those who receive remittance and those who don't.

The social remittance of knowledge and skill exchange is also creating some difference among the local and diaspora members in Afghanistan. There has been complains on locals about how their expertise and experience are being devalorized vis a vis that of the diaspora Afghans. That is, despite their experiences of having worked for years in various sectors like women welfare, during the civil war years, all of sudden in the post 2001 period, they have been placed under projects which were being headed by members of diaspora communities far less experienced than them. Further, there been complains that diaspora members upon their return often tend to impose host land practices in different sectors, while completely ignoring the extant patterns of operations in the homeland (Nawa 2002).

Likewise, there have been complaints on the part of diaspora members as well. These complaints usually are about lack of cooperation on part of the local Afghans. Nawa (2002) has elaborately narrated the experience of Safa Siddiqui, who was the a diaspora member from Canada and who served as the Director of planning and foreign relations in the Ministry of Women's Affiars in the aftermath of 2001. She did not get enough cooperation from local Afghan women, who thought that she did not

have any understanding of the situation in Afghanistan. This then hampered her contribution to the state-building based on her knowledge and technical expertise.

In a way mere presence of skilled diaspora and the facts about volume of economic transfer do not suffice for whole story of how social and economic remittance have significance for the larger state-building and reconstruction. Links between the social and economic remittances are more complicated and complex involving multiplicity of factors: host land conditions, homeland conditions, the personal experience of the diaspora during migration, the economic and educational level of the diaspora, perceptions about diaspora participation and perceptions about local situations among the diaspora. The traditional notion of diaspora as either peacemaker or peace breaker is too simplistic for Afghan case due to the presence of multiple variables in the process of peace-building. More generally, there has been a greater appreciation of diaspora participation in domains of low politics: health, education and the economy. The Afghan diaspora has been taking the risk of starting new business in the country which have been useful for the economic development of the country. However, participation in the economic domain had both negative as well as positive impacts. At one level initiatives like the Afghan Wireless—a mobile phone company have pushed their positive role further by incorporating the social responsibility plan in their business. However, many of the diaspora leaders and members rather than helping the people of Afghanistan to build and develop the concept of public/private partnership have been busy in attracting more grants and access to public money through their influences. The prevalence of interests of diaspora firms in public money only came to be recognized as problem at higher policy levels as well. In this regard, President Karzai at the meeting of one of the Reconstruction Forum even stated that he welcomes the coming of business groups of Afghan-American diaspora, but also requested them said "to bring their own money, rather than trying to gain access to the money meant for the poor people of Afghanistan (Oeppen 2010). These tendencies hints at the presence of a participation of diaspora being driven by multiplicity of factors like personal interests, corporate interests and sectarian interests and was not driven purely by normative concerns of service to the home society.

Further, the domination of diaspora members in key positions in aftermath of 2001, have made them one special group with special interests at stake in the reconstruction efforts. Their emergence at the top brought them in direct confrontation with traditional centres of powers involving the traditional tribal and warring leaders along with traditional urban elites. This has made political affairs in Afghanistan more complex as the resources of the country, particularly with the limitations on resources and dependence of the country on foreign aid. Here, diaspora has to some extent full support of the aid agencies as compared to the locals. So, they got influence at the resource end. While, on ground level politics, the scene is still dominated by the tribal leaders and warlords. Thus this has created a situation in which both the diaspora (as a different kind of elite) and the traditional elite have influence over different spheres of social life.

An important aspect of the diaspora participation in the project of state in Afghanistan has been their dependence on the priorities of the host country and the ability of the diaspora to lobby for causes related with homeland. The scope of political lobbying itself depends upon the attitude and priorities of the host land towards diaspora and their homeland. The American interest in ending terrorism after the 9/11 attack, rekindled its interest in the Afghan politics and Afghan diaspora. In such context, figures like Zalmay Khalilzad an Afghan-American one of the powerful person dealing with policies related with Afghanistan—and was among the prominent advisor for American policy in post-2001 context (Rashid 2008). Khalilzad was even appointed as special Envoy to President Bush on Afghanistan. It was Khalilzad who opposed King Zahir Shah from becoming the head of new Afghan government during Bonn Accord and supported Hamid Karzai. This was later accepted by all the members gathered at Bonn to decide the future of Afghanistan under the UN supervision. However, after Khalilzad no other Afghan rose to such prominence interms of having advisory influence over American policy towards Afghanistan. This happened largely because of change in American priorities and also due to the change in political dynamics within Afghanistan—that has allowed US multiple inroads and access to various political sections and sources of authority, which were earlier linked with US only through the channel provided by Khalilzad.

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The political involvement of the diaspora notwithstanding the complexities and uncertainties it bring within the politics of homeland, has ushered in transformations of radical nature within the society. That is, the new process led by diaspora had added a component of modernity in the political leadership, which was earlier dominated by traditional tribal heads. The diaspora drawing its composition from all sections of the society with their education have pushed in for changes in the rigid social structures of Afghan society. Based on their own experiences in host countries, the diaspora sought to introduce modern political concepts of equality and freedom of speech and expression in the country.

5.4 SUMMARY

Diaspora participation in the state building process need not to be viewed as a uniformly patterned exercise. Rather than representing the grand Afghan identity, the diaspora community itself is divided based on sub-national identities as Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, etc. The engagements of diaspora in the homeland politics is shaped not only by the objective of economic and political interests but also subjective preferences based on sub-national identities. This is exemplified by the instance of a section of the diaspora hosting and supporting the Taliban in recent years. In a way, the diasporas itself acts along the lines of fissures prevalent in homeland, when it comes to the question of participation in politics of the homeland. Their participation then brings in the potential to reinforce fissures prevalent in homeland and often prevents the emergence of consensus and an overarching national identity—vital for nation building and state building. In this way diaspora participation also in certain sense has its own limitations on several occasions.

The participation of diaspora in homeland politics and state-building in post-conflict situation like other political processes of the homeland is also shaped to certain extent by the social structure of the society. The policy/academic treatment of diaspora participation in post-conflict situation as either peace-maker or peace-breaker is an oversimplification. While the actual outcome is often complicated having both positive as well negative impacts. This is evident from the case of Afghanistan, where diaspora has acted as a peace-maker at the international level,

while at the national level it sometimes acts as peace-breaker by widening inter-community difference. That is the impact that diaspora participation will have on peace process and reconstruction is contingent on multiplicity of factors including the social set up prevalent in the homeland. The direct participation of diaspora in a traditional societies like Afghanistan has created an imbalance between different groups and has widened the ethnic and tribal gap by adding another dimension of modernist v/s traditionalist conflict.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

6 INTRODUCTION

6.1 HISTORICAL TRAJECTORY OF THE PROJECT OF AFGHAN STATE

6.2 HISTORY OF MIGRATION AND THE MAKING OF GLOBAL AFGHAN
DIASPORA

6.3 THE AFGHAN DIASPORA AND STATE-BUILDING

6.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS

Introduction

The project of Afghan state significe control, building, strengthening and centralization by the monarchy has been central to social and political life of Afghanistan for most part of its history. In the modern phase, the Afghan state has been under immense flux due to external infleunces. The presence of multiple sources of authorities in the domain of politics as contender to the centralizing state has created contestations, which have been violent and have a significant impact on the everyday life in Afghanistan. The onset of modernization furthered the quest of penetration of the state into the society and which has further fielded interactions among among political forces, which often had violent outcomes. The nature of day to day life in Afghanistan has got more strongly connected with the fate of the state.

Following end of Taliban rule in 2001, Afghanistan entered a new phase of reconstruction and peace-building process. At the heart of this global quest has been the project of state-building. Drawing on global practices, state-building in Afghanistan is viewed as integral to the process of establishment of lasting peace. Some form of state building exercise had perennial presence in the political life of Afghanistan. The recent phase of state-building can be considered to be in continuum with the process started by Amir Abdul Rahman in 19th century. Other Amirs who followed him used different methods for centralization of state power and to build a strong nation state in Afghanistan. Abdul Rahman used brute force to create a strong state, while Amanullah Khan employed the model of constitutional monarchy and Nadir Shah and Zahir Shah tried oligarchy with the support of religious group and tribal leaders to secure the strengthening and legitimacy of the state. During the course of all these periods one thing remained as the prominent feature of everyday life of people in Afghanistan: the migration of people both in and out of the country which over a period of time created a global community of the Afghan diaspora. The diaspora in general and its specific members have from time to time took participation in processes related with the project of state-building and the determination of its social and cultural characters—encapsulated in ideology and identity of the state.

The onset of current phase of globalization has made diaspora an important social and political group in the study of global politics. In case of Afghanistan, the

current process of state-building has seen the emergence of Afghan diaspora as an important transnational actor with strong influence over the process of state-building. The Afghan Government, international governments and INGOs involved in the reconstruction effort have encouraged the participation of diaspora and skilled Afghans to returns to assist in rebuilding the country. The Afghan diaspora ended up playing important role at the very onset of the reconstruction process.

The exploration of the role of diaspora made in this study is based on the quest to find answers to key queries: what is the role of diaspora in state-building process? What are the means in through which diaspora is involved in state-building in Afghanistan? How diaspora participation has influenced the socio-cultural base of Afghan politics? What are the implications of the participation of diaspora in state-building in Afghanistan? The exploration of answers to these set of questions has become essential for any understanding of the process of state-building in Afghanistan. This concluding chapter seeks to present answer to these sets of queries. Based on the thematic journeys conducted in previous chapters, this chapter will attempt to present a crystallized form of the study. This chapter would like to summarise the detailed discussion of the growth trajectory of the Afghan state, evolution of the diaspora and the state-building process and its implication. An effort shall be made to key policy recommendations

6.1 Historical Trajectory of Project of Afghan State

State in the history of Afghanistan for most of time was monarchical. However, a form of consultative mechanism—*jirga* representing various communities was also present and operated both with the state or independently. Operation of *jirga* was vital for legitimacy of the state. With onset of modernization, the space has been increasingly occupied by modern institutions like democratic participation and constitution.

The monarchical system in Afghanistan found elevation in 1880 when Amir Abdul Rehman propounded the notion of divine kingship, which combined political and religious authority in the position of monarch. This was part of series of other reforms brought in to strengthen the Afghan state. After the legal settlement of boundaries, Amir Abdul Rahman completely focused on the internal reforms and

consolidation of his power. Amir Abdul Rahman here made a perfect mix of coercive power, incentives and other *realpolitik* methods for dealing with the various challengers of powers internally (Giustozzi 2010). However, his internal policies were confined purely to bureaucratic institutions and army which were related with centralization of power in one hand. He did not pay sufficient attention to the issues of creation of economic resources and improvement of legal system.

Amir Habibullh Khan who succeeded Abdul Rahman in one of the most peaceful takeover in the history of Afghanistan, attempted to present a soft face of the Afghan state. He toned down on the harsh methods used by Abdul Rahman. He borrowed several clues from traditional norms to bring in what can be called a soft power approach towards the traditional centres of powers. He employed symbolic measures—traditional means of giving honours to leaders and also gave positions to them as a part of larger quest of pacification of traditional authorities. Also, certain appointments were given to pacify some of the tribal and religious leaders. A relaxation was introduced in the tribal military recruitment. Further, Council of State for dealing Tribal affairs was established (Rameen n.d.). In pursuit of policy of goodwill, two important families: the Tarzis and the Musahibans, who were forced into exile by Amir Abdul Rahman were invited back to the homeland. The path of return of the prominent Afghan diaspora (in exile) became an important channel through which the transnational modern political ideals, norms and institutions found their way into Afghanistan. Though an eclectic combination of measures directed towards security and welfare, Amir Habibullah in certain sense succeeded not only in ensuring penetration of the state in domains of traditional society, but also presented a welfare face of the state. With the support of the Amir, a modernist and nationalist elite developed for the first time in Afghanistan.

Habibullah's successor, Amir Amanullah Khan furthered the process of modernization. Amanullah pursued an unadulterated modern approach towards the question of authority and legitimacy. He sought a clear distance from traditional affiliations, both tribal and religious (Newell 1972). Amir Amanullah and his efforts to the modernize the society constitutes the first defined phase of the process of evolution of the contemporary Afghan society. However, the quest of an unadulterated modernization did not go along well with the normative structure and institutions in

society—which was strongly traditional. Eventually, the disturbances that Amanullah's Khan policies created, led to his replacement by a more conservative leader Nadir Shah.

Nadir Shah revoked the policies and reforms introduced by Amir Amanullah. Further a compromise was reached between religious leaders and the government, doing away any state intervention in matters of religion (Voggelsang 2008). Despite the compromise with religious leaders and its institutionalization in the constitution of 1931, the economic developments that came under Nadir Shah led to emergence of a new urban middle class, which rose as an important stake holder of power in the later stage of Afghan political life—particularly under the leadership of Daoud. This group was not homogeneous in the sense that it was not a Pashtun dominated one and had equal number of Tajiks and other ethnic groups. The earlier vertical kinship and ethnic affiliation was changed into horizontal class division (Gopalakrishnan1982).

The project of Afghan state operated in a fluctuating international set up under Zahir Shah, who succeeded Nadir Shah. The onset of ideological rivalries among the two poles in the aftermath of World War II changed the context in which Afghan state operated. An important aspect of this change was that it brought American aid to the country, which were being given by great power as part of foreign policy strategy to maintain influence over developing countries. In the last phase of his rule, Zahir Shah formed a new constitution which combined monarchy, traditional tribal institutions and strong parliamentarism (Saikal 2004). The Constitution ensured a simultaneous existence of both the traditional institution of Loya Jirga and Shura—the parliament (Ewans 2002). Despite the attempts of reforms through constitution, Zahir Shah started facing legitimacy crisis, particularly in face of attacks from the intellectual class—exposed to Western ideas (Siddiqi 1989). The challenge of the authority of his government accentuated and eventually led to his ouster through a bloodless coup led by Daoud in 1973. The coup found supporter in the communist party(PDPA) especially the Parcham Faction. The coup brought an end to monarchy in Afghanistan and made it Republic and Daoud became its first President. A defining aspect of this transition was shift in strategy of securing legitimacy by the regime. Daoud shifted the appeal from traditional centres to modern institutions and organizations like political parties and the army (Sungun 2013).

Like the monarchy under Zahir Shah, the Republic also depended on foreign aid and assistances to carry on economic reforms and modernization programmes. The shift in American Foreign policy priorities brought a transfer in assistance from Afghanistan to Pakistan. Early on, Daoud responded by bringing an end to traditional policy of neutrality by approaching the USSR. As a result series of treaties and agreements were signed with the The USSR. USSR responded with assistance in industrialization and big construction projects. However, there was a price to the Soviet support; ideological influences also followed the material support. Several pro-Soviet agents started filling top governmental positions (Sungur 2013, Brigot and Roy 1988). Many in the intellectual circle and civil society started looking at Communism as the better model than the Western model of Liberal-Capitalism (Sungur 2013).

The growing Soviet influence created concerns for US and its allies: Iran and Pakistan. US succeeded in employing "attractive aid packages" through Iran to influence Daoud. Daoud started retracting on his initial policy of flirting with the Soviets. Around the mid-1974 he began the exercise of removal of Leftist—the Parchamis from his government. By the end of 1975, Daoud had dismissed all Parachami ministers from the cabinet and removed them from other official positions. General Qadir Nuristani, a hard line anti-communist was made the Minister of Interior.

The unholy alliance between Daoud and the leftists in Afghanistan created more problems for the state-building process. On one hand Douad wanted to create a strong Republican state in Afghanistan on the basis of Pashtun nationalism, while on the other hand the leftist both Parcham and Khalq wanted a socialist or communist state in the country. The PDPA was demanding more land reforms and destruction of tribal institutions controlled by tribal leaders and zamindars. The differece reached at its climax when President Daoud tried to distance the official stance of Afghan government towards Soviet Russian. The growing alliance between Afghanistan and USA, finally forced the PDPA to do a coup against Daoud in 1978, the Saur Revolution. Unlike the peaceful regime change of Zahir Shah, the Saur Revolution was more bloody and killed the full family of President Daoud. With this the old system of state-building based on alliance between tribal leaders, religious heads and state ended. The coming of PDPA to rule the country signifies the effect of decade

long process of modernisation in the country which finally created the urban intellectual class who challenged the authority of state itself. This contstation of power between the state and urban intellectual class and also within the urban intellectual class facilitated the external interference and foreign invasion. The external invasion divided the country into two camps of those who support the communist rule and those who opposed it. The main opposition came from religious and tribal leaders, who formed the mujahideen party comprising people of all ethnic and sectarian groups. They declare the war against communist party a religious war and declared jihad. The joint resistance of all parties finally in 1989 forced the withdrawal of the Soviet from Afghanistan.

The end of Cold War with the departure of the Soviet followed by American presence did not bring in any stability. With the Soviet gone, Mujahideen government came that lasted till 1996. The government was headed by Rabbani and comprised of other parties that were formed during the war against Soviet. However, the rule never had any semblance of stability. There was acute infighting within the leadership. Most prominent was the conflict between Pashtun leader Hekmatyar and the Tajik leader Masood. This period proved fatal for Afghan state and its institutions. Gradually the state degenerated into rampant war-lordism creating a situation of anarchy.

The situation of anarchy facilitated the rise of Taliban, which in certain sense was the final blow for the project of modernization of Afghan state. All institutions were destroyed. A shift from Constitution and other legal provisions to *Sharia* under Taliban had severe implications for women and minorities. The quest to push everyone into ideological conformity was detrimental to a society representing ideological diversity. Alongside the social and ideological stringency, there were nothing in terms of welfare and development. The Taliban rule which saw support from Pakistan soon ran out of favour with the epoch making event of 9/11. Taliban due to its proximity with Al-Qaeda, which was behind the conduct of attacks on Twin towers and Pentagon found itself on the wrong side of the fault line of the War on Terror. US led military attack into Afghanistan with the stated objective to end terrorist training and breeding ground. US in alliance with Northern alliance defeated Taliban and removed it from main control of Afghanistan.

The end of Taliban rule, introduced the current phase of post-conflict peace-building and state building in Afghanistan. The Boon negotiations for determination of interim government and framework for peace-building saw participation from all the sections of Afghan political landscape. Taliban however was excluded from the process. The members of Afghan diaspora dominated the process. In the Bonn Conference, though there was the dominance of Northern alliance and through them the Tajik ethnic group, there was also the realization of the need to make it representative. In order to rectify the ethnic asymmetry, the representation of Pashtun community was sought through the Rome group as well a the Peshawar group. Among the various measures, the selection of Hamid Karzai—a Kandhari Pashtun leader was one such move to curtail the Tajik dominance. The formation of an interim administration with a Pashtun as its head was necessary to bring the Pashtun majority within the fold of peace process and to avoid the shifting of their allegiance to Taliban, thus depriving the interim administration of legitimacy component.

The state building process did created a constitutional centralization of the country under central authority. However, the security arm of the state did not evolved to find a unified shape: military power continued to be fragmented. Further, a crude and a hurried integration of ethnic factions into a unified structure did not yield neither a real unification nor structures in sync with the prevalent diversity. Factions stayed and asserted themselves at the cost of institutional inefficacy and policy deadlocks (Jalali 2007).

6.2 History of Migration and the Making of Global Afghan Diaspora

Migration figures prominently in everyday Afghan life as the key adaptive strategy employed by people to escape hardships and disasters—both man made and natural. There has been migrations of Afghan both inside and outside the country, throughout its history. These migrations came in phases depending upon the internal situation (war and instability) and external attraction (economic opportunities).

The series of migrations of the Afghans in the 20th century led to the development of a substantially big community of the Afghan diaspora (near and wider) located in various parts of the world. The Afghan migration story in 20th

century revolved around the project of the Afghan state. The process of establishment of a centralised nation-state pushed the regime to interfere with the norms and practices of the society established over centuries. These created tensions and their violent manifestations—thus creating an environment of insecurity for people, who often adopted the path of migration to neighbouring countries as the way out of the insecure environment.

The state-building process and formation of Afghan diaspora in the different host lands were closely related to each other. In the early 1880s, the centralisation of state power—pushing control of centre over the peripheries for the creation of a modern nation-state led to the migration of people. Subsequently, urban elites had to migrate due to their opposition to the policies of Amir Abdul Rahman. With it, the effective process of the formation of Afghan diaspora in the neighbouring countries of British India, Iran and Turkey began. Those migrating during this period formed the first members of the global Afghan diaspora in the 20th century, who later came back to play an important role in the homeland politics. The very reasons that caused their migration outside the country—the state building project facilitated their return. This has been a repetitive pattern associated with later stages of the project of state in Afghanistan—which saw regular inflow and outflow of people.

The migrations of Afghans in a small scale albeit of the elite and intellectual strata to developed countries in the first half of 20th century marked the beginning of Afghan diaspora formation in the West. Migration continued as a routine economic activity in Afghanistan till the 1980s. The 1980s however, brought a paradigm shift in Afghan migration patterns. The onset of a transformed political scene in the 1980s ushered in by the Soviet invasion brought in a radical change in the Afghan migration history: the scale at which Afghans migrated to Iran and Pakistan was unparalleled in the history of Afghanistan (Stigter 2006). Therefore, the number of migrants and refugees also ran into millions, and such large-scale migration never happened before in Afghan history or any other parts of the world. The migration during the 1980s was quite different from all the previous migration in the history of Afghanistan. The uniqueness of this migration was its forced or involuntary character caused by external interference and invasion.

The end of the Cold War corresponding with the exit of the Soviet from Afghanistan, thus marking an end to the Soviet period of Afghanistan did not usher in a period of peace and stability. The departure of Soviet from the political scene of Afghanistan opened it up as the stage for next round of confrontations—this time however domestic in nature. The conflict was the outcome of the incompatibilities among different tribes and ethnic groups. The incompatibilities of the groups, especially the leaders had grown due to their polarisation in the host countries: Iran and Pakistan during their stay as migrants and refugees. The polarisation along ethnic and sectarian lines eventually led to civil war during the 1990s. The civil war recreated the cycle of migration to immediate neighbouring countries first and then to Western countries. However, the migrants this time comprised mainly of urban elites and the supporters of the previous regime—the PDPA. This time the migrants mostly migrated to Western and developed countries (Stigter 2006).

The 1980s onwards, political situation in the country created migration at unprecedented scale. The selection of migration destination by Afghans depended upon factors such as geographical proximities, cultural similarities and religious affiliations (Ashrafi and Moghissi 2002). Apart from it the class dimension also played a prominent role in the determination of the migration destinations. That is educated, and upper-middle-class Afghans from urban areas opted for different countries in West as the final destinations of their migration. Migration process and the patterns of migration relied heavily on past experiences, knowledge and cultural ties with host countries. Migration of elite Pashtuns to Great Britain, Tajiks to Germany and Hazaras to Austria and Sweden following the Soviet invasion were based on such ties and connections developed with these countries in pre-Soviet period itself. Alongside it, the migration policy and social benefits of the host land also played an important role in the determination of migration destination. Norway, Finland and Sweden were preferred destinations only because of their migration policies (Dimitriadi 2012).

The series of migrations of the Afghans in the 20th century led to the development of a substantially big community of the Afghan diaspora (near and wider) located in various parts of the world. Afghans living in Iran and Pakistan

formed the near diaspora. The size of Afghans living in these countries is substantially large. The 'wide' diaspora comprises of those Afghans, who have mostly opted countries in the West as their host destinations. This type of diaspora is smaller, but, are more heterogeneous in nature as people migrated to these countries in different phases throughout the 20th century (Marieke Van Hout 2014).

The paradigm shift in the information and communication technology—the digital revolution has allowed the activation of Afghan diaspora in different parts of the globe. Today, the Afghan diaspora has emerged as one of the highly transnational groups equipped with money, goods and information. Through the digital world (social media) and other means of communication the Afghan diaspora has successfully established contacts with one another and with the homeland, thus making them an effective stakeholders in political processes in the homeland (Braakman 2005). 'Afghan culture' and 'Afghan ways' are representations which are transmitted and activated by the existence of networks and the experience of living together and sharing of same norms and codes for several generations.

The social and political aspects of Afghan society related with community and group identity have also found expressions in the diaspora spaces. However, in the diaspora spaces, the member of Afghan diaspora assumes several roles as a citizen or a migrant/refugee in the host country, as a member of the immediate social neighbourhood, and as a member of particular Afghan ethnic group. Above all these referents, the Afghan diaspora both participates in the creation of universal Afghan national identity at the global level and associate with it as a recipient of the identity.

6.3 The Afghan Diaspora and State-Building

The series and cycles of the migration of the Afghans in the 20th century led to formation of a global Afghan diaspora (both near and far). It emerged as a community scattered across globe. However, the revolution in the digital and communication technologies have enabled them both access to political developments in Afghanistan and also the capacity to influence them. Further, their own spatial location in particular countries in the West, have placed the diaspora in positions to play special roles related with the politics of homeland. This capacity has been also utilized by

respective host lands who have engaged with the project of state-building in Afghanistan as part of larger international community's involvement in the reconstruction process in Afghanistan in the aftermath of 2001.

On 27 November 2001, all the Afghan factions gathered at Bonn to discuss the future of Afghan state under the supervision of UN. The new phase of State-building was a complex one trying to accommodate many actors within its fold, Northern Alliance, Rome Group, Peshawar group, and Cyprus (Rashid 2008). Diaspora members became part of the process and the interim state that was established after the talks. Most of the cabinet ministers during the interim government formed in 2001 under President Karzai's leadership comprised of diaspora members. In the reconstruction efforts several actors—governmental and non-governmental took part in the reconstruction process. The cumulative efforts of all these actors became the total activity taking place in the name of reconstruction and peace-building in Afghanistan. Diaspora members figured prominently in all of these efforts.

The primary reason which facilitated the rise of diaspora to assume various roles in the process was the presence of skill deficiency and absence of knowledge experts on Afghanistan. Diaspora and migrants are employed in the homeland to fill in the gap caused by skill deficiencies that have come in the country due to its relative underdevelopment or due to the destruction of those institutions in the conflict, which were producing skilled manpower. Afghan diaspora has made immense influence on the process of state-building and reconstruction. Their influence came as a result of their participation in the process of policy lobbying and as actors working in conception and execution of policies and programmes on behalf of governmental and non-governmental organizations.

The role that host land plays in the development of diaspora driven programs related with the state-building project in homeland depends upon the relation between the homeland and host land. The US support to the involvement and projects of the Afghan-American diaspora associated with the state-building process in Afghanistan is due to the growing association between the host land and the homeland. The US military and multiple other non-military government agencies have employed a large number of young, educated Afghans (Oeppen 2010). The host land have used these diaspora members to act as a mediator for providing the necessary knowledge and

information to host land without creating any problem in the homeland. The highest number of Afghan diaspora members are hired by the US Department of Defence (especially its Defence Language Institute) and Voice of America. The reason for this shows the international need for more skilled people after 2001. Another reason for the employment of diaspora members in activities of state-building in Afghanistan is the presence of trust over members of the diaspora community. This trust can be attributed to the fact that the members of the diaspora community are in most instances the naturalized citizens of the host countries (Hanifi 2006).

Alongside more direct participations in political processes, the Afghan diaspora has played important role in the economic realm. In the domain of economy Afghan diaspora has helped many of economic instutions related with banking and finance through their knowledge, skills and know-how about the external markets and by creating awareness in host country about Afghan products. An important sector within economy where diaspora has been on the forefront is the infrastructure development. The diaspora has been playing path-breaking works in infrastructure developments by initiating different projects in their home town based on kinship relation. The hydropower project in Logar district developed by the Afghanistan Development Organization is an example of such infrastructural developments (Oeppen 2010). At one level, by helping the developmental processes, diaspora members contributes in the overall reconstruction process. However, alongside it, because of the role that kinship and other ethnic factors plays in conception of such projects, there has been an increase the ethnic issues in the country.

A more direct involvement of the diaspora in the domain of economy has been in activities of fund-raising for the people of Afghanistan during natural calamities like drought and earthquakes. In many instances, political elites at home go a long distance to keep the diaspora politically and financially interested in the home country matters. Particularly when the country faces a difficult situation, they make various efforts to call upon solidarity among the diaspora members. Afghan governments have regularly made repeated request to the Afghan diaspora all around the world to contribute to the state-building project.

Another important manner in which the Afghan diaspora has also been able to leave its mark on the process of state-building has been through remittances. Afghan

diaspora have contributed in both the domain of social remittance and economic remittance.

Social remittance can be defined as ideas, know-how, practices and skills that the diaspora contributes to the host land societies. They send back social remittances that promote development in the homeland (Levitt 2010). The various types of social remittance that diasporas transfer are norms, practices, identities, and social capital to the homeland. The Afghan diaspora (both near and wider) has made contribution to the homeland through social remittance especially skill transfer, norms and practices, non-monetary contribution like books, sports equipment, innovative educational practices, health care to name a few. The knowledge transfer by the Afghan diaspora mainly falls into two categories: one is professional associations and second is philanthropic non-profit organisations through which they contribute to the reconstruction and state-building process (Hanifi 2006).

The economic remittance likewise, presents another aspect of diaspora involvement in the homeland as it helps in the development of infrastructure and economic base, especially in conflict areas. The cash flow sent into Afghanistan both through formal and informal (hawala system) contributes a good amount of the total GDP of the country. The Afghan Investment Support Agency(2004), offers a high estimate of 500,000 Afghans in the US and claims an average remittances of $1500 per person or a total of approximately $75 million per year to Afghanistan. Most of these amount are transferred through hawala system. Remittance constitute a significant portion of the family income in the Afghanistan, thereby increasing their purchasing power as compared to those who don't receive any remittances. Most of the time these remittances are used for the social purpose (like dowries and wedding), for household consumption (food, clothes, medical emergencies), for investments (land, houses, cars). In post- 2001, people have been using the economic remittances for starting business (shop, workshop, transport vehicles) with the general improvement in the economic condition of people inside the country (Abbasi-Shavazi 2005).

The association of remittance and the state-building however, is indirect one. It act as informal source for economic improvement and skill development. Both of which in the long run, feeds into the emergence and development of institutions vital

for both functioning of state and its legitimization.

The economic remittance coming from the wider diaspora is comparatively very high than those coming from the near diaspora. This can be attributed to the fact that, the Afghan diaspora in neighbouring countries operates in a legal system of citizenship and working rights, which is harsh towards rights of migrants. This has pushed them to often work in informal sectors, where the income is very low. On the other hand, the Afghan diaspora in West having naturalized citizenship have access to all benefits and working rights, which reflects in their overall income. The difference can also due to the general income difference between developing countries and developed countries. Further, those Afghan living in West were from the very beginning from the upper strata of the society. So, they had that head start in the economic realm.

6.4 Concluding Remarks

The participation of the diaspora in process of state building and reconstruction has created both prospects and tension. On the positive, side diaspora through its experiences and technical expertise creates the potential for a smooth transition towards modernization. However, alongside the role of a peace-maker, diaspora has also created contradictions and tensions, that have threatened the process of reconstruction itself and as a result often tend to emerge as peace-breaker.

The political narrative of the involvement of Afghan diaspora is also not complete without consideration of one political implications it has. That is through the very act of involvement in the processes, members of Afghan diaspora, who were mostly educated and belonged to the elite strata have emerged as a separate interest group in the homeland politics of state-building and reconstruction. From 2001 to 2004, almost 80% of the government Ministers and officials were from different diaspora groups (Oeppen 2010). Their rise has been viewed by political elites inside the country as challenge to their authority. This has added a new dimension to the already existing 'contestation' of power in Afghanistan. The diaspora has emerged as a new power group challenging the political position of the traditional tribal and warring leaders and the traditional urban elites. Also, the very push for modernization involving participation of the diaspora in modernization has created confrontation

with traditional elements. For their contribution to the modernization processes, local Afghans often refer to members of diaspora working in Afghanistan as *Afghan-ha-e kharijee* (foreign Afghans), a term which carries derogatory connotations. There is a general understanding that Westernisation in Afghanistan is carried not only by non-Afghans, but also by members of diaspora—often considered as westernised Afghans (Sadat 2008).

Further, the diaspora as an actor does not comes in as purely modern and rational actor. It itself reflects the same diversity of Afghan society and brings along with it the same biases that are result of divisions in Afghan society along sectarian and ethnic lines. Diaspora participation in the state building process need not to be viewed as a uniformly patterned exercise. Rather than representing the grand Afghan identity, the diaspora community itself is divided based on sub-national identities as Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, etc. The engagements of diaspora in the homeland politics is shaped not only by the objective of economic and political interests but also subjective preferences based on sub-national identities. In a way, the diasporas itself acts along the lines of fissures prevalent in homeland, when it comes to the question of participation in politics of the homeland. Their participation then brings in the potential to reinforce fissures prevalent in homeland and often prevents the emergence of consensus and an overarching national identity—vital for nation building and state building. In this way diaspora participation also in certain sense has its own limitations on several occasions.

Another related problem is that, diaspora due to its own experiences of host-land practices often does not understands and ignores the sensitivities and social and cultural contexts of the homeland. This is another fissure, which has often lead to programmes and policies which are not in sync with the local reality of Afghan society. In the domain of economy of reconstruction, the diaspora participation again has its drawbacks. One such aspect is the reversal in aid money which diaspora participation brings. This aspect is associated with the problem of absence of internal capacity to absorb significant aid money given by Western countries in the aftermath of 2001. Which then brings in international firms, who were roped into to improve internal capacity. However, they have been spending a lot on experts (often drawn from diaspora members) to work in this regard. This amount basically was the aid

money flowing in the reverse direction due to the absence of capacity within Afghanistan. Such exercises then creates a negative image of the diaspora and also undermines the real contributions made by the Afghan diaspora to affects the processes related with state-building (Hanifi 2006).

In conclusion, we can say that the state-building process in Afghanistan is still evolving and experimenting with new types of permutation and combinations. Besides the traditional power structure shared by the state, tribal leaders, and religious heads, diaspora participation has added a new dimension to the state-building project. The policies in this direction need to be in cognisance of the transformation in dynamics this participation brings. The current state-building process started with the help of international powers is to a large extent diaspora driven due to the lack of skilled human resource in the country. This dimension of the privileged position of the diaspora in the political realm is creating both positive and negative impact on the state-building process depending on the context in which they are participating.

On the positive side, the diaspora involvement in sectors like education and health is helping the Afghan government to improve the skill and efficiency of these institutions. The diasporas are bringing the skill and new technological improvement which they had learned in the host country. The INGOs and local NGO are taking help from Afghan diaspora to implement more and more welfare projects for the reconstruction and state-building process. The construction of new hospitals is helping many poor people to access better health and cheaper services inside the country. The local people are appreciating the role of the diaspora in the welfare sector more due to the lack of government capabilities to develop infrastructure on its own. The growth in the female education is also another contribution of diaspora participation in the state-building process. The current debates and discussion on the issue of women rights and empowerment are all due to the presence of women diaspora members at the government level.

However, the diaspora participation at the government and political level is creating some negative trends in the state-building process. It is my observation that the despite having 80% of the ministers in the Karzai government diaspora members the institutional improvement is not much. The existence of tribal leaders and warlords proves the failure of the Afghan government's penetration into the peripheral

areas and the unpopularity of the diaspora members in those areas. The ground level politics is still dominated by the traditional power holders like tribal leaders, religious heads and warlords. Therefore, the success and failure of the new state-building process in Afghanistan depend upon the balance of power between the traditional leaders and diaspora members.

In the nutshell, the participation of diaspora in homeland politics and state-building in the post-conflict situation like other political processes of the homeland is also shaped to a certain extent by the social structure of the society. The policy/academic treatment of diaspora participation in the post-conflict situation as either peace-maker or peace-breaker is an oversimplification. While the actual outcome is often complicated having both positive as well negative impacts. This is evident from the case of Afghanistan, where diaspora has acted as a peace-maker at the international level, while at the national level it sometimes acts as peace-breaker by widening inter-community difference. The direct participation of diaspora in traditional societies like Afghanistan has created an imbalance between different groups and has widened the ethnic and tribal gap by adding another dimension of modernist v/s traditionalist conflict.

This study also highlights some new areas of research through which the state-building process in Afghanistan will be more realistic. The importance of host land and its influence on homeland politics through diaspora participation in Afghanistan is one of the areas least explored by the researcher. Especially the relation between Iran and Afghanistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan through the participation of diaspora. The people in neighbouring countries of Iran and Pakistan are usually not considered as diaspora due to their legal status in these countries. Most of the Afghan leaders and warlords had spent most of their time during the civil war in these neighbouring countries. Their return to Afghanistan might also highlight the change in their orientation towards homeland and more active participation in politics on behalf of host land.

Another area of interest might be the role of women diaspora members in empowering or suppressing the Afghan women in the homeland. Most of the current literature takes women diaspora members as passive with minimum influence of the homeland politics. So the role of cross country marriage alliance and the image and

perception of 'women' in diaspora set-up will be very interesting. As the hope and return to homeland is still strong among many Afghans and one of the ways of maintaining relationship with homeland is through matrimonial alliances. In this context, the coming of new social media will be very important in Afghan context due to its nature of population dominated by youths.

Glossary

Abdali, Ahmad Shah	King and founder of modern Afghanistan in 1747.
Amin, Hafizullah	Second president of Afghanistan from the Khalq Party, killed by Soviet invaders in December 1979.
Daud, Mohammed	President of Afghanistan, 1973- 1978, killed during the Afghan communist coup.
Dostum, Rashid Northern	General and the Uzbek anti Taliban commander from Afghanistan.
Durand Line	Border dividing Pakistani and Afghan Pashtun tribes; demarcated by Sir Mortimer Durand in 1893 but which Afghans do not recognise.
Durrani	One of the two major sections of the Pashtun tribes, the other being Ghilzai.
DynCorp International	U.S contracting firm hired to train Afghan army and police.

Fahim, Mohammed	General and successor to Ahmad Shah Masud as the leader of the Panjsheri Tajiks and the Northern Alliance; later defence minister in President Karzai's government.
Gailani, Pir Sayed Ahmad	Sufi Afghan Leader who led a party that fought the Soviets in the 1980s; after9/11 headed the Peshawar group of Pashtuns.
Ghilzai	One of the two major sections of the Pashtun tribes, other beign Durrani.
Hikmetyar, Gulbuddin	Leader of the Hizb-e-Islami Party, allied to the Taliban.
Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin	Afghan Party allied allied to the Taliban and led by Hikmetyar.
Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI)	Pakistan's military intelligence service.
Jalali, Ali Ahmad	Minister ofIinteriors in Karzai's cabinet, 2003-2005.
Kabulov, Zamir	Senior Russian Diplomat representing Russia at major

conferences on Afghanistan; later Russian ambassador to Kabul.

Kamal, Babrak	Installed as president of Afghanistan by the invading Soviet army in December 1979; belonging to the Parcham Party.
Karzai, Abdul Ahad	Father of Hamid Karzai; murdered by the Taliban, in 1999.
Karzai, Ahmad Wali	Younger brother of Hamid Karzai.
Karzai, Hamid	President of Afghanistan, 2001-2014.
Kazemi, Syed Mustafa	Afghanistan's Commerce Minister, killed by a suicide bomb attack in 2007.
Khalili, Karim	A leader of the Hazara resistance to the Taliban and later vice president under President Karzai.
Khalilzad, Zalmay	U.S chief of mission to the United Nations; former U.S Ambassador Afghanistan and Iraq.

Khalq Afghanistan.	The Masses, one of the communist parties of
Khan, Ismael	Anti-Taliban leader in Western Afghanistan.
Khan, Jan Mohammed	Governor of Uruzgan province, former Taliban.
Loya Jirga (LJ)	Traditional meeting of Afghan tribal chiefs and elders.
Masud, Ahmad Shah	Leader of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance; assassinated by al Qaeda two days before 9/11.
Mohaqiq, Mohammed	Hazara leader in northern Afghanistan.
Mujaddedi, Sibghatullah	One of the Seven Mujahedin leaders based in Pakistan;

headed the National Liberation Front of Afghanistan,

to which Hamid Karzai belonged; also a spiritual leader and head of the Naqshbandiyah order of Sufism in Afghanistan; president of Afghanistan in 1992 and later headed the Peace and Reconciliation Commission dealing with the Taliban.

Najibullah,

Mohammed   Last communist president of Afghanistan, 1986-1992.

Naqibullah,

Mullah   Warlord from Kandahar and ally of Karzai.

National Directorate of

Security (NDS), or

Riasat Amnait-e-Meli   Afghan Intelligence Service, headed by Director-GeneralAmrullah Saleh.

Northern Alliance   Anti-Taliban opposition centred on commander Ahmad
Shah   Masud.

North-West Frontier Province (NWFP)	Province of Pakistan; with Pashtun population's domination.
Omar, Mohammed Mullah	Leaders of the Taliban movement.
Panjsheri Tajiks	Tajiks from the Panjsher Valley, north of Kabul, and followers of Ahmad Shah Masud and Later General Fahim.
Parcham	The Flag, one of the Communist parties of Afghanistan.
Popalzai	Pashtun Tribe in Southern Afghanistan headed by Hamid Karzai.

Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)	Group of 100 to 150 Western soldiers and civilian advisers based in a province of help improve security and governance.
Pashtu	The language of the Pashtun tribe.
Qanuni, Younus	Leader of the Northern Alliance, former minister and speaker of the Afghan parliament.
Rabbani, Burhanuddin	Tajik leader who was president of Afghanistan from 1992 to 1996 and a leader of the Northern Alliance.
Rehman, Abdul	King known as Iron Amir, 1880-1901.
Rome Group Zahir	Group of Afghan exiles formed around the former king Shah.
Sayyaf, Abdul Rasul	Pashtun warlords, member of the Northern Alliance, and Wahhabi leader close to Saudi Arabia.
Shah, Zahir	King of Afghanistan, 1933-1973.

Sharia	Islamic law.
Sherzai, Gul Agha	Warlord who captured Kandahar from Taliban and became governor of the Province.
Taliban	Pashtun extremist group that ruled Afghanistan before 9/11.
Taraki, Nur Mohammed	First Communist president of Afghanistan, in April 1978, from the Khalq Party; murdered by his successor Hafizullah Amin, in September 1979.
Ulema	Islamic religious leaders and scholars.
Wahhabism	A deeply conservative sect in Sunni Islam practised in Saudi Arabia.
Wali, Abdul	General and Son-in Law to former king Zahir Shah and influential leader of Rome group.

Wardak, Rahim   General and defence minister of Afghanistan.

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