

**Germany and Problems of European Integration:  
A Study of Angela Merkel's Leadership, 2005-2013**

*Thesis submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University  
for award of the degree of*

**DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

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2017



Date- 21<sup>st</sup> July 2017

**DECLARATION**

I declare that the thesis entitled “Germany and Problems of European Integration: A Study of Angela Merkel’s Leadership, 2005-2013” submitted by me for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

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We recommend that this thesis be place before the examiners for evaluation.

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## DEDICATION

I wish to dedicate the thesis to my family, my sisters *Nirmala and Pinkey* for being pillars of my strength and source of my inspiration with their hard work and unfortunately sacrificing their dreams for making me realise my dreams. I also wish to dedicate the work to my father who has been a constant believer in my capabilities by investing all hopes and dreams in my future success. I also wish to include my younger brothers, *Jalam (jalu) and Rakesh* for helping me during the writing of my thesis and being so lovable and bearing with me and my short temper attitude. Above all, I dedicate my hard work to my late mother whose soul has always guided me and her teachings and blessings will always remain my source of inspiration to work and perform better in future.

I sincerely dedicate it to the prestigious university, *Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi (J.N.U)* for making it possible to have affordable quality higher education and boarding. The university's rich library and academic resources, active student political life, environment of debate and reasons, quest for pursuing critical thinking has change my perspective about issues and life forever and going to shape my career and life in future. I sincerely and proudly dedicate the thesis to Jawaharlal Nehru University as par my family back home.

## Acknowledgements

*It is impossible for me to express my deep gratitude in words for those who helped me during writing the Thesis. But first and foremost I extend my sincere hearty gratitude to my Supervisor Prof. Ummu Salma Bava without her advice, encouragement, patience, motivation and feedback I would never have undertaken to write this thesis. She not only guided me in my academic field but always compelled me to think about the future and essence of life. It has been a learning and life changing association of a decade with her. I still remember the days when I had joined her class on 'German Foreign Policy' in 2009 during my M.A. She was clear enough or sometimes found her strict when she made me realise to overcome inferiority while introducing me with the harsh realities of outside world. But today when I look back and specially the moment I am submitting my Ph.D thesis, I feel those strict words and reality checks has turned boon and changed me into a more confident with positive attitude towards life and problems. She provided me with the confidence to overcome not only the language barrier but also natural obstacles. She invested her faith in me and made me believe so when I was reluctant or hesitant to think about going for the field trip to Berlin. It was her belief and efforts which made me to undertake the seemingly impossible field trip with ease and comfort. I wish to tell you mam that those five months in Berlin has changed me positively forever and have given me sense of enjoying independence of mobility and it could become possible ONLY because of your efforts, sustain guidance and help.*

*While writing this paragraph, her words are echoing in my soul and honestly speaking making me emotional too. I can write pages after pages to thank her for transforming me in a better way and still I would not be able to make justice with her contribution in shaping my life and it will remain in my heart beyond these pages and words of appreciation for her. Dear, Madam Thanks for giving me the most important virtue of life and that is 'belief in your ability' 'self-realisation' and 'confidence'. I wish to have this association to last long.*

*I also take this opportunity to thank the faculty members of Centre for European Studies, for their selfless guidance and help whenever it was required. I am fortunate to have faculty members what our generation calls, 'cool' faculties, easy to approach or discuss your academic problems. I also thank all the faculty members for providing*

*me academic opportunities in the centre's various academic events. I also express my gratitude to the office bearers of Centre for European Studies and specially Sheeshpal ji for being so nice and helpful to me.*

*I am grateful to Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Berlin for providing me a short term fellowship to undertake my field trip which has improved and provided me insights for the thesis. I wish to take liberty to thank Mr. Amos and Mr. Tobias for being helpful and guiding me during the field trip to Berlin. Their immense help in getting interviews and appointments with various scholars has made the trip academically productive. It has also provided me opportunities to experience German culture, academic ambience and their research approach. I am also thankful to Dr. Ingo Peters of Freie University, Berlin for guiding me on my thesis and associating me with the university.*

*I also express my profound love and gratitude to my family members, especially my sisters, Nirmala and Pinky and My father Ratan Singh for investing their faith and hopes in my capabilities. Their hopes and expectations have turned me into a responsible person. In the absence of their faith, care, love, prayer, constant supports and motivation I would have never come so far. My love and respect goes to my Late mother Shanti Devi for making me strong enough to overcome all the problems of life and not unnecessarily pampering me as a special child. I also express my love for my younger brother, Jalam and Rakesh for making my days easy while staying with and doing all the works for me which I am supposed to do myself. There were moments when I have shouted on them without reasons and vented out my frustration on them but they always tolerated me. They are really my happiness and world away from home in Delhi. I also my childhood and the best friend/borther Arjun Rajpurohit for being with me always in each and every circumstances and taking care of my social responsibility whenever asked for. He is a true friend even if I talk to him once in a month but I know he is there with in every moment or circumstances of life.*

*Last but not the least, I wish to thank people who have supported and inspired me during my thesis writing and stay in JNU. I wish to thank friends and fellow scholars of the CES for being nice and encouraging to me. I express my profound love and gratitude towards friends and treasure of my happiness and strength and was always there for me.*

*And above all I thank the Almighty for Her kindness and blessing for making this difficult work done within stipulated time.*

July 2017

NEW DELHI

JAGDISH SINGH

## Preface

The post World War situation of Europe has forced various European leaders, political elite and national economies to support and come with an idea of European integration to prevent recurrence of war in future. Various internal and external factors have contributed to the idea of European integration after the WWII.

West European political elite has believed that since end of the World War II an integrative alliance needed to be formed to strengthen the national economies, ensure peace and rule of law in Europe. The process of integration started with the Treaty of Paris based on the Shuman Plan in 1951 and establishing the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952. The next step in the process was the creation of the European Economic Community in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome with the six countries, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxemburg, West German, France and Italy coming together to carry forward the integration process and today with 27 member states (after the Brexit), EU emerged as an economic and normative power in international affairs. There have been two major systemic changes in the history of European Integration. The first was the shift to bipolarity following the Second World War, a change that sparked the drive to integrate the Europe. The second was the demise of bipolarity following the collapse of the Soviet Union which pushed for consolidation of European Union integration in form of institutional building from Maastricht Treaty in 1992 to the Lisbon Treaty in 2010.

In this process of European Integration, 'leadership' has always been an important factor which has not only founded the vision of 'one Europe' but also carried forward the dream with their leadership. The role of leadership in the European integration had started with Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet's vision in 1952 in the form of the European Coal and Steel Community. Apart from state to state cooperation, another factor 'leadership' has also played a significant role in European Integration process. As the official website of the European Commission underlines the importance of leadership in the European integration process by stating that "visionary leaders inspired the creation of the European Union we live in today.

The study has examined the role of leadership in general and German Chancellors role in particular while taking Chancellor Angela Merkel's leadership role in her first

two terms (2005 to 2019 and 2009 to 2013). While tracing European integration history, there is list of leaders who have contributed to the process. West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer setting Bonn's foreign policy with pillars of westward orientation, multilateralism, reconciliation with France and integrating West Germany in European integration which has made subsequent German chancellors to invest in European integration process. Erhard Ludwig's economic miracle and role in establishing monetary union, Willy Brandt's *ostpolitik* and in principle supporting East-West European unification, Helmut Kohl-Mitterrand initiatives for European integration provides ample evidence that German chancellors have played crucial role in forwarding European integration further.

After Chancellor Schroder's tenure, Angela Merkel from the Christian Democratic Union was elected Chancellor in November 2005 when the European Union was facing challenges after the failure of the constitutional treaty. She has emerged as an undisputed European leader by successful budget negotiation in a summit in Brussels in 2005. In an echo of Chancellor Helmut Kohl's chequebook diplomacy, she has furthered the cause of European integration by raising Germany's contribution to EU budget which today stands highest among the member states, 21.36% of the budget 2015 and showed deep faith in the process. Merkel took substantial steps towards Europe in comparison to former Chancellor Schroeder's EU policy that was not considered much pro-integration which was under the intense influence of German domestic politics. Germany under the leadership of Angela Merkel was calling for more Europe not less. The Euro crisis has defined Merkel's European policy with substance. It is the crisis which has determined more integration. Angela Merkel's efforts to handle the Euro Crisis and bailout packages to indebted countries showed Germany's pro-integration (economic) approach which draws criticisms too. But Merkel also cautioned against the extension of members of EU and sounded more sceptics about Turkey's accession to EU. The scepticism has increased recently after the refugee crisis 2015. The imminent challenge of flowing refugee crisis has also forced member states to reconsider their strategy for a multicultural, inclusive and integrated Europe. Germany, under the leadership of Chancellor Merkel, has led the Europe to address refugee crisis and subsequent challenges. But apart from these challenges and criticisms, the Chancellor Angela Merkel has always considered the



Euro much more than a currency, for her the Euro serves as a symbol for the economic, social and political unification of Europe.

In light of the Euro-crisis and European enlargement, the role of Germany under the leadership of Chancellor Angela Merkel has come under intense debate and discussions globally. German Chancellors role and later leadership of German Chancellor Angela Merkel and her approach to these European crises has impacted the integration process. In wake of the recent refugee crisis and after Brexit, German leadership has crucial role to play in enhancing the European integration process.

Date 21/07/2017

JAGDISH SINGH

New Delhi

## **Acronyms and Abbreviations**

<b>ASEAN</b>	<b>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</b>
<b>AU</b>	<b>African Union</b>
<b>BENELUX</b>	<b>Belgium, Netherland and Luxemburg</b>
<b>CAP</b>	<b>Common Agriculture Policy</b>
<b>CDU</b>	<b>Christian Democratic Union</b>
<b>CFSP</b>	<b>Common Foreign and Security Policy</b>
<b>CIS</b>	<b>Commonwealth of Independent States</b>
<b>CSU</b>	<b>Christian Social Union</b>
<b>EC</b>	<b>European Commission</b>
<b>EC</b>	<b>European Community</b>
<b>ECB</b>	<b>European Central Bank</b>
<b>ECSC</b>	<b>European Coal and Steel Community</b>
<b>EDC</b>	<b>European Defense Community</b>
<b>EEC</b>	<b>European Economic Community</b>
<b>EFSF</b>	<b>European Financial Stability Facility</b>
<b>EMS</b>	<b>European Monetary System</b>
<b>ESDP</b>	<b>European Security and Defense Policy</b>
<b>ESM</b>	<b>European Stability Mechanism</b>
<b>EU</b>	<b>European Union</b>
<b>EUROTOM</b>	<b>European Atomic Energy Community</b>
<b>FDP</b>	<b>Free Democratic Party</b>
<b>FRG</b>	<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>

<b>FTA</b>	<b>Free Trade Agreement</b>
<b>GDP</b>	<b>Gross Domestic Product</b>
<b>GDR</b>	<b>German Democratic Republic</b>
<b>GP</b>	<b>Green Party</b>
<b>IMF</b>	<b>International Monetary Fund</b>
<b>ISK</b>	<i>Internationaler Sozialistischer Kampfbund</i>
<b>NATO</b>	<b>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</b>
<b>PhD</b>	<b>Doctor of Philosophy</b>
<b>QMV</b>	<b>Qualified Majority Voting</b>
<b>SAARC</b>	<b>South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation</b>
<b>SEA</b>	<b>Single European Act</b>
<b>SPD</b>	<b>Social Democratic Party of Germany</b>
<b>TEU</b>	<b>Treaty on European Union</b>
<b>TSCG</b>	<b>Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance</b>
<b>UK</b>	<b>United Kingdom</b>
<b>USA</b>	<b>United States of America</b>
<b>USSR</b>	<b>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</b>
<b>WWII</b>	<b>World War II</b>

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## Chapter I

### **Introduction**

#### **Background**

Since 1945, the world in general and Europe in particular had left with many challenging questions about war and peace. The consequences of the two World Wars in a short span of time were devastating for the European continent, which had led to a political and economic instability across the Europe. The results and outcomes of the past two World Wars had forced European leaders to think about the future of the European continent. In the background of war-torn Europe, an idea of the European integration has originated as an attempt from political leaders, elite and economic elements of European nations to prevent any future recurrence of the devastation witnessed in the last two World Wars.

West European political elite had believed that since end of the World War II, cooperation and integration among the arch rival countries (Germany and France) and camps of Europe is required to restructure the national economies to ensure peace and rule of law in Europe.

French statesman and foreign minister Robert Shuman and French politician and diplomat Jean Monnet had envisioned a steady and gradual integration that would result from the war time rivals working together for common economic goals and peace in the Continent. They envisioned that “the means would be economics, but the goal was always political” (Burgess 1996: 5). Politically, it was an effort of reconciliation between arch rival France and Germany to find a platform to come together and re-establish durable peace and rule of law in Europe. For Germany it was a much needed platform to integrate itself within European community and from the French perspective, the idea to form a regional community was to bind Germany within strong institutional frameworks that would prevent another war (Pinder and Usherwood 2007).



The European integration process had started with the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952. But the idea of an integrated Europe was there even before the 1952. There was a sense of European integration at economic level even during the great depression period in the 1930s. Since the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the idea of an integrated Europe was present among French and German political leadership. French and German efforts were not only crucial for European integration but also an important event even the failed attempts in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Stevenson 2012). The idea of integration failed after the First World War because the forces of extreme nationalism were powerful across Europe (Fischer 2012). Theoretically, European integration process was thought to be a spill-over effect, economic at the initial stage and political at the later stage what Jean Monnet had envisioned.

European Union as an intergovernmental entity with certain supranational traits has evolved since its creation as the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952. The idea of peace, cooperation and integration has got the fertile land in Europe during these gloomy days since 1945. The process of integration had started in 1957 where six countries Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and Netherland had signed a treaty and today with 27 member states (after the Brexit in 2016), the EU emerged as an economic superpower. The first enlargement of the EEC took place in 1973, UK, Denmark and Ireland joining the communities, raising the member states from six to nine. In 1981, second enlargement of the community where Greece joined in and followed by Spain, Portugal in 1986 raising the EEC members to twelve.

In 1986, the Single European Act was signed where the West Germany had played an important role to bring it in action. The treaty has ensured free flow of trade across EEC member states and creating a common market. In 1989, the major political development occurred in Europe with the Berlin Wall coming down on 9 November 1989 and the borders of East and West Germany were opened for the first time since the wall built in 1961.

Disintegration of the Soviet Union and subsequent fall of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, the conditions for brining Eastern part of Europe into West were fertile.

With the collapse of communism across Central and Eastern Europe, Europeans became closer neighbours. In 1993, the common market was completed with the freedoms of movement of goods, services, people/labour and capital. By the 1990s the idea of integration got support and momentum which resulted in many important outcomes.

In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty marked the most significant event in the history of European integration when the Treaty on the European Union was ratified, converting the European Communities into the European Union. The treaty provided the scope and criteria to fully integrate member states' economies and monetary mechanism. It expanded the influence of the European Union beyond finance to things like foreign policy and defence. In a significant development, the West European states were setting a precedent in enhancing the voluntary 'sharing' or 'pooling' of sovereignty which introduced supranational traits in the intergovernmental union.

In 1995, Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the European Union. In 2004, ten Central and Eastern European states joined the European Union which is a milestone in the history of the EU. This was the integration of history and the idea of Europe. The failure of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 has been well compensated by the successful Lisbon Treaty in 2010 which has strengthened the democratic process at the European level. Today, EU with its 27 (after the Brexit) member states (Croatia joined in 2013) stand firm at the international stage with its economic power and presence in global affairs.

Theoretically, the European integration process has posed many challenges to international relations and political theory. Concepts of political theories like state, sovereignty, identity, nation and nation-state, a welfare state and regional integration have been relooked in the context of deepening integration in Europe. Even among academic debates in Europe, the integration process has been analysed with the framework of inter-governmentalism, federalism, and constructivism has been explored with issues like integration and identity, integration and sovereignty, integration and nation state. Regional integration has emerged as a prominent phenomenon since 1952 with creation of ECSC especially in the Western Europe. The Westphalian concepts of state and sovereignty have been pragmatically adjusted for the national interests within regional integration or groupings. The European

integration had started as a regional integration but now heading towards a unique regional intergovernmental formation with certain supranational traits.

### **Defining Regional Integration**

The research has analysed the European integration process and the role of political leadership in general and focusing on the leadership role of German Chancellor Angela Merkel in enhancing European integration process as the case study of the research. It is imperative to understand the concept of regional integration before explaining European integration and the role of leadership element in strengthening the process.

Since 1945, with the end of the WWII and consequences of the War has forced World leaders and governments to think about peace and stability in future. The concept of territorial sovereignty and rigid nationalist rhetoric had been started re-examining since the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Newly decolonised countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America also started experimenting with regionalism to ensure economic cooperation and also for their prevailing regional security concerns. The idea of regional integration in globalisation has challenged the world order based on territorial sovereign of states. The concept has not only redefined the state sovereignty but also constructed and deconstructed existing global order during the Cold War and aftermath.

Historically, regional integration went through different phases in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The initial efforts for regional integration in first two decades since the Second World War were more economic in nature which had included breaking tariff barriers across the region, creating common markets, limited but free movement of goods and services, labour and capital. During the Cold War, countries in the Soviet and the US camps were already cooperating on security and military issues. The next wave of regional integration evolved through intensifying economic engagement within the region by introducing free trade area, movement of labour, goods, services and capital. This wave of regional integration in the 1980-90s has enhanced the idea of political integration, common foreign and security policies.

Defining regional integration has always been a challenging task among the experts of the subject. In simple terms, regional integration has been defined as voluntarily neighbouring countries coming together to address certain common economic,

security or political goals in a provided geographical region which can have the common internal and external security concerns and constraints. Regional integration has also been defined as a “process of overcoming barriers that divide neighbouring countries, by common accord, and of jointly managing shared resources and assets. Essentially, it is a process by which groups of countries liberalise trade, creating a common market for goods, people, capital and services”<sup>1</sup>. Another definition of ‘regionalism’ explains it a "voluntarily mingle, merge and mix with their neighbours so as to lose the factual attributes of sovereignty while acquiring new techniques for resolving conflicts among themselves"(Haas, Ernst B 1971: 4). Niekerk (2005), a senior economist at the World Bank in his paper presented at the Central Bank of Mozambique has outlined regional integration within three frameworks. First is geographical, which illustrates the number of countries involved in that regional arrangement. The second dimension is a substantive aspect which involves sectors as trade, labour and capital mobility and other regional economic policies. The final is the depth of integration to measure the degree of sovereignty a country is ready to surrender, that is from simple coordination or cooperation to deep integration.

### **The Concept of Leadership**

The leadership term carries various meanings and can be attributed to the different entities in every sphere of our life. A leader can be an individual, a state, an organisation, a group, a company or many other entities. The proposed research has examined ‘leadership’ concept in terms of individual’s political leadership.

The term leadership brings to mind a certain set of characteristics and actions of notable individuals from every sphere of life. Political leaders such as Lincoln, Kennedy, Charles de Gaulle, Nehru, Gandhi, Nelson Mandela, Konrad Adenauer, Willy Brandt, and Helmut Kohl and from developing countries like Sukarno of Indonesia, Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia, Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana has played a significant role during the Cold War. These leaders had vision of change and achieve with commitment and taking along others. Existing circumstances and crisis have also shaped their leadership and action but they were at

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<sup>1</sup> [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sectors/economic-growth/regional-integration\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sectors/economic-growth/regional-integration_en)

forefront of setting agendas amidst present challenges. Leadership is complex concept to define and describe as who is a leader and what constitutes leadership.

The literature dealing with the issue offers many definitions of leadership. For example, Benton (2005) described leadership as the art of influencing people to accomplish the mission. Another definition by McArthur (2006) characterises leadership as having a farsighted approach and also possessing strategies and plans for the aspired change and leaders must be able to mobilise people and resources to accomplish their vision of change and achieve desired political, economic or any other goals.

A leader recognises the diversity of followers and establishes unity of shared common values among the followers without destroying the diversity of thoughts and persons. A leader embraces innovative and flexible methods of education, training, support and ethical guide to achieve these goals. Leaders accomplish their goals and targets by building credibility, faith and decisiveness with their followers through interaction, cooperation and feedback from the followers that in process also guide and shapes the followers' ideas, attitudes and behaviours towards risks, failure and success. In the process, a leader strengthens the followers' sense of self realisation and self efficacy in such a manner that both the leader and his supporters show willingness to take calculated risks in making their decision to meet the desired goals (Winston and Patterson 2006).

In this background, the study has examined various aspects of leadership and theoretical underpinnings of the leadership concept which has further explained in context of role of leadership (German Chancellors) in European integration process. Understanding the leadership concept is essential to understand its role in the European integration process.

### **European Integration and Role of Leadership**

Regional integration has been a growing global phenomenon after the Second World War. Across the globe, regional integration has made its presence in the form of economic, security or political amalgamation. From South America to Africa, South and South East Asia and the Pacific regions have integrated regionally but European integration has proved to be a different and unusual regional integration process.

There have been various efforts to form and achieve regional integration in continents across the globe apart from the Europe. In South East Asia, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), in the African continent, the African Union (AU) and Mercosur in South America and SAARC in South Asia. But these regional integration processes could not achieve the same level of integration as that of European Union. Among these regional blocks, ASEAN has been the most advanced and successful economic integration block and remains a strictly inter-governmental body. These regional integration experiments have no signs of pulling state sovereignty or sharing sovereignty for common interests like the European states have done. “It is a similar story elsewhere: no other regional body is anywhere near the EU in terms of political or economic cooperation, let alone integration. Indeed, no other grouping has even gotten to first base in terms of the basic requirements of integration, namely dealing with historical reconciliation and developing the necessary political will. There have been innumerable declarations from groupings in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and South and Central America about the desirability of closer cooperation and even integration, but the record shows that the rhetoric has not been matched by action” (Cameron 2010: 03).

Cameron (2010) has argued that the historical reconciliation within the European member state is a critical factor for the European integration’s success story. The reconciliation between arch rivals France and Germany has been achieved after years of sustained political effort from the leaders of both countries. The element of historical reconciliation has been lacking in other regional experiments across the world which makes the European integration process different from the other regional integration projects. For example in East Asia, cannot be a deep regional integration without genuine reconciliation between Japan and China or Japan and Korea or South Korea and North Korea. This lack of ‘historical reconciliation’ between India and Pakistan also makes the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), not a successful regional integration project.

Since the early 1950s, with the formation of Coal and Steel Community in 1952, the European Community in 1957 has been a leading example of regional integration. Apart from the ‘historical reconciliation’ among the European member states, the other important factor for the deepening of European integration in the 1950s was the

role of the political leaders and their leadership vision. The visionary leader like Robert Schuman of France guided by Charles De Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer of Germany who had envisioned a different form of politics based on community methods, sharing common interests and reconciliation with troubled past rather than the traditional balance of power model and political domination traits. The external factors were crucial such as role of the United States which restructured the Western Europe's economy under the Marshall Plan. The United States has played a crucial role in the early years of European Integration which helped it to contain the Soviet Union's influence in the Eastern part of Europe.

It has been generally argued that European integration is a process, an end product or both. The historical experience of Europe certainly has made European integration an end product of historical experiences of Europe. European Integration as a process has been explained by Karl Deutsch (1957) as “the attainment, within a territory, of a ‘sense of community’ and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a ‘long’ time, dependable expectations of ‘peaceful change’ among its population and when a group of people or states have been integrated this way they constitute a “security community” (Karl W. Deutsch et al, 1957:6). Another important analysis about the European integration is the role of elites or European integration process as ‘elite led process. It has been argued by many scholars studying European integration that the process of European integration has been driven by the political elite and still it is a driving factor for the process. “A more positive perspective is that, after centuries of bloody conflicts born out of dynastic rivalries, religious tensions, clashes of economic interests, nationalistic ideologies, and racist hubris and following two cataclysmic world wars, during the second half of the twentieth century European elites gradually reoriented themselves to policies of peaceful cooperation and economic and political integration. In an era of ever more effective weapons of mass destruction, a continuation of European auto-aggression would have eliminated completely the already gravely weakened status and influence of European elites in world politics and economics. In Western Europe, the process of integration was furthered by the threat that state socialism posed to representative democracy and private property the two main institutional pillars of Western elite regimes” (Best, Lengyel and Verzichelli et al 2012: 01).

The two major historical and systemic changes have influenced the European integration. The first, shifting power balance of the world order from colonial masters of Western Europe to the United States and the Soviet Union's bipolarity since the WWII and the Second was the disintegration of the Soviet Union which pushed for consolidation of European Union integration in form of institutional building from Maastricht treaty to Lisbon treaty. Since the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, expansion of European Union has been on acceleration and EU has transformed itself from single market to monetary union and expanded from 15 to 29 members. Apart from institutional expansion, European Union has also expanded its wings in policy areas as justice and home affairs, forging consent on common foreign and security policy.

In this process of European Integration, 'leadership' has always been an important factor which has not only founded the vision of integrated Europe but also carried forward the dream with their leadership. Apart from state to state cooperation, another factor 'leadership' has also played a significant role in European Integration process. As the official website of the European Commission (EC) underlines the importance of leadership in the European integration process by stating that visionary leaders inspired the creation of the European Union we live in today. Without their energy and motivation, we would not be living in the sphere of peace and stability that we take for granted. From resistance fighters to lawyers, the founding fathers were a diverse group of people who held the same ideals: a peaceful, united and prosperous Europe. The European commission underlines the role leaders have played in the European integration process by calling them "founding father of European integration". There are series of European leaders who have envisioned for the peaceful and prosperous Europe.

In the series of leaders who have contributed to the integration process, the prominent architect of 'Schuman Plan' which outlined a plan to merge Western European heavy industry, especially coal, steel and machinery. Jean Monnet, the French statesman, politician and economist had been the important driving inspirational force behind the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952 and supported amalgamation of French and British industries to reap maximum benefits. Jean Monnet was another visionary leader for European integration and French statesman Robert Schuman scripted the 'Schuman Plan' which he published on 9 May 1950, the date now regarded as the



birth of the European Union. Schuman along with Jean Monnet has proposed in the plan about the shared control of coal and steel industry as it had been the most important industrial materials for the building armament and weaponry industries. The fundamental idea behind this was to prevent a country to dominate in the coal and steel industry, so as to future arms race and war in Europe which had already gone through two World Wars in the last 50 years.

The history of European integration is incomplete without discussing the 'grand old man' of Europe, the first Chancellor (1949-63) of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Konrad Adenauer. He had inherited divided and devastated Germany but with his leadership, he not only changed the face of the post-war West Germany but also pushed European integration by the policy of reconciliation with France by forming the Elysee treaty in 1963. It was Adenauer and De Gaulle (the French President) who came together and signed a treaty of friendship between onetime arch-rivals Germany and France. The treaty has become the milestone for the European integration and this 'engine of Franco-German cooperation' furthered strengthened the European integration process.

Luxembourgish politician, Joseph Bech is another founding father and European leader who played a vital role in the European integration during its early days of formation as he was among those leaders who participated in setting up the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952. The European Commission on his website underlined that he was also the driving force behind the Messina Conference by Belgium, Netherlands and Luxemburg in 1955 which has established European Economic Community. In Benelux countries, the Dutch politician Johan Willem Beyen with his 'Beyen Plan<sup>2</sup>' pushed forward the European integration process with idea that better European integration would lead the political integration in future. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was among those who had floated the idea of European integration by calling for the creation of a 'United State of Europe'. He

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<sup>2</sup> The Beyen plan was formed amidst political and economic circumstances in Europe in the 1950s. The plan was based on the idea that achieving a political integration is hard at the moment, so J. W. Beyen argued for better economic cooperation among the European member states to achieve political integration in future. With his experience in international finance and banking, he knew that issues like trade barriers and unemployment were not easily resolved at the national level and required a more international approach and cooperation.

had vision that the peace and stability in Europe could be achieved only through integrating or uniting Europe by eliminating ills of extreme nationalism and warmongering once and for all. He has believed that European integration will be a viable solution to the extreme nationalism which had caused two World Wars on European land. Another leader who has left his mark on European integration is Italian Prime Minister also holding Italy's foreign affairs, Alcide De Gasperi. He has promoted initiatives taken by the Franco-German efforts and by Benelux countries for European integration. His role is admired for the executing and realising the US sponsored Marshall Plan to push closer economic cooperation and reconstruction among West European economies.

Walter Hallstein, the first president of the European Commission (1958-1967) played a negotiator role in European integration at the very early stage. The European Commission has observed that Walter Hallstein "as President of the European Commission, worked towards a rapid realisation of the Common Market. His energetic enthusiasm and powers of persuasion furthered the cause of integration even beyond the period of his presidency. During his mandate, the integration advanced significantly"<sup>3</sup>. Another leader under the analysis of the thesis is, Sicco Mansholt, who was a Dutch farmer and later who has become the first European Commissioner for agriculture. Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) has been based on Mansholt's idea to make Europe self-sufficient in terms of food production and also to ensure farmers welfare across the Europe. Because it was the farmers who have suffered more during the last two World Wars in European continent due to the marching of armies through their farms. Two other great European leaders discussed in next chapter first is Belgian politician Henri Spaak who was the president of the Messina Conference in 1955 and a leading figure in formulating the content of the Treaty of Rome, the foundational treaty for European integration. Another leader is the Italian politician Altiero Spinelli who drafted the 'Spinelli Plan'<sup>4</sup> which worked as an

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<sup>3</sup> [http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/founding-fathers/index\\_de.htm](http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/founding-fathers/index_de.htm)

<sup>4</sup> The Spinelli Plan was the basis for the Single European Act in 1986, which opened up the national borders among the member states of European Community (now the European Union) for the common market. The plan was also an inspiration to frame Maastricht Treaty in 1992 which formed the European Union. Ironically the plan was supported in European Parliament but failed to gain support in Italy's parliament.

important inspiration for the strengthening of the European Community treaties in the 1980s and the European Union in the 1990s. Apart from these aforementioned European leaders, there are other leaders like the French President Mitterrand, German Chancellor Ludwig, and ever pro-integration German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, British Prime Minister Margret Thatcher would be discussed in a length in the next chapter to analyse the role of these leaders in European integration process.

### **Germany and European Integration**

A multiplicity of factors has contributed to the European integration process and among the major factors which contributed to the success story of this intergovernmental entity with certain supranational traits is the Franco-German cooperation and commitment for a peaceful and prosperous Europe. West Germany as the major economic power in Europe, has led the integration process with France. The neo-functional analysis shows that how the states gain through integration, so these states put their effort for regional integration. The European integration process with its integrated markets has strengthened member states' economies. "The European integration process really does strengthen the state *vis-à-vis* other domestic actors" (Borzel 1997: 87). For West Germany, European integration has provided a base to flourish in liberal democratic path and rebuild its economy based on export. It has also provided with frameworks to trade within Europe and regains support and faith of West European countries especially arch rival France (Jeffery and Paterson 2003).

Germany, is the biggest country and contributor to the EU budget, has remained a constant pro-integration member state. It has been argued that the major factor which drove the European integration process further is Franco-German cooperation on major European policy issues. The Franco-German motor of European integration has introduced major initiatives in European integration with the creation of European Monetary System (EMS) of the late 1970s to the European Monetary Union (EMU) in the early 1990 and the subsequent success of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.

The first Chancellor of West Germany or the 'grand old man' of Europe, Konrad Adenauer was convinced that the only right approach to reduce the mistrust of

Western European countries or neighbours and place West Germany within European community is to cooperate closely with France and remain active in multilateral approach to European integration. If we argue through the realist perspective, West Germany had most to gain from European integration so it became its strongest advocate from its birth and always walked extra miles in terms of pulling sovereignty, sharing financial burden and totally eliminating hyper-nationalistic rhetoric from its national discourse. Germany's growing economic and political weight has provided influence within the EU as being the the largest member state in terms of population with 82 million (2016) and economy with GDP of almost 4 trillion USD (2016). Germany is the largest economy and contributes the highest to the EU budget. As 2015 EU budget contribution by member states shows that Germany is leading by contributing 21.36% which is followed by France 15.72%, UK 12.57% and Italy 11.48% in 2015 EU budget.

The complex relationship between Germany and the European integration process could be understood by external factors as well. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and its influence in the Central and Eastern Europe and the German reunification led to the redevelopment of the continuity of national history. Bremm (1993) has argued that Central and Eastern Europe is opening new options for German policy and is modifying the status of European integration. William E. Paterson (2010 b) placed Germany in the ongoing European integration process through three stages, "in the first stage constituting Germany in Europe- European integration was a vital secondary arena for ensuring that the Federal Republic was able to develop economically, and to become a stable democracy. The second stage, of ever closer union accompanied by institutional export, was already evident under Helmut Schmidt, but became really manifest during the Kohl Chancellorship, reaching a high point in the early 1990s. In the post-Kohl third stage, the European vocation persists, but has been very much scaled back" (Paterson 2010 b: 41).

Germany's pro-European integration approach has been explained *vis-a-vis* its national interest. "Among the large Member States of the European Union (EU), the Federal Republic of Germany has been distinctive in its commitment to integration and enlargement and has always played a key role in European integration.....the European interest was seen as the national interest.....all of these elements have

come under pressure in recent years, but the eurozone crisis has proved to be a tipping point for classic German Europeanism" (Paterson 2011: 57).

Along with French and other European leaders, the German leaders were also at the forefront to bring about this integration process. Germany's political stalwart Konrad Adenauer called for the great work of fostering durable international reconciliation and a community of nations for the good of Europe. Adenauer laid down these principles in West German foreign policy which briefly pose faith in reconciliation with France, addressing issues with multilateral approach, integration Germany within process of the European integration. He has worked tirelessly to achieve these goals and the Elysee Treaty of 1963 was the result of his efforts of reconciliation with France.

Germany under the leadership of Konrad Adenauer was one of the founding members of the European Coal and Steel Community and along with the French leader Charles de Gaulle and other European leaders had taken various efforts to unite the continent. The German Chancellors had played a pivotal role at all stages of integration from the Treaty of Rome in 1957 to the Lisbon Treaty in 2010. German efforts and initiatives under the leadership of their Chancellors were the creation of policies regarding defence and security within the multilateral scope of EU treaties and collaborating in the field of justice and home affairs as well as issues of the internal security.

In 1990, the German unification took place and the Cold War had ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union. "The government of united Germany under Chancellor Helmut Kohl was re-elected twice after the unification of the two German states on October 3, 1990, before he lost his Chancellorship in the 1998 election. At all times during this decade, Kohl's government remained unwavering in its commitment to European integration. German unification and European unity were considered as two intrinsically linked sides of the same coin" (Kuehnhardt 2009 a: 47).

### **Chancellor Angela Merkel and Problems of European Integration**

After Chancellor Schroder's tenure, Angela Merkel from the Christian Democratic Union was elected Chancellor in November 2005 when the European Union was facing challenges after the failure of the constitutional treaty. She has emerged as an undisputed European leader by successful budget negotiation in a summit in Brussels

in 2005. In an echo of Chancellor Helmut Kohl's chequebook diplomacy, she has furthered the cause of European integration by raising Germany's contribution to EU budget which today stands highest among the member states, 21.36% of the budget 2015 and showed deep faith in the process. Merkel took substantial steps towards Europe in comparison to former Chancellor Schroeder's EU policy that was not considered much pro-integration which was under the intense influence of German domestic politics.

Angela Merkel's social profile and her approach to the European integration are interconnected. Being an East German politician, she has seen disintegrated Europe and its consequences, so she understands the peace and prosperity in unity and cooperation (Schmich 2011). "Angela Merkel is unique among post-war German chancellors in that she is a woman, she is from the former German Democratic Republic, and she is the first with a background in the natural sciences.....intersection of these unique social roles have shaped Merkel's foreign policy" (Yoder 2011: 360). CDU and Angela Merkel has been pro-European integration, as argued by the author "in contrast to her predecessors, Merkel's interpretation of the European Union's values and mission emphasises deeper integration first and foremost and opposes further expansion.....Merkel's preference is for the EU to project a more liberal profile for the Single Market, as well as more integration on foreign and security policy" (Yoder 2011: 369).

Chancellor Angela Merkel has been seen as a pro-integration leader in Europe unlike her immediate predecessor Gerhard Schroeder. It is said "like Chancellor Schroeder, Angela Merkel had no strong track record of being a European. Her personal biography as an East German Protestant excluded the passionate Europeanism of Rhineland Catholics like Konrad Adenauer or Helmut Kohl. The CDU electoral programme of 2005 was the least European programme that the CDU has ever fought on and only Peter Altmaier and Elmar Brok stand out among senior CDU figures as committed Europeans" (Paterson 2010 a: 508). Issues of European enlargement, Euro-crisis and refugee crisis gives a glimpse of German commitment to greater and deeper Europe.

Germany under the leadership of Angela Merkel was calling for more Europe not less. The Euro crisis has defined Merkel's European policy with substance. It is the crisis

which has determined more integration. Merkel has presided over a substantial deepening of the European Union's economic integration. With the measures she has supported to resolve the crisis now firmly in place, the European Union has integrated faster and more substantially than in any previous five-year period. It was largely Merkel who designed or enabled these great integrationist leaps forward. Angela Merkel's efforts to handle the Euro Crisis and bailout packages to indebted countries showed Germany's pro-integration (economic) approach which draws criticisms too. But Merkel also cautioned against the extension of members of EU and sounded more sceptics about Turkey's accession to EU. The scepticism has increased recently after the refugee crisis 2015. The imminent challenge of flowing refugee crisis has also forced member states to reconsider their strategy for a multicultural, inclusive and integrated Europe. Germany, under the leadership of Chancellor Merkel, has led the Europe to address refugee crisis and subsequent challenges. But apart from these challenges and criticisms, the Chancellor Angela Merkel has always considered Euro more than a monetary unit or currency, she considered Euro as the visible symbol of European integration and efforts of the leaders since 1945. So for her Europe and Euro serves more as a symbol of economic, social and political unification of Europe and European ideals and values.

### **Research Design**

Germany along with France has been a key factor in pushing forward the European integration since 1952 made it an important pillar of its post-World War foreign policy. Since end of the WWII, West Germany had two major pillars of its foreign policy, first reconciliation with France and Second, European integration. The reason behind this foreign policy approach was to leave behind the horrible past and memories the War and to integrate West Germany in the European integration process. Undoubtedly, the international scenario of the moment such as the role of the United States through Marshall Plan and presence of the Soviet Union on the Eastern European border also pushed for the greater European integration. But the role of Germany sharing leadership with France has been a critical factor for European integration process.

Germany under its political leadership, is the biggest country and contributor for the EU budget, has remained a constant pro-integration member state. West Germany's

Chancellors Konrad Adenauer, Erhard Ludwig, Willy Brandt, and Chancellors of united Germany Helmut Kohl (who has been the chancellor of West and united Germany), Gerhard Schroder and Current Chancellor Angela Merkel have been consistent with the Germany's fundamental foreign policy idea of greater European integration and reconciliation with France. Germany's foreign policy of greater European integration has been driven by the multiplicity of reasons. Among various other reasons, one reason is political leadership of West Germany during the Cold War and united Germany after the end of the Cold War. The leadership of German Chancellors from Konrad Adenauer to present Chancellor Angela Merkel has made a decisive impact on European integration process from Coal and Steel Community in 1952 to the successful execution of the Lisbon Treaty in 2010. The German Chancellors have played an important role in responding to various crises which the European Union has faced during their tenures.

In this background, the research has critically examined leadership role in European integration by focusing and analysing German Chancellor Angela Merkel's role in responding to the certain European crisis and its impact on European integration. The German Chancellor Angela Merkel has emerged as the 'pro-integration' leader in Europe and her responses to issues of enlargement issues, Euro-zone crisis and her role in framing Lisbon Treaty has been examined in the research. Her credentials as a pro-integration leader have been discussed widely after continued challenges encountered by the EU in the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The issue of enlargement has been a critical aspect of the European integration since the 1960s. With 27 (after the Brexit) member states, the European Union is an economic power with certain supranational traits. The recent Euro-zone crisis has posed a major challenge to the 'pro-integration' political leaders across Europe. In light of the Euro-crisis and European enlargement, the role of Germany under the leadership of Chancellor Angela Merkel has come under intense debate and discussions globally. Angela Merkel and Germany's European policy and approaches to safeguard the Euro and its conventional 'pro-integration' foreign policy is required to be critically examined. There has not been an extensive research on how the leadership of Chancellor Angela Merkel and her approach to these European crises has impacted the integration process. So the research has examined the role of the leadership and focusing the Chancellor Merkel's leadership in European integration with reference to



certain crises such as Euro-zone crises, issues of enlargement and the later ongoing refugee crisis.

The research has analysed and examined the leadership role of Chancellor Angela Merkel in responding to the European crisis and its impact on European integration process in her first two tenures as the Chancellorship from 2005-2009 and the second term from 2009-2013. This research has addressed certain research questions such as defining regional integration and leadership with reference to the European integration process and the role of leadership, the role of Germany under various Chancellors in European integration process, the leadership traits of the Chancellor Angela Merkel compared to her predecessors and how she has responded to issues of enlargement, the Euro-zone crisis and its impact on the future European integration process. The foregoing research issues have been examined within the framework of the following research hypothesis:

- German leadership has played a significant role in enhancing the integration process in Europe and this is intertwined with its foreign policy.
- Germany under Angela Merkel's leadership (2005-09 and 2009-13) has strengthened and enhanced the European integration process amidst growing challenges posed by enlargement and the Euro-zone crisis.

The research has examined aforementioned hypotheses under the following research questions and chapters in detail.

#### *Research Questions*

- a) What is regional integration and what are the main elements of European integration?
- b) How has leadership impacted the creation of European integration process?
- c) What was the role of German Chancellors in the European integration process from 1952 to 2005?
- d) What personal qualities distinguish Chancellor Angela Merkel from her predecessors?

- e) How has Germany under leadership of Angela Merkel responded to problems of the European integration and enlargement?
- f) What is the impact of Angela Merkel's approach to the Euro crisis and how has this impacted the European integration process?
- g) What are the main elements of Angela Merkel's European policy which differs from her predecessor German chancellors?

### *Chapters*

1. Introduction: The chapter has explained an overview of the whole Ph.D. research in brief. It has examined the core concepts and issues of the research such as regionalism, regionalisation and regional integration, leadership, the role of leadership in European integration process, role of Germany and the (West) German Chancellors and the role of the Chancellor Angela Merkel in European integration process and issues arising from the process.

2. European Integration and the Role of Leadership: The chapter has examined the concept of regional integration and addressed the issues of European integration process. The chapter has also explained the concept of leadership and how distinct leaders have played their role in the process of European integration.

3. German Chancellors and European Integration: The chapter has assessed and compared the leadership of German Chancellors (Chancellors of West Germany and United Germany) in the context of European integration and also examined its impact on the European integration process from 1952 to 2005.

4. Angela Merkel's Leadership and Problems of European Integration: The chapter has traced leadership and personality traits of Angela Merkel in brief. The chapter has also dealt with three major issues of the European integration, enlargement, Euro-zone crisis and ongoing refugee crisis. It has also analysed the role of the Chancellor Angela Merkel's leadership in addressing these issues and its impact on the ongoing European integration process.

5. Conclusion: The findings of the research has been discussed and explained in the chapter.

In the background of the hypotheses and chapters, the research has applied the realist approach to assessing Angela Merkel leadership during her two terms of office as Chancellor and how her leadership in response to the European issues such as Euro-crisis and enlargement has impacted the European integration process. The research has been done by applying the deductive method to understand leadership of German chancellors in the European integration process in general and the role of Angela Merkel's leadership in particular to understand the problems of the European integration.

The study has extensively used both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources include relevant official documents on the proposed topic from the Federal Chancellor's (Germany) office, Deutscher Bundestag (German Parliament), German political parties and at the European level from the European Commission, Council and European Parliament. The secondary sources of the research include books, research articles, newspaper articles, web articles, published interviews and commentaries of the scholars/academicians. The field trip to Berlin (Germany) has been undertaken to get insights from politicians, policymakers and foreign policy experts, academicians and experts in various think tanks in Berlin. The research also includes excerpts from various interviews with experts and academician in think tanks and universities which have been conducted during the field research in Berlin, Germany.

## **European Integration and the Role of Leadership**

### **Background**

The idea of European unity and identity could be traced back to the 15<sup>th</sup> century with the fall of Constantinople Empire in the mid of the century. Although initial attempts to form and create a European identity or unity were not systematic or visionary attempts but rather an instant arrangement to address immediate threats from Turks invaders or other external threats. The thoughts and ideas about European unity during the 15<sup>th</sup> and the 16<sup>th</sup> century were based more on the religious ground like Christina unity against Turkish invaders. Post the Glorious Revolution (1688) of Britain and French Revolution (1789) intellectuals, literary figures and philosophers in Europe had proposed the time and again European unity based on values, not on religion. But the existing process of European integration was an outcome of the two World Wars on European land and subsequent power politics in the region during the Cold War. European integration process has not been an isolated incident in global affairs. The integration process since 1952 has been interconnected and influenced by the present structural changes and changing power equations in international relation. Among the various reasons which have influenced and guided European integration process, the role of leadership has been an important one. The role of leadership in European integration could be assessed at the two levels; the first is role of the individuals and the second is role of a country or leadership by a country to push forward the European integration process. The study has been looking specifically the role of individual political and public leaders and also making references and explanations about other possible reasons which impacted the European integration process.

The chapter has analysed certain critical issues to explain the role of leadership in European integration. The chapter begins with analysing two concepts; regional integration and leadership in details. Further, the chapter has explained pre-World Wars ideas and efforts for European unity or integration which has been followed by the history of European integration and causes of the European integration after the

Second World War. The chapter has two main sections which have been explained in details. The first section is dealing with the role of leadership in European integration during the Cold War and the second section makes a critical assessment of the role of leadership in European integration process since 1990 marking end of the Cold War and German reunification. While dealing with the role of leadership in European integration process during the pre and post-Cold War era, the chapter has also analysed other factors in connection with the European integration such as the role of the United States and the Soviet Union, Cold War politics and security constraint and its impact on the European leaders approach and integration. The chapter concludes with analysing importance and role of the 'leadership' element along with various internal and external factors in European integration since 1945.

### **Defining Regional Integration**

In international relations, states have a long history of cooperation or coalescence. The consequences of the Second World War have created a new world order replacing European colonial powers of the past. In the new global political structure state has become sole driving actor based on the classical Westphalian concept of sovereign states. The rigid concept of Westphalian sovereignty which gained meaning as an absolute cultural identity within a territory has started losing its influence over the economic interactions and decisions within a region and regional integration projects have come into effect to accelerate economic development and growth as well as security motives in their cooperation to state sponsored goals during the Cold War.

The history of regional integration has been gone through different phases. "In the postwar period, regional integration, or wider preferential trade agreements, developed in three waves: the "old" regionalism of the 1950s and 1960s, which was an attempt to rationalize the depression-era import substitution policies at a moment when they were displaying diminishing returns; the "new" regionalism of the 1990s and early 2000s, which was an attempt to strengthen the foundations of outward-oriented policies at a moment when the nature of globalization was changing dramatically; and the current phase, in which proliferating bilateral North-South agreements seem to prevail over ailing sub-regional projects and there is a growing

consensus on the need to promote the convergence of partially overlapping initiatives” (Giordano and Devlin 2011).

After introducing circumstances for the growing regional groupings across the globe, it's imperative to explore the definition of 'regional integration', its evolving components and preconditions to be a successful experiment. De Lombaerde and Van Langenhove (2007) describes it as a global phenomenon of regional grouping territorial mechanism that facilitates interactions between units of the region and creates a new organisation, co-existing with traditional forms of state-led organisation at the national level. The authors have explained that regional integration is an increased level of interaction in terms of economic, security, political and socio-cultural within a region. Claar and Andreas (2010) defined simply as the merger of individual states within a region into a larger one without compromising sovereignty in absolute and the deepening of integration depends upon the willingness and cooperation of the participating sovereign states to share their sovereignty and make balance with their national interests vis-a-vis the others. Claar and Andreas (2010) has explained major three dimensions of the regional integrations. First is geographical which explains the number of states participating and involved in the regional arrangement. Second is more substantive aspect which involves sectors as trade, labour and capital mobility and other regional economic policies and the final is the depth and degree of regional integration is measured with degree of sovereignty a country is willing to pull or surrender.

The definitions of regional integration have a broader consensus with certain variations and differences. "Existing theories of regional integration are characterised by a lack of consensus. Theorists from different disciplines have attempted to theorise and conceptualise integration. However, the most theorists focus on their own disciplinary inquisition rather than on a comprehensive conceptual framework for understanding regional integration. The different approaches to understanding regional integration resulted in the current epistemological pluralism, which lacking epistemic synergy, led to the correlation between disciplinary inquiry and the nature and character of the integration scheme. Conventionally, integration means the amalgamation of political and economic policies to form a single community. However, theorists will look at integration differently depending on their discipline.

For instance, economists focus mainly on economic integration and integration schemes that require economic policy harmonisation among member states" (Obydenkova, Anastassia 2006: 592).

Karl Deutsch (1953) has given the concept of 'security community' which explains that any regional integration starts with a gradual level of social interaction and communication among the entities of the region. After a certain point it leads to modern democratic governments to the formation of what he calls a 'security community', in which no state or member poses any kind of challenge or threat to others. So basically Karl Duetsch prioritises the steps of the regional integration where the model of regional integration draws primarily upon social interaction and later institutional and political prediction comes in existence. Karl Deutsch (1953) has explained few conditions for a successful regional integration which include geopolitical continuities, shared borders and geographical neighbourhood, economic ties and volume of trade between countries of a region.

Ernst Hass has given neo-functional analyses of regional integration and was first advanced by him and others in the 1950s and deepened by others. "Neo-functionalism arose as an attempt to explain the dynamic processes of integration in Europe. But as neo-functionalism developed it regarded Europe as a case study: integration processes in Europe could operate in any regional setting. Regional integration was analysed as a worldwide trend, examples of which are the formation of free trade areas in the Pacific, Latin America, North America and elsewhere" (Obydenkova, Anastassia 2006: 593). Like Karl Deutsch, Ernst Haas (1964) has also explained basic three preconditions for a successful regional integration, first is pluralistic social structures, the second is substantial economic trade and interaction and the last is industrial development and common values and ideological orientation among participating countries of a region.

In brief, preconditions for a successful regional integration could explain in following points, peace and security among member states of concerned region, political stability and value based commitments to its citizen and mutual trust, political and civic commitment and mutual trust among countries. The important factor for a successful integration is that the process must be guided by principles, which would

assure that regional integration programs and agendas are compatible with national and mutually reinforcing. This principle is known as ‘open regionalism<sup>5</sup>’.

The Westphalia world order of the nation-states is here to survive but growing regional groupings across the world becoming an increasingly more predominant pattern of international relations since the Second World War. The regional groupings are becoming important and playing vital roles in addressing economic and security concerns of a region. E.H Carr "the concept of sovereignty is likely to become in the future even more blurred and indistinct that it is at present" (E.H. Carr 1978: 230-31). The regional integration process has become a major global phenomenon of the present interdependent economies and feature of the international system is deepening in era of globalisation. From Cold War politics to the politics of globalisation, regional integration has achieved a new significance and changing meaning decades after decades. Regional integration has become an instrument by states to meet their national interests by integrating their respective economies in order to secure rapid economic growth and reduce barriers and conflicts to build mutual trust.

### **Explaining the Concept of Leadership**

From the legends and leaders in Ancient Rome and Greece to European dynasties and leaders in the renaissance period who has changed the world forever, the change and leadership influence have been carried forward by many great leaders in modern politics, society, economics and warfare. "From the time-honoured storytelling of great tales such as Beowulf and Homer's Iliad to the study of religious texts, and the philosophical leadership of Epictetus, Plato and Aristotle, one is able to observe the motivation of society for leadership at every time. Leaders come in every form: from the inspirational (Nelson Mandela) to the charismatic (Bill Clinton), from the indicted (Silvio Berlusconi) and unethical (Allen Stanford), to the utterly destructive (Adolf Hitler)" (Zehndorfer 2014: 01).

The literature dealing with leadership concept offers many definitions of leadership. For example, Benton (2005) described leadership as the art of influencing people to

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<sup>5</sup> Open Regionalism" originates from APEC. The idea is that member states liberalise intra-bloc trade while at the same time lowering external trade barriers on imports from the rest of the world. This is a sort of "Concerted Unilateralism" whereby regionalism becomes a means for accelerating joint liberalisation of trade and investment. Here the concept denotes a region-wide market economy that is also opened to the outside world



accomplish the mission. McArthur (2006) characterises leadership as envisioning and executing plans using strategies for change and achieving aspired leadership goals. Leaders must be able to bring together masses and their resources to accomplish vision of change and fulfil desired socio-economic-political goals of the society.

Amidst various definition of leadership available in leadership literature, Winston and Patterson (2006) defined leadership as "a leader is one or more people who select, equips, trains, and influences one or more follower(s) who have diverse gifts, abilities, and skills and focuses the follower(s) to the organization's mission and objectives causing the follower(s) to willingly and enthusiastically expand spiritual, emotional, and physical energy in a concerted coordinated effort to achieve the organizational mission and objectives. The leader achieves this influence by humbly conveying a prophetic vision of the future in clear terms that resonate with the follower(s) beliefs and values in such a way that the follower(s) can understand and interpret the future into present-time action steps. In this process, the leader presents the prophetic vision in contrast to the present status of the organization and through the use of critical thinking skills, insight, intuition, and the use of both persuasive rhetoric and interpersonal communication including both active listening and positive discourse, facilitates and draws forth the opinions and beliefs of the followers such that the followers move through ambiguity toward clarity of understanding and shared insight that results in influencing the follower(s) to see and accept the future state of the organization as a desirable condition worth committing personal and corporate resources toward its achievement" (Winston and Patterson 2006: 7).

In contrast to the above definition of leadership by Winston and Patterson (2006), Kort (2008) take a different approach to the leadership definition and says that "the posing and addressing the question 'what is leadership?' frames many contemporary discussions of leadership. Some scholars, however, have suggested that the question is superfluous; the continuing attempts to address it serve only to divert attention from more pertinent issues" (Kort 2008: 409).

Ciulla (2002) argued that instead of focusing on already answered the question, 'what is leadership', it is time to pay attention on how the characteristic feature of leadership should be in public sphere or in politics or another field of life. Leadership is not just a set of individual qualities and act or actions but it is a continues process by which a

leader influences and inspire others to achieve objectives and direct its followers or objects in way that make it more result oriented, coherent and cohesive in outcomes and leaders carry out this process of inspiring others by their leadership attributes such as belief, values, ethics, character, knowledge and skills.

Leadership must not be confused with skilled management. Available literature draws distinctions and similarities between the terms leadership and management. Benton (2005) described leadership as an art. Kotter (2001) explains management as a science, composed of calculations, methods, and statistics. "While management is focused on consistency and order in an organisation, leadership is focused on dealing with change. In spite of these different approaches, the two are similar in that they involve a decision about what needs to be done, establishing networks of people to accomplish the goals, and ensuring that the people, the followers, actually get the job done" (Grimm 2010: 74).

Leadership theories like any other theories, it does ask three basic questions about leadership concept: these are, what, why and how (Whetten, 2002). He argued that 'what' refers to the definition of the concept which is under-theorization; "how" explains the method used to explain and establish inter-relationships with the concept; and "why" question explains the conceptual founding of the concept (Whetten 2002).

Briefly, there are various leadership theories which answer the 'what', 'why' and 'how' question of the leadership concept. The following theories examine the study of study leadership. The one theory is Great Man/Trait theory; this is the first systematic study of leadership in modern leadership studies. The theory focuses on the traits that effective leaders possess and is more concentrated on the 'fact' that the leaders are born with certain leadership qualities. The 'great man' theory is focusing on personal characteristics and leadership traits which a leader possess or acquired (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 1999). Another theory named skill theory which critiques the trait theory and lays emphasis on the skill that an effective and influential leader possess, this theory basically posits that leadership can be developed. Behavioural theories of leadership adopt more scientific and motivational approach to study the concept of leadership. The theory studies the behavioural side of the leadership to understand the leadership trait.

The situational and contingency theory of leadership is totally different from the aforementioned theories. The theory aims to understand leadership as a process which involves leader, follower and the environment or situation. This is the first theory of leadership which replaces individual or leader element to the environment and process.

Another well know theory of leadership is the charismatic theory and is foremost among 'new leadership school' theories. The theory focuses on the role of aura or charisma in a leadership of a particular leader or individual. Transformational theory of leadership is a contemporary theory of leadership which has history in management studies as a separate academic discourse and discipline and the theory explains that the leader transforms his followers to realise their potential and inspires them to perform with their capabilities and achieve beyond their expectations.

**Table 2.1 Theories of Leadership**

S. N	Name of the Theories	Features of the Leadership Theories
I	Great Man Theory (1840s)	First systematic study of leadership, focuses on innate qualities of an effective leader, leadership quality and facts with a leader born, personality traits which a leader acquire during his/her social, political life.
ii	The Trait Theory (1930s-40s)	Leaders are either born or made, certain qualities identified such as intelligence, sense of responsibility, creativity and ethical values, the theory is almost continuation of the great man theory of leadership.
Ii	Skill Theory of Leadership	It critiques the trait theory, emphasis on skill that an effective and influential leader possess, leaders (leadership) are not only born (as the trait theory suggests) but can be developed.
Iii	Behavioural Theory of Leadership (1940-50s)	Scientific and motivational approach to study the concept of leadership, studies the behavioural side of the leadership to understand the leadership trait. It is also a reaction to the trait theory.
IV	Situational/Contingency Theory of Leadership	First systematic effort to understand leadership as a process which involves leader, follower and the environment or situation, replaces a leader centric

		approach with the recognition of leadership as a process.
V	Charismatic Theory of Leadership	First theory among 'new leadership school' theories, focuses on the role of aura or charisma in leadership of a particular leader or individual, influenced by Max Weber's concept of 'Charismatic leadership'.
Vi	Transformational Theory of Leadership	Contemporary theory of leadership emerged from management studies as a separate academic discipline. Explain transformational leader transforms followers to achieve their potential and inspires them to elicit performance beyond expectations.
Vii	Authentic Theory of Leadership	Emerges from transformational leadership and influence by emotional intelligence theory of leadership. The theory focuses on the central role of morals, ethics, credibility and authenticity of a leader.
Viii	Destructive theory of leadership	Explains that what makes a leader destructive; it provides insight into the way which the destructive leader creates a toxic or destructive political, economic, social or any kind of atmosphere.
Ix	Self Leadership Theory	The theory focuses on the way in which an individual is able to empower himself through the skills and development of the self-leadership approach to achieve better outcome and desired results.

Authentic theory of leadership emerges from transformational leadership and influence by emotional intelligence theory of leadership. The theory focuses on the central role of morals, ethics, credibility and authenticity of a leader. Another theory is important to understand as this could be seen in history and also in many dictatorships around the world; this is the destructive theory of leadership. The theory explains that what makes a leader destructive; it provides insight into the way which the destructive leader creates a toxic or destructive political, economic, social or any kind of atmosphere. The destructive theory of leadership also explains the way in which the destructive leader creates and perpetuates a destructive atmosphere. At last,

there is a theory called 'self-leadership' theory. The theory focuses on the way in which an individual is able to empower himself through the skills and development of a self-leadership approach to achieve a better outcome and desired political, economic or social results.

Bass (1990) argues that the theory of leadership explains three basic ways to understand how a person becomes a leader. The first is that some personal qualities and traits may lead a person naturally into leadership; this is called trait theory which has already explained above. The second way is a crisis or even may cause a person to rise to the certain occasion and bring out extraordinary outcomes and become a leader, this is called great events theory of leadership. The last way is in which a person or people may choose to become a leader by learning certain skills and training to evolve leadership traits. There are two schools of thought about leadership theories, one school of thoughts hold the argument that leaders are born (Grint, 2000, Nietzsche, 1969) and the qualities a leader possesses is embodied in subconscious (Lowen, 1975) while the other school of thought argued that a leader or individual has to work hard to develop the leadership qualities before he/she establishes himself/herself a leader (Henrikson, 2006; Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 1999; Kakabadse and Myers, 1996).

Apart from the theories, there are leadership framework approaches which explain the concept of leadership in detail. Bolman and Deal (1991) explained leadership framework as structural, human resources framework, political framework and final is symbolic framework. The trait and style of leadership from these approaches can be impressive, influential or ineffective depending upon the chosen behaviour of leadership in a particular situation and conditions. Structural framework of leadership focuses on structure, strategy, environment, implementation and adaptation by a leader for his leadership style which can be effective or ineffective depending on certain conditions. In human resource approach leaders invest faith in masses and communicate their vision and belief through being accessible and approachable to them. The leaders increase participation, share information and move and take his decisions to the masses. The political framework of leadership clarifies what a leader wants and how he can get it. This assesses the distribution of power and interests and how a leader builds linkages with another stakeholder by using persuasion tactics,

negotiation skills and force only if it is necessary. The symbolic framework of leadership suggest that sometimes one approach of leadership works or sometimes a leaders need all approaches of leadership to be influential.

## **Understanding the European Integration Process**

### **Thoughts over United Europe before 20<sup>th</sup> Century**

The idea of Europe and the conception of European identity in its definite form has always been an issue of larger debate. Certainly, in European history, there have been efforts to frame a European identity at the political and economic level long before the two World Wars. Shuangge Wen (2013) has traced back that the first proposal to unify Europe was in the 15<sup>th</sup> century. He explained that after the fall of Constantinople Empire in 1453, Bohemia king had proposed a union of European kingdoms in 1464 against the Turks attacks. But this proposal of the union was not based on any geographical affinity but it was more about bringing together Christian kingdoms to fight against the possible threats from Islamic rulers across the sea. In the 14<sup>th</sup> century onwards, religion has played an important role in Europe to generate an identity of Europe based on Christianity. The Holy Roman Empire had united a large part of Europe comprising today's Germany, Italy and France although there was not a clear sign of European Unity. This region under the Holy Empire was loosely administered centrally from the Rome for hundred years. To understand the idea of European unity before 20<sup>th</sup> century can be divided into two parts, pre-Napoleonic and the Post-Napoleonic period.

The pre-Napoleonic era can be traced before the 19<sup>th</sup> century. There are few instances when the idea about connecting and integrating certain regions of Europe had occurred. In 1693, an English philosopher and businessman William Penn had suggested forming a European level institution or kind of a parliament to prevent further war but he had not presented any roadmap about the institution (Andrew R. Murphy 2002). Another instance where the French author Saint Pierre who was possibly the first to suggest for forming an international organisation to establish peace among frequent wars in Europe in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. In 1728, he had proposed to form a European league of 18 sovereign kingdoms of the time with a common fund or treasury, borderless kingdom and forming an economic union. But his idea was too

novel and ideal to be sustained in the age or century of a rigid sovereign concept of state and extreme form of heroic nationalism where wars were treated as God's gift to mankind. In the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the American War of Independence (1775-1783) which had formed the United States of America comprising 13 colonies of British had also inspired few prominent Europeans of the time to propose the idea of 'United States of Europe'. In 1795, the great philosopher Immanuel Kant's proposal for an eternal peace congress among the kingdoms of Europe can be seen as early sign of an idea for united Europe in the pre-Napoleonic period.

Nearly two decades of the early 19<sup>th</sup> century were Napoleon's decades. The Napoleon Bonaparte, a French military and political leader who had dominated and fought many successful wars in the Europe in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Napoleon had laid out continental system or continental blockade as his strategy of his foreign policy to expand the empire against British during the Napoleonic wars. The system was an economic embargo against British naval power and was aimed to blockade goods and trade of British and to establish French naval hegemony against the British. In this background, Napoleon had promulgated a customs union as part of his 'continental system' and declared, "Europe thus divided into nationalities, freely formed and free internally, peace between States would have become easier: the United States of Europe would become a possibility" (Markham, Felix 1996: 257).

After Napoleon's defeat in 1815, the Congress of Vienna (1814-15) which was attended by most of the European state's ambassadors with the aim to bring peace in Europe in the post-French revolutionary wars and Napoleonic wars. The Congress of Vienna also created the German Confederation which was an association of thirty-eight sovereign German states. So there are examples that after the wars there have been efforts from time to time in the past to establish institutions to unify Europe and establish peace. Another attempt to unify Europe economically was made in 1834 by forming a confederation of the European states with the aim to create better trade and commerce opportunity and flow has been called Zollverein or 'custom union'. Geopolitical location of German states and influence of philosophers and intellectual for wider and united Europe have also influenced the efforts to create European level institution or customs unions.

During the war of Olszynka Grochowska (termed as second biggest war after Waterloo battle) in 1831 which was fought between Russia and Poland, Wojciech Jastrzebowski had formulated the document in the defence of Warsaw, which can be termed as the first of its kind of constitution for Europe. The document had proposed a united Europe without internal borders, with unified judicial system and institutions consisting of the representative of all nations. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Italian politician and renowned activist for Italy's unification Giuseppe Mazzini had also called for creating a federation of European states in 1843. He had organised the International Peace Congress in 1849 in Paris. In this event, the great French poet and leading writer of the Romantic Movement Victor Hugo had used the terminology sense of the United States of Europe and favoured to build a supreme institution at the European level like the British Parliament of the time. In 1867, Giuseppe Garibaldi an Italian nationalist and the British philosopher and political economist J.S Mill had also joined and supported Victor Hugo's idea of a united Europe and to create European institutions or Parliament. So the ideas and discussions over united Europe have been in existence before the two World Wars in Europe. The regular wars and non-existence of stable political and economic system and peace compelled intellectuals, reformists, poets, philosophers and political activists to propose an idea of united Europe time and again so regular occurrence of wars could be stopped.

### **Idea of European Integration between 1914-1918**

After the catastrophic consequences of the First World War (1914-1918) in Europe, some thinkers, pacifists, and visionary leaders had begun to float and propose the idea of a unified Europe to avoid the occurrence of war in the future. In 1923, an Austrian-Japanese philosopher and political leader Richard Coudenhove Kalergi was a pioneer of European integration and led the Pan-European Movement for 49 years. In 1926, the Congress of Vienna was intended to unify and integrate Europe on religious line or based on Roman Catholic/Christian Europe. There were also voices that had proposed European unification on an ideological basis not on religion based. Soviet Union's tall communist leader Trotsky had raised voice to form a 'United State of Europe' in 1923 based on communist ideology not on Christianity.

After Paris Peace Conference in 1920 which ended the First World War, the first international organisation in true sense the League of Nation was created. In 1929, the



then French Prime Minister Aristide Briand proposed the idea to form a federation of Europe to ensure peace, political stability and economic prosperity in post-World War Europe. This idea of European Federation was endorsed by the influential economist John Maynard Keynes. But the idea of Europe could not be realised because of growing fascism which had given prominence to state power and growing extreme nationalism also prevented any integration efforts during the two World Wars. So the success of fascist governments, growing communism, struggle and competition between colonial powers in Europe and discriminatory treaties after the First World War not only prevented European integration but also set the stage for the another war in Europe.

Although the foreign minister of Nazi Germany Joachim von Ribbentrop had proposed the creation of European confederation as a part of the new order in Europe under Nazi German dominance with the single currency, a Berlin-based central bank, economic and trading policies but also proposed subordination to the Nazi German state. "These pan-European illusions from the early 1940s were never realised because of Germany's defeat. Neither Hitler nor many of his leading hierarchs such as Goebbels had the slightest intention of compromising absolute German hegemony through the creation of a European confederation. Although this fact has been used to insinuate the charge of fascism in the EU, the idea is much older than the Nazis, foreseen by John Maynard Keynes, and later Winston Churchill and various anti-Nazi resistance movements" (Mazower 2011: 32). Jean Monnet, the architect of European integration and member had argued that there will not be peace and stability if the European states were reconstituted on the basis of national sovereignty rather her proposed community based arrangement in Europe which later resulted in formation of European Coal and Steel Community in 1952.

## **European Integration post-World War II**

The European integration process was not an isolated incident in global affairs. The integration process since the 1950s is interconnected and influenced by the structural changes and changing power equations at the global stage. The consequences of the war include physical devastation of the continent and people were divided by ideological conflicts and nationalist rhetoric and resentments. It has been further deteriorated by the bipolarity of the international system, where under the leadership

of United States of America, security and military alliance named North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was created in 1949, and in the Eastern Europe the Soviet Union under the influence of communism had signed 'The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance' which was known as the Warsaw Pact in 1955 with East European and other neighbouring countries joining the pact.

Now, ideological competition with the Soviet Union and its spreading communism in Eastern border of Europe was an ever present and key factor in the U.S foreign policy in Europe and political calculation among West European political leadership. To contain the Soviet Union, it was imperative to rebuild economies of the Western European countries. "By spring 1947, Washington feared that Western Europe's stuttering recovery was providing fertile soil for communist flowers to bloom. The U.S Secretary of State George Marshall made his famous Harvard speech on 5<sup>th</sup> June 1947, promising that America would fund a programme to put Europe on its feet economically" (Gilbert 2012: 5) and this is how the European Recovery Programme or the Marshall plan worth of 13 billion dollars has been introduced to rebuilt ruined West European economies in the next few years.

After the uncertainties of the very first years after 1945, the US gradually developed clear-cut objectives for Western Europe which at its core were re-building the Western European economies and safeguarding US interests in Europe by containing the Soviet Union at its eastern border. On the whole, it was able to secure these objectives, by far the single most important of which was to limit the Soviet expansion in Western Europe. To Washington, this meant that Western Europe had to include into an Atlantic framework and the NATO was the most important part of this framework. From 1950 it also became essential for the United States to have the larger part of Germany, West Germany, on its side even militarily, either directly in the form of West Germany's membership in NATO or, more indirectly, by its membership in a European defence organisation which in turn was linked to NATO. European integration was under no circumstance to lead to an independent "third force," but was to be part of the Atlantic structure under America's leadership.

The US approach to European economic and political integration from 1945 to 1968 was generally supportive and encouraging at times before Richard Nixon became president in 1969. US support to the European integration was also driven by their

calculations or national interests of safeguarding US security and strategic interests amidst the Soviet Union's expansion in Eastern border of Europe. However, the path of the US foreign policy was carefully designed by subsequent US administrations that always placed the US national interests in the first priority in their foreign policy agenda in Europe.

Apart from aforementioned external factors of European integration, there were also demands for the 'United State of Europe' or greater European integration based on inter-governmental cooperation within West European countries and its leadership. Leaders like Konrad Adenauer, then the Mayor of Cologne city in West Germany had observed in his memoir that his city was looking like as 'ghost city' where more than half of the houses were destroyed. He has also observed that in the background of these consequences of the Second World War the unification of Europe seems more feasible now that in the 1920s when extreme nationalist thoughts and rhetoric were at its height which has caused the Second World War (Adenauer 1966).

In 1952, the six West European countries Italy, Luxemburg, Belgium, Netherland including war time arch rivals France and West Germany came together to regulate their coal and steel industries and production under a joint community. These 'inner six' countries had begun to negotiate under Jean-Monnet and Shuman's leadership and plan to place their important coal and steel production under common control and establish a higher authority to regulate the production. On the basis of the Schuman Plan the Treaty of Paris was signed by the 'inner six' countries which has formed the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the first European common institution after the War, the treaty which started a working on August 1952 and in his first speech at the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) meeting, Jean Monnet declared that the idea and process of the United State of Europe had begun.

This conviction of European integration was "especially pronounced among Christian Democrats, who emerged after 1945 in France, Italy, West Germany and several other states as the principal political party. Leaders like Adenauer, Italian Alcide De Gasperi or the Frenchman Robert Schuman there was no choice but to supersede national rivalries if Europe was ever to return to civilized life again" (Gilbert 2012: 4). So the European integration process was outcome of both changing international

system and growing world bi-polarity and elite led leadership within West European countries to rebuild Europe on democratic values.

John McCormick (2011) has argued that after the Second World War, there were three key factors for the European integration process. First, Economic reconstruction which was pushed by the United States under the Marshal plan was motivated by US national interests and linked with the Cold War circumstances. The Second is security concerns in the context of rising tension and security threats from the bipolar world order and the third important key factor was role of European leaders and their efforts to prevent and curb resurgence of extreme nationalism to spilling over once again into conflict.

The process started with the Treaty of Paris based on the Shuman Plan in 1951 creating ECSC in 1952. The next step in the process was the creation of the European Economic Community in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome with the same 'inner six' countries pushing forward for the integration process. But the European Economic Community set more ambitious goals which have included development of a single market with free movement of people, capital and services and common policies on agriculture, transport and competition among the six countries. These efforts finally culminated in 1986 as the Single European Act. Sebastian Rosato (2012) has argued that there are two key components of early European integration; first, it was external balancing due to an overwhelming presence of Soviet military threat to Western Europe and internal balancing to maintain equilibrium with West Germany. The Second was the post-Second World War asymmetrical and uneven distribution of power between West European states and the Soviet Union which has to provide external factor or the United States to push West European integration to contain Soviet power from spreading in Western part of Europe.

Map 2.1 the European Community from 1952 to 1990



Source: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/European-Community-European-economic-association>

In the background of aforementioned internal and external factors of European integration, the European Coal and Steel Community had become a beginning point of the European integration process and the Schumann Declaration has become the main guideline for the integration of Europe. In 1950, a French politician Rene Plevin made efforts to establish a European Defense Community and subsequently establish European Political Community by merging EDC with ECSC. But the efforts could not be materialized because French parliament rejected the idea of European Defense Community. The first enlargement after the Suez crisis in 1956 was the inclusion of Britain along with Denmark and Ireland in 1973. The United Kingdom had initially declined to become a founding member in 1950s, but was part of the European Free

Trade Area which was formed by 'outer seven'<sup>6</sup> in 1960. Greece has joined the European Union in 1981 and by the 1986 Spain and Portugal had also joined the European Community. The Single European Act in 1986 with its contribution to creating a common market across the member states of the European Community which has revised the Treaty of Rome signed in 1957. The act also set an objective to form a single market by 1992 which culminated in the Maastricht Treaty in 1992-93 and the act also codified European Political Cooperation which was to become the base for Common European Foreign and Security Policy.

The introduction of the Single European Act also explains the element of 'leadership' (both as individual leadership and leadership of a state, particularly Germany in this case) in European integration which the study has explained in next section of the chapter. The Treaty of Maastricht was the first major shift and change in European integration process after the reunification of Germany and subsequently Soviet disintegration and end of the Cold War system. The Maastricht treaty and amendments (Treaty of Amsterdam 1997) increased economic integration and also has widened the scope of larger political integration in the continent. Treaty of Nice 2001 which added to the Treaty of Rome and Maastricht was a much-required step to strengthen internal organization of the European Union which was about to finish the largest enlargement in the history of European integration by bringing in ten Central and East European countries in European Union. This was the major enlargement of the European Union after end of the Cold War, although in 1996, Sweden, Finland and Austria joined the European Union who was 'neutral' countries during the Cold War period. Finally, the Treaty of Lisbon in 2010 which was again a reform treaty addressed the issue of 'democratic deficit' by introducing few measures by strengthening European institutions such as Parliament etc. But apart from these successful treaties and development of the European Economic Community to the European Union (EU), it also faced challenges in the 21st century.

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<sup>6</sup> In 1960, seven European countries Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom have formed the European Free Trade Area and these countries were referred to as the 'outer seven' as opposed to the founding members of ECSC called 'inner six'.

Table 2.2 European Enlargements since 1952

Year	Joining Member States
1952, The Treaty of Paris	European Coal and Steel Community joined by West Germany, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxemburg and Italy called as 'inner six' countries.
1957, The Treaty of Rome	The treaty was signed by the 'inner six' countries creating European Economic Community and European Atomic Energy Agency in 1958.
1967	The merger of European Economic Community and European Atomic Energy Agency into European Communities.
1973, the First Enlargement	It was the first enlargement of European Communities where Denmark, Ireland and United Kingdom joined.
1981, the Second Enlargement	Greece joined the 9 members European Communities, it was considered as first Mediterranean enlargement of EC.
1986, the Third Enlargement	Spain and Portugal joined the European Communities and it was marked as the second Mediterranean enlargement of EC.
1995, the Fourth Enlargement	After Maastricht treaty which formed the European Union, it was the first enlargement after EC named EU. Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU.
2004, the Sixth Enlargement	This is the single largest enlargement of EU where ten Central and Eastern countries joined the EU. These countries are Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
2007, the Seventh Enlargement	Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU.
2013, the last Enlargement	Croatia joined EU.
2016, The Brexit	United Kingdom which joined the European Communities in its very first enlargement in 1973, withdrew from the membership of EU in a referendum on 23 June 2016, 52% Britons voted to leave the EU.

In 2005, a treaty aspiring to create a Constitution for Europe (simply known as the Constitutional Treaty), 2004-2005 which was intended to frame a consolidated constitution for the European Union has failed. The draft of the Constitutional Treaty could not be ratified by the French and Dutch Parliament in 2005. Just three years after the failure of the Constitutional Treaty, the European member states' common currency Euro faced a major challenge in the wake of the sub-prime crisis in the

United States which was caused due to the collapse of housing and private property bubble in the US. The absence of a fiscal union at the European level also deteriorated the situation further as the issue could not be resolved at the European level by the leaders (national leaders played an important role). Among many member states of the EU, Portugal, Greece, Spain and Ireland suffered the most and have to be bailed-out by economically powerful states. Recently the European Union and especially countries close to Black and the Aegean Sea like Greece, Italy and Turkey have been facing a huge refugee influx caused by the civil war and violence by terrorist organization Islamic States (IS) in Syria and Iraq's border.

### **Understanding the European Integration Process**

There are different ways to analyse building of Europe and its integration process post Second World War and each of these have different points of emphasis and so contribute a distinct understanding of integration process. Troitino (2013) has argued that "the reasons for uniting Europe have been changing during the process of integration; at the beginning it was clear that avoiding wars was the main target of the European organization; nowadays this target has been already achieved because a war between France and Germany seems impossible and hence wars between member states of the organization are highly unreal. At the current situation of the integration process, the main target is having a strong union able to compete with other blocks of the world at least on equal terms and avoiding the decline of Europe as a world leader" (Troitino 2013: 7).

There are three major theories of European integration process which includes neo-Functionalism, Inter-governmentalism and Federalism. Theoretically, European integration at the early stage was explained by a new-functionalist approach. The European integration process started in the early 1950s with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952. Ernst Haas in his phenomenal work *The Uniting of Europe* (1958) explained the European integration process. The main theoretical understanding at the time was the concept of spill-over effect. The same concept has been applied by Lindberg in his work *Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration* (1958) to study early years of European Community and its spillover effect on other areas of integration in future. These spillover effect argument has been referred as early theories of European integration and been called as neo-Functionalist



theories. After the 1960s the theoretical model of European integration has shifted from neo-Functionalist to inter-governmentalism of European integration

### **Role of Leadership in European Integration Process**

In this section, the role of leadership in European integration after the Second World War has been explained. The 'leadership' is a multi-dimensional concept in international relations. A leader could be an individual, an institution and a state depending on the power to influence and achieve desired outcomes. But in this section, political leadership of individuals has been analysed in the context of their role in European integration since 1945. There have been various scholarly take on to Drake (1993) has argued that "European political leadership, I mean the political leadership emanating from and relating to the complex polity of the European Community (EC).....; I also mean the set of political demands and opportunities (in the form of situations and events) that, over the life of the Community, have given rise to instances and manifestations of political leadership which in a number of respects its duration, effects, style, sources of legitimacy and support can be distinguished from strictly national leadership.....it has been attached to national figures (such as Charles de Gaulle); or, alternatively (or simultaneously) to "supranational" figures such as Altiero Spinelli, Jean Monnet, Walter Hallstein" (Drake 1993: 2).

After end of the Second World War, European leaders such as Jean Monnet, Schuman, W. Churchill, Konrad Adenauer showed new and visionary style of leadership. These leaders created a "new style of "European" political leadership which drew on both the national, personalised and the institutional, incrementalist styles identified by integration theory as factors contributing to the dynamic nature of European integration" (Drake 1993: 5). The European Commission has also recognized the role of leadership by stating that "without their energy and motivation we would not be living in the sphere of peace and stability that we take for granted. From resistance fighters to lawyers, the founding fathers were a diverse group of people who held the same ideals: a peaceful, united and prosperous Europe"<sup>7</sup>.

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<sup>7</sup> [http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/founding-fathers/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/founding-fathers/index_en.htm)

## **Leadership and European Integration during the Cold War**

The role of leadership could be seen at every stage of the European integration process. Many European leaders had proposed to form a European unity and build common institutions even before the First World War but it could not be realized because of various reasons. The role of leaders in European integration process has been analysed on various basis first, role of leaders to push forward the ideas of European unity and integration, second, impact and influence of leadership to execute and create milestone treaties and institutions on European integration to carry forward European integration and third response by the leadership to various challenges to European integration project in the background of Cold War politics and its impact on the project.

The major hurdle for European integration after the Second World War was to overcome Franco-German hostilities and ensure reconciliation between the past arch rivals of the continent. The two visionary leaders Jean Monnet, the French political and economic advisor and Robert Schuman, a lawyer and French foreign minister contributed the most to fix this rivalry between Germany and France post World War II. Their vision for European integration was influenced by the kind of war time experience they had. For example, Robert Schuman had lived at the French-German border and had seen the arch-rivalry and its consequences on the European society closely. Italy's Prime Minister De Gasperi had (1945-53) also shared his thought about Second World War's experiences and lesson learnt as he stated, "the future will not be built through force, nor the desire to conquer, but by the patient application of the democratic method, the constructive spirit of agreement, and by respect for freedom<sup>8</sup>".

In 1950, Schuman who was inspired by Jean Monnet's plan for integrating heavy industry of France and Britain (which could not be realised) had proposed production of the coal and steel material under a common, shared higher authority. The reasons behind as some have argued to stop these two war time rivals countries from using

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<sup>8</sup> [http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/founding-fathers/pdf/alcide\\_de\\_gasperi\\_en.pdf](http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/founding-fathers/pdf/alcide_de_gasperi_en.pdf)

The Prime Minister made the observation when he accepted the Charlemagne prize for his pro-European commitment in 1952.

coal and steel to rebuild their war industry. Schuman proposed the regulation of these vital industries under higher authority and uses the production to rebuild both countries economy and infrastructure. His vision was broad and inclusive and also offered place to other European countries to join the regulatory authority. Since 1945, there was an invisible conflict between need for ensuring peace in Europe and prevailing mistrust among the European countries. Robert Shuman himself had underlined this dichotomy and said that "Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity. The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age old opposition of France and Germany<sup>9</sup>".

It was again leaders who had responded to Robert Shuman's call for an unusual kind of economic integration in post-war Europe. West German Chancellor Adenauer responded positively to the speech of Robert Shuman as did the governments of Netherlands, Belgium, Italy and Luxemburg. The idea to form a higher authority had been actively supported by Italy under the leadership of Alcide De Gasperi who was Italy's prime minister and foreign minister from 1945 to 1953. He had supported the idea to develop common European defense policy and also was the founding member to form the ECSC in 1951. Gasperi had made efforts to integrate Italy in the West European community and promote initiatives to bring Italy into ongoing idea of European unity and integration. To realize the dream he along with other leaders from Benelux countries had worked closely with Robert Shuman, Jean Monnet and Konrad Adenauer to execute the Marshall Plan and creating closer economic ties with other European countries, particularly with France. The one European leader from far west Europe, the British prime minister during the Second World, Winston Churchill, who himself was an army officer called for the creation of a 'United State of Europe' in 1946 in his famous speech at the University of Zurich. He has believed that only a united and integrated Europe could ensure peace and stability in the European continent. His purpose of advocating European integration was to eliminate ills of war mongering and extreme European nationalism which had led to the two World Wars on European land in just span of 20 years.

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<sup>9</sup> [http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/founding-fathers/index\\_en.htm#ff\\_single\\_9](http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/founding-fathers/index_en.htm#ff_single_9)

Many incidents and consequences from the First and Second World War have made larger impact on mind of people and their leaders in Europe. The Great Depression or financial crisis of the 1930s made many European leaders think about regional integration to prevent any reoccurrence of economic meltdown. Johan Willem Beyen, who was foreign minister of the Netherlands since the 1945 and strong proponent of European regional (economic) integration, believed that to prevent another financial shock it is necessary to have an economic integration at first and political later. He was not only among the founding members of ECSC but also a strong supporter of Marshall Plan in Europe. But his idea about European economic integration was a comprehensive project which went beyond coal and steel cooperation. He drew up the Beyen plan which proposed complete economic integration of West Europe which included all economic sectors of Western European countries.

Another leader from Benelux countries Joseph Bech who was a politician from Luxemburg, participated as the founding member of European Coal and Steel Community in 1952 and was a leading supporter and architect of European integration in 1950s. It was a efforts from the Benelux countries which has led to the convening of the Messina Conference in June, 1955 and creating a way for the European Economic Community.

The Joseph Bech's vision for European integration is another example of War time experiences and consequences which had forced leaders and civil societies across the West European countries to form a community to prevent wars. "Bech's experience of living in Luxemburg during the two World Wars made him understand how powerless such a small state could be, isolated between two powerful neighbours. This led him to realise the importance of internationalism and cooperation between states if a stable and prosperous Europe were to be achieved. He helped to set up the Benelux union between Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, an experience which proved to be of great benefit when the European institutions were developed. The process of forming this union between the three small states has since been considered a prototype for the European Union itself. It was in his capacity as Minister of Foreign Affairs that he signed the Benelux Treaty in 1944. His experience in creating an economic union promoting the free movement of workers, capital, services, and goods

in the region would later prove useful in setting up the European Economic Community”<sup>10</sup>.

In 1955, the much discussed Messina Conference of European leaders had chosen post-war foreign minister of Belgium Paul Henri Spaak as chairman of a committee (the Spaak Committee) in charge of the preparation of a report on the creation of this common European market. During the Messina Conference, the three Benelux states proposed a re-launch of European integration to come about on the basis of a common market and integration in the sectors of transport and atomic energy. This ‘Spaak Report’ was the basis of the Intergovernmental Conference on the Common Market and Euratom in 1956, and led to the Treaties of Rome, signed on 25 March 1957, establishing a European Economic Community. The Belgian foreign minister was among the league of founding figure and leaders of European integration process. As the

European Commission (EC) has underlined the leadership of P.H Spaak by stating that "Spaak always defended the importance of European integration and the independence of the European Commission with great vigour: "The Europe of tomorrow must be a supranational Europe," he stated to rebuff French President de Gaulle's 1962 ‘Fouchet Plan’, attempting to block both the British entry to the European Communities and undermine their supranational foundation. The European unity Spaak envisaged was mostly economic. The Belgian statesman desired political unification but not on the basis of the Common Market countries alone. He was therefore against any further actions until economic integration of Britain into the union had taken place”<sup>11</sup>.

After and before creation of European Economic Community (1957), role of first West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer has been important and historic. His foreign policy was based on three major pillars, first bringing West Germany in European integration process or Westward orientation of West Germany, second was the forging strong transatlantic partnership and the last reconciliation with France.

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<sup>10</sup> [http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/founding-fathers/pdf/joseph\\_bech\\_en.pdf](http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/founding-fathers/pdf/joseph_bech_en.pdf)

<sup>11</sup> [http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/founding-fathers/pdf/paul-henri\\_spaak\\_en.pdf](http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/founding-fathers/pdf/paul-henri_spaak_en.pdf)

In 1963, France and West Germany had signed the Elysee treaty, a treaty of friendship which has later become the milestone of European integration process and called 'Franco-German' motor of European integration. As it has been argued before in the chapter that World Wars time experiences and consequences influenced leaders and civil society member to push for the European unity and integration after the Second World War. So "Adenauer's experiences during the Second World War made him a political realist. His views on Germany's role in Europe were strongly influenced by the two world wars and the century-long animosity between Germany and France. He, therefore, focused his attention on promoting the idea of pan-European cooperation.

Adenauer was a great proponent of the European Coal and Steel Community, which was launched with the Schuman Declaration on 9 May 1950, and also the later treaty for the European Economic Community in March 1957. Adenauer's opinions on Europe were based on the idea that European unity was essential for lasting peace and stability. For this reason, he worked tirelessly for the reconciliation of Germany with its former enemies, especially France. Later, in 1963, The Elysee Treaty, also known as the Treaty of Friendship, set the seal on this reconciliation. With it, Germany and France established a firm foundation for relations that ended centuries of rivalry between them"<sup>12</sup>. The treaty has not only build friendship between Germany and France but also become a milestone event for the future of European integration. It was leadership and vision of leadership which has led historical arch-rival to come together and build a friendship for Europe.

The dream of political leaders to integrate Europe after creating Coal and Steel Community in 1952, on ground the task has been carried out with passion by the Walter Hallestein who was the first commissioner of the Commission of the European Economic Community (European Commission) which has been created by the Treaty of Rome in 1958. "Hallstein's excellent diplomatic skills, awareness of the need for European unity and his specialised knowledge and experience in the field, led Konrad Adenauer, then Chancellor of Germany, to appoint him as head of the delegation leading negotiations at the Schuman Conference on the forming of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1950. During this time he worked closely with Jean Monnet,

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<sup>12</sup> [http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/founding-fathers/pdf/konrad\\_adenauer\\_en.pdf](http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/founding-fathers/pdf/konrad_adenauer_en.pdf)

his French counterpart. They both soon realised that they shared fundamental beliefs on the need for European integration if Europe were to prosper again”<sup>13</sup>.

In, 1954 idea of creating European Defence Community has scrapped after French rejection and for Hallstein the failure of creating the EDC pose a threat to security of Western Europe since it would be easier for the Soviet Union to expand its influence in a divided Europe. This was the reason that W. Hallstein had focused along with other aforementioned European leaders to work on economic integration rather than going for political integration at that time. In 1955, the Messina Conference has decided economic integration by enabling free movement of people, services and goods. “Although Hallstein initially wanted this integration to be all-encompassing and achieved as quickly as possible, the political realities of the time helped him to recognise that a gradual fusing together of the markets of the member states would be of maximum benefit to all. In 1958 the Treaty of Rome came into force and Hallstein was chosen as the first President of the Commission of the European Economic Community”<sup>14</sup>.

A decade of European integration process from creation of European Economic Community in 1959 was dominated and influenced by a tall French and European leader General Charles De Gaulle, who has founded the French Fifth Republic and served as the president of the French Republic until 1968. Under his leadership, France had pushed forward an agenda for economic revitalization, building nuclear arsenals and pursuing independent foreign policy or without influence of Anglo-American nexus. These domestic and foreign policy issues of France were critical for the European integration which led to the confrontation and cooperation during this period. After assuming office in 1958, Gaulle has supported the Treaty of Rome and worked closely with West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer to push European foreign policy and pressing West German Chancellors to formulate and agree on the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP).

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<sup>13</sup> [http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/founding-fathers/pdf/walter\\_hallstein\\_en.pdf](http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/founding-fathers/pdf/walter_hallstein_en.pdf)

<sup>14</sup> <sup>14</sup> [http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/founding-fathers/pdf/walter\\_hallstein\\_en.pdf](http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/founding-fathers/pdf/walter_hallstein_en.pdf)

Although General De Gaulle who has shared the same vision concerning Europe, a vision of stable and peaceful Europe. But his approach to achieving European integration was different from other discussed European leaders and their leadership style. He wanted to create a strong European confederation with independent foreign policy without any links of dependence on the Soviet Union and the US. In 1960, de Gaulle proposed the Fouchet Plan, an intergovernmental arrangement for European foreign and economic policy coordination which aimed at independent operation of European foreign policy after the creation of European Economic Community in 1958-59. Between 1958 and 1969 de Gaulle consistently opposed closer relations with Britain, first vetoing a free trade area (FTA) in 1959, then calling off two years of negotiations over British entry in January 1963.

There were possibly three major reasons for Charles De Gaulle's different approach and perspective to European integration process. The first reason was that France was in weak position after the World War and where it could not bear leadership rivalry/competition from Britain within the European Community. The second reason was General's aim to achieve independent and Anglo-American influence free European foreign policy and the third reason was to protect Common Agriculture Policy which was under threat after proposal of free trade and Britain's application for membership to European Economic Community.

Gaulle's hostility towards supranationalism became most obvious in 1965, with what became the Empty Chair Crisis. The Crisis was based on a disagreement over the Commission's proposal to fund the Common Agricultural Policy over the period between the expiration of the initial financial regulation in July 1965 and the end of the Community's transitional period in 1970. Once a meeting between De Gaulle and Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, in the beginning of June 1965, the crisis failed to be resolved and member states acted on France's proposal that the CAP should be funded by national contributions. General Charles De Gaulle has dominated European discourse until 1968. He was a political realist who has envisioned France's leadership in European integration so always had different approach towards European integration process. He has always declined supranational elements in European Community so has always been regarded as an obstructionist. Even European Commission doesn't recognize him as a founding figure in European integration. But



leadership element of General De Gaulle and his perceived attitude towards the US and its role in European politics has guided and influenced European integration during the 1960s.

After the Charles De Gaulle era in European politics during the 1960s, Willy Brandt, West German Chancellor, from 1969 till 1974, was a key person in the relations between West and East which had laid foundation for future east-west integration of Europe. He was member of the Social Democratic Party and also had also been against the Nazi regime, spending most of the war in exile in the Scandinavian countries. He started a new political stance towards East Germany and the Soviet Union called Ostpolitik, and at the same time supported the enlargement of the European Communities to the UK, Ireland, and Denmark in 1973. Hence, the Communities had a deeper relationship with East Germany than with any other state in the influence zone of the Soviets.

In the 1980s, the Italian politician Altiero Spinelli was among the staunch supporter of European integration. He has voiced for a Treaty on the federal European Union or 'Spinelli Plan' in European Parliament (EP) which later paved way for enacting the Single European Act in 1986 and the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. The treaty was later adopted in the European Parliament with overwhelming majority and provided a basis for enhancing European EU treaties in the 1980-90s towards creating a united Europe.

During the 1980s, three major European leaders had envisioned greater cooperation at European level with different approached supported by their national interests. European integration was in crisis in the 1980s and different issues as the British rebate, the Mediterranean Fund, or the enlargement to Spain and Portugal were solved, and Kohl was a key factor in reaching agreements and overcoming the crisis.

There were three major figures at the European level, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, the French President Mitterrand, and the UK Prime Minister Thatcher in 1980s-90s. The leaders have their own approach to European integration which was guided by their domestic constraints and national interests. For example "the French president rejected the idea of reforming the costly agricultural policy to protect the French farmers but was also a strong supporter of French-German cooperation as the only way to increase the international influence of France.....Margaret Thatcher

believed more in intergovernmental Europe against integration, a free market and weak intervention from the European institutions, a close relationship between the USA and Europe, and the development of a defence policy as a complement to NATO, never as a competitor. Of the three of them, Helmut Kohl was the biggest supporter of European integration. He also believed in close cooperation between France and Germany, but in a difference with Mitterrand, as the motor of integration, never as a brake to integration or a relationship led by national interest” (Troitino 2013: 188-189).

In 1986, the Single European Act to create a common market and common foreign and security policy for the Europe was in fact a cornerstone in history of European integration. It was revision treaty of founding Treaty of Rome which aimed at establishing the European Union, common market and currency and also intended to have political integration in future with common security and foreign policy for European Community. The enactment of the Single European Act was also significant in two terms, first the drafting of the Act was a classic example of leadership role in European integration. West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and His French counterpart President Mitterrand, leaders duo not only pushed for the Single European Act but has also revered traditional French approach to European integration (in contrast to De Gaulle, Mitterrand supported supranational elements in integration). The second significance of the act was not only to create the European Union for future but it was also an underlining effort of Franco-German cooperation for the European integration during the Cold War. The Kohl-Mitterrand remains in their office during the last phase of the Cold War and has also resumed to the office after fall of the Berlin Wall. The role of the leaders' duo was critical in German unification and has also played a defining role in establishing treaty of Maastricht and subsequent creation of European Union in 1992. Their role in European integration has been explained in next section of the chapter which explains role of leadership in European integration process in the backdrop of fall of Berlin Wall and subsequently changed scenario of World politics.

### **Leadership and European Integration in the Post Cold World Europe**


The political, military and ideological division of the world during the Cold War and division of Germany after the Second World has also divided the Europe. During

autumn of 1989, in the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) peaceful protests have led to the reunification of Germany on 3 October 1990. These protests were consequences of economic crisis and deterioration of quality of life in East Germany under Soviet Union's influence compare to the higher employment rate and economic growth of West Germany. Apart from these other external events also led to the reunification of Germany and subsequent disintegration of Soviet Union which had led to the end of bipolarity of World order or end of the Cold War. These external factors include the Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's policies of political and economic openness in the Soviet Union after considering certain domestic issues and constraints which were indirect results of the rivalry with the US and nuclear arms race and its growing burden on Soviet economy. This openness has led to the disintegration of Soviet Union and also creation of independent CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) countries and losing influence on Central Eastern European countries in the 1990s.

German reunification had many obstacles, and most people believed it impossible to achieve. These hurdles were Margret Thatcher's resistance to the unification, initial passive attitude of Mitterrand and prevailing scepticism about united Germany. Margaret Thatcher was against the idea of German reunification and also presented her reservations against the Maastricht Treaty, then Helmut Kohl had persuaded French President Mitterrand to support with the German reunification in return Kohl agreed to Mitterrand's condition to abandoning Deutsch Mark (DM) and accept the Euro. The scepticism about the German reunification and its role in European integration was that "Germany might not need European integration any longer, some argued. Other notorious skeptics perceived united Germany as the dominating European power, while some analysts were questioning whether or not Germany would maintain its interest in pursuing European integration at all. Soon, the first set of reassuring answers was given.....The Kohl was a great advocate of it, and even more, he thought that it was a German issue that should be done by Germans.....At all times during this decade, Kohl's government remained unwavering in its commitment to European integration. German unification and European unity were considered as two intrinsically linked sides of the same coin" (Ludger 2009: 47).

After German reunification and end of the Cold War, in December 1991 European Council assembled in Maastricht and drafted a treaty. On 1 November 1993, the Maastricht treaty came into force when Delors was the commissioner and has played the most significant role in drafting and envisioning this treaty. The Treaty on the European Union or Maastricht Treaty has created single currency (Euro) and it has also created the pillars of European Union, one supranational pillar created from European Coal and Steel Community, European Atomic Energy Commission and European Community, second Common Foreign and Security Policy pillar and the final Justice and Home Affairs pillar.

Graph 2.1 The Three Pillars of EU after the Maastricht Treaty in 1992



Source: <http://www.xanthi.ilsp.gr/kemeseu/ch1/treaties.htm>

This transforming treaty of European integration after the German reunification is a leading example of role of leadership in European integration process. French president Mitterrand's aspiration for creating Euro, Helmut Kohl's desire to unify Germany within integrated Europe and European Commission Jacques Delors's passionate vision for greater integration has created the European Union.

After end of the cold war, the first enlargement was inclusion of the Cold War time 'neutral' European country Austria, Finland and Sweden. After disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Central and Eastern European countries faced political and economic changes. The communism based political and economic system was

radically changing and adopting more decentralised form of economy and political system. The changes made them sync in with Western European countries model and hence make these countries eligible for the European Union's membership. After the disintegration, "Russia was undergoing a big internal transformation, and hence its influence over Central and Eastern Europe disappeared completely. The USA was pushing the western European states to influence the area in order to secure it. The EU had to act to secure the area before any turmoil could collapse the young democracies leading this area once more against the rest of Europe. The best idea to secure them was offering them membership, avoiding any internal disorder or a revival of Russian power over the area. The proposal of membership meant political stability in the area, but still, there were huge economic problems that were solved with financial transfers from the Union as pre-accession aid. This was a historical achievement in Europe for uniting the continent by peaceful means. Finally, the enlargement started in 2004 with 10 countries the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia, plus two Mediterranean countries, Malta and Cyprus, and ended with the incorporation of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007" (Troitino 2013: 218).

The aforementioned European integration elements and events were supported and tirelessly carried forward by the leader of the time. Helmut Kohl and Mitterrand after the completion of Single European Act in 1986 which was the signature achievement of Franco-German cooperation, has pursued for greater European integration. After German reunification and during drafting of the Maastritsch treaty, Helmut Kohl and Mitterrand had written jointly to the European Council, which shows the leaders vision and role in the European integration. The leader's duo has written that "in the light of far-reaching changes in Europe and in view of the completion of the single market and the realisation of economic and monetary union, we consider it necessary to accelerate the political construction of the Europe of the Twelve (enlargement). We believe that it is time to transform relations as a whole among the member states into the European Union and invest this union with the necessary means of action as envisaged by the Single Act.....The European Council should initiate preparations for an intergovernmental conference on political union. In particular, the objective is to strengthen the democratic legitimation of the union, render its institutions more efficient, ensure unity and coherence of the unions economic,

monetary and political action, define and implement a common foreign and security policy"<sup>15</sup>.

Helmut Kohl and Mitterrand's approach was bit different when it came to enlargement issues. The issue of widening or deepening enlargement was the point of difference between these two leaders after the end of the Cold War. Where Mitterrand initially opposed widening of the European Union or inclusion of more members in the European Union and also had certain fundamental French reservation against Free Trade Area which could harm French long standing position on Common Agriculture Policy. During the Cold War, He had supported Kohl for the Single European Act and inclusion of Spain and Portugal in 1986. Together both leaders have completed successful German reunification and guided the milestone Maastricht treaty in 1992.

The relations between France and Germany were becoming stronger and were the leading force of the Community; any new measure had to be approved first of all by Germany and France, they were the clear motor of European integration. As an example, the Schengen agreement, a bilateral international agreement signed between France and Germany for the free movement of people outside the European Communities treaties or laws. Later, other countries joined the agreement, which afterward became a part of the European Union. Mitterrand and Kohl also had a very close relationship, and their initiatives were crucial to the current shape of the European Union, the Treaty of Maastricht being the main consequence of their agreements, and hence the common currency or political cooperation. They also became allies against the pressures from Margaret Thatcher, establishing a long term relationship between both countries as the heart of Europe. Equal and peaceful relations between both France and Germany have been the most notable achievement of European integration, and the possibility of war between them seems impossible nowadays. French President Chirac and Chancellor Schroder also had a strong partnership, and they used to meet before the European Council meetings and then present a common position there. It created some problems inside the Union because there were some complaints because if Germans and the French agreed before the meetings and presented a common position, the rest of the members of the Council

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<sup>15</sup> <http://www.ellopos.net/politics/mitterrand-kohl.htm>

could not reject it. They urged France and Germany to discuss with all the members of the Council, without a previous Franco-German agreement, accusing them of being anti-democratic.

After 27 years of the fall of Berlin wall, the European Union has evolved from treaty of Maastricht to treaty of Lisbon in 2010. In between, European Union witnessed achievements in the form of inclusion of ten Central and Eastern European Countries, high economic growth among member states in the first few years after the introduction of single currency, successful introduction of treaties especially Lisbon treaty. But there has been challenges and crisis during these years of evolvement which includes failure of constitutional treaty, absence of common monetary union, Euro-Zone crisis and current refugee crisis. Amidst these achievements and failures in European integration after the end of the Cold War, the factor of leadership has always remained a significant and critical as has been explained. Today Germany is still a leading force inside the European Union, and its relations with France are still strong. Angela Merkel and Francois Hollande are the main political leaders of the Union, and the relations of France and Germany are still the central core of the Union: most important decisions need the support of these two countries. But to understand the leadership factor in European integration process, it is imperative to have micro study, so the next chapter will explain the role of Germany under its chancellors in the European integration process from divided Germany to unified Germany.

## **German Chancellors and European Integration, 1952-2005**

### **Background: European Integration and Germany during the World Wars**

Since the 16<sup>th</sup> century, Germany has been at the centre of the engaging European state system and its geographical location made it important and provided strategically vulnerable position during the various wars in history. Over the centuries, growing population and industrial strength of Germany made the country a valued and powerful state in Europe. Referring to Germany's role in European history which was divided between princes and churches, Simms (2015) has argued that "the German nation was bitterly divided, between the emperor and the leading princes, and between Catholics and Protestants. This created a vacuum at the heart of Europe which exported instability and attracted the predatory attention of its neighbours .....after a long agony, the Holy Roman Empire collapsed under the onslaught of revolutionary France and Napoleon. Later, the German Confederation, which failed to deter French revanchism, was destroyed by Bismarck in his drive to create a united Germany in 1871. This turned the Germans from objects of the state system into subjects, with a powerful voice in Europe and the world" (Simms 2015: 25). Thus before the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Germany was divided between religion, princes and various reformist movements also brought changes to German society and political and religious establishment.

In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the defining moments for Germany within Europe were the two World Wars, which witnessed its powerful military might accepting humiliating post-war treaties and finally the division of the country. The two World Wars have brought destruction and catastrophic consequences for the European continent. These consequences have led to the various European leaders to think about the European integration to prevent recurrence of wars in future. This idea of integration has led to the creation of the European Union.

The First World War destroyed many existing European monarchs and their empires, created new nation-states based on ethnicity and language, also encouraged



independence movements in Europe's colonies in Asia, Africa and South America. The most important consequence of WW I was the emergence of the United State of America on the international stage. Another worth noting consequences of the war was communism holding power in the Soviet Union and the rise of Hitler and his fascist ideas. With the emergence of these new entrants in the global politics and specifically in European politics had broken but not shattered the existing balance of power. Cameron (2010) has argued that the consequences of two World Wars “led to a profound change in political thinking, at least in Western Europe, about how states should conduct their relations. *Die Stunde Null* was the backdrop to the revolutionary ideas of the EU’s ‘founding fathers,’ statesmen such as Robert Schuman, Alcide De Gasperi, Jean Monnet who developed the novel idea of a community of states establishing a political system based on sharing sovereignty” (Cameron 2010: 1).

Apart from reasons and consequences of these World Wars, there have been intense debates and academic endeavours to decide the responsibility of these two World Wars. The question that who was the offender of the war, there were other changes after the war in terms of political systems, international peace cooperation (League of Nation), and emerging roles of states under nationalist rhetoric. However, during the period advancement in science, technology and medicine was worth noting and interestingly that occurred as a result of the WWI, 1914-18.

These changes in the next twenty years also took place in Germany which under Adolf Hitler modernised and further increased the strength of German army and introduced new warfare methods in the Second World War. In terms of idea and ideology, the aristocracy was overthrown or its role greatly diminished in Europe and particularly in Germany and under growing fascism which has evolved as a political system and ideology later.

In Germany, socialist and labour movements has started gaining ground along with communism and fascism and the country has become centre of experiments of these contradictory ideologies. Germany was at the centre of experiments and directionless practices of these changes after the First World War. The Cameron (2010) has further argued that “Germany’s neighbours like France and other smaller European countries have not forgotten Germany’s role in both World Wars and hence the burden of history weighs more heavily on German shoulders than for any other nation in

Europe. Yet Germany has dealt with *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*<sup>16</sup> better than any state in history; certainly much better than Japan or the Soviet Union/Russia” (Cameron 2010: 2).

The important debate about the World Wars and Germany has been the ‘responsibility of the Wars’. The debate was more about Germany’s role in the World Wars and many believed that it is threatening to leave Germany again as an independent state so it has to be contained in structures such as NATO and EU. The historians have come with different arguments about the German responsibility in these two World Wars. It is also important to underline that this sense of responsibility or historic guilt had guided the German role in European integration and its foreign policy after the Second World War. German historian, Fritz Fischer (1994) has argued that Germany was primarily responsible for starting the war as it had secret ambitions to annex most of Europe. Another historian Macmillan (2013) has supported and argued that Germany should bear much of the responsibility as it had the power to put pressure on its Austria-Hungary ally and stop the drift to war. Clark (2012) argues that Germany, like the other major powers, sleep-walked into the war. Another historian, Neil Ferguson, (1999) has argued that Britain should not have become involved as the stakes were too low and the ultimate costs too high.

Historians and war study experts have presented different narratives and explanations about the involvement of various states in these two World Wars. The states itself has a different takeaway and sense from these wars. In Germany, the war has become source of guilt because of the Nazi period and Holocaust, for Russia, it was an opportunity to remember it as period of heroism and sacrifices. The only country which had gained the prominence during the World Wars was the United States of America. The United States had entered in the First World War around 1917, almost in the end of the War and had also emerged as the leading power during the war because it had not suffered the loss and devastation as the war was fought on European land. The United States had in due course become the financial power

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<sup>16</sup> *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* is a composite German word with individual and collective significance that describes processes of coming to terms with the past (*Vergangenheit* "past"; *Bewältigung* "overcome" which is perhaps best rendered in English as a struggle to overcome the [negatives of the] past. It is a key term in the study of post-1945 German literature and culture. *Web-Source*; <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vergangenheitsbew%C3%A4ltigung>.

leading over United Kingdom's financial power in Europe. The great depression or financial crisis of 1929 had brought economic slowdown and unemployment in post-war European countries. These unfavourable situations after the war in Europe had also provided fertile land for fascism to grow in Germany and in other European countries like Italy which later caused the Second World War in Europe. In Germany, Adolf Hitler seized this opportunity to come into power and started building up Germany's armed forces going against the Treaty of Versailles.

Although the proposed conditions in the Versailles Treaty were never forced or followed by Germany. The humiliating conditions proposed by the treaty were exploited by the dictator to fuel extreme nationalism in Germany. French and British appeasement to the rising power of Hitler in Germany also made things worst and by 1941; Hitler won half of European continent after series of Blitzkrieg victories but he had misjudged and declared war on the United States before defeating the Soviet Union. By the end of 1945, Hitler Nazi Germany was defeated and laid down in ruins.

The treaties after the First World War were just a tool to pause the Second World War for twenty more years only. This shows the discriminatory conditions and imposition of winner's will over the defeated allies in the war. So the Second World War was directly connected to the First World War. The Second World War was more deadly and terrible in terms of loss and modern warfare and has been considered the greatest and deadliest war in human history, with millions of lives lost. It would take a coalition of the UK, the US and the Soviet Union to defeat Hitler after six years of bloody warfare that again brought widespread death and devastation to Europe and other parts of the world.

The consequences of the war divided Europe and huge armies marched to each other through an Iron Curtain at the heart of Europe. The United States has launched the Marshall Plan in Western Europe to contain growing the Soviet influence in Europe and limit communism expansion in Europe.

For this purpose, the US led military organisation NATO was established in 1949 while a huge financial package called as the Marshall Plan, helped Western European economies to recover and make them as a wall against spreading Soviet influence in Eastern and Central Europe. The war also caused division of Germany as East and

West Germany under the influence of Soviet and US bloc during the Cold War from 1946 to 1989.

But amidst this war time chaos and in the era of competing for national identities there were efforts by certain pacifist groups, individual political and visionary leaders and even interest groups in Europe and particularly in Germany towards an idea of unifying Europe. Instead of the broad vision of European unity, these ideas were more based on micro interests and the ideas were not systematic or organised in its approach towards European integration. Milward (2000) has argued that “in an era of intense nationalisation of economic resources, national politicians, encouraged by various economic interest groups such as national coal industries and farmers’ lobbies, edged towards European integration as a means of protecting their nations from international competition” (Milward 2000: 17).

Another instance from the mid nineteenth century to the outbreak of First World War, a significant number of Germans had argued for a *Mitteleuropa*<sup>17</sup>, a Central European community that would serve the economic interests of the German state and unite the German Diaspora (Stirk 1994). This was a quite different vision of integrated European community to the post-WWII integration of Western Europe but one which was recalled by interwar advocates of an Occidental (*Abendländisch*)<sup>18</sup> Europe. “There were significant groups among those supporting European integration, while not dispensing altogether with the language of democracy, did not seek to return interwar democracy to Europe after the fall of Hitler, but rather to implement a different version of Europe to that of nation states legitimized by the support of national majorities” (Buchanan 2002: 42).

In Germany, there were various groups across the political spectrum that opposed the fascism of Hitler and planned to reconstruct the post War Germany with support from the Allied forces.

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<sup>17</sup> *Mitteleuropa* means Middle Europe is a German word for Central Europe. The term has acquired different cultural, political and historical connotations and meanings. Web-Source; <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mitteleuropa>

<sup>18</sup> Occidental means something pertaining to or situated in the occident or west; the word has more cultural meaning such as Occidental customs, dress, climates etc.

The other group focused upon, the *Internationaler Sozialistischer Kampfbund* (ISK), was a party on the leftist revolutionary fringes of the *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (SPD) from its founding in 1925 to its folding in late 1945. There are striking convergences between the integrationist ideology it came to advance in the late 1930s and early 1940s and the position of more centrist and right wing groupings. These convergences suggest a widespread suspicion of parliamentary democracy and the Wilsonian principle of national self-determination among large numbers of the Third Force advocates of European integration that have been counted among the architects of the postwar European project. “As the ISK’s leaders went on to become important members of Kurt Schumacher’s post-war SPD and authors of much SPD policy in the late 1940s and 1950s, a study of their support for European integration also helps to throw further light on Schumacher’s and the SPD’s early approach to integrating Europe. In some cases, there were direct links between the politicians who put together the reunification European treaties and organisations advancing the case for an integrated Europe (Bailey 2010: 457).

Apart from the groups and individuals in Germany, another force which has the immense impact on the European integration and on post-war Germany was the United States of America. Economically and culturally the bonds between the United States and Western Europe were close. The large-scale European immigration to the US was evidence of this; as were the millions of trips back and forth across the Atlantic with the many diverse impulses in both directions that flowed from this. “The military political isolation towards Europe lasted until 6 April 1917 when the United States declared war against Germany. Thus, the United States had become the ally of Britain, France, and, until the October Revolution, also of Russia in the last phase of the First World War. In his Fourteen Points of January 1918, President Woodrow Wilson presented an outline to prevent future wars, particularly in Europe, but the US Senate refused to go along with Wilson’s ideas for the participation of the United States in the League of Nations and for the reorganisation of Europe. “First World War Europe’s concern about involving the United States could be seen in many other ways as well. Both in Britain and in France there was strong interest in maintaining the many wartime inter-allied councils that during the war had regulated the supplies of armaments, raw materials, shipping, etc”(Lundestad 2005: 24). The role of the US in post-war European integration was not only about economic reconstruction of

Western Europe under the Marshall Plan but also its opposition to the Soviet influence and installation of army bases and guiding foreign policy of many European countries, especially West German foreign policy. But the US has always faced diplomatic and foreign policy challenges and indifference from the French, especially in European matters.

In the backdrop of the two World Wars in Europe and role of Germany, the United States and other European countries, one of the strongest and prime motives behind the European integration or regionalism (at initial stage) was 'never again' should there be a war in Europe. The purpose of the aforementioned background about the two World Wars in Europe was to understand its impact on European integration as the consequences of these two World Wars were the major motive behind the European integration during the 1950s. Under the tremendous tragedies and infrastructure devastation, European political leadership and visionaries had come with an idea of community method of government at the European level.

The coal and steel industries were the main force behind the arms industry during these two World Wars. So the founding fathers (like Adenauer, Italian Alcide De Gasperi or the Frenchman Robert Schuman) of the European Coal and Steel Community shared the logic that if arch rival France and Germany come together to share responsibility for the coal and steel industries which is critical in building war economy then the future war could be prevented. The logic contributed in creation of ECSC in 1952 and European Community in 1957. With a vision to develop a system of governance and instrument to avoid war in future was at the centre of the discussion and leading up to the Treaty of Rome in 1957.

The European Community in 1957 and the US led NATO in 1949 has provided the context in which West Germany was able to return to a seat with the international community after the horror of the Holocaust on German land during Hitler's dictatorship. Cameron (2005) has argued that "until unification in 1991 Germany was content to take a back seat to the US on security matters and to France on EU matters. Germany was a *Musterknabe* (model boy) of the EU and one of the strongest supporters of a federal Europe. This approach began to change under the chancellorship of Gerhard Schroeder and accelerated under Angela Merkel. Germany began to play a more assertive role in defending its national interests. A further boost

to Germany's leadership role was provided by the 2008-09 financial crises that shook the EU to its foundations. It swiftly became apparent that only Germany had the financial and economic muscle to rescue the debt-laden members of the euro-zone" (Cameron 2005: 7).

Even after the 70 years of the Second World War, the biggest change in Europe is that hard power is hold less significance today and diplomacy and multilateralism has become key platforms to address their differences. The numbers in Europe's armed forces have been dramatically reduced since the end of the Cold War and despite Russian incursions into Ukraine in 2016, there is little or no appetite to increase numbers. Today the international system has moved from a hegemonic system based on the United States military and economic power to a more multi-polar world.

This change in international system has put challenges to Europe and particularly Germany as the region (Western Europe) had enjoyed United States security umbrella after the Second World War. The geo-strategic interests of United States have also changed and the European Union is also going through certain changes and challenges including refugee crisis in 2016 and Brexit in 2017 where Britons have voted against remaining in the European Union. In these circumstances, Germany's role in the European Union has become more critical and decisive along with France's partnership. "But as the world moves from a hegemonic system based on the US hyper-power to a more multi-polar world this will have serious consequences for Germany and Europe.....Berlin should play a political/military role commensurate with its economic and financial power..... as the leader of Europe, Germany again has a key role to play. It has also profited hugely from the EU and thus has a moral duty to ensure the continued success of the European project" (Cameron 2010: 8).

### **The Federal Republic of Germany's Foreign Policy and European integration**

Federal Republic of Germany's foreign policy has been influenced by the two World Wars. After the World War II in 1945, FRG under Chancellor Adenauer's leadership has pursued more accommodative and less assertive foreign policy approach at European and international level. Post World Wars German support to European integration has become fundamentals of its foreign policy rationale. The FRG's constitution has ensured West German commitment to the European integration and

strong trans-Atlantic relationship. Another important factor of West German foreign policy after the Second World War was a multilateral approach towards international issues. This understanding of foreign policy means that national interest must be pursued through multilateral forums and international organization consulting with other member states and allies in Europe. Another pillar of West German foreign policy has been its total westward orientation during the Cold War. If we analyse with realist perspective then it shows that the westward orientation of West German foreign policy was to regain faith of Western European countries which has benefitted West Germany economically and later politically in form of German reunification.

The Franco-German cooperation has been a guiding framework for West German foreign policy aftermath of the war. The West German foreign policy of reconciliation with France was meant to have not only reconciliation with France but also to integration West Germany within European integration process cooperating with France. "Germany and France played a leading part in this process since the convincing reconciliation between the two European core states formed the basis of a peaceful European community and set an example for other member States. The German-French "engine" was propelled not only by ideas and political figures and leadership but also by the anticipation and realisation of the European peace project in Franco-German relations" (Friedrich Elbert Stiftung 2007: 9).

After German reunification in 1990, this characteristic of German foreign policy intertwined with European integration has been incorporated firmly in German Basic law or constitution. It senses that bases establishing a united Europe, the Federal Republic of Germany shall participate in the development of the European Union. German foreign policy is active both in and from Europe.

At the same time, Germany also has an effect on Europe by pursuing national goals and interests, through this framework and the powers concentrated in it, in the traditional areas of foreign, security and development policy. The European Union, therefore, acts as a booster for German interests in nearly all policy areas and thus as a tool of German foreign policy. The EU's dual nature as the goal and tool of German foreign policy makes the workings of German European policy complex and often difficult to grasp.



The Federal Republic of Germany during the Cold War and later unified Germany has taken leadership within European multilateral and institutional framework as its foreign policy goals to initiate certain development in European integration process. For example, the Schengen area, is the product of a bilateral German-French initiative; Single European Act in 1986 is a prime example of Kohl-Mitterrand's leadership; the design of the Economic and Monetary Union, especially the role of the European Central Bank, was decisively influenced by German leadership; and the European Security and Defense Policy was launched during the German presidency in 1999. The change of government in 1998 after long Kohl's chancellorship and Gerhard Schroder has become the Chancellor; later his initiatives have confirmed that the commitment to Europe is a constant factor for all German governments during the Cold War and after the unification. Chancellor Merkel's first two tenure, Germany has pushed Lisbon Treaty in 2010 to strengthen democracy within the European Union and hard fought negotiations to save euro during the economic crisis in 2008 onwards are examples where German foreign policy has been towards strengthening European integration.

### **The Federal Republic of Germany and European Integration**

At the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949, this outcome looked extremely unlikely. Its future trajectory appeared more likely to be one of renewed instability. The defeat during the Second World War in 1945 resulted in the division of Germany which has lost substantial part of its territory. The Berlin was under four post-World War power and could not be the capital of the Federal Republic of Germany. The newly created West Germany was with decentralisation of power away from earlier federal government structure. West Germany has adopted institutionally plural separation of powers, become a state without a centre seemingly lacked the capacity to deal with the challenges of post World War dislocation and reconstruction. The residual powers of the wartime allies left West Germany with minimal capacity to act externally and the foreign policy was under the US guidance. Immediately after the World War II, West Germany was facing weak central institutions, guilt and humiliation of Holocaust and defeat, the scale of the economy was at challenging level, infrastructure and reconstruction seemed difficult at the point.

But among aforementioned challenges, the Federal Republic quickly emerged as a state so notable for stability that it became seen as a model for liberal democracy internally and externally after a decade only. The grounds for this transformation are multiple, but a number stand out. As Jeffery and Paterson (2003) pointed out, “first and foremost, the geopolitical competition between the Soviet Union and the United States gave the US a vital interest in the stabilisation of West Germany. This was reflected in a security guarantee and the encouragement that the United States government gave to the development of joint fora, especially those of European integration, which would make acceptable an increase in the capacity of the federal government to act externally. Internally the fear of the perceived expansionist ambitions of the Soviet Union subdued the nationalist aspirations of the large refugee population and underlined the new state's Western orientation. Second, the shaming and total nature of the defeat of Nazism in 1945, combined with a fear of communism perpetuated by the rival German Democratic Republic, helped internally to truncate the ideological spectrum and to support the emergence of a politics of centrality” (Jeffery and Paterson 2003: 59).

West Germany was the driving force with France in the creation of the European Communities, and afterwards, its role has just increased in strengthening European integration process under the leadership of its Chancellors. The West German economic miracle made the country the strongest economy of the continent and the firm economic supporter of the integration. West Germany also supported the newborn European Defense Community and other proposals for deeper integration. The European integration project was fully intertwined with West German foreign policy during the Cold War, as it has been explained in the foreign policy of West Germany section of the Chapter. During the first phase of European integration, West Germany wanted to forget its past, WW II, the Nazi regime's atrocities, and the best way was by joining international organisations. Normalisation of external relations was a priority, and the European Communities the best way to deal on equal terms with France, and afterwards the United Kingdom. For an example as The Treaty of Rome was a clear example of this where West Germany accepted the costly Common Agricultural Policy because of diplomatic pressure from France. Nevertheless, West Germany had an economy based on exports, and the common market gave the German economic actors free access to the European markets, something very

important for its economy even today. But the growing confidence of the Federal Republic of Germany after the Second World War was not possible without the visionary leadership and guidance of its first Chancellor Konrad Adenauer.

Under the leadership of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, West Germany has the challenge to regain 'European trust' after the Second World War and he envisioned economic progress and multilateral institutionalism to re-pose the European faith in West Germany. Konrad Adenauer's economic model/Modell Deutschland of economic governance and social cohesion became a success story for others war torn European states to emulate. It was a relative relationship between growing economic strength of the Federal Republic of Germany and European integration process. In the creation of this stable, liberal-democratic path for the Federal Republic, European integration played a central role. At the same time, growing economic power of the Federal Republic of Germany along with France has given a push to the European Community during the Cold War. An export oriented economic structure gave West Germany a fundamental interest in the creation of frameworks for opening up international trade at the European level which would allow other European states, especially France, to gain sufficient confidence in the Federal Republic to lift post-war discriminatory provisions. The same relative relationship between the Federal Republic of Germany and European integration has been explained as Bulmer and Paterson (1987) has argued that "without European integration as a political arena of cooperation West German economic performance would have been perceived as a threat. Participation in European multilateral fora was complemented and deepened by the development of a privileged bilateral relationship with the European state which had originally been keenest to limit the external capacity of the Federal Republic" (Bulmer and Paterson 1987: 7).

The one among other pillars of the West German foreign policy was reconciliation with historical arch rival France. The post World War reconciliation with France was necessary for West Germany to regain 'European trust' and integrate into the Western European community. This Franco-German engine has become a vehicle for collective action bilaterally and in multilateral for which made growth in West German economic capacity acceptable at European level with positive credibility. It has also led to the growing acceptance and faith in West Germany. As the Bulmer and

Paterson have further argued that “the consensus on the desirability of European integration became a central element in the general political consensus that developed in the Federal Republic. It was largely perceived as part of a virtuous circle that transformed the Federal Republic into a stable, liberal-democratic state embedded at the heart of a wider (West) European stability” (Bulmer and Paterson 1987: 7).

Another factor of Chancellor Adenauer and subsequent West German Chancellor’s approach to the European integration was not to articulate West German interests in national terms and pursue them unilaterally, but rather as multilateral or European interests shared with others and pursued in partnership, in particular with France and occasionally also with other West European states. “This leadership avoidance reflex was underpinned by the institutional pluralism of domestic politics. Institutional pluralism further limited the capacity of the Federal Republic to pursue any kind of consistent, national grand strategy in European arenas; European policy making was shaped by the dynamics of a highly sectorised and weakly coordinated ministerial apparatus in central government and in time fragmented further by the territorial dimension of German federalism and the role of key public institutions like the Bundesbank” (Jeffery and Paterson 2003: 59). This is not to argue that the Federal Republic of Germany has not exerted its power at the European level. The expression of West Germany’s power at the European level was based on multilateralism, deliberation, and soft persuasion on any European issues. There are instances when the Federal Republic of Germany has exerted its presence and power at the European decision making by adopting the multilateral approach. “The classic examples have included the role of German actors public and private in standard setting in the European Single Market programme; the impact of the Bundesbank model in providing the parameters for monetary policy at the European level from the European Monetary System through to Economic and Monetary Union; the impact of the German Lander from the mid 1980s in securing recognition for the regional level in EU decision-making. At times, this form of influence had to be lubricated by ratcheting up the German contribution to the EU budget in the form of side payments, which were deployed to line up the preferences of other member states in a direction congenial to the Federal Republic. In some fields, notably social partnership in industrial relations and the commitment to a high-standard (and high cost) social state, German actors had little success in replicating the German model at the European

level” (Jeffery and Paterson 2001: 42). So before dwelling into Federal Republic of Germany’s chancellors’ leadership role for the European integration process in detail, the two factors are important to understanding West Germany’s approach to the European integration under its chancellors from 1952 to till date. First understanding West German foreign policy in the Cold War context and the second is ideological positions of German political parties on European integration process.

### **German Political Parties and European Integration**

The available literature on the German domestic political parties approach to the European integration has been consistent with pro-integration stand. The German political parties with little differences in the approach have shared common goals for European unity since 1945. FRG governments during the Cold War and coalition partners in German Government after the re-unification have supported federal integration and a free economy in a common market within Europe. The change of government or its coalition partners didn't alter the German approach towards European integration process. Wimmel and Edwards (2011) have argued that "this stability is evident in the small influence that changes of government have had on basic decisions towards European politics, which on the whole have remained stable irrespective of the distribution of roles in the political system. Although certain differences between European policy conceptions do exist, a detailed examination of the parties reveals no significant changes of direction or conflicts regarding EU politics since the beginning of the European integration process” (Wimmel and Edwards 2011: 293).

From the beginning, an influential political party in Germany, Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its tall leader Konrad Adenauer has been strong support of European integration. Paterson (1996) argued, “beginning with the leadership of Konrad Adenauer, the CDU has been one of the staunchest advocates of the European project, consistently endorsing European integration with little to no internal dispute.” ( Paterson 1996: 295). Christian Democrats as a party and as a government since the 1950s have participated in European institutions building and advancement.

Table: German Political Parties and their Positions on European Integration.

S. No.	Name of the Major Political Party	Political Position	Party's Position on European Integration
1	Christlich Demokratische Union/ Christian Democratic Union (CDU)	Centre Right	The CDU has always been a staunch supporter of the European integration. The party under the leadership of Chancellors, Konrad Adenauer, Helmut Kohl and Angela Merkel has forwarded the European integration agenda.
2	Christlich Soziale Union in Bayern/Christian Social Union (CSU)	Centre Right	CSU has always backed European integration and EU decision but with certain reservations as CSU had differences towards political integration of the European Community with its sister party CDU.
3	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands / Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD)	Centre Left	The party has supportive line and proponent of European integration, especially Willy Brandt's and Gerhard Schroeder's role during their tenure as the Chancellor.
4	Freie Demokratische Partei/ Free Democratic Party (FDP)	Centre to Centre Right	Ideological very close to idea of integration with sharing affinity with multilateralism and liberalism. The party shares ideological affinity with European integration as supports common and free trade and market.
5	Buendnis 90/Die Gruenen or Green Party/Alliance 90 (Greens)	Centre Left	After being partner in Red-Green coalition from 1998, the party developed a pro European integration profile. Joschka Fishcer, foreign minister in the coalition advanced the pro European stand of the party.
6	Die Linke/The Left (LINKE)	Left	The Left is critical of free market, open economy and sometimes not much pro-integration. Although left party leadership has maintained that the party is not against the idea of integration in principle, it is against the prevailing model of an elite-led economic project based on a free market economy.
7	Alternative fuer Deutschland/ Alternative for Germany	Right	Euro-scepticism, German right wing Nationalism, Conservative.

The party under the leadership of Chancellors, Konrad Adenauer, Helmut Kohl and Angela Merkel has forwarded the European integration agenda in line with the Federal Republic's foreign policy cooperating with France. But there have been instances where the CDU's Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU) had differences towards political integration of the European Community and disassociated itself from CDU's official position on European integration. Nevertheless, the CSU has always backed important EU decisions by a clear majority, so that a split between the two parties over European affairs has thus far been prevented. But at large the goal of re-united Germany within a multilateral framework of integrated Europe has been shared by these parties.

Another major German political party the Social Democratic Party (SPD) has also been pro-European integration. During 1950-60s the party had intense debate and deliberation to frame the party position on European integration. Through internal deliberation, the party has adopted a supportive line and became the proponent of European integration. But "despite its longstanding role as the largest opposition party, the SPD never used Euroscepticism as a tactical instrument to win over the population. On the contrary, it readily supported the general German consensus on European affairs.....the period under the chancellorship of Gerhard Schroder was characterised by pragmatism towards EU politics" (Wimmel and Edwards 2011: 295).

Another German political party based on the idea of classical liberalism, the Free Democratic Party (FDP) shared the ideological affinity to the multilateralism and liberalism of European integration. The FDP had certain reservations against European Community when Treaty of Rome was introduced but later supported it. The party's ideology of liberalism and core of the European integration resembles each other. The core values of European integration such as the creation of a free trade area across the national boundaries, rule of law, human rights and institutional multilateralism coincide with FDP's classical liberal stand. About the Green party and its approach to European integration as Ludger (1998) has argued that "EU politics initially had little significance in the political objectives of the Greens and later of Alliance 90/The Greens. Indeed, for a long time, there was no consistent party opinion on key European policy issues. It was only in view of possible government participation, which could be realised within a Red-Green coalition from 1998

onwards, that Alliance 90/The Greens developed a clear pro-European profile” (Ludger 1998: 295). The Green party’s leader Joschka Fischer who was vice chancellor and also foreign minister during the Schroder’s chancellorship has advanced the party’s pro-European stand in a speech at Humboldt University, Berlin on 12 May 2000. In the speech, Joschka Fischer (2000) has justified the vision of a federation of European nation states and cleared official party line of the Green regarding European integration. Although the Green’s occasionally has criticised the certain European Union’s policies and regulations but never deviated from the pro-integration approach.

The Left party in Germany which has generally deviated from the pro-integration line compare to other German political parties. The ideological basis of PDS/Left List, today’s left party made the leadership critical of free market, open economy and sometimes not much pro-integration. “Since its entry into the Bundestag in 1990, the PDS/Left Party has held true to its socialist/anti-capitalistic doctrine, denouncing the free market dominance of the integration process and criticising the ‘militarisation’ of the reunified Federal Republic under the cloak of the EU common foreign and security policy” (Dunphy 2004:296). Although left party leadership has maintained that the party is not against the idea of integration in principle, it is against the prevailing model of an elite-led economic project based on a free market economy.

### **The West German Chancellors and European Integration**

Europe has dominated world affairs for centuries. But after the Second World War, the international situation has changed dramatically for the European states. Germany, a former power, was devastated, the UK, then still the biggest colonial empire of the world, could not compete with other states and was declining in terms of military and economic power. France, another colonial power, faced similar problems to the United Kingdom. The end of the Second World War led to the decline of European powers' role in the international system which was now dominated by two main powers, the USSR and the USA and no European country could contest for the dominance in international system during the Cold War. Some parts of Central and Eastern Europe were within the orbit of the Soviet influence, while Western Europe was under influence of the US. The decolonization process meant the loss of influence of the former colonial powers as they could not afford to challenge the new super



powers and hold their colonies intact, and these territories became another arena of the Cold War. In the backdrop of changing the international system and changing power equation in Europe after WW II, European integration process started. The European integration process should be understood in this context of the Cold War, besides its primary target of creating a peace system, firstly as a way to strengthen the Western European states towards the threat of international communism and secondly as a way to recover the former influence of European states in world affairs through unity. As Troitino (2013) argued that “the situation was difficult because the division of Germany into two new states was a fact, and the USA wanted a strong West Germany as the main possible battlefield of the Cold War in the European territory. The Allies had been discussing the issue of the Ruhr area, the industrial centre of Germany and an area rich in mineral resources such as coal. Some of them just wanted to have an international area there, taking away German sovereignty to avoid a new reviving of the German threat, others wanted to use it for their own economic benefit to forcing Germany to pay economic war compensations, but all these options meant a weak Germany” (Troitino 2013: 18).

Then Jean Monnet presented his plan of an integrated community to Schuman, who adopted it; it was published in what we know today as the Schuman declaration. After the Schuman declaration, the agreement was soon signed in 1951 in Paris creating the European Coal and Steel Community with France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Netherlands as its founding member states. The inclusion of France and Germany was the centre of the community as a way to end the confrontation between both countries. Also, both were the leading countries of Europe in terms of economy and population besides the UK. The history of European integration afterwards has been explained in the previous chapter. The focus of the chapter is to discuss Germany's role in European integration under the leadership of its Chancellors during the Cold War and after the reunification of Germany. Before explaining German Chancellors' individual leadership role in European integration, it is imperative to explore backdrop in which Chancellors led European integration process such as the existing international scenario and operating West German and later united German foreign policy, role of West German political parties and role of external factors such as the United States and USSR.

## **Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's leadership (1949-63) and the FRG's approach to European integration**

Among all the West German Chancellors after the Second World War, Konrad Adenauer has faced tough internal and external conditions as the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany. He was in the office from 1949-63, changed the face and conditions of post Second World War West Germany and European history more than any other political leader in the recent history of Germany. Like many other politicians of his generation, Adenauer had already realised following the First World War that lasting peace could only be achieved through a united Europe. His experiences during the Third Reich and under the dictatorship of Hitler served to confirm this opinion.

The international settings amidst of the Cold War was getting complex and Europe was the focal point of this confrontation between the two super powers, USA and USSR. The European integration efforts were part of this ongoing Cold War politics and also the result of this international compulsion where US has played an important role in the integration of Western Europe to meet the challenges posed by the USSR in Eastern European. Adenauer was aware of the existing world's political situation as he explained in his speech at the Grand Conference of Catholics in Brussels on 25 September 1955. He said "Soviet Russia is becoming more and more consolidated as a world Power founded on the principles of Communism and dictatorship.....a Communist Russia is bound to have this tendency in even greater measure than the Russia of the Czars.....in the course of the last few decades, the political and economic power of the free world has become more and more concentrated in the United States. I acknowledge in gratitude and admiration that the United States has been reunification aware of the responsibility which the possession of economic and political power entails.....Another factor pointing to a new political era in the world is the enormous contrast between the political and economic power of two countries of the world on the one hand and that of all the rest of the world on the other.....Another factor of great moment for world politics is the appearance, since 1945, of non-white peoples upon the scene of world events<sup>19</sup>".

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<sup>19</sup>[http://www.cvce.eu/obj/address\\_given\\_by\\_konrad\\_adenauer\\_on\\_continuing\\_european\\_integration\\_b\\_russels\\_25\\_september\\_1956-en-ea27a4e3-4883-4d38-8dbc-5e3949b1145d.htm](http://www.cvce.eu/obj/address_given_by_konrad_adenauer_on_continuing_european_integration_b_russels_25_september_1956-en-ea27a4e3-4883-4d38-8dbc-5e3949b1145d.htm)

Konrad Adenauer's vision for a prosperous and stable Federal Republic of Germany within European community was guided by the past and aforementioned global political realities. "Adenauer's experiences during the Second World War made him a political realist. His views on Germany's role in Europe were strongly influenced by the two World Wars and the century-long animosity between Germany and France. He, therefore, focused his attention on promoting the idea of pan-European cooperation. Adenauer was a great proponent of the European Coal and Steel Community, which was launched with the Schuman Declaration on 9 May 1950, and also the later treaty for the European Economic Community in March 1957. Adenauer's opinions on Europe were based on the idea that European unity was essential for lasting peace and stability"<sup>20</sup>. In the six years from 1949-55 Adenauer laid down the basis of FRG's foreign policy goals to bind West Germany's future with the western alliance: which has included membership of the Council of Europe (1951), Foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community (1952), and Germany's entry into NATO (1955). A cornerstone of Adenauer's foreign policy was reconciliation with France which was further strengthened in 1963 by the ratification of Elysee Treaty. Together with French President Charles de Gaulle, a historic turning point was achieved: in 1963 the one-time arch enemies Germany and France signed a treaty of friendship, which became one of the milestones to European integration. He managed to regain some sovereignty and trust for West Germany, by integrating the country with the emerging Euro-Atlantic community (NATO and the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation).

For his vision to integrate Europe and place West Germany within that multilateral framework of the European community, Adenauer has worked tirelessly for the reconciliation with arch rival France. Later, in 1963, The Élysée Treaty, also known as the Treaty of Friendship, set the seal on this reconciliation. With it, Germany and France established a firm foundation for relations that ended centuries of rivalry between them. "In 1963 the Federal Republic of Germany, led by its Christian Democrat Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, and the Republic of France, led by its conservative President Charles de Gaulle, signed the Élysée Treaty (hereafter, Treaty). According to the Treaty's own terms, one of its foremost goals consisted in

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<sup>20</sup> [http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/founding-fathers/pdf/konrad\\_adenauer\\_en.pdf](http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/founding-fathers/pdf/konrad_adenauer_en.pdf)

establishing mechanisms for closer bilateral coordination and cooperation between France and Germany in the fields of economic, foreign, and cultural policy before any decision was made, either at the national or at the international level” (Karagiannis 2013: 49). Adenauer’s faith in European integration project was not merely institutional but also people to people interaction and peaceful building of a Christiana Europe. In his speech at the Grand Conference of Catholics in Brussels on 25 September 1956, he said, “in my opinion the first stage of European integration has reached its goal: wars among the peoples of Europe are definitely a thing of the past. The period of inter-European wars is closed because, on the one hand, a sense of belonging together and of having common interests has become ingrained in the European peoples and because, on the other hand, the weapons of war have become so highly developed”<sup>21</sup>.

Konrad Adenauer's political leadership, his pragmatism and a clear vision for West Germany's role in a united Europe has guided his country to regain trust and place in post war Europe. Konrad Adenauer is one of the most remarkable figures in European history. European unity was to him not only about peace but also a way of reintegrating post-Nazi Germany into international life. Adenauer has set the foundation of West Germany’s cold war foreign policy and European policy which has been guiding united Germany’s foreign policy today. As the European Commission has also observed about the Adenauer that “Europe, as we know it today, would not have been possible without the confidence he inspired in other European states by means of his consistent foreign policy<sup>22</sup>”. The foundation laid by Adenauer to integrate West Germany in Euro-Atlantic community and security arrangements has provided the relatively normal condition to the next chancellor Erhard Ludwig so he could focus more on FRG’s domestic economy.

### **Chancellor Erhard Ludwig’s (1963-66) Social Market Economy and impact on European integration**

After the Adenauer, Erhard Ludwig has become the next Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1963. He has definitely enjoyed the legacy of Adenauer's

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<sup>21</sup>[http://www.cvce.eu/obj/address\\_given\\_by\\_konrad\\_adenauer\\_on\\_continuing\\_european\\_integration\\_brussels\\_25\\_september\\_1956-en-ea27a4e3-4883-4d38-8dbc-5e3949b1145d.html](http://www.cvce.eu/obj/address_given_by_konrad_adenauer_on_continuing_european_integration_brussels_25_september_1956-en-ea27a4e3-4883-4d38-8dbc-5e3949b1145d.html)

<sup>22</sup> [http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/founding-fathers/pdf/konrad\\_adenauer\\_en.pdf](http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/founding-fathers/pdf/konrad_adenauer_en.pdf)

leadership and visionary approach to the FRG's foreign policy and European policy. It has made Chancellor Erhard Ludwig devote more time to the domestic economic conditions. Erhard has made a significant contribution to the restructuring of the German economic system and to the birth of the *Wirtschaftswunder* or 'economic miracle'. It was the Chancellor who has popularised the term social market economy in West Germany. His aim was prosperity for all in a free society. As the Federal Chancellor, Erhard tried to encourage the socio-political acceptance of the social market economy. It was his hope that more understanding and information on economic issues would be able to prevent institutional order policy aberrations. From very early on, Erhard favoured a far reaching liberalisation of foreign trade in order to see West Germany becoming more deeply rooted in the world economy (foreign trade). It was Erhard Ludwig's tirelessly and sustained efforts that the principles of the market economy were taken into account in the process of European economic integration. The growing West German economy has also provided the impetus for the European economic and market integration which had indirectly led the foundation for the Single European Act of 1985 during the Kohl's chancellorship.

Ludwig Erhard has reviewed Konrad Adenauer's Chancellorship time and differentiated conditions facing his chancellery and offered his solutions to these prevailing situations. He has explained in his first policy statement after becoming the Chancellor on 18 October 1963 that West German policy must continue to focus on ending the Cold War and strengthening European and Atlantic cooperation. He cautioned against complacency and urges West Germans to continue exhibiting the drive that led to their economic success. He also warned against interest groups and called for policies that benefit all. The new federal government took office at a phase in world politics when changes in East-West relations were becoming apparent. Further, he added that "our policies must continue to be focused on helping to bring about an end to the Cold War, which the Soviets have been waging for one and a half decades, above all by refusing Germans in the Soviet zone their right to self-determination. Therefore, German policies, domestic and foreign, will always have to be internationally oriented and will have to be designed in a more liberal manner than ever before in our history. They will contribute to strengthening European and Atlantic cooperation, and in the process, they will remain ever conscious of the fateful importance of close cooperation and solidarity with all our allies" (Ludwig 1963: 1).

There is consensus among the scholars about the success of Erhard's economic policies but there are different opinions about his foreign and European policies. One argument is that the Ludwig Erhard went down in history as a key figure in the economic reconstruction of West Germany after World War II, but as a rather unsuccessful German Chancellor from 1963 to 1966. To some extent, Erhard's failures as chancellor are attributed to his ineffective steering of German foreign policy at a time of Franco American antagonism, and to his inept dealing with the 'option between Washington and Paris'. As Schoenborn (2014) has explained Erhard's dilemma between Federal Republic's two closest allies, the United States and France, "the background of Chancellor Erhard's dilemma between his two closest allies, the United States and France, was Charles de Gaulle's challenge of Washington's position as the sole leader of the West. Indeed, the French president aimed at a more independent 'European Europe' in which the European leaders would be less subordinated to American decisions and gradually shoulder their own responsibilities" (Schoenborn 2014: 378 ).

Amidst this mistrust between Paris and Washington, Erhard's stance was crucial in determining whether Gaullist plans found some European backing or not, especially since the envisaged European Europe (without the US) was to be built upon a Franco-German foundation. As West Germany's Minister of Economy (from 1949) and Vice-Chancellor (from 1957), in the early 1960s Erhard has publicly endorsed Adenauer's political course of close cooperation with France, albeit less exclusively than Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. Erhard has presented an outline of monetary union in 1964 and the ultimate goal was to form an 'Atlantic community' comprising all the Western European countries and especially their economies. Although Erhard Ludwig has endorsed the Adenauer's idea of foreign policy and European policy but there are examples where he has differed with his predecessor. For example, Ludwig has presented Franco-German reconciliation and friendship as major achievements of the two individuals. In late December 1962, he declared that this friendship was not dependent on Adenauer and demanded that it continue forever. On the economic level, Erhard's scepticism regarding France was more obvious. As a lifelong economist, Erhard contemplated world affairs in terms of economics rather than foreign policy. Erhard Ludwig was a successful chancellor in terms of West Germany's economic growth and introducing social market economy. But in short

span of the chancellorship, he was not too successful in the field of FRG's European policy as compared to his predecessor, Konrad Adenauer.

In short, Erhard Ludwig through strengthening West Germany with the social market based 'economic miracle' has reposed faith of Western European countries in FRG. This has also led to the economic contribution of West Germany in European Community with close cooperation with France and its role has increased in European integration process.

### **Chancellor Willy Brandt's (1969-74) Ostpolitik and European Integration**

Willy Brandt was the first post World War Chancellor from Social Democratic Party from 1969 to 1974. During his tenure, two major treaties he has signed, in the early 1970's, Willy Brandt signed the Treaty of Moscow with the Soviet Union, and in 1972 the Basic Treaty with the German Democratic Republic. These agreements marked the culmination of Brandt's *Ostpolitik*, which signalled a radical departure in the Federal Republic's policy toward the Eastern European countries. When Brandt had introduced the *Ostpolitik*, it was controversial in the Federal Republic of Germany at the time, but over the years come to be widely seen as an act of statesmanship by Brandt, who received the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts in 1971.

All the successive governments of West Germany have later pursued some variation of *Ostpolitik*, even as that has frequently led to strained relations between West Germany and its partners in both the European Community and in NATO. Willy Brandt acknowledged that certain flexibility in German foreign policy was needed in the 1970's to integrate West German foreign policy more towards East Europe. Because by the 1970s, West Germany has become the part of major European and Atlantic economic and security institutions, and its economy and polity were stable and there was the gradual diminishing of the trust deficit with neighbouring countries thanks to the previous West German chancellors.

Apart from aforementioned situations, Willy Brandt's achievements in foreign policy were not unproblematic. Although his *Ostpolitik* led to improvements in relations between the two Germanys, including mutual recognition, and also to an easing of the restrictions on families divided by the Cold War, the policy's wider impacts were far from positive. At the time it led to no small amount of tension within both NATO and

the European Community. It complicated West Germany's position within the alliance, while contributing little to the eventual ending of the Cold War. The prevailing Hallstein Doctrine, whereby the Federal Republic refused to recognize the existence of the German Democratic Republic and severed relations with those countries that recognized the latter (such as Yugoslavia in 1957) was clearly outmoded. Brandt was hardly alone in believing that a new vision of the Federal Republic's relations with its eastern neighbours was necessary.

The critique of *Ostpolitik* has marked that this it was a deviation from West Germany's Hallstein Doctrine (no official recognition to GDR). But it was Brandt's visionary *Ostpolitik* which has somewhere laid down the foundation of East-West integration after a decade and later the big bang European integration in 2004 of Eastern and Central European countries. Although there were other various major external and internal reasons for the reunification of Germany in 1989 and 2004 enlargement but somewhere Brandt's *Ostpolitik* has provided the historical basis and principle guidance for East-West European integration in 2004.

### **Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (1974-82) and European Integration**

“Helmut Schmidt . . . is certainly not likely to push the Federal Government in the direction of a more forward Western European policy. . . . He is not so much anti-European as agnostic about it. He is sceptical about the Community's ability to provide solutions to the immediate problems confronting Europe. He has an almost Prussian intolerance of its inefficiency and financial lackadaisicalness. His general aim will be to limit damage rather than to construct”<sup>23</sup>.

This perception about the Helmut Schmidt's approach to European integration was perceived as being reluctant and half-hearted towards European integration as quoted in British Foreign Office archives. However, his policies towards the European Community have been perceived differently by various scholars. Matthias Schulz (2004) similarly paints the picture of a reluctant European who only came to support

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<sup>23</sup> The National Archives, Public Record Office (Kew) [henceforward: TNA: PRO/] FCO33/2459, 'Diplomatic Report 184/74: Germany, Europe and the United States', 27 February 1974. Quoted in Haeussler, Mathias (2015), "A Cold War European? Helmut Schmidt and European Integration, c. 1945-82", *Cold War Histor*, 15(4): 427-447.



the integration process because of an alleged lack of American leadership under President Jimmy Carter after 1977. In Schulz's opinion, Schmidt had considered the European option only when the U.S. failed to respond to his initiatives, but after several setbacks gained the conviction that Europe had to be strengthened on the basis of Franco-German cooperation. Schmidt's European policies have later focused on the creation of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1978–79, often regarded as a departure from Schmidt's earlier convictions and reluctance about more integration in Europe.

Later, Schmidt's approach to the integration was based on pragmatic calculation. His European policies "were grounded in the overriding principle that European integration ultimately served Germany's self-interest, and displayed at least three distinctive features: first, the preference for pragmatic piecemeal integration in clearly defined areas resulting from Schmidt's awareness of the growing economic interdependencies in the post-war world; second, an internationalist conviction based on the need to bind post-war West-Germany firmly and permanently into multilateral Western alliances and finally, the attempt to constantly balance Germany's relations with France and the United States"(Haeussler 2015: 429). Thus, Schmidt's early preference for pragmatic, piecemeal cooperation over more ambitious schemes of European integration is again clearly detectible, since he has regarded the essentially intergovernmental coordination of European economic policies as the European Community most urgent task. Helmut Schmidt has focused more on strengthening European institutions. After all, the most important result of Schmidt's early European policy was the institutionalisation of regular meetings between EC heads of government in the form of European Council, organised strictly along intergovernmental lines.

Table: German Chancellors and developments to the European Integration

Name of the German Chancellor	Developments to the European Integration During Their Chancellorship
Konrad Adenaur (1949-63)	Founding Father of European Coal and Steel Community in 1952, laid down basis of West German Foreign Policy, West German Membership of European Council in 1951, NATO membership in 1955, The Berlin Wall built in 1961, The Elysee Treaty with arch-rival France in 1963.
Erhard Ludwig (1963-66)	<i>Wirtschaftswunder</i> or ‘economic miracle’ economic transformation of FRG as social market economy, in 1964 presented outline of European Monetary Union.
Willy Brandt (1969-74)	Known for his approach to Eastern Europe called as <i>Ostpolitik</i> , Won Nobel Peace Prize in 1971 for his <i>Ostpolitik</i> .
Helmut Schmidt (1974-82)	Creation of European Monetary System in 1978-79.
Helmut Kohl (1982-98)	The longest serving Chancellor, The Shengen Agreement in 1985, The Single European Act in 1986, The fall of Berlin Wall in 1989, The Treaty of Maastricht in 1992.
Gerhard Schroeder (1998-2005)	Germany cut the budget contribution to the EU, Germany joining US led War on Terror in 2001, Central and Eastern European countries joining EU in 2004, The failure of the Constitution Treaty in 2005.
Angela Merkel (2005- continue)	Agreement on EU budget for 2007-13, The Eurozone Crisis in 2009-10, the Lisbon Treaty in 2010, The Refugee Crisis in 2015-16, The Brexit in 2016.

He, therefore, regarded the European Council as a necessary element in the EC's reform and revitalisation. “Let us not waste time on sterile philosophical disputes about a federal or a confederated Europe’, he claimed in his Foreign Affairs Club speech, ‘and also let us not rouse expectations which cannot be fulfilled”<sup>24</sup>. Helmut Schmidt emphasised the importance of European integration and economic stability in modern market economies. At the same time, he underlined his scepticism over the fact that too many countries from Eastern Europe were to be integrated at the same time.....Schmidt would have preferred several smaller steps of eastern EU enlargement, taking on board only a few countries at the same point of time. As regards EU integration, the former German chancellor was quite convinced that too fast an eastern enlargement was as much a major problem as the lack of monetary integration in the EU” (Welfens 2015: 3).

<sup>24</sup> BPA, ‘Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in London’, 6 February 1976. [copy in PHSA/EA, 29.1.-12.3.1976]. Quoted in Haeussler, Mathias (2015), “A Cold War European? Helmut Schmidt and European Integration, c. 1945-82”, *Cold War Histor*, 15(4): 427-447

## **Post-Unification German Chancellors and European Integration**

### **Chancellor Helmut Kohl (1982-98) and European Integration**

Helmut Kohl the chancellor who came into office after Helmut Schmidt been one of the most important politicians in Germany since the end of WW II and was Chancellor from 1982 to 1998. Since the end of the war, Kohl has held the position of Chancellor more times than any other politician, almost two years more than Konrad Adenauer, the first Chancellor, from 1949 to 1963. During his tenure, Germany got re-united. As Troitino (2013) has argued that “one of the main achievements of Kohl was making the world believe that the Germans had changed and was no longer a threat to collective security, which restored trust from the international community to Germany. German reunification had many obstacles, and most people believed it impossible to achieve; Kohl was a great advocate of it, and even more, he thought that it was a German issue that should be done by Germans” (Troitino 2013: 187).

Kohl had occupied as head of government in Bonn, making him, in fact, a kind of honorary Chancellor of the Community; any new measure had to be approved first of all by Germany and France, they were the clear motor of European integration. As an example, the Schengen agreement, a bilateral international agreement signed between France and Germany for the free movement of people outside the European Communities treaties or laws. Later, other countries joined the agreement, which afterwards became a part of the European Union. Mitterrand and Kohl also had a very close relationship, and their initiatives were crucial to the current shape of the European Union, the Treaty of Maastricht being the main consequence of their agreements, and hence the common currency or political cooperation. They also became allies against the pressures from Margaret Thatcher, establishing a long term relationship between both countries as the heart of Europe. Equal and peaceful relations between both France and Germany have been the most notable achievement of European integration, and the possibility of war between them seems impossible nowadays. This has been seen as a major contribution of Chancellor Helmut Kohl to European integration and he has been regarded as the father of European integration.

The classic example of leadership’s role of Helmut Kohl in European integration is the Single European Act of 1986, which was pushed forward by Chancellor Helmut

Kohl and his French counterpart Mitterrand. Kohl was the biggest supporter of European integration who also believed in close cooperation between France and Germany, but in a difference with Mitterrand, “as the motor of integration, never as a brake to integration or a relationship led by national interest. His ideas about Europe were closer to a European federation” (Troitino 2013: 189). The main achievement of the act was the creation of the internal Market, a common market among the members of the European Communities. It was based on the four basic rules: free movement of goods, capital, services, and labour. It meant the creation of a European market with common rules, duties, and rights for the economic agents within the Europe.

Helmut Kohl believed profoundly in German reunification and in European integration as parts of the same process, and the creation of the European Union could not have been done without the support of the USA, or at least the positive attitude of Washington. The European Union was also a consequence of the end of the Cold War. German reunification was an important milestone in the political career of Helmut Kohl because of obvious German internal reasons, but it also had huge importance in the European Union. The role of the German Chancellor in the negotiations with the European powers was decisive and can just be understood in the context of the European Union. Margaret Thatcher and Mitterrand were against the reunification of Germany because they thought it could alter the balance of power established after WW II. A reunited Germany would be more populous than its partners in the EU, more powerful economically if the German economic miracle were going to be repeated, something assumed as a fact, and more influential politically because of its geopolitical position towards the ex-communist states of Central and Eastern Europe. Kohl had to deal with the resistance of France and the United Kingdom to unblock reunification, but he counted on the support of the USA. So Helmut Kohl along with French leadership achieved the Single European Act, reunification of Germany and later Maastricht treaty which has changed the face of the European community and established the European Union with the single currency. Although the fall of the Soviet Union and its domestic economic fallout, shifting geo-political interest of the United States and diminishing bi-polarity of the world were also the reason behind the aforementioned events in European integration.

## **Gerhard Schroder (1998-2005) and European Integration**

The Schroder-Fischer government continued the tradition of previous governments and gave the process of European integration an important intellectual impetus. Joschka Fischer's speech at Humboldt University paved the way for a debate on the European Constitution, which Gerhard Schroder in his speech to the 2001 SPD party conference linked to Europe's enlargement in an exemplary way. He emphasised the economic advantages for the EU as a whole and for Germany in particular and called for citizens to be involved more closely in European decision-making.

German European policy under Schroder with a different backdrop despite continuing a European policy of decisions for the good of the community and voicing its support for deepening the Union, a change took place in German European policy under the Red-Green government. "Firstly, financial resources for German policy decreased due to the extra burden of German reunification and weaker economic growth, combined with higher unemployment. This led to a reduction in Germany's opportunities for implementing new policies in the EU or complying with existing rules, such as the Stability and Growth Pact. Second, the German Lander in particular, but also the parliament, increasingly re-claimed the room for manoeuvre the executive had gained through the transfer of sovereignty to the EU and the accompanying co-decision making powers. Now more actors are involved in European policy, and decision-making processes in Germany have become more complicated. Thirdly, the cross-party consensus on pushing forward with European integration has waned. Turkey's membership application split both major parties: while the CDU uses arguments about geography and values to block Turkey's full membership, the SPD argues in favour of an accession policy geared more to strategic issues. German interests were always been parallel to European integration process and interests. Germany always showed a willingness to walk extra miles to strengthen European integration process and finance its budget as it was directly linked to its national interests. Schroder and Fischer's government moved from a more ideal relationship between European integration and German relations to a pragmatic approach. "This changed under Schroeder and Fischer; German European policy was now also designed to achieve measurable results in line with German interests and was viewed much more in terms of a cost-benefit analysis. This new style was demonstrated in the conflicts with

France over the Agenda 2000, the majority rule in the EU Constitution and the Common Agricultural Policy, as well as more recently in the watering down of CO2 emission limits for cars. Berlin, together with France, also acted as a blocking force in Europe, for instance for the End-of-Life Vehicle Directive, the safeguard clauses after the 2004 enlargement and above all the weakening of the Stability and Growth Pact” (Wimmel and Edwards 2011: 297).

After the end of the Second World War, West Germany under its Chancellors has pursued a pro-European integration approach linking with its foreign policy. The foreign policy has two basis, first reconciliation with France and second serving West German national interest within European multilateral framework. From Chancellor Adenauer to Kohl and after re-unification Chancellor Schroder has advanced Germany's role in European integration as being the most populous and economic powerful country in the European Union today. Chancellor Angela Merkel, who has become the Chancellor in 2005, has taken the leadership of Germany and showed leadership in a crisis such as Euro-zone crisis, integration issues and refugee crisis in 2016. Her policy decisions and approaches towards these European crises have made a defining impact on European integration process which has been discussed in details in the next chapter.

## **Chancellor Angela Merkel's Leadership and Problems of European Integration, 2005-2013**

### **Background**

On May 22, 2005, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder from Social Democratic Party has surprisingly announced that he would seek early federal election in coming September 2005, a year ahead of scheduled next federal election. Gerhard Schroeder's announcement of the early federal election was followed the resounding defeat suffered by his party, Social Democrats (SPD) in the state election in North Rhine Westphalia which was a traditional SPD's political stronghold. This was the most recent in a string of state election losses that had given the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) led by Angela Merkel at the time, firm control of the German Bundesrat (upper house of Bundestag/Parliament). The series of state election loss, seeking no confidence motion in Bundestag by Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and growing strength of opposition party in the upper house of the Bundestag has forced Gerhard Schroeder to ask for the federal election before its scheduled time.

A grand coalition government of Germany's two largest parties, the Christian Democrat Union/Christian Socialist Union (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) led by CDU candidate Angela Merkel took office on November 22, 2005, after the German federal election of September 18, 2005, had produced no clear winner. The marginal defeat of the Gerhard Schroeder's led SPD was a credit to the failure of certain domestic economic and social welfare policies of the government. During the Gerhard Schroeder's second tenure of chancellorship (2002-2005), the German economy was sluggish and suffering from high unemployment. The people's concerns about welfare and labour reforms, both enacted and planned, were widely seen as principal reasons for the SPD defeat. So the second term of Schroeder's chancellorship was domestically characterised as a phase of German political and economic stagnation. The unemployment marked five million, growth rate remained sluggish and national debt had increased.

The Red-Green coalition (SPD and Green Party coalition) of Gerhard Schroeder has introduced an economic reform programme 'Agenda 2010' in 2003 to address the problems of unemployment and boost economic growth rate by introducing tax reforms, greater labour market flexibility and consolidating the public finance. The Agenda 2010 reforms prompted no quick improvement to the economy and led to all-time lows for the SPD in the opinion polls and heavy defeats in regional elections. The SPD lost control of the chancellor's home state of Lower Saxony in 2003, suffered a convincing defeat in Hamburg in 2004 and was ousted in Schleswig Holstein in spring 2005 and finally defeat in the federal election in September 2005.

Chancellor Angela Merkel led new government or grand coalition of CDU-SPD represents a significant change in German federal power structure. A woman is leading Germany for the first time in German political history. Also for the first time, a political leader from the former German Democratic Republic (East Germany) has wielded unprecedented influence, holding the chancellorship and a number of other key positions. Some election observer has also stressed that the election result has also confirmed the end of decades of post-World War two German consensus that in the past has given German politics a great deal of predictability and stability. Domestically, the most difficult and crucial area for the newly elected Chancellor Angela Merkel was to immediately address social and economic issues which had defeated the Gerhard Schroeder's government in 2005 federal election. The success of the coalition was not only needed for Germany, but it was also for Europe and global economic scenario.

Both the coalition partners of the newly formed government were on the common platform when it comes to the fundamentals of German foreign policy which includes multilateralism in solving European and international issues, cooperation with France and Germany within institutional set up of European Union. In 2005, USA along with its NATO partners (including Germany) was engaged in Afghanistan. France was traditionally pursuing European integration with less external interference specially the United States. So amidst aforementioned external conditions, it was challenging for Chancellor Angela Merkel to make a balance with traditional strong Franco-German cooperation within the EU and closer ties with the United Kingdom. She has



indicated to pursue European integration as a corollary rather than in opposition to the transatlantic partnership.

Traditionally, German Chancellor has the dominant voice on foreign policy issues regardless of which party holds the Federal Foreign Office. Former Chancellor Schroeder prided himself with having returned Germany to “normalcy” among nations, a country like others that acts and speaks out in its own national self-interest and is less hesitant to seek influence commensurate with its size and economic strength. He has pursued distinctly German interests in bilateral relations, in the European Union, and on broader international issues. However, the newly formed Chancellor Angela Merkel government’s first-year priority was to address the pressing domestic economic issues and problems. But in terms of foreign policy arena, Angela Merkel is already seen as bringing some changes in style and substance. The Merkel's foreign policy approach in her first term of chancellorship was less combative but more pragmatic compared to her predecessors. German foreign policy was also shaped largely by domestic developments. German influence in the world is likely to depend on its ability to restore its own economic vitality in 2005. She has indicated after the winning her first term that she will be sensitive to the interests of smaller EU member countries, especially the newer Central European members and European integration process would be complemented by the strong transatlantic partnership. She has also indicated that her positions on issues such as the failed EU constitutional treaty, the budget, and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) are similar to those of Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder.

The European integration has long been a fundamental element of German foreign policy and also the instrument through which Berlin seeks to play an influential role in Europe and the world without raising concerns among the neighbouring countries of being hegemonic. Germany has always championed the European integration and enlargement of European Union as it is deeply intertwined with German national interests. For an example, in 2005 the Constitution Treaty was overwhelmingly supported by the German Bundestag although the treaty was later rejected by the French and Dutch parliaments.

After the failure of the Constitutional Treaty, it was felt at European level that a strong and decisive leadership is required to regain the momentum of European

integration. So it was hoped that the newly elected Chancellor Angela Merkel will play a more decisive leadership role by once again Germany becoming the honest broker of competing for EU interests, as Chancellor Merkel appears to have done at the December 2005 EU summit.

“German leadership is seen as necessary. The country has traditionally been the engine of EU economic growth and political development. Germany is the largest contributor to the EU budget and other EU members account for almost 50% of Germany’s trade. Germany’s ability to fully exercise its EU leadership will depend on the success of its efforts to stimulate domestic economic growth. If it fails, Germany may be a drag on the other EU economies. Germany has been a primary supporter of the EU’s further enlargement to the east as a means to ensure political and economic stability on Germany’s eastern border. Germany sees its prosperity as tied to the fortunes of a new member and candidate countries. Germany is the main Western trading partner of every country in Central and Eastern Europe and a leading source of foreign direct investment. Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership was an issue in the 2005 election campaign, with SPD leaders supporting eventual membership and CDU/CSU politicians, including Merkel, voicing opposition to full Turkish membership (as opposed to some privileged partnership status). However, since EU accession talks with Turkey have begun and are expected to take many years to complete, the current government will not have to face the issue” (Miko 2006: 10). Like his predecessors, the Merkel government has also indicated continuing Germany’s support for the EU’s European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), though with greater emphasis on ensuring that it complements rather than competes with NATO. There was the observation that the previous Schroeder government was more inclined to support the French drive to build an independent defence capability independent of NATO.

When Angela Merkel has become the Chancellor, she had less exposure to the European politics. It was unclear among the European policy makers that how she will seek to shape the Germany’s role in European politics. She was not much known political figure in Brussels. But soon after becoming the Chancellor her credentials were tested at her first EU summit in December 2005. She has impressed other participants with her knowledge of details and her commitment to making the EU

more effective. She was credited by her counterparts with playing a decisive role in forging agreement on the EU 2007-2013 budget. She was praised as a coalition builder who helped to defuse French concerns over farm spending and British problems with the EU rebate. Afterwards, she remains and continued to be an important and decisive leader in German politics and also at European level politics. Her leadership has been tested by continuing challenges to the European integration since 2005 to the recently facing refugee crisis and expected changes in the Trans-Atlantic relationship in Donald Trump's administration. Before addressing problems of European integration and their responses by Chancellor Angela Merkel during her two tenures as the Chancellor, it is imperative to assess her evolution as a political leader.

### **Angela Merkel: Assessing the Personality and Political Leadership**

Angela Merkel is born in Hamburg, a port city in Germany. Angela Merkel was only a couple of months old when her father, a Lutheran pastor, was given a parish in a small town in East Germany. She grew up in a rural area outside Berlin in the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), a satellite territory of communist Soviet Union after the end of the Second World War. Although Angela Merkel aged 63, was born in Hamburg but grew up in Templin, place to the north of Berlin, in what was then communist East Germany. Her father, a Protestant minister, moved there to oversee a local parsonage. Angela Merkel considers her roots to the communist East Germany an important for a political leader as she says, "I consider it very important for political leaders, even when they're in the government, to have a local voting district, where people treat you differently than they would if you were just traveling around".<sup>25</sup> As a college student, she has shown a great talent in areas such as mathematics, science and languages. She is a Ph.D holder in physics from the Leipzig University but later has worked as a chemist at a scientific academy in East Berlin. She is married to a chemistry professor from Berlin, Joachim Sauer.

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<sup>25</sup> <http://www.dw.com/en/kohls-girl-makes-good/a-1600411>

Angela Merkel had never been in conventional party politics until age of 36. She became politically active in the burgeoning democracy movement in 1989 or a party called 'Awakening Democracy'. After the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, she has worked as the spokeswoman following the first democratic elections in reunited Germany under the leadership of incumbent Chancellor Helmut Kohl. She has joined the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) just two months before the German reunification as her party 'Awakening Democracy' merged with the Christian Democratic Union. After the merger, within three months she was in the Chancellor Helmut Kohl's cabinet as minister for women and youth. From here, she has politically established herself within the CDU's political ranks and has risen through the ranks and became main opposition leader from CDU during Gerhard Schroeder's chancellorship and finally was elected as the first female chancellor and first political leader from the East in 2005. While assessing her political leadership, her training as a PhD student in science background has been reflected in her political leadership since she joined the conventional politics. "She retained the disciplines of scientific inquiry learned on the way to a PhD in quantum chemistry intellectual diligence and a quest for the most reliable data. In combination with her natural, seemingly endless curiosity, the result was inquisitiveness rare for a politician" (Vick and Shuster 2015: 11).

Politically and economically things were changing swiftly in united Germany with the fall of the Soviet Union and unification of Germany and exposure of Western capitalism to the Eastern part of Germany. Amidst these historical, social, economic and political changes in eastern and western part of Germany after the reunification, Angela Merkel's political journey starts after the fall of Berlin wall in 1989. She was just 36 years old and took office as a minister in the first government of united German under Helmut Kohl's Chancellorship. Before becoming a minister in reunited Germany, Angela Merkel's party of an association called Democratic Awakening stood for the first and last elections in East Germany. She became the deputy press secretary for the East German's Prime Minister. After the reunification, the Democratic Awakening party has merged with the Helmut Kohl's Christian Democratic Union as both party shares ideology of Christian democracy and stands on conservative side or right of the centre. Angela Merkel's joining of CDU has a symbolic significance as Vick and Shuster (2015) has argued that "the Christian

Democrats were centre right, Catholic, culturally conservative and something of a boys' club. By choosing them, Merkel a divorced Protestant from the East bloc who lived with her lover would presage a tidal shift in German society, which a quarter century later would be less formal, more liberal and more comfortable with it. But at the time, the choice spoke more to Merkel's ambition" (Vick and Shuster 2015: 22).

The CDU controlled the government almost a decade after the unification, and after seeking out an introduction to Helmut Kohl then Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel considered him as her political mentor. CDU made Merkel its candidate for a constituency in the far north of Germany, on a peninsula extending into the Baltic Sea. After the CDU won the unified election, Kohl put Merkel in his Cabinet as Minister for Women and Youth. In CDU, Chancellor Helmut Kohl proved to be her political mentor and he has always supported and pushed her into more leadership role. German and European media has started calling her 'Kohl's girl'. She has become an environment minister during the last term of Helmut Kohl's Chancellorship. Angela Merkel's performance as the environment minister was underlined by her leadership role in the global conference on climate change in Berlin in 1995. The conference has ended with major promise to reduce greenhouse gas emission and Angela Merkel as the minister pushed for consensus among the participants. Angela Merkel's style to work in a system, persevere, seek consensus is probably the key to her success and leadership in the politics and signs of these leadership qualities were visible during the conference in Berlin, 1995.

In 1998 federal election, Helmut Kohl has lost to the Social Democratic Party (SPD) opponent Gerhard Schroeder. After the defeat, Angela Merkel has been appointed to the post of general secretary of the CDU. Angela Merkel has already proved her leadership while holding two ministerial (women & youth and environment) portfolios during Helmut Kohl's chancellorship. When Helmut Kohl was allegedly blamed for diverting the party fund and Kohl's refusal to admit any wrongdoing thrust the party into turmoil after the defeat in 1998 federal election. Nobody in the CDU was prepared to confront Helmut Kohl over the issue of financial irregularities.

Table: Chancellor Angela Merkel's Political Journey

Year	Political Position or Achievement
1962	Become member of the 'Youth Pioneers' organization.
1968	Joined another organisation named 'Free German Youth'.
1978	Worked as a member of the academic faculty at the Central Institute of Physical Chemistry of the Academy of Sciences in East Berlin.
February 1990	Joined the newly founded political party 'Democratic Awakening' and became the party's press spokesperson.
August 1990	She joined the 'Christian Democratic Union', her current political party.
December 1990	Merkel won a seat in the Bundestag (lower house of parliament) representing Stralsund-Ruegen-Grimmen region.
January 1991	She was appointed the Minister for Women and Youth by Chancellor Helmut Kohl.
December 1991	She became Deputy Chairman of CDU.
November 1994	Merkel became the Minister of Environment, Conservation and Reactor Safety during Helmut Kohl's Chancellorship.
March-April 1995	She presided over the first United Nations Climate Conference (UNCC) in Berlin.
November 1998	Angela Merkel elected secretary general of the CDU.
April, 2000	Merkel was elected head of the CDU, becoming the first woman and the first non-Catholic to lead the party.
November 2005	Won the federal election defeating SPD with very narrow margin became the first woman, the first East German Chancellor at age of 51, the youngest person to date to hold the office.
September 2009	Defeated SPD with huge margin became second time Chancellor forming coalition of CDU-FDP.
2011	Merkel was awarded the US Presidential Medal of Freedom
September 2013	With the CDU-CSU alliance she became the third time Chancellor the longest serving Chancellor after Helmut Kohl (1982-98).
2015	Merkel was chosen the Times Person of the Year

Angela Merkel has refused to follow the silence of her colleague and denounced her political mentor and called upon him to resign. It was a stunning but calculated courageous act of political standing and set Angela Merkel on a trajectory towards the top of German politics. “Merkel was asked to make a fresh start as party leader. More than a few Christian Democrats thought it would be easy to sideline the inexperienced easterner. In particular, an ambitious gaggle of young state premiers and regional party leaders were believed to harbour such plans. However, with growing firmness, Merkel solidified her position as party leader and was one of the first to break with the era of her bigger than life predecessor, Helmut Kohl and his machinations. But at the same time, she was also able to mend relations with Kohl and thus restore the all important inner balance of the party”<sup>26</sup>.

In 2002, Merkel stepped aside to let Edmund Stoiber, the chairman of the CDU's Bavarian sister party, CSU, run against Gerhard Schroeder in national elections. Stoiber lost narrowly and Merkel emerged as the big winner within CDU. In addition to the CDU party leadership, she also took over as leader of the joint CDU/CSU parliamentary group. Merkel's internal rivals have realised that ‘Kohl's girl’ is a formidable opponent. Before becoming the Chancellor in 2005, Angela Merkel was not taken seriously for a long time by a large part of the general public. The young woman from Eastern Germany was supposedly lacking the attributes of long associated with political success. She did not work through the ranks as a grass root worker, had no support or family connection within the party, and little eloquence or media charisma. For an example after becoming the chancellor first time she had difficulties expressing her emotions in her first press conference as chancellor designate. When a reporter asked her about feeling being elected the first woman chancellor in the history, she was just expressed without any emotions on her face that she is feeling happy but more concentrated about the coalition talks ahead. This was an example that the chancellor has lesser media charisma but more task handler traits.

Apart from her East German origin and her journey to active politics another factor about her leadership which was discussed, gender. Ferree (2006) has tried to explain woman and leadership by explaining the case of the Chancellor Angela Merkel. He

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<sup>26</sup> <http://www.dw.com/en/kohls-girl-makes-good/a-1600411>

argued that “unlike the women who held political authority on the basis of their family relationships, whether as hereditary monarchs or "over the dead bodies" of their politician husbands or fathers, she and other women making political news today around the world are rising through their own campaigns and with their own agendas. This could not have happened without women's movements driving the world toward a more gender inclusive understanding of politics. Considering Angela Merkel as an individual woman as well as a symbol of women's greater role in politics raises the question of how her position should be understood in relation to the state of gender relations in the 21st century” (Ferree 2006: 94).

Apart from explaining the woman and leadership relationship, the case of Angela Merkel's leadership has been interconnected with the growing crisis in Germany and Europe. The authorised biographer of the Chancellor Angela Merkel Stefan Kornelius (2013) has argued that there is a correlation between growing crisis (domestically and at European level) and her leadership traits. The crises which have posed to Chancellor Merkel proved as an opportunity and advantage to her leadership. There is another reason too as Stefan Kornelius (2013) has argued that “the crisis gave Angela Merkel many advantages. First, from the German point of view, her rescue policy was both urgent and conclusive so she encountered very little resistance from the opposition at home. Second, she was governing at a decisive moment for the executive. It was the time when heads of governments in Europe not the European Commission or national parliaments were taking the lead. And third, no road can bypass the Chancellor of the strongest economy in Europe; anyone wishing to save Euro would have to do so in conjunction with Merkel (Kornelius 2013: 9).

Angela Merkel is Chancellor of Germany and serving her consecutive third term in the office and going to contest for the fourth term in federal election 2017. Germany being the most populous and economically powerful member state in the European Union has not only become an influential and leading country to define European agenda but also bear much responsibility to safeguard idea of European integration. Merkel has shown leadership commitments towards EU's mission of removing barriers and spreading democracy across the continent. She has also delivered encouraging decisions and mandates on crises from enlargement issues to euro-zone and recent refugee crisis by building consensus but sometimes also attracting severe



criticism for her leadership style. She has shown these leadership temperaments during EU summit in December, 2005 just after becoming the chancellor, the German presidency of European Union in 2007 (in her first tenure) and while dealing with issues after failure of the constitutional treaty and membership of Turkey and other applicant's countries during her first term of chancellorship (2005-2009).

### **Problems of European Integration and Angela Merkel's Leadership, 2005-2009**

Historically, Germany has been one pillar of the Franco-German motor of European integration as well as being very Atlanticist in its foreign policy approach since the end of the Second World War. This was important to assert because it signifies that Germany foreign policy ensures a balance between European integration and its relationship with the United States. The German foreign policy makers always believed that European integration and a strong transatlantic partnership compliments each other. Germany's approach towards the European integration or the European Union has always been a combination of domestic issues and its foreign policy. The German policy towards the European Union has become so important over the time that the power has shifted to the Chancellor's office to decide the policy. Germany's policy towards the European integration must be explained in the context of Germany's domestic issues and national interests and decisive role played by its Chancellors.

After the German reunification in 1989, German Chancellors have been influential for European integration process coupled with French cooperation. The Chancellor of united Germany Helmut Kohl's years has been regarded "as the high water mark for Germany's willingness to subordinate domestic interests to greater European integration" (Heisenberg 2006: 110). Although the Single European Act (1986) was supported by Germans but it has also witnessed less progress on the institution side than Helmut Kohl has imagined. Germany's role in formulating and rectifying Maastricht Treaty which initially has seen against the perceived national interests and elite consensus in Germany but it shows Helmut Kohl's firmness to integrate German national interest with European integration process. For an example with opinion polls in 1996 showing 58 percent of the German public against the creation of the Euro but Helmut Kohl insisted on keeping to the timetable and ignored opportunities to delay

the advent of the single currency. Today the same currency (Euro) has become a visible symbol of European integration.

Gerhard Schroeder's Chancellorship (1998-2005), whose role and leadership has already explained in the previous chapter. In 2005, Angela Merkel has won the federal election defeating the incumbent Chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder by a very close margin. Merkel has the added advantage that her predecessor, Gerhard Schroeder, instituted a number of unpopular structural reforms of the welfare state giving management more leeway in laying off employees and streamlining various government benefits that probably cost Gerhard Schroeder the 2005 election that saw Merkel come to power. With every new German Chancellor, there is speculation about the continuity of the Germany foreign policy towards the European integration process. Angela Merkel has the challenge to address the issues of the European integration just after becoming the chancellor in 2005. During that time, the Eurobarometer poll was taken in 2005, 46 percent of Germans believe that Germany has not benefited on balance from being a member of EU. It was also the year when the failure of the Constitutional Treaty (2005) raised doubts about deepening of European integration process. So it was politically challenging for Chancellor Angela Merkel to push forward European integration agendas at least during this troubled time for the European Union in 2005-06.

The first major test for the Angela Merkel's leadership during her first tenure as a Chancellor was EU budget negotiation during the summit in 2005. When Angela Merkel began her campaign after Schroder's announcement of an early election in May 2005, and the European Union budget was already in crisis. "Following the failure of the summit on the constitution in December 2003, Schroder had used the EU budget as a veiled threat to Poland and Spain, saying, there were 'certain parallels' between the constitutional and the budget talks. The Luxembourg presidency had not been able to bridge the gap between six net payer states, (Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Austria, France and the UK) on the one hand, which wanted to cap the EU budget at 1.00 percent of member states' GDP"<sup>27</sup>.

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<sup>27</sup> "Failure to agree a new EU constitution shows that the goodwill of new members cannot be taken for granted," *Financial Times*, 2 January 2004.

The EU budget was scheduled to approve in June 2005 summit but all sides showed no sign of compromise. The primary problems were that the United Kingdom has refused to give up any of its rebates, and wanted instead to cut in the expenditure of Common Agriculture Policy. In the contrary, France said that CAP spending had already been negotiated and cut in the 2002 agreement (on CAP) and that it would not consider further reductions as France is the major beneficiary of the policy. Like her predecessor, Merkel has insisted on the importance of strict limits on the EU budget. “Thus, it was somewhat of a surprise to find that Merkel was the catalyst to a budget deal at the 16-17 December 2005 summit. “EU Budget: Merkel Emerges as Heroine of Financing Deal,” “The German Wallet Saved the EU Budget” was typical headlines after another marathon summit. In the meeting, Merkel had restrained French President Jacques Chirac on his demands that nothing change except the British rebate, and had received commitments from France and Italy to increase their contributions. She had cajoled a small dent in the British rebate.....Perhaps the biggest change from Schroder was in negotiation style and largesse” (Heisenberg 2006: 113). This was the major achievement of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s leadership at European level, as it has been reported by the *Financial Times*:

“But perhaps the most intriguing implications of the budget deal concern the role of Germany.....At previous summits Gerhard Schroeder, and Jacques Chirac agreed on a joint position beforehand, and presented it to the rest.....The dynamics of [this] summit proved very different. There was no Franco-German demarche. Instead, Ms Merkel held meetings with everyone in sight, in parallel with the official talks chaired by the British.....Like her Christian Democrat predecessor as Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, she agreed that Germany would finance the lion's share of the increase in the size of the EU budget. And in the end, the final compromise owed more to her proposals than to Britain's original one”<sup>28</sup>.

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<sup>28</sup> New leaders do not guarantee a new Europe," *Financial Times*, 21 July 2005.

Angela Merkel's negotiator and leadership role during the EU budget crisis has not only showed an early sign of her firm leadership but has also enhanced the European integration by avoiding the budget crisis to jeopardise the integration process after the failure of the Constitution Treaty.

A week after the success of the summit, Merkel has put forth the agenda of tax harmonisation among EU member states to combat unfair tax competition within EU. German finance minister in Merkel government, Peer Steinbrück said, "It cannot be that some countries demand more funds from the EU budget while on the other hand fail to improve their own tax basis"<sup>29</sup>. As unfair EU tax competition had a place in the laboriously negotiated grand coalition document, it was evident that a Merkel government intended to pursue the issue of tax harmonisation, using goodwill from the summit to prepare the way. These leadership examples from the Chancellor Merkel's have not only pushed her party's (CDU) pro European integration stand more firmly but also situated the German Chancellor as emerging European leader during her first tenure as the Chancellor.

In 2004, the major expansion of European Union was the inclusion of ten Central and Eastern European countries. This was the largest enlargement in the history of European integration since 1952. It was also symbolically united Europe, as the former Soviet allies joined the European Union in 2004 so it was also considered the integration of East and West Europe. These countries politically and economically were still trying and evolving to keep pace with Western European countries such as Germany and France. It was expected from the pro-European integration countries (especially Germany) to deal with these newly inducted countries on the symmetric basis to strengthen the European Union. There are a few pointers that suggest that Chancellor Angela Merkel is more committed to working with the smaller countries to achieve consensus and less likely to find ideas of enhanced cooperation. She has shown, moreover, that she is willing to forego short-term economic gains in, for example, the EU budget or domestic stimulus packages, for the sake of longer term payoffs like tax harmonisation as explained earlier in the chapter. Bocquet (2010) has assessed the leadership role of Chancellor Merkel in her first term 2005-2009 and argued that "Angela Merkel continued on this way sets the tone for the chapter on the

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<sup>29</sup> "German finance minister urges fairer tax competition within EU," *EU Observer*, 30 December 2005.

Grand Coalition's European Policy.....Merkel quickly became Europe's white hope in a time of abysmal perplexity (Bocquet 2010: 264).

During her first tenure, in 2007 German presidency of the European Council set another benchmark in testing Chancellor Merkel's leadership role in enhancing European integration. In the European Council's summit in June 2007, Merkel has pushed for and got the approval of a roadmap for strengthening European integration. By promoting this roadmap, which, in fact, was a concrete mandate for the subsequent intergovernmental conference, Merkel led the way to end the EU's constitutional crisis as the roadmap document addressed and solved all the controversial issues, e.g., the allocation of votes in the Council, the status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the removal of state-like symbols. Even though Merkel has played a vital role in the summit but has sought support and cooperation from her French and Luxemburg counterparts (e.g., Nicolas Sarkozy or Jean-Claude Juncker) during negotiations. But she deserves the credit of saving the substance of the Constitutional Treaty and transferring it into the new agreement (future Lisbon Treaty), a strong achievement of her leadership to enhance European integration.

Chancellor Merkel's European policies during these four years (2005-09) have met with criticism too. Bocquet (2010) argued that "despite the success in the field of constitutional reform and EU budget negotiations, does not see a distinctive signature of Merkel on the last four years of European German policy.....the chancellor failed to give the European Union a new perspective....during her first term and that the new institutional foundations, which lay down the framework for new initiatives that had not been set until late 2009 (Bocquet 2010: 270)". Although Bocquet (2010) has encapsulated her assessment of the last four years of German European Policy by describing it as pragmatism without the visionary impetus for the future of European integration. But it was prematurely criticised about her first term's approach and leadership role in European integration process. Under Chancellor Merkel's leadership (2005-09), German European policy was becoming more pragmatic combining with building consensus among the member states and simultaneously promoting German national interests parallel to European integration.

## **The Euro-Zone Crisis and Leadership of Chancellor Angela Merkel (2009-2013)**

In September 2009 the German federal election were held. The incumbent Chancellor Angela Merkel won the election and continues for the second term but her new governing partner now was the pro business and liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP). This newly formed 'black-yellow' coalition was a reincarnation of a coalition that has governed West Germany from 1983-98 (later united Germany) under Chancellorship of Helmut Kohl.

Domestically, Angela Merkel has different challenges to cope with its new alliance partner FDP after the 2009 federal election result. The FDP is a pro business party that champions reforms of social security, civil liberties, and above all lower and simpler taxes. It has strongly opposed many of the policies that Angela Merkel had pursued during the 'Grand Coalition' (2005-2009) to placate her SPD partners, such as minimum wages and giveaways to pensioners. So the challenges for Angela Merkel's leadership was to resolve these domestic issues with its coalition partner while Euro-zone was gradually caught by the financial crisis by this time.

The 2009 federal election was mostly contested around the growing leadership persona of Angela Merkel. After four years as head of the 'Grand Coalition' of CDU-SPD from 2005-2009, Chancellor Angela Merkel has emerged as Germany's the most popular politician, well ahead of her Social Democrat (SPD) challenger, Frank Walter Steinmeier in 2009 federal election. As Detmar Doering, head of the Liberal Institute in Potsdam has been quoted in BBC reporting after the result, saying, "Some people said Angela Merkel was boring and provincial, but they underestimated her.....Mrs Merkel does not need to rely on charisma to win over voters because she is a pragmatic politician who inspires confidence. ....Angela Merkel has developed a presidential style of leadership.....German voters aren't stupid they don't want a Britney Spears as the Chancellor of Germany, they want a serious leader whom they can trust. Merkel knows what she's doing"<sup>30</sup>. Her growing charisma and personalised campaign in this election has been explained by Schoen (2011) and argued that "even

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<sup>30</sup> <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-23709337>

though Merkel was the obvious victor of the election, she was criticised both before and after the election by pundits and members of her party for her campaign strategies and tactics. Following a long tradition in German electoral politics, the CDU/CSU campaign focused on Chancellor Merkel. At the same time, the conservative CDU/CSU hardly covered policy issues and tried to avoid provoking public controversy about them. This personalised campaign obviously aimed at capitalising on Merkel's popularity with the electorate (Schoen 2011: 92).

Just four years before, the quiet, unassuming physicist who grew up in communist East Germany is now well known for her ability to draw a large crowd at campaign rallies, and her opponents have been relegated to the sidelines. Angela Merkel emerged as the popular leader in Germany after the 2009 federal election and was enjoying the highest popularity ratings. At European level, the growing domestic profile and persona have boosted her confidence and leadership. Germany was still out of the approaching financial crisis, leading economy and exporter of Europe, her decision not to join NATO led forces in Iraq, and her initial efforts and indication to save the Euro gradually made her an emerging sole European leader and it was firmly reflected in the second term of her chancellorship especially during the Euro-zone crisis.

### **Explaining the Euro-Zone Crisis**

In an era of globalisation, the world is interconnected in almost every sphere of life. The Euro-zone crisis is an example of the interdependence of the world economy. The Euro-zone crisis was triggered by the economic events happened in America in 2008-2009. As the European Commission has summarised that Euro-zone crisis as the outcome of the banking sector crisis in America among other various reasons. “Europe’s debt crisis was initially triggered by the economic events in the American banking sector. When a slowdown in the US economy caused overextended American homeowners to default on their mortgages, banks all over the world with investments linked to those mortgages started losing money<sup>31</sup>”. America’s the fourth largest investment bank, Lehman Brothers, collapsed under the weight of its bad investments and loans, making vulnerable to other banks and investors with which the bank has

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<sup>31</sup>[http://ec.europa.eu/economy\\_finance/explained/the\\_financial\\_and\\_economic\\_crisis/why\\_did\\_the\\_crisis\\_happen/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/explained/the_financial_and_economic_crisis/why_did_the_crisis_happen/index_en.htm)

the extensive business. The fear of defaulting and causing failure stopped banks to lend each other and pushing those reliant on such loans close to the edge. European banks that had invested heavily in the American mortgage market were hit hard.

The economic crisis in Europe started after the failure of American banks to recover their issued loans generally called as European debt crisis, Euro-zone Crisis or the European sovereign debt crisis. Since 2009, the crisis in Europe has taken a multilayer shape and affecting almost every sector of the economy from banking to employment generation. In Europe, several Euro-zone member states, especially Cyprus plus PIGS countries (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain) were unable to repay or refinance their government debt or to bail out over indebted banks under their national supervision without the assistance of third parties like other Euro-zone countries, the European Central Bank (ECB), or the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The detailed reasons for the Euro-zone crisis varied. In many European countries, private banks debts arising from a property bubble were shifted to sovereign debt as a result of banking system bailouts and governments responses in these countries to slowing economic scenario after the property bubble burst. Apart from individual countries responsibility towards causing the Euro crisis, there is also a structural flaw in the Euro-zone area itself. The structure of the Euro zone as a currency union without fiscal union (different tax and public pension rules) contributed to the crisis and limited the ability of European leaders to respond. European banks own a significant amount of sovereign debt, such that concerns regarding the solvency of banking systems or sovereigns are negatively reinforcing. As concerns intensified in early 2010 and thereafter, leading European nations implemented a series of financial support measures such as the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and European Stability Mechanism (ESM). The European Central Bank has also contributed to solving the crisis by lowering interest rates and providing cheap loans of more than one trillion euro in order to maintain money flows between European banks.

The national governments came in rescue to their falling banks in Europe like Germany, France, UK, Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands. But bailing out highly indebted banks was costly to these countries growth or GDP. For an example, in Ireland, it almost bankrupted the Irish government until fellow EU countries stepped



in with financial assistance to Ireland. As Europe slipped into recession in 2009, a problem that started in the banks began to affect governments more and more, as markets worried that some countries could not afford to rescue banks in trouble. Investors began to look more closely at the finances of governments. “Greece came under particular scrutiny because its economy was in very bad shape and successive governments had racked up debts nearly twice the size of the economy. The threat of bank failures meant that the health of government finances became more important than ever. Governments that had grown accustomed to borrowing large amounts each year to finance their budgets and that had accumulated massive debts in the process, suddenly found markets less willing to keep lending to them. What started as a banking crisis became a sovereign debt crisis”<sup>32</sup>.

There are other reasons also to explain the happening of the Euro-zone crisis. There is a combination of factors and reasons which have caused the crisis. These factors include globalisation of finance, easy credit conditions during the 2002–2008 (during economic boom) period that encouraged high risk lending and borrowing practices, the financial crisis of 2007–08, international trade imbalances, real estate bubbles that have since burst, the Great Recession of 2008–2012, fiscal policy choices related to government revenues and expenses and approaches used by states to bail out troubled banking industries and private bondholders, assuming private debt burdens or socializing losses. The European Commission has also explained the root cause of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe.

The European Commission (EC) has explained that “in several countries, governments became ensnared by the problems of the banking sector when troubled banks started turning to them for help. The high cost of bank rescues led financial markets to question whether governments could really afford to support the banking sector.....Easy money was available because investors had turned a blind eye to warning signs about the health of the economy and were not paying enough attention

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<sup>32</sup>[http://ec.europa.eu/economy\\_finance/explained/the\\_financial\\_and\\_economic\\_crisis/why\\_did\\_the\\_crisis\\_happen/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/explained/the_financial_and_economic_crisis/why_did_the_crisis_happen/index_en.htm)

to the risks involved in lending more and more”<sup>33</sup>. All of this prompted questions as to whether the institutional setup of the Economic and Monetary Union and the Euro was adequate in times of crisis. The crisis exposed several shortcomings in the EU’s system of economic governance. The European Commission has identified the following structural problems with the Euro-zone itself which has intensified the crisis which includes “too much focus on deficits, lack of surveillance of competitiveness and macroeconomic imbalances, Weak enforcement, Slow decision-making capacity, Emergency financing”<sup>34</sup>.

As a consequence, Greece, and subsequently Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Cyprus, were eventually unable to borrow on financial markets at reasonable interest rates. The EU was requested to step in, which resulted in the creation of a crisis resolution mechanism and financial backstops i.e. large funds on standby to be used in an emergency by euro area countries in financial difficulty. “To prevent a complete collapse of the banking system, European governments came to the rescue of their banks with an urgent support of an unprecedented scale. 1.6 trillion euros, the equivalent of 13 % of the EU’s annual GDP were committed between 2008 and 2011. The EU also launched a Europe wide recovery programme to safeguard jobs and social protection levels and to support economic investment. In this way, bank runs were avoided and European savings were protected. The euro broadly maintained its value and successfully shielded euro zone countries from the worst effect of the economic crisis by providing EU companies with a stable playing field for international trade and investment. But this effort took its toll, especially because most of this money had to be borrowed. The economic and financial crisis has demonstrated that the EU’s banking system is vulnerable to shocks. A problem at one bank can spread quickly to others, affecting depositors, investment and the overall

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<sup>33</sup>[http://ec.europa.eu/economy\\_finance/explained/the\\_financial\\_and\\_economic\\_crisis/why\\_did\\_the\\_crisis\\_spread/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/explained/the_financial_and_economic_crisis/why_did_the_crisis_spread/index_en.htm)

<sup>34</sup>[http://ec.europa.eu/economy\\_finance/explained/the\\_financial\\_and\\_economic\\_crisis/why\\_did\\_the\\_crisis\\_spread/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/explained/the_financial_and_economic_crisis/why_did_the_crisis_spread/index_en.htm)

economy. In response, the EU and its member countries have been strengthening financial sector supervision”<sup>35</sup>.

The crisis had significant adverse economic effects and labour market effects, with unemployment rates in Greece and Spain reaching 27%, and was blamed for subdued economic growth, not only for the entire euro-zone but for the entire European Union. As such, it can be argued to have had a major political impact on the ruling governments in 10 out of 19 euro-zone countries, contributing to political power shifts in Greece, Ireland, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Slovenia, Slovakia, Belgium and the Netherlands, as well as outside of the eurozone, in the United Kingdom. After five years of deepening crisis, now the return of economic growth and improved structural deficits has enabled Ireland and Portugal to exit their bailout programme in July 2014. Greece and Cyprus, both countries have been party trying to manage market access. Germany suffered less shock and emerged as the stable and growing economy and also an influential or sometimes labelled as ‘economic hegemony’ within the European Union.

### **Angela Merkel and Euro-Zone Crisis: A Case of Greece and Other Countries Bailouts**

Before dwelling into the response of Germany under leadership of Chancellor Merkel to the Euro-zone crisis, it is imperative to understand the country specific euro-crisis problem and European response in very brief;

Greece's economy was one of the fastest growing in the Euro-zone and was associated with a large structural deficit. As world economy was hit by the financial crisis of 2007–08, Greece was hit especially hard because of its main industries, shipping and tourism were especially sensitive to changes in the business cycle. The government spent heavily to keep the economy functioning and the country's debt increased accordingly. In reality, the government had lied about its budget deficit and borrowings and investors had blindly invested in the economy. When the truth came out, the Greece was hit hard by the financial crisis.

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<sup>35</sup>[http://ec.europa.eu/economy\\_finance/explained/the\\_financial\\_and\\_economic\\_crisis/responding\\_to\\_the\\_debt\\_crisis/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/explained/the_financial_and_economic_crisis/responding_to_the_debt_crisis/index_en.htm)

“Another country Ireland has also suffered the setback but between December 2010 and December 2013 Europe’s rescue funds, the International Monetary Fund, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Denmark, lent Ireland EUR 85 billion to restore its national finances and repair its economy following the collapse of the country’s largest banks. In January 2014, Ireland became the first euro area country to successfully emerge from a macroeconomic assistance programme. In Portugal, when financial investors started demanding ever higher returns for lending to governments, Portugal found itself unable to pay. On 17 May 2011, European finance ministers and the International Monetary Fund agreed to lend Portugal EUR 78 billion to finance its budget deficit, reduce the government's debts, repair its banking sector, and fiscal reforms to stimulate economic growth and create jobs. Portugal has already received more than EUR 71 billion, with the rest expected to come by mid-2014. Despite its challenging situation, Portugal’s reforms have significantly improved the country’s finances and its economy. In Spain, a burst property bubble left the Spanish banking sector holding billions of euros worth of loans that borrowers could no longer repay. Euro area countries used their financial assistance funds, the European Financial Stability Facility and the European Stability Mechanism to help Spain repair its struggling banking sector by setting aside EUR100 billion in loans, that were paid out between July 2012 and December 2013. Cyprus turned to its euro area partners for help. On 24 April 2012 euro area governments and the International Monetary Fund agreed to lend Cyprus EUR 10 billion to restructure its banking sector, rebuild its public finances and invest in a more balanced and healthy economy. In other countries except for the PIGS, in total, EUR 16 billion has been disbursed to three countries: Hungary, Romania, and Latvia, before it adopted the euro as its currency”<sup>36</sup>.

The emergence of the Euro-zone crisis in 2009-2010 coincides almost perfectly with the incumbency of the second Merkel government (2009-2013), establishing this crisis as one of the most important and enduring challenges it had to address during the second tenure of Merkel’s Chancellorship. Moreover, saving the Euro was certainly the most important topic of European policy making in this period. The German federal government under the leadership of Angela Merkel was widely

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<sup>36</sup>[http://ec.europa.eu/economy\\_finance/explained/the\\_financial\\_and\\_economic\\_crisis/assisting\\_countries\\_in\\_trouble/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/explained/the_financial_and_economic_crisis/assisting_countries_in_trouble/index_en.htm)

recognised to act in a central role of political leadership for the resolution of the Euro crisis. The response has two-dimensional approaches, first, immediate crisis management such as the Greek bail-out, and the second, institutional reform of governance mechanisms in the Euro-zone through measures of European Stability Mechanism or Fiscal Compact (officially the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance, TSCG). The central role of the Chancellor Angela Merkel's government was to safeguard the visible symbol of European integration.

Hertner and Miskimmon (2015), has explained that why the Euro-zone crisis provided German Chancellor with a central role which includes domestic political factors too. They argued that "Germany has taken centre stage in the Euro-zone crisis, due to its economic strength and the key role of Chancellor Angela Merkel in negotiating the response to the crisis. Merkel sought to project a narrative that both asserts Germany's commitment to European integration and chastises Euro-zone members for their economic failures" (Hertner and Miskimmon 2015: 43).

In this way, Merkel has projected a narrative of promoting budgetary rigour and austerity, thereby portraying the crisis as being caused by overwhelming national debt, rather than as a result of structural weaknesses or imbalances in the Euro area. Merkel has attempted to dominate the narrative of the Euro-zone crisis to shut out policy alternatives, which could have negatively impacted on Germany. Her longevity as German chancellor, while colleagues in other Euro-zone countries have been voted out of office, has added weight to her voice. Merkel's domestic credibility and electoral success demonstrated yet again in September 2013 have rested on her handling of the Eurozone crisis. Chancellor Angela Merkel has also considered saving Euro as the historical responsibility of Germany and to support bailouts to the Euro-zone crisis ridden countries. While addressing the Bundestag to ratify the first bailout package for Greece on 5<sup>th</sup> May 2010, she has stated;

"Germany, the strongest economic nation in Europe, has a special responsibility in this situation, and Germany takes this responsibility. The happy history of Germany after World War II, the development of a free, unified, and strong country, cannot be separated from European history, not even in thought.....Germany lives in the European Union in a union of

destiny. We owe it decades of peace, prosperity, and friendship with our neighbors”<sup>37</sup>.

The commitment towards the saving Euro and subsequently strengthen European integration process is a firm conviction of Chancellor Merkel as has been stated above. When it comes to saving the Euro, the German Chancellor prefers strong measures but also seemed flexible when the warning sound that the end of Euro is in near future. Spanish economy minister Luis de Guindo has underlined the power and importance of the chancellor’s leadership to save the Euro and strengthen the European integration process when he said that all eyes turn to Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor. Germany must assume its part in saving the currency<sup>38</sup>.

Chancellor Angela Merkel has assumed the leadership role at Europe stage during the Euro crisis. Time and again she has taken stands against bailouts only to relent. She balked at bailing out Greece and at a permanent rescue fund and she vetoed the use of bailout money to buy government bonds in the secondary market. In each case, she gave in although she has been criticised for responding late and with harsh unpopular measures. But she has time and again reiterated that she wants more Europe and Euro is an emotional value for her. Greece who was facing huge unemployment and the high inflation rate has been somehow pushed to adopt Merkel laid austerity measures which included a huge reduction in government's public expenditure, increasing taxes and meeting required budget deficit criteria. The people of Greece have strongly come out against the bailout condition as it is going to hit hard their daily life. They assumed that German under the leadership of Chancellor Merkel is the prime responsible for the economic mess in Greece. She has been painted as Merkel with Hitler's moustache and Germany's move has been called as ‘new Versailles’ measures, refereeing to the discriminatory treaty for the Germany after the end of the First World War. But indifferent to these protests and criticism, Chancellor Merkel has

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<sup>37</sup> Angela Merkel, “Regierungserklärung zu den Hilfen für Griechenland,” 5 May 2010; available at <http://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Content/DE/Regierungserklaerung/2010/2010-05-05-merkel-erklaerung-griechenland.html>, quoted in Hertner, Isabelle and Miskimmon, Alister (2015), “Germany’s Strategic Narrative of the Eurozone Crisis”, *German Politics and Society*, 33(1/2). 42-57.

<sup>38</sup><http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA292200720&v=2.1&u=fub&it=r&p=AONE&sid=AONE&inPS=true&linkSource=interlink>

firmly pushed these measures to respond the Euro-zone crisis. Although Angela Merkel didn't accept the floating arguments that austerity is pushing the Euro towards breakup but deficit cuts and structural reforms have inflicted short term pain. But the rewards will come, as Germany's own experience shows. The example of the Baltic countries was given where these countries have enacted austerity and economically growing fast. Merkel wants to save the euro but believes peripheral countries can make still more sacrifices. The German line is that Greece must decide whether to default and perhaps exit from the Euro.

Initially, Chancellor Merkel has been reluctant, offering bailout money to Euro-zone nations only when no other options remained and hesitating to commit Germany to the costs of deeper fiscal unity in the Euro zone. She has, for instance, rejected a proposal for 'Euro-bonds' backed by all member nations, which would help spread the risk and pain of the crisis. Angela Merkel has reiterated many times that if the Euro fails, Europe fails, which shows her commitment for the Euro and for the idea of European integration. She has been reluctant to wholeheartedly devote German resources to the Euro's cause, which is the kind of commitment markets want to see. Her caution is in part a response to anger at home. German voters oppose seeing their hard earned Euros diverted to rescuing neighbours they perceive as lazy, profligate and irresponsible. But Angela Merkel's efforts to saving euro were not only envisioned in terms of European integration but also fulfilling German national interests. She has domestic challenges to deliver taxpayers money to bailout Greece during the Euro-zone crisis. But she has largely been successful to convince German voters for the bailout which can be seen during the 2013 German federal election results in her favour and becoming third time Chancellor. Although compared to the previous election, her popularity rating has come down drastically but she has managed to retain the office.

The biggest problem for Angela Merkel's second term (2009-13) was Europe's debt crisis. Amid signs of a recovery in some hard hit European countries, Chancellor Merkel continues to resist pressure to mutualise Euro zone debt to reduce borrowing costs for weaker countries and stands by the doctrine of austerity that has seen unemployment spiralling upward in those same countries. At the same time, Merkel has succeeded in carrying most of Germany with her when she makes a move. The

European policies of the mainstream parties are closely aligned. In Parliament and among voters, there is broad recognition that Germany's export driven economy is dependent on the survival of the Euro. So moving towards the greater European integration by preventing the disintegration of Euro was also in the interest of German export economy and national interests within multilateral Europe. Chancellor Merkel has largely been successful to meet the German national interests by saving Euro and strengthening or enhancing European integration project.



## **Conclusion**

### **Background**

After the end of the Second World War in 1945, Europe was left with devastating consequences which had led to a situation of political and economic instability across the Continent. The post World War landscape of Europe had forced European political leaders, elite and economies to confront the harsh side of nationalism and thus support the idea of European integration to prevent recurrence of war in the future. Apart from the World War's consequences, external factors have also contributed to the integration process. The United States under the Marshall plan had supported the economic reconstruction of Europe but this financial assistance could benefit only the Western part. The US had closely linked the Marshall plan's assistance with the Cold War security concerns and constraints. Consequently, America's interests were to rebuild Western European economies to safeguard its interest in Europe by containing the Soviet Union's influence. Internally, European political leadership had realised that curbing resurgence of extreme nationalistic rhetoric was only possible through integrating European nations and nationalities into the idea of one Europe. The West European political leadership had also believed that since 1945, the idea of integration was the necessity of time to rebuild national economies to ensure peace and rule of law in the post World War Europe.

The process of European integration which had started with the Treaty of Paris based on the Shuman Plan in 1951 and establishing the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952 culminated in 1992 with the formation of the European Union. Subsequently, the number of states increased from six in 1952 to 28 by 2016 and after the Brexit vote there are 27 member states. The journey of 60 years of integration process has gone through various challenges and success stories from the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 to the Brexit in 2016. The history of European integration process has witnessed two milestones in the last 60 years. The first is bipolarity of the world order following the WW II which had sparked the drive to integrating in

Western Europe. The second is the evolving world order from unipolar to multipolar following the disintegration of the Soviet Union after the end of Cold War which has pushed for consolidation of the integration process and strengthening EU institutions from the Maastricht Treaty in 1991 to the Lisbon Treaty in 2010.

Among multiple internal and external factors which have played a crucial part in the European integration process, the 'role of leadership' has been vital. The leadership concept carries various meanings and explanations but the proposed research has studied 'leadership' element as political leaders and their leadership role in the European integration process.

While tracing the history of European integration, one fact comes across that the 'leadership' element has played a crucial role. The leaders not only envisioned the foundation of an integrated Europe after the WWII but also carry forwarded the belief with their leadership efforts and cooperation. Its role can be observed from the very founding of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952 based on French statesman Robert Schuman and French economist and diplomat Jean Monnet's vision to integrate the economies of war time enemies especially Germany and France. Leaders like, West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer (1949-63), French President De Gaulle (1959-69), Luxemburg's Prime minister Joseph Bech (1953-58), Banker and Dutch politician Johan Willem Beyen, British Prime minister Winston Churchill (1951-55), German diplomat and the first President of the European Commission Walter Hallstein (1958-67) and in the 1980s, French President Francois Mitterrand (1981-95), and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (1982-98) were not only at forefront of integrating their respective national interests with the European interests but also cooperating with each other on various European policy issues to push further the integration process. For example Winston Churchill's assertion of a 'United State of Europe' or signing of the Elysee Treaty in 1963 by arch rival France and Germany by their leaders Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and French President Charles De Gaulle are fine example of role of leadership and their efforts to strengthen the European integration process from the beginning.

Leadership cooperation and a belief in the idea has ensured launching of various major initiatives for the integration process, from the European Monetary System of the late 1970s, Schengen Agreement in 1985 (effective from 1995), Single European

Act of 1986 and subsequent success of the Maastricht Treaty in 1991 which has formed European Union and the common currency Euro. As it has been a well established assertion that Franco-German or Franco-German motor has been a driving force for the European integration. West Germany and later reunited Germany has been an economic powerhouse within the European Union and under the different Chancellors has always provided a leadership role to the European integration. Today, Germany under its political leadership is the biggest country with a population of 82 million (2016), GDP of 3.134 trillion USD (2016) and the highest contributor to EU budget with 24.28 billion Euros (2016) and has remained a constant pro-integration member state and intertwined it with the core of its foreign policy.

### **German Chancellors, Foreign Policy and European Integration**

Since 1945, West Germany and later reunited Germany has been a constant pro-integration member state and leadership of German Chancellors has always taken a pro integration stand and intertwined this approach with Germany's foreign policy. The research has critically examined the role of German leadership under its Chancellors from Konrad Adenauer to Angela Merkel in enhancing and strengthening the European integration.

West Germany has played a key role in the integration of Europe since the end of the World War II and made it an important pillar of its post-World War foreign policy. In 1949, West Germany had two major pillars of its foreign policy, first reconciliation with France and Second, multilateralism which resulted in German support to European integration. The reason behind this foreign policy approach was to leave behind the German identity of being responsible of the two world wars and to integrate West Germany in Europe, especially in Western Europe to rebuild faith and trust in German identity of being Western European country. The fundamentals of West German and later reunited German foreign policy were intertwined with European integration has been incorporated firmly in the German Basic law or Constitution. The article 23(1) of German Basic law clearly states that with a view to establishing a united Europe, the Federal Republic of Germany shall participate in the development of the European Union that is committed to democratic, social and federal principles, to the rule of law, and to the principle of subsidiarity, and that

guarantees a level of protection of basic rights essentially comparable to that afforded by this Basic Law.

Among multiple elements of Bonn's foreign policy after WWII, the fundamentals of the foreign policy was to intertwine the West German national interest within European multilateral framework. Since 1949, West Germany under the leadership of its Chancellors has framed and pursued a pro-European integration approach linking it with the Bonn's foreign policy that focuses on multilateralism and *Westbindung* (commitment towards West Europe). From Chancellor Adenauer to Kohl and after reunification, Chancellor Schroder and Merkel have advanced Germany's role in European integration in two ways, the first pushing European integration and the second envisioning German national interests within European integration project. These were the main reasons that Germany under leadership of its Chancellors has been a pro-active proponent of European integration process and deeply intertwined it with its foreign policy.

Among all the German Chancellors, the circumstances that Chancellor Konrad Adenauer (1949-63) faced were the most challenging. At the same time he had proved to be an efficient and tall leader, who took this opportunity to change the fate of West Germany and played the vital role in the European integration process, as the European Commission has regarded him as the 'founding father' of European integration. Adenauer had not only laid down the Bonn's foreign policy to bind West Germany's future within Western Europe but also pushed forward the European integration agenda to achieve the national interests of regaining faith, building economy and joining Western European multilateral forums to normalise relations with West European countries. Konrad Adenauer's leadership has been there from the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952. Although post WWII European circumstance which has guided Chancellor Adenauer but his leadership and vision has strengthened European integration process by integrating West Germany in Western Europe for example membership of the Council of Europe in 1951 and the US invitation to West Germany into NATO in 1955, the Elysee Treaty in 1963. A cornerstone of Adenauer's foreign policy was reconciliation with France which was further strengthened in 1963 by the ratification of the Elysee Treaty. Together with the French President Charles de Gaulle, a historic turning point was achieved and the

one-time arch enemies Germany and France became strong drivers of European integration.

Chancellor Erhard Ludwig (1963-66) has carried forward the legacy of Adenauer's leadership and visionary approach to the FRG's foreign policy and European policy. The Chancellor devoted more time in restructuring West German economy which has resulted in the *Wirtschaftswunder* or 'economic miracle'. This economic transformation of FRG that made it an export oriented economy gave firmness to the Chancellor to strengthen the European integration as it has benefited West Germany in getting access to European market, labour and expand its trade and economy. Later Chancellor Erhard has presented an outline of monetary union in 1964 and the ultimate goal was to form an 'Atlantic community' comprising all the Western European countries and especially their economies. In short, Erhard Ludwig through strengthening West Germany with the social market based 'economic miracle' reposed faith in Western European countries in FRG and this resulted in further normalization of FRG's relation with other West European countries.

Chancellor Willy Brandt (1969-74), the first Social Democrat Chancellor had been a visionary leader ahead of his time. Brandt acknowledged that certain flexibility in German foreign policy was needed in the 1970's to expand West German foreign policy more towards East Europe. His Eastward orientation or *Ostpolitik* had initially faced criticism and also lead to strained relations between West Germany and its partners in both the European Community and in NATO. But it was the leadership and vision of Willy Brandt which has come true after fall of Berlin Wall and later the enlargement of 2004 when ten Eastern and Central European countries joined the EU. His foreign policy approach and vision of European integration was holistic and courageous. Amidst such strained atmosphere between the United State and the Soviet Union, the Chancellor had managed to pursue his *Ostpolitik* vision and giving an idea of European integration to look eastward which has finally come true in 2004.

Helmut Schmidt who had been in office from 1974 to 1982 had considered the European option only when the U.S. failed to respond to his initiatives, but after several setbacks gained the conviction that Europe had to be strengthened on the basis of Franco-German cooperation. Schmidt's European policies have later focused on the creation of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1978-79, as a departure

from Schmidt's earlier convictions and reluctance about more integration in Europe. Later, Chancellor Schmidt's approach to the European integration was more pragmatic and grounded in the overriding principle that European integration ultimately served Germany's self-interest.

Helmut Kohl (1982-98) who has been the longest serving Chancellor of Germany, served as the Chancellor of West Germany and a reunited Germany. After Konrad Adenauer, Germany under his leadership has played crucial role in European integration. Helmut Kohl taking along and cooperating with the French President Mitterrand had achieved various milestones for the integration process. The classic example of leadership's role of Helmut Kohl in European integration is the Single European Act of 1986 which has created common market and ensured free movement of goods, services, labour and capital was pushed forward by him and his French counterpart Mitterrand. German Chancellors have ensured its role within multilateral frameworks to strengthen European integration process. During the Helmut Kohl's chancellorship, Germany was united after fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, and in 1992 a milestone in European integration, the Maastricht Treaty came into effect, transforming European Community into European Union and pushing for the deeper economic integration, political integration with introducing the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Germany always showed a willingness to walk the extra mile to strengthen European integration process and finance its budget (24.28 billion Euros in 2016) as it was directly linked to its national interest. Schroeder and Fischer's (1998-2005) government moved from a more ideal relationship between European integration and German relations to a pragmatic approach. During the Schroeder's government, Germany witnessed slow economic growth which resulted in decrease of financial resources to the EU budget from Germany. This led to a reduction in Germany's opportunities for implementing new policies in the EU or complying with existing rules, such as the Stability and Growth Pact. The government calculated German national interests pragmatically then mere pushing the integration ideally. Despite the cutting budget contribution to the EU, German spirit and commitment to European integration has remained intact and pro-integration.

The analysis of German Chancellor's leadership and their role in the European integration process clearly indicates that from Konrad Adenauer to Gerhard Schroeder, Chancellors have been consistent with long standing core of German foreign policy of the supporting the European integration process forward. However, there have been degrees of adjustment in various Chancellors' approach to the European integration depending upon the external and internal circumstances during the Cold War. But their leadership has always guided German foreign policy to fulfill German national interest within a multilateral, integrated and institutionalised Europe. So the hypothesis stands proved since there is enough evidence to substantiate that leadership of Germany and its Chancellors has intertwined German foreign policy with the European integration which has resulted in strengthening and enhancing the European integration process amidst multiple challenges it has faced since the 1950s.

### **Chancellor Angela Merkel's Leadership, Challenges and Strengthening the European Integration**

In 2005, Angela Merkel became the first woman Chancellor in the history of Germany and is also the first head of the government from the Eastern part of Germany. She has been serving the third term (2013-2017) as the Chancellor and has shown her willingness to contest for the election in September 2017 for the fourth term. However, the proposed research has chosen her leadership role in European integration as the case study, the scope of the research is limited to her first two tenures as the Chancellor from 2005-2009 and 2009 to 2013. The second hypothesis of the study deals with the proposed case study which states that Germany under Angela Merkel's leadership (2005-09 and 2009-13) has strengthened and enhanced the European integration process amidst growing challenges posed by enlargement and the Euro-zone crisis.

The CDU-SPD coalition of newly formed government in 2005, were on the same base when it comes to the fundamentals of German foreign policy concerning European integration. But the incumbent Chancellor had a challenging task ahead after the failure of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 and also the US led NATO's shifting its strategic role from Europe to Middle East after invading Afghanistan and later Iraq under the 'war on terror' during the George Bush administration. For Chancellor Merkel, it was a challenging time to make a balance with the traditional pillars of

German foreign policy of Franco-German cooperation within the European Union and also to pursue strong Trans-Atlantic relations with the US. She has clearly indicated that the German efforts for the European integration are corollary rather than in opposition to the Trans-Atlantic partnership. It clearly shows the kind of maturity the Chancellor has shown while pursuing less combative and more pragmatic foreign policy in her first term.

Germany has always been pro-active to the integration process and enlargement of European Union as it is deeply intertwined with German national interests. For example, in 2005 the Constitution Treaty was overwhelmingly supported by the German Bundestag although the treaty was later rejected by the French and Dutch parliaments. Angela Merkel government has also clearly indicated continuing Germany's support for the EU's European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), though with greater emphasis on ensuring that it complements rather than competes with NATO. She was credited with playing a decisive role in forging agreement on the EU 2007-2013 budget.

Angela Merkel has been praised as a coalition builder and negotiator which helped in enhancing and strengthening European integration process. For example, the Chancellor was credited to defuse French concerns over farm spending and the British problems with the EU rebate in her first term. As a negotiator, her leadership role during the EU budget crisis has not only shown an early sign of her firm leadership but has also enhanced the European integration by avoiding the budget crisis to jeopardise the integration process after the failure of the Constitution Treaty in 2005.

In 2007, Germany had the presidency of the European Council, and this has provided an insight into Chancellor Merkel's pro-integration approach and her leadership when she has pushed for and got the approval of a roadmap for strengthening European integration in European Council's summit in June 2007. The roadmap which has mandated for the intergovernmental conference, led to the end to the EU's constitutional crisis. Merkel's efforts to get the roadmap documents approved in the European Council meetings has also addressed controversial issues, e.g., the allocation of votes in the Council, the status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the removal of state-like symbols. As the German foreign policy firmly place faith in multilateral approach to addressing European issues, so the Chancellor has sought



support and cooperation from her French counterpart at the time Nicolas Sarkozy and Luxemburg counterpart Jean Claude Juncker. It clearly indicates, Chancellor Angela Merkel's leadership attributes in enhancing European integration process while bringing other leaders together to defuse differences. But she deserves the credit for saving the substance of the Constitutional Treaty and transferring it into the new agreement which has resulted in the Lisbon Treaty (2010), a critical achievement of her leadership to enhance European integration.

The emergence of the Euro-zone crisis in 2009-2010 coincides with incumbency of the second Merkel government (2009-2013). The crisis was the enduring challenge to both the leadership of Chancellor Angela Merkel and deepening of European integration process. Sometimes a leader and leadership have been shaped by the immediate crisis a leader face and it seems true when the leadership of Chancellor Merkel has been analysed. The buzz word of the time was to save the Euro and the crisis provided a platform to the emergence of the leadership of Chancellor Merkel at European level more firmly and strongly. The German federal government under the leadership of Angela Merkel was widely recognised to act in a central role of political leadership for the resolution of the Euro crisis. The response has two-dimensional approaches, first, immediate crisis management such as the Greek bail-out, and the second, institutional reform of governance mechanisms in the Euro-zone.

Chancellor Angela Merkel has taken the leadership role at the European stage during the Euro crisis. She has firmly placed permanent solution or rescues fund for Greece then merely settling to the bailout. She has been criticised as being reluctant leader with no sentiments and imposing harsh unpopular austerity measures as preconditions for bailing out Greece and other troubled economies during the eurozone crisis. The third bailout package worth of \$95 billion which is a three year bailout programme (2015-18), to be provided in instalments by the EU's main bailout fund, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) based on an outline agreement reached at a special EU summit on 13 July 2015. But the assistance come with tough preconditions where the Greece was directed to reduce its fuel tax benefits to farmers and pursue more austerity measures to consolidate its fiscal balance and ensure fiscal discipline while availing the third bailout package. Angela Merkel has insisted open the economic reforms in Greece in terms of cutting down government expenditure, tax benefits,

labour reforms, health sector reforms and adopting more austerity in terms of government expenditure. This approach invited severe criticisms from the Greeks and Left parties specially Syrzia party which later came into power with rhetoric of not bending before the external pressure. But the Chancellor has time and again reiterated her firm commitment that she wants more Europe and Euro is an emotional value for her even if it invites severe criticism to her policy measures to save Euro. It clearly indicates, her commitment to the European integration process, and her leadership has been critical to the process.

Germany is the biggest economy in Europe and managed to cope with the Eurozone crisis compared to other European Union member states. Germany's export driven economy is dependent on the survival of the Euro. So moving towards the greater European integration by preventing the disintegration of Euro was also in the interest of German export economy and national interests within multilateral Europe. Chancellor Merkel has largely been successful to meet the German national interests by saving the Euro and strengthening or enhancing European integration project.

Angela Merkel is completing her third term (2013-17) as the Chancellor, the tenure which has witnessed more challenging issues to the European integration, refugee crisis in 2015 and Brexit in 2016. Merkel has been at the forefront to address the refugee crisis where she has been seen more decisive leader compared to her initially reluctant approach to the eurozone crisis. Initially she had adopted the open door policy to handle the refugee crisis and Germany became the highest refugee taker with estimated 1.5 million in Europe which is the result of civil war in Syria. While other EU member states' didn't respond to the crisis with the same 'moral authority' the way Chancellor Angela Merkel has responded despite facing severe criticism and political setbacks at the domestic level, she has shown willingness to contest the federal election in September 2017 for the fourth term in office.

Leadership and crisis has been two driving factors for the European integration, and the case of Chancellor Angela Merkel's role in her first two terms as the Chancellor compliment it appropriately. Angela Merkel has faced challenges at the domestic level being the first woman Chancellor from East German origin, but she has moved away from such identities and has established herself as the key leader in Europe. Her leadership role and policy responses to the challenges in her first two term as the

Chancellor from 2005 to 2009 and from 2009-2013 has been decisive, sometimes reluctant or wait and watch approach which draw criticism but she has successfully defended German national interests combining it with European interest while dealing with major European crisis which enhanced and strengthened the European integration.

After critically examining the problems of European integration and leadership role of German Chancellors especially role of Chancellor Angela Merkel's first two tenures as the case study the research has established the following key findings. First, German foreign policy to its core has been intertwined with the vision of expanding and enhancing European integration. Second, German national interests has been closely linked with the vision of strong, enhanced and integrated Europe. Third, Germany under the leadership of its Chancellors has been at the forefront of expanding European integration. Five, German Chancellors learning from their past have ensured to exercise their leadership role within multilateral framework and cooperating with their counterparts in EU member states. Six, Chancellor Angela Merkel has firmly responded to the crisis posed during her first two tenures, be it eurozone crisis or the EU budget negotiations to strengthen the integration process by creating mechanism with multilateral approach. Finally, Chancellor Angela Merkel's response to the crisis met with criticism of being hegemonic and reluctant leaders but she has been successful to fulfill German national interests within larger vision of enhancing and strengthening European integration.

Since 1952, Europe has moved from a tiny six member community of the European Coal and Steel Community to legal entity of 27 member states European Union which has today become a normative and economic power in international affairs and participating in international conference, agreements and as a negotiator in capacity of a separate legal entity. European Union has gone through various challenge and achievements and today celebrating 60 years of the Treaty of Rome (1957). It has been witnessed that crisis and leadership always shaped and carried forward the European Union, so the crisis in form of Brexit and growing stature of Germany and German Chancellor Angela Merkel along with incumbent pro-integration French President Emmanuel Macron is going to shape the future of European Union with its 27 member states.

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## Annexure I

List of the experts, I have interviewed during my Ph.D field tip to Berlin, Germany

S.No.	Name of the Interviewee	Designation and Institution	Date of the Interview	Consent to Referring in the Thesis*
1	Prof. Simon Koschut	Guest Scientist, Centre for Transnational Studies, Foreign and Security Policy, Otto Suhr Institute of Political Science, FU, Berlin, Germany.	14 April, 2016	YES
2	Dr. Nicolai von Ondarza	Research Division: EU/Europe, Deputy Head of Research Division, German Institute of International and Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin, Germany.	15 April 2016	YES
3	Dr. Henning Riecke	Head of Programme-Transatlantic Relations Programme, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), Berlin, Germany.	20 April 2016	YES
4	Dr. Martin Sieg	Associate Fellow, Robert Bosch Centre for Central and Eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), Berlin, Germany.	28 April 2016	YES
5	Julian Rappold	Programme Officer, Alfred von Oppenheim Centre for European Policy Studies, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), Berlin, Germany.	02 May 2016	YES
6	Julie Hamann	Programme Officer, Franco-German Cooperation Programme, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), Berlin, Germany.	02 May, 2016	YES
7	Prof. Tanja Borzel	Director- European Integration Centre, Freie University, Berlin, Germany	03 May 2016	YES
8.	Dr. Ingo Peters	Associate Professor, Otto Suhr Institute for Political Science, Centre for Transnational	05 April, 2016	YES



		Relations, Foreign and Security Policy, Freie University, Berlin, Germany		
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\*All the interviewee has signed a consent letter which gives permission to quote their arguments in the thesis.

## **Annexure II**

The questions for the interviews with the experts during the field trip to Berlin, Germany from 07-01-2016 to 05-06-2016;

- a) Why European integration process is different from other regional integration experiments? Why does there something so different and unique about this process compare to other regional integration experiments in Latin America, Africa and South and South East Asia?
- b) Historically, European integration process has always been considered as elite driven process. How do you assess the role of leadership (especially political leadership) like Adenauer-Gaulle, Mitterrand-Schmidt or Mitterrand-Kohl and others in this 'elite driven process' of integration?
- c) Franco-German cooperation has always been considered as the major driver for European Integration. From Coal and Steel community in 1952 to Maastricht treaty in 2010, How do you assess Germany's role in the process or what are the reasons that Germany always walked two steps further to strengthen this process compare to other member states?
- d) First I would like to make more biographical question, how do you analyse Chancellor Merkel's personality as a political leader with comparison to league of other great European political leaders which we have discussed in earlier question?
- e) Sir, Angela Merkel has become chancellor first time when European Union was facing tough challenge just after the failure of the constitutional treaty in 2005 and three years later European Union has faced the most threatening challenge of Euro-zone crisis. So how do you assess Angela Markel's first two terms of chancellorship with regards to European integration or European policies which has seen Euro zone crisis, issues of enlargement, Turkey's

candidacy for European Union's membership and also seen success of Maastricht treaty?

- f) Euro-zone crisis was the major challenge which has definitely brought the German chancellor at the centre stage of Europe and her leadership met with praise and criticism too. I would like to understand your point of view about the role of Germany and her leadership and assertiveness during Euro Zone crisis and its larger impact on future of European integration?
- g) How would the current refugee crisis and Chancellor Merkel's grand stand on the crisis is going to make an impact on concept of European multiculturalism which definitely going to make larger impact on further European integration? And also how do you assess her leadership role on the issue of refuse crisis?
- h) Chancellor Merkel as an European leader and Merkel as a German leader, how do you assess this dual-leadership, is this the same approach or leadership personality or there is a difference in approach at both level, not on policy level but I would like to know more about leadership style level?
- i) After failure of the constitutional treaty in 2005, and just three years later again 2008 Euro-zone crisis and now refugee crisis. In 2017 Brexit, how do you see one after another crisis for European integration, it's a chance to strengthen the process or exposing the integration process and its future?