Social and Economic Exclusion in China and India: A Comparative Study of Ethnic Minorities in Sichuan and Dalits in Uttar Pradesh, 1991-2013

Thesis submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University for award of the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

CHANDRA SEN

Chinese Studies
Centre for East Asian Studies
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
NEW DELHI-110067
INDIA
2017

Date-

DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled **"Social and Economic Exclusion in China and India: A Comparative Study of Ethnic Minorities in Sichuan and Dalits in Uttar Pradesh, 1991-2013"** submitted by me for the award of the degree of **DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or other University.

Chandra Sen

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this thesis be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli

(CHAIRPERSON, CEAS)

Chairperson
Centre for East Asian Studies
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi-110067

Prof. Varaprasad Sekhar Dolla

SUPERVISOR

Supervisor
Centre for East Asian Studies
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi-110067

Contents

Acknowledgements

The study on ethnic minorities and Dalits is considered to be off the track in the Area Studies. Especially, the social exclusion of ethnic minorities in Sichuan and Dalits in Uttar Pradesh is entirely a new endeavor to accomplish. This challenge could not have been achieved without my supervisor-cum-mentor, Prof. Varaprasad Sekhar Dolla.

My first heartfelt acknowledgement goes to him, whose half decade of continuous guidance, and critical inputs helped me to improve my understanding regarding the subject. His guidance not only has a bearing on the present thesis but also on my personal and academic life in future. His support for choosing this topic was crucial as it is new for the area studies. This work would have been an incomplete endeavor without his active encouragement. I sincerely thank the other faculty members of the Centre; Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli, Prof. Alka Acharya, Dr. Ritu Agarwal. Apart from them Prof. Lalima Varma, Prof. H.S. Prabhakar, Prof. Srabani Roy Choudhuri and Dr. Jitendra Uttam as all gave their feedback in the seminar meeting.

I thank Prof. Rajesh Shrikrishnaa Kharat for his critical comments on my draft.

Dr. Chuanjie Zhang, Associate Dean Department of International Relations, Office of International Cooperation and Exchange Director, Doctoral Program in Developing Country Studies Tsinghua University China provided me invitation letter to visit China for my field work. My sincere thanks go to him. Dr. Zhangting from the Centre of Russian and Central Asian Studies, Dr. Yuanmei, an expert on India and China from the International Studies, East China Normal University, Shanghai, shared her perception. Dr. Rajiv Ranjan from Shangahi University and friend and doctoral candidates Sudeep Jaiswal and Anna Thomas made my travel easier in China. My sincere thanks to them also.

From Chengdu, Dr. Li Jingfeng, Centre for Indian Studies, and his associate Li Yi along with You Xiangfei, the Head of Tibetology Institute played a crucial role during my field visit to Sichuan province. This visit would have been incomplete without the valuable suggestions and discussion of Chief of Minority and Religious Affairs of Sichuan, Liu Dong. They provided all sorts of material besides accompanying me to Sichuan Public library as well as Sichuan University. They took me historical places that enriched my knowledge about Chinese society and culture. It was Chao Xie, a doctoral candidate from Tsinghua University, Beijing, without him, the China tour of mine would have been impossible.

I would like to thank my galaxy of friends; Jigme, Lobsang, Jasmeet, Rajesh, Rakesh, Lakshmi, Chandramani, Jasmeet, Dinesh, Rahul, Pooja, Chinmay, Aparajitha, Archana, Subodh, Naresh, Daya Shankar, Arun, Anoop, Rajan, Abdul, Matin, Om Prakash, for their help and love. The responsibility of any discrepancy in the work lays with me.

Chandra Sen

Centre for East Asian Studies
Chinese Division
School of International Studies
JNU, New Delhi.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AA:	Affirmative Action
BAWS:	Babasaheb Ambedkar Writings and Speeches
BJP:	Bhartiya Janata Party
BSP:	Bahujan Samaj Party
CASS:	Chinese Academy of Social Science
CC:	Central Committee
CCP:	Chinese Communist Party
CJI:	Chief Justice of India
CRC:	Commission for Racial Equality
CSDS:	Centre for the Study of Developing Societies
DAM:	Dalit Adivasi and Minorities
DRC:	Disability Rights Commission
EF:	European Foundation
EHRC:	Equality Human Right Commission
EOC:	Commission for Equal Opportunities
EPW:	Economic and Political Weekly
EU:	European Union
FDI:	Foreign Direct Investment
FIEs:	Foreign Investment Enterprises
FYP:	Five Year Plan
GDP:	Gross Domestic Production
GLP:	Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution
GOI:	Government of India
GR:	Growth Rate
HC:	High Court
IEP:	Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
IHDS:	Indian Human Development Survey
ILO:	International Labour Organisation
IMF:	International Monetary Fund
INC:	Indian National Congress
IT:	Information Technology
LA:	Legislative Assembly
LS:	Lok Sabha
M.L.A.:	Member of Legislative Assembly
M.P.:	Member of Parliament
NBC:	National Bureau of Statistics
NC:	National Census
NCRB:	National Crime Report Bureau
NGO:	Non-governmental Organisation
NPC:	National People's Congress
NRI:	Non-Resident Indian
NSSO:	National Sample Survey Office
OBC:	Other Backward Class
PLA:	People's Liberation Army
PP:	Preferential Policy
PRC:	People's Republic of China
RPI:	Republican Party of India

SC:	Supreme Court
SCC:	Scheduled Caste Commission
SCs:	Scheduled Castes
SNAC:	State National Bureau of Statics
SOEs:	State Owned Enterprises
SP:	Samajvadi Party
SPSS:	Statistical Package for the Social Scientists
SSA:	Social Structure of Accumulation
STC:	Scheduled Tribe Commission
STs:	Scheduled Caste
UN:	United Nations
UP:	Uttar Pradesh
USA:	United States of America
USSR:	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WB:	World Bank:
WHO:	World Health Organisation
WTO:	World Trade Organisation

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF MAPS AND FIGURES

Maps

Figures

Chapter-1

Introduction

Chapter-1

Introduction

1. Background

In the recent past several social scientists have started recognizing the importance of social exclusion and explained it from various vantage points leading to a better understanding of the concept. Social exclusion focuses on the multidimensionality of deprivation whereby certain sections of the society are often deprived of different privileges and options at the same time. It refers to exclusion in the economic, social and political sphere. Moreover, less discussed in the literature but perhaps more relevant to the theoretical contribution of the concept-social exclusion implies a focus on the relations and processes that cause deprivation.

This phenomenon is discernible in China and India as well. The nature and degree of social and economic exclusion in China and India differ given the differences in their political, economic and social systems. However, to address the issues of social and economic exclusion both the states have provided certain constitutional arrangements that are broadly called affirmative action. The affirmative action has broader meaning and hence should be seen in the global context also. The liberalization and privatization of Indian and Chinese economies led to the weakening of the importance of these provisions.

In addition, in India, religion and caste are the driving forces for evolving and consolidating group identity. On the other hand, in China it is mainly ethnicity and culture. Ethnicity, caste and poverty are related. In both India and China, religious minorities and disadvantaged social groups are much poorer than the majority population. Economic and cultural forms of injustice are hybrid forms which give rise to what Nancy Fraser calls 'bivalent collectivities'. It is bound up with the cultural - valuational disadvantage. Gender, race, ethnicity and caste all have bivalent collectivities. This includes both economic and cultural injustice. Thus, people subordinated by caste, ethnicity and race need both redistribution and recognition.

The situation and the social, political and historical contexts of Sichuan and Uttar Pradesh are different but the extent of exploitation, marginalization and social and economic exclusion of

Dalits in Uttar Pradesh and minorities in Sichuan are similar in certain ways especially after the liberalization of its economy. Sichuan was China's most populous province until 1997 when Chongqing was separated from it and UP is still most populous state in India. While Sichuan, as of 2010, ranks as both the 3rd largest and 4th most populous province in China but UP used to be the largest state of India till 2000, now it is 4th largest with the one-fifty150 seats in the NPC. Moreover, UP is the largest Dalit populated (20.5%, 2011 Census), with the highest number of parliament seats (8o) and known for the first ever non- Congress Dalit Chief Minister in India whose politics underscore the emancipation of Dalits.

In Uttar Pradesh, after the rise of social movements the situation of Dalits vis a vis other backward communities has changed dramatically. Historically, UP has been the centre of Indian politics and this trend is continuing today also. Sudha Pai et al. (2005) argue that 'not only because of its size but also for historical reasons, Uttar Pradesh has always been a key state in the Indian union. Major political movements in independent India, including backward caste and Dalit politics and the rise of Hindutva have largely developed here or have significantly impinged on it. Economic backwardness and political populism are some of the factors intertwined with the recent history of Uttar Pradesh.

The present study thus endeavours a conceptual understanding of social and economic exclusion in two different political systems of the world, India and China that adopted divergent policies in their respective contexts to address the issue of social exclusion. The study would try to find out the nature and modes of social and economic exclusion and consequences for the historically oppressed Dalits and Chinese ethnic minorities in Han dominated society. The onslaught of globalization that unleashed the pace of privatization and marketisation has been diminishing the state's role, raising a serious debate over the state led welfare policies and affirmative action in both the countries. As a result the condition of erstwhile excluded communities, which only depended on the state, has deteriorated. In this new scenario, where the market plays a major role in development, the debate on social and economic exclusion and inclusion has become very crucial necessitating the imperative to revisit and rethink with an eye on its multi-dimensional nature.

2. Literature Review

A number of scholars have delineated social and economic exclusion in China and India from various vantage points. The literature on social and economic exclusion in China and India is

divided into four sections- social and economic exclusion in China, India, Sichuan and Uttar Pradesh.

2.1 *Social and Economic Exclusion in China*

Social and economic exclusion in China is an evolving area but there are many scholars who have been writing on it. These studies cover not only the exclusion of economic process but also how ethnic minorities are being excluded in that process. C. Gladney Dru, Collier, A.S. Bhalla and Qin, L. Wong, Brenda Chan, Kinglun, Ngok, Li Ying, Chui Ernest, Shaohua Zhang, and Yuegen Xiong etc.

This part of literature review would highlight the nature of the Chinese state with respect to its ethnic/ minority policy vis a vis Han majority population. Moreover it tries to examine the liberalization phenomenon while factoring the market forces.

There is a major debate over the nature of the political system in China and India that raises the questions whether democratic state (India) and authoritarian state (China), can have the similar policies and similar consequences?

Gladney (1995) notes that the economic reforms in China's minority areas were designed to improve the living conditions of ethnic minorities and to encourage and quicken the pace of their integration into Han culture. However, one unexpected consequence of these reforms turned out to be what Gladney calls 'ethnic revitalization' and 'religious resurgence'.

Some observers (Collier, 2001) argue that the effect of ethnicity on economic growth would depend on the nature of the political system in place (democracy versus an authoritarian rule). They believe that ethnicity has no adverse effect in a democratic regime with adequate political rights. It is the lack of political rights for ethnic minorities under an authoritarian regime that do generate adverse effects on economic growth. Lack of political rights encourages rent-seeking, which will tend to benefit ethnic elites. This argument does not apply to non-democratic China, (Bhalla and Qiu (2006) which has achieved one of the most impressive economic growth rates in history. This is true not only of overall growth rates for China, but also of provincial growth rates. Even in the south-west, which is ethnically very diverse, growth rates in many provinces are quite high, though not as high as in less diverse coastal provinces.

Surveys of inter-ethnic relations in China also, (those between the Uygur and Han Chinese) (Yee, 2003) suggest that tensions arise from segregation and isolation. The strong ethnic identity of the Uygur and their mistrust of the Han Chinese are major barriers to social cohesion in Xinjiang.

Li (2004) reviews cases of urban exclusion in China by studying the political privileges of the rich upper classes, and the lack of social protection and vulnerability of the poor. The argument of L. Wong (2004) details the historical context by adducing the salience of development and justice in the period before and after the market reforms, which is followed by an analysis of the state reform discourse in justifying market reforms and their function in development and human welfare.

Brenda Chan (2006) explains that after the economic reforms and some relaxation on foreign travel a new wave of overseas migration from mainland China has taken place. These new Chinese migrants are also forming cyber-communities on the Internet. She investigates whether virtual communities formed by new Chinese migrants also offer identity options to migrants in terms of ethnicity and national belonging, as offline immigrant associations do. Thus he argues that virtual communities formed by migrants may or may not offer distinct identity options to their members in terms of ethnic or national belonging. Virtual communities with very diverse user profiles may offer more distinct identity options for their members as a strategy in attracting and retaining members, compared to virtual communities with a more homogeneous membership.

Liu et al. (2008) study the social exclusion of two categories of urban poor, laid-off workers and rural migrants with special reference to Nanjing. The transition from planned to market economy in China led to the closure of many state-owned enterprises.

The embrace of market reforms and increasing globalization has radically transformed China's redistribution regime as well as distorted old commitments to social justice. This paper reviews China's attempt to realize the goal of social justice, including its changing rhetoric, strategies and actions. Moreover, the economic reforms have dramatically increased inequality and social exclusion in China (Chan, Ngok, and Phillips, 2008).

Li Ying and Chui Ernest (2010) carry forward the above logic based on a review of government policy documents and other literature, this paper provides an account of the evolution of government policies in China since 2000. The Chinese state selectively provides

some inclusive policies for rural-urban migrants but denies them formal membership and offers them only partial social entitlements in the host city.

A few studies (Wang, 2011) are concerned with social exclusion in education. Wang argues that Sen's (2000) classification of exclusion (constitutive deprivation, instrumental deprivation, active exclusion and passive exclusion) and capability approach can be applied to the study of the educational inequalities which have persisted in China. She argues that the Sen's analytical framework helps to discuss the choices and needs of different social groups regarding access to higher education.

Shaohua Zhan (2012) points out that it is widely believed that household registration (*hukou*) continues to play a fundamental role in determining migrant workers' life chances in contemporary China. Moreover, it is not hukou but social exclusion and market resources that most concern the majority of migrant workers when they strive to find a better job, move up the social ladder, and secure opportunities to settle in the city.

The arguments of many scholars who examine the marginalization of Dalits and backward caste in India find resonance in the Yuegen Xiong (2012) work, wherein he aims to explore and interpret the growing social inequality in China, in particular between urban and rural areas, and between ordinary people and the elite classes. He also attempts to explain the impact of social policy on reducing inequality in China as well as its institutional constraints as the government strives to integrate the fragmented social security system.

2.2 *Social and Economic Exclusion in India*

The writings on the social and economic exclusion and especially of Dalits and backward caste have carved a much in the growing body of literature in India in the recent past. Historically, scholars have written on it but the 21st century took different roots with the assertion of Dalit/subaltern politics. B.R. Ambedkar, Gopal Guru, Sukhdev Thorat, Anand Teltumbade, Paul Attewell, Nirmal Chandra, and Nidhi Sabharawal are some of scholars whose writings I have chosen to review.

Historically, social and economic exclusion of Dalits and backward caste in India has different trajectories. They have been excluded at all levels. Since independence constitutional provisions have been made to include them into the mainstream. But the liberalization of its economy has once again begun to marginalize them. The recent literature

will give glimpses of exclusion of Dalits at multi-dimensional levels as well as their deterioration in the 21st.

Ambedkar (1936) primarily argued to restructure the retrograde Indian social system. He attacked the hierarchical system for maintaining an unjust and unequal system for centuries. He blames the philosophy of Hinduism and other religious texts that set the rules and sanctioned all exclusionary practices to the depressed classes in India.

Gopal Guru (2000) highlights the marginalization of Dalits in several areas. He insists that the very term must be interpreted in the Indian context, particularly in the case of Dalits' . While delineating the nature of marginalization, he divides it into political, economic, social, intellectual, cultural and categories level.

The same argument is also made by Sukhadeo Thorat and Paul Attewell (2007) in their work where they examine the prevalence of discrimination in the job application process of private sector enterprises in India. These findings document a pattern of decision-making by private sector employers that repeatedly advantages job applicants from Hindu higher caste backgrounds and disadvantages low caste and Muslim job applicants with equal qualifications. The findings suggest that social exclusion is not just a residue of the past clinging to the margins of the Indian economy, nor is it limited to people of little education. On the contrary, it appears that caste favouritism and the social exclusion of Dalits and Muslims have infused private enterprises even in the most dynamic and modern sectors of the Indian economy.

Anand Teltumbde (2008) outlines various causes of social exclusion in India. He underscores a three-pronged strategy - protective laws, compensatory discrimination and developmental policies taken by the Indian government in his work. He argues that Indian ruling class treated Dalits as the Western countries treated Africans. He argues that when it comes to the question of walking the talk, they betray the cause and talk about merit and efficiency which is identical to the racist talk in the West.

In the history of exclusion and inclusion of Dalits and backward caste and marginalized has to be been seen in the context of social justice in India. The affirmative (reservation) provisions and constitutional arrangements provided by the Indian Constitution take care of the historically deprived sections of India. The measures are under threat by the privatization and globalization, which is argued by Gopal Guru that this marginalization of Dalits would

be completed by globalization that would lead to subvert reservation. This logic is also fits in the case of other backward caste also.

In the 21st century, both China and India have been grappling with social and economic exclusion tension. The reason can be traced in the work of Kumar, Nirmal Chandra (2009), where he raises the following crucial questions. Do the economic policies or the "business model" adopted by China and India necessarily aggravate inequalities in income and wealth distribution, and thus exacerbate social contradictions? He tries to examine the rising concentration of income and wealth, the trends in poverty, employment and unemployment, the nature and extent of social unrest, and how the rich are getting richer, aided by fiscal sops, and outlines a feasible alternative centred on development with equity.

In the Indian context Sukhdeo Thorat and Nidhi Sadana Sabharwal (2010) argue that Social exclusion has encompassed three main components in this understanding: denial of equal opportunity in multiple spheres' its embedded in societal inter-relations and causal relationships of exclusion and poverty and deprivation. They posit that the Dalits are excluded not because they lack skills, merit, but because of birth. The so called hierarchical nature of Indian society and its philosophical logic from Hinduism is the determining factor. The graded inequality among the four Vernas and the "untouchable" Dalits) at the last ladder were the victims of the caste system and social exclusion. The "untouchables" face dual exclusion, first by denial of equal access and secondly by 'forced non-association'. Moreover, caste- based exclusion is essentially "structural in nature" and therefore is comprehensive in coverage.

2.3 *Social and Economic Exclusion in Sichuan*

In the context of Sichuan province, the Chinese as well as the non-Chinese scholars have written on the theme. Some of them are Thomas Herber, Guo Jian-xun, Elena V. Barabantseva, Ming Zhuang, Wai-fong Ting and Hongli Chen. They cover from ethnicity to developmental process and their exclusion in the Han dominated institutions and policy making process.

Sichuan is the south-western (non-coastal) province of China, meaning that it is far from the hub of growth. In 1978, when Deng Xiaoping initiated reform programmes. Sichuan was one of the first provinces to undergo limited experimentation with market economic enterprise. It

has the largest member of minorities inhabiting including, Tibetans, Yi, Miao and Hui. Moreover, it has got one fifty (150) seats in the National People's Congress.

Elena V. Barabantseva (2009) in her work examines the effects of China's official discourse on development. She exposes and analyzes the ethnic minority label that China's dominant discourse on development attaches to the Western Development Programme (WDP) and argues that this discourse prevents ethnic minorities from becoming fully recognized participants in the economic transformations taking place in China. It does so by localizing ethnic minorities in one region, China's west, and by characterizing them in a derogatory fashion. Ethnic minorities and the western region are often represented by the official discourse as obstacles to modernization as they are both associated with backwardness, underdevelopment, and stagnation, among other derogatory characteristics. She contends that ethnic minorities remain on the margins of the modern transformation in China.

Ming Zhuang in his work (2009) discusses how well-placed civil society actors are able to create a space for migrant workers' concerns, which included private sector service providers and the media as well as local government officials. This case focuses on three key concerns: labor rights, children's education and social security. It shows how joint civil society and government initiatives reverse the patterns of migrant workers' exclusion from these public services came about and their achievements and continuing challenges.

Wai-fong Ting a & Hongli Chen (2013) examine the Community economy as an alternative model which emphasizes not just on economic growth, but also the importance of renewing the interpersonal relationships among local villagers and the relationships between rural producers and urban consumers.

2.4 *Social and Economic Exclusion in Uttar Pradesh*

There are numerous scholars and commentators writing on the conditions of Dalits in UP, their assertion and on the role of identity politics. Some of them are A.K.Verma, Sudha Pai, Zoya Hasan and Craig Jeffery etc.

Sudha Pai (2004) deals with the different mobilizational strategies in UP and MP, used by the BSP & Congress, respectively. She talks about the upliftment of Dalits in UP where it was based on identity and self respect while in MP it is more individual economic empowerment.

A K Verma (2007) in his work proves that the role of local politics as well as the Dalit mobalization have given a new turn in the history of UP, which he calls 'reverse osmosis'. In the context of elections he identifies a new political phenomenon has become noticeable. Traditional caste-based and exclusionary parties are reaching out to other groups even rival caste and class groups, in the hope of forming a government on their own.

Many scholars have articulated that the Dalit assertion in UP has led to "Dalit Revolution". But the reality is highly contested and misleading. Craig Jeffrey, Patricia Jeffery and Roger Jeffery (2008) in their work use recent field research to challenge the widely held view that a "Dalitrevolution" is occurring in North India. Drawing on two years' ethnographic research in a village in western Uttar Pradesh, the authors uncover the growing importance of a generation of local political activists among Dalits that these young men have not been able to effect a broad structural transformation at the local level.

Zoya Hasan (2011) has analyzed the changed socio-political scenario of UP in the context of declining the dominant Party Congress in the state and its implications for the lower caste politics. Hence, today none of the political parties commit to change the structures that generate class, gender or community inequalities. Rather, they only seek to redistribute the spoils of office to favor one group over another. At best, this can broaden the avenues of upward mobility without greatly changing the norms and structures of distribution.

3. Critical Gaps in the Existing Literature

Thus the literature available on social and economic exclusion in China and India is substantial. But most of the literature does not deal with the social and economic exclusion focusing on caste and ethnicity. Therefore this study critically scrutinizes the conceptualization of the term as well as tries to establish social and economic exclusion with respect to the state policy of liberalization and globalization.

4. Research Questions

What is the nature and extent of social and economic exclusion in China and India? How do the political institutions and social structures of both the countries exclude certain communities?

What is the impact of liberalization and privatization on the socially and economically excluded people of both the countries?

Does the exclusion in both countries lead to social tension and cause any threat to stability?

How can Chinese and Indian states learn from each other in addressing the issues of social and economic exclusion in their respective societies?

Is the local politics of Sichuan and Uttar Pradesh provide any lesson to address social and economic exclusion in their respective regions?

5. Hypotheses

Social and economic exclusion in China and India has been leading to the evolution of politics of identity, representation and dignity of the marginalized communities.

The local politics based on ethnicity in Sichuan and caste in UP have been redefining the social and economic dynamics.

6. Definition, Rationale and Scope of the Study

The concept and reality of social and economic exclusion in China and India is increasingly being recognised to be vital in the contemporary period. In this context the role of social policy in the form of affirmative action is seen as a solution for the integrity and unity of both the societies. The deteriorating conditions of ethnic minorities and Dalits are alarming in the both Hindu and Han dominated societies.

Social and cultural sources of exclusion are rooted in the informal social structures and institutions of caste and ethnicity covering not only the private but also public domain governed by the State. Social exclusion of groups or individuals within the larger context is a denial of equal opportunity, respect and recognition of the right to development. This phenomenon, therefore, calls for additional policies complementing anti-poverty and economic development programmes.

Though China and India have different political systems, both exclude certain communities in politics, economic and social development. While this exclusion is based on ethnic identity in China and it is on caste identity in India, although the social and economic exclusion of other backward castes in India and particularly in UP is significant. The proposed study, thus,

focuses only on Dalits. The author is against the categorization of castes into higher and lower. Therfore, both the terms are put in quotation marks.

The nature and scope of this research includes conceptualization of 'social and economic exclusion' in China and India. Moreover, it focuses on the ethnic minorities of Sichuan and Dalits of UP. Although the context and historical conditions of both the communities in their respective states is different but the exclusion and deprivation is quite alarming, particularly after the recent phase of globalisation and liberalisation. Sichuan is the fourth largest populous province with having 150 members in the NPC on the other hand UP is the most populous state with the highest number of parliament seats (80). In addition, Sichuan is known for its highest numbers of ethnic minorities while UP is significant for the concentration of the highest number of Dalits. But their deteriorating conditions and pauperization is alarming and considerable. Thus this study also delineates the implications of social and economic exclusion in both the societies. The time frame chosen for the study is 1991-2013.

7. Research Methodology

The study is located in the theoretical framework of Amartya Sen's classification of exclusion and 'Capability Approach' as well as Nancy Fraser's idea of 'Bivalent Collectivites' and 'Cultural - Valuational Disadvantage' by taking into account the various modes of social and economic exclusion as well as the increasing relevance in both societies.

It has used both primary and secondary research material and the various resources related to this topic. The primary resources include government white papers, newspapers, special reports. The secondary resources include books, articles, seminar papers, newspaper reports, journal and online articles. It has employed the analytical, historical analysis.

The proposed study considers social and economic exclusion as independent variable and ethnic/caste assertion as dependent variable. Social policy of China and India is intervening variable. After the economic reform led by the both the states played a crucial role in the life of ethnic minorities and Dalits in their respective societies. The social and economic policies of both the states will be determined in the context of their pauperisation and mobilisation.

8. Chapterization

The introductory chapter gives background to the study besides highlighting research questions, hypotheses, definition, rationale, scope and the structure of the study.

The second chapter explores the genealogy of the term 'Exclusion' and various debates over it. It investigates the application of the term in China as well as in India. At the same time this study engages Amartya Sen's idea of 'Capability Approach' and Nancy Fraser's concept of 'Bivalent Collectivites' and 'Cultural-Valuational Disadvantage' to examine social and economic exclusion in China and India.

The historical legacies of social and economic exclusion, institutional and structural justification as well as the societal norms that have been the source of such exclusion are part of the third chapter. Moreover, the chapter focuses on the State measures, and constitutional safeguards against all the modes of the social and economic exclusion. At the same time, itanalyses the social policy of both the States to redress the exclusion in their respective societies.

The fourth chapter is as a case study on social exclusion in Sichuan and UP. It delineates the exclusionary policy of the ethnic minorities in the province vis-a-vis the Han majority besides comparing it to the conditions of Dalits in UP. Moreover, it also analyzes the dissatisfaction of the ethnic minorities and Dalits, their specificity and the impact of social policy of both China and India.

Social and economic exclusion in Sichuan and Uttar Pradesh is the central thrust of the fifth chapter. Being the largest Dalit populated state and ruled by a Dalit Chief Minister through a Dalit movement makes it unique in the Indian subcontinent. At the same time the historical importance of being the limited economic experiments done by Deng regime makes Sichuan even more challenging and unique.

The concluding chapter summarizes the major findings of the study. It maps the trajectory of social and economic exclusion in China and India with a focus on Sichuan and Uttar Pradesh.

Chapter-2

Exclusion: A Conceptual and Theoretical Discussion

Chapter-2

Exclusion: A Conceptual and Theoretical Discussion

2.1 Introduction

The literature and policy papers on exclusion often use the terms such as discrimination, deprivation, marginalization, and segregation interchangeably. These terms have definite origin and meanings. The concepts of exclusion and marginalization have multiple dimensions. Some forms of exclusion and marginalization are historical in nature while others unfold with time and space. The policies of governments also add to the marginalization and deprivation process of some specific groups, individuals, classes. The structural and societal exclusion happens due to the consistent negligence of government and the society. Exclusion encompasses the prejudices and manufactured biases against particular communities and groups. These biases are deep-seated in the psyche of people against the people of certain minorities and ethnic groups. The longevity of the exclusionary process makes people more vulnerable. This vulnerability leads to other kinds of discrimination, and segregation.

Exclusion has been a universal phenomenon; it encompasses a substantial part of the population. Every society has peculiar specificity to it. The narration of apartheid is a well-known fact which reminds us one of the worst forms of exclusion and humiliation. The caste system of South Asian countries has its peculiarity. To touch or not touch by someone's birth is the example of the worst kind of humiliation and exclusion. The cultural and religious sanctions on women's mobility are another kind of illustration that shows the exclusionary practices in human history. The Political subversion, cultural invasions, patriarchal and racial arrogance and class exploitation could be cited as some of the reasons for exclusion and segregation in the world.

Keeping the relevance and specificity in mind, this chapter would be focusing on the term 'social exclusion'. It is located in a multidimensional approach.

Thus this chapter seeks to explore the conceptualization, genealogy and historicity of the term 'Social Exclusion' and various debates on it. The chapter will also examine the usefulness

and limitations of the term. The specificity of the origin of the term in France would also be discussed. At the same time this study would engage Amartya Sen's idea of 'capability approach' and Nancy Fraser's concept of 'bivalent collectivities' and 'cultural-valuational disadvantage' to address the problem of social and economic exclusion in China and India.

2.2 Social Exclusion: Conceptual Underpinnings and its Genealogy

The term social exclusion has emerged over the last few decades acquiring conceptual clarity as more scholars began to turn their attention to it.

2.2.A *Conceptualisation of the term Social Exclusion:*

The conceptual underpinning of the term social exclusion is of recent origin. The term exclusion is Eurocentric, specifically of French-origin and its short span had raised many questions about its applicability and relevance in the non-European world, especially in the Asian and African countries. The term 'social exclusion' has limited use in its origin which primarily focused on the excluded groups of welfare schemes particularly those implemented in the Western societies. The exclusion of these sections happened because of their neglect by the state. The structural and historical discrimination and kinds of prejudice are central to its origin.

Social exclusion as a phenomenon is thus new in the context of European societies. It modern use is also very specific and limited. The modern capitalist approach to development produced a class of have-nots. These people were left out of the fruits of development. The responsibility for their condition can be fixed on the states and their political elites. Hence the economic exploitation, poverty and deprivation could also be seen as social exclusion in the modern European sense. The exclusion of the left-out groups could be seen in the context of resource distribution and the failure of state. When The fruits of development did not reach every section of the society, the excluded classes began to assert in the modern Western societies. Can we see social exclusion in its entirety? Are the institutions, be it political or social, responsible for it? Beyond the political and social exclusion, the procedural dimension is one more aspect of social exclusion. What may be its limitations and solutions are some questions that need to be probed.

Critics of this concept, such as Du To it argues that it has limited use in situations where chronic poverty is often the result of incorporation of particularly disadvantageous terms ('adverse incorporation') rather than any process of exclusion. Du To it (2004: 987–8) 'therefore calls for a move beyond the simple counter-positions of 'exclusion' and 'inclusion' and ….the use of concepts that allow a much more sensitive analysis of the links between livelihood dynamics and the broader discursive, social and spatial formations of power.'

Social exclusion of groups and individual has been a historical phenomenon. The society, culture, religion and states place an important role in the exclusion of these groups. The recognition of excluded group and its causes are very important for their upliftment. The modern developmentalist approach has been very problematic in understanding the concept of exclusion. Scholars on development treated it in the class terms only. The non-material dimensions of exclusion were not taken into consideration. The issue of poverty was seen as the only dimension of exclusion but social exclusion involves multi-dimentional facets.

A holistic understanding of exclusion could help us in two ways. Firstly, it will help development practitioners to acquire a better understanding and appreciation of the non-material dimensions of poverty; and secondly it will stimulate discussion which in turn will help development practitioners to act effectively in response to this dimension of poverty reduction.

2.2.B *Genealogy of Social Exclusion*

The French bureaucrat René Lenoir, writing about a quarter of a century ago, is given credit of authorship of the expression (Lenoir, 1974). The concept of social exclusion is seen as covering a remarkably wide range of social and economic problems.

> "The primary concern of the French bureaucrat (René Lenoir) was limited to merely addressing the monetary and occupational issues. The new scenario has brought many changes in the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of social exclusion today. Hence, its relevance and usefulness has given new impetus to the policy-makers and academia. Some proponents of development theory believe that the concept of social exclusion is useful because the emphasis on the social and economic processes that create exclusion helps academics and policy makers to better understand the causes and consequences of exclusion and deprivation.

This in turn opens up new possibilities in terms of policy interventions'' (de Haan 1998:11; Gore 1995:8; Sen 2000: 45-7).

Arjan de Haan in his work, 'Social Exclusion: enriching the Understanding of deprivation' (1998: 23) gives a detailed history of the term and further illustrates how the term had its deep roots in France

> "The popularity of the new term was partly the result of the unpopularity in France of the (British) concept of 'poverty'. This was discredited because of its association with Christian charity, the *ancien regime*, and utilitarian liberalism. French Republicans have rejected both liberal individualism and socialism in favour of the idea of 'solidarity', and the welfare state was justified as a means of furthering social integration. Correspondingly, social exclusion was defined as a rupture of the social fabric, and attributed to a failure of the state" (ibid: 24).

The term social exclusion has been defined by different scholars differently, Evans (1998) defines social exclusion as multidimensional and dynamic whereas Cummins (1993) gives a clear exposition of this and presents four dimensions-exclusion from civic integration-a failure of democratic and legal systems, the labour market, welfare states and lastly family and community. According to Murray, (1984) social policy itself causes or exacerbates such "breaking of social bonds", thus implying social exclusion. Conceptually social exclusion is, as Hilary Silver (1995:6061) writes, "associated with a variety of terms like superfluity, irrelevance, marginality, foreignness, alterity, closure, dissatisfaction, disposition, deprivation and destitution and social inclusion is about insertion, integration, citizenship, or solidarity". Arjan de Haan (1997), on the other hand, emphasises the process by which individual and groups are wholly or partially excluded from full participation in the society within which they live" (European Foundation, 1994).

> "The term social exclusion has gained its relevance in the third world countries where the exclusion of natives, ethnic minorities, castes, and gender occurs due to biased cultural and social pedigree. 'While term has become a key concept among analysts and policy makers in Western Europe, the developing countries have not yet considered the concept of social exclusion. Bhalla and Lapeyre (1997) try to find an answer by asking whether it is due to different levels of development, different perceptions of relative weight which should be attached to economic

social and political dimensions of poverty and deprivation, absence of a welfare state in developing countries or lack of political, civil or social rights".

Thus while the French establishment defined social exclusion as a rupture of social bonds, others conceptualised social exclusion as a process by which individuals or households experience deprivation either of resources or of social links to the wider community or society. 'In Indian context, exclusion revolves around institutions that discriminate, isolate, shame and deprive subordinate groups on the basis of identities like caste, religion and gender (Thorat and Newman, 2007: 22).

In the context of India, the most rigorous form of exclusion is practiced by the institution of caste followed by income, ethnicity, gender, religion and territory. The complexity of caste is not limited to social subordination only. Rather, it encompasses the whole gamut of socio-cultural and economic life. The severity and complexity of caste can be located into the class and caste relationship in Indian society too. The inflexible arrangement of caste has a long history of subjugation and exclusion by the majority population. The 'The rigidbarriers of caste not only practise the most pungent form of exclusion but also regulate economic life. Inequality is the organizing principle of the caste based hierarchy, which spews discrimination and has kept numerous groups outside the gamut of Hindu social order. The end product of this kind of exclusion for thousands of years has resulted in disempowerment of a vast multitude of population' (Subramanyam and Sekhar, 2010: 2).

The nature and the context of discrimination and forceful exclusion is enormous. They can be located in the form of ethnic cleansing, racial profiling, gender marginalisation and pauperisation. In contrast to French understanding of social exclusion, different scholars have explained these processes quite differently.

Social exclusion has some roots other than merely in a class. The majority tend to exclude and discriminate minority groups based on religion, race, and ethnicity. The international history is full of such instances.

> "Ethnicity is another form of group identity which has served as a basis of social exclusion across the world. 'Indigenous' ethnic minorities are often located in difficult or remote geographical areas which have allowed their way of life to be preserved - or to be bypassed-through major periods of transformation. For instance, in the Asian context, Jorgensen points out that the mountain ranges

which stretch from Afghanistan to the Gulf of Tonkin have been a refuge for indigenous communities who have, for various reasons, occupied a marginal position in relation to the dominant majorities in the valleys and plains. In Vietnam, the ethnic minorities make up around 10% of the population. They are largely concentrated in the remote, usually upland and mountainous areas of the northern and central areas of the country with poor access to services and with little infrastructure. Many are nomadic or semi-nomadic in their way of life. The Hmong and the Dao, for instance, were originally from southern China (where the latter are known as Miao). They practised widen cultivation at high altitudes and continue to do so today, often walking more than a week to get to their fields which might be located across the national borders. Rainfall is low, the land is infertile and access to water for agriculture is highly irregular" (Kabeer, 2006: 7).

The nature and substance of social exclusion in India has changed particularly after independence. With the British leaving India; the new social elites took over the regime. The democratic republic was established. The age-old social evils were outlawed. The constitution sets new aims and promises for Indian citizens. It is interesting to note that how the age old rigidity of caste turn after independence. Rajanai Kothari argues, while keeping caste in mind, that the exclusion of minorities is a global phenomenon. The post-colonial state establishment and control of state power led to the marginalization and exclusion.

"Exclusion also takes new and perverted forms. Those in control of state power foment "communal" tendencies, incite feelings against religious and ethnic minorities, and induce deep anxiety among middle class Hindus about dangers from the minorities' too similar anxieties and communal feelings, and together result in detracting national attention from issues of social justice and economic suffering. In part knowingly, in part unknowingly, this plays into the hands of those who in any case believe in excluding all castes and communities that do not fit the homogenous model of an urban middle class keen on a technocratic push into the future. The basic thrust is one of exclusion. Both the communal and the technocratic mind-sets produce the same results, both undermining pluralist politics and social identities based on a diverse and differentiated social order" (Kothari, 2003: 14).

He further argues that 'Such thinking is not confined to India. In fact, it is in keeping with global tendencies that seem to treat assertions of new identities whether in the form of newly liberated states or in the form of new social moments as inimical to the stability and tranquillity of the world status quo' (ibid).

Naila Kabeer's analysis also finds resonance in Kothari's views:

> "Here the modern state was founded in the context of colonial rule and dedicated to its defence and prosperity rather than to the development of the local economy or social redistribution. The practice of citizenship by the colonial powers at home bore very little relationship to their practice in their colonies. As a result, not only did they fail to challenge pre-existing hierarchies based on tradition, custom and 'moral economy', they actively strengthened and reified them through the defining powers of a modern state apparatus and a codified system of law. Consequently, colonised populations achieved national independence organised as religious, ethnic and tribal communities with immutable interests and collective rights, 'apparently eternal and enduring elements of their societies', rather than as individual and free citizens" (Kabeer, 2006: 96).

The term social exclusion has been going through constant evolution which has been very inclusive and all-encompassing with broader scope and relevance. T. H. Marshal identifies the exclusion of people in legal domain and in 'citizenship discourse. As Marshall points-out that:

> "The concept of citizenship was also made more inclusive through a broadening of the rights of the citizen to include social rights. While membership of village communities, towns and guilds had offered some degree of social security in the pre-industrial period, this had been eroded by the spread of capitalist market relations. However, the diminution of inequality, which accompanied the growing prosperity of the entire society and the compression of the economic distance between classes led to a growing demand for an abolition of inequality, at least with regard to the essentials of social welfare" (Marshall 1950: 107).

Marshal's analysis has been very insightful but did not escape from criticism: The 'history of citizenship' he describes is, almost exclusively, that of the white, male working class in industrialising Britain. It is an account of a society without empire and without internal

inequalities, save those of class (Fraser and Gordon 1994: 93). It is silent on gender and race and on the rights of those whose lands were colonised, whose way of life was disrupted and whose humanity denigrated by the imperial powers, including, of course, Britain.

Historically, exclusion and deprivation existed in every society, starting from Indus, Greek, Chinese and Egyptian civilisations. Contemporary scholars have debated on inclusion/exclusion in their society. Greek philosopher Plato's schema of the division of Athenian society on the basis of 'virtues', has excluded the productive classes. The excluded sections were women and slaves were not treated equally, in other words, as not having the virtues of upper strata of the society. He has gone to that extent where he justifies the institution of slavery to provide extra leisure for ruling classes. The argument was given under the guise of producing creative work. For him, there is need for a class which can serve the philosopher class so that they can get the leisure to produce knowledge system. Citizenship in medieval Europe was also highly selective. It was confined to the residents of the city who had freed themselves from the feudal relations of servitude. Outside the city, feudal relationships, based on 'private-law' identities such as serf, villain, vassal, lord and so on, continued to govern the social life.

The concept of 'social contract', 'natural rights of the people' covers the history of broadening horizons of the concept of rights and inclusivity. Yet, the discrimination and exclusion of people exists in the name of culture and tradition. Shklar rightly argues that justifications for exclusion took on a more primordial form when they were bound up with socially ascribed identities, such as those of race and gender: 'nature had made women so weak as to require male protection and blacks so stunted that slavery was their true condition' (Shklar, 1991: 49).

2.2.C *Ethnicity/Caste and Exclusion in International Relations*

Before going into the physicality and selection of these areas as my focus of research, I would like to deal with the significance of topic in the International Studies.

The very first question which arises is how can anyone deal with the question of ethnicity and caste at the international level? Does any international theory or school of thought explain ethnic and caste issues at the global level? In a sense the well established schools of realism and liberalism that dominate international politics do relegate the domestic issues like ethnicity and caste.

Ethnicity has been the core reality of any society. The politics of cold war and then the consequent disintegration of the Soviet Union has not only made realism more credible but also highlighted the significance of the concept of ethnicity in international relations. The two blocks, the Soviet Union and U.S.A. have dominated international politics for almost forty years. These were the years when the politics of two ideologies, communism and capitalism, played a very important role in world politics. This was the year when realism as an important international studies/approach/paradigm was used to understand the international power politics.

The world became multi-polar following the demise of Soviet Union. This was the era when liberal institutions played an important role to manage the complex reality of international politics. Globalization and the economic trade and business brought new challenges to the realist paradigm. The liberal institutionalists define the world as being much more complex which cannot be seen in a binary form. This was known as the complex interdependence paradigm that will check the aggression of states and politics of war.

This has initiated new debate into the international politics i.e. State security (realist/neo-realist) debate versus constructivist and culturalist or societal security. New questions were raised such as: can we perceive state always as a universal and singular identity across the world? Are these states with reference to their nature, grievances and demands similar to Afro-Asian states? How come the religious polarization or ethnic revitalizations of minority in any communist society is less threatening than the militarily in the powerful neighboring state? The pauperization of people and increased income gap raised the questions on the politics of war and its rationale. The people were being brought in the centre of politics rather the 'state'. The concept of realism/neo-realism was challenged. 'Emergence of a borderless global society based on international economic interdependence, made security discourse to evolve in myriad directions with scholars calling for re-conceptualizing the term "security" and re-evaluating the definition of security studies' (Gunaratna, Rohan etc 2010: 12).

Thus the debate on security and bipolarity was challenged. The new paradigm emerged which not only questioned the rationale of this approach but also gave new insights to see the world politics. To be prcise, the rise of ethnicity and the role of Chinese state can be understood in the following analysis.

"More specifically, several scholars such as Callaway and Harrelson-Stephens argue that ethnic conflict is more likely to occur when basic rights are systematically violated by the state. These discourses suggest a "causal link" between ethnic conflict or terrorism and violations of human rights-understood as "political and civil," "security," and "subsistence rights." In this respect, the scholars subscribing to the Copenhagen School have made substantial contribution in exploring the relationship between human security, identity and ethnic conflict, and terrorism. This particularly relates to the contentious issue of "broadening" or "redefining" the "agenda" or the "discourse" of security, which according to many international relations scholars became a virtual cottage industry in the post–Cold War era international politics"[1] (Gunaratna, Rohan etc, 2010:10).

The Chinese and Indian states are clubbed into the third world which have diverse social systems compared to the Western and European states. The debate which always comes to the fore is that can any Western theoretical and ideological formulations be applied to understand them? The geographical and value systems of these countries have been quite unique and different from the rest of the world. The failure of security paradigm has also been challenged in these states.

"In a related development, a group of scholars also criticized the realist notion of the state as being inappropriate in the context of Third World states which were insecure not because of military factors, but primarily because of their "relative weakness," "lack of autonomy," "vulnerability," and "lack of room for manoeuvre" in respect of economic and political levels as with the military one"[2] (Gunaratna, Rohan ed., 2010:12).

In the last section we have seen the extent of oppression, humiliation and atrocities perpetrated against both oppressed groups in their respective societies. The nature of the exclusion and deprivation has been structural and societal. This leads to their political

---

[1] For a detailed account of what constitutes new security issues, among others,
Richard Ullman, "Redefining Security," *International Security*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1983): 129–153; L. Paggi and P. Pinzauti, "Peace and Security," *Telos*, No. 68 (1985): 79; N. Myers, "Environment and Security," *Foreign Policy*, No. 74 (1989): 24; Jessica T. Matthews, "Redefining Security," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 68, No. 2 (1989): 162; David Dewitt, "Common, Comprehensive and Cooperative Security," *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1994): 3; and David Baldwin, "The Concept of Security," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 23 (1997): 26. The *International Human Development Program Research Projecton Global Environmental Change and Human Security* synopsis on "What Is 'Human Security?'"makes a complete inventory of the human security regimes. http://ibm.rhrz.uni-bonn.de/ihdp/gechuman security.htm.

[2] See also Caroline Thomas, *In Search of Security: the Third World in International Relations,* Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1987: 4.

marginalisation and cultural exclusion and sometimes are also faced the worst kind of genocide. The African countries and some of the South Asian countries are best examples of it. When we analyse the reasons behind such brutality and exclusion, we find the structural and political complexities being the dominant factors.

There are many general reasons to explain the conflict between the ethnic minority groups across the globe. In the context of the China, the following analysis seems very true.

> "Ethno-nationalist and minority conflicts are usually rooted in the perception of threat from the majority group that sustains with an inexhaustible supply of distrust of each other. This distrust feeds on the policies and practices of governance that often brings different ethnic, religious, cultural, and linguistic groups into loggerheads. In many cases, it has been found that the desire of particular minorities to protect their ethnic identity often comes into conflict with the demands of loyalty to the state dominated by the majority group. It is the contradiction in these two desires that constitutes the root cause of conflicts in many multinational states and of terrorism with ethno-religious connotations" (ibid: 15-16).

To avoid the above situation in their respective societies both China and India adopted different strategies. Sometimes they follow special policies like affirmative action (reservation policy in India) and preferential policies in China. The concept of regional autonomy was devised to assimilate the historically discriminated and culturally excluded communities. 'In a state-building process, assimilation is often a national demand, and minorities' rights and interests are compromised as they have to be subordinated to the dominant political entity' (Zhu and Dongyan, 2006: 26).

Moreover, the case of Uighur in Xinjiang is another example which is considered to be seen as a serious threat to the Chinese state. The Chinese state, along with Xinjiang, Tibet and a Taiwan, treats them as the 'three evils' in its political discourse. The nation building process in China has faced severe challenges from these dissatisfied groups. Human rights violations, cultural subjugation, indignity and economic exploitation could be seen as the sight of distrust among the marginalized groups.

> "Evidently, some policies and commitment of nation-building can be perceived to
> be violations of human rights, which are linked to ethnic strife and terrorism. It is

the real or perceived threat to identities that generates the discontent of the disadvantaged minorities at the very root level. One particular example is the ethnic tension related to Chinese Muslim minorities, which demonstrates its closer relation to threats to identity rather than just human rights violations" (ibid).

From the state perspective this argument is being propagated but seen it from the ethnic minority perspective the picture is quite different. The unfulfilled promises and unequal benefits given to the minority by the state are being taken as other reasons for the assertion of minority groups against political discrimination and exclusion.

'Ethnic issues, however, are not the primary generators of conflict. Conflicts in which the rights and political or social viability of particular communities are central issues are not evidence of ethnic chauvinism or of hatred for the other. Identity conflicts emerge with intensity when a community, in response to unmet basic need for social and economic security, resolves to strengthen its collective influence and to struggle for political recognition'.[3]

2.2.D *Case Studies*

The cases of China and India are peculiar because of their dominant Han and Hindu majoritarian facets. Both societies are being dominated by the values of Confucius and Hindu systems that culturally, economically and politically discriminate and exclude the minority and Dalits in their respective societies. This historically structured domination is not new where the oppressed sections of these societies were socially excluded and culturally criminalised. These tendencies of both the societies led to the assertion of the oppressed people of the society. That is why in the Indian context, the architect of Indian constitution, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar used to call free India not as a single nation rather a nation of multiple nations which is still in the making. In one of his writings, he warned of India becoming a Hindu nation. Andrew, Tan (2002) rightly observes: 'National identity is invariably defined in terms of "the dominant group's values and culture, with other groups on the periphery tending to be left out'[4] (as cited in Gunaratna, Rohan ed., 2010:17).

---

[3] Ernie, Regehr (May 9, 2007). "It's not really a matter of hate," Disarming Conflict (Online: Web), Accessed 15 May, 2017 URL: http://disarmingconflict.ca/2007/05/09/its-not-really-a-matter-of-hate/.

[4] Andrew, Tan (October–December 2000), 'Armed Muslim Separatist Rebellion in Southeast Asia: Persistence, Prospects, and Implications, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 23: pp. 267–288.

The bearing of the ethnicity and Dalits at the national level is crucial for both the states. The marginalisation and exclusion of these groups do have global import. The recognition of rights and their grievances in Human Rights Charter elucidates the global importance.

After the demise of Soviet Union in 1990, the binary between capitalism and communism ended. With the end of cold war politics, a new stream of thoughts and schools got importance. The free flow of capital and culture as part of globalization added to new dimension to it. The rise of extremism, the debates on terrorism also paved the way for recognising the importance of ethnic groups and their grievances. Sometimes extremism emanates from deprivation and exclusion of a particular group which in turn leads to revivalism and assertion of some kind of ethno-nationalism. 'In an ethno-nationalist context, identity conflict and strife are the outcomes if domination fails or is not tolerated by the minority community. Such conflicts are ref lections of a more fundamental social distrust, borne out of a community's experience of economic inequity, political discrimination, and human rights violations'[5] (as cited in Gunaratna, Rohan ed., 2010:17).

Chinese state faces a similar kind of situation. The CCP and Chinese state have been using domestic as well as the foreign policy to control the ethnic unrest at home. For the last few decades, China has been putting together 'white papers' on the freedom, autonomy and cultural distinctiveness of Chinese ethnic minorities annually. These white papers clearly mention all the rights of Chinese ethnic groups which focuson integrity and unity of Chinese state. Equality among ethnic groups is the cornerstone of China's ethnic policy. Full equality among ethnic groups is one of the constitutional principles of China. The Constitution of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the "Constitution") stipulates: "All ethnic groups in the People's Republic of China are equal"[6].

A Unified Multi-Ethnic State and Regional Autonomy for Ethnic minorities are the hallmark of CCP since its founding in 1921 and Chinese state has made an active effort to solve China's ethnic problems.

> "The Long Existence of a United Multi-Ethnic State Is the Historical Basis forPracticing Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities China is a united

---

[5] Ernie, Regehr (May 9, 2007). "It's not really a matter of hate," Disarming Conflict (Online: Web), Accessed 15 May, 2017 URL: http://disarmingconflict.ca/2007/05/09/its-not-really-a-matter-of-hate/.

[6] Govt.White Paperschina.org.cn
"II. Full Equality among Ethnic Groups",(Online: Web), Accessed 15 May, 2017 URL: http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/200909/ 27/content_18610400.htm 1/3.

multiethnic state with long history. As early as 221 BC, the Qin Dynasty (221-206 BC), the first feudal empire in the history of China, brought about unification to the country for the first time. The subsequent Han Dynasty (206 BC-220 AD) further consolidated the country's unification. Administrative areas known as *jun* (prefecture) and *xian* (county) were established across the country, and uniform systems of law, language, calendar, carriage, currency, and weights and measures were adopted. This promoted exchanges between different areas and ethnic groups, and created the fundamental framework for the political, economic and cultural development of China as a united multiethnic state over the next 2,000 years or more. Later dynasties whether they were established by Han people, such as the Sui (581,618), Tang (618,907), Song (960,1279) and Ming (1368,1644), or by other ethnic minority groups, such as the Yuan (1271,1368) and Qing (1644,1911) all considered themselves as "orthodox reigns" of China and regarded the establishment of a united multiethnic state their highest political goal"[7].

At one level the Chinese state tried to assimilate all the ethnic minorities by following such domestic policies. The other side of the role which China played in international politics is very interesting. The CCP and its leadership also became part of global community by following international rules and treaties/ conventions. The foreign policy of China is also being devised very strategically keeping her ethnic assertions in mind.

The 2009 White Paper underscores that:

"China firmly opposes ethnic discrimination and oppression in any form. Any words or acts aimed at inciting hostility or discrimination against any ethnic group and sabotaging equality and unity among peoples are regarded as violations of the law. Any ethnic minority subjected to discrimination, oppression or insult has the right to complain to judicial institutions. China has joined the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and conscientiously performs the duties prescribed in the convention, making

---

[7] Beijing Review.com.cn (May, 27, 2009), "Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities in China", (Online: Web), Accessed 5 June, 2017 URL: http://www.bjreview.com/nation/txt/2009-05/27/content_197768_3.htm#.

unremitting efforts together with the international community to build a world free from racial and ethnic discrimination"[8].

India has followed the top down approach to address the social and economic problems of society since her independence. It enacted all the fundamental rights for all its citizens and clearly emphasises that it would not discriminate any one on the basis their identity. Keeping in mind the structural and historic injustices to Dalits in the Indian society, Indian states in the federation also came with new rules and stringent laws to safeguard the rights and dignity of oppressed sections of her society. Despite these constitutional arrangements, the Dalits (ex-untouchables) never experienced genuine freedom and rights. The brutal killings, gang rapes, massacre of Dalits forced their community to raise this issue at the international level. In the famous Durban Conference debate (2002) where human right activists and Dalits raised their concerns. They also demanded the recognition of castiesm and humiliation of Dalits as similar to the racial discrimination across the globe. Since, India government has denied these allegations arguing that they are India's domestic issues. It was in 2009 that UN recognized discrimination and humiliation of Dalits as a major problem. 'The UN draft, which has been opposed by India, pledges to work for the "effective elimination of discrimination based on work and descent". The Indian government had lobbied heavily at the Human Rights Council to remove the word 'caste' from a draft earlier this year'[9] (*The Telegraph:*29 September, 2009).

Another case of internationalization of caste discrimination and exclusion of Dalits can be located which has been raised vigorously in the UK since 2011. The Dalit rights groups demanded the inclusion of Dalit rights in 'equality act' and barring any such discriminatory practices against Dalits.

Meena, Varma a Dalit activist in UK writes that

> "Amendments tabled by Business Secretary Vince Cable in the House of Commons today state that the Equality Act will "provide for caste to be an aspect of race." This means that the government conceded on the principle and tabled an amendment, which requires the Secretary of State to bring forward regulations to

---

[8] China Daily.com.cn (Sept., 27, 2009), "Full text of white paper on ethnic policy" (Online: Web) Accessed 15 July, 2017 URL: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-09/27/content_8743072_4.htm.

[9] The Telegraph (Sept., 29, 2009), "UN says caste system is a human rights abuse", (Online: Web). Accessed 10 June, 2017 URL:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/india/6239842/UN-says-caste-system-is-a-human-rights-abuse.html.

include Caste as an aspect of Race (under Section 9(5) of the Equality Act) withintwo months of enactment of the Enterprise Regulatory and Reform Bill"[10](*Dalit Solidarity Network,* April, 2013).

The two most notable incidents that have not only caused embarrassment for the Indian establishment but also brought about a new level of the Dalit assertion at the global scale. The one is the suicide of a Dalit Ph.D. scholar, Rohit Vemula in Hyderabad University on 17 January 2016. Many scholars and his mother Radhika Vemula, termed it as an institutional murder.'I would not call it a suicide, but an <u>institutional murder</u>. This is not the first suicide remember. Right from Senthil Kumar, this is the eighth suicide of a Dalit student in the Hyderabad University. That cannot just be accidental' K. Sacchidanandan, (a poet) said on the sidelines of the ongoing Jaipur Literature Festival here'[11] (*The Economics Times,* Jan 23, 2016).

The second issue is related to the inclusion of caste abuse and discrimination in the syllabus of California (State Board of Education) over curriculum on Indian history. The tussle came when the Hindu Group of America pressurised the Board to delete caste from the syllabus because it maligns the images of India. The advocates of human rights and Dalits pressed for the demand of inclusion of caste in the system which is the stark reality of Indian society. 'Michael Witzel, a Harvard University professor of Sanskrit who has also been pressing California for changes that Hindu advocates have objected to for nearly a decade, said the entire controversy was one of image protection.' 'Castes are a hot-button issue, and people living in the United States don't want to talk about it or want to deny it,' he said. 'But it's ingrained in the society, and it has its roots in sacred texts'[12] (*The New York Times*, May 4, 2016).

The exclusion of Dalit lives and their value system at pedagogical level is a product of Indian educational system. The Indian sociologist, Vivek Kumar, aptly elucidates that 'even after completing a hundred years, Indian sociology is practised in the milieu of domination.

---

[10] Varma, Meena (April, 25, 2013), "The UK Parliament outlaws Caste-Based Discrimination", Dalit Solidarity Network UK., (Online: Web) Accessed 12 May, 2017 URL: http://dsnuk.org/2013/04/25/the-uk-parliament-outlaws-caste-based-discrimination/.

[11] The Economic Times (Jan., 23, 2016), "Rohit Vemula's suicide an 'institutional murder': Satchidanandan", (Online: Web) Accessed 15 May, 2017 URL: http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/rohit-vemulas-suicide-an-institutional-murder-satchidanandan/articleshow/50696414.cms?intenttarget=no.

[12] Medina, Jennifer (May 4, 2016), "Debate Erupts in California Over Curriculum on India's History", The New York Times, (Online: Web), Accessed 18 May, 2017 URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/06/us/debate-erupts-over-californias-india-history-curriculum.html.

British, European and American domination has been well documented while the domination of the so-called twice-born castes has not been analysed' (Kumar, 2016: 33).

A similar argument has been made by Gopal Guru on the nature of methodology and hierarchy of social sciences in India. The discrimination of Dalits and other marginalized sections is well planned as can be found in the writings of the Indian academia. According to him, 'Social science practice in India has harboured a cultural hierarchy dividing it into a vast, inferior mass of academics who pursue empirical social science and a privileged few who are considered the theoretical pundits with reflective capacity which makes them intellectually superior to the former. To use a familiar analogy, Indian social science represents a pernicious divide between theoretical Brahmins and empirical Shudras' (Guru, 2002: 5003).

2.3 Amartya Sen's Conception of Social Exclusion and his Capability Approach

Amartya Sen, an Indian economist, born in 1933 in Bengal, then part of British India, and studied there until he went to Cambridge University for post-graduation. He was awarded the 1998 Noble Prize in Economic Sciences for his contributions to welfare economics and social choice theory and for his interest in the problems of society's poorest members. He is Thomas W. Lamont University Professor, and Professor of Economics and Philosophy, at Harvard University and was until 2004 at the Master of Trinity College, Cambridge. He is also Senior Fellow at the Harvard Society of Fellows. Earlier on he was Professor of Economics at Jadavpur University Calcutta, the Delhi School of Economics, and the London School of Economics, and Drummond Professor of Political Economy at the Oxford University.

The scope and range of Sen's work are comparable to that of such eighteenth- and nineteenth-century practitioners of political economy as Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, and Karl Marx. Indeed, Marx and especially Smith are key reference points for Sen. Amartya Sen's work goes beyond the most famous scholar on justice, John Rawls. The concept of inclusion through some individual and group rights finds a special place in his work. The exclusion of any community or class through the developmental process, as well as the rudimentary reactionary practices, is the specially mentioned in his work. Sen is indebted to Adam Smith's idea of 'shame' in his development. Therefore, he categorically says that the state and society should provide as such much freedom to any individual for his/her

development. It is, therefore, the responsibility of any democratic state so that its citizen should not feel ashamed. The concepts of 'capability', 'freedom', 'development' central to the ideas of justice and equality.

Amartya Sen's main argument regarding the idea of development is quite fundamentally different from the GDP growth oriented model of development. He sees development as building capability of individual and of a group to curtail un-freedoms of his/her lives. Moreover, for him, development is not merely an economic process but a political one as well.

Development should be seen, Sen claims, as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy. Hence, development requires the removal of major sources of un-freedom: poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or over activity of repressive states. This Concept has been employed extensively in the context of human development, for example, by the United Nations Development Programme, as a broader, deeper alternative to narrowly economic metrics such as growth in GDP per capita. Here 'poverty' is understood as deprivation in the capability to live a good lifeand 'development' is understood as a process wherein capabilities are expanded.

Amartya Sen's analysis of social exclusion revolves around his conception of 'freedom', deprivation, participation, capability and poverty. He attempts to understand social exclusion as both a cause and a consequence of poverty. Sen has used the term 'social exclusion' to address the causes, nature and relations of poverty. Alongside this, he investigates the modalities of the concept in the context of social policy making. On the whole, he argues that social exclusion is either part of 'capability' or directly linked to it.

Sen (2000: 40) finds social exclusion as being instrumental in the degradation of peoples' lives. 'The concept of social exclusion focuses attention on the processes that cause capability deprivation. Factors such as inequality and relational poverty; exclusion from the labour market, the credit market, or health care; gender-related exclusions and inequality; and food-market poverty can all cause capability deprivation.'

The importance of the term social exclusion can be seen in its holistic outlook. The socio-cultural as well as the economic aspects find equal space in his conceptualization. For him,

exclusion is both as a procedural as well as an institutional phenomenon. The term 'social exclusion' used by Sen finds special appeal at global level.

Thorat (2007) in his work delineates the importance of Amartya Sen in the field of conceptualisation of 'social exclusion' at the global level. According to him:

> "He (Sen) has drawn worldwide attention to the dimension of social exclusion. He draws distinctions between situations in which individuals are kept out (or left out) and circumstances of inclusion (including forced inclusion) on deeply unfavourable terms. Either type can generate adverse effects. Sen also differentiates between active exclusion-blocking opportunity through deliberate policy interventions on the part of government or private agents and passive exclusion, which does not rely on these interventions, but may lead to similarly negative outcomes.' On the relationship between social exclusion and deprivation in understanding the conditions of the excluded, Sen (2000: 8) posits that "it is important to distinguish between exclusion which is in itself a deprivation (that is to say that exclusion has constitutive relevance) and exclusion which is not in itself negative, but which can lead to other deprivations which do have constitutive relevance".

Elaborating the causal chain in this way elucidates the processes that lead to poverty and social exclusion. This type of causal analysis is further enhanced by differentiating between active and passive exclusion. According to Sen (op. cit.:15) 'active exclusion is the result of a deliberate policy to exclude certain people from particular opportunities. On the other hand, passive exclusion occurs when 'there is no deliberate attempt to exclude'. Deprivation is the unintended result of social processes or policy decisions, as for example when economic restructuring results in increase in unemployment in certain sections of society.

This two-fold active and passive exclusion is visible at many levels. These are sometimes very subtle and many times they are obvious. Both the rudimentary and reactionary institutions and the modern state and its institutions exclude and discriminate. The level of exclusion is also not limited to only states and its institutions but also includes the process. The process of decision making and approach play an important role in exclusion.

Sen's view of social exclusion offers a number of important analytical distinctions. Broadly he has divided it into three categories that lead to exclusion and subsequent derivation of

people. First, Sen (2000) takes poverty as the broader concept, with social exclusion being only one of a number of reasons why an individual is unable to obtain adequate basic capabilities. Treating social exclusion as a subset of poverty means that not everything has to be explained as some form of exclusion. Second, the distinction drawn by Sen between forms of exclusion (or unfavourable inclusion) which are in themselves a deprivation and those which are not necessarily negative but which can lead to deprivation allows the researcher to elaborate the causal chain. The third, that is active and passive forms of exclusion (and unfavourable inclusion), knowing whether the causal influence is the result of a deliberate policy decision, or the unintended consequence of other policy decisions, is useful in determining an appropriate policy response.

A similar argument has been put forth by Barbara Harriss-White and Aseem Prakash in their conceptualization of 'regime of discrimination[13]'.

Social discrimination takes several forms. Discrimination can be either direct or indirect. Direct discrimination[14] describes a phenomenon where there is a deliberate and explicit policy to exclude a specific individual or a social group from some possible opportunities. Indirect discrimination[15] occurs when supposedly neutral provisions, criteria or practices disadvantage individual(s) due to their social status or due to capabilities derived from a socialization differentiated by social status[16] (Harris-White and Praksh, 2).

---

[13] Barbara Harris-White and Aseem Praksh in their work 'Social Discrimination: A Case For Economic Citizenship' define the term in the Indian context and try to apply it to the marginalised groups such as Dalits, Adivasi and Minorities (DAM). They have given three features of the term 'regime of discrimination'. The normative framework of hierarchy also denies the need to seek any consent from social groups constituting DAM for the social relationships sought to be imposed on and practised between them. The subordination and marginalisation which result from discrimination are thus internalised and accepted as 'the' defining, 'natural', and even 'just' principle of the socio-cultural, political and economic order.
The second feature of the regime of discrimination is the practice of these principles of hierarchy in the form of capillary power. India's norms of social order support the capacity of the 'dominant' social groups to act against and police the interest of social groups constituting the DAM.
The third feature of the regime of discrimination, the politics of discrimination, is the means by which social discrimination is crafted in the face of laws and movements to the contrary. The politics of discrimination charts the course of the advance of 'dominant' social groups in the face of consistent democratic assertion by deprived social groups constituting DAM.

[14] For instance, the use of pre-natal tests for selective abortion of female babies is a good example of direct discrimination against women.

[15] For instance, many housing societies do not intend to discriminate against religions or castes but at the same time, they firmly uphold the policy of not selling or renting any property to non-vegetarians. The net result of this policy is that it excludes potential buyers/ tenants who belong to certain castes or practice religions other than Hinduism.

[16] The practice of social discrimination (whether direct or indirect) is not limited to India but is practiced across the world in different forms. For instance, discrimination on racial grounds in United States. However, certain forms of discrimination (for instance, caste based discrimination) are unique to the India because they derive their origin from religious texts.

The most important aspect of Sen's idea of social exclusion is the idea of 'capability'. In this idea he has concentrated on what the capability perspective can do for the theory of justice or of human rights. He conceptualizes capability approach as follows:

> "The particular line of reasoning that will be pursued here is based on evaluating social change in terms of the richness of human life resulting from it. But the quality of human life is itself a matter of great complexity. The approach that will be used here, which is sometimes called the "capability approach", sees human life as a set of "doings and beings" we may call them "functionings" and it relates the evaluation of the quality of life to the assessment of the capability to function. It is an approach that I have tried to explore in some detail, both conceptually and in terms of its empirical implications" (Sen, 1982:2).

The capability approach of Sen has been much debated among several shades of scholars. Some scholars find its relevance and importance not only to move ahead from the utilitarian philosophy of Bentham but also critiqued the most acclaimed contribution of Rawlsian theory of justice.

In fact, Rawls gives a central place in his theory of justice to the distribution of what he calls "primary goods" among which he includes rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth. But Sen feels that the move does not take us far enough, for by concentrating on the means of freedom rather than the extent of freedom. In his the most celebrated work, 'The Idea of Justice', he questions the institutionalists who heavily concentrate on the building and functioning of an institution as instrument to build a just society. Sen's apprehension of the functioning and procedures of building the institutions and the participation of people is one step ahead in making a just society. He is of the opinion that institutions alone can't make any society a just society.

Sen's critique of building institution is very much relevant in the South Asian societies like India. The constitutional structure and the institutional arrangements of the Indian state is one of the finest in the world. The provisions of fundamental rights to her citizens are remarkable. The preamble which claims socialist republic of secular democratic India is surmountable. The enfranchisement of its women and the most marginalized are much more revolutionary than many Western countries, even though the functioning and participation of people in the

decision-making are minimal in many institutions. The execution of the above rights and privileges are yet to come about.

According to him, 'human capability focuses on the ability the substantive freedom of people to lead the lives they have reason to value and to enhance the real choices they have' (Sen, 1999:293). Moreover, for a fuller understanding of the role of human capabilities he advocates to take note of firstly, their direct relevance to the wellbeing and freedom of people and secondly, their indirect role in influencing social change and, lastly their indirect role influencing production' (ibid: 296).

The concept of capability seemed to be new for the world when Sen used it in his formulations. But the idea of capability finds its roots in the Greek philosophy. In his formulation, Sen insists and draws a linkage of capability approach to the work of Aristotle. According to him:

> "The 'capability' of a person is a concept that has distinctly Aristotelian roots. The life of a person can be seen as a sequence of things the person does, or states of being he or she achieves, and these constitute a collection of 'functionings'- doings and beings the person achieves. 'Capability' refers to the alternative combinations of functionings from which a person can choose. Thus, the notion of capability is essentially one of freedom-the range of options a person has in deciding what kind of life to lead" (2002: 35-36).

Sen contrasted his approach not only with the commodity based system of evaluation, but also the utility based assessment. He goes a step ahead of Rawls in arguing that the "capability" approach gives a better account of the freedoms actually enjoyed by different people than merely looking at the holdings of the primary goods. Primary goods are means to freedom, whereas capabilities are expressions of freedoms themselves.

'The underlying motives of the Rawlsian theory[17] and the capability approach are similar, but the accountings are different. The problem with the Rawlsian accounting lies in the fact that,

---

[17] John Rawls, a very eminent American liberal philosopher who has propounded his ideas in his famous book 'A Theory of Justice, 1971, (Cambridge MA, Haward Press, University Press). He introduces a theoretical "veil of ignorance" in which all the "players" in the social game would be placed in a situation which is called the "original position". Having only a general knowledge about the facts of "life and society," each player is to make a "rationally prudential choice" concerning the kind of social institution they would enter into the contract with. And the second principle is the "difference principle."

   a) A liberal political conception of justice will ascribe to all citizens familiar individual rights and liberties, such as rights of free expression, liberty of conscience, and free choice of occupation;

even for the same ends, people's ability to convert primary goods into achievements differs, so that an interpersonal comparison based on the holdings of primary any given–or variable–ends' (Sen, 1982 :49).

The concept of capability, argues Sen, is not only ahead of the liberal utilitarian approach but is also much more comprehensive. According to him:

> "In contrast with the utility based or resource based lines of thinking, individual advantage is judged in the capability approach by a person's advantage in terms of opportunities is judged to be lower than that of another if she has less capability less real opportunity to achieve those things that she has reason to value. The focus here is on the freedom that a person actually has to do this or be that-things that he or she may value doing or being.…Thus concept of capability is linked closely with the opportunity aspect of freedom, seen in terms of 'comprehensive' opportunities, and not just focusing on what happens at 'culmination"(2010: 231-232) .

Historically, different scholars have interpreted and theorized the ideas of justice, capability, freedom and social justice. Starting from Greek philosophy to the social contract to the libertarian, have contributed to the making of a just society. The concepts of 'primary goods, equal opportunity and equality of resources were used by earlier and contemporary scholars before Sen. However, he has not only questioned their limitations in making a more just society but also kept a distance from them. He contrasts his conception of capability with various conceptions of equal opportunity that have been championed for a long time. He goes on to observe that a person's capability to achieve does indeed stand for opportunity to pursue his or her objectives. He refers to capabilities as the "real opportunity" to "accomplish what we value" (Sen 1992, 7, 28, 31, 40; Sen's emphasis).

In the era of globalization and liberalization the role of state has been diminishing. Consequently the government benefits for the deprived sections have also declined. The bridge between the north and south and rich and poor has also increased. The importance of Sen's Capability approach can be seen in the context of its applicability by various scholars

---

b) A political conception will give special priority to these rights and liberties, especially over demands to further the general good (e.g., greater national wealth) or perfectionist values (e.g., the values of cultural flourishing);

c) A political conception will assure for all citizens sufficient all-purpose means to make effective use of their freedoms.

in a number of varied fields. A well articulated analysis is being given by internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. According to it:

> "Within academic philosophy the novel focus of Capability Approach has attracted a number of scholars. It is seen to be relevant for the moral evaluation of social arrangements beyond the development context, for example, for considering gender justice. It is also seen as providing foundations for normative theorising, such as a capability theory of justice that would include an explicit 'metric' (that specifies which capabilities are valuable) and 'rule' (that specifies how the capabilities are to be distributed). The philosopher Martha Nussbaum has provided the most influential version of such a capability theory of justice, deriving from the requirements of human dignity a list of central capabilities to be incorporated into national constitutions and guaranteed to all up to a certain threshold" (Barker-Plummer, D., 2009).

In this scenario, the importance and relevance of capability approach has been significantly increased. Sen (2010: 270), in his conception of capability approach has highlighted its relevance very aptly. According to him 'the relevance of capability is not confined only to its role in telling us about the advantage of a person, since it also carries implications regarding a person's duties and obligations, at least in one perspective. As was noted earlier, capability is also a kind of power, in a way that happiness is clearly is not. How significant are the implications of this contrast for moral and political philosophy in general and for the theory of justice in particular?'

This approach is philosophical/normative which goes beyond the liberal-welfarist strategy. The focus includes both individuals as well as the society. It is essential in advancing the theory of individual liberty with social justice concern. The mere prerequisite of primary goods is not only obliging, but their functionings and ends also need to be taken into consideration.

Can we say that the 'capability approach' of Sen has widened the horizon of the concept of development? It is obvious to say that the individual growth does not include only the increase of salary or money only. Rather, the high growth rate must be translated into overall development of the people. The expansion of people's capabilities to have independent choice, with the elimination of all sorts of oppression, also includes all modern safety nets is

necessary. These contributions to normative theory and the practical world are overwhelming.

In spite of all the positive contribution of Sen's conception of capability approach, it could not escape from the liberal individualist approach. Charles Gore (1995:9) aptly passes judgment on it. '[S]een as a relational concept, it offers a way of completing the shift away from a welfarist view of social disadvantage which Amartya Sen has begun, but which, in the guise of the concept of capabilities, still remains wedded to an excessively individualist, and insufficiently social view.'

Moreover, many sociologists and anthropologists perceive the individualistic capability approach critically. They appreciate the philosophical contribution of Sen's idea to liberalism but could not raise some very crucial apprehensions on the applicability of the term. The role of global capitalist market, the market culture has impacted and consequently constructed its own global culture. This culture contravenes to the collective capabilities of third world collectivities. Peter Evans rightly highlights the role of global marketised economy:

> "As the global political economy moves with ever greater determination toward the implantation of more thoroughly marketized economic relations, analysts must correspondingly focus more closely on how to prevent market based power inequalities from undermining "development as freedom". Centralization of power over cultural flows that shape preferences is a more subtle form of "unfreedom" than those which Sen highlights, but no less powerful for being subtle" (Evans, 2002: 59).

The capability approach is also critiqued for its liberal individualistic leanings. The concept of individual is perceived very objectively and devoid of the hegemonic structure of state and society. The structural constrains were denied while providing the 'freedom he wishes'. Scholar like Dean, Hartley (2009:5)[18] explains the limitation of capability approach on two

---

[18] It is not simply that it is possible for official national and international agencies to adopt the language of capabilities while studiously ignoring key drivers of inequality and poverty. For all its attractions, the concept is in itself constrained. The 'space of capabilities' is abstracted from the 'space of commodities' and the 'space of functionings' in ways that necessarily constrain the critical purchase of the concept. If we consider the revolutionary Enlightenment objectives of *egalité* (equality), *liberté* (freedom), *fraternité* (solidarity), the capability approach to equality is framed in terms of freedom, but not solidarity. It is a liberal-individualist approach and while ethical individualism need not imply methodological individualism (Burchardt, 2006) the priority is individual liberty, not social solidarity; the freedom to choose, not the need to belong. In the space of capabilities the individual is one step removed; she is objectively distanced from the relations of power within which her identity and her life chances must be constituted. Within the space of capabilities there are three major issues which the individual cannot readily see and which are seldom clearly discussed. First and in any event, human beings cannot be free from their dependency upon other human beings. Second and third, under capitalist social relations of production,

grounds, firstly, the objectivity of individual and secondly the denial of structural hegemonic functions on him. He could not resist himself to cite some of the applications of the concept of 'capability', in policy making institutions. According to him 'A very recent application of the capabilities approach has been witnessed in the UK. In October 2007 the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) was created, absorbing into a single organisation the separate functions of its three 'legacy commissions', the Commission for Equal Opportunities (EOC), the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) and the Disability Rights Commission' (DRC) (Hartley, 2009:4).

2.4 Nancy Fraser's Ideas of 'Bivalent Collectivities' and 'Cultural-Valuational Disadvantage'

Nancy Fraser, a great scholar of Marxist and feminist tradition, and is considered one of the leading theorists. She analyses contemporary societal developments from a normatively informed position. Her analytical framework is applicable to current, empirical studies of struggles about recognition and she relates them to classic struggles of redistribution. Her thinking is located in the intersection between feminist theory, critical theory and post-structuralism.

She has worked extensively on the disintegration of Soviet Union and the rise of new political and theoretical trends in national and global politics. It was the era when the Francis Fukuyama has given the theory of 'end of history and the last man' and was presented as an unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism. The triumph of the West or the Western idea, is evident first of all in the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism. There were several debates where socialist ideas were regarded as the remnants of the history and the politics of recognition and identity on the rise. The politics of identity and the class politics were presented and assumed to be contradictory to each other. At this time, the formulation of 'Bi-Valant Collectivities' and 'Cultural-Valuational Disadvantage' by Nancy Fraser gave an alternative mode of thinking to Fukuyama's Western liberalism.

Moreover, her areas of specialisation include: social and political theory, feminist theory, nineteenth and twentieth century European thought, and cultural studies. She has raised some very pertinent questions about the cultural politics and its decoupling with social politics,

---

individuals can be free neither from hegemonic controls over their participation in the public realm, nor from the direct or indirect consequences of the exploitation of human labour.

politics of difference and the politics of equality. She questions the politics of redistribution vis-a-vis the politics of identity. She argues that class and identity questions are often juxtaposed to each other.

Since the exclusion of marginalized sections of any society has multiple dimensions. They vary from structural to cultural socio-economic and political levels. It is to divide them into some broad categories. Is it possible to theorize exclusion or compartmentalise them into some form? Here, Nancy Fraser's conceptualization of 'Bi-valent Collectivities' is very important.

Noticeably, exclusion and discrimination of people have been elucidated at two levels in Fraser's conception. Exclusion has a structural base which encompasses the political economy as well as the cultural questions. This also finds expression in policy of a particular state to exclude some sections of society. There are numerous instances which demonstrate that fruits of development do not reach the people. Such discrimination, in Fraser's opinion, is also cultural, where a particular community is culturally and structurally devoid of benefits.

The social exclusion is a harsh reality of the world. These exclusions often occur by identity. This identity could be race, gender, minority, or caste. The racial discrimination in Western societies, particularly in the USA, is well-documented. Moreover, this exclusion and discrimination shape the dynamics between majority and minority phenomenon. The majority community sometimes dehumanises the minority under the guise of superior cultural value system and socio-religious pedigree. These subordinated creeds are blamed for less civilized, non-meritorious and culturally-socially backward to mainstream. In India, the Dalits are considered unfit for certain types of skilled labour jobs in the society, and hence they are discriminated against.

This argument is also validated by Sukhdev Thorat and Paul Attewell (2007) in their work. They examine the prevalence of discrimination in the job application processes of private sector enterprises in India. These studies document a pattern of decision-making by private sector employers that repeatedly gives an upper hand to job applicants belonging to the "high" caste Hindu backgrounds. Such a trajectory leaves the "low" castes discriminated with limited or minimum opportunities. The findings suggest that social exclusion is not just a residue of the past clinging to the margins of the Indian economy, nor is it limited to people of little education. On the contrary, it appears that caste favouritism and the social exclusion

of the Dalits have got infused in private enterprises even in the most dynamic and modern sectors of the Indian economy.

Fraser defines recognition through honour, dignity, status, and civility. The plight of Dalits in Indian sense is very much in line with the above conception of Fraser. Many scholars and activists have emphasised that the exclusion of Dalits is related to humiliation and dehumanization. Vivek, Kumar a prominent Indian sociologist asserts that 'When we conceptualize the process of exclusion with specific reference to caste, exclusion is predominantly based on ascribed features. The critical ascribed features are carried through caste i.e., birth in particular 'jati' because of deeds of the past incarnation. These ascribed features are justified on religious grounds through sacred texts and religious philosophy (2014: 106)….. 'Hence we can argue that the paradigm of social exclusion of Dalits emanates from social structure justified by religion in which historicity plays a dominant role'.

The exclusion of Dalits at its extreme level can be located in the Indian village system. The extent of dehumanization, discrimination and exclusion of Dalits in the villages has been aptly and rightly illustrated by many scholars. The bivalent nature of exclusion of any particular identity can be accurately found in the following assessment.

> "The Hindu village is a working plant of the Hindu social order. One can see there the Hindu social order in full swing…The India village is not a single unit. It consists of castes. But for our purpose, it is enough to say….The population in the village is divided into two sections….Touchable and untouchables…What are the terms of associated life on which the touchables and untouchables live in Indian villages? In every village the touchables have a code which the untouchables are required to follow. This code lays down the acts of omissions and commissions which the touchables treat as offences… Another important thing to note is that the punishment for these offences is always collective. The whole community of untouchables is liable for punishment through the offence have been committed by an individual.…The right to beg for food from the touchable is now the principal means of livelihood for…untouchables in India…..such is the picture of the inside life of an Indian village. In this republic there is no place for democracy. There is no room for equality. There is no room for liberty and there is no room for fraternity. The Indian village is the very negation of a republic. If it is republic, it is republic of touchables, by the touchables, and the touchables. The

untouchables have no rights..... They have no rights because they are outside the village republic and because they are outside the so-called republic, they are outside the Hindu fold" (Kumar, 2014: 62-563, Ambedkar, 1989: Vol. 5, 19-26).

The kind of Indian Hindu social system and its implications on untouchables in Indian society are rare in the world. The exclusion in other society by identity is also very much noticeable. The Chinese hierarchal social system reveals distinct glimpses that show the dehumanisation of the ethnic minority too. The exclusion is very much visible and documented at various levels in China.

The exclusion of ethnic minorities of China is no less than India in capturing all the major political and administrative posts. This is aptly shown in the work of Isabelle Côté which indicates the exclusion of non-Han communities in 21st century. 'The XPCC provided Han Chinese with both resources and leadership and, for this reason, its role in the social and political organization of the Han community in the region and in the government of Xinjiang as a whole could hardly be overstated' (Côté, 2011:1859).

The exclusion and dehumanization of ethnic minorities has cultural and civilisational roots. The Han has always treated the minority ethnic people as inferior and less civilized. The treatment of Uyghur, Tibetan, and other smaller minorities at societal and structural level has been historically biased and based on Han prejudices. Edward, Wang (1999: 304) in his work argues that:

> "through the course of Chinese imperial history, the Chinese worldview underwent several major changes. In the formative years of the Han dynasty, the Chinese view of the world was shaped around the axis of Han ethnic culture, which helped grade and hierarchies the rest of the world according to its acceptance of Han culture. As a result, the Han people and their neighbours formed a dichotomous relation. The Han people were wary of their "less" civilized, barbaric neighbours, especially the northern nomads".

The formulation of the term, 'bivalent collectivities' has given new impetus in the global politics. It has brought new dimensions to the class and identity politics. It has been very obvious to see both as different poles. But her conceptualization brought the cultural and class dimensions to the exclusion of marginalized sections of the society. The much talked and debated conception of Fraser has some evolutionary history also. It is very pertinent to

inquire into the evolution of the concept. How can one develop a two pronged approach? How can one integrate redistribution and recognition in a single framework so as to overcome to their current dissociation?

Three sets of issues are relevant here: Normative Philosophical issues, which concern the relation between recognition and distributive justice; and social theoretical issues, which pertain to concern economy and culture; and practical-political issues, which are related to the tensions that arise when one seeks to promote redistribution and recognition simultaneously.

The parity of participation and equal respect for all the participants are the ideas according to her, which can do justice to the marginalized sections of the society.

"The normative core of my conception is the notion of parity of participation[19] According to this norm, justice requires social arrangements that permit all (adult) members of society to interact with one another as peers. For participatory parity to be possible, I claim, at least two conditions must be satisfied[20]. First, the distribution of material resources must be such as to ensure participants' independence and voice. This I call the objective condition of participatory parity. It precludes forms and levels of material inequality and economic dependence that impede parity of participation. Precluded, therefore, are social arrangements that institutionalize deprivation, exploitation and gross disparities in wealth, income and leisure time, thereby denying some people the means and opportunities to interact with others as peers[21]. In contrast, the second condition requires that institutionalized patterns of cultural value express equal respect for all participants

---

[19] Since I (Nancy Fraser) coined this phrase in 1995, the term 'parity' has come to play a central role in feminist politics in France. There, it signifies the demand that women occupy a full 50 percent of seats in Parliament and other representative bodies. 'Parity' in France, accordingly, means strict numerical gender equality in political representation. For me, in contrast, 'parity' means the condition of being a peer, of being on a par with others, of standing on an equal footing. I leave the question open exactly as to what degree or level of equality is necessary to ensure such parity. In my formulation, moreover, the moral requirement is that members of society be ensured the possibility of parity, if and when they choose to participate in a given activity or interaction. There is no requirement that everyone actually participates in any such activity.

[20] I (Nancy Fraser) say 'at least two conditions must be satisfied' in order to allow for the possibility of more than two. I have in mind specifically a possible third class of obstacles to participatory parity that could be called 'political', as opposed to economic or cultural. 'Political' obstacles to participatory parity would include decision-making procedures that systematically marginalize some people even in the absence of maldistribution and misrecognition, for example, single-member district winner takes all electoral rules that deny voice to quasi-permanent minorities. The corresponding injustice would be 'political marginalization' or 'exclusion', the corresponding remedy, 'democratization'.

[21] It is an open question how much economic inequality is consistent with parity of participation. Some such inequality is inevitable and unobjectionable. But there is a threshold at which resource disparities become so gross as to impede participatory parity. Where exactly that threshold lies is a matter for further investigation.

and ensure equal opportunity for achieving social esteem. This I call the *intersubjectivecondition* of participatory parity" (Fraser, 2001: 29).

According to her, gender, race, ethnic minorities, caste all have bivalent collectivities, and need both recognition and redistribution. In her formulation of the bivalent-collectivities, she elaborates:

> "I call such a collectivity "bivalent." What differentiate it as a collectivity is both the economic structure and the status order of society. When oppressed or subordinated, therefore, it will suffer injustices that are traceable to both political economy and culture simultaneously. Bivalent collectivities, in sum, may suffer both socio-economic mal-distribution and cultural misrecognition in forms where neither of these injustices is an indirect effect of the other, but where both are primary and co-original. In their case, neither the politics of redistribution alone nor the politics of recognition alone will suffice. Bivalent collectivities need both" (Fraser, 1996: 15).

She raises questions about the degree of oppression, about the criteria for the recognition and redistribution for any oppressed identity. She gave the answer for the practical questions to the precise proportion of economic disadvantage and the status injury must be determined empirically in every case.

> "For practical purposes, then, virtually all real-world oppressed collectivities are bivalent. Virtually all suffer both mal-distribution and misrecognition in forms where each of those injustices has some independent weight, whatever its ultimate roots. To be sure, not all oppressed collectivities are bivalent in the same way, nor to the same degree. Some axes of oppression, such as class, tilt more heavily toward the distribution end of the spectrum; others, such as sexuality, incline more to the recognition end ; while still others, such as gender and "race," cluster closer to the centre. The precise proportion of economic disadvantage and status injury must be determined empirically in every case. Nevertheless, in virtually every case, the harms at issue comprise both mal-distribution and misrecognition in forms where neither of those injustices can be redressed entirely indirectly but where each requires some practical attention. As a practical matter, therefore,

overcoming injustice in virtually every case requires both redistribution and recognition" (Ibid: 22).

Marginalization and exclusion in today's world are apparent everywhere. Different states devise various policies to rectify the past wrong doings. The system of representation is one of the most successful policies among them. The concept of positive discrimination, affirmative action as well as reservation policy is another substitute to this world. The Chinese state calls it the preferential policy to address the social exclusion of the ethnic minorities in China. The question of discrimination, according to Fraser, cannot be solved by redistribution and recognition. Adding to these two concepts, she argues for representation too which is, according to her, implicit in doing justice with redistribution and recognition.

> "It is now apparent that no claim for justice can avoid presupposing some notion of representation, implicit or explicit, insofar as none can avoid assuming a frame. Thus, representation is always already inherent in all claims for redistribution and recognition. The political dimension is implicit in, indeed required by, the grammar of the concept of justice. Thus, no redistribution or recognition without representation" (Fraser, 2005:10).

What is redistribution? Does it only represent or symbolize the class politics or is it more than that? Are class and identity politics complementary to each other? The economic discrimination of particular community or group is not only due to unequal wage differences or materiality rather it is also because of the prejudices and cultural biases. She has rightly located the problem in its entirety. Fraser argues that:

> "The politics of redistribution encompasses not only class-centre orientations, such as New Deal Liberalism, social democracy, and socialism, but also those forms of feminism and anti-racism that look to socio-economic transformation or reform as the remedy for gender and racial ethnic injustice. Thus it is broader than class politics in the conventional sense. The politics of recognition, likewise, encompasses not only movements aiming to revalue unjustly devalued identities, such as cultural feminism, black cultural nationalism, and gay identity politics, but also deconstructive tendencies, such as queer politics, critical "race" politics, and deconstructive feminism, which reject the "essentialism" of traditional identity politics" (2008: 4).

The nature of exclusion among classes and identity construction has spillover effect. Their dual nature of exclusion and deprivation need a radical structural change to stop the exclusion and marginalization at both levels. The politics of class redistribution and the politics of recognition together can help in making the society non-discriminatory at large[22]. She aptly explains that the justice can be achieved through:

> "First, recognition should be considered a matter of justice, not self realization. Second, theorists of justice should reject the idea of an either/ or choice between the distributive paradigm and the recognition paradigm; instead, they should adopt a bivalent conception of justice premised on the norm of participatory parity. Third, justice could in principle require recognizing distinctiveness, over above common humanity; but whether in any given case it does so in fact can be determined pragmatically only in light of the obstacles to participatory parity specific to the case. Fourth and finally, to justify claims for recognition claimants must show that institutionalized patterns of cultural value unjustly deny them the inter-subjective conditions of participatory parity" (2008: 24).

It has been the constant acceptance and rejection of one another by both the flag bearers of class politics and the culturalists. Culturalists reject redistribution logic in the name of old outdated materialism and the some proponents of redistribution perceive the claims of recognition of differences as 'false consciousnesses'. This has been perceived in binaries. Class politics or identity politics?, multiculturalism or social equality?.

While not failing prey to either of these claims, Fraser rather questions not only the Keynesian-Westfalian frame of justice but also proposes a strategy for theories of justice also:

> "I shall argue, first, that theories of justice must become three-dimensional, incorporating the political dimension of representation, alongside the economic

---

[22] To be sure, the ultimate cause of class injustice is the economic structure of capitalist society. But the resulting harms include misrecognition as well as mal-distribution. Moreover, cultural harms that originated as by product of economic structure may have developed the life of their own. Today the misrecognition dimensions of class may be sufficiently autonomous in their operation to require independent remedies of recognition. Left un-attendant, moreover, class misrecognition may impede the capacity to mobilize against mal-distribution. To build broad support for economic transformation today may require first challenging cultural attitudes that demean poor and working people: for example, "culture of poverty" ideologies that suggest that the poor deserve what they get. Likewise, poor and working people may need a counter "identity politics" to support their struggles for economic justice; they may need, that is, to build class communities and cultures in order to neutralize the hidden injuries of class and forge the confidence to stand up for themselves. Thus, a politics of class recognition may be needed both in itself and to get a politics of redistribution of the ground (2008: 13).

dimension of distribution and the cultural dimension of recognition. I shall also argue that the political dimension of representation should itself be understood as encompassing three levels. The combined effect of these two arguments will be to make visible a third question, beyond those of the 'what' and the 'who', which I shall call the question of the 'how'. That question, in turn, inaugurates a paradigm shift: what the Keynesian-Westphalian frame cast as the theory of social justice must now become a theory of post-Westphalian democratic justice" (Fraser, 2005:73).

Nancy Fraser incorporates the justice model including identity model of recognition and status model of redistribution. She also claims that both models are complementary to each other while having proper representation with mutually irreducible dimensions. Hence she developed status model to avoid the authoritarian reification[23] and conformist logic of identity model. Hence she finds two types of problems naming them as 'problem of reification' and 'problem of displacement'[24] in addressing the issues of recognition and redistribution. So to avoid these problems, she proposed the theory of social justice which includes redistribution and recognition with proper representation to stop the further exclusion of a particular community in any society.

Fraser's formulation with a focus on the concept of recognition, redistribution, and proper representation is insightful for the academicians and policy makers. The question of political economy and identity is a major challenge to the larger unity against the economic discrimination and cultural discrimination. Can these issues of political economy and social recognition be different? Is there any such methodology or philosophy that can deal with the issues of recognition and redistribution? How are the issues of economy and culture related to each other? These are some of the questions raised by Marxist philosophers, and they tried to correct Fraser that the political economy incorporates the issue of culture and other identities. The culture and economy are deeply connected to each other. Hence no dichotomy between them is needed.

---

[23] Nancy Fraser in her work, 'Social Justice in the Knowledge Society: Redistribution, Recognition, and Participation', WWW.WISSENSGESELLSCHAFT.ORG # HEINRICH-BÖLL-STIFTUNG # SEITE 2, elucidates the problem of reification. According to her 'struggles for recognition do not promote respectful interaction across differences in increasingly multicultural contexts. They tend, rather, to encourage separatism and group enclaves, chauvinism and intolerance, patriarchalism and authoritarianism. I have called this the problem of reification'.

[24] Ibid, 'by treating misrecognition as a freestanding cultural harm, identity politics abstracts the injustice from its institutional matrix and obscures its entwinement with economic inequality. Thus, far from synergising with struggles of redistribution, it all too easily displaces the latter'. I have called this the problem of displacement*.

Iris Young (1997; 155) delineates the relation between the economy and culture.

> "As I understand it; this has been the project of the best of what is called 'cultural studies': to demonstrate that political economy, as Marxists think of it, is through and through cultural without ceasing to be material, and to demonstrate that what students of literature and art call 'culture' is economic, not as base to the superstructure, but in its production, distribution, and effects, including effects on reproducing class relations. Political economy is cultural, and culture is economic".

Another set of criticisms is also raised vis-a-vis the methodology of Fraser's the bivalent collectivites. These criticisms were in the context of the dichotomy formulation of Fraser. Fraser posed this question that why did she divide class and identity issues separately? It was for a tool to understand the problem and to analyse the identity and class exploitation in the society.

The reason for constructing a dichotomy is that a mutually exclusive opposition best enables the theorist to identify contradictions in reality. Scholars find injustices at multiple levels. Hence the plural categorization of issues is necessary to deliver justice. The categorisation of political economy and cultural issues are perceived to reduce it. Hence multiple approaches are compulsory to address discrimination and humiliation.

2.5 Summary

The concept of 'social exclusion' is, historically, not very old. The French bureaucrat Lenoir has propounded the term for those who were left behind in relishing the fruits of development. This was the context in which the policy makers started using the term for a more inclusive society. The exclusion of the natives can be noticed in different societies in different epochs. The concept of 'virtues' led to a hierarchical division of the Athenian society, the excluded being the women and slaves. Citizenship in medieval Europe was also highly selective, and was confined to residents of the city who had freed themselves from feudal relations of servitude. Beyond the city, feudal relationships based on 'private-law' identities such as serf, villain, vassal, lord and so on, continued to govern the social life.

The concept of 'social contract' (Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau) was devised to concede more freedom and participation to citizens in the society. They propagated 'natural rights of

people'. However, exclusion and deprivation did not cease to exist in the name of culture, religion and customs. In this regard, the modern state has treaded a step further from the previous societies, which generally tried to incorporate people under the slogans of citizenship and democracy. The concentration of wealth and the pauperisation of the majority of the population at the global level have given an impetus to many scholars including Amartya Sen to expand the concept of social exclusion. The "capability approach" of Sen focuses, on the one hand, on the ability the substantive freedom of people to lead their lives, wherein they have a reason to value and to enhance the real choices they have'. Moreover, it makes a case for the well-being and freedom of the people, which is indirectly linked to social change. Adam Smith's idea of 'appear in public without shame' is the idea around which Sen presses for inclusion in any society.

Various forms of segregation and exclusion are evident in the case of Chinese ethnic minorities and Dalits of India. They need differential treatment at both levels of redistribution and recognition. The historical and structural injustices of both the communities have been remarkable in their respective societies. Historically, they have been criminalised and devalued at ethnic and caste level at several junctures. The subjugation and segregation process at various levels in the society and policy-making need special active inclusion. Thus, Nancy Fraser aptly summarises the solution to these problems in the three strategies for inclusion; redistribution, recognition and representation.

Fraser specifically pictures discrimination and exclusion at two levels, economic and cultural, namely, "bivalent collectivities". The segregation and exclusion of gender, race, caste, ethnicity, gays, lesbian and transgender all have "bivalent" discrimination. The demeaning and the devaluation of their history, culture, lifestyle and origin can be regarded as cultural devaluation by the mainstream. Such a trajectory paved way for their rigorous and constant exclusion. Even the state discriminates them through its policies. The exclusion of women from the military services is one such example that operates at a global level. There are a number of indirect instances in India and China where Dalits and ethnic minorities are being widely discriminated against. Nancy Fraser calls this phenomenon as both direct and indirect discrimination.

Such discrimination calls for the provision of material as well as cultural benefits. In Fraser's opinion, the "bivalent collectivities", in sum, may suffer both from socio-economic maldistribution and cultural misrecognition in forms where neither of these injustices is an

indirect effect of the other, but where both are primary and co-original. In their case, neither the politics of redistribution nor the politics of recognition alone will suffice. Moreover, she conceptualizes social justice, which includes three elements of recognition, redistribution with proper representation. This notion of justice is being demanded in both Chinese and Indian societies to end exclusion of ethnic minorities and Dalits respectively.

With the discussion on the theoretical facets of exclusion as a backdrop, the next chapter focuses on social and economic exclusion in China and India. The social exclusion in both societies has a special connotation. The case of ethnic minorities in China and Dalits in India is chosen for this study. As we discussed in the current chapter about the multidimensional aspects of social exclusion, the next chapter will deal with various shades of exclusion in their respective societies.

Chapter-3

Social and Economic Exclusion in China and India: Broad Contours

Chapter- 3

Social and Economic Exclusion in China and India: Broad Contours

3.1 Introduction

Social exclusion as a term has gained much attention in the arena of policy making. The exclusion of a particular section of society includes social, political and economic dimensions. Hence, social exclusion focuses on the multidimensionality of deprivation whereby certain sections of the society are being frequently deprived of different privileges and options at the same time. Moreover, a lesser amount of discussion in the literature but perhaps more significant to the theoretical contribution of the concept on social exclusion implies a focus on the relations and processes that underpin deprivation.

Against this backdrop, the chapter examines the historical legacies of social and economic exclusion, institutional and structural justification as well as the societal norms that have been the source of such exclusion. Moreover, it focuses on the State measures, and constitutional safeguards against all modes of the social and economic exclusion. At the same time, it analyses the social policy of both the states to redress exclusion in their respective societies.

Social and cultural sources of exclusion are rooted in the informal social structures and institutions of caste and ethnicity covering not only the private but also public sphere of influence governed by the State. Social exclusion of groups or individuals within the larger context is denial of equal opportunity, respect and recognition of the right to development. This phenomenon, therefore, calls for additional policies complementing anti-poverty and economic development programmes.

This process of social exclusion is discernible in China and India as well. The nature and degree of social and economic exclusion in China and India differ given the differences in their political, economic and social systems. However, to address the issues of social and economic exclusion both the states have provided certain constitutional arrangements that are broadly called affirmative action. The affirmative action has broader meaning and hence should be seen in the global context too. The liberalization and privatization of Indian and Chinese economies led to the weakening of the importance of these provisions.

The existing historical and structural exclusion got impetus through the legal and political suppression of dissenting voices in both societies. The Chinese ethnic minorities resisted in many ways. The Han settlement in western regions and the repression of ethnic minority can be seen in the context of 2008 Urumchi riots. Further the economic reforms and mobilization around ethnic identity against repression is called by Glandely as 'ethnic revitalization' and 'religious resurgence'. The continuous demand of ethnic minorities for full autonomy is another symbol of resistance against the state's formulation of 'three evils' in China.

In India, the struggle and resistance is not new. The ex-"untouchables" register their protests in all forms. The idea of demand for 'separate electorates, in the past and the constitutional provisions for today's Dalits are some of the instances. It is a well established notion that the massacre and atrocities against Dalits necssitate the active resistance of Dalits. The 2001, Durban convention[25] is one of the instances which showcased the fighting tendencies of Dalits for justice and dignity.

3.2 A Brief Theoretical Approach to Social Exclusion in China and India

Social exclusion as a concept has multiple dimensions as underscored in the pervions chepter. It includes socio-cultural dimensions as well as politico-economic aspects. Chinese and Indian societies have been multicultural from times immemorial. The Confucius philosophy and Hindu religion played important roles in shaping both the societies.

The Han and ethnic minority relations are said to be based on the Confucius philosophy. At the same time, the Hindu religious texts divided the society hierarchically. The hierarchical relationships are the backbone for social exclusions in China and India. The five relationships in China and caste hierarchy India are examples.

The onslaught of globalization that unleashed the fast pace of privatization and marketisation has been diminishing the State's role, raising serious debates over the state-led welfare policies and affirmative action in both the countries. As a result the condition of erstwhile excluded communities, which depended on the state, has deteriorated. In this new scenario, where the market occupies a major role in development, the debate on social and economic exclusion and inclusion has become exceptionally crucial, necessitating the imperative to revisit and rethink with an eye on its multi-dimensional nature.

---

[25] In 2001, there was a world conference against racism in Durban where dalits have raised caste as an issue in India. They have brought it globally and argued that though caste is not same as race, castiesm and racism are indeed comparable'. (Arundhati, Roy, 2014: 43).

In addition, in India, religion and castes are the driving forces for evolving and consolidating group identity. On the other hand, in China it is mainly ethnicity and culture. Ethnicity, caste and poverty are inter-related. In both China and India, religious minorities and disadvantaged social groups are much poorer than the majority populace. Economic and cultural forms of injustice are hybrid forms which give rise to what Nancy Fraser calls 'bivalent collectivities'.

Social exclusion is bound up with the cultural valuational disadvantage. Gender, race, ethnicity and caste all have bivalent collectivities. Bivalent collectivities include both economic and cultural injustice. Thus, people "subordinated" by caste, ethnicity and race need both redistribution and recognition. According to Fraser's Bivalent collectivities' theoretical framework, what matters is the nature of relations in a society, in which there is equal respect and recognition. The outcome is not only the criterion to judge the kind of discrimination and exclusion rather the process under which the decision are madealso equally vital. The societies, which are diverse and multicultural, have to be equally treated and represented. The history suggests that the dominant groups misinterpreted and garnered their share of power disproportionately. The question of representation hence comes into being to get proportionate representation for historically marginalized and culturally demonised groups. The concept of cultural valuation is decisive to comprehend the economic and cultural injustice in both the societies.

3.3 Historicity of Exclusion

Both China and India are diverse societies. China has fifty six (56) ethnic communities divided into Han and 55 minorities and India is unique for its caste based social structure. Indian society is broadly divided into four Varnas- Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vaishaya and Shudra. Dalits are treated as those outside the Varna system and hence are called as "untouchables".

While the Chinese society is ethnically divided in which the Han ethnic group is the most dominant ethnic group, in India, it is the Brahmin, Kshatriya and Vashiya castes which are the dominant beneficiaries at the cost of most oppressed and broken Dalits, constitutionally known as Schedule Caste (SC).

The notion of identity, its exclusion and representation have become crucial in this globalised world. Their deprivation and humiliation has become the strong reasons for their

mobilisation. It has been noticed historically that sometimes the mobilisation and assertion also taken as a threat for the establishment. Hence,

> "Identities were not located purely according to the so called objective, scientific criteria, but peoples' statements about their identities their desired identifications and their actual ones, listen to, taken into account, recorded and considered together with other factors such as economic types and stage of social development, history language and religious affiliation" (Tapp 2002a, p. 67; Mullaney 2004, p. 230; see also Gros 2004, pp. 278, 291; Harrel,1995b, p. 83 as cited in Xiaowei Zang, 2015, 6).

Ethnic minority in general and ethnic minority of China, in particular, have different contested meanings and location. The ethnic minorities have been, historically, very important and crucial in China. Its definition, classification and location have to be borne in mind while conceptualizing it in the Chinese society. The role of Confucianism in defining ethnic minority makes it unique in China. Since the People's Republic of China is governed by the Communist Party (CCP), the position of ethnic minorities vis-a-vis dominant Han and Chinese state becomes very crucial.

The largest ethnic group in the People's Republic of China is the Han Chinese ethnic group, which makes up about 91.6% of the population, and that means other ethnic minorities constitutes 8.4 percent. (World Population Statistics: 2013). It is interesting to know that most of the ethnic minorities have been situated in the western part of the China which is shown below in the table number 3.1.

Table: 3.1 Population and Distribution of China's Top 10 Ethnic Minority Groups and the Han Chinese Majority (1990–2000)

Ethnic Group	Population (1990)	Population (2000)	Growth Rate (%)	Main location
Han	1,042,480,000	1,159,400,000	11.22	Entire country
Zhuang	15,489,630	16,178,811	4.45	Guangxi,Yunnan, Guizhou, Hunan
Manchu	9,821,180	10,682,263	8.77	Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Jilin, Hebei,Inner Mongolia, Beijing
Hui	8,602,978	9,816,802	14.11	Ningxia,Gansu, Henan, Xinjiang, Qinghai, Yunnan, Hebei, Shandong, Anhui, Beijing
Miao	7,398,035	8,940,116	20.84	Guizhou, Yunnan, Hunan,Sichuan, Guangxi, Hubei
Uighur	7,214,431	8,399,393	16.42	Xinjiang, Hunan
Tujia	5,704,223	8,028,133	40.74	Hubei,Hunan, Sichuan
Yi	6,572,173	7,762,286	18.11	Yunnan, Sichuan, Guizhou
Mongol	4,806,849	5,813,947	20.95	Inner Mongolia, Liaoning,Xinjiang, Heilongjiang, Jilin, Qinghai, Hebei, Henan
Tibetan	4,593,330	5,416,021	17.91	Tibet, Sichuan, Qinghai,Gansu, Yunnan
Buyi	2,545,059	2,971,460	16.75	Guizhou

Source and Notes: Data are based on the fourth national census of the PRC completed in July 1990 and the fifth national census of the PRC completed in November 2000.
http://hi.baidu.com/yuh1985/blog/item/bec0a6eca522242462d09f30.html;and
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjgb/rkpcgb/.

Table: 3.1 also shows that most of these minorities are concentrated in autonomous regions and provinces in the northwest, north, northeast, south, and southwest of the country.

Moreover, Yun Zhou (2013: 6) has given the details of change that occurred in Chinese population by ethnicity from the inception of CCP.

Table: 3.2 Change in Chinese Population by Ethnicity (%), 1953-2010

	1953	**1964**	**1982**	**1990**	**2000**	**2010**
Minorities	6.06	5.78	6.7	8.01	8.41	8.49
Han	93.94	94.22	93.3	91.99	91.59	91.51
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Source: figures are from the official report of censuses of the National Bureau of Statistics of China, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjgb/rkpcgb/, Presented (August 30th 2013) in Session 253: Collecting ethnic and racial data in censuses and surveys at Peking University China, pp.1-13 as cited in Yun Zhou, 2013: 1).

There are many other smaller groups who have been clubbed together or unrecognised, because they are very less in number, other than the above mentioned group. To put it more precisely, Yun Zhou (2013: 6) has enlisted the numbers of ethnic groups which were historically unidentified in Chinese census.

Table: 3.3 Unidentified Ethnic Population from Six Censuses in China

Year	Total Population	Unidentified Ethnic Group Populations	Naturalization	Unidentified/Total Population (%)
1953	577856141	1017299	1004	0.18
1964	691220104	32411	7416	0.00
1982	1003913927	799705	4937	0.08
1990	1130510638	752347	3498	0.07
2000	1242612226	734438	941	0.06
2010	1332810869	640101	1448	0.05

Source: Population Census Office under the State Council and Department of Population, Social Science and Technology Statistics of National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2012 (for 2010 data, p.54), 2002 (for 2000 data, p.46), 1993 (for 1990 data, p.319), 1985 (for 1982 data, p.20); Department of Population Statistics of State Statistical Bureau and Economic Department of State Nationalities Affairs Commission, 1994 (for data of 1953 and 1964, p.2, as cited in Yun Zhou, 2013,6).

In regard to India, the caste system is a form of social stratification in which castes are hierarchies', occupationally specialized and separated from each other in matter of marriage, physical contact, food by rules of purity and pollution. The birth based segregation is reinforced by rigorous endogamy and strict control. Hierarchy-along with purity and power-culminates in the Brahman says Manu, the ancient lawgiver of brahmanical tradition; 'When a Brahman is born, he springs to light above the world; he is the chief of all creatures, entitled by eminence of birth to the wealth of the world' (Manusmiriti 1.99-100).

Moreover, it is very much relative to the course of dominance and subjugation of powerless. Thus, power politics is at the heart of brahminism. The exercise of power necessarily

involves conflict and resistance. The contestation of economic, cultural, and intellectual resources between the powerful and powerless involves both dominance and resistance. This conflict, obviously multifaceted, takes place at different levels. There is heterogeneity of resistance as there is heterogeneity of dominance, which is equally true of resistance. As Turner (1983: 78) says, 'each mode of production will give rise to at least two significantly separate ideologies corresponding to the class position of subordinate classes.' 'In other words, since no dominant ideology goes unchallenged, it is never absolute, never all pervasive' (Mani, R. Braj, 2005:17).

Uma Chakravarty (2012: 59) traced the history of brahminism and she argues that not only the religious texts of Hindus but also the land relation is responsible for subjugation of Dalits. According to her, 'the dominant perception of caste is not only based exclusively on brahmanical sources, but also relies heavily for its theoretical underpinning on texts that date only from the first century AD'. She maintains that the Dharmshashastra literature, in particular, has been widely used by Indologists and sociologists. These texts are the bedrock of the brahmanical legal theory but what they reflect is just the ideology of caste; they are hardly concerned with its real working'. Further, in her argument she asserts that 'use of caste framework of reference alone is clearly inadequate because it does not sufficiently account for the material basis of the society' (ibid, 60).

The relationship between caste and class has been cogently articulated by Gail Omvedt in her pioneering and insightful work. She explains that 'class is a 'material reality' with a 'material base'; it is not only a form but a concrete material content, and it has historically shaped the very basis of Indian society and continues to have crucial economic implications even today (Omvedt 1982: 14). She highlights the political economy of caste system but also her arguments resonant to Chakravarty's formulation.

According to Omvedt, perhaps one of

> "the most sophisticated versions of a history-based theory of caste is that of D.D.
> Koshambi, the Indian historian, sanskritist and mathematician. Koshambi stresses
> the economic aspect of the process of incorporation, involving the transformation
> of hunting and gathering tribes to a settled, agricultural economy. The other
> functions of Brahman priests were wrecked by invasion of Alexander, the growth
> of new kingdoms, and the flourishing of Buddhism, but they remain as the most

important holders of an intellectual tradition. The role that these Brahmans then began to perform was not simply one of maintaining the class structure of society and winning over new tribes to caste culture, but was also crucial to economic development'' (Koshambi cited in Omvedt, 2011: 20).

However, there are various theories and contending concepts to define caste system in its origins and functioning. The Ariyan-Dravidian theory propounded by the Indian philosopher Jyoti Rao Phule in nineteenth Century is a key to understand caste. His arguments resonate through others like Tilak (Balgangadhar Tilak) where they asserts that Aryans are not original inhabitant like Dalits rather came from central Asia. This gave the racial supremacy a soaring tone. The divine theory of emergence of caste system is another aspect. The so-called Hindu sacred texts, (Vedas, Smrities) posit that the Brahma, the God has produced different castes from his body. The Brahmin is born from the mouth. Hence, he accordingly meant to be more respected and privileged. The third aspect of caste system finds its theoretical moorings in political economy.

India has a peculiar social system, which is popularly known as Varna system. The hierarchy in the system divides these four *Varnas* into thousands of castes. The graded inequality and endogamy are two key features of the system. People are required to maintain their "purity" by keeping distance physically and sexually. Women were guarded and made the property of their caste.

Though, Schedule Castes (SCs) are found in most states, they are largely concentrated in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar in the north, West Bengal in the east, Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh in the south and Rajasthan and Maharashtra in the western India. The word 'Dalit', which means oppressed, is academically accepted today. The history of the word and its meaning has been different in the South Asian context. The Hindu religious texts have given the most degraded terms and attached meanings. Traditionally, in the Hindu social order they are placed at the bottom of the hierarchy and are considered as *Atisudra* or *Avarna*, and are treated as "untouchables."

The history of the 'word 'Dalit' is not very old. This word is chosen by assertive Dalits which emerged from the radical politics of Maharastra. They were highly influenced by the 'Black Panthers' of United States of America and preferred the term 'Dalit Panthers' in India. The word 'Dalit' was popularized in 1960s and 1970s in the Marathi literature. It gained currency

in public sphere during the SC –caste Hindu riots in Bombay in the early 1970s. 'Dalit Panthers' used the term to assert their identity and fight for rights and self-respect. Later, the term has been used with a wider connotation. It includes all the oppressed and exploited sections of the society. It does not confine itself merely to economic exploitation in terms of appropriation of surplus. Philosophically, this movement incorporates not only the exploitation of labouring classes but also the social, cultural and economic subjugation of the marginalized sections of the society. It has essentially emerged as a political category. For some, it connotes an ideology for fundamental change in the social structure and relations.

Mahatma Gandhi, the leader of the Indian Congress, called the "untouchables", 'Harjan' which means children of Hari (god). He also popularized this term across the India. He also inspired many Congress leaders to open school and hostels as a title of 'Harijan'. Many great leaders, notably the architect of Indian Constitution, Dr, Ambedkar never liked this term. He preferred the term depressed classes. 'Gandhi borrowed the term from a Bhakti saint of the 17th century, Narsinh Mehta. He primarily appealed to caste Hindus to use the term Harijan instead of Antyaja (the last-born). The term Harijan has been widely used by caste Hindus as a substitute of Achuchute, i.e., Untouchable' (Shah, 2001: 20-21).

Dalits are the poor and downtrodden. Generally, Dalit includes those terms in administrative parlances as Schedule Castes (SCs), Schedule tribes (STs), and other Backward Classes (OBCs). 'The term SC was first used by the British in the Government of India Act, 1935. Prior to this, some of these castes were included among the Depressed Classes a category used for the first time at the beginning of the 20th century' (Gupta, 1985: 7-35).

However, in day- today use of political discourse, the term is so far mainly confined to SCs. The present work also confines mainly to these groups (SCs) only.

3.4 Ethnic Minorities and its Classification in China

The question of ethnicity, its definition and classification is a complex issue. The complex social structure of Chinese society makes the categorization and identification tedious and sometimes misleading too. The smaller ethnic groups were at times merged into larger groups and were not given proper representation. These were the groups, which lived together for centuries but maintained their cultural distinctiveness.

"The Ethnic Classification remains one of the least understood issues in contemporary Chinese history, not only in terms of its importance, but even in terms of basic information: who was involved, how it was undertaken, and why it was undertaken in the first place. Some of this confusion was alleviated in 1995, when the first (and, until now, only) published monograph on the Classification was released in China" (Thomas, Mullaney, 2010: 326).

In some ways, the complexity of Chinese society is much more than in the other parts of the world. The history of China has been not peaceful rather a series of invasions and influx of groups makes it more complete. The historians have pondered over it. For instance, Fairbank points that 'The Chinese society has been diverse ethnically, religiously and culturally. Even, the diversity among the ethnic groups in China 'might be even greaterthan that of all the ethnic differences combined in Europe and America' (Fairbank, 2010: 16).

There are many modern terminologies such as nationalism, nationality, democracy; along with human rights which have different meaning for Chinese rulers and leaders even today. The modern understanding of state, citizenships and even Marxism and socialism has Chinese interrelation and articulation.

Xiaowei Zang (2015: xiv) argues that 'Nationality is arguably a product of West. No such concept existed in pre-modern China, and it was until the late nineteenth century that I was introduced to China from Japan. It is often translated as Minzu in Chinese, which means 'people' or 'an ethnic group'. In Chinese 'nationality' is called 'Shaoshu Minzu'.

There were other group of scholars (Barbantseva 2008, pp. 569-70; Gladney 1996, pp. 16-17, 85; see also Huang 2002) who made a similar observation. According to them:

"The concept of nationality did not exist in traditional Chinese literature and philosophy. The 'Minzu' was first introduced into China from Japan by combining the notion of people (min) and the notion of descent (zu) in the second half of the nineteenth century. At that time China was perceived by Han people to be about to be colonized by foreign powers. Leading intellectuals such as Liang Qichao and Kang Youwei advanced the notion of a Chinese nation to unite Han people to save China from foreign dominance".

After the establishment of PRC, Chinese leadership has enunciated the rights of ethnic minorities and granted them some special privileges through its ethnic classification project.

Sun Yat-sen recognized five people of China (wuzu gong he): the Han, Manchu (Man), Mongolia (Meng), Tibetan (Zang) and Hui (all Muslims). Chiang Kai-shek divided them into five on the basis of region but not as race and blood. Abanti, Bhattacharya, (2003: 364) in her work argues that 'Chinese Sociologist, Fei Xiaotong studied the process of ethnic identification and enumerated some 400 minority-groups which had applied for recognition by 1955.' The communist China adopts the Stalinist definition of nation, i.e. Common language, a common geographic living area, a common economic life, and a common psyche, based on common culture.

She further elucidates the legal discourse in the making of Chinese ethnicities. According to her, 'the 1954 Constitution clearly made the right to secession illegal and instead introduced 'regional autonomy'. Preamble to the 1982 Constitution stipulates that: 'Regional autonomy is practiced in areas where people of minority nationalities live in compact communities; in these areas organs of self-government are established for the exercise of the right of autonomy. All the national autonomous areas are inalienable parts of the People's Republic of China' (ibid: 366).

A similar argument is also put forth by (Gros 2004, p. 278), that the CCP eventually decided not to use Stalin's fourfold criteria of 'nationality' in the ethnic classification project and pragmatically turned to Republican era for conceptual and methodological inspiration in its effort to develop a strategy for identifying nationality groups in the PRC.

The question of self-determination has been the most controversial in the history of international politics. The Soviet Union has followed the policy of self-determination granting the rights to wither it away from the Union. In the history of CCP, the question of self-determination and rights of ethnic minorities were debated and questioned consistently. The CCP and its leadership in China dealt with the ethnic questions very strategically.

> "Like other CCP leaders, Mao Zedong supported the right of self-determination
> by non-Han peoples in the 1920s and early 1930s. However, he withdrew his
> support after 1937, sensing that the right had been used by Japan to promote the
> independence of Mongolia. Mao and his comrades decided that the right to self-
> determination could be exercised in the case of oppressed nationality groups

calling off the rule of imperialism and colonialism. Like Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-Shek, Mao regarded the Chinese people as the 'whole country' comprising 'all nationalities' in China. Tibetans, Mongolians, Uyghurs and other minorities were among the broad masses of the Chinese people" (He 2004: 115-116; Howland 2011: 7-8; Zhou 2009: 333-4; Zhu and Yu 2000: 49).

The newly born PRC had taken the broader responsibility to classify the diverse minorities and granted them constitutional autonomy. The history of classification of minority was tedious and took many years. The project of classification went into several phases. The PRC took the responsibility to gather the logistics to define the ethnicity in China. The institutionalized mechanism and the state machinery played significant roles in its classification. This classification and categorization hence raised several doubts over the intention and politics of communist regime.

Although, Kevin, Caffrey (2004: 253) in his work explains that

''Much of the ethnic Classification Project was completed in six months, producing 38 nationality groups in 1954 for unknown reasons, this figure increased drastically to 53 after the second PRC census in 1964. Lhoba was then recognized as the 54th minority nationality group in 1965, and the Jino of Yunnan were designated as the 55th minority group in 1979. In 1990, it was officially confirmed that China had 56 nationalities.Despite the arbitrary and problematic nature of the Ethnic Classification Project, most people in China have used the official categories in their research on ethnic minorities in the PRC''.

The Minzu system set up after the Ethnic Classification Project has been a key institution in governance and in the maintenance of the PRC's legitimacy, and at the same time it has transformed the relationship between the ethnic minority groups and the PRC state.

While the motive and agenda of Chinese state was preferred to be for the classification of ethnic minorities, on the one hand, it projected it (PRC) as a responsible state to provide proper rights and privileges but on the other hand, it was a policy designed to have control over those regions. The issues of autonomy and self-rule are at a crucial juncture and that was strategy for assimilation and co-option of ethnic minority and at the same time it had security concerns too. Lundberg and Zhou (2009: 295) argue that, in addition to geopolitical and historical issues, state security and concerns for territorial integrity significantly motivated

the implementation of regional autonomy. Interestingly, Howland (2011: 16) regards regional autonomy as a 'policy of divide and rule the criterion of a mosaic of autonomous zones in order to prevent any collective action against the PRC'.

The ethnic policy of PRC has been the agenda of 'Confucius *Ronghe'* ideology. The ethnic classification scheme and minority entitlements have been implemented to serve the CCP's long term goal, i.e., acculturation, integration and eventual assimilation of the non-Han groups into Han society. In essence, China's nationality policy is consistent with Confucius *Ronghe* ideology as its supports the enterprise of expanding the Chinese cultural sphere' (He 2004: 119-20; Mackeraas 1994: 7-10).

3.5 Philosophical and Religious Rationalization (Middle Kingdom and Hinduism)

Chinese and Indian societies have been predominantly known as Han and Hindu, which are the main dominant forces in their respective societies.

3.5 A *Chinese Society*

The very premise for the building of Chinese society centred around concepts such as 'Middle Kingdom', 'Centre and Periphery', 'all Under Heaven' and 'Confucianism'. The teachings and moral code of conduct preached by Confucius were compiled by his disciple (s) Mencius is popularly known as 'Confucianism'. This philosophy has been interpreted by different rulers and leaders in their different course of time.

> "Mao himself said in 1938 that we should sum up our history from Confucius to Sun Yat-sen and take over this valuable legacy". In 1964, Mao lamented that the Party had "cast aside the mainstream of Confucianism". Confucius, in fact, "understood something of the suffering of the masses". He went on to recount how at one time he himself had "believed deeply in Confucius..."and affirmed that "Confucius... was rather democratic". In the course of the Cultural Revolution, however, Mao's ideas seemed to have undergone some significant change. By the time of the Lin Biao affair he began to address himself explicitly to certain theoretical questions, namely, "idealist apriorism" and the "question of genius, "both themes that were to surface and resurface in the subsequent Anti-Confucian Campaign" (Gregor, James A. and Maria, H. Chang, 1979: 1077).

It is interesting to see how affirmative policy of PRC played an important role to assimilate the ethnic minorities. Moreover, the policy is to not give equal representation to ethnic groups but to bring them into the Confucius fold. The hierarchical relations were maintained between Han and ethnic minorities.

'Although the CCP has implemented an affirmative action policy, there is no guarantee that it intends to promote multiculturalism in China. In fact, its nationality policy has been heavily influenced by Dr. Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925), who in turn was heavily influenced by Confucian legacies. Confucianism specifies that anyone can be a member of the Han community if he or she accepts Han culture' (Xiaowei, Zang, 2015:18).

E. O. Reischauer and Fairbank (1958:70) also find 'Confucius' Philosophy and teachings as from the perspective of rulers and their subjects. According to them, 'Confucius felt, men must play their proper assigned roles in a fixed society of authority. The idea is succinctly expressed in the famous statement: "Let the ruler be ruler and the subject a subject; let father be a father and the son a son'.

Edward Wang (1999: 304) in his work argues that 'through the course of Chinese imperial history, the Chinese worldview underwent several major changes. In the formative years of the Han dynasty, the Chinese view of the world was shaped around the axis of Han ethnic culture, which helped grade in hierarchies the rest of the world according to its acceptance of Han culture. As a result, the Han people and their neighbors formed a dichotomous relation. On the one hand, the Han people were wary of their "less" civilized, barbaric neighbors, especially the northern nomads'.

Chinese history has witnessed many invasions. Tibetan, Mongolian, Manchus etc. who invaded China, and in the course of time they also settled down there. The diversity, especially ethnic, that we find in the western part of China aptly proves it. The middle part or core China is considered to be that of the Yangtze River area.

The official thinking of Chinese establishment not only develops the racial as well cultural supremacy but they also maintained the idea of physical proximity. The mainland China located and developed along with the delta region. The prosperity alongside the fertility of the region provides enough rationale to settle the Han race.

Tu Wei-ming (1991: 3) offers a the similar argument where he reiterates that the idea of a cultural core area; first located in the Wei River Valley, a tributary of the Yellow River, and later encompassing parts of the Yangtze River has remained potent and enduring in the Chinese consciousness. According to him:

> "The expression *hua* or *huaxia*, meaning Chinese, connotes culture and civilization. Those who lived in China proper were, inter alia, cultured and civilized, clearly differentiable from those barbarians in the periphery who had yet to learn the proper ways of dressing, eating, dwelling, and travelling. On the surface, the classical distinction between Chinese and barbarians was predicated on the divergence of two drastically different modes of life: the agrarian community of the central plain and the nomadic tribes of the steppes. But the rise of Chinese cultural consciousness was occasioned by primordial ties defined in ethnic, territorial, linguistic, and ethical-religious terms. Although it is often noted that culture, rather than ethnicity, features prominently in defining Cheesiness, the cultured and civilized Chinese, as the myth goes, claim a common ancestry" (ibid).

The Chinese always differentiated themselves from the outsiders who were non-Hans. The Han pride comes from its roots in culture of 'Confucianism'. The Chinese perception of the world thus reflected the hierarchical nature of Chinese society and culture (John Fairbank, 1968: 2). This hierarchy was central to Han Chinese culture, or Confucianism, mainly from the early third century B.C. to early 20th century. The position of non-Han people in the hierarchy was determined by the extent to which they resembled mainstream Han culture. A similar standard was applied to arranging the non-Hans socially in this hierarchy. 'The Han Chinese often judge a non-Han people by their social behaviour. If the non-Hans showed a willingness to adopt the Han lifestyle they were referred to by the Han Chinese as "cooked" (shu), in contrast to the "raw" (sheng) who resisted to Han influence' (Frank, Dikotter, 1992: 8-10).

The cultural and racial superiority of Han Chinese also got some advantages due to their geographical location. The Chinese always consider themselves as inhabitant of central China. 'In the context of centre and periphery, the Chinese notion of hierarchy is built around the geographical position of Han occupied region. If the Han Chinese perceived the world

hierarchically this hierarchy was built on ethno-centric as well as spatial thinking' (Xiaobing Tang, 1996).

Historically, ethnic minorities settled in western regions of China. These regions include Inner Mangolia, Xinjiang, Ningxia, Guanxi, Tibet, Yunnan, Guizhou, Qinhai, Sichuan, Gansu, Hubei and Hunan. Population wise, it is Zhuang ethnic group who is the highest in number. Manchus are more assimilated than others. Moreover, Yunnan province has the highest number of recognized minorities (25). The Chinese claim that these groups settled in China around 5,000 years ago.

> "Herber, (1998:18) claims that starting with the Han dynasty (206 BC-220 AD), Han Chinese classified non-Han peoples as the Yi(east), Rong (west), Man (south), and Di (north) barbarians, and much of pre-modern Chinese history consisted of intensive interaction between the Han people and these non-Han people" (as cited in Xiaowei Zang, 2015: 6).

It is surprising to note that anyone can change their ethnic status form Han to ethnic minority and vice versa. This policy is very rare and unique in China. So, the rigidity of any identity can be normalized in China. 'A person's ethnic status appears on his or her identity card, and his or her status depends on his or her parent's ethnic status. Ethnic status can be changed from Han to minority or from minority to Han. An individual who wants to change his her ethnic status can apply for permission from relevant local government offices if he or she meets official criteria' (Ma 2007a, p.14, Leibold 2010, p.6 as cited in Xiaowei, 2015, 18).

The relationship of Han Chinese with the outside the world needs to be located in their conception of 'Middle Kingdom'. It is called sinocentricism. Chinese call their country 'Zhongguo in Chinese. The term *zhong* means middle or central, whilst *guo* means land, kingdom or country; therefore *zhongguo* could be translated as "middle kingdom".

John K. Fairbank, a renowned historian and expert on Chinese history and culture explains the concept of Sinocentricism appropriately. According to him,

> "Sinocentrism," which links up tightly with traditions of thought within China, including some that have gained renewed currency in recent years, expresses Chinese superiority and hubris. It has been couched historically through the millennial experiences of the great Chinese civilization in certain key terms:

Tianxia ("all under Heaven"), presided over by Tianzi (the "Son of Heaven") is presumed to envelope the entire world outside of Zhongguo (the "Middle Kingdom"). The taxonomy that Fairbank confers on China's "foreign relations" derives from these key terms; it is hierarchic and non-egalitarian, in contrast to the European international order, which came to embrace since the nineteenth century the notions of sovereignty and "equality" of nations" (Fairbank 1968, 1–19).

Dilip K. Basu also notes the importance of Fairbank's perspectives in understanding the *Han* Chinese relations with the other ethnic groups. Chinese relations with other countries are aptly explained by him.

"Fairbank classifies the "concentric hierarchy" of China's foreign relations in three main zones: the Sinic Zone comprising the culturally close neighbours, including Korea, Vietnam, and occasionally Japan; the Inner Asia Zone consisting of the nomadic and seminomadic peoples of the steppes region outside the Great Wall frontier; and the Outer Zone inhabited by Wai-yi ("outer barbarians") who are at a farther distance across land and sea-states of Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Europe that would send "tribute" (gong) while trading (Fairbank 1968, 2). We are introduced to two additional terms in the framework-barbarian and tribute" (Basu, 2014: 928).

3.6 Indian Society

On the other hand in India, according to the Hindu myths and their religious texts such as Rigveda, PurushaSukta, 10[th]Mandal, Brahmins, Kashtriayas, Vaishyas and Shudras were born from the mouth, shoulders, abdomen and legs of Lord Brahma respectively. In a descending order, they were degraded respectively. One unscientific feature of the Hindu philosophy is 'Karma' theory. According to this theory, everyone is destined to work according to their position in the above hierarchical system. The most important one is the Dalit here. Since they are not born from any other part of Brahma', so they are treated as the most degraded.

Dalits were not only doomed as degraded "untouchables" but were also criminalised. For that, they have been treated even "lower" than animals. All these inhuman provisions are documented in the religious texts of Hinduism. That was the context where Ambedkar burnt Manusmiriti publically in 1927. In his famous work, 'Annihilation of Caste', he asserts that

'Hinduism is a veritable chamber of horror'. There cannot be a more degrading system of social organization than the caste system, 'it is the system deadens paralyses and cripples the people from helpful activity' (Ambedkar, 1936:17.7).

The architect of Indian Constitution, B. R. Ambedkar puts it aptly; 'the Brahminical rule not only controlled the social space but also turned the untouchable body into a cultural space that pushed into the shadow during the daytime. Ambedkar, therefore, argues that 'the untouchables were treated like 'Hyenas', who like untouchables are 'nishachar', who come out into the open from their den only during the night time' (Ambedkar, 2001: 203).

Romila Thapar, the renowned the Indian historian depicts the real picture of "untouchables" in the eyes of the so-called "upper-strata" of the Indian society. Her findings delineate the different world-views of Dalits vis-a-vis the Brahmanical system of segregation and hierarchy. According to her, 'the *Meleccha* (barbarian) areas were impure lands not only because those who lived there spoke an alien language, but what was more important they did not perform the correct rituals. These were lands where the *Shradha* ceremony (offerings to ancestors on stipulated occasions) was not carried out, and where people did not observe the laws of the Varna' (Thapar, 1978: 140).

To abolish this age-old hierarchical social system, modern Indian state took some steps. The constitutional mechanism and modern rules and laws do have many provisions to destroy it. 'The Indian Constitution has formally abolished the caste system in 1950. Among others, Article 15, Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth, 17, Abolition of Untouchability' (Giuseppe, Scuto, 2007-08: 10). The Indian constitution grants fundamental rights to every citizen of India. Special privileges and rights are provided to the excluded communities such as Dalits.

Since the demarcation between the Han and the non-Han people was based largely on cultural and social terms, the exact boundary was not always clear. Rather as history shows, the term "Chinese" often had a broad and loose connotation so as to all as the Han Chinese to accommodate the regions where non-Hans are administered, especially after the decline of Han dynasty in the 3rd century AD, and to include non-Han ethnic groups who entered China proper and became Sinicised.

3.7 Economic Reform and Social Exclusion of Ethnic Minorities and Dalits

The economic reforms in China and India have had many implications. These reforms have taken different paths in the two countries. The socialist economy of China started to open her economy in 1978. In many phases, Chinese establishment allowed foreign investment in China. Indian case is slightly different. It is a mixed economy. India officially opened her economy in 1990s. Both China and India have faced several problems. The investment of foreign capital on the one hand unleashed the pace of economic growth but on the other hand, it has also excluded certain groups.

3.7.A *Reform and Affirmative Action Programmes in China*

'Opening up' 'four modernizations' and 'let's some get rich first' are some of the slogans that underpinned the change that came about in post-Mao China. The state led economy of Mao era was opened after 1978 in China. During Mao's time, the Chinese government under the leadership of CCP has followed two fold strategy for the reduction of inequality in China. On the one hand they attempted to reduce Han-minority inequality by addressing socio-economic gaps between Han and minority inhabited regions. At the same time, they devised affirmative action programmes to improve opportunities of individual members of minority nationalities in both Han and minority regions. The liberalization and privatization of its economy has, indeed, made China economically more powerful and prosperous in the world. At the same time, however, it has increased the gap between the rich and poor. The second loss was felt immensely in the life of those people who depended on the progressive policy of Chinese government, i.e., affirmative policy. The growing privatization has dismantled the structure of state. The rising private sectors were not in support of any kind of affirmative action or quota for the weaker and historically excluded communities of the society. In the case of China, the ethnic minorities of Chinese society were the biggest losers. Their marginalization and pauperization not only exponentially increased but widened the gap between Han and non-Han ethnic minority.

> "Using Chinese census data, Hasmath (2007-08) shows that ethnic minority groups in Beijing have achieved greater educational attainment than Han Chinese, but when it comes to their occupational outcomes in high status and high wage posts, ethnic minority groups are disproportionately under-represented. Using

the1998 Chinese House Hold Income Project (CHIP) data, Johnson and Chow (1997) showed that in all specifications across urban and rural areas, minority ethnicity was negatively related to income. Ethnic minorities received wages that were approximately 19 percent less than Han Chinese in rural areas and approximately 4.5 percent less than Han Chinese in urban areas. H. Li (2003) finds that ethnic minorities made 9 percent less than Han Chinese in 1995. Using 2001 survey data conducted in Lanzhou, Zang (2008a) shows that during market reforms, the government has not been able to protect Hui workers as promised by its equal opportunity policy. Hui workers have faced barriers in finding a job in both state firms and government agencies: 54.3 percent of the Han respondents work in state firms, as compared to 45.2 percent of the Hui respondents; 25. 5 percent of Han Chinese is employed in government agencies, where only 11 percent of Hui Muslims report the same institutional affiliation. Using survey data gathered in Urumchi in 2005, Zang (2010) shows that 52.3 percent of the Han respondents work in state firms, as compared with 28.5 percent of the Uygur respondents. A job in the state sector is a treasured achievement in Urumchi. In fact, any job in urban areas is hard to come by today given cut-throat competition in the labor market in China" (Xiaowei Zang 2015:55).

A similar assessment has been made by other scholars and reports:

'More alarming, the gap in socio-economic status between ethnic and minorities and Han Chinese actually became wider during the post-1978 market reforms. 'Overall growth, however, masks a large and increasing disparity' between ethnic minorities and Chinese' (Barbantseva 2008: 244; US Congressional Executive Commission on China 2005a: 16-17; Dreyer 2005: 82; Hansen 2005: 117; Sautman 1999: 285 in Zang 2015: 56).

The Chinese and Indian cases are somewhat similar in the arena of affirmative action and reservation policy. A big blow to this much appreciated and helpful policy was felt immensely when privatization and liberalization process was unleashed in both the societies. Here, like in India, Dalits and tribals are the main beneficiaries of reservation; the ethnic minorities are the ones who avail affirmative policies benefits with other marginalized sections of the society in China. Along with this, the Chinese state granted many legal and constitutional support systems for its ethnic minorities.

The affirmative policy is not unique to a particular country or community rather it is a global phenomenon. Some states devised this system to make their societies more inclusive and democratic. From Western to African nations, the affirmative policies are compelling realities. Scholars like Deshpande (2013: 8-9) have highlighted the history and global importance of affirmative action (AA) for the marginalized sections of the society. According to her:

> "AA consists of a set of anti-discrimination measures indeed to provide access to preferred positions in a society for members of groups that would otherwise be excluded or under represented. It provides a mechanism to address contemporary exclusion, particularly a mechanism to de-segregate elites. Even though AA primarily addresses contemporary exclusion, we should be fully aware that historical factors such as the history of slavery in the US or that of caste based discrimination in India have been instrumental in making AA politically feasible in the two countries and that there are similar historical factors relevant in other countries pursuing AA. Affirmative action can be, and has been, utilised in different parts of the world to change the social composition of elite position holders, making those provisions more representative of the caste/ethnic/gender composition of the society as a whole" (Zweigenhaft and Domhoff 1998 as cited in Deshpande, 2013: 8-9).

The discrimination and exclusion have been structured into the Chinese society. The PRC formulated various policies and set up constitutional mechanisms to address it. Like Indian modern state, the age-old discrimination was addressed at three levels, the constitutional provision, stringent laws, and public institutions. The case of China was not very different from its Indian counterparts. They too have made laws; formulated affirmative policies and economic remunerations to endow with proper space for minorities.

Privatization coupled with the influx of private players into public sector have reduced the governments role in formulating public policy. The logic of development legitimizes commercialization and privatization. This led to the decline of public institutions in public care. It has been observed that the dilution of affirmative policy due to the shrinking of state sector led to the marginalization of ethnic people. The loss of protective measures to the marginalized communities resulted in discrimination in the market.

In theory, Chinese law prohibits ethnic discrimination in the labor market. Article 12 of the Labor Law of the PRC stipulates that

> ''Laborers, regardless of their ethnic group, race, sex, or religious belief, shall not be discriminated against in the employment' (Zheng 2007: 993, 1006). Article 22 of the Law on Regional National Autonomy stipulates that the government of a national autonomous area may stop special measures to provide preferential treatment to job seekers with minority status. Article 23 and 62 stipulates that when recruiting personnel, firms and institutions in an autonomous area shall give priority to applicants from minority nationalities" (http://www.novexcn.com/regional_nation_autonomy.html; Sautman 1997: 295).

Moreover, Article 134 of the 1982 constitution (PRC) lays down that:

> "Citizens of all nationalities have the right to use the spoken and written language of their own nationalities in court proceedings. The people's court and people's procuratorate should provide translation for any party to the court proceedings who is not familiar with the spoken or written languages in common use in the locality. In an area where people of nationalities live in a compact community or where a number of nationalities live together, hearings should be conducted in the language or languages in common use in the locality; indictments, judgments, notices and other documents should be written, according to actual needs, in the language or languages in common use in the locality." http://en.people.cn/constitution/constitution.html see also Mackerras 2005b: 24).

The competition in the job sectors and the less support system of the state also excluded the ethnic groups. They are forced to adapt to the market dynamics. The language policy of Chinese establishment also discriminated and excluded ethnic minorities.

'The decline of non-Han languages is partly due to market forces Non-Han groups with moribund languages have often chosen 'not to make an issue of language maintenance', seeing no economic incentive to resist the adoption of Mandarin (Bradley 2009: 9), because mastering the Chinese language seem to be the most viable option. Many ethnic parents want their children to speak Mandarin to fare well in the job market' (Lai 2009a:10; Wang and Phillion, 2009: 1).

The impact of liberalization and commercialization of economy on the marginalized sections is quite serious. The diminishing role of state has led to the further exclusion of historically marginalized groups. The reason for the exclusion and marginalization of the ethnic minorities can be found in the following assessment of the scholars.'The minimum hiring quotas for ethnic minorities have faded into oblivion because the state sector has declined since 1978 and the rising private sector is not legally obliged to recruit workers from ethnic minority groups and is largely responsible for rising ethnic discrimination in the labor market' (Human rights in China 2007; 2, 20-1; Shan and Chen 2009: 16, 20; Zang 2010: 344; 2011a: 141).

There has always been a negative feeling against these programmes under the pretext of 'merit'. There have been undue concerns about non-deserving candidates misusing the policy by using false certificates. Moreover,

> ''The affirmative action programme has received bad publicity in recent years as some Han students assumed false ethnic identities in order to take advantage of preferential policies when they applied for admission into university' (Wang 2007: 160). It is not only in India but also in China that the demand for the affirmative (quota) in private sector is being continuously raised. 'There have been proposals to set up minority quotas in the private sector in some minority regions'' (Lai 2009a: 10; Sautman 1997: 23-4).

The shrinkage of state sectors and the consequent decline of affirmative action programme led to further exclusion of ethnic minorities in China. In spite of all these, Chinese state has been accused of its bias towards the ethnic minorities and autonomous regions of the PRC. If anyone compares the eastern and western parts of China, he/she can notice the developmental imbalance. The coastal regions are highly developed than the western regions. Sometimes CCP prejudices have also been noted by the scholars who are working on China. Even if the local government of a minority region receives a grant directly from the central government, it does not necessarily mean that all ethnic minority groups in the region will benefit, because the central grant is awarded to the minority region where Han Chinese are often the largest ethnic group. 'Indeed, minorities are not allowed to ask for special treatment for themselves, but must instead call for benefits for nationalities in general, or for all those living within an autonomous area' (Kaup 2002, p. 882).

The history of Afro-Americans in the USA, Dalits in India and ethnic minorities of China present similar stories. The dominant groups in these countries not only opposed these policies in the name of merit but also tried to stop them at the implementation level. However, the ethnic minorities made serious accusation of Han dominance is being noticed. 'Generally, Han residents in minority regions have benefited more from state support to minority areas than minority residents given the inter-group differences in education, political connection etc.' (Xiaowei, Zang, 2015: 43-44).

The next section will discuss the most controversial policy of India i.e. 'reservation'. It is a constitutionally sanctioned policy for Dalits since the inception of the Indian state. The reservation, majoritarian attitude and the liberalization of the economy are some of the points that will be dealt with in the section.

3.7.B *Reform and Reservation in India*

It is a well-known fact that the economic reforms started in India in the 1990s in full swing. Some scholars have pointed out the fact that the growth of private capital in India began to accelerate during the early 1970s (see Kohli 2006). It was during the post-1991 period that it experienced furthered expansion at an unprecedented rate. This expansion was not merely in terms of growth rates and profits; but also an important ideological shift. The socialist rhetoric that had been so central to the Nehruvian idea of planned development lost its charm. Markets and middle classes came to occupy the centre stage.

The development of capitalism or to put it differently, the entry of private sector has had many effects on the traditional structure of both the societies. On the one hand, it is assumed that the primordial loyalties of a particular section would get dismantled while on the other hand, the private sector would provide more opportunities to the excluded communities. The question of democratization of a society becomes very important here.

The era of 1990s was not only known for its liberalization of the Indian economy but was also a churning point in Indian electoral politics. The Mandalization of Indian politics which began with the introduction of 27 percent reservation to the other backward classes in education and jobs has changed the whole gamut of Indian politics. As a consequence, this process has initiated much debate over caste system in India which has been invisible in the garb of Nehruvian socialism. 'These shifts have also transformed the paradigm for understanding caste politics relationship. The growing consolidation of democratic politics at

the grassroots brought about some important changes in the grammar of Indian politics. Political scientists described this as a shift from the 'politics of ideology' to the 'politics of representation' (Palshikar 2004; Yadav 1999 as cited in Jodhaka, 2010:14).

The logic of merit was invoked once again to counter the reservation for OBCs as was with Dalits in India. The introduction of capital has had many effects on the lives of Dalits. In order to develop appropriate remedies to eliminate caste inequality, we need to understand precisely how caste affects an individual's economic lives, how the economy interacts with caste values and attitudes, and what behavior produces persistent inequality and deprivation for groups based on their caste, ethnicity or religion. The diminishing of state-led development and the dominance of private sector and has caused marginalization of Dalits. The ordained structure of Dalits in every walk of life has aggravated their condition with the introduction of private sector in India. The fixed and humiliated positioning of the Dalits in society can be well understood from the analysis of Sukhadeo Thorat and, Katherine S. Newman (2007).

> "Fixed economic rights defined by caste, with rigid barriers against change, leads to "forced exclusion" – to use Sen's term – of one caste from the economic rights of another. In market economies, occupational immobility is the result as restrictions on access to land, labour, capital, credit, education, and other inputs and services necessary for commercial activity provide for differential capacities to participate. Entitlements to economic rights become narrower and narrower the farther down the hierarchical ladders of the caste system. Without intervention, classically untouchables, or Dalits, who lie at the very bottom of the social order, find themselves restricted to the most despised occupations and the lowest wages" (4122).

The project of modernization and sharing of resources among the other sections of the Indian society, particularly Dalits has exposed the lofty promises of post-colonial India. The case of land reform is case in point.

> "One of the most important developmental initiatives taken by the Indian state soon after independence was the introduction of Land Reform legislations. These legislations were designed to weaken the hold of the non-cultivating intermediaries by transferring ownership rights to the tillers of the land. Even

though Land Reform legislations were invariably subverted by the locally dominant interests they ended-up weakening the hold of the traditionally powerful but numerical small groups of upper castes" (Moore 1966; Frankel and Rao 1990; Jaffrelot 2000; Stern 2001 as cited in Jodhka, 2010: 12).

The hold of the dominant groups in the Indian society has been maintained and carried forward with the introduction of privatization and liberalization of its economic sector. The so called question of 'merit' and efficiency led to the opposition of affirmative action programme.[26] The private sector which is supposed to be free from all the regressive policy elements of any society and an epitome of free and fair selection on the basis of merit has been proven wrong in India. The sectors, which are devoid of reservation in India, did not show any interest in inclusive policy and secular representation. The Indian Judiciary, media, civil society, NGOs, and all the private firms did not give ample and enough place to the marginalized sections of Indian society. On the question of representation of Dalits, these sectors excluded them. The exclusion can be seen not only in giving seats but also at the policy level. The decision making process thus became exclusionary in these sectors.

More recently, some scholars have also looked at the social profiles of those working in the 'new economy, professionals in the global software industry (see Krishna and Brihmadesam 2006; Rothboeck et al. 2001; Upadhya 2007). 'The available evidence tends to point towards the continued dominance of the traditional "upper castes" in the India's corporate sector'.

Daljitet. al. (2012) found in a recent study of 1000 companies that as many as 92.6 percent of the board members of Indian corporate houses came from two "upper caste" clusters, that have traditionally been in urban employment, the Brahmins (44.6 percent) and the Vaishayas (46 percent). In their study, they have found out the explicit tactics of the company managers to exclude the marginalized and reserved category candidates. They had devised many devices and subtle tactics. For instance, 'several of the bosses told us about their experience of campus hiring where they were invariably given two separate lists of candidates, first of those admitted to the course through pen competition , and second of those who came in through the reserved quotas for Schedule Castes and Schedule Tribes' (Jodhka, 2015: 130).

In the same study, he (Jodhka) quotes that:

---

[26] The term 'affirmative action program' is of relatively recent origin the term was first used in 1961 in the United States by John F. Kennedy in the context of policies designed to promote equal opportunity or non-discrimination…..The quota or reservation policy in India, which is core of affirmative action, is essentially a policy of preferential treatment for certain disadvantaged groups (Deshpande, 2013: 6-7).

"The reservation policy was a complete 'no-go' from the corporate perspective. In the 25 interviews we conducted, there was not a single supporter of the idea. At most, hiring managers willing to support policies of educational investment, and scholarships to reward deserving students, as means to encourage meritorious behavior and the future benefits that are presumed to go with high achievement" (2015: 140).

It is a well-known fact that the constitutionally mandated reservation policy was not only vehemently opposed by the illiterate and rural population of this country but also the most elite institutions of this country were at the fore front across the country. The 'Youth for Equality' organization was formed in AIIMS in response to Mandal Commission in 2006 in Delhi. Most interestingly, the private firms of metropolitan cities, which were not liable to follow the reservation policies, were also organized in opposition to that inclusive policy.

"Although there is some recognition on the part of the industry leaders that the work force is not as inclusive as it could be, most are firmly opposed to legal or administrative action to remedy this situation or to increase diversity. Indeed, IT industry leaders-even techies themselves have been at the forefront of opposition to the recently revived proposal for reservations in the private sector, as well as new policy of reservation for OBCs in premier institutions of higher education".[27]

There have been many myths about private sector. 'Representatives of software industry often claim that a large proportion of the workforce is drawn from rural and semi-rural areas. Scholars and activists have shown contrary pictures. In their study, they have demonstrated that there has been a clear-cut bias against the rural and oppressed groups in the Indian firms. The selection of candidates which not only focuses on their technical attributes but also their non-technical attributes such as caste leads to their exclusion. The soft skills like attitude, body language, confidence, knowledge of English and background are the factors that go against the rural and marginalized sections of the society who enter the market for the first time.

"The language of merit appeared to be hiding many aspects of the recruitment process. Although on the surface merit alone mattered; in reality, many appeared

---

[27] Upadhya, Carol (2007:1866) in her work, 'Employment, Exclusion and 'Merit' in the Indian IT Industry', elucidate that 'the strength of this opposition is seen in the fact that at the height of the anti-reservation agitation in 2006, a number of IT professions came out on the road near electronic city in Bangalore (the campus that houses Infosys as well as several other software companies) to protest although they were not liable to be directly affected by the new policy'.

more concerned about hiring only those who possessed the required soft skills, which, as we have seen, are culturally acquired while growing up, or through socialization, in a particular kind of family and social context which is urban, invariably upper caste, and requires educated parents. Their narrative of modernity presented merit in opposition to caste, where merit implied those 'without caste', the 'general' category and from the ''upper'' castes, and caste indicated the 'reserved' category, the Schedule Castes. In this binary, merit could only be an attribute of those 'without caste' because it is only in the 'general category' that individual distinction (merit) can be recognized. The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes had to always carry the burden of their community and thus no available scale could judge their merit, and hence their exclusion" (Jodhka, 2015: 140-141).

Preference is given to those students who have the overall cut off percentage throughout their course (usually 70 percent aggregate marks). In fact, many IT companies require candidates to have had a consistent average of 70 to 75 percent marks from standard ten onwards. These requirements tend to exclude engineering students who are admitted seats on government quotas (ST/ST or OBC) with lower cut off marks and who were not able to score well in previous examinations because of their educational and social background.

'Thus the assessment of the candidate's general appearance, demeanor and ability to mingle during the interview acts effectively as an exclusionary mechanism, in that it is weighted against those who are not from the middle class, cosmopolitan and English speaking backgrounds. This biased recruitment process gives preference to the urban and English speaking candidates who come from the middle class families. Various data and several other studies (Athreye 2005; Rothboeck et al. 2001; Krishana and Brimahdesam 2006; Oommen and Meenakshi Sundrarajan 2005) have suggested that most of the software engineers come from middle class, educated families'.

Carol Upadhya (2007), in her work explains the caste/class and religion nexus in hiring the employees of the firms which not only suggests the passive exclusion of Dalits and historically oppressed groups but also indicates the collaboration of communities at the higher levels.

'With regard to caste and community, 88 percent of respondents in our survey were found to be Hindus while only 5 percent were Christians and 2 percent Muslims. Brahmin constituted 48 percent of our sample. The pre-dominance of Brahmins is not surprising, given their historical monopoly over higher education and formal sector employment, especially in south India' (Fuller, 1999; Fuller and Harpriya 2007 as cited in Upadhya, 2007: 1863).

Moreover, they have conducted research to see the caste composition and over representation of the so called ''high'' castes in the firms.

> "If we include others belonging to "twice-born" castes, the figure for all upper castes comes to 71 per cent. Employees from dominant agricultural castes [including some of which are classified as other backward classes (OBCs)] constituted 15 per cent, bringing the proportion of respondents who come from ''upper'' or dominant caste groups to 86 per cent. If we further include some of the Christian respondents, such as Syrian Christians (a relatively wealthy landowning community in Kerala), the proportion is even greater. Only one respondent said that he belonged to a scheduled community. Other studies have thrown up the same pattern: in the survey by Oommen and Meenakshi Sundararajan (2005), three-fourths of the respondents were from ''forward'' castes and the rest were OBCs, while none were from the SC/ST category" (Fuller and Narasimhan 2006: as cited in Upadhya, 2007: 1864).

The forced and passive exclusion of Dalits has its roots in the very nature of Indian society. The same phenomenon has been consistent in the post-colonial India. The affirmative action was on the one hand, not fulfilled, but on the other, the introduction of privatization has made the situation even worse. The erstwhile-marginalized sections were not represented and were also deprived of benefits of the fruits of development. Thus caste discrimination became even more complex and exclusionary.

The failure of market economy to provide equal opportunity and its relation to caste system has been well documented by many scholars.

> "Market failures are created via economic discrimination as an insufficient allocation of labor among firms emerges, and wages recedebelow the marginal product for workers of discriminated groups, by preventing free mobility of human labor, land, capital and entrepreneurship, the caste system creates

imperfect, segmented, and monopolistic divisions in factor markets. Labor and capital fail to move from one occupation to another even when the wage rate and rate of return (on investment) is higher in alternative fields. Thus factor immobility spurs gross insufficiency in resource allocation" (Akelof 1976; Scoville 1991; Lal 1989; Ambedkar 1936 and 1987 as cited in Thorat, 2007: 4122).

Moreover, the horror of caste system and its collaboration with capitalism can be seen in its worst form in India. The historical and societal segregation has led to the pauperization and complete exclusion of these communities at massive level.

Akerlof (1976) and Scovile (1991) have argued that social ostracism, coupled with economic penalties, acts to strengthen the caste system by creating deterrents to change. Only if the magnitude of the social costs (in terms of isolation and deprivation), economic costs (transaction and enforcement) begin to outweigh the economic gains (profit and surplus extraction), are we likely to see significant change in the shape of the caste system. Sadly, the opposite prevails: the cost of enforcement is low and the economic gains associated with exploited labor conspire to prevent change. Thorat, and Newman (2007), in their work suggest not only ending this discrimination and exclusion but also providing some respiration of highly hierarchical Indian society:

> "The view that inefficiency, and therefore pressure on firms, will self-correct discriminatory behaviour argues in favour of strengthening competitive markets as the solution to this vexing problem. Those who regard this as insufficient, argue instead, that an interventionist policy is necessary because self-correction takes too long or is weakened, particularly in societies like India with enormous surplus labour. Legal safeguards and "set asides" or quotas governing access to land, labour, capital markets, product and consumer markets, and social services including education, housing, and healthcare, for these advocates, the only way we are likely to see discrimination abate" (ibid, 4123).

3.8 Exclusion As Violence

The marginalization of any particular community, whether it is minority or under- developed community, has many facets. The cultural, social, political as well as economic exclusion has been a long history of violence also. The worst form of exclusion is the physical annihilation

of Jews and African-Americans in the world history. They were excluded violently in the name of race. The most perennial and violent form of exclusion in the world is considered to be untouchability in India. The physical touch and presence of Dalits was ''pollution'' which was not even seen with the Afro-American in USA. These exclusions have multiple dimensions.

Historically and structurally, both Chinese and Indian societies have been built around hierarchy and domination. The Chinese who are culturally and geographically at an advantageous position termed outsiders as barbarians.

The 'three evils': separatism, splitism, extremism have been popularized in the Chinese context too. The nationality question, grievances of Tibetan, Uyghur, and Taiwanese are central to rights discourse in China. A semi-religious group which celebrates its identity as 'Falun Gong' is also seen with suspicion and called as 'evil cult'. Human Rights Watch (1999) concludes, that "the Chinese leadership's attempt to contain the Falun Gong is part of a broader government effort to try to control all organizations, religious, civil, social, or economic"."

The north western state of China, Xinjiang has not only been facing the hard policy of China but also Hananization. Hansen (1999: 142) opined that: The Han Chinese migrants were never under pressure to adapt to the culture of practice or learn the dominant language of the receiving communities. They were a numerical minority in the new home place, but socially and politically, they represented a dominant majority. They were expected and supposed to influence and eventually change the society to which they had moved.

> "The Han settlers in the western region of China have raised many tensions. They see it as the process of domination and isolation of local ethnic groups. Han settlers and their actions are justified by the fact that they constitute one of the few contemporary examples of ongoing, and ever increasing, large-scale resettlement of dominant group, and that this growth has repeatedly been the object of resentment and has driven the mobilization of the local minority population not only in Xinjiang but also in other Chinese minority regions" (Goldstein 2004: 208, Starr 2004: 17).

The result of this settlement has been noticed and documented by many scholars. The sharp demographic change is visible in these regions.'As a result, the demographic share of the Han

Chinese increased from a meagre 6.1 per cent of Xinjiang's permanent population in 1953 to 39.6 per cent or 8.12 million in 2005; whereas the Uighur population dropped to a mere 45.9 per cent, or 9.41 million' (Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook, 2007).

Barry Sautman (1998) argued that 'the income level of Han peasants near the capital, Kunming, was four to five times the income level of minority peasants in impoverished Guangnan County. Moreover, he emphasised that in 'minority area officials acknowledge the growing Han/minority economic gap; and, some accuse the government of aggravating it through anti-redistributive tax reforms carried out in China from 1994.

The grievances and the anger of local inhabitants can be better understood through the political domination in the minority autonomous regions. The western provinces particularly, Tibet and Xinjiang wherein the top political positions are held by Han Chinese despite their minimal presence.

Similarly, the Indian society based on graded inequality and caste-based stigma has given to the upper hand to so called ''upper'' strata of the society to denigrate and exploit the Dalits. The very concept of caste, as argued by Dr. Ambedkar in his famous work, 'Annihilation of Caste,' is based on violence. The major population of Indian society even today face gruesome attacks and suffer atrocities due to caste bias and inequality. History is replete with many instances of Dalit massacres, which explain the brutality of caste system in India. Devoid of all human rights, they are being excluded in many ways. The violence and humiliation of the so-called "untouchables" started from Hindu Varna system itself. The concept of four *Varnas* does not include Dalits in the Hindu fold. Hence, the religious exclusion is very much enshrined in the Hindu scriptures that sanctions protocols for Dalits. The history is full of instances where Hinduisation process was launched to incorporate Dalits into the Hindu fold.

For the first time in December 2006, Manmohan Singh, the then Prime Minister, likened the discrimination against Dalits to the South African apartheid. 'Dalits have faced a unique discrimination in our society that is fundamentally different from the problems of minority groups in general. The only parallel to the practice of untouchability was apartheid' (The Guardian, 28th Dec. 2006, referred on 23 June, 2017).

Following are some of the instances of atrocities against the Dalits in the history of India.

"On the night of December 1, 1997, an "upper" caste landlord militia called the Ranvir Sena shot dead sixteen children, twenty-seven women, and eighteen men in the village Laxmanpur-Bathe, Jehanabad district Bihar. Five teenage girls were raped and mutilated before being shot in the chest. The villagers were alleged to have been sympathetic to guerrilla group known as Naxalites that had been demanding more equitable land redistribution in the area. When asked why the Sena killed children and women, one member told Human Rights Watch, We kill children because they will grow up to be Naxalites. We kill women because they will give birth to Naxalites" (Giuseppe Scuto, 2007-08: 11).

'In 1997 the United Nations Human Rights Committee noted that members of Scheduled Castes endured severe social discrimination and suffered disproportionately from many violations of their rights under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights' (ibid, 13). On September 29, 2006, four members of the Bhaiyyalal Bhotmange's family belonging to the Mahar (Dalit), his wife Surekha and daughter Priyanka, were paraded naked in public, then allegedly gang-raped before being murdered.

The most shocking stories of these cruelties are that the democratic Indian state has never been up to the expectation of grieved families. *Frontline*, (2006), narrates the story in this way.

''After a four-year wait Bhaiyyalal Bhotmange's family got no justice. In 2010, the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court said that the murder of his wife and three children was an act of revenge which had nothing to do with the fact that the victims were Dalits'. Like all verdicts, this one too was an outcome of the evidence placed before the court and so, if justice was not served to the Bhotmanges it was because of shoddy investigation and presentation of evidence. To attribute their killing solely to revenge is just one more example of the casual investigation-a result of institutional bias that has characterised similar cases in Tsunduru (Andhra Pradesh) and Bathani Tola (Bihar) in which the perpetrators of anti-Dalit violence literally got away with murder."

It is remarkable to notice that the historically, when Dalits demanded their democratic rights, they were labelled as anti-national, foreign agents or Naxalites/Maoists. Kabir Kala Manch, a

cultural front, and its members like Sachin Mali, Sheetal Sathe and many others are falsely arrested and released after that. Dr Manmohan Singh as Prime Minister of India termed Naxalism as greatest internal security threat to India.

3.9 Resistance and Responses in China and India

The historical exclusion and injustice to any community never operate in a vacuum. The exclusion of the ethnic groups in China and Dalits in India has been contested and revolted at every front. The ideas of equality, liberty, dignity and autonomy are central to the struggle of both the communities. Moreover, the issue of autonomy, particularly in the case of China has been a contested zone. The PRC has thus made five autonomous regions where ethnic dominance prevails. The cultural, linguistic and historical facets of autonomy were taken into consideration.

In China, the ethnic minorities tried to be assimilate themselves in majoritarian Han culture, which is based on the hierarchical order. The classification project of ethnic minorities and consequent granting of autonomy did not fulfill the demands for genuine autonomy of many ethnic groups in China. The Chinese leadership has followed the Confucian philosophy of patronizing the ethnic minorities. The civilizing project of Han value system ignited the revolt in ethnic people of China. The struggle of Tibetans, the riots in Uyghur are some of the burning examples where ethnic mobilization and ethnic assertion are being felt.

Ethnic minorities were criminalized and were rejected culturally. The prejudices and stereotypes of minority people have been well noted by the activists and scholars working on China. 'There is also a cultural dimension to minority threat: stereotypical perceptions define each minority group as either 'backward' or 'advanced'. Backward minority groups are less acculturated and are viewed as unintelligent, lazy and the like, where as 'advanced' minority groups are more acculturated and are viewed as enterprising, civilized and the like (i.e., it is more like the dominant group culturally). These stereotypes define the distribution of group worth and affect inter-group relations and the strategies of ethnic competition' (King and Wheelock 2007; Kunovich 2004; Semyonov et al. 2002; 2004).

The situation and location of ethnic minorities and their mobilization always played a crucial role in enabling to devise the policy of PRC. Beijing has maintained its policy towards national minorities in China by insisting on the supremacy of state sovereignty and territorial

integrity over individual rights and collective minority guarantees. Beijing consistently tries to pacify the grievances of its excluded people through economic modernization.

Similarly, 'a geographically concentrated ethnic minority group is more likely than other minority groups to be seen as a big threat by the dominant group. This is probably because minority residential concentration is thought to be conducive to mobilization for collective action against the dominant group' (Jacobs and Tope 2008: Quillian 1995; Semyonov et.al. 2006).

Some scholars have analyzed the Han policies in the following manner. 'Although the government has provided minority students with preferential treatment for access to secondary schools and universities, it has not addressed the issues of the cultural exclusion that minority students have encountered in the campus (Yi 2008; Zhao 2010)'. The affirmative action and many other policies for ethnic minorities are always seen skeptically by the scholars and they have analyzed the policy of PRC very critically. 'It's first priority in managing ethnic relations in China is given to economic development and the reduction of ethnic inequality, followed by the preservation of some elements of minority cultures that are beneficial to the CCP's legitimacy and governance, and its lowest priority is regional autonomy that would enhance minority identity consciousness and would be detrimental to *Ronghe'* (Xiaowei Zang 2015: 108).

The Dalits of the Indian subcontinent have projected their different world imaginations while being denied of dignity and equality in their land. They have a legacy that not only revolted against injustice and exclusion but have also imagined different ways of living. Gautam Buddha to Phule, Periyar to Ambedkar and Kanshi Ram have showed the path for the liberation of Dalits. The right to have separate religion, culture, political system and value system has been their sole concern. The cultural and devotional revolt took place in the Indian history against Brahmanism and caste system. It was unleashed by different saints and religious groups across the country.

'Apart from Buddhism, 'the first was Tamil devotionalism, which attained a wave of popularity in the sixth and seventh centuries, ignoring or denying Vedic Gods and including women among their saints "as perhaps the most revolutionary feature' (Omvedt, 211: 27).

In Mysore, in southern India the revolt took the form of the *Lingayat* movement or *Virashivism,* which emerged in the twelfth century AD to question basic Hindu notions of the

authority of the Vedas, to deny rebirth and to encourage anti-brahmanic social practices such as late marriage and widow remarriage.

In north India and the Punjab, later fifteenth century religious movements influenced by Islam and led by Guru Nanak and Kabir, Ravidas, drew their followers from artisans and cultivators and expressed a strong need for social equality, firmly denouncing caste. In Bengal cultural revolt took somewhat different from. Devotional cults also existed here, but it appears that the Tantric movement, which also had Buddhist connections, was the main form of opposition in the sixth century AD.

Maharastra has a long history of religious as well as political leadership who gave a decisive blow to the caste system. The great revolutionary Jyotiba Phule and Savitri Bai Phule come from the same land. They have challenged the Brahmanical order by invoking racial theory of Aryan and non-Aryans.

Conversion to Islam as an alternative religious value system was a way out, and it is significant that large-scale conversion in India occurred not in the centers of Muslim political power but on the outskirts of the subcontinent, namely Punjab, Bengal and Kerala in southern part of India. The role of missionaries and the value system of Christianity has opened the way for an egalitarian religion for Dalits. The large number of ''lower sections'' proved their assertion against an in-egalitarian and barbaric system of Hindus. The revolt of Dalits against Brahmanical hierarchical system was on multiple levels: cultural political, social, religious and political. The demand for separate electorates made by Dr. Ambedkar was the most famous political demand and his adoption of Buddhism with his followers publicly was the deed which reflects Dalit's revolt against the Hindu social system.

Although the affirmative action, preferential policies and the constitutional methods adopted by both the societies helped to some extent and there is much that needs to be accomplished. The idea of reservation in India was to create fissures in the hegemonic hold of the immutable status of the higher castes over public services. Therefore, the historicity of reservations included; firstly, the amelioration in the relative position of the ''lower castes'', and secondly, restructuring the institutionalized social relationships in the Indian society on democratic lines.

The reserved seats for Dalits have never been filled and the area where it is not applicable, the situation is even worse. 'In 2006, CSDS did a survey on the social profile of New Delhi's

media elite. Of the 315 key decision makers surveyed from thirty seven Delhi-based Hindi English publication and television channels, almost 90 percent of the decision makers of the English language print media and 79 percent in television were found to be ''upper caste''. Among them, Brahmins are 49 percent. Not one of the 315 was a Dalit or an Adivasi. (Roy, 2014: 31)'. Similar is the story of the India Judiciary. So far, only one Dalit, Justice Balakrishanan, could become the Chief Justice of India since independence.

A similar situation can be traced from Chinese society. As Sautman (1998) posits,

> ''Preferential policies benefit broad sections of the minority population, particularly in family planning and education. Preferences in higher education are especially important because they are aimed at creating a reliable minority middle class. Stronger minority administrative, professional and technical strata are seen by PRC leaders as essential to increasing the legitimacy of the state among the key sectors that will mediate between it and the larger minority society during what promises to be a long period of overall widening of economic and social differences among China's ethnic groups and regions''.

The situation in China and India is not a problem caused by policies. It goes deep into history, society and culture. After independence, both the states have devised many policies and schemes to solve the historical injustices of both the communities. The affirmative action policy is one of them.

China has one of the oldest and largest sets of state-sponsored preferential policies *(youhuizhengce)* for ethnic minorities. 'Although the preferential policies programme in People's Republic of China (PRC) dates from the inception of the state in 1949 and is a variant of a concept pioneered in the former Soviet Union (Barry, Sautman, 1998:77)', affirmative action has only been an explicit PRC policy since the mid-1980s (ibid).' The Chinese leadership did recognize the social composition of its society and adopted constitutional provisions to safeguard the rights of minorities.

The arguments of the following scholars substantiate the above statements that Chinese leadership has affirmative action programmes for the oppressed sections of its society. 'Unlike the development policies that have affected minorities and Han Chinese in the minority areas, the affirmative action policies have been designed for individuals from ethnic minority groups in both minority areas and Han areas. The Soviet preference policy in the

promotion of minority language, education, financial aid and employment (Martin 2001) has shaped the PRC's affirmative action programmes' (Ma 2007a, p. 10; Yang and Wu 2009, p. 118).

'Beijing has regarded preferential policy as an effective way to reduce ethnic tensions through redistributive justice, thereby maintaining, social stability and the political legitimacy of CCP's leadership in the minority regions' (Clothey2001, p. 3-4; Wang 2007, p. 157-8).

In the education field, from primary level to higher education, the Chinese government provides preferences and seats to the marginalized minorities in priority basis. 'Thirteen national minority universities were set up and are run specifically for the education of minority students, who can choose to take a college entrance examination in their native language or in Mandarin (Clothey 2001: 16-17)'. 'The preferential policy has been extended from the higher education sector to cover secondary education, adult education and graduate education as well' (Lai 2009a: 9, Wang 2007: 153).

The more backward within the minority groups are given extra points and privileges in the Chinese education sectors. Minority students are treated differently under the affirmative action programme. For example, minority students from minority regions and remote areas receive more bonus points than their co-ethnic students who reside in Han-dominated regions (because the better are presumably more acculturated than the former), and less acculturated minority groups receive more bonus points than more acculturated groups in the same minority region.

Political representation is the need of hour to represent the voices of that particular group. A highly diverse and multicultural nation needs proper representation at every level. The PRC has tried to fulfill the aspirations and demands of the minorities through their political representation. 'The 1953 Election Law promised that at least one representative seat would be awarded to each minority group regardless of population size. This was designed to safeguard the political interests of smaller minorities, and to prevent them from being overshadowed by larger groups, as might have happened in a system based solely on proportional representation' (Deng, 1985 as cited in Mullaney, 2010: 328).

The following table shows the ethnic minorities representation in Central Committee of Communist Party of China vis-a-vis the Han population. The data in the table is not only sufficient enough to prove the marginalization of minorities in Maoist regime but also clearly

shows the change in representation of ethnic minority leaders post-reform era. On the Central Committee of the CCP since the Eighth Party Congress in 1956, the first Party congress held after the founding of the PRC, ethnic minority leaders have occupied more seats on this important decision-making body in the reform era than during the Mao era. In the five Congresses held since 1987, ethnic minority members usually constituted about 10 to 11 percent; almost double their numbers from the five congresses of the earlier period.

Table: 3.4 Representation of Minorities on the Central Committee (CC) of the Chinese Communist Party

Central Committee	Year	Number	Percentage
8th	1956	9	5.2
9th	1969	13	4.6
10th	1973	18	5.6
11th	1977	19	5.7
12th	1982	31	8.0
13th	1987	32	11.2
14th	1992	33	10.3
15th	1997	38	11.0
16th	2002	35	9.8
17th	2007	40	10.8

Notes and source: This includes both full and alternate members of the CC. Cheng Li and Lynn White, "The Sixteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Hu Gets What?" Asian Survey Vol. 43, No. 4 (July/August), pp. 553_597. For the data on the 17th CC, see http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2007-10-28/082514179177.shtml.

Chinese officials have missed opportunities to improve the situation. Moreover, Isabelle Côté posits that the Chinese leadership has dominated the entire key positions in all the autonomous regions. At the same time as it has appointed minority leaders to top posts in the ethnic minority regions, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has also maintained its firm control over these provinces by giving the most important leadership posts-the Party Secretary positions-to cadres who come from Han Chinese backgrounds. Indeed, none of the Party secretary posts in any of the five provincial-level minority autonomous regions is currently held by an ethnic minority leader. 'In short, the XPCC provided Han Chinese with both resources and leadership and, for this reason, its role in the social and political organization of the Han community in the region and in the government of Xinjiang as a whole could hardly be overstated' (Isabelle Côté, 2011:1859).

Cheng Li in Table 3.4 has a given a list of ethnic minorities which is a glimpse of party- state leadership positions of those 61 ethnic minority leaders in the fifth generation. Most of them

work in the provincial leadership, including 4 (6.6 percent) full governors, 37 (60.7 percent) vice-governors, and 7 (11.5 percent) who serve in other provincial leadership positions. This once again shows marginalization of ethnic minorities.

Table: 3.5 Distribution of the Leadership Positions Held by the Fifth-Generation Leaders with Ethnic Minority Backgrounds

Positions	Number	Percentage
Central CCP Organs	2	3.3
Minister	1	1.6
Vice Ministers	4	6.6
Governors	4	6.6
Vice Governors	37	60.7
Other Provincial Leaders	7	11.5
College Presidents	1	1.6
Municipal Leaders	4	6.6
Mass Organization Leaders	1	1.6
Total	61	100.0

Notes and source: This includes both full and alternate members of the CC. Cheng Li and Lynn White, "The Sixteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Hu Gets What?" Asian Survey Vol. 43, No. 4 (July/August), pp. 553_597. For the data on the 17th CC, see http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2007-10-28/082514179177.shtml.

India adopted this policy of reservation for Dalits/SCs in educational and political institutions and in government jobs. Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution enabled both the state and Central Governments to reserve seats in public services for the members of the SC and ST communities, thereby, enshrining equality of opportunity in matters of public employment. The Constitution prohibits discrimination (Article 15) of any citizen on grounds of religion, race, caste, etc.; untouchability (Article 17); and forced labour (Article 23). It provides for specific representation through reservation of seats for the SCs and the STs in the Parliament (Article 330) and in the State Legislative Assemblies (Article 332), as well as, in Government and public sector jobs, in both the federal and state Governments (Articles 16(4), 330(4) and 335. Following such constitutional guarantees, the Indian government has successively passed various Acts: the Protection of Civil Rights Act (1955), the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act (1976), the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act (1989) and the Employment of Manual Scavenging and Construction of Dry Latrines (Prohibition) Act (1993). Despite these efforts, the effects of these and related laws have been in many cases painfully minimal.

Anand Teltumbde (2008) 'outlines various causes of social exclusion in India. He underscores a three-pronged strategy of protective laws, compensatory discrimination and developmental policies taken up by the Indian government in his work. He argues that Indian ruling class treated Dalits as the Western countries treated Africans. He argues that when it comes to the question of walking the talk, they betray the cause and talk about merit and efficiency which is identical to the racist talk in the West.'

In the Indian context, SukhdeoThorat and Nidhi Sadana Sabharwal (2010) 'argue that social exclusion has encompassed three main components in this understanding: denial of equal opportunity in multiple spheres' is embedded in societal inter-relations and causal relationships of exclusion and poverty and deprivation. They posit that the Dalits are excluded not because they lack skills, merit, but because of birth. The so called hierarchical nature of Indian society and its philosophical logic from Hinduism is the determining factor.'

It was believed and assumed in post-independent India that modernization and urbanization would lead to the eradication of social evils, including subjugation of Dalits in India. The thrust on scientific advancement and mechanization based on the Nehruvian socialism in India eventually failed in Indian context. However, the patterns of urbanization even during his own time did not fulfil Ambedkar's dream, as he landed up into the same Maharwada (Dalit dwelling place) that he had left behind in the village. The social morphology of villages was replicated even in most of the urban cities of India, including Bombay.

The changed scenarios have not much changed the conditions of Dalits in urban spaces. Even today, educated and salaried classes are denied access to equal and dignified life in the modern spaces. The ghettoisation and risen slums in most of the metropolitan cities of India engulf the Dalits. The spatial discrimination of Dalit is rampant. This can be substantiated with the argument of Gooptu (2001: 146) that: 'these localities and even the local *chawls* (tenements) came to be organised around caste and even sub-caste lines not only in Mumbai but in many places such as Kanpur.'

As reported by The Indian Express(November 29, 2014),based on the survey conducted by

> "The India Human Development Survey (IHDS-2) - the largest pan-Indian non-government household survey - carried out in 2011-12 for economic and social variables across multiple categories. Across India, 27 per cent respondents agreed that they did practised untouchability in some form. The practice was most

prevalent among Brahmin respondents (52 per cent). 24 percent of non-Brahmin forward caste respondents admitted to it- lower, interestingly, than OBC respondents, 33 per cent of whom confirmed its prevalence in their homes. 15 per cent of Scheduled Caste and 22 per cent of Scheduled Tribe respondents admitted to the practice"[28]

In the case of China, scholars have rightly reminded that liberalization of economy had weakened the state's measures. 'The embrace of market reforms and increasing globalization has radically transformed China's redistribution regime as well as distorted old commitments to social justice Moreover, the economic reforms have dramatically increased inequality and social exclusion in China' (Chan, Ngok, and Phillips, 2008).

The same argument is also made by Sukhdev Thorat and Paul Attewell (2007) in their work where they examine the prevalence of discrimination in the job application process of private sector enterprises in India. These studies document a pattern of decision-making by private sector employers that repeatedly advantages job applicants from Hindu ''higher'' caste backgrounds and disadvantages ''low'' castes with equal or nearly equivalent qualifications. The findings suggest that social exclusion is not just a residue of the past clinging to the margins of the Indian economy, nor is it limited to people of little education. On the contrary, it appears that caste favouritism and the social exclusion of Dalits have infused private enterprises even in the most dynamic and modern sectors of the Indian economy.

The process of globalization has led to modernization and mechanization of society has in some sense loosened the feudal rigidity. However, at the same time it has weakened the role of state and relevance of welfare policies to the Dalits and minorities of both the societies eventually. Privatization and liberalization indeed have revolutionized societies but certainly not ended the discrimination and exclusion. Sometimes the exclusion and discrimination have been unleashed on a massive scale. The reports from national and international institutions, help groups and non-state actors have shown the grim situation. The GDP led economic growth under the disguise of 'inclusive growth' model has disappointed the erstwhile-marginalised communities. There is discussion of "inclusive growth", especially in economies such as India and China which have been growing rapidly over the last two to

---

[28] See more at: The Indian Express, "Biggest caste survey: One in four Indians admit to practising untouchability", (Online: Web), Accessed 8 June, 2016 URL: http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/one-in-four-indians-admit-to-practising-untouchability-biggest-caste-survey/#sthash.P6m7CsPN.dpuf.

three decades, based on the observation that specific groups in these two countries appear to be excluded, broadly speaking, from the benefits of high growth.

Ashwani Deshpandey in her piece has aptly contextualized the myth of inclusive growth in India and China respectively

> "This question is now occupying centre stage in both India and China (the latter with emphasis on "harmonious development"), as inequalities in various dimensions have been on the rise, with serious tensions on the ground. The document of the Eleventh Plan of the Government of India (2007-08 to 2011-12) started with a chapter titled "Inclusive Growth: vision and strategy", signaling the strategic importance of inclusive growth in India's planning vision. The Approach Paper to the 12th Five Year Plan (2012-2017) goes a step further, as reflected in its title "Faster, Sustainable and More Inclusive Growth" (Planning Commission, 2011). However, the critical issue to keep in mind is that while plan documents do outline the vision of the government towards the development process, they are a legacy of the time when economic development in the country was actively shaped by the planning process. In this day and age of market-led economic growth, and high levels of global integration, both the willingness and the ability of the government to sculpt the growth process to achieve broader developmental objectives seems weak, and the broader, overarching vision for development is hard to find" (Deshpande, 2012: 6).

3.10 Summary

The social exclusion of ethnic minorities in China and Dalits in India is a compelling reality. It goes beyond the polity and state institutions. The most remarkable point of both the communities is their caricatures in the psyche of common people. The popular discourse in both the societies depicts their societies as the most harmonious and inclusive ones. But their founding philosophies, societal structures and political processes have been discriminatory and exclusionary. The concept of 'Middle Kingdom', 'Centre and Periphery', 'all Under Heaven' and 'Confucianism' all have been devised in favour of the dominant 'Han' group. Dominant Han discourse termed them as "cooked" (shu), in contrast to the "raw" (sheng), 'barbarian'. The mainland Han Chinese treated the surrounding areas as peripheries which have been always ''inferior'' to the 'Centre'.

Historically, integrity and state sovereignty structured the legitimacy of its ideology and rule. The communist China on the one hand gives autonomy to its ethnic areas but at the same time bans separation from the Chinese nation. The state ideology gives power to its leaders to suppress dissenting and alternative voices. The concept of 'Three Evils', separatism, splitism and extremism, highlights the hard policies of the PRC. The treatment of 'Tibetan and Uighurs show the inflexible policies of PRC toward its ethnic minorities and other dissenting sects.

The very foundation of Indian society draws its inspiration and ideological leanings from Hinduism. The caste structure based on graded inequality is the essence of Hinduism. The philosophy of 'Karma' gave legitimacy to hierarchy and exclusion in Indian society. The Scheduled Castes, ''ex-untouchables'', faced the worst of it. Gopal Guru argues that the exclusion of Dalit is multidimensional. Although the post-colonial India, constitutionally tries to take care of Dalits but society at large and the political leadership time and again showed its bias against them. The Dalits in today's India faced not only brutal massacre but also are being criminalized as 'Naxalites/ Maoist supporters. So from philosophy to civil society to polity, Dalits have been discriminated, degraded and criminalized.

Both the minorities in China and Dalits in India have been stigmatized and criminalized socially, culturally and politically in their respective states. At cultural and political level, they were not only criminalized but were also coerced to adopt the Han and Hindu social and cultural value systems.

Though the state-led affirmative policies have reduced exclusion to a certain extent, they are undermined by privatization and state's gradual withdrawal. On the one hand both communities need equal redistribution but on the other, they need recognition too. The efforts to secure recognition are important but at the same time discriminatory structures, processes and philosophies need to be eliminated.

Chapter—4

Social Exclusion in Sichuan and U.P.

Chapter-4

Social Exclusion in Sichuan and U.P.

4.1 Introduction

In the last chapter, we have examined the complex social and political realities of both societies. The Chinese case is not similar to that of India in the context of its political administration as it is a communist country. The Chinese state also does not fall into the category of former Soviet Union and face the prospect of further break away of minorities. The concept of autonomy was introduced to avoid the Soviet fate. The special provisions for social inclusion paved the path for the integration of ethnic minorities into the Han dominated society. The representation of minorities in political system has been the dark side of CCP which did not encourage them to the top leadership. The Confucian value system like the Hindu system played the same role in the marginalization of the oppressed communities.

This chapter would focus on the specific areas of both the countries to analyse the actual conditions of ethnic minorities in China and Dalits in India. The chosen regions are Sichuan Province in China and Uttar Pradesh in India.

4.2 Sichuan: Province, Autonomy and Ethnic Minority

(4.2.A) *Sichuan: Fear of Soviet Fallout Effect*

Historically, Sichuan, a western province, has been a unique part of China. As a province, it remained on the margins of development until 1990. 'Deng's appeal to get some areas rich first' campaign began to change that. 'During his southern tour of 1992, however, Deng indicated that China was still in an era when some areas had to grow faster than others and that it was not yet time to give equal emphasis to common prosperity. Deng, in effect, made use of what Albert Hirschman (1978) had termed the "tunnel effect' (L.Yang , 1997: 6).

The province has diverse ethnic groups, huge population and covers vast geographical area in mainland China. Sichuan is important not only for its western development campaign but also due to its location in the vicinity of ethnically polarised provinces such as Tibet and Xinjiang. It has a sizeable Tibetan population and the Chinese administration is very cautious about the

spill over effect of ethnic nationalism of both the neighbouring provinces. This region, particularly the ethnic majority areas of western part of China has a chance of fall out effect of former Soviet Union. The highly powerful Soviet Communist state had disintegrated into fifteen states including today's Russia. The ethnic mobilization and self-determination policy of Stalin paved the way for the disintegration of Soviet Union. The general policy of China has been against the concept of self-determination since its inception (1949) and it tried to assimilate other ethnic minorities through affirmative policies and the project of autonomy. The concept of autonomy has also been a highly disputed policy in the PRC's course of history. It was the brain child of Mao and his comrades. The policy of autonomy was adopted to prevent a self-determination tendency in China. Many scholars and policy makers defined it from various vantage points.

> "However, the meanings of autonomy are equally, if not more, diverse than those of self-determination. Some might see autonomy as a confirmation of the central government's sovereignty over minority territories. In contrast, many writers find autonomy an attractive arrangement due to their respect for human rights that should, according to this view, have higher moral significance than sovereignty. Others might use autonomy as a conflict resolution mechanism. Still, others promote the idea of autonomy because it best maintains the ethnic identity of the minority group. A final possibility is that autonomy represents an emerging ethic of alterity that recognizes the local agency that is able to create meanings outside the familiar realm of the state" (Chih-yu Shih, 2007: 17).

Barry Sautman has a different view on the self-determination tendency. He argues that the 'splitism' which is one of the three evils for Chinese leadership is not only related to territorial integrity of China but also to the Han culture:

> "There is also something very special about ethnicity in the Chinese cultural milieu. The dominant Chinese cultural ideology embedded in Confucianism is profoundly relational and ethical, and it is now promoted as China's soft-power globally. Domestically, this ethical relationality dictates that minorities cannot maintain their "autonomy" or "difference" from the Chinese without offending Chinese ethical sensibility. What results is a Chinese moral rage at so-called minority "splittism." The term splittism is not limited to territorial secession; it is also understood to be a deliberate centrifugal distancing from a righteously good

China and the Chinese people. One can then reasonably wonder how high-handed punitive measures against alleged minority violation of China's ethical ethnicity can help to win minority "heart" to China. What is China's soft-power towards its minorities, today?"[29]

Social inclusion needs political and constitutional measures across the globe, particularly in India. The specific policies and sectoral benefits were fixed for the marginal groups. The intermingling was prohibited by religious Hindu in India. The constitution banned untouchability. The Hindu social system which segregates the people on the basis of caste is the bone of all exclusions in Indian society. Women were protected while adopting endogamy. It is not surprising why 'honour killing' is rampant here. Moreover, the exogamy or inter-caste marriages was prohibited by religion. Interestingly, however, the Chinese government promotes intermingling among ethnic communities. Recently, the current Chinese leadership has proposed to encourage intermingle by performing the ethnic marriages for more social cohesion:

> "Chinese Premier Li Keqiang took the time to comment on China's social goals. In doing so, he reiterated what has become the cornerstone of ethnic policy under Chinese President Xi Jinping: "the acceleration of interethnic contact, exchange, and mingling"- in other words, the blending of peoples through mixed marriages and other forms of social and cultural exposure.…..In China, the nation is fundamentally conceived as a biological union, or what Xi calls "a large family" with a long and rich history of "conjoined bloodlines." In recent years, Xi has repeatedly stressed the need to speed up the pace of cross ethnic exchanges-with exogamy, or marriage outside one's own ethnic group, viewed as an important indicator of success. Interethnic marriage, party officials believe, will reduce ethno cultural differences and strengthen identification with a single, shared Chinese culture and identity".[30]

Social cohesion has been a historical problem in Chinese society. The Han always tried to present themselves as the superior race and the other ethnic minorities as barbarians and

---

[29] Leibold, James (13 Feb., 2014), "Are Ethnic Tensions on the Rise in China?", (Online: Web) Accessed 15 May, 2017 URL: http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/are-ethnic-tensions-rise-china.

[30] Leibold, James (23 March, 2016), "China's Minority Report: When Racial Harmony Means Homogenization"Foreign Affair, (Online: Web) Accessed 15 July, 2017 URL: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2016-03-23/chinas-minority-report.

uncivilized. The concept of Middle kingdom and the concept of five relationships elucidate the hierarchal nature of relationship between Han and non Han. It is discernible to note here that the leadership of China also tried to mix these groups by inter-ethnic marriages. James Leiboldsuccinctly provides the evidence from the Chinese history:

> "Encouraging interethnic matrimony is not a new policy. During the imperial period, emperors offered up their own concubines to nomadic chieftains, hoping that "peace marriages" would buy stability. Sun Yatsen, the first president of the Republic of China, considered bloodlines the most powerful element in the formation of a nation. In 1924, he wrote that "Since the blood of one's ancestors is always transmitted by heredity downthrough the race, bloodline is the greatest force." Sun and others in his generation called on the Tibetans, Mongols, Manchus, and other "culturally inferior" frontier peoples, as they considered them, to "smelt together" with the Han majority in an evolutionary "furnace." And in 1988, China's most famous sociologist, Fei Xiaotong, employed the metaphor of a "rolling snowball" to describe what he thought would be an inexorable process of ethnic homogenization"[31].

If we visit ancient history of China, we find more glimpses of how Han Chinese ruling race has facilitated the assimilation of frontier barbarians, an ethnic minority. A famous Chinese ethnologist specializing in south-western frontier Ren Naiqiang (1934), based on his investigations of Tibetans in the Xikang region of Sichuan, specifically suggested "sightseeing" as one of the most effective ways to promote the assimilation of barbarians into the Han Chinese. Ren suggested three ways to "entice the barbarians to enter and tour Sichuan."

> "The first way was to encourage "barbarian" traders to come to trade tax free in Chengdu, the provincial capital, where they would be provided with good housing facilities and interpreters. They would return and "propagate the awe and virtue" of the Chinese and their words would be taken seriously, given the high status enjoyed by traders among "barbarians." "The second was for the Sichuan provincial military department to set up a school, ordering each county to send more than four children from families of "barbarian headmen" to study Chinese

---

[31] Leibold, James (23 March, 2016), "China's Minority Report: When Racial Harmony Means Homogenization"Foreign Affair, (Online: Web) Accessed 15 July, 2017 URL: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2016-03-23/chinas-minority-report..

language and to learn knowledge about China taught in Tibetan. The teaching would last three to four hours a day, and the rest of the day would be spent visiting military camps, factories, streets and other "great places". Again, Ren suggested that they would be likely to go back and say nice things about China, and their words would be convincing because of their high status of nobility. The third was not to execute captured "barbarian rebels" as had usually been the case. Instead, the more powerful rebels should be taken to Chengdu for disciplining. He argued that they would not rebel again upon release, and their experiences in Chinese prison would be a warning to others. The only problem he detected was that the "barbarians" dreaded the hot weather in Chengdu, believing that they would die if they came. The real reason, he argued, was smallpox, to which many barbarians were not immunized. So he suggested setting up a smallpox immunization clinic for would-be Tibetan travellers. He was convinced that with political pressure applied, they would not refuse to come" (Ren 1934: 232-233, quoted from Bulag, Uradyn E., 2012: 140-141).

'However, the reasoning in Ren's proposal for minority sightseeing was instructive and compelling. Sightseeing was not intended as leisure, but largely for political integration and cultural assimilation of the frontier peoples into the new Chinese state' (Bulag, 2012: 141).

Moreover, Bulag in his analysis establishes the fact that relates to the rebellion of Tibetan to the earlier visitors who were allowed to be assimilated in China. 'The turmoil in Sichuan, in turn, led to the Tibetan uprising and the flight of the Dalai Lama to India in 1959. All of these rebellions were led by none other than the former guests of the Chinese government who had toured the greater part of China, having seen the motherland's beautiful mountains and rivers' (Bulag, 2012: 151).

The ethnic revivalism and spill over effect of Soviet Union has been well noticed not only by the then leadership of CCP but also Chinese policy makers and scholars. 'Domestic liberalization and the fallout from the collapse of communism in a number of China's neighbours have resulted in an increase in ethnic separatist activities in China's border regions, particularly in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia' (Baum 1994:323–25; Gladney 1994). But the Chinese leadership, though accepted the above fact, is very much confident of its assimilative policies like affirmative action that reduces the more spill over effect.

"On the surface, Chinese leaders on nationality affairs have insisted that the various ethnic groups live in harmony in China. According to Ismail Amat, Minister of the State Nationalities Affairs Commission, ethnic separatist activities are conducted by a very small number of people who lack support among the minority populations. Amat asserts that the economic and social gaps between the coastal and western regions will never lead to tension between because the Chinese government's preferential policies for ethnic minority areas have successfully narrowed the economic gap between them and Han Chinese" (Xie Liangjun 1996 Quoted from Dali L.Yang, 1997: 93).

On the other hand, the Chinese policy makers and commentators have views different from its leadership. They are critical of the official polices of government and appeal to more development in these regions.

"In reality, however, Chinese policy-makers and commentators have become extremely concerned about the potential for socio-political instability in areas inhabited by ethnic minorities. There is a widespread perception that increasing economic disparities between these regions and the more prosperous east coast have contributed to rising ethnic tension and separatist tendencies" (Brauchli 1993 Quoted from Dali L.Yang, 1997: 93).

Despite all the above assimilative policies of inter-ethnic marriages, preferential policies and autonomy of PRC, the Yi ethnic minority was highly autonomous in their life style from mainstream Han culture and tradition for long time.

"In the Liangshan region in south western Sichuan, the situation is even more complicated. Some regions of Liangshan, including the eastern counties of Meigu (425-430), Butuo (433), and Zhaojue, are populated almost exclusively by the Nuosu, a sub-group of the Yi that has retained and developed its ethnic traditions of clothing and body ornamentation almost free of Han Chinese influence until the late 20th century. In fact, in much of the Nuosu heartland, there was no Chinese political influence until the People's Liberation Army occupied the area in the 1950s. In other areas, however, Nuosu live intermixed with Han Chinese or with Han and other minorities, and their clothing and jewellery styles both reflect

outside influences and serve to distinguish them clearly from members of other ethnic groups with whom they have contact"[32].

The Chinese ethnic minorities have many painful memories of their cultural and psychological suppression during the Cultural Revolution. They are very conscious about that past and try to interpret their culture and traditions against the PRC's misinterpretation.

> "The Cultural Revolution was not only directed at psychological and physical annihilation and suppression, but comprised the element of *memoricide*, that is the extermination of historical documents, accompanied by rituals of intimidation, in order to demonstrate who has the monopoly of interpretation of Chinese history. This memoricide has not been forgotten, especially today, where representatives of various minorities are trying to reappraise and reinterpret their history. Concurrently, among ethnic minorities in China we find a rediscovering and an increasing consciousness of history. Accordingly, Stevan Harrell argued that in China a triple pattern of ethnic classification is existing: *ethnohistory*, a scholarly discourse of the history of a nationality or an area; state discourse of ethnic historization, the official classification by Chinese authorities, and *ethnic identity*, the perception of one's own and ethnic identity. Undoubtly, there exist differences in the way in which different nationalities evaluate history andhistorical events, a fact that till today is not sufficiently understood by the political leadership of the Han" (Harrell 1995, quoted in Thomas Heberer, 2000: 5).

4.2.B *Sichuan: Western Vs Coastal Debates and Development*

The physical location of Sichuan province is very crucial for China. It is China's western province which connects it to the Tibet and Xinjian regions, the two perceived great "evils" or problems of PRC. The CCP has kept a special eye on Tibet as, according to China, it seeks to split from PRC. Moreover, for PRC, the Xinjiang is notorious in Chinese establishment for its extremist nature. The importance of this province increases because of its location in the western zone. This region is highly crucial, as there is a large concentration of ethnic minorities. 'Minority peoples live in every province, autonomous region and municipality directly under the Central Government, and in most county level units two or more ethnic

---

[32] A China File Conversation Enze Han, James Palmer, Robert Barnett, Nicholas Bequelin, James A. Millward, Rachel Harris, James Leibold, Uradyn E. Bulag, Nathan Hill, Elliot Sperling, Tsering Shakya, Emily Ting Yeh, Accessed February 13, 2014 https://www.chinafile.com/conversation/are-ethnic-tensions-rise-china

groups live together. Now minority peoples are mainly concentrated in provinces and autonomous regions such as in Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Ningxia, Guangxi, Tibet, Yunnan, Guizhou, Qinghai, Sichuan, Gansu, Liaoning, Jilin, Hunan, Hubei, Hainan and Taiwan'[33]

Sichuan acts as a bridge for not only of these two autonomous regions but also to the Western world. So for PRC, Sichuan's strategic position is very important two ways. First, in the context of its two main disturbed areas and secondly, it connects China to the larger global world.

Moreover, Sichuan is located in south-western part of China which is an important junction between northwest China and central China, and a critical intersection and transport corridor connecting South China and Central China, linking Southwest China and Northwest China as well as uniting Central Asia, South Asia and Southeast Asia. Sichuan's governing area is about to 486,000 square kilometers, which makes it the fifth largest province in China. There are 21 cities (prefectures) and 183 counties (districts) in Sichuan. Sichuan is a province with abundant resources, large population and strong economy.

Map : 4.1 Map of Sichuan Province in China

Source: Google Map

    "Sichuan occupies about 6.9 per cent of China's land area and is the largest of the

    Han Chinese provinces. Surrounded by mountains, Sichuan is somewhat remote

---

[33] "National Minorities Policy and Its Practice in China" (08/07/2002), (Online: Web) Accessed 5 May, 2016 URL: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/3711_665954/t18972.shtml#1.

but unlike other peripheral provinces, the province's aggregate economic performance is not too far behind the provinces of the more advanced coastal areas. Sichuan has a well-developed industrial sector with significant national concentrations of defence-related and nuclear industries" (Lijiang Hong quoted in Goodman, 1997: 203).

Moreover, 'Sichuan not only is China's most populous province, but also has- and has had consistently since the establishment of the People's Republic-one of the largest provincial economies. A particular source of economic strength has been its agricultural output. However, the development of Sichuan's economy-even before 1978 as well as during the reform era-has been hampered by both its natural and political settings. Remote and isolated, it has had difficulties in integrating its economy into the national mainstream' (Ibid.: 199).

The coastal and western development debate and shift of Chinese policies towards this region also has much significance for this region. The five gorgeous dam projects and high levels of migration of Han migrant workers have raised many debates in the Chinese academia as well as in policy makers. 'For instance, the Three Gorges Project, the splitting of Chongqing municipality from Sichuan province and China's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) are all influencing the development prospects of Sichuan in combination with initiatives sponsored directly by the campaign' (A. McNally, 2004: 429).

Sichuan is the hometown of Deng Xiaoping, the general architect of China's reform and opening up to the outside. One needs to be aware that Sichuan is the only province where Deng has launched his experiment of development. The Third Plenum speech (1978) of Deng Xiaoping heralded a new era for the Chinese economy. After the demise of Mao in 1976, the new leadership has taken a different diversion in communist thinking. The private sectors were allowed, and rewards and benefits scheme in the economic enterprising were encouraged. The four modernization policy of Deng was put in motion.

"As Deng Xiaoping initiated China's economic reforms in 1978, the province stood at the forefront of experimentation with new institutions. Sichuan was the first province to begin abolishing collectivization of agriculture and to start state-owned enterprise reforms. In the mid-1980s it was also one of the first provinces to experiment with converting state firms into joint stock corporations. In fact, by 1999 Sichuan was the province with the third highest number of enterprises listed

on China's stock market, trailing only Shanghai and Guangdong" (McNally, 2004:16).

The vision behind the western development project has well-calibrated goals. One of them is the nation-building project. It was not only appreciated in Chinese establishment but also set a precedent for modernization and development in the larger context. The old systems of state benefits were demolished along with the new approach of models. This could be seen in the regional development imbalances too. The coastal regions were highly developed in the previous regime. The eastern coastal areas were also inhabited heavily by the Han nationals. The CCP leadership was well aware of the regional and ethnic imbalance in their region. They launched this project keeping in mind the ethnic dissatisfaction of these regions.

The provincial Party establishment also stresses a political facet of implementing the campaign: ensuring continued social stability.

> "Four points are emphasized in particular: the improvement of living conditions in minority areas; the alleviation of the financial burdens of farmers; the strengthening of social security reforms; and the reinforcement of efforts to diminish crime…. Mostly funded by central revenues, this project reflects the objectives of nation building and state-building by the Open Up the West campaign in Sichuan. The fear exists that if minority nationalities are not given better chances for economic development (in this case by establishing better infrastructure), then social harmony, political stability and national security could be imperiled" (McNally, 2004: 439).

The gravity of imbalance of development in China led many to protests at policy as well as social level. The difference between coastal and western regions on the issues of development has forced the Chinese leadership to take a firm initiative at policy level also. 'Indeed, in an apparent reference to the preferential policies for the coastal region, people in the interior region are fond of saying: "[We] want policy, not subsidy." They believe that with the right policy, the interior can take off on its own' (L.Yang, 1997: 85).

The regional imbalances caused tension between coastal, central, and western provinces. The overflow of the population caused several inconveniences for netizens and the administration. The coastal biases of Chinese leadership has been facilitated by many factors, including flow of FDIs, NRIs connections which other regions, particularly Sichuan lacked.

"Since the mid-1980s reform has basically concentrated on attracting foreign investment to China's ambitious economic modernization programme, trying in the process to change the earlier Maoist economic structure. Preferential policies granted by central government, proximity to the overseas markets, and overseas Chinese connections, have all greatly helped the coastal areas to attract more foreign investment. These conditions do not exist in Sichuan and with the decline of central investment in the province and sustained financial deficits, Sichuan has had to raise funds from other sources in order to support its economic development" (Goodman, 1997: 216).

Over the past 25 years the development of market economy and growing international openness generated rising income inequalities in the People's Republic of China[34] (PRC). In particular, the developmental gaps between the eastern seaboard and interior western provinces have become politically prominent. However, inequalities within provinces are considerable as well. Inside Sichuan province the large developmental gaps that exist between eastern and western regions mirror the regional inequalities in China.

(4.2.C) *Sichuan Province: History and Outlook*

The history, social structure, and political economy as well as the climate play a key role in the development of any region and its people. The productivity and industrial development lead to the upliftment of the citizens. The policy of the state also adds to the advancement of its inhabitants. Therefore, it is imperative to know the geography and history of Sichuan before delving into the conditions of ethnic minorities.

"Sichuan is a huge and diverse province. Its land area is roughly the same as that of France and, prior to the separation of Chongqing in 1997, it was China's most populous province, with a population of 114.3 million in 1996. This large population is heavily concentrated in the central and eastern parts of the province-the northwest of Sichuan lies on the Himalayan plateau with an average elevation of more than 3,000 m, while the southwest lies on the Yunnan– Guizhou plateau at an average elevation of 1,500 m. Over 90% of the province is classified as hilly or mountainous and thus, although having 10% of China's population, Sichuan

---

contains only 6.5% of China's arable land. This also results in extremely small average landholdings—average farm size was 0.34 ha in 1980 falling to 0.23 ha in 1996, although the de-collectivization of land holdings post- 1978 has resulted in a relatively equitable distribution of land" (Mcculloch and Calandrino, 2003: 613).

The topography also shapes the development of a given region. The river delta and the plains are not only highly productive in comparison to the hilly regions but also accessible and economical for any agricultural production. The Sichuan is geographically divided into western areas and eastern which is mountainous compared to the east. Only 6.7% of Sichuan's population lives in the three districts of the western mountain regions. The rest is concentrated in the Sichuan basin and its adjacent hills and small mountains. On the whole, almost 80% of Sichuan's 86.4 million people are considered to be rural residents. This physical setting of the province can be seen in its location of the population as well as in its agricultural production.

"The soils and climate of the eastern basin of Sichuan are ideally suited to agricultural production and so the province produces more food than any other and is a net exporter to other provinces and the rest of the world. Although agriculture still employed over 60% of Sichuan's labor force in the mid-1990s, it only accounted for a little more than a quarter of its GDP, with industry accounting for 42% and services 32%. But, with the bulk of the population still dependent upon agriculture, Sichuan is a relatively poor province with a per capita GDP of Yuan 4,012 in 1997-ranking 22nd among 30 provinces in China" (ibid. : 3).

Topological limits of Sichuan impeded its development historically:

"As the mysterious archaeological findings at Sanxingdui attest, the Sichuan basin contained civilizations long before large-scale migration from China's Huang [Yellow] River Valley occurred. Initial migration into Sichuan began around the fifth century BC and accelerated after Emperor Qin defeated the kingdom of Bashu. After the third century AD Sichuan became China's main grain producer. Several centuries later, during the Tang Dynasty, Chengdu emerged as the political, cultural and economic centre of China's south-west. Chengdu retains this position up to the present, having become renowned for cultural refinement. However, after the Tang Dynasty Sichuan's role in China's development declined.

This was both a function of China's politico-economic centre moving eastwards and of Sichuan's geographical remoteness. After all, Sichuan is surrounded by what were in ancient times almost impassable mountains, lending the basin an air of mystery and autonomy from the rest of China" (McNally, 2004: 9).

The communist regime had many plans for China's economic development. The regional development especially the western part of vast China was paid much attention after the establishment of Communist regime. The fast and targeted growth of the region included the industrialization of Sichuan during the communist regime.

"After the founding of the PRC in 1949 the central government set out to restore agricultural output, modernize existing industries, start new enterprises and develop Sichuan's transport system. Although these efforts led to economic recovery, the biggest push towards industrialization occurred a decade later. Fearing a Soviet invasion from the north and an American invasion from the south and east, Chairman Mao launched in the 1960s China's most ambitious project to relocate heavy industry westward: the Third Front Construction Project" (McNally, 2004: 431).

The launch of development in Sichuan gives us a clear-cut view that the local leader jointly asserted the development of their constituency.

"In a more intangible manner, the Open Up the West campaign has often resembled a large-scale marketing drive for China's west. This has not only raised the nation's awareness of commercial opportunities in the west, but also increased the political stature of its provincial-level jurisdictions. As a result, provincial officials in Sichuan have jumped on the bandwagon of the campaign and attempted to maximize the province's benefits. Besides implementing infrastructure projects, greater attention is being paid to "soft" factors, above all bureaucratic streamlining and the amelioration of the investment climate for foreign and domestic Chinese investors" (McNally, 2004: 73).

(4.2.D) *Sichuan Province: Population and Ethnic Composition*

In India where governance is decentralised at Centre and state levels, China also has decentralised system. The regions are divided into provincial levels with five autonomous

regions. The democratic centralism is the core of organisational principle. National People's Congress is like the Indian Parliament where representatives are elected by the party members. Provinces are divided into many prefectures and counties to facilitate governance.

The CCP has a firm hold in electing and selecting the representatives to govern the state. The NPC sends its representative to Central Committee, and Central Committee chooses its Politburo and general secretary for five years. The General Secretary usually takes over as the President of the country. The Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China provides the second line of leadership. However, Prime Minister takes the lead in India while in China, it is the President who commands the nation.

The question of selecting Sichuan and its minority as a case study is imperative for this endeavour. The strategic location, geographical diversity, and its various minorities make it noteworthy. The province is peculiar for its minority groups, and is the most diversely populated region in China. The Encyclopedia Britannica provides valuable information by Robert Lee Suettinger of diverse ethnic minorities inhabiting the province.

> "Sichuan province has one of the most diversified ranges of ethnic groups in all of China, including Han (Chinese), Yi (Lolo), Tibetans, Miao (Hmong), Tujia, Hui (Chinese Muslims), and Qiang peoples. Most of the Han- who constitute the major part of the population-live in the basin region of the east. The Yi reside in the Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture in the southwest, while the Tibetans are distributed in the plateau region of the west. The Miao live in the southern mountains, near Guizhou and Yunnan provinces. The Hui are concentrated in the Zoigê Marsh grasslands of the northwest and are also scattered in a number of districts in the east. The Qiang are concentrated in the Maoxian-Wenchuan area on both banks of the Min River. The majority of the non-Han ethnic groups are fiercely independent and have maintained their traditional way of life. In most cases, they practice a mixture of agriculture, animal husbandry, and hunting. Among the Han there has been an influx of people from various neighbouring provinces, particularly from Hubei and Shaanxi. This immigration was especially intensified in the early part of the 18th century, as a result of the massacre of the people of Sichuan by a local warlord. The immigrants brought with them agricultural techniques that are reflected in the heterogeneity of present cultivation patterns. There are three major linguistic groups: the Han, who speak

Southern Mandarin; the Tibeto-Burman group, including the Tibetans and the Yi; and the Hui, who also speak Southern Mandarin but use Turkish or Arabic in their religious services. The Han practice a mixture of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism. They do not maintain rigid boundaries in religious belief. The Tibetans follow their own form of Buddhism. Many people in the northwest profess Islam, while some hill peoples ofthe southwest practice traditional beliefs" (Charles Y. Huet. all, https://www.britannica.com/place/Sichuan, accessed on 10 June, 2017).

Moreover, the Sichuan has the largest member of minorities including Tibetans, Yi, Miao and Hui. On the level of political exclusion, 'the Chinese establishment has politically excluded the ethnic minorities. The ethnic groups were never given proper representation in the CCP. The major posts and the presentation of this group is almost nil in the politburo, which is the highest decision making body of CCP. In Sichuan, constitutionally, it has only one fifty (150) seats in the National People's Congress.[35]

The enquiry about the social exclusion in Sichuan, specifically in the context of ethnic minorities includes varied discourses and debates. It is not only limited to the state policies. The geography, topography, location, biased approach of Chinese leadership and its historical and social settings have played a major role. The liberalization process contributes to the pauperization and exclusion of ethnic groups. The hampering of special policies by privatization is a serious concern for the whole community. The exclusion of Sichuan has been multidimensional. This impacted further social exclusion of the people of Sichuan, particularly the ethnic minority.

During my field visit to China in May-June, 2017, I covered six provinces, seven libraries and six universities including several historical sites. The field visit mainly focused on the social and economic exclusion of Ethnic minorities in China and Sichuan. The PRC ethnic policy and minorities' perception of discrimination were at the heart of the field study. Questions were asked on the conception of exclusion, affirmative and inclusive policies and Han and Ethnic minority relations. Professor Dan Smyer Yu discussed a number of issues

---

[35] The National People's Congress (NPC) is the supreme organ of state power in China. It is composed of NPC deputies who are elected according to law from 35 electoral units from the people's congresses of provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities directly under the Central Government, the People's Liberation Army, the deputy election council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Taiwan compatriots' consultation election council. Each congress is elected for a term of five years. A total of 2,987 deputies were elected to the current 11th NPC (2008-2013) before the first session was convened. "The National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China", (Online: Web) Accessed, 5 Jan., 2016 URL: http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Organization/node_2846.htm.

and debates especially pertaining to social and economic exclusion of ethnic minorities in China during my personal interview to him.

He conceptualizes social exclusion in China as 'inclusionary exclusion'. According to him, while in the name of development and inclusion in the mainstream Chinese societies, the value system and traditional lifestyle of minorities were neglected. This could be seen across China. The bone of contention could be considered in the context of Tibet and Xinjiang. The question of recognition of their tradition, culture, and identity is crucial. Another expert on Tibetan, You Xiangfei, the Director of Sichuan Tibetology Research Institute, explains the demands and concerns of Tibetans in Sichuan. In his interview in Chengdu, he told that the Tibetans are the largest number of ethnic minority people who live outside the Tibet in Sichuan. Moreover, Tibetans are the second largest ethnic group after Yi ethnic minority in Sichuan. The reason given by him was geographical and socio-cultural. Tibet is a border region as well as the number of Tibetan in Sichuan automatically explains the inclusionary policy of the local and national government, he argues.

Another scholar, LiJingfeng, the Head of the Centre for Indian Studies, Chengdu, discussed various issues, especially ethnicity and role of CCP. He explains how historically, CCP managed the ethnic minorities in China. He views that the Chinese government and CCP will manage its political questions through its economy. More precisely, 'Chinese economy will supersede the politics.' The reason he gives is that the economic corridors especially the Sichuan economic corridor will bring security and prosperity to these groups in Sichuan. To question of why so many ethnic minorities inhabited in Sichuan, he replies that the strategic as well as the geographical location suits the ethnic minorities Sichuan. He also argued that the cultural and traditional value system of these minorities were recognised and respected here.

4.3 Uttar Pradesh (U.P.): State, Dalit, Exclusion and site of Resistance

The state Uttar Pradesh (U.P.) historically is the site of political and cultural contestations not in only post-independent India but from the period of *Mugahals* and British. It was the state which collectively kwon as '*Awadh*' in pre-independent India. The political battle of first Indian struggle (1857) for independence, was launched from this land. The new independent India got its first Prime Minister (Jawaharlal Nehru) from here. This state is also popularly known to produce the highest numbers of Prime- Ministers. In the post-liberalization period,

another political leader, Kanshi Ram led the movement for political/social assertion to the most oppressed community (Dalit) of India. To imagine of any Dalit becoming the Chief Minister of any state was impossible. This state has another record. It produced the first Dalit and a woman Chief Minister of not only Uttar Pradesh but of whole India for the first time in Indian history.In spite of its political importance, this state is also known for its social movements.Various social/political movements were also born in this land. The rise of Ambedkarite politics and the leadership of Kanshi Ram are well known across the globe. Another, contrary to above social assertion, the reactionary right wing politics also got momentum here. The political assertion of current regime is very important to contextualise it from UP politics. It is the only state which has the highest number of Members of Parliament (total 80) across India. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the current ruling party BJP secured 71 seats out of eighty, which paved the way to get a full majority in the Indian Parliament.

Table: 4.1 Description of Uttar Pradesh Population

Population	199,812,341	166,197,921
Male	104,480,510	87,565,369
Female	95,331,831	78,632,552
Population Growth	20.23%	25.80%
Percentage Of Total Population	16.50%	16.16%
Sex Ratio	912	898
Child Sex Ratio	902	916
Population Density/Km2	829	690
Population Density/Mi2	2,148	1,787
Area(Km2)	240,928	240,928
Area Mi2	93,023	93,023
Total Child Population (0-6 Age)	30,791,331	31,624,628
Male Population (0-6 Age)	16,185,581	16,509,033
Female Population (0-6 Age)	14,605,750	15,115,595
Literacy	67.68 %	56.27 %
Male Literacy	77.28 %	68.82 %
Female Literacy	57.18 %	42.22 %
Total Literates	114,397,555	75,719,284
Male Literates	68,234,964	48,901,413
Female Literates	46,162,591	26,817,871

Source: "Government of India", (Online: Web), Accessed, 6June 2017 URL:

https://data.gov.in/catalog/villagetown-wise-primary-census-abstract-2011-uttar pradesh.

According to the 2011Census,

"Uttar Pradesh has a population of 19.98 Crores, an increase from 16.62 Crore in 2001. Total population of Uttar Pradesh as per 2011 census is 199,812,341 of which male and female figures are 104,480,510 and 95,331,831 respectively. In 2001, total population was 166,197,921 in which males were 87,565,369 while

females were 78,632,552. The total population growth in this decade was 20.23 percent while in the previous decade it was 25.80 percent. The population of Uttar Pradesh forms 16.50 percent of India in 2011. In 2001, the figure was 16.16 percent" (Census, 2011)[36].

Like Sichuan, U.P. has also the highest population. The population of Dalit (ex-untouchable) is also the largest in this state. Geographically this state cannot be divided as hilly/mountainous and plain regions but in the sense of its land productivity is quite similar to Sichuan. Sichuan is blessed with the Yangzi River while it is well known for its Ganga and Yamuna. Uttar Pradesh has become the second largest state geographically after its division into UP and Uttarakhand in 2000.

The 1990s is well known for two most important phenomena: Mandal-Kamandal politics and launch of the liberalisation agenda. This was the time when the economic liberalization in India was initiated. The report of the Mandal Commission[37] sought to implement 27 percent reservation for other backward classes (OBC) in educational and government sectors. At the same time the right wing party in the leadership of BJP (Bhartiy Janata Party) launched the hatred campaign to build the Ram-Mandir (temple). The political commentators have termed it against the social justice because they opposed the implementation of Mandal Commission. right wing unit was created which culminated into the demolition of Babari Masjid[38] in Ayodhya (UP) in 1992.

When we deal with Chinese pattern of development, we have found certain differences in western part when compared to or with to the eastern parts of China. The highly urbanised

---

[36] "Government of India", (Online: Web), Accessed, 6June 2017 URL: https://data.gov.in/catalog/villagetown-wise-primary-census-abstract-2011-uttar pradesh.

[37] The Mandal Commission was established in 1979 by the Janata Party government under Prime Minister Morarji Desai with a mandate to "identify the socially or educationally backward." It was headed by Indian parliamentarian Bindheshwari Prasad Mandal to consider the question of seat reservations and quotas for people to redress caste discrimination, and used eleven social, economic, and educational indicators to determine "backwardness." In 1980, the commission's report affirmed the affirmative action practice under Indian law whereby members of lower castes (known as Other Backward Classes and Scheduled Castes and Tribes) were given exclusive access to a certain portion of government jobs and slots in public universities, and recommended changes to these quotas, increasing them by 27% to 49.5%. The plan to set up another commission was taken up by the Morarji Desai government in 1978 as per the mandate of the Constitution of India under Article 340 for the purpose of Articles like 15and 16. The decision was made official by the President on January 1, 1979. The Commission is popularly known as the Mandal Commission, its chairman being B.P. Mandal.

38 Sixty years after the matter first went into litigation; a Special Full Bench of the High Court of Allahabad has ruled that the disputed land in Ayodhya where the Babri Masjid stood for 500 years until it was demolished in 1992 shall be divided into three parts. A two-thirds portion is to be shared by two Hindu plaintiffs and one-third will be given to the Sunni Muslim Waqf Board. The Hindu (30 Sept., 2010), "Court awards two-thirds of Ayodhya site to Hindu parties, one-third to Waqf Board", (Online: Web), Accessed 20 May, 2017 URL: http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/Court-awards-two-thirds-of-Ayodhya-site-to-Hindu-parties-one-third-to-Waqf-Board/article10751918.ece.

development is visible in the coastal areas than to western part of China. This has impacted the overall areas, its population and particularly to its minority also. But in the context of caste system of India, particularly the Dalit, the difference is southern and northern in Indian context. Sudha Pai (2005), analyses the difference between northern and southern part of India. According to her, 'Unlike states in the southern and western regions, which had experienced faster social and economic change in the colonial and post-colonial period, where the lower castes had experienced democratisation earlier making them better equipped to deal with rapid and destabilising change' (Pai, 2005:2144).

The reading of caste character in northern and southern part of India of Christophe Jaffrelot is different but convincing. According to him:

> "In South and West India, caste associations marked the first stage of a much larger ethnicization process. They have not only promoted caste fusion, their discourse on autochthony (indigenous) and the Buddhist origins of the lower castes endowed them with a prestigious identity. In North India, none of these processes reached their logical conclusion, even though the British policies of positive discrimination had created the same context as in the South and in the West…... North India, while caste associations took shape at an early date, they did not prepare the ground for a resilient ethnicization process but operated within the logic of Sanskritization" (2000: 762).

The condition of Dalitsand oppressed communities in southern part is better because of radical social/political movements launched by Periyar and Narayana Guru and others. They not only attacked the Hindu Philosophy but were also given proper representation after Independence. The western part of India, Maharastra, is another state where social movements of Phule, B.R.Ambedkar raised the issue of social, economic and cultural exclusion of dalists and oppressed people.

> "The rise of egalitarian movements, stemming from the ethnicization of caste was more prevalent in the South and in the West. In these two mega regions, the ethnicization of caste did not rely only on caste fusion. This process, fostered by caste associations, prepared the ground for a more radical transformation based on new imaginaries. In Maharashtra, Phule invented a pre-Aryan pedigree for the Shudras while Ambedkar endowed the Untouchables with a Buddhist identity. In

Tamil Nadu, the Dravidian identity of the non-Brahmin movement borrowed from both sources of inspiration" (Jaffrelot, 2000: 765).

Another difference that has been observed by the scholars is in the arena of materiality. The conditions of Dalit in north and south is aptly analysed by Ian Duncan (1999). According to him:

"The general position of Dalits within the pattern of social and economic relationships of north India is perhaps well known, but it is worth outlining some of the details of their marginal social and economic position as revealed by the most recent (1991) census figures. The various Scheduled Caste (SC) groups in UP make up more than 23 per cent of the rural population, but they are internally differentiated in a variety of ways. Of particular importance in UP is the numerical preponderance of particular SC sub-groups. The Jatav/Chamar caste group makes up more than half of the total Dalit population and is found in villages across most of the state. The second largest group, the Pasis, form just under 15 per cent of Dalits but they are much more geographically concentrated than the Jatavs. The Dalit population is far less urbanised than the non-SCs and it has lower rates of literacy in general with large differences between women and men and between rural and urban areas. Taking the state of UP as a whole, the SC make up some 47 per cent of the total landless labour force but only 18 percent of the population of landowning cultivators, although both of these proportions are subject to great regional variation. Particularly noticeable is the high number of SC among landowners in the central districts around Lucknow; in Lucknow district itself it is as high as 42 per cent although again it needs to be emphasised that Dalits are found disproportionately among the smaller landholders. On the other hand in the west the SC groups are almost completely shut out from landownership; in Meerut district for example they constitute less than 5 per cent of all cultivators" (37-38).

The caste profile of both the regions is different. Even the eastern part of India does have not all the four Varnas. The physical presence/absence of all the Vernas is crucial in the defining of Indian caste system and further the complexity and rigidity of caste system.

"These two regions always had a different caste profile. In the Hindi belt, the caste system is traditionally the closest to the Varna model with its four orders (Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas, and Shudras) and its Untouchables. In the South, the twice-born are seldom "complete" because the warrior and merchant castes are often absent or poorly represented, as in Maharashtra and Bengal. Correlatively, the upper Varnas are in larger numbers than in the North. According to the 1931 census, the last one asking about caste, upper castes represented from 13.6% (in Bihar) up to 24.2% (in Rajasthan) of the population. In the South, the proportion of the Brahmins and even of the twice-born is often low. In Andhra Pradesh, for instance, the Brahmins and the Kshatriyas represent respectively 3% and 1.2% of the population. In Maharashtra a bridge state between the North and the South, the twice-born were only marginally a larger number with 3.9% Brahmins, 1% Kshatriyas, and 1.69% Vaishyas" (Jaffrelot, 2000: 757).

Jaffrelot documented the different land ownership settlements in the north and south regions of India. According to him, 'the kind of land settlement that the British introduced in India was not the same in these two areas. While the Zamindari (intermediatory) system prevailed in North India, the Raiyatwari (cultivator) system was more systematically implemented in the South' (2000: 1).

The age old caste system in the Indian subcontinent has made Dalits untouchables, un-seeable and unspeakable. The real problem of caste system is very much rooted in the Hindu social order of hierarchy which graded whole Hindu society. The Dalits are at the "lowest" in the ladder and so were the most degraded. Dalit politics, their leaders and intellectuals have perceived their history and themselves differently.

"Dalits believe that their history has four functions. First, it imparts self-respect. Second, they understand their specific place in society. Third, history is a means to acquire self-confidence and self-esteem. And fourth, it establishes a platform for self-analysis. The literate Dalits who claim their narratives to be history, present its ideas through reason and logic to challenge Brahminical beliefs and values

based on Hindu religious codes, and deconstruct the dominant and hegemonic "upper caste" history and myths. These, they claim, silence Dalit history or describe it as "low" *(nich)*, degraded *(adham)*, or criminal and uncultured" (Baudh, 1985: 3).

The architect of the Indian constitution, D.R. Ambedkar delineates the problem of caste system aptly. According to him:

> "We are often reminded that the problem of depressed classes is a sociological problem and that its solution lies elsewhere than in politics. We take strong exception to this view. We hold that the problems of the depressed classes will never be solved unless they get political power in their hands. If this is true, then the problem of the depressed classes is, I submit, eminently a political problem and must be treated as such" (Ambedkar Quoted in Jaffrelot, 2005).

The bone of contention of Dalit and the Indian nation state is quite complex. The Dalit population never takes Indian nation as a nation, rather it is in the making. They always take caste as the biggest antinational element because it disintegrates the Indian society. The lack of brotherhood and compassion for its people is the biggest impediment to make India as a nation. Nobel laureate Amartya Sen rightly states in one of his lectures in the London School of Economics that "I would say caste is anti-national because it divides the nation. We want to be national, not anti-national, for which it is important to eliminate all divisions".[39]

The well known leader Kanshi Ram, who mobilised the Dalits in UP and uplifted them to political power, explains the nature of caste system in Indian society. He emphatically articulates that caste has been the basis of exploitation of Dalit Bahujan. The caste system is not only against the majority of the people but also has been the biggest hindrance in making India an egalitarian nation.

> "The requirements that compel Dalits to link themselves with the narratives of nation-making are reflected in the ideological statement of Kanshi Ram, leader of the Bahujan Samaj Party (A Dalit political party active in the political mobilisation of Dalits in north India.) He calls his movement a real nationalist step. He also explains his view about national unity by saying that for him the

---

[39] The Indian Express (June, 16, 2016), "Amartya Sen describes Indian caste divisions as 'anti-national' at London School of Economics", (Online: Web), Accessed 10 May, 2016 URL:http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/amartya-sen-indian-caste-system-anti-national-london-school-of-economics-2857296/.

meaning of national unity is to correct social imbalances. Uniting the Dalits was perceived by him as an essential prerequisite for national unity. He believed that the true meaning of the creation of the nation state is to provide a fair share for the Bahujans in the state power and administration. He alleged that Brahminism decelerated the process of nation making by dividing the Dalits into fragments for their own vested interests" (Narayan, 2004: 14).

Badri Narayan (2004) writes further that how Dalits see nationalism as a process of modernization in India. He specifically emphasised the aspirations of Dalits in the nation building process. This is the social churning which actually modernises the rigid reactionary and rudimentary practices of caste system.

According to him, 'The story of nationalism as narrated by the Dalits not only expresses their desire to be a part of the nation-building process, but also reflects their inner aspiration to emerge as an important and active group in the process of social modernisation. Social modernisation and nation-building seem to be inseparable according to Liah Greenfield, who describes the nation as the 'constitutive' element of modernity' (Narayan, 2004: 15).

(4.3.A) *Uttar-Pradesh: Dalits and Exclusion*

Uttar Pradesh came into more limelight in the late 1990s. The reason was the assertion of Dalits under the banner of their own party, i.e. Bahaujan Samaj Party (BSP). It does not mean that the assertion and mobilization of Dalits for their dignity and share was new. UP has a history of political and electoral mobilization of Dalits.

> "As elsewhere in rural India, in rural UP, caste has played a key role in structuring individual identity, limiting economic choices, and reinforcing patterns of consumption consonant with the identification of Dalits as social inferiors. In evaluating the evolution of the well-being of Dalits and other socially excluded groups during the era of market reform, a period that also coincides with increasing political empowerment of Dalits in UP, one cannot simply assume how the complex interplay of economic, political and social has played out. As Chandhoke (2009: 141) points out, "the link between redistribution (of material resources) and what has come to be known as recognition (development of feelings of self-respect)" has "proved to be more tenuous than originally

conceived by egalitarians" especially since recognition "is not so easily commanded by politics" (Chandrabhan Prasad, et. al. 2010: 40).

Jagpal Sing (1998) traces the history of post-Independent India where Dalits fought both socially and electorally. According to him:

"The Dalits of western Uttar Pradesh, particularly the jatavs, have resorted to diverse means to register their protest and also achieve improvement in their living standards. Religious conversion, supporting mainstream political parties or parties having Dalit leadership and launching socio-cultural organisations are some of the strategies adopted by the jatavs to redress their grievances. Though, currently, the Bahujan Samaj Party commands the allegiance of a large number of jatavs, it should not be overlooked that the roots of self-assertion of jatavs of western UP go back to the process of Ambedkarisation initiated by the Republican Party of India in the 1960s" (Singh, 1998: 2611).

Moreover, another scholar, Vivek Kumar (2004) summarises the streams of Dalits movements historically in India. He locates the first phase in the medieval period of Indian history when Dalits converted to Islam and Sikhism to escape from the exploitation and harsh treatment inflicted on them by the Hindu Social order. The second phase is located when poets belonging to the Dalit community started projecting the pathetic conditions of the community. The third phase started with the emergence of the leadership of Baba Sahib Ambedkar in 1920. The fourth phase starts with the demise of Dr. Ambedkar which continues until today.

The work on the comparison of Dalit and Ambedakarite movements in different parts of India has been much discussed in Indian academia. The Ambedkarite movements in Maharashtra and the BSP assertion in UP are aptly compared by Harish Wankhede. According to him:

"Post-Ambedkarite movements for Dalit emancipation in India have had different currents. In Uttar Pradesh, the assertion of the Bahujan Samaj Party has initiated a new era of democratisation, while the upsurge of Dalit castes through Buddhist conversion has brought about social change in Maharashtra. Yet, both these separate phenomena suffer from the disadvantages of not addressing vital issues raised by Ambedkar. He develops a model out of the dialectics of the socio-political movements in Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh from the vantage point of

Ambedkarite philosophy. Both the modern Buddhists and the new aggressive Dalit political elites reject all "the given" liberal identifications and "cultured" nomenclatures, eventually constructing a socially robust political identity in the public domain" (2008: 50).

In spite of all these movements and assertions of Dalits, it would be interesting to see the kind of social upliftment of Dalits in UP. Have the historical legacies of RPI and BSP led to any advancement of Dalits in UP? How did this help in overcoming the social exclusion of Dalits in UP? How does the liberalization of Dalits help or degrade the conditions of Dalits in India and specially the Dalits of UP? After the Independence of India in 1947, there have been many preferential policies. The question is to see the impact of these progressive policies in the context of social liberation of Dalits in UP.

There is constitutional validity of Dalits. The definition of Dalits (schedule caste, SC) has been illustrated by Central Government Act of India. Article 341 in the Constitution of India 1949 illustrates:

(1) The President may with respect to any State or Union territory, and where it is a State after consultation with the Governor thereof, by public notification, specify the castes, races or tribes or parts of or groups within castes, races or tribes which shall for the purposes of this Constitution be deemed to be Scheduled Castes in relation to that State or Union territory, as the case may be

(2) Parliament may by law include in or exclude from the list of Scheduled Castes specified in a notification issued under clause (1) any caste, race or tribe or part of or group within any caste, race or tribe, but save as aforesaid a notification issued under the said clause shall not be varied by any subsequent notification.

A total of 131 seats (18.42 per cent) are reserved for representatives of Scheduled Castes (84) and Scheduled Tribes (47). These seats are reserved in proportion to the SC/ST population as a share of the total population of the State. As per the 2011 census, these sections comprised about 16.6 per cent and 8.6 per cent, respectively, of India's population.

In the context of UP, the state of Uttar Pradesh has a bicameral legislature. U.P. is the largest legislature in India. The Uttar Pradesh Assembly has 403 elected members and one nominated Anglo-Indian member and 100 members in the Legislative

Council. It has thirty one (31) members from the state to Rajy Sabha, which is called as the Upper House in Indian Parliament. The state has eighty (80) members as the members of Parliament from the state. Both seats (31, 80) are highest from all over India. For Dalits the 85 seats were reserved in Uttar Pradesh assembly and out of eighty seats of members of parliament from UP, 17 seats have been reserved for the Scheduled Castes.

(4.3.B) *Liberalization and Dalits*

In India, the economic liberalization process started in 1990. The promises of liberalization were high. The argument that came from the establishment classes claimed that it would lead to the enhancement of the economic development and modernization in the country. The sluggish sector of government will get a chance to excel in its performance. Many social scientists also argued that the rigidity of Indian feudal system will get dismantled by the free flow of capital and knowledge. On the other hand, it has raised serious questions over the logic of privatization and liberalization. Economists have pointed that it has led to the concentration of capital in few individuals and the majority are being exploited. The surplus value of production was not equally distributed among the people but cornered by the few masters of market. The state has no control over these forces which created a huge income gap between the minority capitalist class and the majority labouring class. This debate is not only localised in India but also extends the global arena.

'Many have expressed the concern that the growth of the market economy in India unleashes inequality-increasing forces. Dev and Ravi (2007: 509) reach a "clear conclusion" that inequality "increased significantly in the post reform period", a conclusion shared by other researchers' (Himanshu 2007; Datt and Ravallion 2010).

The financial crisis and the pauperization of majority of the people, has raised many questions on the measurement of poverty and exploitation of people.

> "For instance, the recent Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progressrecommends that (Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi2009: 12) "…the time is ripe for our measurement system to shiftemphasis from measuring economic production to measuringpeople's well-being." Since "objective and subjective dimensionsof well-being are both important" (Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi, 2009: 14-15 quoted in Chandrabhan Prasad et al., 2010:41).

Amartya Sen emphasized on raising the 'capability' of individual rather than just providing him the goods and cash. It is the responsibility of state to intervene continuously so that the capability of individual can be raised. This has a long lasting effect and the individual's dependency would be decreased slowly. Accordingly, the 'well-being is subjectively assessed and emphasizes capabilities and functionings that reflect a particular subjective valuation. However, in empirical practice, this conceptual insight has congealed into merely emphasizing a slightly different set of outcomes, and somewhat dissimilar set of summary statistics, while the question of whose views matter in the designof the survey instrument is ignored' (Sen quoted in Chandrabhan Prasad and et.al., 2010: 41).

The social exclusion of Dalits has been at multiple levels. The overall exploitation, humiliation and pauperization of Dalits in India have a long history. The generality of their exclusion at economic, cultural, social and at the political level has led them to live sub-human lives. The independent India and the legal system of post-independence India provided them some state benefits and enacted many laws to save them from further humiliation and exclusion. The liberalization of economy and contractualization of government sector has snatched the little jobs whatever they manage to get from the state sector.

My field study of Uttar Pradesh (May, 2016) has covered the historical and current social exclusion of Dalits. I have tried to understand the type of exclusion of Dalits in their locality, profession, office and in political field. The survey has been divided broadly in three sections: economic, social and political exclusion of Dalits in UP. The field survey was conducted on both levels. Firstly, forty questions were asked to respondents followed by few selective interviews of individuals, both male and female. The questions were categorized into five sections of the Dalit populace, Farmer, laborers, students, government employees and political leaders/ activists. I have consciously asked the individual who have passed the age of fifteen or class tenth. Another aspect of the survey was to know the impacts of both, liberalization and political assertion of Dalits in UP. This effort was made very consciously to know the logic of redistribution, representation (reservation) and recognition as well as the assertion (BSP) of Dalits after economic reforms.

The methodological part of this field survey has been both quantitative and qualitative. The focus of the research was on the respondents and their experiences. The quantitative method was supplemented with personal interviews and discussions with the residents.

The urban sector showed different forms of exclusion and discrimination of Dalits. The form of humiliation and discrimination has changed but caste-based prejudices still exist. The village society has been highly celebrated for its tolerance and brotherhood. My interviews and surveys show quite a different picture. There is a high level of discrimination, segregation and untouchability and it is still the reality of rural India. As B. R. Ambedkar recognised the villages more than six decades ago (1994: 61-62): 'The love of the intellectual Indians for the village community is of course infinite if not pathetic… What is the village but a sink of localism, a den of ignorance, narrow mindedness, and communalism?'

After the independence of India, the fruits of development have not reached the Dalits. Rather the Indian society has been highly biased towards the Dalits. It is interesting to know that after sixty-six (67) years of independence, the fruits of development are unevenly distributed. The governmanetal schemes and policies were cornered by the "upper" castes of the society. The special policies and schemes meant for Dalits were either did not reach them or very poorly implemented. Even the materials (for roads) used for villages roads (*Khadanja*) were very bad in caprasion to the other dominant sections of the same villages. The following figure (4.1) shows clearly that the pattern of modern development has been discriminatory and exclusionary against Dalits.

Figure: 4.1 Government Facilities and Social discrimination of Dalits in U.P.

Is public electricity/ road/drainage the same as in "upper"-caste locality?

Another factor is that the Indian establishment always presented a rosy picture of the Indian villages. My findings are similar to Dr. Ambedkar's that Indian villages are 'den of ignorance and narrow mindedness'.

The findings emphasise the fact that a vast majority of Dalits live either outside the village or near pond or garbage/dumps (Figure 4.2, ninety percent). It is important to see this type of exclusion and isolation of the majority of the population in the context of modernization and lofty promises of development. The argument of development and scientific temperament has been proven less effective in caste-ridden Indian society. Their conditions are very much similar at social and cultural level despite the fact that there is some improvement in their economic condition. Historically, Dalits were forced to live outside the Hindu villages, the condition still prevails.

It is fascinating to note here the observation of political scientists, Gopal Guru that the exclusion of Dalits in urban sector is similar to the villages too. The physical location of Dalits in urban and modernised cities, he asserts, is alongside the railway's track, near the drains and sewer, under the construction sites. The majority of Dalits are forced to live in the newly emerged slums of the cities. From the following figure 4.3, it is evident that majority of Dalits are excluded from the villages. They reside either in the corner of the villages or near the pond and garbage.

Figure: 4.2 Segregation of Dalits in villages

Where are the Dalits located in the village?

The Untouchability Act was passed in the early 1950s and Indian constitution prohibits untouchability under Article 17. The findings are shocking because less than five percent people said that they were fortunate, as they did not face untouchability in villages. It can be noted also that the *Panchayati Raj* system was introduced in 1973 with the aim of achieving

democratization at the gross roots. This system has been ineffective in the Indian society and the reality is that there is an increased atrocities and widespread humiliation of Dalits in most of the cases. Some of my respondents said that they faced severe discrimination despite the fact that one of them was elected as village head. Some of them told that they faced untouchability in that they were not allowed to enter or sit in the house of "upper" castes. Untouchability is the perennial injustice that exists in some or other form even today in the 21st century. The following Figure (4.3) clearly shows the practice of untouchability in U.P. even though it is illegal in India since the inception of Indian constitution. The results are shocking because around eighty percent people accepted that they faced it on regular basis. The percentage of the people who confessed that they never faced it is very less (less than 5 percent).

Figure: 4.3 Practice of Untouchability against Dalits in U.P

Do the "upper" castes practice untouchability vis-a-vis you?

One of the solutions that Dr. Ambedkar suggested to abolish caste system was promoting inter-caste marriages. Endogamies are the core of Indian society. The inter-dining and inter-caste marriages were prohibited in India. The rampant honour killing[40] of youths, especially Dalits, happens in Indian society because they dare to love the so-called "upper"-caste girls.

---

[40] More than 1,000 young people in India have been done to death every year owing to 'Honour Killings' linked to forced marriages and the country needs to introduce stringent legislation to deal firmly with the heinous crime, two legal experts have claimed. Participating in International Child Abduction, Relocation and Forced Marriages Conference organised by the London Metropolitan University here, Chandigarh-based legal experts Anil Malhotra and his brother Ranjit Malhotra have said that in traditional societies, honour killings are basically 'justified' as a sanction for 'dishonourable 'behaviour.In a joint

"A total of 18 cases of 'honour killing' were registered in 2014. Minister of State for Home, Haribhai Parathibhai Chaudhary, said as per information provided by the National Crime Records Bureau, collection of data on honour killings has started since January last year on a monthly basis. "Hence, there is no available data for the last three years. A total of 18 cases were registered under 'honour killing' during 2014," (DNA, 4 Mar 2015, New Delhi, PTI)[41].

The survey reveals that inter-caste marriages in UP are almost negligible. It shows how the whole Hindu society is confined to their caste and less social mobility is permissible even after sixty five years of independence. The acceptability of different castes is very less because of the purity and pollution Philosophy of Hindu caste system.

In the case of China, we found that the Chinese establishment tried to include the minorities through marriages. The policies like 'cultural melting', 'peace marriages', and 'bloodlines' among ethnic minorities and Han was one sort of policies of inclusion. However, the assimilation of the ethnic minority could be the agenda of Chinese establishment but 'honour killings' and maintaining the purity of blood like in India was quite untraceable in China.

Figure: 4.4 Social Pattern of Inter-Caste Marriages In U.P.

Has any Dalit man married an "upper" caste women in your village?

---

paper, they said: "Forced marriages and honour killings are often intertwined. Marriage can be forced to save honour, and women can be murdered for rejecting a forced marriage and marrying a partner of their own choice who is not acceptable for the family of the girl.They said in India, honour killings happen with regularity in Punjab, Haryana and western Uttar Pradesh". The Times of India (July 4, 2017), "More than 1000 honour killings in India every year: Experts", (Online: Web), Accessed 12 May, 2016 URL:http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/More-than-1000-honour-killings-in-India-every-year-Experts/articleshow/6127338.cms.
[41] DNA (March 4, 2015), "18 Cases of 'honour killing' registered in 2014: Government", (Online: Web), Accessed 16 May, 2016 URL: http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-18-cases-of-honour-killing-registered-in-2014-government-2066092.

Among all the respondents of my survey, only one respondent, (Figure 4.4) witnessed the inter-caste marriage in his village. It is not surprising as of why the well-educated, foreign returned go for matrimonial to choose his/her caste bride/bridegroom. Few reports have also been heard that the caste Hindus (gay/lesbian) also preferred the partner of his/her caste. One of the activists exposed the caste character of his community.

> "The queer space across India is dominated by Savarna (Upper caste) cis-gay-men. Some of them are in lavender heterosexual marriages, reaping additional privilege from the heterosexual world. Do not say caste is a thing of the past. Listen to our stories. Listen to us when we point out how you bring your caste preferences within the queer movement. Do not play the victim when we point out your privilege. Do not say 'not-all-"upper" castes…'. Do not say that you are helpless because you were born into that 'unfortunate' caste - you still carry your caste privilege"[42] (The News Minute, June 16, 2016 -13:24).

One of the Indian *Savrna* parents gave an advisement in matrimony for their gay son for Iyer gay man. This has created huge debate in the Indian elite circle.

> "Dubbed the first gay matrimonial ad in India, Padma was able to get it published only after being rejected by a few leading dailies. Iyer, a well-known gay activist, was shocked when the ad was turned down by some mainstream newspapers, which he felt always covered LGBT issues extensively and stood with them on many an occasion. The ad reads: "Seeking 25-40, well-placed, animal-loving, vegetarian groom for my son 36, 5 11' who works with an NGO caste no bar (though Iyer preferred"[43] (Yahoo India News: 2015).

The second set of questions focused on the discrimination of students in school/colleges and at university level. The type of discrimination they face is alarming to the outside world because it is not only the students but the teachers/peon and the administrators who are supposed to impart education for a more egalitarian and democratic society discriminated and excluded Dalit children and scholars. They face social discrimination not only in the classrooms setting as they are forced to sit at the in the classroom but also were given less

---

[42] The New Minute (June 16, 2016), "Let's Talk LGBTQ+" (Online: Web), Accessed 18 May, 2016 URL: accessed on 25th May, 2016 http://www.thenewsminute.com/article/dear-savarna-queer-men-lets-talk-about-casteism-within-our-movement-44951,

[43] ANS India Private Limited/Yahoo India News(May 24, 2015), "Matrimonial ad for gay son stirs lively debate" (Online: Web), Accessed 20 May, 2016 URL:https://in.news.yahoo.com/matrimonial-ad-gay-son-stirs-lively-debate-051214389.html.

marks in internal exams and in viva voice. The exclusion of Dalitsin history and culture is another matter of Dalit exclusion at the level of pedagogy. They either were excluded from the syllabus or were depicted in a distorted manner.

The following three Figures (4.5, 4.5.A, 4.5.B) show the type of discrimination that the Dalit students face in their schools.

Figure: 4.5 Pattern of Discrimination faced by Dalits in Educational Institutes in U.P.

Did you face any sort of discrimination in your school?

Figure: 4.5.A Pattern of Discrimination faced by Dalits Students in Educational Institutes in U.P.

What kind of discrimination do you face in interviews?

Figure: 4.5.B Pattern of Discrimination in Educational Institutes faced by Dalits Students in U.P.

Who discriminated you in school?

The kind of discrimination that is usually perpetrated against the Dalits and marginalized students of new generation has been different from the older generation as they are not open and blunt today. It also differs from school to school and location. The older generation has faced the blunt and caste abuse in the classrooms by teachers and classmates. But the newer generation is being discriminated against in securing less-marks in internal exams and viva voce. One basic difference that has emerged with the passing of time is the older generation used to face humiliation on a daily basis or in some intervals but the frequency has decreased with the newer generation.

The onslaught of economic liberalization has drastically reduced opportunities for Dalits to get jobs in private sectors due to absence of reservation system in it. Discrimination of Dalits is however not less or absent in both sectors. Many respondents have replied that discrimination exists in both sectors. Despite discrimination, they prefer jobs in government sector. The logic of privatization and the emergence of Dalit entrepreneurs is being rejected by the Dalits of UP. The following Figures (4.6 and 4.7) indicate that nearly ninety percent

respondents believe that they face discrimination in both sectors even though they prefer government job.

Figure: 4.6 Pattern of Discrimination faced by Dalits in Government and Private Sectors

Do you face more discrimination in government or private job?

Figure: 4.7 Pattern of Job Preferences by Dalits after Liberalisation in U.P.

What kind of job do you prefer?

The government employees also are not immune to caste discrimination and discouragement in their office and working place. This discrimination is at multiple levels and in layers. They were ignored, isolated, discouraged and even face caste abuses sometimes. The type of humiliation is as stark as it used to be in the pre or early independence period in India. One of the respondents who was newly appointed as a primary school teacher in Kaushambi district told that in his school, 'there are two water pots. One is separate for him and another is for "upper" caste teachers'. This is the reality of rural India. He narrates the story as to how they isolate him as he is the only Dalit teacher in the school. He rarely takes leave from school and other so-called "upper"-caste teachers take leave as and when they wish.

Figure: 4.7.A Nature of Discrimination at Work Place

Which kind of discrimination do you face in the office?

The vast majority of Dalits in India are either casual workers or farmer-cum workers. They work in the fields of "upper"-castes and the factories outside the village. The women are mostly in the villages where they work in the fields of the dominant castes. The type of discrimination they face is shameful and expose the myth of the so-called democratic and socialist agenda of the Indian state. They not only receive low wages but were also employed in the highly risky jobs. They are forced to work far more hours and sometimes even without extra-wage of payment over time. This situation is more or less similar in the case of field labourers and sometimes with Dalit working in the big cities. One of respondents a (woman) narrates the story of her experiences in the village life. She told me that 'we have no dignity (*ijjat*) in life, the "upper"-caste men and boys make sexist comments on us. They sometimes try to give us bad and ruined grains as wages (*majdoor*i). If we refuse to work in their fields,

then they challenge us while coming to our field for grazing and grass cutting,' she added with anger.

Figure: 4.7.B Nature of Discrimination at Work Place

How does your employer discriminate you?

At the political level, the Dalits due to reservation used to contest local elections. They also participate in the regional and national level politics. What kind of discrimination do they face in politics was one of my questions to them. Were they treated as the leader at all if elected or just treated like a Dalit leader? The answers are disappointing. The exclusion and discrimination of Dalits in politics is also visible. Their view is that they are always treated as Dalit leaders and "upper"-castes rarely accept their leadership. The following Figure indicates that more than sixty five percent respondents replied that they were never accepted as the leader of all communities rather they were called as a 'leader of Dalit or a Dalit leader'.

Figure: 4.8 Nature of Discrimination in Politics

How do mainstream politics/politicians exclude you in politics?

One positive change which I could observe during the field study is that Dalits are discarding the traditional occupations. There are still twenty-five percent of them who still do the same humiliating caste-centered jobs under Hindu system but the majority (75%) of them have left the traditional jobs (Figure 4.10). The reasons are multiple. Dalit politics, mechanization of farming, migration of Dalits to cities, provision of government jobs due to reservations can be enlisted as some of the reasons that can be noticed especially after liberalization process in the country. Chandrabhan Prasad (et. all.) in his work on the Dalits of UP also finds similar results in 1990.

"First, there is a significant shift of Dalits into non-caste traditional occupations. Second, and related to the first, there has been significant migration of Dalits into cities, leading to circular flows of members of Dalit households between the rural and urban areas. Third, there have been major shifts in the practice of agriculture as Dalits are increasingly less likely to work in the fields of the traditional landlords. Instead, with the mechanisation of agriculture and hence decline of bullocks, Dalits are becoming sharecroppers, cultivating "upper"-caste lands and increasingly hiring upper-caste men to till the land by tractors, shifting the nexus of contracting relationships. This is not to say the market is free of discrimination against Dalits. Several studies have shown that in the formal private sector, there appears to be discrimination. But changes in market opportunities have allowed shifts in the economic occupation of Dalits, of which this survey captures the implications for rural areas" (2010: 47).

The following Figure (4.9) clearly shows that the newer generation is not interested in the system of Hindu work division. They not only rejected the humiliating jobs but left it as soon as they get any chance.

Figure: 4.9 Change in Traditional Occupation after 1990

Traditional occupation

The overall exclusion of Dalits from all aspect of lives in Uttar Pradesh has been documented by Bibhuti Bhushan Malik in his work, 'Caste-based exclusion and Inclusion of Dalits In Eastern Uttar Pradesh', edit. By Jagan Karade in 'Caste Based Exclusion, 2015.

Table: 4.2 Distribution of the respondents on the basis of the disabilities

	Response	Response		If yes	If yes		Unable to answer	Total
	Yes	No	Only A Few People	Many people but less than half of the village/ neighborhood	More than half of the village/neighborhood	All SC people		
Education/school	35	402	5	3	19	1	9	441
	7.90	91.20	1.13	0.68	4.30	0.23	1.58	100
Water	46	391	10	0	27	3	4	441
	10.43	88.66	2.26	0.00	6.12	0.68	0.91	100.0
Health Service	9	427	0	0	8	1	5	441
	2.04	96.82	0.00	0.00	1.18	0.3	1.13	100
Justice	14	422	5	5	3	1	5	441
	3.17	95.69	1.13	1.13	0.68	0.23	1.13	100
Transport	8	428	2	2	4	0	5	441
	1.81	97.05	0.45	0.45	0.91	0.00	1.13	100
Market Places	7	430	2	1	4	0	4	441
	1.58	97.50	0.45	0.23	0.91	0.00	0.91	100
Public place of worship, temple	89	347	23	9	55	2	5	441
Total	20.18	78.68	521	2.04	12.47	0.45	1.13	100

Source: (Caste-based Exclusion and Inclusion of Dalits in Eastern Uttar Pradesh, edit. Karade, 2015:87).

"The above table presents the frequency distribution of the respondents on the basis of the disabilities observed by the people regarding the use of water, temple, educational institutions,, etc. Among the respondents, only 7 percent population agreed that the Schedule Caste students should go to public school as against 93 percent population who did not agree due to caste conservatism, similarly, only 10 percent population support drawing or use of water from the public well or tap, 97 percent respondents denied provision for any health services to the Dalits, nearly 97 percent of population did not agree with regard to the use of justice , market place and transport system as these are used by upper caste members. Hence, it is evident that most of the people blame caste conservatism as leading to constraints on various areas" (Karade, 2015: 87).

Moreover, he also provides data relating to the Dalit participation in the Indian society.

According to his survey of 441 Dalit respondents, the following responses are shocking even in 21st century India. They are almost excluded from the society and hence bear the brunt of marginalization. From table (4.3) we can see clearly that near half (48.53%) population do not have opportunities to participate in the community development activities.

Table: 4.3 Participation of Dalits in community activities

Participation of the respondents in community activities	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	84	19.05
No	214	48.53
I can participate in all activities	102	23.13
Unable to answer	41	9.30
Total	*441*	100

Source: (Caste Based Exclusion and Inclusion of Dalits in Eastern Uttar Pradesh, edit. Karade, 2015:87).

4.4 Summary

The social exclusion of both ethnic minority and Dalits has been the national character in both the states with minor regional differences. They were culturally stigmatised, socially backward and were treated as uncivilized historically. The Han and Hindu majoritarian civilization have been projected as the solutions to all problems. This attitude and exclusionary views/ practices were vehemently opposed by these groups domestically and globally.

The Chinese state followed the policy of keeping all the 55 national ethnic minorities united in mainland China. The Han domination and the coastal biased China have had an adverse impact on the ethnic groups and western regions simultaneously. As documented in the chapter Sichuan, accounts the for most diverse minority population in China. This led to the exclusion of both the regions and ethnic groups' altogether.

This region is also very crucial for China. This region including Sichuan is a centre of connectivity to the western. Sichuan becomes important for Chinese establishment because it also connects to China's two most disturbed regions, Tibet and Xinjiang. The Chinese establishment began to take a relook at this region to avoid the spill over effect of marginality, split and extremist activities. Sichuan has been a mountainous region but very advanced in natural resources. The erstwhile leadership of China has special programmes and attempts to assimilate the ethnic minorities.

The pattern of development in Sichuan and U.P. is located into the regional discourse. Sichuan, being the western province of the China, is culturally and economically different. The situation in India is also very interesting. The location, development, exclusion and assertion of Dalits in southern and western parts are quite different and much ahead from the central U.P. and nearby region. The economic condition and mobilization of Dalits in western and southern parts are also better than the rest of U.P.

The liberalization of its economy and free flow of capital has created much disparity among the regions and the people of China. This study shows as to how privatisation and contractualisation of government sectors have lessened the chances of economic empowerment of both the groups. The preferential and reservation policies were being scuttled leading to further marginalization of these oppressed groups.

The case of U.P. is very interesting to study social exclusion of Dalits in connection with the promises of modernization and goals of Constitution. The findings of field survey are shocking. The practice of untouchability, spatial segregation, economic deprivation and cultural stigmatization are still very much prevailing even in the 21st century India. The practice "pollution" and "purity" is still very high which made caste Hindus to kill their daughters and sisters if anyone crossed the caste boundaries. The preservation of endogamy has blocked inter-caste marriages. While the Indian state has forbidden the killings with stringent laws, the society and brahmanical establishment never gave up its hiearchial

attitudes. On the other hand, the Chinese leaders and the government encourage marriages for a more inclusive Chinese society. One particular improvement can be seen in the type of work they do and prefer today. Modernization and mechanization of agriculture has begun to free the Dalits from bonded labour and the caste-based occupation in U.P.

Chapter-5

Economic Exclusion in Sichuan and Uttar Pradesh

Chapter-5

Economic Exclusion in Sichuan and Uttar Pradesh

5.1 Introduction

The current chapter explores the economic exclusion and its consequences in Sichuan in China and Uttar Pradesh in India. The economic exclusion has multiples facets to comprehend. The discrimination in the economy includes markets, land, property, states and civil society. The global as well as local and regional institutions do come into the picture when one tries to locate economic exclusion and discrimination. Moreover, the politics of class, globalization, and liberalisation cannot be ignored while discussing economic discrimination in any society.

In this chapter, the focus would be on various kinds of economic exclusion in both the regions. The first section of the chapter will focus on the various debates over economic exclusion and discrimination. The following section will enumerate the relationship between economic discrimination and identity, particularly ethnic minority, and Dalits. The role of state and society become the focus in the next section in contextualising the regulatory functions of both the institutions. 'Opening up' campaign of the economy in China and 'liberalisation' in India is another aspect of this chapter to locate its implications for marginalized sections of the society. The economic and property rights of the ethnic minorities vis-a-vis Han and Dalits and Caste Hindus would be the next part of the chapter. The last section will be focusing on the mobilizational and assertive roles of both the communities for more economic rights and dignified lives in both regions.

5.2 Economic Exclusion: Some Conceptual and Theoretical Reflection

The questions of poverty, humiliation, hunger and indignity have many reasons in different contexts and locations. The most likely reasons that always come under scrutiny include the distribution of wealth and unequal development. Historically marginalization and exclusion of people had raised many questions and debates. The historians, economists and political/ social commentators have tried to explain it from their vantage points of view. The most popular answer which is given to explain exclusion and poverty is scarcity of resources and

inability of individuals to achieve it. The individualization of problem is sometimes an apt reply except while explaining its socio-political reasons.

The Marxist tradition is crucial to understand the economic pauperization of huge population. This school has widened the horizon from individual and resource scarcity to the structural level. The class analysis of Marx has questioned the old formulations and gave a new interpretation to understand the concepts of exploitation and exclusion of masses. The concentration of capital in the hands of few due to extraction of surplus labour of huge masses brought two clear-cut classes in the world. The working class sells its labour while the capitalist class enjoys it. The appropriation of capital in few hands brought out the contradiction in the society. This contradiction in the society thus, further leads to a new stage for the society. Thus the progress of society is known in the Marxist terminology as historical materialism.

The question of unequal distribution has been analysed in the class paradigm. The above analysis is credible to understand the role of state and capital in many societies. For equal and a dignified life, it has been argued that the role of state is very important.

> "Internationally, discrimination across social lines has been studied by individual researchers as well as multilateral bodies like ILO and World Bank. From a neo-liberal perspective, such disparities can be seen as an unfortunate, but inevitable side effect of global economic realignment, a necessary result of global realignments of production structures and the concomitant fact that workers formerly protected by trade barriers at national level and social security and formal employment conditions at personal level are now excluded from such benefits. A second more radical position argues that earning differentials is nothing but inequality generated by the workings of the economic system and is termed *social* only to conceal its *economic* origin (Willis, 2000). The third view is that disparity appears as people are evicted from spaces they previously occupied or are deprived of rights of access in the first place due to international processes and institutional relationships associated with rapid social and economic global change and local impacts and responses" (Joint-Lambert, 1995 quoted in Majumder, 2007: 945).

The welfare state has come as a blessing to the people who are usually left out in the process of development. The state-driven development and its progressive and pro-people policies are seen as the necessary tools to fill the widening gap among the people. Hence, state regulation has become a crucial point to avoid further exclusion of masses in the process of development.

> "Empirical studies at the international level include those by Atkinson (1998), Lovering (1998), Bhalla and Lapeyre (1999), Gore and Figueiredo (1999), Mishra (1999), Beall and Clert (2000), Clert (2000), Kabeer (2000), Beall (2002), Carr and Chen (2004). Most of them conclude that empirically at least there has been an erosion of social equity in recent times and state intervention is necessary for bringing the disadvantaged groups nearer to the advantaged ones, especially in the developing countries" (Majumdar, 2007: 945).

State regulation has many levels. The local, regional and global institutions play an important role in regulating capital. The global regulatory institutions and mechanism could not stop the accumulation of wealth in few hands leaving huge masses in poverty.

> "There is much evidence to show that, despite the existence of global institutions of regulation, economic globalization does not replace "defective" state regulation with a new international framework that is neutral to the many dimensions of discrimination. In fact, the regulative framework formal and informal becomes more complex and produces outcomes that are not determinate. Furthermore, the forced adoption of "national competitive advantage" policy effectively creates a new field of discrimination, the nation, in a global market" (Kay, 2002 Quoted in Harris, 467).

Economic discrimination has been analysed either in the form of free trade or in its class forms. Political economy, globalization, and role of the state have been the main foundations to explain the causes of poverty and exploitation. The state is appreciated for regulating the economy to avoid such adverse impacts. The state and its instituyions are meant to regulate the economy. The social institutions and identities too played significant roles to control, and distribute the economy of a particular society. The social and religious mechanisms sometimes created biases against some communities in the accumulation of wealth.

The question of social economy is another dimension, which is being payed attention in the analysis of economists and political scientists. The sociology of economy is a new trend in the mapping of regulation of the political economy. The next section delineates the above issues.

5.3 Social identities as regulatory mechanism

Exclusion, be it social or economic is a global phenomenon. Exclusion has its geographical and societal specificity. There is no such society in the world which has not been victim of its structural and social hierarchies. The social and religious institutions have important role in a given society to impose the sanctions on a particular group or community to exclude it.

> "While orthodox economics externalises the regulative environment, the school of 'social structure of accumulation' (SSA) challenges the conventional triple reductionism to markets, of markets to the economic domain and of economic markets to supply, demand and price. It seeks to examine the complex of social institutions in which accumulation is embedded. These institutions enable the collection of factors of production, the transformation of money into the means of production, the organization of production and the reconversion of the product into money, through the selling of products and by-products" (Harriss-White, 2005: 71).

Social institutions have not only controlled and regulated the free flow of capital but also have been discriminatory in their behaviour towards the marginalized sections of the society. The dominant sections of the society, secure access to the decision making process and hence garnered the fruits of development at the cost of other oppressed groups. Women, the ethnic minorities, Afro-Americans, Dalits and other minorities are some of those who are excluded from such process. The genealogy of exclusion has been well documented by scholars in the recent times.

> "Current patterns of socio-economic inequality within nations are often intertwined with much older systems of hierarchical or vertical stratification. In the US, many descendants of enslaved Africans continue to face social and economic disadvantages. In Europe, the Roma, Pavee, and other semi-nomadic groups that pre-date modern nation-states find themselves distrusted and socially excluded. In modern Japan and in South Korea, the descendants of families, who

historically held 'unclean' occupations, remain a stigmatised group. In India and its neighbouring countries, ancient systems of caste inequality endure those modern manifestations severely constrict the lives and opportunities of lower caste citizens" (Thorat, et.al., 2009: 2).

So, in spite of state, social identities have been at the helm of controlling the free flow of capital. They not only control the capital but also play a major role in the biased distribution of it. 'This makes identity crucial to the social regulation of the economy; it shapes the ownership of businesses, the character of petty production and trade as much as it does the composition of the labour force and the terms and conditions of work' (Harriss-White and Gooptu, 2000 quoted in White, 460-461).

The role played by market in a particular society is eqally significant. The role of social and political institution in facilitating the accumulation of capital demands a serious enquiry. These questions could not be answered by the traditional approach of political economy. 'The exploration of the impact of social institutions on the process of capitalist accumulation requires a theoretical framework that takes into account the economic, cultural and political dimensions of change. The 'social structure of accumulation' school has set itself the task of tackling this issue and provides the conceptual framework upon which we draw' (Harriss-White, 2005: 69).

The accumulation of capital in few hands or the equal distribution of wealth on the basis of merit were some of the concerns of the traditional approach devised to understand it. The disparity and unequal distribution of wealth on the basis of merit and educational qualifications, and skills were some of the individual attributes that determine the discrimination of individual in market economy. The tabulation of inequality and measurement of disparity were the main concerns of economists and policy makers. Discrimination induced inequality on the basis of ascribed identity has never been so popular among the policy makers and scholars. This study tries to understand the various types of discrimination on the basis of identity, particularly ethnicity and caste in societies like China and India.

5.4 Economic Exclusion in Sichuan

Sichuan province has been on forefront of the economic reform movement that began in the late 1970s, introducing innovative policies such as the one that linked farmers' incomes to

actual output. It was here that Deng Xiaoping was born. Moreover, he also launched his economic reform from this province. Three counties in the province became the first areas to dissolve communes, a practice that soon spread nationwide.

Before going to the specificity of the economic dimensions and its implications of the ethnic minorities residing in this province, it is very important to factor the civilisational linkages between both the countries. The ancient Indus valley civilisation of Indian subcontinent is very close to the Shu civilisation of Sichuan province. Scholar like Paramita Mukherjee compares the shu civilisation to the Indus valley civilization,

> "The Indus valley and the ancient *Shu* civilizations are two ancient civilizations that developed independently. They played an important role in the ancient Eurasian Civilization. But these two civilizations were far apart from each. Their formation and timing were different and characteristics also varied. But they had certain characteristics in common, for example, their economies, which were based on farming, developed in ancient times and they had built the world's oldest artificial irrigation system. Numerous and glorious cities were another important characteristic of both. They had cultural exchange and mutual influence with wide influence on other civilizations as well. A comparative study of the Indus valley and the ancient *shu* civilizations will help us to deepen our understanding of the connotation of ancient civilization and understand the profound influence of the ancient civilization on the sustainable development of economy and culture. Here a comparison is carried out between these two ancient civilizations from three perspectives: the water conservancy projects, city construction and international cultural exchanges during that period" (Mukherjee, 2016:54).

The ancient *Shu* civilisation was born and developed in the southwestern part of China. It had very good economic and cultural exchanges with South Asia, South East Asia, and West Asia through the Southern Silk road. Moreover, its connection to the far Western civilisation, Mesopotamia, is also unearthed.

> "The Indus valley civilization and the ancient Shu civilization displayed openness in culture. They showed complex civilization feature. Many seals from Mesopotamia were unearthed from the sites of the Indus valley civilization. Similarly, in Mesopotamia many seals from the Indus valley civilization were also

147

unearthed. This fully reflects the frequent interactions in terms of trade between two regions. …..'beside Mesopotamia, the cities of the Indus valley civilization also used to promote foreign trade to Iran, Central Asia, Afghanistan, and China. Archeological research shows the presence of ivories, she shells, bronze swards and so on in Southwest China, which depicts its interaction with the Indus valley civilization" (Duan Yu, 2014 as quoted in Mukherjee, 2016: 12).

5.5 *Shu* Kingdom

Shu is an age-old ethnic group. Its earliest people moved to Sichuan and established his or her own kingdom more than four thousand years ago. They created the most brilliant civilization of Sichuan and the fertile Chengdu Plain was the centre of the *Shu* Kingdom. The 3,200 year-old Sanxindui Cultural Site in Central China was probably the kingdom's early capital. A new cultural branch from the west plateau invaded the Chengdu Plain and so formed the Sanxingdui Culture by assimilation with that of the plain, culminating in a pinnacle during the development of the *Shu* Kingdom.

'Some 2,300 years ago, the capital relocated to present Chengdu and for a long time, people deemed that the city built during that period was the real start of the city' (https://www.travelchinaguide.com/cityguides/sichuan/chengdu/, accessed on 8 June, 2017).

The antiquity of Sichuan region has been aptly explained in the following words.

'According to legends and historical records, there was once an ancient state called "Shu" located in the enclosed Sichuan Basin in Southwest China. In 316 B.C., the ancient Shu State was conquered by the Qin State and the ancient Shu culture had been buried under the mainstream Central Plain (Zhongyuan) culture, only leaving a few reign titles mentioned in the later literatures and tales' (http://whc.unesco.org/en/tentativelists/5816/, accessed on 8 June, 2017).

All the historical civilizations of the world have few common features. They all existed along the river beds. The Indus Valley Civilization, Mesopotamian civilizations are some of the examples. The origin and flourishing of Shu civilization also followed the same path. It developed alongside the valley of the Min river.

"*Shu* has both a geographic and an ethnic connotation. *Shu* lands centred on the Chengdu plain in western Sichuan and included the valley of the Min River, a major Yangtze tributary that in ancient times was considered the headwaters of the Yangtze itself. *Shu* also occupied the upper Han River valley. As an ethnic term, *Shu* refers to the distinct people who inhabited these lands in and around western Sichuan. Ancient Shu is known for various data: myths, etymology, inscriptions, some stray historical references-and from startling archaeological finds at Sanxingdui, the first *Shu* capital" (Steven, F. Sage, 1992: 9).

There ares difference among the historians and geographers over the exact time period of *Shu*. They tried to dig out its original time from different sources.

"Although geographers cannot agree on the precise origin and meaning of the term "Sichuan" (lit., "Four Rivers" or "Four Streams"), there is consensus that its first textual appearance (referring to what we now regard as Sichuan) came relatively late in Chinese history, probably in the eleventh century. In any case, it is not surprising that the character *chuan* ("river" or "Stream") appears in the place name for this part of China, for Sichuan hosts a vast network of navigable waterways" (James M. Hargett, 2006:9).

Sichuan is surrounded by mountains from all sides. The western part of Sichuan is mostly the hilly and mountainous regions. The majority of the ethnic minorities inhabit in these hilly regions. They are scattered in these terrains while the Han majority inhabit in the southern basin regions. The hilly regions of Sichuan are divided into three autonomous regions.

Sichuan is divided into three autonomous prefectures, which preserve the cultural and linguistic life of ethnic minorities. The autonomous prefectures are the Aba Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, the Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, and the Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture. These prefectures have some autonomy in their cultural aspects but the actual control of the units is exercised by the central government at Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan. The ethnic groups, however, enjoy their own mode of life and preserve their language and cultural traditions with a minimum of interference by the Han-controlled provincial government. Geographically, Sichuan is divided ethnically too. 'The Han Chinese dominated, agro-ecosystem (red basin of Sichuan, for example) end and the ethnic minority

dominated Tibetan-Qinghai high mountain plateau, river, gorges, forested uplands, and rangelands begin' (Hays, 2014: xviii).

5.6 Sichuan: An administrative and economic powerhouse

Sichuan is not only important for its ethnic composition but also very significant for its strategic location. This province is located in the southwestern part of China, which acts as a bridge between the Western world and mainland China.

> "Sichuan is an important traffic hub connecting south-western and north-western China. The fourth largest province in terms of population in China, the province had 81 million permanent residents in 2012, which accounted for 6% of China's total population. There are 155 county-level study-units (18 cities (These "cities" are composed of the districts under their administrative jurisdiction. For example, "Chengdu" refers to a prefecture city that controls 10 districts, six counties and four county-level cities, whereas "Chengdu city" only includes the 10 districts.), 14 county-level cities ("County-level city" is, in essence, a county although it is named "city" in Chinese.), 119 counties, and4 autonomous counties). The areas at the county level can be classified according to landform type into 15 counties located on the Chengdu plain, 47 hilly counties, 24 mountainous counties and 51 ethnic minority counties (mainly on the plateau)" (Chengfeng Yang, Huiran Han et al. 2014: 6511).

Map: 5. 1 Location map and five economic zones of Sichuan province.

Sources: (Chengfeng Yang, and Han et.all. 2014: 6509-6528).

Table: 5.1 The five economic zones of Sichuan province (2012)

Economic Zone	Area (sq.km)	Permanent Residents (10,000 persons)	GDP (100 Million Yuan)	Population Density (People per sq.km)	Per Capita GDP (Yuan)
Chengdu plain Economic Zone	64,881	3421.05	13, 193.79	527	38,566
North-eastern Economic Zone	64,027	2084.73	3928.59	326	18,845
Southern Economic Zone	38,874	1607.92	4354.29	414	27,080
Pan-Xi Economic Zone	82,066	671.22	2069.64	82	30,834
Western Economic Zone	233,403	233.38	455.43	10	19,515

Source: Sichuan Statistical Yearbook, 2013 as cited in Chengfeng Yang, Huiran Han and Jinping Song, 2014: 6512.

"Owing to the variety in its landscape, population distribution and economic development are highly unequal within the province. In the "12th five-year" Development Plan for Towns, Sichuan was divided into five economic zones by the development and reform commission: the Chengdu plain, the North-eastern, the Southern, the Pan-Xi and the Western economic zones (Figure 5. 1).The population and economic data for the five zones are shown in Table 5.1" (Chengfeng Yang, Huiran Han et al. 2014: 6511).

The distribution of economic wealth and the prosperity in Sichuan could be analysed through the migration of local Sichuanese in the other parts of cities. It is obvious that the agriculture has the lowest share of GDP and hence people migrate to the urban sectors for better opportunities.

"Though the annual growth rates of permanent resident population are highly unequal within Sichuan, the annual growth rates of the non-agricultural population are positive in the five economic zones from 2005 to 2012. The annual growth rates of permanent residents are either slow or negative in the Chengdu plain, northeastern and southern economic zones, but the annual growth rates of the non-agricultural population are 3.7%, 3.2% and 2.4%, respectively. This indicates that

the highest outflow of population is among the agricultural population, which moved to the cities or other provinces, representing a major contributing factor to the population decline in these three economic zones. In addition, we find that the cities in these zones have remained attractive, and most migration occurs to a higher or equivalent level administrative division within Sichuan" (Chengfeng and Huiran et al. 2014: 657).

From these migration patterns and the low production and profitability, one could discern the exclusion of ethnic minorities in Sichuan. It is imperative to know that these minorities are largely involved in agricultural production and hence more marginalized.

"From the perspective of the spatial distribution of GDP, higher GDP areas are mainly concentrated in the hilly and plain counties in eastern Sichuan, which is similar to the distribution of population (Figure 2) and population density. The minority counties in the western and Pan-Xi economic zones and mountainous counties in the north-eastern and southern economic zones have weaker GDP" (ibid, 2014: 6517).

The concentration of ethnic minorities in Sichuan is mainly in the hilly and mountainous regions. These minorities are scattered in these regions, which are poor in infrastructure and less developed. These regions are clubbed into three autonomous regions, known as autonomous regions of ethnic minorities in Sichuan.

Table: 5.2 Minority population in the three autonomous regions in Sichuan Province (Million)

National Autonomous Region	Urban Areas			Rural Areas		
	Minority population	Total Proportion	Proportion of Minority	Minority Population	Total population	Proportion Minority
Aba	0.16	0.27	59.26 %	0.68	0.90	75.56 %
Ganzi	0.11	0.21	52.38 %	0.89	1.09	81.65 %
Liangshan	0.29	1.25	23.20 %	2.38	4.54	52.42 %

Source: Data were extracted from the tabulation on the 2010 population census of Sichuan Province.

In table 5.2, the density of population is shown. The concentration of the ethnic minorities is in these three ethnic minority autonomous regions of Sichuan. Moreover, these three regions are scattered in the hilly areas whereas Han Chinese live in the central basin of Sichuan.

5.7 Economic exclusion in Sichuan

Economic exclusion in China has multiple forms. The rural urban divide could be one aspect at the same time the class division is another. The eastern and western divide of China's regions could be another explanation for exclusion. The Han and non-Han divide and discrimination is the prime thrust of this chapter. However, the economic exclusion in Sichuan has other aspects too. As we know that, Sichuan is divided, geographically, into two broad regions. One is central basin area and other one is mountainous region. Its population is unevenly distributed, however, with most people concentrated in the eastern part of the province. The majority of the population is rural.

The ethnic minorities of this province inhabited historically on the mountain and scattered all across the Sichuan. It has fewer opportunities and inadequate infrastructure. The Han population mostly, inhabit in the central basin regions, which is much better in every aspect. This has added another dimension to the exclusion of minorities and hence they are much backward in all realms.

> "There are several ethnic groups that inhabit the area. Yanyuan's population is made up of 45 percent Nuosu, 47 percent Han, and 8 percent Prmi and Na. The Han Chinese live mostly in the basin and in some of the river valleys, while the Nuosu villages are located primarily in the mountains. Like many mountainous areas, especially in Western China, the region is quite poor due in part to its geographic remoteness. Within the county, Nuosu areas are generally poorer and have worse infrastructure, including schools, than do the Han areas in the central basin" (Chan and Harrell, 2009:145).

This poor infrastructure and mountainous terrain leads to the further exclusion of ethnic groups inhabiting in these areas. The scattered ethnic population in the hilly regions lack the state facilities in these regions. One of the examples could be the conditions of educational institutions in these areas. The poor quality of village primary schools and shortage of teachers' acerbate the poor quality of students. These students do not compete with the students of central basin students.

"The poor quality of village primary schools, including the shortage of teachers, has impacted the demand side of education. Without an adequate number of teachers or facilities, students are unable to compete in entrance examinations for secondary schools, resulting in low returns on education. Families who wish their children to attend school prefer sending them to higher quality schools in developed townships. Therefore not only do village schools suffer from underfunding, they also often suffer from under-enrolment" (ibid: 147).

The other area where exclusion of ethnic minorities in Sichuan is observed in their culture. The culture of ethnic minorities do not allow them to migrate the cities for better opportunities as their nomadic life style does not suit the city dwelling. This sort of exclusion could be called as self-exclusion of ethnic minorities in Sichuan as well as in China at large.

"Western Sichuan, which mainly consists of ethnic minority counties, has a lower population and low population density. Traffic is inconvenient, increasing the cost of migration. Due to their underdeveloped economy, the state and provincial governments have provided many subsidies to the region and its population. In addition, the culture of ethnic minorities does not encourage migration. For example, people in the plateau do not adapt to life in the plain area because their nomadic life is different from a farming life. The emotional attachment to their home town also reduces enthusiasm for migration" (Chengfeng Yang and Huiranet al., 2014: 6525).

The hilly region is less developed compared to the rest of Sichuan. The geographical constraints add to the exclusion of minorities inhabiting in this part. The development cost in the mountainous regions is always high. Thus, the hilly regions are paid less attention. The failure to upgrade the education system in the mountainous regions of Sichuan is part of this problem as highlighted below.

"If the Chinese government wants to pursue a purely public education system, there needs to be serious rethinking of the consolidation policy. There need to be more schools in mountainous areas to decrease transportations costs. Moreover, the locations for these schools should not be chosen by economic prosperity or by outside connections of local people people, but by whether that location will

improve access to education for marginalized groups" (Chan and Harrell, 2009:161).

The economic exclusion of ethnic minorities in Sichuan is noticed in the other sectors as well. The health sector is another one where ethnic minority regions are facing many problems. Lack of infrastructure, poor facilities and less skilled doctors in these regions have added to more exclusion of ethnic minorities in these regions. Apart from a shortage of hospitals in ethnic minority region, imbalances in the healthcare market also exist. In ethnic minority region in Sichuan, about two thirds of hospitals are secondary, compared with around two fifths in non-minority region

Though the Chinese state provides basic health services, they cannot compete with the tertiary hospitals. These hospitals have the best medical facilities and equipment, their doctors are relatively more qualified and experienced, they are more successful in controlling diseases and they receive the highest levels of investment. These areas have limited primary hospitals that endangers access to the basic health care services. At the same time, the shortage of tertiary hospitals also affects health services.

What is needed is to improve the health facilities in the ethnic areas of Sichuan. The scholars working on this area have suggested many plans and recommendations to promote more inclusive health services in the region.

> "Xiuli Wang and Jay Pan, "identified the following problems in the supply of healthcare in ethnic minority region: (1) Doctors, health professionals, and beds are insufficient, and heavily clustered in a few sites; (2) the market mostly relies on government investment with only a small role for private investment; and 3) more primary and tertiary hospitals are needed in this region. To improve the situation in ethnic minority region, the government can focus on (1) promoting private sector investment in hospitals through beneficial policies, (2) supporting the upgrade of secondary hospitals to tertiary hospitals through favourable policies and financial support, (3) making it compulsory for qualified doctors to spend a period of time working there, and (4) push forward road construction in rural area of ethnic minority region" (Xiuli Wang and Jay Pan, 2016: 9).

Moreover, the economic exclusion of ethnic Minorities cannot be overruled the regional imbalance in China. The coastal regions were historically much more developed while the

western part of China was neglected. The more concentration of ethnic minorities is in western part of China. The majority of Han population benefited from the earlier development of coastal regions. The imbalance in regional development is another reason for ethnic dissatisfaction. The following table (5.3) clearly shows the historical regional imbalances in terms of development in China. Since Sichuan is located in south-western part of China and hence was economically excluded. Thus, ethnic minorities who are on the margins are left behind in all areas.

Table: 5.3 Per capita net income of rural households by source and region, 2013

Region	Net income	Income from wages and salaries	Income from household operations	Income from properties	Income from transfers
National average	8895.9	4025.4	3793.2	293.0	784.3
Beijing	18337.5	12034.9	833.4	2023.5	3445.7
Tianjin	15841.0	9091.5	4571.6	1120.0	1058.0
Hebei	9101.9	5236.7	3219.2	161.6	484.4
Shanxi	7153.5	4041.1	2273.9	93.2	745.3
Inner Mongolia	8595.7	1694.6	5348.4	371.0	1181.7
Liaoning	10522.7	4209.4	5160.2	283.2	870.0
Jilin	9621.2	1813.2	6855.1	187.9	765.0
Heilongjiang	9634.1	1991.4	6365.4	429.6	847.8
Shanghai	19595.0	12239.4	1062.0	1446.8	4846.8
Jiangsu	13597.8	7608.5	4258.4	572.1	1158.7
Zhejiang	16106.0	9204.3	4758.6	727.4	1415.7
Anhui	8097.9	3733.5	3681.4	113.6	569.3
Fujian	11184.2	5193.9	4890.5	359.9	739.8
Jiangxi	8781.5	4422.1	3683.8	191.0	484.6
Shandong	10619.9	5127.2	4525.2	283.9	683.8
Henan	8475.3	3581.6	4285.4	160.3	448.1
Hubei	8867.0	3868.2	4381.6	99.1	518.1
Hunan	8372.1	4595.6	2962.0	147.7	666.9
Guangdong	11669.3	7072.4	2596.4	1040.5	960.0
Guangxi	6790.9	2712.3	3420.4	70.4	597.8
Hainan	8342.6	3001.5	4153.8	347.9	839.3
Chongqing	8332.0	4089.2	3136.5	234.7	871.7
Sichuan	7895.3	3542.8	3321.2	202.3	829.1
Guizhou	5434.0	2572.6	2355.9	78.4	427.2
Yunnan	6141.3	1729.2	3650.4	229.8	532.0
Tibet	6578.2	1475.3	4157.0	88.9	857.1
Shaanxi	6502.6	3151.2	2500.0	212.3	639.0
Gansu	5107.8	2203.4	2231.0	132.9	540.5
Qinghai	6196.4	2347.5	2570.3	165.9	1112.7
Ningxia	6931.0	2878.4	3250.0	133.3	669.3
Xinjiang	7296.5	1311.8	4654.5	230.1	1100.0

Source: http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2014/zk/html/Z0626E.HTM, accessed on 8 June, 2017.

5.8 Economic Exclusion and Dalits

The economic exclusion in the Indian context has been an age old phenomenon. The caste system of Indian sub-continent firmly believes in complete exclusion of Dalits and marginalized groups. Hindu philosophy plays an important role in locating the exact place of a particular community in the Hindu hierarchical social order. Economic, political, social and cultural rights are being decided according to position in the Hindu social order. Moreover Dalits were excluded from afore mentioned the above rights as they were organizationally on the other side of the Hindu social order. Hence the utter and most inhuman exclusion of these groups forced them to live in like conditions of slave. Untouchability is being practiced in some villages and cities even today.

The severity of the forced exclusion of Dalits has been systematically analysed by many scholars. The history of Dalits has been one that has seen some of the worst forms of social evils and a system, which denigrates its own people on the basis of birth. The birth of any person in Hindu social system has either provided all the rights or deprived from them of those enduring. 'Extending this concept (social exclusion) to the institutions of caste system and untouchability, it becomes obvious that social exclusion is embedded in the Hindu social order, insofar as social relations in the caste system are based on unequal and hierarchical (graded) entitlement to civil, education, economic and cultural rights. The predetermined and fixed nature of rights under the caste system involve 'forced exclusion' of the lower castes from having equal rights in multiple spheres by the higher castes' (Acharya in Thorat ed. 2010: 209).

After the Independence of India, the Nehru government had focused on the speedy development of country. Modernization and scientific temperament were the main mottos meant to eradicate the social evils of the society. Some progressive laws were also enacted to uproot those evils. The caste question was deliberately sidelined hoping that it will die sooner or later due to science and technology. It was ideological bankruptcy and shrewdness of the leadership that led to such a slow progress in eliminating social exclusion.

But in the larger view of things, Nehru explained, India had no reason to hang its head.

> "Caste was a group system based on services and functions. It was meant to be an inclusive order without any common dogma and allowing the fullest latitude to each group'. Mercifully free from what had handicapped to Greeks, it was

'infinitely better than slavery even for those lowest in the scale. With each caste there was equality and a measure of freedom, each caste was occupational and applied itself to its particular work. This led to high degree of specialization and skill in handicrafts and craftsmanship. In a social order that was 'non-competitive and non-acquisitive'. Indeed, far from embodying any principle of hierarchy, caste kept up the democratic habit in each group" (The Discovery of India, 248-249, 211,250,253 quoted in Anderson, 2012: 54).

The current situation in 21st century we can all realise is that caste still exists and persists. It is a daily phenomenon which is rampant not only in backward regions like villages but also very much obvious in the hi-tech metropolitan cities. It was the result of earlier leadership's policies of India, for whom caste was a thing of the ancient past. The issues discrimination and exclusion of Dalits and other identities were not placed in their proper perspective. Research on exclusion and discrimination was never paid attention in any policy making process.

"Economic exclusion has received little attention in mainstream discourse in the social sciences in India. With the exception of gender, there are very few studies related to market and non-market discrimination associated with the instructions of caste, untouchability, ethnicity, religion, colour, and other group identities, and their market institutions. This applies to theoretical as well as empirical studies. The lack of systematic theoretical and empirical research on market and non-market discrimination has constrained our capacities to develop well found equal opportunity policies for production and business sector, employment, education, housing, health and other spheres for the discrimination groups" (Thorat and Newman (eds.), 2010: 1).

To put it more specifically to caste and untouchability, there was large scale negligence of discrimination-induced deprivation and marginalization. 'The discrimination-induced/link deprivation and poverty of former untouchables is something that has not yet become the subject of enquiry in theoretical and empirical studies on poverty and deprivation in the discipline of economics' (Thorat, et al., 2010: 175).

The exclusion of the untouchables from the market has been perennial and discriminatory. The market used to be free from all the social constraints. The free flow of goods is the basic

logic of market. It is been argued that the profits and gains are dependent only on market logic. But, historically it has been the experience that Dalits faced discrimination and exclusion at multiple levels. 'In economic terms, discrimination in labour markets may operate along a number of dimensions gender, religion, caste and age which effectively reduce the opportunity for such groups to gain access to social services and limits their participation in the labour market. Of all the lines along which discrimination and disparity have been practiced in India, none have had as long-lasting an effect as the division along caste lines. The Scheduled Castes and Tribes have been a pariah in the development process of India for quite a long time' (Majumder, 2007: 943).

Market perpetrated discrimination has been the global norm. In the Indian context the discrimination of Dalits and other marginalized sections has been historically rampant. The free flow of goods and rationality of markets are empty claims. The social norms and values seem much stronger in controlling the market functioning than the state. Barbara Harriss-White (2003) rightly suggests:

> "Economic order then rests on forms of social regulation rather than state regulation. Social regulation not state regulation governs entry into the labour force, and into other markets such as those of the many Muslim artisanal clusters in Uttar Pradesh in northern India (e.g. brassware, pottery, glassware, carpets, hand printed textiles, silk embroidery, perfume, and pewter, copper and silver ware).Social regulation determines the acquisition of skills, contacts, information and technology, and starting capital and credit; the calibrations of units of exchange; the definition of a range of contracts considered "proper" and the settlement of disputes about transactions; certain kinds of collective insurance and representation; the organization of space and territory; the selection and control of (the scope of "rights" of) labour and the parametric control of other derived markets (e.g. transport and porterage, especially their pricing); entitlements to help in times of need; hygiene in marketplaces; and physical security, from the night watch to protection mafias." (460).

There are clear examples in India where identities play a role of power in deciding the economic fate of an individual's identity or group. Barbara Harris-White ((2003), summarises four examples where the social normative powers discriminate beyond the power of economy.

An example of how forms of power outside the economy may result in economic discrimination is the way in which fear of, and hatred for, Muslims has been used by the Hindu Right in India to justify the destruction of their property, boycotts of their firms and labour market exclusion (Engineer, 1984; Prakash, 2003). Conversely, an example of how change in the economy itself may affect discrimination is the association in India of new forms of production, new goods and services with increasing labour force cosmopolitanism (Parry, 1999, p. xix; Kapadia, 2002). Another example of how economic change may affect forms of power outside the economy is the way in which the need for collective economic representation and regulation has been mapped onto caste associations, thereby deepening the economic meaning of the institution of caste (Basile and Harriss-White, 2003). A fourth example of how economic power and extra-economic power interact is the way in which the expansion of property ownership in south India has been accompanied by the diffusion of the dowry system and forms of patriarchal authority under which girls are systematically culled (462).

In the case of India, the discrimination in the market and the role of caste system has been neglected arena for the academicians and researchers. There has been little study that ever tried to explore the interconnection between the caste system and market economy. It is also surprising that this area has never been the choice of the independent intellectuals. However, recently few independent scholars and some institutions have found some interest in finding out that the exclusionary and discriminatory roles of the caste system in the market. Majumdar (2007) elucidates that 'only a handful of studies look into the social disparities in labour market in India. Banerjee and Knight (1985) examined wage differentials between scheduled and non-scheduled castes in the urban labour market; and Borooah et al. (2005) examined differences in employment rates between "upper" and "backward" castes. Takahiro (2007) also studied caste discrimination in the labour market in north India. Their results also indicate that "job discrimination" against the backward classes does happen' (945).

5.9 Uttar Pradesh: Economic Exclusion of Dalits

In the previous chapter, we have discussed the importance of U.P. as a case study in this work. The geographical location and its historical importance in the political history of modern India makes it relevant for the study. The post liberalization process has produced another churning in the state. The assertion, political mobilization of Dalits and other marginalized sections under the leadership of Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) raised debates and

discussions in Indian polity to a higher level. The ex-untouchables formed government in U.P. for the first time under the leadership of Mayawati as Chief Minister. It would be interesting to study the economic situation of the Dalits in this state. This study will try to find out whether any transformation was experienced by the Dalits in the changed scenario.

Map: 5.2 Uttar Pradesh Map

Source: Google map

Before going into the debate on these questions, it would be imperative to know the political economy of caste system in India. The historical and complete exclusion of Dalits from the mainstream and job market must be pondered upon. Dalits were historically forced to perform the so-called impure and dirty works. They were forced to eat the left over and hence were forced to live as untouchables in the Hindu society. Thorat and Umakant, (2004) rightly analysed the place of Dalits in the system. 'Dalits worked in stigmatised occupations that handled 'impure' materials such as human faeces, dead animals, hides etc. Tanning, scavenging, sweeping, and cleaning jobs remain distinctively Dalit's occupations in modern

India. However, the majority of today's 167 million Dalits work as landless or near-landless labourers in agricultural production or in the lowest paid kinds of manual labour'.

The case of U.P. is unique with the largest number of Dalits in India residing here.

> ''The SCs are not monolithic whole but are divided into sixty six sub castes. The Chamars top the list followed by Pasis, Koris, Dhobies, Valmikis, Khatiks and others. Among these, the Chamars are the most numerous, comprising about sixty percent of the total SC population in UP. The Chamar include Jatav, Ravidasis, Ramdasia, Kureel, Dhore, Dhusia, Ahirwar, Jiaswar, Shankhwar and Mochi. One positive aspect about them is that by and large, they are an integrated community and inter dining and inter-marrying among them is common'' (Rao and Karakoti, 2010: 12)

Another scholar, Badri Narayan, an expert on Dalits in India and particularly on U.P., provides the whole list of Dalits residing in U.P. They includes:

> ''Chamar, Pasi, Dhobi, Khatik, Dusadh, Basor, Dhanuk, Valmiki, Kori, Dom, Gond, Kol, Dharikar, Kharwar, Musahar, Beldar, Kanjar, Nat, Bhuaiar, Ghasi, Habuda, Hari, Kalabaz, Kapadia, Karbal, Khairaha, Agariya, Badhik, Vadi, Baiswar, Bajaria, Bajagi, Balahar, Bangali, Bansphor, Barwar, Bedia, Bhandu, Bauriya, Korwa, Lalbegi, Mazhabi (Kahada), Parika, Paradiya, Patri, Saharia, Sansiya, Bahelia, Balai, Bawaria, and a few more'' (2015: 63).

The Dalit population in U.P. accounts for the 21.15% (Table 5.4) of the population. It would be also helpful to know about the population of other communities in the state (U.P.) to rationalise the Dalit assertion and their exclusion here.

Table: 5.4 Population of Social Groups in UP

Social Groups	Percentage in Total Population
SC	21.15
ST	0.06
OBC	33.4
Muslim	18.5
"Upper Caste"	21.3

Source: For SCs, STs and Muslims (Census 2001), For OBCs and upper castes (Pai, 2007).

Table: 5.5 State-wise Scheduled Caste (SC) Population (2009-10) -Rural

(*Number in lakhs*)

S. N.	State	Scheduled	Caste	
	Males	Males	Females	Persons
1.	Andhra Pradesh	57.58	60.21	117.80
2.	Arunachal Pradesh	0.08	0.07	0.15
3.	Assam	12.97	27.43	14.47
4.	Bihar	86.68	79.31	165.99
5.	Chhattisgarh	13.37	13.41	26.78
6.	Goa	0.10	0.08	0.18
7.	Gujarat	18.10	16.09	34.20
8.	Haryana	22.90	19.84	42.74
9.	Himachal Pradesh	8.05	8.07	16.12
10.	Jammu & Kashmir	3.49	3.17	6.66
11.	Jharkhand	18.39	17.84	36.23
12.	Karnataka	35.10	34.66	69.76
13.	Kerala	13.44	13.59	27.03
14.	Madhya Pradesh	54.97	51.30	106.26
15.	Maharashtra	44.28	41.10	85.38
16.	Manipur	0.20	0.18	0.38
17.	Meghalaya	0.10	0.11	0.22
18.	Mizoram	0.02	0.02	0.04
19.	Nagaland	0.01	0.03	0.04
20.	Odisha	31.63	31.71	63.34
21.	Punjab	34.23	32.08	66.32
22.	Rajasthan	47.94	48.82	96.77
23.	Sikkim	0.17	0.19	0.37
24.	Tamil Nadu	39.77	44.96	84.73
25.	Tripura	3.25	3.24	6.49
26.	Uttaranchal	6.91	7.13	14.03
27.	Uttar Pradesh	**185.80**	**170.33**	**356.13**
28.	West Bengal	86.77	78.44	165.21
	Union Territiries			
29.	A & N Islands	0.00	0.00	0.00
30.	Chandigarh	0.40	0.49	0.89
31.	D & N Haveli	0.04	0.05	0.09
32.	Daman & Diu	0.05	0.04	0.09
33.	Delhi	1.49	2.17	3.66
34.	Lakshadweep	0.00	0.00	0.00
	All India	830.28	792.22	1622.49

Source: GOI, NSSO, Primary data (2009-10).

Table: 5.6 The Distribution of Dalits in Rural and Urban Setting of Uttar Pradesh

Scheduled Caste Population	Absolute Population			Literacy Rate		
	Total	Rural	Urban	Total	Rural	Urban
Persons	4,1357608	3,5685227	56,72381	20.7	23.0	12.7
Males	2,1676975	1,8663920	30,13055	20.7	23.0	12.8
Females	1,9680633	1,7021307	26,59326	20.6	22.9	12.7

Source: 2011 Primary Census Abstract, XV.

The table 5. 5 shows that a large number of Dalits, be it males or females inhabit in villages. It also shows that the largest population of Dalits reside in Uttar Pradesh across India. Table. 5. 6 shows the distribution of Dalits in rural and urban settings of Uttar Pradesh. Dalits who reside in urban settings are very few. This is another reason for their economic exclusion because in the villages they have very less opportunity for their economic mobility. Moreover, they also face the severe brunt of dominant caste atrocities in the villages because of their dependency on them.

The economic exclusion of Dalits in U.P. is analysed in this section including my fieldwork of U.P. in May this year. During the fieldwork, the researcher has collected data. Both qualitative and quantitative methodology was used to collect these data and other information. The quantitative data was collected by posing forty questions to the Dalit respondents starting from the age of 12years. The limitation of quantitative methodology was supplemented by qualitative method through personal discussions and interviews. The SPS software was used to analyse and to tabulate the data and findings.

To map the economic exclusion of Dalits in U.P., various parameters were chosen for the study. The amount of land, caste based work, government and private sector jobs, shares of Dalits in industry and business, public facilities to Dalits, discrimination in markets, and wage differential vis-a-vis so-called upper strata of the society etc.

Economic discrimination of Dalits in India has a similar phenomenon with slight geographical and locational differences. This study examine conditions of Dalits in U.P. in comparison to other dominant groups in the state. The study also tries to focus its analysis to delineate the pattern of economic discrimination in the region and also across India. For a

glimpse of economic discrimination of this particular group across India, the following findings of Majumdar are illuminating. His argument is also crucial in the era of reform as well as globalization in India and in the world.

"These studies on social disparity and labour market, however, are either case studies, or even when the study is of macro dimension, are limited to studying the unemployment rates only without exploring the earning differential – the crux of disparity. Also, no effort has been made to understand how the process of globalization is affecting social discrimination in India. The present study will bring out not only unemployment among socially disadvantaged groups, but also non-employment among them (defined as employment without adequate remuneration). In addition, the study will enquire as to how the post-liberalisation regime has affected such social disparities" (Majumdar, 2007: 945, 949).

He also tabulates these wage differentials. In the following two tables (6, 7) he shows that Schedule Tribes, and Schedule Castes (Dalits) are far below from the dominant castes and "upper" strata of the society.

Table: 5.7 Shares of Different Social Groups in Top and Bottom Wage Classes in India

Social Group	In Bottom Wage Class			In Top Wage Class			In Population		
	1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
Scheduled Tribe	12.9	11.2	13.7	1.9	3.9	3.7	8.4	8.9	8.5
Scheduled Caste	29.9	23.8	30.4	3.5	6.6	9.7	18.4	19.6	19.7
OBC	26.1	37.9	14.8	24.4	35.8	41.2	10.0	35.9	41.2
General	57.3	38.9	18.0	94.6	74.7	62.2	73.2	35.6	30.6
All groups	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Note: a – For 1993, General includes the OBCs as well.
Source: Majumdar, 2007: 948.

Table: 5.8 Working Status of Wage Workers by Social Groups in India, 1993-2004

	1993		1999		2004	
Social group	**Regular**	**Casual**	**Regular**	**Casual**	**Regular**	**Casual**
Scheduled Tribe	14.5	85.5	16.3	83.7	17.1	82.9
Scheduled Caste	16.4	83.6	19.0	81.0	23.8	76.2
OBC			30.3	69.7	35.5	64.5
General a	40.4	59.6	44.8	55.2	60.8	39.2
All groups	31.4	68.6	33.5	66.5	37.0	63.0

Note: a – For 1993, General includes the OBCs as well.
**Source**: Majumdar's calculation based on NSSO (1997, 1997a, 2001, 2001a, 2006, 2006a), 2007: 951.

The table 5.8 clearly explains the number Scheduled Castes of temporary, unskilled and casual labours. This shows the dismal condition of Dalits being deprived even after four decades of independence of India. The earnings of the Dalits in comparison to the dominant Hindus is very less. They (Dalits) are the largest group of lowest top wage earners while their share is the highest in the lowest wage earnings. This differential in the earnings is one of the explanations for their exclusion in Indian society.

The casualisation of labour has a direct relation to the problem of landlessness in India. The majority of the Dalits in India as well as in states like U.P. have no land and this makes them dependent on the dominant castes for their daily wage earnings. 'Lot of depressed classes (Dalits) have remained miserable and economically poor. A large majority of the Dalit population is clustered in the ranks of landless labourers. It is against them that the "upper" caste commits open forms of violence. The western part of UP is prosperous and progressive and the people are enterprising. The relationship between the SCs and "upper" castes assumed an ugly form in the eastern part of UP where the caste system is rigid and the SCs are at the receiving end' (Rao and Karakoti, 2010: 104).

In my own fieldwork, I found out that there are a member of casual labourers in U.P. It was because historically they were denied the rights of property which put them in perpetual dependency on the dominant castes. The Indian state boasts and claims about the massive land reforms but the facts expose the truth in states like U.P. In my fieldwork, the majority of Dalits own on an average below one acre of land. These lands were most of the time barren and unproductive. The waste pieces of land were given the Dalits as part of the lip service of land reforms.

The Graph 6.3 shows that the average landholding among Dalits is one and half *Bigha* which is near about one hectare. The Dalits who got some government jobs due to reservation are able to buy some land for farming and dwelling. *Distribution (Patta)* of land by the state to the land less Dalits in U.P. another recent phenomenon that facilitated the acquisition of land by the Dalits.

Figure: 5.1 Land possessed by Dalits in U.P.

Land possessed (in *Biswa*) by Dalits in U.P.

Source: Field survey by me in 2017.

The above graph (5.4) clearly shows that the land possessed by Dalits in Uttar Pradesh is very marginal. There may be some differences among some region but the findings suggest that the Dalits have less than one-acre land.

Ravi S. Srivastava, in his study on Uttar Pradesh, highlights the pattern of land owing in six *Panchayats* (Village Council) U.P. According to him:

> "The pattern of land ownership in the six *Panchayats* (village council) leads to several main conclusions. First, upper caste (inclusive of intermediate caste) Hindus own a higher proportion of land compared to other major caste groupings in five of the *Panchayats*. Only in one *Panchayat* is their share in total land ownership distinctly lower than that of Muslims, OBCs or even SCs, while in another, OBCs own nearly as much land as the upper castes. Second, however, the upper and intermediate castes are still predominant among the large landowners in

167

all the gram Panchayats studied, except one where Muslims (also belonging to the upper caste) predominante among big landowners. Together upper caste Hindus and Muslims still own between 67 to 100 per cent of the land in large holdings. Third, despite these results, the traditional proprietary castes in the eastern and central UP Panchayats have been losing land whereas there is a small accretion of land holdings of the OBCs, as well as the SCs, the latter mainly through government land distribution programmes. Fourth, the proportion of landlessness or near landlessness is higher among scheduled castes than among any other caste group in four of the *Panchayats*. Scheduled caste households also constitute the largest proportion of landless households in five *Panchayats*. Notwithstanding this, non-scheduled caste households form a majority of landless households in four *Panchayats*. Together, however, scheduled caste, OBC and Muslim households comprise an overwhelming proportion of land-poor households. Fifth, there is a varying degree of differentiation in land ownership among all castes, including the upper and intermediate castes - many of whom are marginal owners of land and some are virtually landless, the OBCs, and, to a lesser degree, even the SCs" (Srivastava, 1999: 268-269).

The pattern of land holding and nature of its distribution across the state is more or less similar. The landlessness forced the Dalits to be dependent upon the dominant and historically. Dependency has direct a link to the pattern of land distribution of Dalits in U.P. as well as across India.

Rao and Karakoti identified a similar relationship between land, dependency and the attitude of caste Hindus towards Dalits. 'Land gives respect and esteem in rural society; so Dalits also want to have some land to have the feeling of independence. But the upper castes kept them in perpetual social bondage and even a *Bigha* or two of land owned by Dalits was intolerable to them. They knew it well that possession of land owned by the lower classes would lessen their dependency and give stability and respect to them. This has been so for centuries and even in independent India the lot of the untouchables in the villages remained static and unchanged' (2010: 22). The village economy depended historically on the servility of the ex-untouchables. The social and economic bondage of Dalits made them vulnerable in every walk of life. Wherever and whenever Dalits defied the rules, atrocities and social boycotts

were the order of the day. The massacres of Dalits across the country are clear instances of these aspirations and assertion.

5.10 Impact of Economic Exclusion on mobilization of Dalits under the banner of BSP

Economic exclusion of the Dalits in India in general and the Dalits in U.P. in particular has had a major impact on the mobilization of the Dalits both in history and in present times. Thus a brief discussion on the theme is necessary here. In the medieval times the Dalit poets and poetesses raised their voice against stigma and marginalization of Dalits. Before Independence, Dalits were mobilized under the leadership of the architect of the Indian constitution, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar. He left the Hindu religion in 1956 with his supporters and embraced Buddhism. He embraced the idea of equality, liberty, brotherhood in his new religion which were completely absent from the older ones. He formed a new party known as The Republican Party in 1956 before the few months of his death. After his Mahaparinirvana (death), his followers tried to raise the issues of economic and social exclusion and discrimination under the banner of this party. The Republican Party, the first party to organize the Dalits for more participation and inclusion in Indian polity. It also contested in U.P. elections. A detailed account of Dalits mobilization is documented by many scholars.

> "After the death of Dr Ambedkar in 1956, the Dalit movement in Uttar Pradesh was taken over by the Agra branch of the Republican Party of India, established in 1958 as the successor of the Scheduled Caste Federation. The Scheduled Caste Federation of Agra, formed in 1944–45, had been linked with Dr Ambedkar's All India Scheduled Castes Federation. The Republican Party of India, which was in contact with branches of the party working in Maharashtra, emphasised the economic, political and social plight of the Dalits in Uttar Pradesh. In 1962, the Agra branch of the Republican Party of India contested parliamentary elections, winning one seat each for a Member of Parliament and a Member of the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly. But then this independent organisation lost both seats in the 1967 general elections and the 1969 mid-term state assembly elections, and was disbanded in 1969. After this, the Dalit leadership in the 1970s fell to the Dalit leaders of the Congress Party. Despite the Congress politics of patronage of Dalits, there was insignificant improvement in their general socio-economic status. Indeed, during the 1970s there was a spurt of atrocities on Dalits, which gave birth to the militant Dalit Panther Movement in 1980 in Lucknow and

Kanpur, based on the Dalit Panther Movement formed in western India in the 1960s" (Narayan, 2008: 176).

This mission could not be accomplished as the party became the victim of personal and ideological clashes. The era of 1990s witnessed a major churning in the Indian politics. The beginning of this era dates back to 1984 when the Bahujan Samaj Party was formed. This is another party which tried to mobilize the majority of Dalits of this country in Indian political history. This movement drew inspiration from the historical antecedents.

"The Dalit movement in north India gathered momentum from the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, although it had strong historical roots. As far back as the medieval period, the *bhakti* movement led by Kabir, Sant Ravidas and Mirabai contributed a great deal to imparting consciousness about Dalit identity. These poets tried to express pain, pathos and suffering in a society dominated by Brahminical norms through devotional songs and poetry. Under the influence of some of their leaders, religious groups like the Kabir Panth, Satnami Panth and the Ravidasi sect were formed. The Arya Samaj also tried to inculcate self-respect in the Dalits, combined with a desire to rise in the social hierarchy by annexing symbols of Brahminical traditions" (Narayan, 2008: 174).

The assertion and self-respect movements of Dalits in India in general and Uttar Pradesh in particular have different trends and shades. The Movement was launched by Dalits and non-Dalits with different aims and interests. The social reformers particularly Dalit-Bahujan tried to transform the social structure of Hindu society while the Hindu leaders like Gandhi and Arya Samajists wanted to Hinduise them.

Vivek Kumar (2002) summarises various stages of Dalits movements in India. According to him there were four stages in Indian history. He locates the first phase in the medieval period of Indian history when Dalits converted to Islam and Sikhism to escape from the exploitation and harsh treatment inflicted on them by the Hindu social order. The second phase begins when poets belonging to the Dalit community started projecting the pathetic conditions of the community. The third phase started with the emergence of the leadership of Baba Sahib Ambedkar in 1920. The fourth phase spans from with the demise of Dr. Ambedkar which continues until today.

Post-Ambedkarite movements for Dalit emancipation in India have had different currents. In Uttar Pradesh, the assertion of the Bahujan Samaj Party has initiated a new era of democratization, while the upsurge of Dalit castes through conversion to Buddhism has brought about social change in Maharashtra. Yet, both these separate phenomena suffer from the disadvantages of not addressing vital issues raised by Ambedkar.The economic exclusion of Dalits and Dalit mobilization have played dual roles in the formation of Dalit identity as different from the caste ridden hierarchical Hindu identity. 'In the social history of identity formulation of the deprived castes, Ambedkar's name is the most prominent as he was the only thinker who had successfully formulated an assertive and separate Dalit identity. He demonstrated that the exploitative relationship of the untouchables to the other Hindus was a result of the battle between two divergent cultures. He argued that the Brahminic counter-culture destroyed the great Buddhist civilisation, which resulted in the enslavement of Buddhist population as "untouchables'' (BAWS 1990: 372-374 as cited in Wankhede, 2008: 51).

At the same time Dalit mobilization and assertion of Dalit identity under the leadership of Kanshi Ram's (BSP) played an important role. The humiliated, downtrodden untouchables were imbued with confidence and challenged in achieving these goals in the Hindu social order. 'Thus, the Dalit leadership specially the BSP leadership in the state had addressed social issues and being persuasive in nature in the begining has now become assertive. The leaders pursue vigourously the political issue leading ultimately to capture power' (Kumar, 2002: 171).

There were other leaders like Swami Achhootananda, who himself belonged to a Dalit community from U.P. who instilled confidence and mobilized them. He played a leading role in raising Dalit literacy levels by setting up a number of schools for Dalit children. He was also a pioneer in inculcating print culture among Dalits, establishing printing presses for publishing Dalit newspapers, books and magazines, helping to develop an educated and articulate element in Dalit society. In addition, their introduction to the politics of identity and self-respect made them ever more conscious of caste hierarchy, giving rise to an urge to challenge and break the status quo it. All these factors led to an increase in the reading and writing of booklets on Dalit history. The alternative culture of Dalit politics had not only mobilized the Dalits but also challenged the age old Hindu social order. Both cultures stood

opposed to each other. The idea of Dalits politics raised the serious questions over the discriminatory and humiliating value system of caste Hindus. Nancy Fraser's idea of 'Bivalent Collectivites' and 'Cultural - Valuational Disadvantage' by taking into account the various modes of social and economic exclusion is thus relevant for this study.

"An exploration of the discursive strategies and politics of imagination and narration of the Dalits' own history are helpful to understand their protests and demands. This goes much deeper than studying politics, though political parties, especially the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), have been using these strategies for mobilizing grassroots Dalits, helping them to demand social, economic and political privileges based on the history of injustice done to them. This complex process of identity reconstruction has a deliberately subversive input in socio-political discourses, providing a strong basis for alternative claims that undermine and challenge the historically grown dominant discourses and combat the everyday humiliation still encountered through largely Brahminical and Sanskritic cultural narratives" (Narayan, 2008: 170).

The Dalits were either presented as villains or excluded deliberately from the Indian history. The image of Dalits and their socio-cultural value system was distorted in the writing of Indian history. With the dawn of Dalits politics in India especially in U.P., new images and pictures of Dalit were emerging. The forgotten heroes, leaders were being remembered in several ways.

"The power of writing histories is being used by the Dalits as a critique of the nation-state through invented narratives of nationalism. These narratives are being generated as a knowledge and resource base for their democratic struggle for a better quality of life. The earlier professional empirical–analytical history, in which Dalits were treated as passive subjects, marginalized them politically and culturally. It not only made them uninterested, not merely in this kind of history and its concept of truth, but ultimately dispossessed them of the images of their own histories of life in which they have always lived" (Turner, 1990: 4).

The Dalit history writing represents not only the assertion of an alternative system but also representation in the knowledge system. The hierarchical Hindu system gets democratized with the inclusion of marginalized sections. The exclusionary system that marginalized the

Dalits and the assertion of Dalits in the form of their history writings, thus correlates their historical injustice.

> "The histories written by the Dalits themselves are different from the books authored by professional historians such as Illaiah, 1996; Omvedt, 1996 on Dalit history. They are also different from the Dalit history written during the Dalit movement in Maharashtra in the 1960s, in both form and content. These histories also differ from the history of the *shudra* castes belonging to the lowest rung of the Hindu caste hierarchy, written by empirical–analytical Marxist historians who attempted to locate that group within a class framework (see Jha, 1998). In the Marxist histories of the lower castes, social and economic dimensions are highlighted. However, in Dalit popular history, there is greater emphasis on re-constructing a counter-socio-cultural history. The history of Dalits and Bahujans written in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar (Sagar, 1987; Prashant, 1994; Saran, 1998) interprets Indian social history through a caste prism in an effective but apparently crude 'story telling' manner" (Narayan, 2008: 174).

Dalit literature has emerged to narrate the pain and historical injustice that the Dalits experienced. The way Badri Narayan depicts the writings and story telling by Dalit is being challenged by many Dalits scholars. Literary critic Kaval Bharti argues that the Dalit writings are depiction of the crude reality of Hindu society. Dalit Writer, Jai Praksh Kardam asserts that Dalit literature is the literature of pain not of happiness. '*Dalit sahitya aah ka saahitya hai waah ka nahi*'.

The assertion in the form of Dalit history has helped the construction of Dalit identity. This construction of new identity includes many functions too. A positive image of Dalits was being achieved through long struggles of Dalits. Dalits wanted to construct their identity by reviving their own folk memories as guided by their contemporary aspirations. Often this process has provided the space for protesting, resisting and contesting the present structures and also for deconstructing the dominant and hegemonic structures of the past.

> "Dalits believe that their history has four functions. First, it imparts self-respect. Second, they understand their specific place in society. Third, history is a means to acquire self-confidence and self-esteem. And fourth, it establishes a platform for self-analysis. The literate Dalits who claim their narratives to be history,

present its ideas through reason and logic to challenge Brahminical beliefs and values based on Hindu religious codes, and deconstruct the dominant and hegemonic upper caste history and myths. These, they claim, silence Dalit history or describe it as low (*nich*), degraded (*adham*), or criminal and uncultured" (Baudh, 1985: 3).

At the grassroots level the Dalits (Chamar) of U.P. and the Ad Dharmis of Punjab tried different strategies to construct their identities while demanding more inclusion in the Hindu mainstream social order although their demands were rejected them. These tactics signify that the Dalits cannot tolerate the history, culture and value system that denigrates them. They need a more positive and an entirely new identity for themselves.

"The Jatav Mahasabha had repeatedly rejected the 'untouchable' Chamar status for their community in the 1920s and 30s.' In fact, this position was not limited to the Jatavs. A prominent feature of the Dalit movement of this period was the contestation of the status of 'unclean' and 'impure' attached to their communities. In this phase, the Jatavs through their Mahasabha made a claim for Kshatriya status. The Chuhra community of Punjab articulated a new religious identity by formulating their own alternative, that of the Ad-Dharm religion. The Chuhras consciously began to describe themselves as Ad-Dharmis, a position they defined outside the realm of the Hindu community. They outlined their own religious rituals and moral order, social structure and history. The Jatavs sought a 'clean' status within the fold of Brahmanical religion. The Ad Dharmis rejected the Brahmanical religion. These two different choices by Dalits were two strategies which attempted to adopt a 'clean' status" (Rawat, 2003: 589-590).

Dalits too have their own history but it was never documented by mainstream historians. Their culture and value system could be traced from their oral traditions. The BSP politics in the state (U.P.) has taken this responsibility to reinterpret the hegemonic version and produced the Dalitperspective as an insider to represent themselves correctly. They have their visibility in every form of knowledge productions which was either ignored or misinterpreted by the caste Hindus. Badri Narayan explains that:

"Through these narratives of the past, the Dalits want to acquire power in the ongoing social struggle. It is also an attempt to remake fractured and competing

pasts and acquire a position of authority for themselves and other Dalit castes. This process of remaking the past is based on their contemporary socio-political and cultural experience of discrimination, which they face in their everyday lives. They link their historical experiences of recent times with the remote past and try to authenticate those events by establishing their historicity. Invention of history for them is thus a process of acquiring legitimacy by establishing the oldness of their tradition of sacrifice for the nation and society. In this sense one can propose that the past can be an authority but the nature of the authority is seen as shifting, amorphous and amenable to intervention" (Narayan 2004: 3538).

The exclusion of Dalits has multiple dimensions. The economic deprivation and dependency led to the marginalization in other areas too. A systematic denial to have the right to property forced the Dalits out of the mainstream. The forced exclusion of Dalits from all walks of life is the reason for their cultural and psychological exclusion. Hence, they were made "untouchables". Nancy Fraser called this form of indignity 'Cultural-valuational' disadvantage. Noticeably, exclusion and discrimination of people have been elucidated at two levels in Fraser's conception. Exclusion has a structural base which encompasses the political economy as well as the cultural questions. This also finds expression in the state policy. There are numerous instances which demonstrate that fruits of development do not reach the people. Such discrimination, in Fraser's opinion, is also cultural, where a particular community is culturally and structurally devoid of benefits.

In the realm of ideas, the cultural clash in India is an age-old phenomenon. The invasion of various communities in India is well known. The subjugation of Dalits historically can be seen in this context also. The clash between Hindus and Budhists and further violent triumph of Hindus led to the subjugation of the majority of the people of this country. Among those majorities, the Dalits were the biggest victims. In his book, 'The Untouchable: Who were they and Why They Became Untouchables', Ambedkar explained that each and every society is subjected to invasions by tribes appearing to be more powerful than the local ones. Suffering from a process of dislocation, the latter give birth to new groups that Ambedkar called the "Broken Men" (Dalits in Marathi). Ambedkar argued that after the conquering tribes became sedentary, they used the services of the Broken Men against the still unsettled tribes to guard the villages.

5.11 Summary

Economic exclusion of any community has multiple facets. The political economy is one of them. A holistic picture emerges only after looking at every aspect of exclusion in the society. This chapter dealt with the economic aspects of exclusion and discrimination of ethnic minorities in Sichuan and Dalits in U P. The question of land, property, redistribution and social goods are taken into account to examine with the economic exclusion of both the communities.

In doing so, the geographical location and structure of Sichuan and Uttar Pradesh are also factored into the study. The developmental approach and the various debates over economic discrimination, poverty and accumulation are also delineated. The coastal regions of China were developed while the western region was left behind. To correct this anomaly the Western Development Strategy was commissioned which brought new challenges to the Chinese society.

Since Sichuan is located in southwestern region of China it is geographically divided into mountain and basin. The hilly and mountainous regions are less developed. The infrastructure of this region is less advanced in comparison to the central basin region of the province. Historically, ethnic minorities resided in the hilly regions. Because of these geographical constraints, the overall development of these groups is minimal. The central basin region has its own geographical advantages. The majority of Han population resides in this region and this had extra edge in all aspects of life. The education and health facilities of this province are discussed to show how the Han majority gets more benefits than the ethnic minorities.

The infrastructure is much better in the central basin and the doctors and school teachers do not want to serve in the backward hilly regions. It has affected the life of ethnic minorities considerably. They either have to pay more to get better facilities or have to migrate to the central basin regions for better opportunities.

Another striking reason for the exclusion of ethnic minorities is their own value system. The traditional culture and societal norms of these ethnic groups do not allow them to adopt the modern value system. Hence, they exclude themselves. This phenomenon is often called self-exclusion. In this way they not only confront the main stream's cultural and political assimilation but also try to preserve their own distinct cultural- value system.

Historically, Dalist were devoid of all rights. The post-independent India witnessed land reforms, but very few Dalits benefited from it. The pattern of land holding and nature of its distribution across the state is more or less common. The landlessness or negligible land made Dalits dependent upon the dominant and upper castes historically. This dependency to humiliation and pauperization of Dalits. This dependency caused many atrocities because they could not muster courage to resist them. There have been many instances even today that wherever, Dalits protested against the injustices, the whole village has socially boycotted them. My own fieldwork suggests that the most of Dalits are landless or have very little land. Historically, they were bonded labourers of the dominant castes and now either they work on their land or they migrate to cities for better opportunities.

This socio-politico and economic exclusion of Dalits made them the most marginalized lot of the Indian society. The lack of material prosperity forced them to be excluded from education system, better health facilities, and better lifestyle. This led Dalits to protest against the oppression/ exploitation through every day forms of resistance, informally organised, litigation and political intervention. The rural rich oppose the resistance of the Dalits by imposing sanctions on them.

The Dalits socio-cultural and political mobilizations have redefined the identity of Dalits in the region. They mobilized for better economic opportunities. They also demanded more representation, recognition and redistribution in every walk of life. A positive image of Dalits was being achieved through long struggles of Dalits. Dalits want to construct their identity by reviving their own folk memories as guided by their contemporary aspirations.

Both China and India have put in place some progressive policies to include their marginalized groups in the mainstream society. The welfare schemes, sectoral plans and special legislative provisions were made to check their further exclusion. Policies like preferential mechanisms and reservation have played a crucial role to give them some respite. The post-liberalization process in China and India has affected these policies negatively. The growth of private sector and the withdrawal of state also hampered the aims of these progressive policies. The private sectors are not providing any such advantages, which used to be mandated by the state, and hence, the exclusion of both ethnic minorities and Dalits is further exacerbated.

Conclusion

Chapter -6

Conclusion

Human civilization is full of complexities. It is diverse in terms of culture, religion, language and ethnicity. Different societies have divergent ways of administering their people. The political, social and religious codes and customs are used to regulate the society. Some of these rules and codifications arechallenged repeatedly in the human history. Sometimes the powerful groups set the rules for their own benefit and hence dominate the rest of society. Sometimes, in the name of religionand culture, some communities were subjugated and excluded. The political history of human civilization is full of such instances where one group, dynasty, or class subjugated others for their selfish ends and benefits. Some forms of exclusion and marginalization are historical in nature while others unfolded with time and space. The policies of governments also add to the marginalization and deprivation process of some specific groups and individuals. The structural and societal exclusion happens due to the consistent negligence of government and the society.

The racial conflicts, religious wars, ethnic cleansing, patriarchal subjugation are some of the sociological processes that deserve analytical explanation. Anthropologists/sociologists, historians and political commentators have tried to theorize and interpret these processes. Global leaders and policy makers have set up various institutions to curtail them. Despite these initiatives, exclusion continues in the name of culture, religion, ideology and faith. Exclusion encompasses prejudices and manufactured biases against particular communities and groups. These biases are deep-seated in the psyche of people against the people of certain minorities and ethnic groups. The longevity of the exclusionary process makes people more vulnerable. This vulnerability leads to further discrimination and segregation.

The caste system of South Asian countries has its peculiarity. To touch or not touch by someone's birth is one such example of the worst kind of humiliation and exclusion in the world. The cultural and religious sanctions on women's mobility are another kind of illustration that show the exclusionary practices in the human history. Political subversion, cultural invasions, patriarchal and racial arrogance and class exploitation could be cited as some of the reasons for exclusion and segregation in the world.

Against this backdrop, this work dealt with the social and economic exclusion of ethnic minorities in China and Dalits in India. Ethnic minorities and Dalits are taken as social and political categories in order to understand their exclusion in both the societies. Moreover, the term social exclusion has been conceptually defined in the context of China and India. The term social exclusion has a French origin. It is used by French bureaucrat, René Lenoir, in 1960s and 1970s to address the economically excluded groups in France. These groups were left out in the developmental process. The state has to launch more welfare schemes to uplift the excluded groups. Thus, the term 'social exclusion' came into existence to understand and address the problems of people who were left behind in the development project within the modern state. The primary concern of the French bureaucrat (René Lenoir) was limited to merely addressing the monetary and occupational issues.

However, social exclusion has multiple facets. It includes social, cultural, economic and political dimensions too. The ambit of social exclusion has been much more diverse. Amartya Sen's conception of social exclusion is used to understand the complexities of the term. The constitutive and instrumental form of exclusion is necessary to understand it in its entirety. The procedural aspect of exclusion is another dimension of social exclusion which Sen talks about. The capability approach of Sen has been used to understand the social and economic exclusionin China and India.

The cultural and economic aspects of exclusion, aptly dealt by Nancy Fraser in her works, is also used as a broad framework for the study. She argues that classists have seen the world in terms of haves and have-nots. They did not pay attention to the cultural and religious aspects of exclusion and discrimination in the society. At the same time, the culturalists valorize identity without paying attention to the economic dimensions. Thus, she conceptualizes social exclusion in terms of 'bivalent collectivities' and 'cultural-valuational disadvantage.' She emphasizes that recognition, redistribution and representation of marginalized and excluded groups can solve their problems in the society. Hence, this study engages Amartya Sen's idea of 'capability approach' and Nancy Fraser's concept of 'bivalent collectivities' and 'cultural-valuational disadvantage' to address the problem of social and economic exclusion in China and India.

The demise of Soviet Union in 1990, led to some sort of closure to the binary between capitalism and communism paving the way for further explorations of exclusion. The Cold War politics came to an end. The new streams of thought and schools gained importance with

the free flow of capital and culture as part of globalization. The rise of extremism, and the various debates on terrorism also paved the way for recognizing the importance of ethnic groups and their grievances. Sometimes extremism emanates from deprivation and exclusion of a particular group which in turn leads to revivalism and assertion of some kind of ethno-nationalism.

The very first question which arises is how can anyone deal with the question of ethnicity and caste at the international level? Does any international theory or school of thought explain the ethnic and caste issues at the global level? In a sense the well established schools of realism and liberalism dominate international politics and in also to an extent relegate the domestic issues like ethnicity and caste to background. China and India have diverse social systems compared to the Western countries. The debate raises question such as Are Western theoretical and ideological formulations adequate to understand them given the geographical and value systems of these countries have been quite unique and different from the rest of the world.

Ethnicity has been the core reality of any society. The notion of minority and majority may simply be a matter of perception that changes over time. Its meaning and usage is different and sometimes quite contradictory in different social and political settings. Sometimes it depends on numbers only. At other times, it is defined in terms of class. The questions of race, gender and ethnicity and caste could be clubbed into identity. The term identity has both positive and negative connotations. Sometimes, this identity becomes oppressive and other times it is oppressed. The majoritarian community has the tendency to subjugate the minority. It is the ethnic minority of China that faces the brunt of Han chauvinism. Historically, ethnic minorities of Chinese society were forced to adopt the Han value system. They were treated as uncivilized and barbarians. The Confucian culture denigrates the ethnic minorities. Tibet question, assertion of Falun Gong and unrest in Xinjiang could be seen in this light. The demand for more autonomy and cultural, religious freedom has become a global issue in China. Chinese establishment pays special attention to its ethnic minorities while dealing with the other states in her foreign policy.

Moreover, the Chinese state, along with Xinjiang, Tibet and a Taiwan, treats them as the 'three evils' in its political discourse. The nation building process in China has faced severe challenges from these dissatisfied groups. Human rights violations, cultural subjugation,

indignity and economic exploitation could be seen as the signs of distrust among the marginalized groups.

The question of caste in India is no more a domestic issue these days. Although, the Indian Constitution forbids the discrimination of Dalits, (ex-untouchables) the Hindu society still practices untouchability in subtle ways. The caste system of Indian subcontinent is horrendous in the world as a person is discriminated based on his and her birth. The Hindu religious texts sanction these practices. In the Durban Conference debate (2002) human rights activists and Dalits raised their concerns. They also demanded the recognition of castiesm and humiliation of Dalits as similar to racial discrimination across the globe. But the Indian government denied these allegations arguing that they are India's domestic issues. It was in 2009 that UN recognized discrimination and humiliation of Dalits as major problems.

Another case of internationalization of caste discrimination and exclusion of Dalitshas been raised vigorously in the UK since 2011. The Dalit rights groups demanded the inclusion of Dalit rights in the 'Equality Act' to end any such discriminatory practices against Dalits. The second issue is related to the inclusion of caste abuse and discrimination in the syllabus of California (State Board of Education) over curriculum on Indian history. The tussle came when the Hindu Groups of America pressurised the Board to delete caste from the syllabus because it maligns the image of India. The advocates of human rights and Dalits pressed for the inclusion of caste in the system, which is the stark reality of Indian society.

The demand for cultural and religious autonomy in China and assertion of Dalits in India has attracted attention of the world community. This assertion is not only political but has deep roots in defining their identity. The quest for recognition and dignity is the core of their assertion. Fraser defines it as recognition through honor, dignity, status, and civility. It also indicates their marginalization in the polity and society.

Marginalization and exclusion in today's world are compelling realities. Different states devise various policies to rectify their past wrong doings. The system of representation is one of the most successful policies among them. The concept of positive discrimination, affirmative action/reservation policy is another substitute to this word. The Chinese state calls it the preferential policy to address the social exclusion of the ethnic minorities in China. The question of discrimination, according to Fraser, cannot be solved by redistribution and

recognition. Adding to these two concepts, she argues for representation which according to her, isimplicit in doing justice with redistribution and recognition.

Thus, social exclusion as a concept is not limited only to the economic deprivation in this study and because it has many other facets. The multidimensional approach of social exclusion has been employed. The socio-economic, cultural and political exclusion of ethnic minorities and Dalits has been dealt with in considerable detail. The study examined the historical and structural exclusion of both the communities in their respective societies. The exclusion and marginalization of any community creates disturbances in the society. Quite often the political and social mobilization and assertion do lead to more inclusion. But at the same time, the insensitivity of state aggravates the situation. The inclusive policies of both the states serve positive roles. The governmental policy givessome space to few elites to emerge from among the excluded groups. These elites become more articulate and assertive to address the historical injustice meted out to them. Hence, this study factored both the sides. Social exclusion leads to more mobilization and inclusive policies provide advantage to a particular class to articulate more effectively.

Historically, ethnic minorities settled in western regions of the China. These regions include: Inner Mangolia, Xinjiang, Ningxia, Guanxi, Tibet, Yunnan, Guizhou, Qinhai, Sichuan, Gansu, Hubei and Hunan. Population-wise, Zhuang ethnic group which is the largest in terms of numbers whereas Manchus are more assimilated in Han culture than others. Moreover, Yunnan province has the highest number of recognized minorities (25). The Chinese claim that these groups settled in China around 5,000 years ago. Geographically, ethnic minorities and Han Chinese are settled in the western and eastern parts of China respectively.

The Chinese always differentiated themselves from the outsiders who were non-Hans. The Han pride comes from its roots in culture of 'Confucianism' which exposes hierarchical social structure. This hierarchy was central to Han Chinese culture, or Confucianism, mainly from the early third century B.C. to early 20th century. The position of non-Han people in the hierarchy was determined by the extent to which they resembled mainstream Han culture. A similar standard was applied to arranging the non-Hans socially in this hierarchy.

The very premise for the building of Chinese society centered around concepts such as'Middle Kingdom', 'Centre and Periphery', 'all Under Heaven' and 'Confucianism'. The teachings and moral code of conduct preached by Confucius were compiled by his disciple

(s) Mencius is popularly known as 'Confucianism'. The social exclusion of ethnic minority is largely because of their portrayal in the Confucius philosophy. Culturally they were treated inferior to Han. This became the basis for their social and cultural degradation.

In China, the ethnic minorities tried to assimilate themselves in majoritarian Han culture, which is based on the hierarchical order. The classification project of ethnic minorities and consequent granting of autonomy did not fulfill the demands for genuine autonomy of many ethnic groups in China. The Chinese leadership has followed the Confucian philosophy of patronizing the ethnic minorities. The civilizing project of Han value system ignited the revolt among the ethnic communities in China. The Tibetan struggle, riots in Uyghur, are some of the burning examples where ethnic mobilization and ethnic assertion are being felt.

This form of treatment of ethnic minorities is visible in every aspect of life. At the administrative level, ethnic minorities are not adequately represented. Politically, they have never been given top positions in the party. Political exclusion is not only visible in the coastal regions but in the western regions too. The grievances and the anger of local inhabitants can be better understood through the political domination of Han in the minority autonomous regions. In western provinces particularly, Tibet and Xinjiang wherein the top political positions are held by Han despite their minimal presence.

This created huge distrust among ethnic minorities. As a result, they assert their identity and culture. At the same time, they demand more space in decision making process. The Chinese officials have however, missed opportunities to improve the situation. The Chinese leadership dominates all the key positions in the autonomous regions. At the same time, as it has appointed minority leaders to top posts in the ethnic minority regions, the CCP has also maintained its firm control over these provinces by giving the most important leadership posts-the Party Secretary positions-to cadres who come from Han Chinese backgrounds. Indeed, none of the Party secretary posts in any of the five provincial-level minority autonomous regions is currently held by an ethnic minority leader.

Another reason for distrust among the ethnic minorities is the huge settlement of Han majority in the western part of China. The western development campaign has once again raised the question mark on development project of China. The extraction of resources and the degradation of traditional life style of ethnic minorities are the outcomes of the Western Development Campaign. They also targeted CCP for giving more share to the Han majority

in developmental process. The northwestern state of China, Xinjiang has not only been facing the hard policy of China but also Hananization.

The assertive ethnic minorities and their demands are often seen with suspicion. The Chinese Communist Party restricted the religious and cultural freedom to these groups. Whenever, they asserted, they faced state brutality. The repression, silencing, and misrepresentation of ethnic minorities in China is another form of exclusion. The 'three evils': separatism, splitism, extremism have been popularized in the Chinese context too. The nationality question, grievances of Tibetan, Uyghur, and Taiwanese are central to rights discourse in China. A semi-religious group which celebrates its identity as 'Falun Gong' is also seenwith suspicion and called as an 'evil cult'.

Historically, the Chinese establishment evolved many inclusive policies to assimilate ethnic minorities in Han culture. The mixing of blood through inter-ethnic marriages is one of the policies. Before the establishment of PRC, these polices were in practice. That is why we can find that Hui Muslim minority is the most assimilated ethnic group in China today. After the ethnic classification project of 1954, ethnic minorities were given extra points in schools and colleges. Thirteen ethnic minorities' universities were established to assimilate them into Han culture. Through White papers, CCP guaranteed the socio-cultural autonomy of ethnic minorities and their regions. Autonomous provinces, prefectures and counties were established to preserve the culture and customs of ethnic groups.

The opening up of Chinese economy and four modernization programme of Deng Xiaoping have made a colossal impact on the special privileges and preferential policies. These preferential policies were mandated only in public sector. Foreign investment and privatization of economy eroded these policies to a great deal. These sectors are for profit and no more responsible for any subsidy and special privileges for ethnic minorities.

The social exclusion of ethnic minorities in China and Dalits in India covers a vast area. It goes beyond the polity and state institutions. The most remarkable point of both the communities is their caricature in the psyche of common people. The popular discourse in both the societies depicts their societies as the most harmonious and inclusive ones. But their founding philosophies, societal structures and political processes have been discriminatory and exclusionary.

India has a peculiar social system, which is popularly known as the *Varna* system. The hierarchy in the system divides these four *varnas* into thousands of castes. The graded inequality and endogamy are two key features of the system. People are required to maintain their "purity" by keeping distance physically and sexually. The Hindu sacred texts divided Hindus into four sections, which are called *Varnas*. Even Dalits are excluded from these four Varnas and hence treated as outcastes.

The history of the word 'Dalit' is not very old. This word is chosen by assertive Dalits which has emerged from the radical politics of Maharastra. They were highly influenced by the 'Black Panthers' of United States of America and preferred the term 'Dalit Panthers' in India. The word 'Dalit' was popularized in 1960s and 1970s in the Marathi literature. It gained currency in public sphere during the Schedule Caste-Hindu riots in Bombay in the early 1970s. 'Dalit Panthers' used the term to assert their identity and fight for rights and self-respect. Later, the term has been used with a wider connotation. It includes all the oppressed and exploited sections of the society. It does not confine itself merely to economic exploitation in terms of appropriation of surplus. Philosophically, this movement incorporates not only the exploitation of laboring classes but also the social, cultural and economic subjugation of the marginalized sections of the society. It has essentially emerged as a political category. For some, it connotes an ideology for fundamental change in the social structure and relations. Constitutionally all the Dalit castes are clubbed into one category and called as Schedule Castes (SC). The term SC was first used by the British in the Government of India Act, 1935. Prior to this, they were known as depressed classes in the early 20th century.

The exclusion of Dalits is multidimensional. They were degraded and excluded from every walk of life. Even this is the only community in the world which is unseable and untouchable. They were not only doomed as degraded "untouchables" but were also criminalized. For that, they have been treated even "lower" than animals. All these inhuman provisions are documented in the religious texts of Hinduism. That was the context where Dr. B. R. Ambedkar burnt Manusmiriti (Hindu Sacred Text) publicly in 1927. In his famous work, 'Annihilation of Caste', he asserts that 'Hinduism is a veritable chamber of horror'. There cannot be a more degrading system of social organization than the caste system.

The very foundation of Indian society draws its inspiration and ideological leanings from Hinduism. The caste structure based on graded inequality is the essence of Hinduism. The

philosophy of 'Karma' gave legitimacy to hierarchy and exclusion in the Indian society. The Scheduled Caste, ''ex-untouchable'', faced the worst of it.

The subjugation and exclusion of Dalits can be interpreted broadly in two ways. The first way of looking at this is the 'Racial' theory of interpretation. Balgangadhar Tilak and social reformer Jyotiba Phule claim that the Aryans invaded India and made slaves of the real inhabitants. These slaves are mostly today's Dalits. Another interpretation is given by the architect of Indian constitution, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar. He argues that it is the divine theory of Hindus that made majority of the population untouchables. The Hindu *Dharmshashtras* and *Smrities* gave sanction to it. The Hindu god Brahma has created the four Varnas and thus Dalits were made unseable and untouchable.

Thus, historically both the minorities in China and Dalits in India have been stigmatized and were being criminalized socially, culturally and politically in their respective societies. At cultural and political level, they were not only criminalized but were also coerced to adopt the Han and Hindu social and cultural value systems.

Sichuan and Uttar Pradesh have been chosen as case studies to assess the specificity of regions and socio-economic exclusion of ethnic minorities and Dalits in China and India.The question of selecting Sichuan and its minority as a case study is imperative for this endeavour. The strategic location, geographical diversity, and its various minorities make it noteworthy. The province is peculiar for its minority groups, and is the most diversely populated region in China.

The enquiry about the social exclusion in Sichuan, specifically in the context of ethnic minorities includes varied discourses and debates. It is not limited to the state policies. The geography, topography, location, and biased approach of Chinese leadership and its historical and social settings have played a major role. The liberalization process contributed to the exclusion of ethnic groups. The hampering of special policies by privatization is a serious concern for the whole community. This has further impacted social exclusion of the people of Sichuan, particularly the ethnic minorities. This poor infrastructure and mountainous terrain led to the further exclusion of ethnic groups inhabiting these areas. The ethnic minorities of this province have historically lived on the mountains and are scattered all across Sichuan. This region has fewer opportunities, bad infrastructure and people face severe hardships. The Han population mostly inhabits the central basin regions, which is much better in every

aspect. This has added another dimension to the exclusion of minorities and hence they are much more backward in all realms.

The scattered ethnic population in the hilly regions lacks adequate facilities. One of the examples is the condition of educational institutions in these areas. The poor quality of village primary schools, and shortage of teachers' resulted in the poor quality of education provided to students. These students cannot compete with the students of central basin students.The other reason for the exclusion of ethnic minorities in Sichuan is their culture. The culture of ethnic minorities does not allow them to migrate to the cities for better opportunities as their nomadic life style does not suit the city dwelling.

The case of U.P. is very interesting to study social exclusion of Dalits in connection with the promises of modernization and goals of Constitution. The findings of field survey are shocking. The practice of untouchability, spatial segregation, economic deprivation and cultural stigmatization are still very much prevalent even in the 21st century India. The practices of "pollution" and "purity" are still widespread which have made caste Hindus even to kill their own daughters and sisters, if any one dared to cross the caste boundaries. The preservation of endogamy has blocked inter-caste marriages. While the Indian state has forbidden the killings with stringent laws put into place the society and brahminical patriarchal set-up of establishment never gave into government. On the other hand, the Chinese leaders and the government encourage marriages for a more inclusive society. One particular improvement can be-experienced in the type of work they do and prefer today. Modernization and mechanization of agriculture have been freeing the Dalits from bonded labour and the caste-based occupations in U.P.

Sichuan, the southwestern province is very crucial for China connecting it to the Tibet and Xinjiang. Moreover, it is located in south-western part of China which is an important junction between northwest China and central China, and a critical intersection and transport corridor connecting South China and Central China, linking Southwest China and Northwest China as well as uniting Central Asia, South Asia and Southeast Asia.

The existence of large number of Tibetans in Sichuan is another reason that makes Sichuan more relevant for understanding the minority issue in China. The developmental imbalances between coastal and western regions of China fuels the ethnic dissatisfaction and may create another complication to Chinses establishment.

Moreover, the economic experiment started by Deng Xiaoping started from this province only. As Deng Xiaoping initiated China's economic reforms in 1978, the province stood at the forefront of experimentation with new institutions. Sichuan was one of the first provinces to begin abolishing collectivization of agriculture and to start state-owned enterprise reforms. In the mid-1980s, it was also one of the first provinces to experiment with converting state firms into joint stock corporations. But the hesitation to adopt the Chinese developmental approach by ethnic minorities has raised the question of tradition and modernity in Sichuan. Scholars may term it self-exclusion, but the local ethnic groups call it preservation of their culture and value system. It is another way of looking at redefining their identity vis-a-vis majoritarian Han value system.

On the other hand, socio-cultural and political mobilizations have redefined the identity of Dalits in the region. They have their resources mobilized for better economic opportunities. They also demanded more representation, recognition and redistribution in every walk of life. A positive image of Dalits was being achieved through long struggles of Dalits. They want to construct their identity by reviving their own folk memories as guided by their contemporary aspirations.

The historical dissatisfaction and economic liberalization may fuel ethnic minorities in China and Dalits in India. The Hananization and Hinduisation processes may also trigger the problem in both the societies. It could lead into a wider distrust between majoritarian Han and ethnic minorities and dominant Hindu and Dalits.

The ethnic revitalization and Dalit assertion are symbolsof their historical exclusion as well as the dissatisfaction with the establishment. Their assertion may turn into a more severe conflict at the community level. Both the societies may be divided into the majority and minority groups. If minority nationalities and Dalits are not given better chances for economic development, then social harmony, political stability and national security could be imperiled. Therefore, as the rising as the fastest growing economies of the world, China and India must address social and economic exclusion.

References

References

(*indicates primary source)

Acharya, Sangamitra (2010), "Access to Health Care and Patterns of Discrimination: A Case of Dalit Children in Selected Villages of Gujrat and Rajasthan". IIDS-UNICEF Working Paper Series, New Delhi.

Ahmad, Imtiaz (eds.) (1978), *Caste and Social Stratification Among the Muslims in India*: New Delhi: Manohar.

*Ambedkar, B. R. (1979), *Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writing and Speeches*, Compiled by Vasant Moon, 21 Volumes, The Education Department, Government of Maharashtra: Mumbai.

Andrew, Tan (2000), "Armed Muslim Separatist Rebellion in Southeast Asia: Persistence, Prospects, and Implications," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 23, pp. 267-288.

*ANS India Private Limited/Yahoo India News (May 24, 2015), "Matrimonial ad for gay son stirs lively debate" (Online: Web), Accessed 20 May, 2016 URL:https://in.news.yahoo.com/matrimonial-ad-gay-son-stirs-lively-debate-051214389.html.

*"Archaeological Sites of the Ancient Shu State: Site at Jinsha and Joint Tombs of Boat-shaped Coffins in Chengdu City, Sichuan Province; Site of Sanxingdui in Guanghan City, Sichuan Province 29C.BC-5C.BC", (Online: Web), Accessed 8 June, 2017 URL:http://whc.unesco.org/en/tentativelists/5816/.

Banerjee, B. and J.B. Knight (1985), "Caste Discrimination in Indian Urban Labour Market", Journal of Development Economies, Vol. 17, pp. 277-307.

Baranovitch, Nimrod (2001), "Between Alterity and Identity: New Voices of Minority People in China", *Modern China*, 27/3: pp. 359-401.

---------- (2007), "Inverted Exile: Uyghur Writers and Artists in Beijing and the Political Implications of Their Work", *Modern China*, Vol. 33, No. 4: pp. 462-504.

Barabantseva, Elena (2008), "From the Language of Class to the Rhetoric of Development: Discourses of 'Nationality' and 'Ethnicity' in China", *Journal of Contemporary China*, 17/56: pp. 565-589.

---------- (2009), "Development as Localization: Ethnic Minorities in China's Official Discourse on the Western Development Project", *Critical Asian Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 2: pp. 225-254.

Barbara Harriss-White (2003), *India Working: Essays on Society and Economy*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Barbour, Brandon and Reece Jones (2013), "Criminals, Terrorists and Outside Agitators: Representational Troops of the "Other" in the 5th July Xinjiang, China Riots", *Geopolitics*, 18/1: pp. 95-114.

Barnett, Robert (2009), "The Tibet Protests of Spring, 2008: Conflict Between the Nation and the State", *China Perspectives*, Issue 3: pp. 6-23.

Basu, K. Dilip (2014), "Chinese Xenology and the Opium War: Reflectionson Sino centrism", *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 73, No. 4: pp. 927-940.

Beatrice, Leung (2002), "China and Falun Gong: Party and Society Relations in the ModernEra", *Journal of Contemporary China*, 11(33): pp. 761-784.

Becquelin, Nicolas (1997), "Trouble on the Marches: Interethnic Tensions and Endemic Poverty in the National Minorities Areas", *China Perspective*, 10: pp. 19-28.

*Beijing Review (May, 27, 2009), "Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities in China", (Online: Web), Accessed 5April, 2017 URL: http://www.bjreview.com/nation/txt/2009-05/27/content_197768_3.htm#.

Bennet, Michel T. (2008), "China's Sloping Land Conversion Program: Institutional Innovation or Business as Usual?'', *Ecological Economics*, 65: pp. 99-711.

Bension, Linda (1990), *The Eli Rebellion: The Moslem Challenge to Chinese Authority in Xinjiang, 1944-1949*, New York: Armonk, M. E. Sharpe.

---------- (2004), "Education and Social Mobility Among Minority Populations in Xinjiang", in S. Federic Starr (eds.) *Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland*, New York: Armonk, M. E. Sharpe.

Betrand, M. and S. Mullainathan (2004), "Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lasika and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labour Market Discrimination", *American Economics Review*, Vol. 94, pp. 991-1048.

Bhalla, A.S. and Lapeyre, Fredric, (1999), *Poverty and Exclusion in A Global World*, London: MacMillan Press Limited.

---------- A.S., Luo, Dan (2013), *Poverty and Exclusion of Minorities in China and India*, Palgrave: MacMillan.

Bhattacharya, Abanti (2003), "Conceptualising Uyghur Separatism in Chinese Nationalism", *Strategic Analysis*, 27:3: pp. 357-381.

Bill, Mc Sweeney's (1996), "Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 22: pp. 181-193.

Blanton Robert, T., David Mason and Brain Athow (2001), "Colonial Style and Post-colonial Ethnic Conflict in Africa", *Journal of Peace Research*, 38/4: pp. 473-91.

Bourdieu, Pierre (1984), *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Bovingdon, Gardner (2002), "The Not So Silent Majority", *Modern China*, 28/21: 39-78.

---------- (2004a), "Contested Histories", in S. Federic Starr (eds.), *Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland*, New York: Armonk, M. E. Sharpe.

---------- (2004b), *Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent*, Washington, D.C.: East-West Center Washington, Policy Studies.

---------- (2010), *The Uyghur: Strangers in Their Own Land, New York*: Colombia University Press.

Bradley, David (2005), "Language Policy and Engagement in China: Orthography Development for the Yi", *International Journal of Sociology of Language*, 173: pp. 1-21.

---------- (2009), "Language Policy for China's Minorities", *Written Language and Literacy*, 12/2: pp. 170-87.

Brass, Paul, (1965), *Factional Politics in An Indian State: The Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh, Berkeley*: University of California Press.

---------- (1985), *Caste, Faction and Party in Indian Politics, Volume One: Faction and Party*, Delhi: Chanakya.

Brenda, Chan (2006), "Virtual Communities and Chinese National Identity", *Journal of Chinese Overseas,* Vol. 2, No. 1: pp. 1-32.

Brown Ronald (2009), *Understanding Labour and Employment Law in China*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bryan R. Roberts (2004), "From Marginality to Social Exclusion: From Laissez Faire toPervasive Engagement", *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 39, No. 1: pp.195-197.

Bulag, Uradin E. (2002), *The Mangols at China's Edge: History and Politics of National Unity*, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

---------- (2004), "The Dialectics of Colonization and Ethnicity Building in Morris Rossabi" (eds.) in *Governing China's Multi-ethnic Frontiers*, Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press.

Bulag, Uradyn E. (2012), "Seeing Like a Minority: Political Tourism and the Struggle for Recognition in China", *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs*, Vol. 41, No. 4: pp. 133-158.

Caffrey, Kevin (2004), "Who "Who" Is, and Other Local Poetics of National Policy", *China Information*, 18/2: pp. 243-74.

Cai, Yong (2010) "China's Below-Replacement Fertility: Government Policyor Socio-economic Development?", *Population and Development Review*, Vol. 36, No. 3: pp. 419-440.

Callaway, Rhonda L. and Julie Harrelson-Stephens (2006), "Towards a Theory of Terrorism: Human Security as a Determinant of Terrorism," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 29: pp.773-796.

Cannon, Terry (Ed.) (2000), *China's Economic Growth: The Impact on Regions, Migration, and The Environment*, New York: St. Martin's Press.

Carroll, Beatriz and Ducket, Jane (eds.) (2011*), China's Changing Welfare Mix: Local Perspectives*, New York: Routledge.

Chakraborty, D, D Shyam Babu and M Chakravorty (2006), "Atrocities on Dalits: What District Data Say About State-Society Complicity", *Economic & Political Weekly*, 41(24): pp. 2478-2481.

Charvarty, Uma (2012), *Everyday Lives, Everyday Histories: Beyond the Kings and Brahmanas of 'Ancient' India*, Delhi: Tulika Books.

---------- (2013), *Gendering Caste: Through a Feminist Lens*, Kolkata: Stree.

Chan, C.K. Ngok, K.L. and Phillips, D. (2008), *Social Policy in China: Development and Well-Being*, Bristol: The Policy Press.

Chan, Kwok-bun (2005), *Chinese Identities, Ethnicity and Cosmopolitanism*, Rutledge.

Chandhoke, Neera (2009), "Inequality For What? On the Troublesome Relation Between Egalitarianism and Respect" in Gopal Guru (eds.) *Humiliation: Claims and Context*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Chang, Gordon G. (2002), *The Coming Collapse of China, London*, Arrow, Random House.

Chen, H.N. (2003), "Paradigm Shifts in Social Policy Welfare Policy Making in China: Struggling Between Economic Efficiency and Social Equity", in Finer, C.J. (eds.) *Social Policy Reform in China: Views from Home and Abroad*, Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited.

Chen, Sheying (1996), *Social Policy of The Economic State and Community Care in Chinese Culture*, Aldershot: Avebury.

Chengfeng Yang, Huiran Han and Jinping Song (2014), "Spatial Distribution of Migration and Economic Development: A Case Study of Sichuan Province, China", *Sustainability*, 6: pp. 6509-6528.

*China Daily (Sept., 27, 2009), "Full text of white paper on ethnic policy" (Online: Web) Accessed 15 April, 2016 URL:http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-09/27/content_8743072_4.htm.

"China Uses "Rule of Law" to Justify Falun Gong Crackdown" (Online: Web), Accessed 15 June, 2017 URL: https://www.hrw.org/news/1999/11/09/china-uses-rule-law-justify-falun-gong-crackdown.

Clothey, Rebecca (2005), "China's Policies for Minority Nationalities in Higher Education: Negotiating National Values and Ethnic Identities", *Comparative Education Review*, Vol. 49, No. 3: pp. 389-409.

Cohen, G.A. (1989), "On the Currency of Egalitarian justice", *Ethics*, 99: pp. 906–944.

Cohn, B.S. (1959), "Some Notes on Law and Change in Village India", Economic Development and Cultural Change, Reprinted in Cohn, Bernard S. (eds.) *An Anthropologist Among the Historians and Other Essays*, Delhi: Oxford University Press.

---------- (1955), "The Changing Status of a Depressed Caste", A.R. Desai (eds.), 1961, Rural Sociology in India, Bombay: Popular Prakashan.

"Constitution of the people's republic of China", (adopted on December 4, 1982), (online: web), accessed 8 june, 2017 URL: http://en.people.cn/constitution/constitution.html.

Côté, Isabelle (2011), "Political Mobilization of a Regional Minority: Han Chinese settlers in Xinjiang", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 34/11: pp. 1855-1873.

Croll, J. Elisabeth (1999), "Social Welfare Reform: Trends and Tensions", The China Quarterly, No. 159, The People's Republic of China after 50 Years.

Daly, Mary and Silver, Hilary (2008), "Social Exclusion and Social Capital: A Comparison and Critique", *Theory and Society*, Vol. 37, No. 6: pp. 537-566.

Datt, Gaurav and Martin Ravallion (2010), "Shining for the Poor Too?" *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 45, No. 7: pp. 55-60.

Dean, Hartley (2009), "Critiquing Capabilities: The Distractions of A Beguiling Concept", *Critical Social Policy*, Vol. 29, No. 2: pp. 261-273.

Deaton, Angus S and Jean Dreze (2009), "Food and Nutrition in India: Facts and Interpretations", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 44, No. 7: pp. 42-65.

De Haan, Arjan, and Pulin Nayak (1995), "Social Exclusion and South Asia", Discussion Paper 77, Geneva: International Institute of Labour Studies.

---------- (1997), "Poverty and Social Exclusion: A Comparison of Debates on Deprivation", Working Paper No. 2, Poverty Research Unit at Sussex, Brighton: University of Sussex.

----------, and Simon Maxwell, (eds.) (1998), "Poverty and Social Exclusion in North and South", IDS Bulletin, 29 (1).

---------- (1998), "Social exclusion: An Alternative Concept for the Study of Deprivation?", IDS, Bulletin, 29 (1): pp. 10-19.

Dejian, Lai (2003), "Principal Component Analysis on Human Development Indicators of China", *Social Indicators Research*, Vol. 61, No. 3: pp. 319-330.

Dennis, Lai and Hang, Hui (2009), "Politics of Sichuan Earthquake", *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management*, Vol. 17, No: 2: 137-140.

Deshpande, Ashwini (2008), "Quest for Equality: Affirmative Action in India", *Indian Journal of Industrial Relations*, Vol. 44, No. 2: pp. 154-163.

---------- (May 2012), *Exclusion and Inclusive Growth*, India: UNDP.

---------- (2013), *Affirmative Action in India*: New York: Oxford University Press, Rutledge.

Dev, S Mahendra and C, Ravi (2007), "Poverty and Inequality: All-India and States, 1983-2005", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 42, No. 6: pp. 509-21.

Dirks, Nicholas (2001), *Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India,* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Diwakar, D. M. (2009), "Intra-Regional Disparities, Inequality and Poverty in Uttar Pradesh", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 44, No. 26/27: pp. 264-273.

*DNA (March 4, 2015), "18 Cases of 'honour killing' registered in 2014: Government", (Online: Web), Accessed 16 May, 2016 URL: http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-18-cases-of-honour-killing-registered-in-2014-government-2066092.

Dommen, Edward (1997), "Paradigms of Governance and Exclusion", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 3: pp. 485-494.

Dorn, J. James, (eds.) (1998), *China in the New Millennium: Market Reforms and Social Development*, USA: Cato Institute.

Dreyer, June Teufel (2005), "China's Vulnerability to Minority Separatism", Asian Affairs: *An American Review*, 31/2, pp. 69-85.

Drèze, Jean, and Amartya Sen (1989), *Hunger and Public Action, Oxford*: Clarendon Press.

---------- (eds.) (1990), *The Political Economy of Hunger*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

---------- (1995), *India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity*, Delhi: Oxford University Press.

---------- (2002), *India: Development and Partition*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

----------, and Gazdar, H. (1998), "Uttar Pradesh: The Burden of Inertia" in J. Dreze& A. Sen (eds.) *Indian Development: Selected Regional Perspectives*, New Delhi: OUP.

---------- and Mukherjee, Anindita (1989), "Labour Contracts in Rural India: Theories and Evidence", in S. Chakravarty (eds.) *the Balance Between Agriculture and Industry in Economic Development*, Vol.111, London: Macmillan.

Du Toit, Andries (2004), "Social Exclusion" Discourse and Chronic Poverty: A South African Case Study", *Development and Change*, 35(5): pp. 987–1010.

Dubey, Abhay Kumar (2001), "Anatomy of a Dalit Player: A Study of Kanshi Ram" in Ghanshyam Shah (eds.) *Dalit Identity and Politics*, New Delhi: Sage.

Duncan, Ian, (1988), "Party Politics and the North Indian Peasantry: The Rise of the Bhartiya Kranti Dal in Uttar Pradesh", *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol.16, No.1: pp. 40-75.

---------- (1999), "Dalits and Politics in Rural North India: Bahujan Samaj Party in Uttar Pradesh", *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol. 27, No.1: pp. 35-60.

Edward, Q. Wang (1999), "History, Space and Ethnicity: The Chinese Worldview", *Journal of World History*, 10/2: pp. 285-305.

Elliot, James (2001), "Referral Hiring and Ethnically Homogenous Jobs", *Social Science Research*, Vol. 30, pp. 401-425.

Ernie, Regehr (May 9, 2007). "It's not really a matter of hate," Disarming Conflict (Online: Web), Accessed 15 May, 2017 URL: http://disarmingconflict.ca/2007/05/09/its-not-really-a-matter-of-hate/.

Evans, M. (1998), "Social Security Dismantling the Pyramids?" in Glennerster (eds.) in *The State of Welfare* (2nd edition), Oxford: Oxford University Press.

---------- (1998), "Behind the Rhetoric: The Institutional Basis of Social Exclusion and Poverty", in Arjan de Haan and Simon Maxwell (eds.) *Poverty and Social Exclusion in North and South*, IDS Bulletin.

Evans, Peter (2002), "Collective Capabilities, Culture and Amartya Sen's Development As Freedom", *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Vol. 37, No. 2: pp. 54-60.

Eyferth, Jacob (2003), "De-Industrialization in the Chinese Countryside: Handicrafts and Development in Jiajiang (Sichuan), 1935 to 1978", *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 173: pp. 53-73.

Fairbank, John King, (eds.) (1968), *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations,* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Fewsmith, Joseph and Zheng Yongnian (2008), *Migration and Social Protection in China, Singapore*: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Finer, Jones, Catherine, (eds.) (2003), *Social Policy in China: Views from Home and Abroad, England*: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.

Fitzgeralds (1969), *Chinese View of Their Place in the World*, London: Oxford University Press.

Frank Dikotter (1992), *The Discourse of Race in Modern China*, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.

---------- (1998-1999), "Reading the Body: Genetic Knowledge and Social Marginalization in the People's Republic of China", *China Information*, Vol. 13, No. 2/3: pp. 113.

Fraser, Nancy (1995), "From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in A 'Post socialist' Age," *New Left Review*, No. 212: pp. 68-93.

---------- (1996), "Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition, and Participation", The Tanner Lectures on Human Values Delivered at Stanford University.

---------- and Gordon, L. (1994), "Civil Citizenship Against Social Citizenship?", in B. Van Steenbergen (eds.) *The Condition of Citizenship*, London: Sage.

---------- (2000), "Rethinking Recognition", *New Left Review*, No. 3: pp. 107-119.

---------- (2001), *Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the "Post socialist" Condition,* London: Rutledge.

---------- Axel Honneth (2003), *Redistribution or Recognition: A Political-Philosophical Exchange*, New York: Verso.

---------- (2007), "Re-framing Justice in a Globalizing World", in T. Lovell (eds.) (Mis) *Recognition, Social Inequality and Social Justice, Nancy Fraser and Pierre Bourdieu*, London: Rutledge.

---------- (2008), *Scales of Justice: Reimagining Political Space in a Globalizing World*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

---------- 2013), *Fortunes of Feminism: From State-Managed Capitalism to Neoliberal Crisis,* New York: Verso Books.

Fuller, C. J. and Narasimhan, Haripriya (2006), "Engineering Colleges, 'Exposure' and Information Technology", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 41 (3): pp. 258-262.

G. A. Cohen (1989), "On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice", *Ethics*, 99: pp. 906-44.

G. K. Lieten, Ravi S. Srivastava (1999), *Unequal Partners: Power Relations*, *Devolution and Development in Uttar Pradesh*, New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Ghai, Yash and Sophia Woodman (2009), "Unused Powers: Contestation over Autonomy Legislation in the PRC", *Pacific Affairs*, 82/1: pp. 29-46.

Gladney, Dru (1994), "Representing Nationality in China: Refiguring Majority/MinorityIdentities", *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 53, No. 1: pp. 92-123.

---------- (1996), *Muslim Chinese*, (2ⁿᵈ eds.) Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

---------- (2004), *Dislocating China: Muslims, Minorities and Other Subaltern Subjects, Chicago*: University of Chicago Press.

Gloria, Goodwin Raheja (1988), *The Poison in the Gift: Ritual, Presentation, and the Dominant Caste in a North Indian Village*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Gould, Harold A. (1984), "Politics of Agrarian Unrest in U.P.: Who Co-opted Whom?", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol.1, No.49: pp. 2084-2088.

*"Government of India", (Online: Web), Accessed, 6 June 2017 URL: https://data.gov.in/catalog/villagetown-wise-primary-census-abstract-2011-uttar pradesh.

*"Govt.WhitePaperschina.org.cn"II. Full Equality among Ethnic Groups, (Online: Web), Accessed 15 May, 2017 URL: http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/200909/ 27/content_18610400.htm 1/3.

Gregor, James A. and Maria Hsia Chang (1979), "Anti-Confucianism: Mao's Last Campaign", *Asian Survey*, Vol. 19, No. 11: pp. 1073-1092.

Gros, Stephane (2004), "The Politics of Names: The Identification of the Dulong (Drung) of Northwest Yunnan", *China Information*, 18/2: pp. 275-302.

Grunfeld, A. Tom (1985), "In Search of Equality: Relations Between China's Ethnic Minorities and the Majority Han", *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, Vol. 17, No. 1: pp.54-67.

Guldin, Gregory E. (1994), *The Saga of Anthropology in China From Malinowksi to Moscow to Mao*, Armonk NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc.

Gunde, Richard (976), "Land Tax and Social Change in Sichuan, 1925-1935", *Modern China*, Vol. 2, No. 1: pp. 23-48.

Gundimeda, Sambaiah (2014), "The Bahujan Samaj Party: Between, Social Justice and Political Practice", *Social Change*, Vol. 44, No.1: pp. 21-38.

Guru, Gopal (1993), "Dalit Movement in Mainstream Sociology", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 28, No. 14: pp. 570-573.

---------- (2002), "How Egalitarian are the Social Sciences", *Economic and Political Weekly*, pp. 5003-5009.

Gustafsson, Bjron and Li Shi (2003), "The Ethnic Minority-Majority Income Gap in Rural China During China Transition", *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 51/4: pp. 805-22.

Hannum, Emley and Yu Xie (2002), "Ethnic Stratification in Northwest China", *Demography*, 35/3: pp. 323-33.

Harriss-White, Barbara (2005), *India's Market Society: Three Essays in Political Economy*, New Delhi: Three Essays Collective.

Harrel, Stevan (1995a), "Introduction: Civilizing Projects and the Reaction to Them", in Stevan Harrel (eds.) in *Cultural Encounters in China's Ethnic Frontiers*, Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press:

---------- (1995b), "The History of the History of the Yi" in Stevan Harrel (eds.) *Cultural Encounters in China's Ethnic Frontiers*, Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press: pp. 63-91.

Hasan, Nader, (2000), "China's Forgotten Dissenters: The Long Fuse of Xinjiang", *Harvard International Review*, Vol. 22, No. 3: pp. 41.

Hasan, Zoya (1989), *Dominance and Mobilisation: Rural Politics in Western Uttar Pradesh 1930-1980*, New Delhi: Sage.

---------- (2001), "Transfer of Power? Politics of Mass Mobilisation in UP", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 36, No. 46/47: pp. 4401-4409.

---------- Review by Anirudh Deshpande (1999), "UP Politics through Marxist Lens Quest for Power: Oppositional Movements and Post-Congress Politics in Uttar Pradesh", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 34, No. 14: pp. 808-810.

Hayer, Eric (2006), "China's Policy Towards Uyghur Nationalism", *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 26/1: pp. 75-86.

---------- (2009), "Sino-centrism and the National Question in China", in Susana Carvalho and Francois Gemenne (eds.) *Nations and Their Histories*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Mcmillan.

He, Baogang (2004), "Confucianism versus Liberalism over Minority Rights", *Journal of Chinese Philosophy*, 31/1: pp. 103-123.

Heberer, T. (1990), *China and Its National Minorities*, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.

---------- (2005), "Ethnic Entrepreneurship and Ethnic Identity: A Case Study among the Liangshan Yi (Nuosu) in China", *The China Quarterly*, pp. 407-427.

---------- (2008), "Ethnic Entrepreneurship and Ethnic Identity: A Case Study Among The Liangshan Yi (Nuosu) in China", *Asian Ethnicity*, Vol. 9, No. 2: pp. 97-119,

---------- (2004), "Ethnic Entrepreneurs as Agents of Social Change-Entrepreneurs, Clans, Social Obligations and Ethnic Resources: The Case of the Liangshan Yi in Sichuan Institute of East Asian Studies", Duisburg Working Papers on East Asian Studies, No. 54: pp. 1-26.

---------- (2000), "Some Considerations on China's Minorities in the 21st Century: Conflict or Conciliation?", Duisburg Working Papers on East Asian Studies, No. 31 No. 31: pp. 1-25.

Hong Yanbi and Qian Minhui (2010), "Educational and Social Stratification in China: Ethnicity, Class, and Gender", *Chinese Education and Society*, Vol. 43, No. 5: pp. 3-9.

Howland, Douglas (2011), "The Dialectics of Chauvinism: Minority Nationalities and Territorial Sovereignty in Mao Zedong's New Democracy", *Modern China*, 37/2: pp. 1-32.

Huang, Yesheng (1995), "China's Cadre Transfer Policy Towards Tibet in The 1980s", *Modern China*, 21/2: pp. 184-204.

Jaffrelot, Christophe (2000), "Sanskritization vs. Ethnicization in India: Changing Identities and Caste Politics Before Mandal", *Asian Survey*, Vol. 40, No. 5: pp. 756-766.

---------- Review by Hebbar, Ritambhara (2003), "Rising Low Castes in Politics India's Silent Revolution: The Rise of the Low Castes in North Indian Politics", *Economicand Political Weekly*, Vol. 38, No. 42: pp. 4445-4447.

Jeffrey, Craig (2002), "Caste, Class, and Clientelism: A Political Economy of Everyday Corruption in Rural North India", *Economic Geography*, Vol. 78, No. 1: pp. 21-41.

---------- Jeffery Patricia and Jeffery, Roger (2008), "Dalit Revolution? New Politicians in Uttar Pradesh, India", *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 67, No. 4: pp. 1365-1396.

Jodhka, S. Surinder (2010), "Engaging With Caste: Academic Discourses, Identity Politics and State Policy", *Working Paper Series*, Vol. 2, No.2: pp. 1-38.

---------- (2015), *Caste in Contemporary India*, New Delhi: Routledge.

John, Fairbank, (eds.) (1968), *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Jordan, B. (1996), *A Theory of Poverty and Social Exclusion*, Oxford: Blackwell.

Jorge, Svartzman, (1997), *Xinjiang Government Dismisses Separatist Threat*, Agency France Press, News Library, afp file.

Kabeer, Naila (2006), *Social Exclusion: Concepts, Findings and Implications for the MDGs*, Brighton: University of Sussex.

Ka Ho Mok and Yeun-Wen Ku (eds.) (2010), *Social Cohesion in Greater China: Challenges for Social Policy and Governance*, Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co.

Kapur, Devesh, Chandra Bhan Prasad, Lant Pritchett, D Shyam Babu (2010), "Rethinking Inequality: Dalits in Uttar Pradesh in the Market Reform Era", *Economic & Political Weekly*, Vol. XLV, No 35: pp. 39-49.

Karade, Jagan (2015), *Caste-Based Exclusion*, New Delhi: Rawat Publications.

Kaup, Katherine Palmer (2002), "Regionalism Versus Ethnic Nationalism in the People's Republic of China", *The China Quarterly*, 172: pp. 863-84.

Kaviraj, S. (2000), "Democracy and Social Inequality", in F.R. Frankel, Z. Hasan, R. Bhargava and B. Arora (eds.) *Transforming Indian Social and Political Dynamics of Democracy*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Keith, Ronald And Lin, Zhiqiu (2001), *Law and Justice in China's New Marketplace*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Khilnani, S. (1998), *The Idea of India*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.

King, Ryan D. and Darren Wheelock (2007), "Group Threat and Social Control: Race, Perceptions of Minorities, and the Desire to Punish", *Social Forces*, 85/3: pp. 1255-80.

Kinglun, Ngok (2012), "Migrant labour, Urban Exclusion and Social Harmony in China", *Journal of Poverty and Social Justice*, Vol. 20, No 3: pp. 247-60.

Kohli, Atul (1987), *The State and Poverty in India: The Politics of Reform*, Bombay: Orient Longman.

---------- (2006), "Politics of Economic Growth in India, 1980-2005 Part II: The 1990s and Beyond", *Economic and Political Weekly*, pp. 1361-1370.

Koz, D.M.,T. McDough and M. Reich (1994), *Social Structures of Accumulation: The Political Economy of Growth and Crisis*, UK: Cambridge.

Kumar, Nirmal Chandra (2009), "China and India: Convergence in Economic Growth and Social Tensions?" *Economic and Political Weekly*, Special Article, pp. 41-53.

Kumar, Pradeep (1999), "Dalits and the BSP in Uttar Pradesh: Issues and Challenges", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 34, No. 14: pp. 822-826.

Kumar, Vivek (2002), *Dalit Leadership in India*, New Delhi: Kalpaz Publication

---------- (2016), "How Egalitarian Is Indian Sociology?" *Economic & Political Weekly*, Vol. LI, No, 25: pp. 33-39.

Kunovich, Robert, M. (2004), "Social Structural Position and Prejudice", *Social Science Research*, 33/1: pp. 20-44.

Kwan, Chan, et al. (2008), *Social Policy in China: Development and Well-being*, UK: Policy Press, University of Bristol.

L. Wang (2011), "Social Exclusion and Education Inequality: Towards an Integrated Analytical Framework for the Urban–Rural Divide in China", *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, Vol. 33, Issue: 3: pp. 409-430.

Lackshamanasamy, T. and S. Madheswaran (1995), "Caste Discrimination: Evidence from Indian Scientific and Technical Labour Market", *Indian Journal of Social Science*, Vol. 8, No. 1: pp. 59-77.

Lai, Hongyi (2009a), "China's Ethnic Policy and Challenges", *East Asian Policy*, 1/3: pp. 5-13.

Leibold, James (2008), *Reconfiguring Chinese Nationalism: How the Qin Frontier and its Indigenous Became Chinese*, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

---------- (2010), "The Beijing Olympic and China's Conflicted National Form", *The China Journal*, 63: pp. 1-24

*Leibold, James (13 Feb., 2014), "Are Ethnic Tensions on the Rise in China?", (Online: Web) Accessed 15 May, 2017 URL: http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/are-ethnic-tensions-rise-china.

*Leibold, James (23 March, 2016), "China's Minority Report: When Racial Harmony Means Homogenization" Foreign Affair, (Online: Web) Accessed 15 July, 2017 URL:https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2016-03-23/chinas-minority-report.

Lerche, Jens (1994), "New Wine in Old Bottles: Caste, Local Action, Social Movements and General Elections: Scheduled Caste Agricultural Workers in Uttar Pradesh, India", paper presented at the XIII World Congress of Sociology, Bielfeldt, Germany.

---------- (1995), "Is Bonded Labour a Bound Category? Reconceptualising Agrarian Conflict in India", *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol. 22, No.3: pp. 484-515.

---------- (1999), "Politics of the Poor: Agricultural Labourers and Political Transformations in Uttar Pradesh", *The Journal of Peasant Studies,* Vol. 26, No. 2-3: pp. 182-241.

Levitas, Ruth (1998), *The Inclusive Society? Social Exclusion and New Labour*, London: Macmillan.

Lewis, Oscar (1958), *Village Life in Northern India*, Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.

Li Ying and Ernest Chui (2010), "Governmental Policy and Social Exclusion of Rural Migrants in Urban China", *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal*, Vol. 19, No. 2: pp. 295-306.

Li, Qiang, (eds.) (2010), *Thirty Years of Reform and Social Changes in China*, Netherlands: Brill.

Lin Yi (2008), *Cultural Exclusion in China: State Education, Social Mobility and Cultural Difference*, New York: Rutledge.

Linda, Wong (1998), *Marginalization and Social Welfare in China*, London: Routledge.

Lister, R. (1997), *Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives*, Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Ma, Rong (2007), "New Perspective in Guiding Ethnic Relations in the Twenty First Century; "De-Politicization" of Ethnicity in China", *Asian Ethnicity*, 8/3: pp. 199-217.

Majumdar, D.N., Pradhan, M.C., Sen, C. and S. Misra (1955), "Inter-Caste Relations in Cohanakallan", A Village near Lucknow", *Eastern Anthropologist*, 8: pp.191-214.

Majumder, Rajarshi (2007), "Earning Differentials Across Social Groups: Evidences from India", *The Indian Journal of Labour Economics*, Vol. 50, No. 4: pp. 443-453.

Mamdani, M. (1996), *Citizens and Subjects: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Mani, BrajRanjan (2005), *De-brahmanising History: Dominance and Resistance in Indian Society*, Manohar: Delhi.

Marshall, T.H. (1950), *Citizenship and Social Class*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mcculloch, Neil and Michele Calandrino (2003), "Vulnerability and Chronic Poverty in Rural Sichuan", *World Development*, Vol. 31, No. 3: pp. 611-628.

Mackerras, Colin (1994), *China's Minorities: Integration and Modernization in the Twentieth Century*, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press.

---------- (2003), *China's Ethnic Minorities and Globalization*, London: Routledge.

---------- (2005a), "China's Ethnic Minority and the Middle Classes", *International Journal of Social Economics*, 32/9: pp. 814-26.

------------- (2005b), "People's Republic of China: Background Paper on the Situation of the Tibetan Population" A Writenet Report, (Online: Web) Accessed 15 July 2017 URL:http://nzchinasociety.org.nz/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/unhcr-tibet.pdf.

McNally, Christopher A. (2004), "Sichuan: Driving Capitalist Development Westward", *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 178: pp. 426-447.

Mendelsohn, O. and Vicziany, M. (1998), *The Untouchables: Subordination, Poverty and the State in Modern India*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Medina, Jennifer (May 4, 2016), "Debate Erupts in California Over Curriculum on India's History", The New York Times, (Online: Web), Accessed 18 May, 2016 URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/06/us/debate-erupts-over-californias-india-history-curriculum.html.

Menon, N. (1998), "Women and Citizenship", in P. Chatterjee (eds.) *Wages of Freedom: Fifty Yearsof the Indian Nation State*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Michael, M. S. Review by Anand Teltumbde (2007), "Debating Dalit Emancipation Dalits in Modern India: Vision and Values", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 42, No. 42: pp. 4229-4232.

Minglang Zhou, Ann Maxwell Hill (2009), *Affirmative Action in China and the U.S.: A Dialogue on Inequality and Minority Education*, Palgrave Macmillan.

Mullaney, S. Thomas (2004), "Ethnic Classification Writ Large", *China Information*, 18/2: pp. 207-41.

---------- (2010), "Seeing for the State: The Role of Social Scientists in China's Ethnic Classification Project", *Asian Ethnicity*, Vol. 11, No. 3: pp. 325-342.

Mushkat, Roda (2011), "China's Compliance with International Law: What Has Been Learned and the Gaps Remaining?", *Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal*, 20/1: pp. 41-69.

Mutatkar, R. (2005), "Social Group Disparities and Poverty in India", Working Paper Series No. WP-2005-004, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, pp. 1-44.

Narayan, Badri (2004), "National Past and Political Present", *Economic and Political Weekly*, pp. 3533-3540.

---------- (2015), "Democracy and Identity Politics in India: Is It a Snake or a Rope?" *Economic & Political Weekly*, Vol. l, No.16: pp. 61-65.

---------- (2008), "De-marginalisation and History: Dalit Re-Invention of The Past", *South Asia Research*, Vol. 28(2): pp.169-184.

Naughton, Barry (1988), "The Third Front: Defence Industrialization in The Chinese Interior," *The China Quarterly*, No. 115: pp. 351-386.

*"National Minorities Policy and Its Practice in China" (July 8, 2002), (Online: Web) Accessed 5 May, 2016
URL:http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/3711_665954/t18972.shtml#1.

Nayak, P. (1995), "Economic Development and Social Exclusion in India", in Arjan de Haan (eds.) *Social Exclusion and South Asia*, Geneva: ILO.

Nelson, Keely (2005), "Language Policy and Minority Resistance in China", *Languages, Communities and Education*, 25: pp. 25-30.

Norbu, Dawa, (1991), "China's Policy Towards its Minority Nationalities in the Nineties", *China Report*, 27 (3): pp. 230.

Omvedt, Gail (1982), "Caste Class and Land in India: An Introductory Essay", in Gail Omvedt (eds.) *Land, Caste and Politics in Indian States*, Delhi: Guild Publication.

Oommen, T.K. (2004), *Nation, Civil Society and Social Movements*, New Delhi: Sage Publication.

Pai, Sudha, Pradeep Sharma, PralayKanungo And Rahul Mukherji (2005), "Uttar Pradesh In The 1990s" *Economic And Political Weekly*, Vol. 40, No. 21: pp. 2144-2145+2147, South Asia Research, Vol. 28(2): pp. 169-184.

Palshikar, Suhasand Yogendra Yadav (2009), "Principal State Level Contests and Derivative National Choices: Electoral Trends in 2004-09", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 44, Issue No. 06: pp. 1-9.

Perry, Alex, Bombay (2003), "India's Great Divide", Times Asia, (Online: Web), Accessed 10 June, 2017 URL: http://www.time.com/time/asia/cover/5030811/story.html.

Ping ti Ho (1976), *Cradle of the East: An Enquiry into the Indigenous Origins of Techniques and Ideas of Neolithic and Early Historic China, 5000-1000 B.C.,* Hong Kong:Chinese University of Hong Kong.

Poston, Dudley and Michel, Micklin (1993), "Spatial Segregation and Social Differentiation of the Minority Nationalities from the Han Majority in the People's Republic of China", *Sociological Enquiry*, 6/2: pp. 150-65.

Quillian, Lincoln (1995), "Prejudice as Response to Perceived Group Threat", *American Sociological Review*, 60/4: pp. 586-611.

R. H. Tawne (1931), *Equality, London*: George Allen and Unwin.

Rai, V. K (1999), "In Search of a New Balance: Caste, Region and Community in Uttar Pradesh", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 34, No. 34/35: pp. 2400-2408.

Rao, S. Srinivasa (2002), "Dalits in Education and Workforce", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 37, No. 29: pp. 2998-3000.

Rawat, Ramnarayan S. (2003), "Making Claims for Power: A New Agenda in Dalit Politics of Uttar Pradesh", 1946-48", *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 3: pp. 585-612.

Rawls, J. (1993), *Political Liberalism*, New York: Columbia University Press.

---------- (1999), *The Law of Peoples*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

---------- (1999), *A Theory of Justice*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rebecca, Clothey (2005), "China's Policies for Minority Nationalities in Higher Education: Negotiating National Values and Ethnic Identities", *Comparative Education Review*, Vol. 49, No. 3: pp. 389-409.

Reed, Bradly W. (1995), "Money and Justice: Clerks, Runners, and the Magistrate's Court in Late Imperial Sichuan", *Modern China*, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 345-382.

---------- (1999), "Gentry Activism in Nineteenth-Century Sichuan: the Three-Fees Bureau", *Late Imperial China*, Vol. 20, No. 2: pp. 99-127.

Renard, Mary-Francoise (eds.) (2002), *China and Its Regions-Economic Growth and Reform in Chinese Provinces*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Richard, Smith (1996), *Chinese Maps: Images of "All Under Heaven"*, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press.

Riskin, Carl et al. (eds.) (2001), *China's Retreat from Equality: Income Distribution and Economic Transition*, Armonk: M. E. Sharpe.

Rohan, Gunaratna, et al. (2010), *Ethnic Identity and National Conflict in China*, New York; Palgrave McMillan.

Ronald, C. Keith and Zhiqiu Lin (2003), "The "Falun Gong Problem": Politics and the Struggle For the Rule of Law in China", *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 175: pp. 623-642.

Roy, Arundhati, (2014), *The Doctor and the Saint*, New Delhi: Navyana Publishing Pvt. Ltd.

Sautman, Barry (1998), "Preferential Policies for Ethnic Minorities in China: the Case of Xinjiang", Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol. 4, No. 1: pp. 86-118.

---------- (1999), "Ethnic Law and Minority Rights in China: Progress and Constraints", *Law and Policy*, Vol. 21, No. 3: pp. 284-314.

---------- (2002), "Labor Market Competition, Perceived Threat and Endorsement of Economic Discrimination against European Workers in Israel", *Social Problems*, 49/3: pp. 416-431.

Semyonov et.al. (2006), "The Rise of Anti-Foreigner Sentiment in European Societies, 1988-2000", *American Sociological Review*, 71/3: pp. 426-449.

Saxena, N.C. (1984), "Caste, Land and Political Power in Rural Uttar Pradesh", paper presented at the Conference on Caste, Class and Dominance, University of Pennsylvania.

Schmitt, Edwin A. (2014), "The History and Development of De-Swiddening Among the Ersu in Sichuan, China", *Himalaya, the Journal of the Association for Nepal and Himalayan Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 2: pp.97-110.

Schuler, Yi Fu Yi (2011), *Education As A Means of Integration Into The City: Migrant Children in The Government-Sponsored Honghua School in Chengdu, China*, School of Intercultural Studies, Biola University.

Scoville, James (1991), "Towards a Formal Model of a Caste Economy" in James G. Scoville (eds.) *Status Influences in Third World Labour Markets Caste, Gender*, Custom, New York: Walter De Greuyter.

Sen, Amartya (1980), "Equality of What?" in S. M. Mc Murrin (eds.) *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values*, Vol. 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

---------- (1985), *Commodities and Capabilities*, Amsterdam: North-Holland.

---------- (1999), *Development as Freedom*, Oxford: Oxford University Press

---------- (2000), "Social Exclusion: Concept, Application and Scrutiny", *Social Development*, Paper No. 1, Manila: Asian Development Bank.

---------- (2006), *Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny*, London: Penguin Books.

---------- (2010), *The Idea of Justice*, London: Penguin Books.

Shan, Wei and Chen Gang (2009), "The Urumqi Riots and China's Ethnic Policy in Xinjiang", East Asian Policy, 1/3: pp. 14-22.

Shankar, Kripa (1993), "Agricultural Labourers in Eastern UP", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 28, No. 24: pp. 1211-14.

Sharma, K. L. (eds.) (1994), *Caste and Class In India*: Jaipur: Rawat Publications.

Sheth, D. L. (1999), "Secularisation of Caste and Making of New Middle Class", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 34, No. 34/35: pp. 2502-2510.

Sheying, Chen (2002), "Economic Reform and Social Change in China: Past, Present, and Future of the Economic State" *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society*, Vol. 15, No. 4: pp. 569-589.

Shieh, Shawn and Guosheng Deng (2011), "An Emerging Civil Society: The Impact of The 2008 Sichuan Earthquake On Grass-Roots Associations in China", *The China Journal*, 65, pp. 181-207.

Silver, Hilary (1995), "Reconceptualising Social Disadvantage: Three Paradigms of Social Exclusion", in Gerry Rodgers et al. (eds.) *Social Exclusion: Rhetoric, Reality, Responses*, Geneva: International Institute for Labour Studies.

Singh, Ajit Kumar (1997), "Agricultural Growth, Employment and Poverty in Uttar Pradesh: Some Recent Trends", in G.K. Chaddha and A.N. Sharma (eds.) *Growth, Employment and Poverty: Change and Continuity in Rural India*, New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House.

Singh, J. (1992), *Capitalism and Dependence: Agrarian Politics in Western Uttar Pradesh, 1951–1991*, Delhi: Manohar.

---------- (1998), "Ambedkarisation and Assertion of Dalit Identity: Socio-Cultural Protest in Meerut District of Western Uttar Pradesh", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 33, No. 40: pp. 2611-2618.

Singh, Rajendra, (1978), "Peasant Movements in Uttar Pradesh: A Study in the Politics of Land and Land Control in Basti District" in M.S.A. Rao (eds.) *Social Movements in India*, Volume 1, Peasant and Backward Classes Movement, New Delhi: Manohar.

Singh, Shyam (2010), "Dalit Movement and Emergence of the Bahujan Samaj Party in Uttar Pradesh: Politics and Priorities", Working Paper, The Institute for Social and Economic Change, 242: pp. 1-17.

Singh, Surjit, "Financial Exclusion and the Underprivileged in Indi" in Aseem Prakash (eds.) *Towards Dignity: Access, Aspiration and Assertion of Dalits in India*, forthcoming.

Smith, Warren (2004), "China's Policy on Tibetan Autonomy", Washington DC: East West Centre in Washington Working Papers No. 2 October, (Online: Web), Accessed 18 July,

2017URL:https://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/handle/10125/3539/EWCWwp002.pdf;jsessionid=5D2503C2C991EEA1E666985A2D7EB0F1?sequence=1.

Srivastava, Ravi (1999), "Rural Labour in Uttar Pradesh: Emerging Features of Subsistence, Contradiction and Resistance", *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol. 26: No. 2-3: pp. 263-315.

Starr, S. Frederick (2004), "Introduction', in S. Frederick Starr (eds.), *Xinjiang: China's Border land*, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

Stiglitz, Joseph E et al. (2009), Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress, Also at: http://www.stiglitz- senfi toussi.fr/documents/rapport_anglais.pdf.

Takahiro, Ito (2007), "Caste Discrimination and Transaction Costs in the Labor Market: Evidence from Rural North India", Discussion Paper, Series No. 200, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.

Tapp, Nicholas (2002), "In Defence of the Archaic: A Reconsideration of the 1950s Ethnic Classification Project in China", *Asian Ethnicity*, Vol. 3, No 1: pp. 60-84.

---------- (2009), "The Key to Understanding And Interpreting Ethnic Relations in Contemporary China", *Development Issues*, 11/1: pp. 18-20.

Teets, Jessica C. (2009), "Post-Earthquake Relief and Reconstruction Efforts: The Emergence of Civil Society In China?", *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 198, pp. 330-347.

Teltumbde, Anand (2007), "Reverting to the Original Vision of Reservations", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 42, No. 25: pp. 2383-2385.

---------- (2007), "A 'Mayawi' Revolution", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 42, No. 23: pp. 2147-2148.

Thapar, Romila (1978), *Ancient Indian Social History: Some Interpretations*, Orient Blackswan.

The Economic Times (Jan., 23, 2016), "Rohit Vemula's suicide an 'Institutional Murder': Satchidanandan", (Online: Web) Accessed 15 May, 2016 URL:

http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/rohit-vemulas-suicide-an-institutional-murder-satchidanandan/articleshow/50696414.cms?intenttarget=no/

The Hindu (Sept., 30, 2010), "Court awards two-thirds of Ayodhya site to Hindu parties, one-third to Waqf Board", (Online: Web), Accessed 20 May, 2017 URL:http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/Court-awards-two-thirds-of-Ayodhya-site-to-Hindu-parties-one-third-to-Waqf-Board/article10751918.ece.

The Indian Express, "Biggest caste survey: One in four Indians admit to practising untouchability", (Online: Web), Accessed 8 June, 2016 URL:http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/one-in-four-indians-admit-to-practising-untouchability-biggest-caste-survey/#sthash.P6m7CsPN.dpuf.

The Indian Express (June, 16, 2016), "Amartya Sen describes Indian caste divisions as 'anti-national' at London School of Economics", (Online: Web), Accessed 10 May, 2016 URL:http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/amartya-sen-indian-caste-system-anti-national-london-school-of-economics-2857296/.

The Times of India (July 4, 2017), "More than 1000 honour killings in India every year: Experts", (Online: Web), Accessed 12 May, 2016 URL: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/More-than-1000-honour-killings-in-India-every-year-Experts/articleshow/6127338.cms.

*"The National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China", (Online: Web) Accessed, 5 Jan., 2016 URL:http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Organization/node_2846.htm.

The New Minute (June 16, 2016), "Let's Talk LGBTQ+" (Online: Web), Accessed 18 May, 2016 URL: http://www.thenewsminute.com/article/dear-savarna-queer-men-lets-talk-about-casteism-within-our-movement-44951, accessed on 25th May, 2016.

The Telegraph (Sept., 29, 2009), "UN says caste system is a human rights abuse", (Online: Web) Accessed10, May, 2016URL:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/india/6239842/UN-says-caste-system-is-a-human-rights-abuse.html.

Thomas, Caroline (1987), *In Search of Security: The Third World in International Relations*, Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Thomas, Heberer (1989), *China and Its National Minorities: Autonomy or Assimilation?*, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc.

Thorat, Sukhadeo (2003), "Inequality at Work In the Informal Economy: Key Issues and Illustrations", *International Labour Review*, Vol. 142, No. 4: pp. 459-469.

---------- (2001), "Caste and Untouchability Based Economic and Market Discrimination: Theory, Concept and Consequences", *Artha Vijnana*, Vol. 153, No. 1-2: pp. 123-146.

---------- (2002), "Oppression and Denial: Dalit Discrimination in the 1990s", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 37, No. 6: pp. 572-578.

---------- (2005), "Reservation and Efficiency: Myth and Reality", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 40, No. 9: pp. 808-810.

Thorat, Sukhdeo (2006), "On Economic Exclusion and Inclusive Policy", *Little*, Vol. VI, No.4-5: pp. 7-17.

---------- and Attewell, Paul (2007), "The Legacy of Social Exclusion: A Correspondence Study of Job Discrimination in India", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 42, No. 41: pp. 4141-4145.

---------- Katherine S. Newman (2007), "Caste and Economic Discrimination: Causes, Consequences and Remedies", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 42, Issue 41, pp. 4121-4124.

---------- "Caste and Economic Discrimination: Causes, Consequences and Remedies", *Economic and Political Weekly*, 42 (41): pp. 4121-4124.

---------- (2008), "Labour Market Discrimination: Concept, Forms and Remedies in the Indian Situation", *The Indian Journal of Labour Economics*, Vol. 51, No. 1: pp. 31-52.

---------- and Kumar, Narendra (2008), *B. R. Ambedkar: Perceptions on Social Exclusion and Inclusive Policies*, Delhi: Oxford University Press.

---------- and Katherine S. Newman (eds.) (2010), *Blocked By Caste: Economic Discrimination in Modern India*, New Delhi: Oxford.

*"Travel China Tour", (Online: Web), Accessed 8 June, 2017 URL: https://www.travelchinaguide.com/cityguides/sichuan/chengdu/.

Turner, Bryan S. (1983), *Religion and Social Theory*: London: Heinemann.

Upadhya, Carol (2007), "Employment, Exclusion and 'Merit' in the Indian IT Industry", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 42, Issue, 20: pp. 1863-1868.

Uradyn E. Bulag (2012), "Seeing Like a Minority: Political Tourism and the Struggle for Recognition in China", *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs*, Vol. 41, No. 4: pp.133-158.

"US Congressional Executive Commission on China (2005a)", Annual Report 2005, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, Accessed 4 Feb., 2016 URL: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/annualRpt/annualRpt05/CECCannrpt2005.pdf.

"US Congressional Executive Commission on China (2005b), China's Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law: Does it Protect Minority Rights? Accessed 11, April 2016 URL: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109hhrg21045/pdf/CHRG-109hhrg21045.pdf.

V. Subramanyam, K. Sekhar, (eds.) (2010), *Social Exclusion, Integration and Inclusive Policies*, Jaipur: Rawat Publication.

Vani K Borooah (2010), "Social Exclusion and Jobs Reservation in India", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. xlv, No 52: pp. 31-35.

Varma, Meena (April, 25, 2013), "The UK Parliament outlaws Caste-Based Discrimination", Dalit Solidarity Network UK., (Online: Web) Accessed 12 May, 2016 URL: http://dsnuk.org/2013/04/25/the-uk-parliament-outlaws-caste-based discrimination/

Vijayalakshmi, V. (2001), "Politics of Inclusion: Scheduled Tribe Women in Local Governance", IESC Working Paper 88, Bangalore: Institute for Social and Economic Change.

Wai-fong Tinga and Hongli Chen (2012), "The Alternative Model of Development: The Practice of Community Economy in Disaster-stricken Sichuan", http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17525098.2012.658609.

Wang Shougang and Hu Angang (1999), *The Political Economy of Uneven Development: The Case of China*, New York: M. E. Sharpe.

Wang, Tiezhi (2007), "Preferential Policies for Ethnic Minority Student In China's College/University Admission", *Asian Ethnicity*, 8/2: pp. 149-63.

Wang, Yuxiang and JoAnn Phillion (2009), "Minority Language Policy and Practice in China', *International Journal of Multicultural Education*, 11/1: pp. 1-14.

Wankhede, S. Harish (2008), "The Political and the Social in the Dalit Movement Today", *Economic and Political Weekly*, pp. 50-57

White, G. (1977), "Social Inequality and Distributive Politics in China, 1949-1969", Ph.D. Thesis, Department of Politics, Stanford University.

---------- J. Howell and Shang Xiaoyuan (1996), *In Search of Civil Society in China*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

White, Gordon (1987), "The Impact of Economic Reforms in the Chinese Countryside: Towards the Politics of Social Capitalism?" *Modern China*, Vol. 13, No. 4: pp. 411-440.

White, Sydney D. (1998), "State discourses, Minority Policies, and the Politics of Identity in the Lijiang Naxi people's Autonomous County", *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Vol. 4, No.1-2: pp. 9-27.

Whyte, Martin King (1996), "The Social Roots of China's Economic Development", in Andrew G. Walder, (eds.) in *China's Transitional Economy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wolfgang, Kasper (1982), "Note on the Sichuan Experiment", The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 7: pp. 163-172.

Wong, Jia Wei and Nyima Gyaincain (2000), "The Historical Status of Tibet", *Journal of Washington Institute of China Studies*, 4/3: pp. 18-66.

Wong, L. and Mok, K. (1995) "The Reform and the Changing Social Context", in Wong, L. and MacPherson, S. (eds.) *Social Change and Social Policy in Contemporary China*, Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited.

Wright, Teresa (2002), "The China Democracy Party and the Politics of Protest in the 1980s-1990s", *The China Quarterly*, No. 172: pp. 906-926.

Xiaowei Zheng (2009), *The Making of Modern Chinese Politics Political Culture, Protest Repertoires, and Nationalism in the Sichuan Railway Protection Movement*, San Diego: University Of California.

Xiaowei, Zang (2003), "Ethnic Differences in Neighbouring Behaviour In Urban China", *Sociological Focus*, Vol. 36, No. 3: pp. 197-218.

Xiuli, Wang and Jay Pan (2016), "Assessing the Disparity in Spatial Access to Hospital Care in Ethnic Minority Region in Sichuan Province, China", *BMC Health Serv. Res.*, 16 (1): pp.1643-8.

Xu, Bin (2009), "Durkheim in Sichuan: The Earthquake, National Solidarity, and The Politics of Small Things", *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 72, No. 1: pp. 5-8.

Yagati, China Rao, and Sudhakara Karakoti (eds.) (2010), *Exclusion and Discrimination: Concepts, Perspectives and Challenges*, New Delhi: Kanishka.

Yang, Rui and Mei Wu (2009), "Education for Ethnic Minorities for China", *SA Education Journal*, 6/2: pp. 117-31.

Yingcong, Dai (2009), *The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet: Imperial Strategy In The Early Qing* Dynasty: Washington: The UWP.

Yiping Fang (2002), "Ecotourism in Western Sichuan, China", *International Mountain Society*, Vol. 22. No. 2: pp. 113-11.

Young, I. M. (1990), *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Yuchao Zhu and Blachford, Dongyan (2012), "Economic Expansion, Marketization, and Their Social Impact on China's Ethnic Minorities in Xinjiang and Tibet" *Asian Survey*, Vol. 52, No. 4: pp. 714-733.

Yun Zhou (August 30, 2013), "Question of Ethnic Group Formulation in the Chinese Census", Presented in Session 253: Collecting ethnic and racial data in censuses and surveys at Peking University China, pp.1-13. Accessed 23 June, 2017 URL: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/dec/28/india.mainsection.

Zang, Xiaowei (2010), "Affirmative Action, Economic Reforms, and Han-Uyghur Variation in Job Attainment in the State Sector in Urumchi", *China Quarterly*, 202: pp. 344-361.

---------- (2011a), "Uyghur-Han Earnings Differentials in Urumchi", *China Journal*, 65: pp. 141-155.

Zhang, Zhen, Yang, Qizhi (2011), "Impacts of Venture Capital on Development of Sichuan High-Tech Enterprises", *International Business Research*, 4, No. 2: pp. 250-256.

Zhao, Zhenzhou (2010), *China's Mangols at University*, Idaho Falls, ID: Lexington Book.

Zheng, Xiaowei (2009), *The Making of Modern Chinese Politics: Political Culture, Protest Repertoires, and Nationalism in the Sichuan Railway Protection Movement*, University of California, San Diego.

Zheng, Xun (2007), "Enforcing Equal Employment Opportunities in China", *Labour and Employment and Law*, 9/4: pp. 991-1025.

Zhou, Yong (2009), "Legal Predicament of Combining "Regional" and "National" Autonomy: A Group Rights Perspective", *International Journal On Minority and Group Rights*, 16/3: pp. 329-348.

Zhu, Minglang (2000), "Language Policy and Illiteracy in Ethnic Minority Communities in China", *Journal of Multilingual and Multi-cultural Development*, 21/2: pp. 129-148.

Zhu, Minglang and Ann Maxwell Hill (2009), *Affirmative Action in China and the US: A Dialogue on Inequality and Minority Education*, Basinstoke: Palgrave McMillan.

Zhu, Rongji (2015), *On the Record: The Road to Reform: 1998-2003*, trans. by June Y. Mei, Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press.

Zuo, Xiulan (2007), "China's Policy Towards Minority Languages in a Globalization Age", *Transnational Curriculum Inquiry*, 4/1: pp. 80-91.

Zweigenhaft, Richard L. and William G. Domhoff (1998), *Diversity in the Power Elite: How Women and Minorities Reached the Top, New York*: Yale University Press.