MEDIA AND INDO-PAK CONFLICTS, 1999-2008

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Date.

DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled "**MEDIA AND INDO-PAK CONFLICTS, 1999-2008**" submitted by me for the award of the degree of **DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other University.

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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this thesis be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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18 July 2017   **APRA VAIDYA**

In Memory of

My Loving Father Ashok Vaidya and

Uncle Vijender Sharma

CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKA   Aman ki Asha

APC   All Parties Conference

ATC   Anti-terrorism Court

ATS   Anti-terrorist Squad

BBC   British Broadcasting Corporation

BJP   Bharatiya Janata Party

BRIC   Brazil, Russia, India and China

BSE   Bombay Stock Exchange

BSF   Border Security Forces

CBMs   Confidence Building Measures

CCIT   Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism

CII   Centre for Indian Industry

CNN   Cable News Network

CST   Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus

EU   European Union

FDI   Foreign Direct Investment

HT   Hindustan Times

HuJI   Harkat ul jihad al Islami

IB   Intelligence Bureau

IE   Indian Express

IRS   Indian Readership Survey

IWT   Indus Waters Treaty

ISI   Inter Service Intelligence

ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ISPR	Inter-State Public Relation
JIC	Joint Intelligence Committee
JKLF	Jammu and Kashmir National Liberation Front
JeM	Jaish-e-Mohammed
JuD	Jamaat-ud-Dawah
JMB	Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh
LeT	Lashkar-e-Taiba
LoC	Line of Control
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MEA	Ministry of External Affairs
MHA	Ministry of Home Affairs
MFN	Most Favoured Nation
MP	Member of Parliament
MSDT	Media Systems Dependency Theory
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NDA	National Democratic Alliance
NDFB	National Democratic Front of Bodoland
NMCT	New Media and Communication Technologies
NSA	National Security Advisor
NSC	National Security Council
NSG	National Security Guards
OSA	Official Secrets Act
PEMRA	Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority
PML (N)	Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz)
POF	Pakistan Ordnance Factories
PoTA	Prevention of Terrorist Activities Act

PPO	Press and Publication Ordinance
PTA	Preferential Trade Agreement
PTV	Pakistan Television Broadcasting
RAS	Receive-Accept-Sample
RBI	Reserve Bank of India
RPF	Railway Protection Force
R&AW	Research and Analysis Wing
SAARC	South Asian Association of Regional Conference
SC	Security Council
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
TRPs	Television Rating Points
TOI	Times of India
ULFA	United Liberation Front of Asom
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UN	United Nations
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UPA	United Progressive Alliance
USA	United States of America
VLPT	Very Low Power Transmitter
VOIP	Voice-Over-Internet Services
VT	Victoria Terminus
WAN	World Association of Newspapers
WTC	World Trade Centre

CHAPTER- 1

INTRODUCTION

The press, regarded as the fourth estate[1], is one of the most essential organs of a nation state. The functioning of the press has undergone a tremendous change over the centuries as it has evolved from merely documenting the proceedings of the House of Commons to now scrutinising those in positions of power. Since India's independence, the media in the country has been more or less free and vibrant, but not the typical ideal model of the fourth pillar of democracy. Traditionally, media, especially print, sought to communicate what was happening in the world around. But with the technological advancement in the area of communication and dissemination, the role of media has also transformed over the time.

Today, mass media does not act just as an informant for the public but also as a major actor in shaping public opinion. It acts as an immediate source of information not only for people but for the governments also and subsequently, it influences the latter's policies. In a democracy, media and civil society, generally, form an unstructured but organic coalition in forming public opinion and hold the powers to be accountable.

Ashis Nandy wrote that "India has seen the expansion of democratic public sphere and the civil society from the presence of disparate voices, social and political movements, and in a variety of public interventions." (Nandy 2003: 13) Nandy further added that "civil society has a definite role in recovering the liberal ground by monitoring areas like the human rights, environment, peace, feminism, alternative science, and technologies." (*ibid.*)

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[1] Thomas Carlyle in 1840 said that the term "Fourth Estate" was first used by Edmund Burke "at the press gallery in the late eighteenth century, contrasting it with three Estates of the Realm in France (Clergy, Aristocracy, and Commoners)." Carlyle further wrote that "the first three estates might be regarded, instead, as King, Lords, and Commoners, in a British context. In either case, the idea of Fourth Estate signifies that, whatever the formal constitution, genuine political power resides in the informal role of the press, which in turn derives the relationship between the press and its readers." Hampton, Mark (2010), "The Fourth Estate Ideal in Journalism History" in Stuart Allan (ed.), *The Routledge Companion to News and Journalism*, US: Routledge

URL:https://books.google.co.in/books?id=vW6NAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA3&dq=CONCEPT+OF+FOURTH+EST ATE&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwito4Koi_zRAhUVSo8KHabdBEUQ6AEINzAF#v=onepage&q=CONCEP T%20OF%20FOURTH%20ESTATE&f=false

Moreover, Shakuntala Rao and Vipul Mudgal stated that civil society usually finds that media is a "willing collaborator for articulating alternative imaginations", which may be different from those of the state and markets but aimed at everyone's well-being. Especially in the development sector, say areas like environment, human rights or feminism, the Indian media depends quite a lot on the civil society as well for arguing against the state's policy choices. Furthermore, they added that "the media coverage against the Armed Forces Special Powers Act in Jammu and Kashmir and North Eastern States and that of human rights violations in tribal areas have a lot to do with the presence of a vigilant civil society." (Rao and Mudgal 2015: 617)

Over the years, the Indian media has played an important role in the formulation of public opinion that has often compelled the political parties to consider those issues which are becoming hindrance for the country's progress like the Indo-Pak conflicts and issue of terrorism.

Terrorism, as a distinct discourse in international relations, has gained a considerably higher attention after the September 11, 2001 attacks on World Trade Centre (WTC) twin towers in the United States of America (USA). But terrorism is not a new phenomenon. It has been there since time immemorial.

However, over the last few decades, there have been frequent terrorist attacks worldwide and India has also been a target. In post-9/11 world, Mumbai terror strikes, which took place on November 26, 2008, quickly adopted the nomenclature of 26/11 with parallels being drawn between the two by many commentators. One of the most tangible parallels was that both these attacks had a defining effect on how terrorism is viewed not only in the targeted countries but globally.

The sheer magnitude of these attacks prompted the press in India to cover the incident and its aftermath thoroughly and tediously. Considering the widespread reach and influence of the press, both print and electronic, its reportage of the Kargil War, Indian Parliament attack case and 26/11 attacks assume significance even with a large chunk of illiterate population. Analysis of this reportage thus becomes more important to ascertain the often ignored role the press plays in nation building and shaping public opinions.

1.1 Terrorism: Some Conceptual Paradigms

Today, terrorism is considered as one of the biggest threats to global peace and security. Over the decades, the theorists as well as academicians have suggested several definitions for terrorism but it is such a complex phenomena that no one has come to one comprehensive definition. This divergence is persistent among different actors such as the nation-states, academics, experts, regional groupings and international organisations. The complexity of arriving at a particular definition of terrorism can be gauged from the fact that a treaty like the proposed Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT) is stuck at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and Security Council (SC) since 1996. The main stumbling block of this treaty that was proposed by India is the absence of consensus among the member states on the very definition of terrorism.

As Thalif Deen elaborated,

> "The key sticking points in the draft treaty revolve around several controversial yet basic issues, including the definition of 'terrorism'. For example, what distinguishes a 'terrorist organisation' from a 'liberation movement'? And do you exclude activities of national armed forces, even if they are perceived to commit acts of terrorism? If not, how much of this constitutes 'state terrorism'?"[2]

In this premise, it is significant to introduce some of the key definitions of terrorism that are adopted by certain leading countries, their counter-terrorism bodies, widely read peer reviewed academicians and experts on the subject. First, the basic dictionary definition of terrorism needs to be mentioned. According to the Oxford dictionary, terrorism means, "The unlawful use of violence and intimidation, especially against civilians, in the pursuit of political aims."[3] It attributes the origin of the word "terrorism" to the late 18th century from the French word *terrorisme*. It is "in reference to the rule of the Jacobin faction during the period of the French Revolution known as the Terror."[4]

However, it does not even begin to do any justice to various ramifications, contradictions and complexities that can be attached to terrorism. As terrorism is a criminal act, the legal

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[2] Deen, Thalif (2005), "U.N. Member States Struggle to Define Terrorism", [Online: web], Accessed 15 June 2017, URL:
https://web.archive.org/web/20110611053853/http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=29633

[3] "Definition of Terrorism", *Oxford*, [Online: web], Accessed 5 March 2014, URL:
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/terrorism.

[4] *Ibid.*

foundation of this definition is also weak. It is of paramount importance to define terrorism from a legal standpoint so that it can withstand judicious scrutiny.

From this legal aspect, The United Nations (UN) resolution adopted on December 9, 1994, described terrorism as follows,

> "Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them."[5]

Although this was in a context to eliminate international terrorism, there was no binding element in it. Over the years, different aspects of terrorism by state and non-state actors have attracted UN-sponsored punitive actions such as sanctions, blacklisting, and terror designation creation in a bid to cut funding. However, there is still no cogent definition of terrorism as a concept that is accepted by all.

Having said that, terrorism committed by non-state actors have become a little more legally definitive when the above mentioned definition was adopted by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in the year 2004 unanimously. Among large group of nations, European Union (EU) has a clearly defined concept of terrorism that is accepted by all its members. It was adopted in 2002 through the "Article 1 of Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism" and it defined terrorism related offenses committed against individuals or group of people or on properties as,

> "given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organization where committed with the aim of: seriously intimidating a population; or unduly compelling a Government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act; or seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization."[6]

As this study largely focuses on terrorism committed, therefore, some academic perspective on different elements on state terrorism as a concept must be touched upon. Again, there has not been any consensus in the definition here. However, an attempt has been made in the

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[5]* United Nations General Assembly (1994), "Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism", [Online web], Accessed 10 June 2016, URL: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/49/a49r060.htm.

[6]Council Framework Decision (2002), "Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism", [Online: web], Accessed 10 June 2016, URL:
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32002F0475.

Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research under the heading of **"Revised Academic Consensus Definition of Terrorism (2011)"** compiled by Alex P. Schmidt. It described it as,

> "Terrorism refers, on the one hand, to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties." (Schmidt 2011: 99)

It is also significant to note that the Supreme Court of India while giving a ruling in the year 2003 adopted parts of Schmidt's definition much before the academic consensus was reached. Gus Martin while explaining terrorism from the layman's point of view defined the concept of terrorism as a "politically motivated violence", "usually directed against soft targets (i.e. civilian and administrative government targets", and "intended to affect (terrorise) a target audience." (Martin 2016: *n.d.*) Noam Chomsky defined terrorism as "the use of coercive means aimed at populations in an effort to achieve political, religious, or other aims" (Chomsky 2001: 19). Walter Enders and Todd Sandler defined it as: "the premeditated use or threat of use of extra normal violence or brutality by sub national groups to obtain a political, religious, or ideological objective through intimidation of a huge audience, usually not directly involved in the policy making that the terrorists seek to influence." (Enders and Sandler 2002: 145-146) Moreover, Peter Chalk's definition of terrorism involves the "systematic use of illegitimate violence that is employed by sub-state actors as means of achieving specific political objectives, these goals differing according to the group concerned." (Chalk 1999:151) Furthermore, Bruce Hoffman, an expert on terrorism, called the notion of terrorism as a political concept and stated that terrorism is a deliberate act and "exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change."[7] (Hoffman 2006: 41)

The concept of terrorism has changed over the years, Jonathan R. White said, adding that the "modern terrorism has its origin from the French Revolution (1789-1799). It was used as a term to describe the actions of the French government. By 1848, the meaning of the term had changed. It was employed to describe violent revolutionaries who revolted against the governments. By the end of the 1800s and the early 1900s, terrorism was used to describe the

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[7] Hoffman also mentioned that the word "terrorism" which is a widely accepted contemporary term, is "fundamentally and inherently political". While explaining further, he said that "it is about power: the pursuit of power, the acquisition of power, and the use of power to achieve political change." Hoffman, Bruce (2006), *Inside Terrorism,* New York: Columbia University Press.

violent activities of several groups, including labour organisations and nationalistic groups revolting against foreign powers." (White 2012: 8)

According to White, the concept of terrorism again changed after the Second World War. White also said that from 1960s till 1980s, the word terrorism was also used for the actions of "violent left wing groups, as well as those of nationalists." (White 2012: 8). He further elaborated that the meaning changed yet again in the mid 1980s because certain violent activities of hate group in America was viewed as an act of terrorism. But, globally, it was seen as a sub-national warfare. Thus, with the change in the millennium, the concept and the definition of terrorism had also changed. While elaborating further, he referred terrorism to "large groups who are independent from state-violent religious fanatics, and violent groups that terrorise for a particular cause." (*ibid.*) B. Raman has also called terrorism as a "continuously evolving threat." (Raman 2008: IX) He mentioned that "from a one-dimensional threat involving attacks with hand-held weapons, it has evolved into a multi-dimensional threat involving the use of hand-held weapons, improvised explosive devices, suicide bombers, landmines, mobile phones as triggers, aircraft hijackings, cyber attack through internet etc." (*ibid.*) Raman further elaborated that terrorism not only has political and economical dimensions attached to it, but has operational and ideological dimensions too. Also, according to him, even the profile of a terrorist keeps changing. The terrorists of yesterday were seen as "misled youth from the exploited or wronged sections of society. An increasing number of the terrorists of today are educated and come from well-to-do families. They are self-motivated and technology savvy. Their ability to add sophistication to their methods of operation surpasses the skill of the security agencies."(*ibid*.)

Several scholars and experts have given their own definitions on terrorism but the biggest challenge is in conceptualising the worldwide phenomenon of terrorism where there is a lack of consensus on its definition. There have been many instances where Pakistan has indulged in cross-border terrorism and sponsoring terrorism in the region and beyond. It is dominantly embedded into the fact that there exists no commonly agreed upon definition of terrorism, therefore, the above divergent views and notes on conceptual premise of it were discussed.

1.2 Terrorism in South Asia

South Asia, as a region, is entirely post-colonial and like many other such groupings, it also has a unique socio-political experience. Therefore, the nature, role and various aspects of terrorism that exist here have some common and yet indigenous characteristics which are deeply connected to the shared historic and cultural realities of South Asia as well as its inter-state and intra-state relations. It is true that even though South Asia was ravaged with war against nation-states in the region and there had been civil wars too, the concept of terrorism is widely understood in the modern sense.

Conceptual hurdles also lurk in defining terrorism in South Asia. There are arguably many variants of it if one goes by the classical definition of terrorism as discussed earlier. Assassinations, sectarian violence, separatist movements, communal riots, insurgency, armed rebellion etc. all can come under the gamut of it as all of these are rampant in South Asia. Therefore, it assumes a great degree of diversity and ambiguity in its categorisation. Professor S. D. Muni has addressed certain aspects of the concept of terrorism in South Asia. He has termed these aspects as the "conceptual confusion; the anatomy and structure of terrorism in South Asia; its external dimensions; the responses of various South Asian states to this challenge; and policy imperatives."[8] He stated that "the events of 9/11 have had a "steamrolling effect" on the understanding of the concept of terrorism which emanates from every act of political violence and as a result, the concepts and terms like 'insurgency', 'proxy-wars', 'asymmetric and unequal conflicts' have been subsumed by one word—'terrorism'." (Muni 2012: 6)

He further maintained that "the blurring of the boundaries between the objectives and agenda of political violence and its terrorist methods reinforced by 9/11 was welcomed in South Asia, especially by the states and state supported media and analysts."[9] Professor Muni has also suggested that the concept of terrorism has to be understood in the broader context of violence. Thus, "the main causes, the roots of political violence must be factored into while forming strategies to address the issues of terrorism and political violence."[10]

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[8] Muni, S.D. (2012), "Beyond Terrorism: Dimensions of Political Violence in South Asia", in Anand Kumar (ed.), *The Terror Challenge in South Asia and Prospect of Regional Cooperation,* New Delhi: Pentagon Press.

[9] *Ibid.*

[10] *Ibid.*

South Asia has been the target of terrorist activities for a long time. The counter-terrorism appeared in the global agenda post-9/11 attacks in America. The region is among one of the world's most badly terrorism-infested regions. Almost every country in South Asia has faced the problem of terrorism in one form or the other but the causes of terrorism differ from one country to another. South Asian region which is "home to more than one-third of humanity has more terrorist groups and terrorists, than any other part of the world. More lives have been lost in this region to terrorist attacks than anywhere else in the world." (John and Bhattacharya 2015: 1)

The issue of terrorism has also been a factor in influencing inter-state relations in South Asia. There has been animosity between countries due to terrorist activities coupled with cross-border insurgent movements, illegal trafficking of arms and apart from various other reasons, due to political and religious conflicts too.

Ethnic and religious problems in India, issues related to Jammu and Kashmir, Tamil problem in Sri Lanka, the rising phenomenon of Islamic extremism in Pakistan and Bangladesh that resulted into a series of attacks; each raises different security implications for the region. Not just this, terror has managed to leave its footprints even in Maldives. This island nation has mostly been unaffected by terrorism but now there have been reports that several Maldivians had joined al-Qaeda. This has changed in the recent years with extremist forces coming to the fore in the political turmoil that has gripped the country. Moreover, there are now credible reports of "ISIS gaining support among the youth with some young people travelling to Syria and Iraq to fight alongside the terrorist group." (John and Bhattacharya 2015: 2) The region, thus, remains politically volatile which has the potentialities to threaten global peace and stability.

Hence, Professor Muni has put terrorism and political violence under some categories namely, "ethnic/ separatist, left ideological; religious/sectarian; and externally organised" and stated that the above mentioned categories fall in the context of the South Asian nation-states. While giving the examples, he said that "the war for a Tamil homeland by the LTTE in Sri Lanka; insurgency in the Baluchistan province of Pakistan and in India's Northeast for separate identity and statehood, all fall into the ethnic category." (Muni 2012: 21) He further added that the Maoist movement in Nepal and the "left-extremism raging in India's so called 'red-corridor' (across Maharashtra and Andhra to Orissa, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, West

Bengal and Bihar) are the examples of ideologically led political violence and terrorism." (*ibid.*)

Today, the region has evoked an image where religious extremist groups like the Taliban, al Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), Jamaat-ud-Dawah (JuD), Harkat ul jihad al Islami (HuJi), and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) are quite active. Moreover, the terrorists apart from using the conventional methods of exploding earth mines, and using hand bombs, grenades and rifles have now moved beyond that and now they have adopted new methods like human bombs and use of planes as missiles to attack the target. The United States of America had witnessed the latter method in 2001. Also, new media and communication technologies (NMCT) are now "enabling the terrorists to sustain longer campaigns on several fronts by acting as publicity force multipliers, thereby bringing greater force to bear upon the governments they oppose in the form of international media attention and the resulting pressure generated by international and domestic public opinion."[11] Today, the extremists are using internet and social media to recruit and raise funds for their organisations.

Terrorism has affected the domestic political structures in South Asian countries but at the same time, it has also imposed heavy economic costs on most of the nation-states and in the last decade, the region has, indeed, emerged as the centre-stage of international terrorism. Professor Mahendra P. Lama has explained the "typologies of cross border linkages of terrorism in India." He mentioned that firstly, it is "India's neighbouring country (Pakistan) which is found to be actively involved in terrorism in India wherein examples of Pakistan's Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) involvement in the terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir and other parts of India could be cited. Though Pakistani government consistently denies such involvement, such complicity is well established and reported."[12] Secondly, according to him, "it is one of the parties in the conflict in the neighbouring countries which is found to be involved in terrorism in India wherein, he cited the instance of LTTE of Sri Lanka." (Lama 2007: 10) Moreover, "its involvement in terrorism in South India and also in the assassination

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[11] As the internet does not have any geographical and economic boundaries, therefore its reach among people has increased manifolds.
Smith, Paul J (2005), *Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia: Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability,* US: Routledge, pg. 231.

[12] Lama, Mahendra P. (2007), "Terrorism and Insurgency in India: Economic Costs and Consequences", *ICSSR Journal of Abstracts and Reviews*, 33 (1&2): 5-20.

of Rajiv Gandhi, former Prime Minister of India do give it a new variety status of cross border terrorism in India. This has strong link with the foreign policy aspects of India." (Lama 2007: 10)

He also mentioned that, thirdly, "the working of the Indian terrorist groups from the neighbouring countries has been another matrix of cross border linkages." (*ibid*.) He also cited the examples that "the ULFA in Bangladesh, KLO-ULFA and NDFB in Bhutan and some of the North East insurgency groups in Myanmar have been a major issue in the handling of terrorism in India." (*ibid:* 11) Fourthly, he mentioned that the Indian insurgents, radical groups as well as terrorists' growing coordination with their counterparts of the neighbouring nation-states have increased the militancy in India. In this context, he has cited the example of the "MCC of India with the Maoists of Nepal." And finally, he stated that "the smugglers and traffickers of small arms and drugs that usually work in the various cross border situations have manifold increased the terrorism in India to a great extent." (Lama 2007: 12)

Moreover, on the other hand, former National Security Advisor of Pakistan Mahmud Ali Durrani has delivered a lecture on March 6, 2017 which was attended by the author wherein he stated that there have been sporadic terror attacks in Pakistan too and Islamabad itself has suffered from both domestic and foreign attacks. He highlighted certain points to counter terrorism. According to him, "extremism should be discouraged at every level and each nation should make sure that their territory is not being used for terror attacks, and the existing disputes should be resolved through dialogues."[13] While explaining certain reasons that cause terrorism, he pointed out that a) "high level of illiteracy or inadequate education b) poor judicial practices or an insufficient police is major cause of frustration among the masses which lead people to take crime in their own hands, and c) poverty or an unequal distribution of wealth" become certain major factors that cause terrorism.[14]

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[13] *Durrani, Mahmud Ali (2017), "Developing a Common Denominator to Fight Terrorism in Asia", Lecture delivered on 6 March 2017 at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis: New Delhi.

[14] *Ibid*.
On India and Pakistan's relationship, Durrani stated that there has been presence of serious mistrust between each other. India and Pakistan are more interested in blaming each other. If something happens in Pakistan, the media, the bureaucrats blame the Indians and similarly, there is a "mirror image reports" in India.

The much greater attention to terrorism by non-state actors is also due to the media. N. S Saxena stated that the terrorists love the media as it is one of the most effective instruments for them to achieve their objectives. He mentioned that media was only related to daily newspapers till 1940s. It was in mid-1950s that television started getting importance in the developed societies. He also wrote that the terrorists look for media attention and they garner it by "creating sensations, which are highly newsworthy. Anything which makes news is headlines' material for the press and television no amount of preaching of morals by government agencies will prevent the press and the television from publicising sensational terrorist deeds."[15] (Saxena 1985: 13)

South Asia is an India-centric region as many nations in this region like Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan and Sri Lanka have common borders with India but these nation-states do not have common borders among themselves. Today, terrorism has been playing a significant role in influencing bilateral relations among the nation states. There have been tensions between India and Nepal, India and Bhutan and India and Bangladesh in the past due to the latter's attitude towards the growing threat of terrorism posed on New Delhi. While giving the example of Bangladesh, Niranjan Dass wrote that "India's complaints of continuing ISI activities, and shelter and support provided to the North East insurgents constitute an area of tension because few North East insurgent leaders move freely, have bank accounts and run businesses in Bangladesh."[16] Additionally, there has been infiltration of terrorists from Bangladesh to India. For several years now, India's main issue with Dhaka has been that "anti-India elements using Bangladeshi territory as a safe haven."[17]

An opinion piece in *Mint* mentioned that on the one hand, militants from the North-Eastern states have taken an advantage of the porous border and they have been slipping away from the Indian securities and on the other, "there were radical Islamist groups such as Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B) and Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) that sought to foment trouble in both countries."[18] Also, the hijacking of IC 814 in 1999 has

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[15] Saxena, N.S. (1985), *Terrorism History and Facets: In the World and in India*, New Delhi: Abhinav Publications.

[16] Dass, Niranjan (2006), *Terrorism and Militancy in South Asia*, New Delhi: M.D. Publications, pg. 113.

[17] Opinion (2017), "Bangladesh and India's Terrorism Problem", *Mint*, [Online: web], Accessed 17 June 2017, URL: http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/4AKX7qBa43epcSQ4yt6cHK/Bangladesh-and-Indias-terrorism-problem.html

[18] *Ibid.*

brought the relation between India and Nepal to a new low. Similarly, the tension had also been witnessed in Indo-Bhutan relationship due to the several reports that Bhutan has practiced a soft attitude towards National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) insurgents and "the rebel presence has been the one sore point in an otherwise excellent relationship between India and Bhutan."[19] Thus, one of the defining characteristics of South Asia's terrorism is that it calibrates the inter-state relationship as well. One another example which needs to be cited is of the conflicting relationship India has with Pakistan on the issue of terrorism emanating from the Pakistani soil. One of the major reasons for the present standstill in the bilateral relations between the two nuclear-armed neighbours (historically speaking, talks have broken down because of terrorist attacks) is the Indian assertion that Pakistan sponsored terrorism and talks cannot go hand in hand. As late as on April 5, 2017, the Minister of State for External Affairs of India, General V.K. Singh replied in the Rajya Sabha to a question on starting fresh negotiations with Pakistan,

> "During the visit of the External Affairs Minister to Pakistan in December 2015 to participate in the fifth Ministerial Conference of the Istanbul Process Heart of Asia, it was decided that Comprehensive Bilateral Dialogue on all outstanding issues would be launched. However, the terrorist attack on Pathankot Air Base on January 2, 2016 and subsequent intensification of cross border terrorism has prevented the initiation of such a dialogue. The Government has clearly stated that the onus is on Pakistan to create a conducive environment free of violence, terrorism and hostility for addressing all outstanding issues through a bilateral dialogue."[20]

Thus, it can be clearly understood that regional peace and stability in South Asia is deeply entrenched with terrorism of non-state actors because it successfully manages to dislodge dialogue between the two nuclear-armed nations. In the absence of concerted effort to maintain peace that can only be achieved through negotiations of all outstanding disputes between India and Pakistan peacefully, the situation in South Asia remains on tenterhooks and terrorism has a prime role to play for it. In this regard, it may be worthwhile to examine the historical contours of India-Pakistan relations from a time when terrorism wasn't a buzzword.

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[19] Chaudhuri, Kalyan (2003), "Bhutan's Resolve", *Frontline*, New Delhi, 02-15 August, 2003, [Online: web], Accessed 16 January 2016, URL:
http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl2016/stories/20030815001104900.htm

[20] *Singh, V.K. (2017), "Indo-Pak Talks", *Ministry of External Affairs* [Online: web], Accessed 5 June 2017, URL: http://www.mea.gov.in/lok-sabha.htm?dtl/28314/question+no5081+indo+pak+talks.

1.3 Background of India-Pakistan Relations

Probably no other bilateral relationship has gained so much global scrutiny for over six decades as the India-Pakistan relationship. Since 1947, India and Pakistan have had a problematic, conflicted and complicated relationship. Despite having so much socio-cultural commonality, ethnic as well as linguistic affinity and historic connections, both the countries have shared a strained and thorny relationship. T.V. Paul stated that the "India-Pakistan rivalry remains one of the most enduring and unresolved conflicts of our times."[21] Paul has also mentioned that "despite occasional peace overtures and periods of detente, it shows no signs of a permanent settlement in the near future." (Paul 2006: 3) While explaining certain causes of India-Pakistan conflict, Stephen P. Cohen wrote,

> "The origins of the India–Pakistan conflict have been traced to many sources: the failure of the British to manage a peaceful and politically acceptable Partition; the deeply rooted political rivalries between the subcontinent's major religious communities – Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims; the struggle for control over Kashmir; Kashmir's importance to the national identities of both states, and the greed or personal shortsightedness of leaders on both sides of the border."[22]

Calling the Indo-Pak relationship as "paired minority conflict", Cohen mentioned that the differences between India and Pakistan remain "embedded in culture, history and identity." [23] Since the partition of India in 1947 and creation of Pakistan, the two sides have fought four major wars and numerous skirmishes that still continue to affect the relationship on daily basis.

The first war which occurred in 1947-1948 between India and Pakistan lasted for more than a year. The intention was to wrest control of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir, a state that was ruled by a Hindu king but the population was largely Muslim. The state was a princely one that fell between the territories of the newly independent state of India and the newly created state of Pakistan and "the ruler of Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh was 'undecided'

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[21] TV Paul defined enduring rivalries as "conflicts between two or more states that last more than two decades with several militarised inter-state disputes punctuating the relationship in between." Paul, T.V. (2006), *The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry,* New Delhi: Cambridge House

[22] Cohen, Stephen P. (2002), "India, Pakistan and Kashmir", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 25(4), 32-60.

[23] He further explained that "such conflicts are rooted in perceptions held by important groups on both sides – even those that are not a numerical minority, and which may even be a majority – that they are the threatened, weaker party, under attack from the other side."
Ibid.

about joining either India or Pakistan and wished to remain independent. It didn't join either and remained independent for almost two months. However, large number of Pakistani tribesmen invaded Kashmir in order to take the state and oust the ruler forcing him to join India." (Schofield 2003: 11) This officially prompted India to attack and marked the beginning of the first India-Pakistan War over Kashmir. In this long, arduous battle, both the sides suffered losses of lives. India and Pakistan both agreed to a United Nations mandated ceasefire in August 1948. According to the mandate, "Pakistan was needed to withdraw both its regular and irregular armed forces. India was to have bare minimum forces to maintain law and order. The question of accession was to be fixed by a free and fair plebiscite.[24] However, the ideal conditions for plebiscite were never achieved. There were attempts to resolve the issue peacefully but what started in 1947 continues to cause enormous friction between India and Pakistan.

The second war between India and Pakistan started off as a localised skirmish in the Rann of Kutch in Gujarat in April 1965, which escalated into a full blown war in the Kashmir Valley by the beginning of August (Ganapathy 2014: 163). Though "Pakistan could inflict early damages and made some inroads, they were pushed back and Indian troops crossed the international border reaching up to outskirts of Lahore."[25] Sumit Ganguly wrote that its "outbreak bore a striking similarity to the first Kashmir conflict. Pakistan again sought to seize the territory, using soldiers disguised as local inhabitants." (Ganguly and Kapur 2010: 12) However, in a UN mandated ceasefire and peace treaty signed in Tashkent, "both sides were compelled to give up their territorial gains."[26] C. Uday Bhaskar further argued that the war ended in stalemate with no clear winner. However, "India maintained the edge with Pakistani side suffering more deaths, aircrafts and tanks."[27]

Later, the 1971 War broke out between India and Pakistan, and Bangladesh was created. This was the war where Kashmir took a backseat and the internal strife in Pakistan and its resultant

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[24] *United Nations document on India-Pak, [Online: web], Accessed 20 June 2017, URL: http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/46-51/Chapter%208/46-51_08-16-The%20India-Pakistan%20question.pdf.

[25] Joshi, Manoj (2015), "Looking Back at the 1965 War with a More Objective Eye", *The Wire*[Online: web] Accessed 1 July 2017, URL: https://thewire.in/10066/looking-back-at-the-1965-war-with-a-more-objective-eye/

[26] Bhaskar, C. Uday (2015), "50th Anniversary of 1965 India-Pakistan War: Lessons Remain Elusive" *Eurasia Review* [Online: web], Accessed 1 July 2017, URL: http://www.eurasiareview.com/02092015-50th-anniversary-of-1965-india-pakistan-war-lessons-remain-elusive-analysis/.

[27] *Ibid*.

spill over in India, ended up in conflict. The bitter civil war that started between East and West Pakistan developed into a war between India and Pakistan when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared her support for the liberation warriors of Bangladesh. It was fought on both Eastern and Western fronts with India emerging victorious. Writing on it, Major General D K Palit noted, "After a period of seeming impotence during the earlier part of Bangladesh crisis, which was perhaps the most critical period of our history, the Indian armed forces executed, within 12 days, the most decisive liberation campaign in military history – giving a nation of 75 million people its independence in one lightning strike." (Palit 1972: 15) It was also a diplomatic victory for India with many nations recognising Bangladesh immediately. Pakistan lost more than half of its population. The success of it was a direct result of Indira Gandhi's diplomatic outreach.[28] It also compelled Pakistan to sit for peace talks that gave birth to one of the most significant documents of India and Pakistan relations, the Shimla Agreement. This agreement of 1972, signed between Indira Gandhi and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto is still considered a guiding document of India-Pakistan relations as it focuses on bilateralism. The agreement pledged that neither side will resort to military aggression and maintain the sanctity of the Line of Control (LoC) to settle any dispute. While talking about the crises in 1990s, Happymon Jacob wrote that "while Kashmir receded into the background after the mid 1990s, tension between India and Pakistan did not dissipate significantly."[29] He also mentioned that through the 1990s India has witnessed "incessant cross firing." (Jacob 2016: 10)

India and Pakistan had conducted nuclear tests in May 1998 and following this, the then Indian Prime Minister and the then Pakistani Prime Minister had signed the Lahore Declaration in February 1999 for a peaceful and cooperative relationship in future. After the Lahore Declaration, India expected that cross border infiltration and militant activities in Jammu and Kashmir would reduce but in the same year, Kargil War took place in May. (Malik 2013: 102)

While explaining prospects for a turnaround in Indo-Pak relations, Muchkund Dubey said, "the decisive factor determining the Indo-Pak relations is Pakistan's definition of its self

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[28] Katoch, Major General Dhruv (2011), "Brief on India Pak War 1971: Western Theatre," *Center for Land Warfare Studies* [Online: web], Accessed 1 July 2017, URL: http://www.claws.in/743/brief-on-the-indo-pak-war-1971-western-theatre-maj-gen-dhruv-c-katoch.html.

[29] Jacob, Happymon (2016), "The Kashmir Uprising and India-Pakistan Relations: A Need for Conflict Resolution, Not Management", *Asie.Visions*, [Online: web], Accessed 1 July 2017, URL: https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/kashmir_uprising_india-pakistan_relations_jacob_2016.pdf.

identity as a diehard Islamic state and in terms of perpetual hostility towards India." He also mentioned that the possibility of a turnaround in the relationship between the two countries is "only if there is a change in this definition of Pakistan's identity." (Dubey 2016: 189)

However, as discussed in detail in the later chapters, this study will go on to demonstrate that the Pakistani side violated the 1972 agreement in letter and spirit during the next war, the Kargil War, thereby pushing the subcontinent in the clutches of instability and conflict from which we have not yet emerged unscathed. Apart from other disputes and conflicts, the Kargil War of 1999 and the attack on Indian Parliament in 2001 increased the trust deficit and tension that existed between the two countries. The optimism that marked the then Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee's historic visit to Lahore in February 1999 was short-lived when it was found that some people from Pakistan were capturing the Kargil heights at the LoC in the Kargil sector of Kashmir. Kargil War was a direct conflict between both the nations whereas the 2001 Parliament attack and the 2008 Mumbai attacks were indirect. As Sanjaya Baru wrote that "cold war of sorts has been on between India and Pakistan since November Mumbai attacks and Islamabad has done little since the 26/11 attacks to respond to New Delhi's concern about terrorism."[30]

1.4 The Press in India - A Background

The Indian press has shown phenomenal growth in the last few decades. According to the research by the World Association of Newspapers (WAN) in 2008, India had become "the second largest newspaper market in the world with about 99 million copies being sold out daily."[31]

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[30] Baru, Sanjaya (2016), "An Indo-Pak Cold War", *The Indian Express*, New Delhi, [Online: web], Accessed 24 February 2017, URL:
http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/surgical-strikes-uri-attack-india-pakistan-relation-pm-modi-saarc-summit-3061982/

[31]Also, according to WAN, "Growing literacy and new technology have resulted in India emerging as the second largest newspaper market in the world. The figures show that the four largest markets for newspapers are: China, with 107 million copies sold daily; India, with 99 million copies daily; Japan, with 68 million copies daily; and the United States, with nearly 51 million."

PTI (2008), "India, Second Largest Newspaper Mkt", *The Economic Times*, [Online: web], Accessed 3 March 2017, URL:
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/media/entertainment/media/india-second-largest-newspaper-mkt/articleshow/3096316.cms

Historically speaking, James Augustus Hickey's *Bengal Gazette* was the first newspaper that got published in India in January 1780.[32] The newspaper's main content was on "gossip and advertisements" and the Indo-Pak media owes its existence to Hickey and his *Bengal Gazette*. Soon after, the dailies like *Bombay Herald, Bombay Courier* and *Calcutta Chronicle* to name a few were started in the country. In the early nineteenth century, i.e. "in 1818, the first regional language newspaper *Samachar Darpan* was published in Bengali. Later, in 1822, *Bombay Samachar* was started." (Patil 2004: 11) Moreover, the main reason to start the newspapers in regional languages was to promote the feeling of patriotism. J.V. Vilanilam mentioned that most of the historians agree that the seeds of national awakening in India were sown in different sections of the country more or less at the same time but the Bengal Renaissance under Raja Rammohan Roy, Keshab Chandra Sen, Dwarka Nath Tagore, Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar and others was a great inspiration for thinkers in the other region of the country. Vilanilam also mentioned that along with the national awakening, there was a commitment towards social causes such as widow remarriage and banning of child marriage. (Vilanilam 2003: 31)

Slowly and steadily, the press became a strong as well as powerful tool for the freedom struggle under the leadership of prominent personalities who backed the liberal journalism and progressive ideas and were confident in the strength of media that it can mould general public's opinion and help in safeguarding the rights and liberties of the citizen. The newspapers such as *Anand Bazar Patrika, Amrita Bazar Patrika, Hitavaada,* Mahatma Gandhi's *Young India and Harijan, Free Press Journal, Matrubhumi, The Hindu and Malayam Manorama* had played prominent role in the independence movement of India. Thus, prior to 1947, the print media mainly had one goal and that was to promote the cause of independence. (*ibid.*)

Post Independence, the Indian print media underwent an immense change and there has been a phenomenal growth in the number of newspapers and their circulation too. One of the major

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[32] *Bengal Gazette* was also known as *Calcutta General Advertiser* and it was a weekly dealing exclusively with the arrivals, departures and other social, economic and cultural activities of the small British community in Calcutta (now Kolkata) which was the headquarters of East India Company (EIC). Hickey's *Gazette* raised the issues of a section of the British residents of Calcutta who were dissatisfied with the EIC's policies. Hickey himself described his paper as "political and commercial weekly open to all parties, but influenced by none." Also, the newspaper lasted only for two years because Hickey was fined and thrown in jail for tarnishing the reputation of Warren Hastings and his wife and also for focusing more on scandals.

Vilanilam, J.V. (2003), *Growth and Development of Mass Communication in India,* New Delhi: National Book Trust, pg. 9

changes was in the ownership of the newspapers as well as expansion of the press and radio. British owners and editors of the Anglo-Indian newspapers left India soon after Independence but the newspapers in India continued to grow and so did the vernacular press. Few newspapers got shut down but several continued to flourish. Moreover, the English as well as Indian language press expanded majorly in the 1960s and 1970s. [33]

The Indian media (which was predominantly print media), has undoubtedly played a pivotal role in peace building processes in South Asian region. According to N. Ram, after the independence, the press, both English language and vernacular, which was nascent at that point yet vibrant, has showcased the vitality of a strong fourth estate. Many times, the press has "pioneered freedom of expression, safeguarded human rights and thoroughly scrutinised functioning of the state." (Ram 2011: 5). He also added that

> "The Indian press is more than two centuries old. Its strengths have largely been shaped by its historical experience and, in particular, by its association with the freedom struggle as well as movements for social emancipation, reform, and amelioration. The long struggle for national emancipation; controversies and battles over social reform; radical and revolutionary aspirations and movements; compromising as well as fighting tendencies; and the competition between self-serving and public service visions of journalism – these have all found reflection in the character and performance of the Indian press over the long term." (Ram 2011: 6)

However, 1970s saw a turbulent phase for the press in independent India as the television channel was launched in India in 1972, and the critics of media were doubtful regarding the impact which the electronic media can have on the newspapers. In 1975, the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had declared Emergency in 1975 and suspended civil liberties. Soon after this, "the government took control of the press, prohibiting their reporting of all domestic and international news. The government expelled several foreign correspondents and withdrew accreditation of several Indian reporters who were covering the capital. The fundamental rights of the Indian people were suspended, and strict controls were imposed on freedom of speech and press."[34]

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[33] The Anglo Indian press with the exception of *The Statesman* (Calcutta) was taken over by Indian businessman who found that the press was a useful instrument for enhancing their socio-economic and political influence. *The Statesman* came under total Indian ownership n 1964. *The Times of India* was taken over by the Dalmias; *The Indian Express* was already in Indian hands and was run by the Goenkas.
Vilanilam, J.V. (2003), *Growth and Development of Mass Communication in India,* New Delhi: National Book Trust, pg. 9

[34] Singh, Indu B. (1980s), "The Indian Mass Media System: Before, During and After the National Emergency" *Ruttgers University* [Online: web], Accessed 19 June 2016, URL:

In a country where there is poverty, unemployment, underdevelopment and other social evils, the English language media as well as the vernacular press have performed with more responsibility than merely disseminating information and entertainment. But freedom of the press and media is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution of India. As, article 19(1)(a) states that "all the citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression which shall include the freedom of the press and other media, the freedom to hold opinions and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas."[35] But, this freedom is not absolute as article 19(2) talks about "imposing reasonable restrictions in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India."[36] K. Balasankaran Nair mentioned that "free press is the hallmark of a democratic society. It has to play a vital role in safeguarding the rights and liberties of people. This freedom is based on thinking, writing, printing and publishing with free access to information." (Nair 2004: 60) He further mentioned that "the press, as a powerful medium with tremendous influence over the public has the moral responsibility to abide by the rules and regulations and also by its own ethical considerations. But the media has a Press Council, the authority which deals with the misconduct of the press."[37]

Also, laws such as Prevention of Terrorist Activities Act (PoTA) (but later in 2006, it has been repealed) and the Official Secrets Act (OSA) (which still continues) have been used to limit the freedom of the press. (Shutlar et al 2011: 289) Moreover, Shutlar et al maintained that assassination is the deadliest form of censorship. The practice of killing journalists has become a routine in today's times. There have been several instances in the past when the newspaper offices were vandalized and journalists and editors were attacked by political parties for publishing something that was critical of their leaders. But it is debatable how much the press is free in India as the Indian media is dominated by a handful of media groups and chains.

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http://snschool.yolasite.com/resources/Indian%20media%20system%20during...pdf.

[35] *Ministry of Law, "Fundamental Rights, Directive Principles and Fundamental Duties", [Online: web], Accessed 20 February 2014, URL: http://lawmin.nic.in/ncrwc/finalreport/v1ch3.htm.

[36] *Ibid.*

[37]The Press Council of India (PCI) was first set up in 1966 as "an autonomous, statutory and quasi judicial body" by the Parliament on the recommendations of the First Press Commission with the objective of preserving the freedom of the press and of maintaining and improving the standards of press in India.
*Press Council of India, About PCI, [Online: web], Accessed 6 March 2015, URL:
http://presscouncil.nic.in/Content/29_3_History.aspx

Moreover, India started television telecasts on an experimental basis in 1959 with the help of United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). The programmes were telecast twice a week for an hour a day but the first general service began in 1965. The general programmes that were telecast were in Hindi and English and were featured on folk music and folk dances, news, light entertainment, quiz programmes, discussion on topical subjects and interviews with the distinguished personalities and experts. (Acharya 1987: 17)

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, India had black and white programmes on television as it did not have equipment for coloured transmission. The colour television broadcast and the modernisation of media began in 1980s with the live telecast of the Independence Day speech by the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on August 15, 1982, which was followed by the 1982 Asian Games. In 1991, under the leadership of the then Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao, the Government of India had opened its avenues in economic and social reforms. According to the new policies, the Government of India had opened the way for private and foreign broadcasters to involve in limited operations in India. The advent of *Star TV* in 1991 opened up new avenues in the South Asian region. According to Umar Sama, "since 1990s, India has been a witness to revolution in electronic media and online news services. Media has acquired such great control on the mind of the masses that it now controls and shapes the liking, disliking and interest in different segments of news items to a considerable extent."[38] While comparing the print media and electronic media, Sama wrote that "electronic media has grown faster in view of advantage of visual impact enjoyed by it. But the media in India also depend a great deal on governmental advertising; without such revenues, it would be difficult for many Indian newspapers to stay in business. Unfortunately, this has kept many of them vulnerable to government manipulation."[39]

Overall, media (both print and electronic) scenario has witnessed tremendous changes in the last six decades. These changes can be broadly divided into positive achievements as well as

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[38]Sama, Umar (2007), *Law of Electronic Media,* New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications.

Aggarwal, Vir Bala (2002), *Media and Society: Challenges and Opportunities*, [Online: web], Accessed 24 June 2016, URL:
https://books.google.co.in/books?id=UVoztWmsFFQC&pg=PA38&dq=India+and+electronic+media&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi1u-W84t7UAhUHrY8KHZi9BTwQ6AEIIzAA#v=onepage&q=India%20and%20electronic%20media&f=false

[39]*Ibid.*

negative trends. Justice G.N. Ray mentioned that with the globalisation and rise and advancement in communication technology, the media's ability to reach out to common man has grown tremendously. Earlier, the whole process of exchanging information was slow and restricted because of its own limitations due to which the press could not perform as effectively as it does today. This has also made it relatively easy for the state to impose certain restrictions on the media in a bid to control it. On the other hand, certain positive developments are technological breakthrough in printing which has further helped in the designing and doing attractive layout of the newspapers. Also, "the technology has made it possible and economically viable to print several editions and copies faster and at lesser cost. Thus, enabling the press to cater to more readers stationed at different locations." (Ray 2009: 6-7) Consequently, due to the technological advancement, the viewers as well as the readers have a lot of options to choose the publication which is devoted to specialised subjects. The diversity of the readership has also been achieved by increasing rate of women literacy in India who have carved a niche interest area for subjects devoted to women empowerment. Consequently, more women have joined the profession of journalism to give it a much desired gender equity.

With the growth of media, the press has also witnessed certain negative trends for instance its corporatisation over the years. Today, the leading dailies as well as news channels are run by the corporate houses. This may eventually lead towards monopoly of certain big business houses over the media.

Also, like any other organisation, media is also plagued with corruption. Such things operate both explicitly and implicitly. It is said that yellow journalism as well as blackmailing are common practices that are found in media circles. The distortion of news and paid news syndrome has become a regular feature in media. Also, earlier the content of newspaper, including the advertisements, was controlled by the editor. But today, the role of editor and that of the head of the advertising section –either manager or director – have pretty well-defined role with lesser intrusion into each other's territory. However, there has been a growing influence of owners in the content which goes into the newspaper is witnessed. (Ray 2009: 12)

Additionally Rao and Mudgal stated that "television and new media have played a powerful role in the country's transformation. With 600 million viewers, India now claims to be the second largest television market in the world. "Sixty per cent of Indian households,

approximately 119 million, have a television, and 42 per cent of those have cable services." (Rao and Mudgal 2015: 617) A.G. Noorani has mentioned that the Indian press has expanded further but nowadays, new issues have arisen on which there has been little study or reflection. The media, moreover, has seen no real audit. "Issues have been discussed episodically and forgotten. The fundamentals are overlooked." (Noorani 2006: 483) He gave an example of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The press, the Fourth Estate, like the executive and legislature, is a player in the political process. The judicial rulings affect politics, as does media reportage and commentary. (*ibid.*)

Meanwhile, it is also important to mention the brief history and status of Pakistani media. Pakistan's media has shown similarities in freedom of press, or probably lack of it in the South Asian context. However, over the years, the political manoeuvres in Pakistan have been far more drastic and compelling than any other nation in the region. Therefore, the media in Pakistan has been under a constant state of transformation.

Since the very beginning, the press freedom in Pakistan has been a victim of political instability. As a new nation-state, Pakistan remained deeply embroiled in internal strife and this has affected the press as well. Shuja Nawaz wrote that after 1947, "Pakistani media functioned according to what has been identified by Lucian Pye as a transitional communications process characterised by its urban nature and elitist approach. The press went through very little qualitative change up to the 1970s, although the number of publications increased and domestic news agencies were set up. Initially radio, and later television, grew rapidly but under strict government control." (Nawaz 1983: 937)

He also mentioned that "after an initial period of relative freedom of the press, all news media functioned under some form of government control or constraint due mainly to the nature of the legal and administrative system inherited by Pakistan from the colonial power." (*ibid.*) Beena Sarwar said, "During the initial and formative years of Pakistan, media in Pakistan that is the Urdu daily *Jang*, the English daily *Dawn* and *Radio Pakistan*, had toed the pro-government and pro-establishment line." Sarwar also said that "from 1958 to 1971, which was the Army rule, the state-controlled *Pakistan Television* (that began broadcasts in 1964), had remained very much 'his master's voice'. Along with a few newspapers and the government controlled *Radio Pakistan*, *Pakistan Television Broadcasting (PTV)* reported only what the government had allowed." (Sarwar 2011: 25) The Pakistani press, which brought forth the failures and incompetence of the state, faced several forms of strictures that

included arrests, harassments and curbs on newsprint import. In spite of always having been guaranteed freedom of speech and expression by the Constitution, be it the one adopted in 1956, 1962 or, the latest, 1973, forms of such repression still plague Pakistan's press. The time period from 1977-1988 had brought censorship, journalists being imprisoned and flogged and tortured. Basically, most of the stringent actions were taken by General Zia-ul-Haq's Martial Law regime to control or restrain the press. Also, the constitutional rights were infringed plenty of times with the imposition of martial law that also curbed freedom of the press. The government's action to control the press by using a variety of devices has never been new in Pakistan. (*ibid.*)

Newspapers germinated in Pakistan as soon as it was carved out of India. *The Jang* group of newspapers is the largest media group which is followed by the *The Dawn* group of newspapers. *The Dawn* was founded by "Quaid-e-Azam and first published in 1941, was dedicated to countering 'anti-Muslim propaganda and promoting an independent Pakistan'. The conservative newspaper *Nawa-e-Waqt,* an Urdu daily, established in 1940, was the mouthpiece of the Muslim elite who were among the strongest supporters of an independent Pakistan."[40] This group also publishes *The Nation* which is an English daily. On the other hand, *PTV* which started broadcasting in 1964, has nearly six channels. The monopoly of the state run channel ended when the market for the electronic media was liberalised in 2003 in Pakistan.[41] As the world media underwent a profound change in the last decade of the twentieth century, the change was visibly reflected in the Pakistani press as well.

Zubeida Mustafa also pointed out that the press in Pakistan, television, radio and newspapers, had failed to become as the fourth estate as expected in any democratic set-up. It lacked autonomy and independence, and could hardly play an independent role of a watchdog which monitors the policies of the government. Mustafa further added that the media in Pakistan has not been in a position to advice policymakers on issues of public concern and neither the media was "in a position to educate and inform the public objectively and honestly in order to constructively influence public opinion because it did not enjoy the freedom to perform these functions when they militated against the policies of the government." (Mustafa 2004: 56).

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[40] International Media Support (2009), "Between Radicalisation and Democratisation in an Unfolding Conflict: Media in Pakistan", [Online: web], Accessed 16 February 2016, URL: https://www.mediasupport.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/ims-media-pakistan-radicalisation-2009.pdf.

[41] *Ibid.*

Syed Abdul Siraj mentioned that there was no consistency in the freedom of press in Pakistan. Different regimes as well as the governments have used the media to prevent any public debates through its legal and constitutional means to control it. In its independent history, Pakistan has been ruled by military for a longer period of time than a civilian government. Siraj further added that "press in Pakistan usually faces threats, violence, economic pressure, etc and the country's law on blasphemy has been used against journalists. Poor literacy, urban orientation of the press, and the high price of newspapers are the factors detrimental for under-development of print media in Pakistan."[42] (Siraj 2009: 43) However, this is not to suggest that state has never played a positive role in protecting the rights of the press and the journalists. During Benazir Bhutto's first rule, the stringent permit system was replaced with free and fair import of news print at market prices. During the otherwise strict regime of General Pervez Musharraf, private players were allowed to enter the broadcast news arena of Pakistan thereby ending over a three-decade long monopoly of the state-owned (and controlled) *PTV*. This has led to a boom of news channels in Pakistan which, like the print media, are versatile in nature. Such developments can only lead to a more credible, free and constructive press regime in Pakistan which has witnessed a lot of political upheavals. But there have been several laws that curb freedom of press in Pakistan. One of the draconian laws in media's history in Pakistan was the Press and Publication Ordinance (PPO), which was introduced by Ayub Khna's military government. According to the Ordinance, "any sort of news publication had to be cleared by the government before being printed and disseminated."[43]

However, later this draconian law was replaced with the Registration of Press and Publication Ordinance of 1988. But almost till 2002, Pakistan's television media was mainly controlled

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[42] Siraj has also explained that "media in Pakistan is generally confined to big cities and prominent people. Rural and poor people's problems are usually ignored. Mostly, the print media rely on press releases which are a reflective of publicity journalism. Media owners keep journalists under their thumb by giving them contractual appointment and low salaries without benefits and allowances. Media owners are only interested in profit making and therefore not in investigative journalism." He also mentioned that "media in Pakistan is expanding but such proliferation of the press is meaningless as the journalists can't access a lot of information because of the rules which prevents media freedom."

Siraj, S.A. (2009), "Critical Analysis of Press Freedom in Pakistan", *Journal Media and Communication Studies,* 1(3): 043-047.

[43] Peshimam, Gibran (2013), "Media Powered Democracy: How Media Support has been Pivotal to Pakistan's Latest Democratization Project", *Reuters Institute,* [Online: web], Accessed 5 June 2017, URL: https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Media-powered%20democracy-%20how%20media%20support%20has%20been%20pivotal%20to%20Pakistan's%20latest%20democratization%20project.pdf

by the state. Pervez Musharraf's military government "had promulgated Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) Ordinance, 2002 and it had provided with the powers to seal any building where it believed illegal transmissions were aired and to cancel the licence of any TV channel involved in the same sort of illegal activities." (Mezzera and Sial 2010: 10) Amir Mir while talking about the press freedom in India and Pakistan states that "though media is relatively free in both the countries, the two states often use their coercive state apparatus selectively to project and highlight their official perspectives through their mass media." (*cited in* Noorani 2006: 484)

The media in India since its independence in 1947 has been more or less free, vibrant but not the ideal model of the fourth pillar of democracy. In March 2010, Noam Chomsky, in an interview to *Outlook* magazine said that "the media in India is free and the government does not have the power to control it. However, it is pretty restricted, very narrow and provincial."[44] Chomsky further said that the "media in Pakistan is more open, free and vibrant than that in India."[45] However, the UNESCO report released in March 2012 ranked Pakistan as the second most dangerous country for journalists the world over."[46]

Moreover, the World Press Freedom Index, 2016, has ranked India 133rd out of 180 countries mentioned in the list. India has jumped three places compared with 2015's ranking.[47] These rankings which come annually are based on freedom allowed to journalists in countries around the world. This study will be primarily looking at the three major attacks that have occurred on India's soil, namely, the Kargil War of 1999, the Parliament attack in 2001 and the Mumbai terror attacks in 2008. The Kargil War which stated in May 1999 was

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[44] Chomsky has also said that "the crisis in the media is not a result of its declining revenues as much as its intellectual dishonesty."
Raman, Anuradha and Ashraf, Ahaz (2010), "Media Subdues the Public. It's So in India, Certainly" *Outlook,* [Online: web], Accessed 24 January 2014, URL: http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?267553.

[45] *Ibid.*

[46] The report titled "Safety and the danger of Impunity" has mentioned "that a dramatic increase in the number of media staffers killed in Pakistan has been witnessed from two and six killings registered in the two previous reports, respectively, to 16 during 2010-11." After analysing the report in depth, it was figured out that "worrying proportion of victims was freelance journalists."
Ahmad, Amin (2012), "UNESCO Ranks Pakistan Second Most Dangerous for Journalists" *The Dawn,* [Online: web], Accessed 20 November 2014, URL: https://www.dawn.com/news/715281.

[47] According to the World Press Fredom Index, "Among India's neighbouring countries, Pakistan ranks 147, Sri Lanka stands at 141, Afghanistan at 120, Bangladesh (144), Nepal (105), Bhutan (94) and China at 176th in rank."
PTI (2016), "India Ranks133 in Press Freedom Index", *The Hindu,* [Online: web], Accessed 5 January 2017, URL: http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-ranked-low-in-press-freedom-index/article8500250.ece

the outcome of the infiltration of Pakistani troops along with militants into Kargil sector of Jammu and Kashmir along LOC. The intrusion in Kargil had come as a complete surprise to the Indian Army which launched "*Operation Vijay*" immediately to flush out the enemy from the Indian soil. This direct conflict between India and Pakistan took place at a time when electronic journalism was evolving in India, and subsequently, the coverage of Kargil War turned out to be India's first war in the age of television. For the first time, the Indian reporters and correspondents went to a battlefront to cover the War. The footages of the war were telecast live on the television. A sizeable chunk of television viewers of India got intrinsicly attached to the coverage that prompted the government to devise an articulated media strategy.

Another major attack that occurred in India was in December 2001. It was a brazen attack as it happened in the Parliament of world's largest democracy. The relations between India and Pakistan were at an abyss during the Kargil War of 1999. With this attack, bilateral relationship between India and Pakistan had reached a new low. The attack on Indian Parliament is still considered as one of the most shocking acts of terrorism in the history of such attacks on India.

The November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack which had killed people in hundreds is one of the most significant events that affected Indo-Pak relationship majorly. The attack was carried out by Pakistani nationals who entered India through sea route aiming at high value targets across the city of Mumbai. Their main targets were Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus (CST), the Leopold Café and Taj Hotel, the Oberoi – Trident Hotel, the Nariman House, Metro Cinema and the Cama hospital. Oberoi – Trident Hotel and the Nariman House, a residential building in Colaba. It assumed an international characteristic because foreign nationals were killed in the five star hotels and a Jewish centre was also attacked. When it comes to covering the attacks, for the first three days, the Indian press, the Pakistani press along with the other foreign press extensively focused on the developments of the anti-terror operations which were carried out primarily by the National Security Guards (NSG) commandos with the help of other law enforcement agencies to flush out the terrorists holding up in the hotels and the Jewish centre. The condemnation from all the major countries was swift and profound, including Pakistan. But Pakistan had claimed that India had no evidence of the role of Pakistan in the attack and that it would not charge any of its citizens unless given concrete evidence.

India–Pakistan relations have always been a pivotal issue for the media of both India and Pakistan. However, with so much passion involved in various aspects of the India–Pakistan relations, it is often noticed that the press does not follow the puritan form of journalism. History has documented that the press can be patriotic and religious in its functioning which can often be an obstacle to objective reporting, particularly on a thorny issue like the Indo-Pak ties.

1.5 Survey of the Literature

It is significant to understand the nature of the influence of media on foreign policy makers as well as public. According to N. Jayapalan, "Public opinion, both national and international, is an important input of foreign policy. The foreign policy makers of each nation have to accept and give due place to the opinion of the people they represent as well to the world public opinion." (Jayapalan 2001: 10). This rings true in a democracy and India being the largest one can be presumed to exhort considerable pressure of public opinion on the policy makers. Foreign policy making cannot be an exception.

The behaviour of countries, their policy priorities and their approaches to foreign policy are embossed on perceptions which shape their foreign policy outlook. In the context of Indo-Pak relations, these perceptions are even more vital in order to comprehend the complex nature of bilateral relations between the two neighbours, Smruti Pattanaik said, adding that "the media plays a significant role in shaping some of these perceptions, thereby influencing foreign policy decision making not only in terms of providing inputs in the form of news reports, but also having the potential to contribute substantially in terms of policy formulation. This is because newspapers, while reflecting public opinion in the form of criticism and suggestions through the editorial pages, at the same time also influence people are thinking." (Pattanaik 2004: 7)

Over the last two decades the literacy rate of India has improved considerably and various studies reflect that the penetration of newspapers among Indians is steadily growing. Internet, though still has a limited penetration, it is still a medium that is gaining ground fast among at least the urban population. People can now read a variety of newspapers because of the availability of online editions of almost all the major dailies in the country. With such a surge in readership, the impact newspapers can create is enormous. With the features of instant feedbacks through online comments and other methods (such as sharing articles, signing

newspaper sponsored petitions, and writing to the editors) they hold a mirror of what the society is thinking. Walter Lippman's "Agenda Setting Theory" (as was described in his 1922 book *Public Opinion* but termed so retrospectively by later scholars) illustrated "how mass media influences and shapes public perception though images." Moreover, "perceptions acquired from pictures and words have far-reaching implications, Bernard Cohen said, adding that "the press is significantly more than a purveyor of information and opinion. It may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling people what to think about." He also said that "if we do not see a story in the newspapers (or catch it on radio or television), it effectively has not happened so far as we are concerned." He further added that "the press is a significant part of the public audience for foreign policy." (Cohen 1963: *n.d.*) The marriage of mass media with the new media has all but widened the scope of this. Cohen added that "media helps to create or shape the outlines of foreign policy issues in the minds of the general public, of organised groups, and of government official more or less remote or removed from these particular issues" (Cohen 1965: 199-200).

The media's influence on foreign policy is "shaped by two important factors", Sanjaya Baru said, adding that "first, the extent of domestic political disagreement or consensus on foreign policy issues; and secondly, the relationship between the Government of the day and the media." (Baru 2009: 278). He also wrote that:

> "the electronic media, like Parliament, has become an arena in which party political differences on foreign policy do get articulated more forcefully because of the nature of the medium. In fact, television news channels may have contributed to increased public discord on foreign policy by deliberately strait-jacketing all 'discussions' into binary, conflictual 'for-and-against' debates. Rather than facilitate a consensus such 'argumentative' debates foster divergence. While television resorts to this practice to increase viewer attention and make news more 'entertaining', this has increased the role of the media in shaping political thinking on foreign policy." (*ibid*.: 279)

Within the Indian context, public opinion plays an important role in influencing India's future foreign policy goals, a role that will become more crucial in future, "owing to the fragmented nature of the current political landscape." (Kapur 2009: 290) Baru wrote that media's role in shaping Indian foreign policy has intensified because of three factors: "1) the gradual erosion of the domestic political consensus on foreign policy, giving the media the role of an arbiter and an independent analyst of contending political views; 2) the media revolution and its private expansion which has alleviated its dependence on government support; 3) the

increasing influence of the middle class and the business class in the media has also influence media thinking on foreign policy." (Baru 2009: 279-280)

Therefore, media has played a significant role in influencing public opinion and the government cannot afford to marginalise the media in a democratic country. It is not necessary that it influences the policy makers directly but, it may work through public opinion.

But as several theories suggest that terrorists use media for their publicity and on the other hand, media focuses on sensationalism for its television rating points (TRPs) and for the readership. Thus, understanding this relationship becomes essential. According to B. Raman, "Terrorism is a threat, a modus operandi and a phenomenon." (Raman 2013: *n.d*) Today, the terrorists are not using the conventional ways for the attacks rather they use highly sophisticated weapons and Raman called this process as multi-dimensional threat. He said that now the terrorists "use the hand-held weapons, improvised explosive devices, suicide bombers, landmines, mobile phones as triggers, aircraft hijackings, cyber-attack through internet etc." *(ibid.)* Therefore, the terrorists choose the place of their strike very carefully in order to get the best reportage from the media. The appropriate instances of this are the September 11 attacks in the United States of America in 2001 and 26/11 attacks in Mumbai in 2008 where the media globally has covered these incidents immediately. One of the common components of the several definitions of terrorism is the idea that the "terrorists attract an inordinate amount of media attention." (Dass 2008: 63)

Bruce Hoffman said on the media and the terrorist attacks that "without the media's coverage the act's impact is arguably wasted, remaining narrowly confined to the immediate victim(s) of the attack, rather than reaching the wider 'target audience' at whom the terrorists' violence is actually aimed." (Hoffman 2006: 174). Likewise, Brigitte Nacos also said: "Without massive news coverage the terrorist act would resemble the proverbial tree falling in the forest: if no one learned of an incident, it would be as if it had not occurred." (Nacos 2000: 175) The new generation tech savvy terrorists are more equipped to exploit such media attention. N. S. Saksena mentioned that the "terrorists love the media as it is one of the most potent instruments of achieving their objectives. Till the 1940s, media meant the daily newspapers but since mid-1950s television is becoming even more important in the developed world." (Saksena 1985: 13) The terrorists want attention by creating sensations, which are highly newsworthy. Anything which makes news is headlines' material for the

press and television and no amount of preaching of morals by government agencies will prevent the press and the television from publicising sensational terrorist deeds. (*ibid.*) According to Amit Baruah, "In the summer of 1999, India and Pakistan fought a 'mini-war' in Kargil, where the power of Indian news channels was on show. Not only did the media projection of 'victory' help the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to come to power in the 1999 elections, it displayed the power of India's growing 24/7 television channels." (Baruah 2008: 195) Moreover, Muhammad Adeel Javaid mentioned, "To show or not to show, how much and how to show was the question. Rarely has the Indian media faced the kind of challenges it did during the coverage of the Mumbai terror attacks." (Javaid 2012: 291)

Des Freedman and Daya Kishan Thussu stated that the Indian media "was not geared to cover such high-optic unfolding events and tended to sensationalism and shortcuts for Pakistan bashing. Operating in an extremely competitive commercial environment, the news networks were aiming to be first with the exclusives, and in the process, the line between objective and subjective coverage and news and entertainment was constantly blurring." (Freedman and Thussu 2012: 79) Ingrid A Lehmann mentioned that at the time of the crises internationally, "the media in most countries usually operate within the sphere of a prevailing national consensus. Journalists as well as citizens are less likely to criticise their governmental leadership during times of perceived threats to national security." (Lehmann 2004: 3) Dennis Kux observed that "until recent years, newspapers and television coverage in both India and Pakistan on the whole has faithfully reflected the respective official lines". (Kux 2006: 53) This is a debatable generalisation in the context of India.

The Times of India carried an editorial on December 1, 2008 which stated that "All roads from the Mumbai terror attacks seem to lead to Pakistan. The only captured terrorist is a Pakistani... Even if one presumes that elements in the Pakistani government are not involved in the attacks, evidence points to Pakistani soil being used to mount these attacks on India. Islamabad can't escape without accounting for this. It has promised full cooperation in investigating the attacks."[48] Writing in *The Hindu* on December 7, 2008, India's media critic Sevanti Ninan described the coverage of attacks as "a non-stop, news-generated soap opera that you could plug into whenever you wished."[49] Nasim Zehra stated that "as news of the

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[48] Editorial (2008), "Go To the Source", *The Times of India,* New Delhi, 1 December 2008.

[49] Ninan, Sevanti (2008), "Do We Deserve This?", *The Hindu,* New Delhi, 7 December 2008.

Mumbai terror attacks spread countrywide, shock and horror were woven with sorrow and sympathy in India. However, soon this sympathy began transforming into disbelief. Even before the bloody saga in Mumbai had ended, sections of the Indian media were pointing accusatory fingers at Pakistan, claiming the terrorists had been trained in Karachi. The terrorists were still inside the buildings, but the Indian media was already reporting on their nationality, the weapons they carried, the phones they were using!"[50]

According to Beena Sarwar, "Journalists may argue that they are just the messenger, reflecting official or public opinion. But the media must also question, and get people to think. The stakes are high in our nuclear-armed countries, in a post-9/11 world where the major players include armed and trained men around the world who subscribe to the ideology of Al Qaeda and the Taliban."[51] Khaled Ahmed in *The Friday Times* wrote that the "media war that began between India and Pakistan after 2008 should have ended after that, with the Pakistani media eating humble pie, but it did not happen."[52] He made it clear that "after the latest admission by Intelligence officials before an anti-terrorism court (ATC) in Rawalpindi's Adiala jail that the suspects in the Mumbai attacks case got training at various centres of the banned LeT militant organisation, including navigational training in Karachi, should have been covered by the Pakistani media in greater detail."[53] Dileep Padgaonkar said on Indo-Pak relations that the outcome of talks between Indian and Pakistani foreign ministers points to a slow but cautious and steady progress. He went on to call the then Indian Foreign Minister, S.M. Krishna, a "tortoise" and his Pakistani counterpart, Heena Rabbani Khar, a "hare".[54] Not just this, he went to say that "the memories of partition and of the liberation of Bangladesh may longer numb the reflexes of Pakistan or inform India's endeavour to normalise ties with its western neighbour. But New Delhi cannot look the other way and

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[50] Zehra, Nasim (2008), "Conveyor Belt Hacks", *Outlook,* New Delhi, 15 December 2008.

[51] Sarwar, Beena (2008), "When 'Nationalism' Trumps Responsible Reporting", *The Hoot,* [Online: web], Accessed 16 July 2016, URL:
http://www.thehoot.org/research/media-monitoring/when-nationalism-trumps-responsible-reporting-3520.

[52] Khaled, Ahmed (2012), "'Outing' Elements Behind Mumbai attacks", *The Friday Times*, [Online: web], Accessed 12 September 2015, URL:
http://www.thefridaytimes.com/beta3/tft/article.php?issue=20121123&page=4.

[53]*Ibid.*

[54] Padgaonkar, Dileep (2012), "Indo-Pak Talks: Patience and Persistence", *Times of India,* [Online: web], Accessed 20 June 2016, URL:
http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/talking-terms/indo-pak-talks-patience-and-persistence/.

pretend that the scars of the 26/11 terrorist attacks in Mumbai have healed. That dastardly incident will haunt Indian public opinion so long as its perpetrators are not brought to book and the terror infrastructure on Pakistani soil, that continues to wreak havoc in India, is not dismantled."[55]

The noted editor suggested that "a 'modest but steady progress' on non-confrontational issues like liberalisation of visas and more people to people contact will clear the path to deal with the more contentious issues - Sir Creek, Siachen and Kashmir, and went on to advise that 'patience and persistence, not overreach, are of the essence'."[56]

The Indo-Pak relations sank to new depths as the Indian government and the press had blamed Pakistan for all these attacks and the latter had remained in denial. Pakistan maintained the saying that there are no tangible evidences against Pakistan in connection with 26/11 attacks. *The Times of India (*2009) stated that the then Pakistan Prime Minister, Yousuf Raza Gilani had claimed, "the material provided by India on the Mumbai attacks constituted 'information' and not evidence and said that 'pragmatic cooperation' was the way forward for dealing with the 26/11 terror attacks. All that has been received formally from India is some information. I say information because this is not the evidence. This needs to be carefully examined."[57]

Michael Krepon (2012) on the other hand stated that the current attempts (in 2012) between "Indian and Pakistani leaders, and the officials to resurrect the peace process between the two countries and the success it had been having in recent months led to some policy wonks in Washington, and even in administration circles. This shows that India-Pakistan relations were then, that is, in 2012, much better than US-Pakistan relations, and thus, once again made the time ripe for Pakistan-based terrorists to carry out another strike at some of India's iconic targets."[58] He recalled that "in both the 'twin-peaks' (Pakistan-based terrorist attacks in India

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[55] *Ibid.*

[56] *Ibid.*

[57]PTI (2009), "26/11 Dossier Mere Info Not Proof: Gilani", *The Times of India,* [Online: web], Accessed 10 September 2013, URL:
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Let_us_conduct_probe_India_can_wait_Gilani/rssarticleshow/3973495.cms.

[58] Haniffa, Aziz (2012), "'India Remains Vulnerable to Spectacular Attacks", *Rediff,* [Online: web], Accessed 5 January 2017, URL:
http://www.rediff.com/news/report/india-remains-vulnerable-to-spectacular-attacks-krepon/20120227.htm.

in 2001-2002) and the 2008 cases, the attacks occurred after attempts by political leaders in Pakistan and India to improve relations."[59]

As the dialogues between India and Pakistan had shunned, the press in both the countries had even tried to play the role of peace facilitator between the two. For instance, the movement was jointly launched by India's *The Times of India* and Pakistan's *Jang* Group, called, "Aman ki Asha" (AKA), hope for peace, on January 1, 2010 to promote amity between the two countries. Today, the dynamics of foreign relations are also somewhat intertwined with the stand that media takes. It simply implies the ever-increasing credibility and power of media.

Thus, this study includes models of media effects. It also includes the concepts and several theories of media that are applied on foreign policy matters, and those are, Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw's (1972) "Agenda Setting Theory", "CNN Effect" and Sandra Ball-Rokeach and Melvin DeFleur's (1976) "Media Systems Dependency Theory (MSDT)". Moreover, the study also talks about Marshall Mc Luhan's Theory of Communication.

1.6 Definition, Rationale and Scope of the Study

The study deals with the role that print and electronic media of India played in covering the Kargil War of 1999, the Parliament attack in 2001 and the Mumbai terror attacks in 2008. These three particular conflicts are taken in the study as these three were tragic events that brought security threats to India and it resulted in great loss of human lives. These incidents have not only shocked the whole country but the world at large by its sheer audacity as well as their attacks on "high value" targets. The English print as well as electronic coverage was relentless and minute.

The peace process between India and Pakistan has always been hampered in the past because of the growing number of proxy wars, conflicts and terror attacks that have been launched in India. The Kargil War, The Parliament attack, and the latest being The Mumbai attacks, inflicted a severe blow to the ongoing peace talks between the two nations and suspended the bilateral dialogue between the two nuclear powered neighbours.

The regional peace is always at tenterhooks because of the tense relation between the two neighbours. Any large scale conflict between the two has a potential of not only destabilise

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[59] *Ibid.*

the region but also affect the global order of balance of power and geopolitics. Thus, a breakthrough in the peace process or a breakaway from the peace process, both need to be intensely focused upon.

1.7 Objectives of the Study

Certain objectives of the study are:

- To understand the relationship between press, public opinion and foreign policy decision making within the context of different sorts of conflicts between India and Pakistan.

- To comprehend the nature and pattern of coverage of major conflicts between India and Pakistan post 1999 by leading Indian English dailies and news channels.

- To determine the importance of public opinion in India as an important determinant in its relations with Pakistan; the further aim is to do a comparative analysis of role of Indian media in nurturing and shaping up this aspect of the public opinion during the major conflicts.

1.8 Research Questions

Certain questions which will guide this study are enumerated below:

- What are the dynamics of the relationship between press, public opinion and foreign policy of India?

- How have the bilateral relations between the two nuclear-armed neighbouring countries shaped post three major direct and proxy conflicts since 1999? Did Indian media play a main role in shaping up of public opinion during these conflicts given its much wider reach when compared to the coverage of earlier conflicts between the two neighbouring countries?

- Is the role of public opinion more critical in Indian foreign policy formulations with respect to Pakistan with the Indian media acting as an agent of information and feedback to the policy makers in a more widespread manner than ever?

1.9 Hypotheses

The Hypotheses of the study are:

1. Print and electronic media have played more negative rather than positive role in influencing India's foreign policy with respect to Pakistan.

2. The impact of print and electronic media was the most during the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks as compared to the Kargil war of 1999 and 2001 Parliament attack.

1.10 Research Methodology

The methodology for this study is deductive reasoning. The study involves the content analysis of the newspapers and electronic channels. In order to answer the aforementioned questions, this study analyses national English dailies and the channels of India. For the completion of the study, five Indian English dailies -- *The Hindu, The Times of India, The Indian Express, The Telegraph and The Hindustan Times* are chosen. The English news channels which are selected for the study are *DD News, Star News, NDTV and Times Now*. Additionally, Pakistani English dailies for instance *The Dawn, The Nation and The Daily Times* are also consulted in the study for the comparison wherever required.

These newspapers and channels are chosen on the basis of their popularity, their readership, their viewership and their different ideological orientations so as to provide a wide and broader understanding of the opinions of different sections of people. The news coverage in the media was intense for a fortnight and gradually the intensity came down. But some aspects related to the events kept featuring in the media for months to follow. Therefore, from the year 1999 till 2008 are taken as the period to analyse the above mentioned dailies and channels.

Primary reports published by the global organisation (like the United Nations) as well as Indian organisations will be accessed. The reports of Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (I&B) are also consulted. Interviews of prominent scholars and journalists are carried out for establishing certain perspectives on the study. For secondary sources, reports published in an array of journals, periodicals and other newspapers are consulted.

Archival research is done to understand the background of the topic. Several books and commentaries are also referred to.

The Times of India has been chosen as it reflects centrist views; *The Indian Express* has been considered as it is centre-right in its opinion while *The Hindu* and *The Telegraph* are seen as centre-left. Also, *The Hindustan Times* has also been centrist in its approach. Print and electronic media, due to the nature of separate media together, could give detailed analyses of the events. Therefore, doing a detailed study of the role of print and electronic media of India becomes quite essential. Also, in order to analyse the role of media in covering the above mentioned conflicts, it is necessary to do a comparative analysis of selected English national dailies as well as news channels.

According to the Indian Readership Survey (IRS), 2012, *The Times of India* "remains India's most widely read English newspaper with a readership that exceeds the combined readership of its three closest competitors, *The Hindustan Times*, *The Hindu* and *The Telegraph*."[60] It is published by "Bennett, Coleman & Co. Ltd." which is owned by the Jains. *The Indian Express* was founded in 1931 and is owned by the Indian Express group. This paper is popular for raising a critical voice against government's policies. *The Hindu* was founded in 1878 and is owned by Kasturi and Sons Limited. According to IRS, 2012, "it is the third most widely read English newspaper in India with a readership of 2.2 million." *The Telegraph* was launched in 1982 and is published by the ABP group of publications. In a short span, the daily has become the largest circulated English daily in the eastern part of the country. The IRS report added that *The Hindustan Times* is the second largest daily of the country (after the *TOI*). The newspaper's "average issue readership (AIR) grew to 3,820,000 in the fourth quarter up from 3,786,000 in the third quarter in the year 2013."[61]

The electronic channels that are referred in the research are: *DD News, Star News, NDTV 24*7* and *Times Now*. *DD News* is important as it was the first news channel and it is the only government owned news channel. *STAR News* was launched in February 1998. It was the first bilingual (English - Hindi) news service and was initially run by *STAR* on its own with *NDTV*

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[60] TNN (2013), "TOI Bigger Than Next 3 Together", *The Times of India,* [Online: Web], Accessed 14 August 2015, URL: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/TOI-bigger-than-next-3-together/articleshow/19283143.cms.

[61] Sheikh, Aminah (2013), "Newspapers See Marginal Growth in Q4: IRS", *Mint*, [Online: Web], Accessed 5 February 2014, URL: http://www.livemint.com/Consumer/t5WYyhADdyRjwFP5VMMySN/Newspapers-see-marginal-growth-in-Q4-IRS.html.

doing the production till 2003. However, when the agreement with *NDTV* expired in 2003, STAR News was transformed into a completely Hindi news channel, a part of *STAR* and *ABP* tie - up. *NDTV 24*7* is also one of the oldest privately owned news channels in India. *NDTV* and *STAR* News collaborated to cover the Indian sub-continent's first live war. *NDTV* today, is the most watched and the most respected news and lifestyle network in India. *Times Now* was launched in 2006 by Times Global Broadcasting Company Limited, a joint-venture of 5 the Times Group and *Reuters*.[62] It has since then become the most popular 24-hour English news channel.

The **second chapter** titled "Press, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework" of this study deals with the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy with special reference to both print and electronic media. It looks into how public opinion is an important determinant of foreign policy. The chapter also emphasises on the theories of mass communication like Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw's (1972) "Agenda Setting Theory" and Sandra Ball-Rokeach and Melvin DeFleur's (1976) "Media Systems Dependency Theory" (MSDT) and CNN effect. Further, it talks about models of media effects, and the role of media in foreign policy making with special reference to India.

The **third chapter,** "Media and the Kargil War of 1999" of the research, analyses and compares the role and various aspects of Indian media's (both electronic and print) coverage of the Kargil War. It also talks about the conflict, the government's role, the issues related to national security and about Pakistan's actions. The chapter also mentions whether the media echoed the same voice as that of the ruling government or not.

The **fourth chapter** titled "Media and the Attack on Indian Parliament in 2001" compares and analyses the role and various aspects of Indian media's coverage of the attack on Indian Parliament.

The **fifth chapter** titled "Media and the 26/11 Mumbai Terror Attacks in 2008" critically analyses and compares the role and various aspects of Indian media's coverage of the 26/11 Mumbai attacks.

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[62] K.K., Sruthijith (2008), "After CEO Exit, Times Now May Part Ways with Partner Reuters", *Mint,* [Online: Web], Accessed 4 March 2014, URL:
http://www.livemint.com/Consumer/MR7k4gZPHGeejqK7kDrNnN/After-CEO-exit-Times-Now-may-part-ways-with-partner-Reuters.html.

The **sixth** (i.e. the last chapter) of the study is "Conclusion" which has the concluding observations, tests the hypotheses and tries to answer the research questions.

CHAPTER 2

PRESS, PUBLIC OPINION AND FOREIGN POLICY: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In a democratic state, it has never been possible for any government to ignore the importance of public opinion in both domestic and foreign policies. This has become all the more true in the present scenario with the revolution in information technology, telecommunications and mass media. As a result, today, people are more informed about the world affairs than they were earlier. Public opinion has various effects on how policy is constructed or even viewed. According to Winston Churchill, there is "no such thing as public opinion - there is only published opinion."(*cited in* Berg 2008: 1) On the other hand, Abraham Lincoln stated that "our Government rests in public opinion… a Government of people, where the voice of all the men of the country, enter substantially into the execution - or administration, rather - of the Government - in such a Government, what lies at the bottom of it all, is public opinion." (Guelzo 2014: 171) He also mentioned that "Public sentiment is everything" and added, "Whoever can change public opinion can change the government." (*ibid.*)

In common parlance, one can define public opinion as the collective beliefs or attitudes by the general public. Public opinion takes a proper shape after several processes of modifications, consolidation and clarifications. It is an essential component of the working of a democratic nation—state. [63]

One of the main functions of public opinion in a stable government is to provide a generalised support for the regime. Historically, foreign policy has been considered a core sovereign and specialised domain where governments do not want to be restricted by domestic constraints and uphold sanctity of national interest which, at times, might be contrary to populist public opinion.

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[63]Public opinion is significant as it guides the government in enacting laws for the betterment. It acts like a watchdog for government as it checks its policies for taking an irresponsible step. Public opinion protects the rights of people. In a democratic nation-state, people have the right to support or criticise the government in their own way. Thus, in the age of globalisation, public opinion acts as a powerful instrument in international sphere. Today, the governments remain conscious of international public opinion also. Therefore, no democratic government can afford to ignore public opinion.

The role of public opinion goes through a differential trajectory of engaged and vigorous debates, especially, in multi-ethnic democracies like India. Public opinion cannot be formed through any automatic process. If the public finds an issue which concerns it, several sections of society from various backgrounds then express their views on that particular subject. In this whole process, certain views of public get wider attention and they are able to establish public opinion.

In a democracy, the decisions over domestic and foreign policies rest with the common people but there are always certain limitations. For instance, the involvement of people in foreign policy matters in developing countries is limited as compared to the advanced countries. One of the reasons could be indifferent attitude towards the subject. Illiteracy among people coupled with poverty being the other. However, free press, which is unbiased and objective, is imperative for the formulation of a healthy public opinion.

Sheila S. Coronel stated that despite tendencies of present day's media towards sensationalising, sleaze and superficiality, modern day's politicians still see them as an important tool of democracy and leave no opportunity to praise them. Coronel suggested that "contemporary democratic theory appreciated media's role in ensuring governments' accountability. In both new and old democracies, the notion of the media as watchdog and not merely a passive recorder of events are widely accepted."[64]

Moreover, public opinion varies with regard to the issues in a democracy. Similarly, the nature of public opinion also differs from one country to another depending on factors like the existing political system, past history, the freedom of the press, and furthermore, it also depends on people's economic as well as social conditions. For instance, media is available in all the nation states but it works differently in democratic country like India and in an authoritarian country like China. Also, "the process by which citizens acquire political

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[64]Coronel has also maintained that the "media serves as a conduit between governors and the governed and provides a platform for public debate that leads to more intelligent policy- and decision-making." Not just this, she has quoted Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen in her article *The role of the media in deepening democracy* as saying: "Media acts as a watchdog not just against corruption but also against disaster. A free press and the practice of democracy contribute greatly to bringing out information that can have an enormous impact on policies."
Coronel, S. Sheila, "The Role of Media in Deepening Democracy" [Online: web], Accessed 25 February 2016, URL: http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan010194.pdf.

opinions is complex. It involves a continuous interplay among institutional sources of information and persuasion, interpersonal contacts and ideological and personality factors." (Janowitz and Hirsch 1981: 52)

Moreover, one cannot ignore the strong influence which public opinion has on politics through its "latent aspects." Ann Hosein quoting V.O. Key (1961), said, "latent public opinion is future reaction by the public to a current decision of the government establishment and warned that politicians who ignore the possible consequences of latent public opinion risk a setback or defeat in future elections." (Hosein 2016: 59-60)   Hosein further wrote that "government leaders, who keep in mind latent public opinion, can take an unpopular action that has a negative effect on public opinion in the near term, provided the action is also likely to have a significant positive effect at a later and more important time." (*ibid.*) Furthermore, the public opinion, in case of foreign policy, sets firstly, broad limits of constraint regarding the choice of policies – the mood of the public; and secondly, constraints in the policy execution. (*ibid.*)

Devesh Kapur viewed public opinion on foreign policy "to be largely acquiescent (i.e. latent) or at least implicitly supportive of the policy actions of the government in power. But public opinion can also be 'primed' and strategically manipulated to support (or oppose) policy changes which may challenge long cherished shibboleths, whether compromising on boundary disputes or international agreements, or aligning with new partners."[65] (Kapur 2015: 1)

Talking about the public opinion in India and foreign policy in India, Kapur also mentioned that foreign policy here has been mainly "dominated by the executive branch." During the days of Jawaharlal Nehru, foreign policy in India used to be an area of elite until war with China in 1962. Although, efficacy can be debated, "the combination of Nehru's personal stature and his leadership of India's pre-eminent ruling party underpinned the domestic legitimacy of Indian foreign policy. Popular legitimation meant that public opinion on foreign

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[65] While explaining further the role of public opinion in foreign policy, he also mentioned "the information revolution of the recent past has ensured that media sources no longer serve as a passive transmitter of national policy from government to people. Rather, the press plays the role of independent actor and ultimately shaper of public opinion as regards foreign policy in democracies. He also mentioned that in particular, when political elite are at loggerheads over foreign policy, media plays a pivotal role in making this conflict overt and susceptible to the influence of public opinion."
Kapur, Devesh (2015), "Public Opinion", [Online: web], Accessed 15 July 2016, URL: https://casi.sas.upenn.edu/sites/casi.sas.upenn.edu/files/bio/uploads/Public_Opinion.pdf.

policy was channelled through the opposition members of Parliament and the print media, which served as the vehicle for opinion-makers." (Kapur 2015: 2) Further Sanjaya Baru argued that "the Congress Party's dominance and a high degree of consensus among mainstream political parties meant that the media played a marginal role and did not influence official thinking in any significant way." (Baru 2009: 278)

Kapur also mentioned that even when foreign policy was dominated by elites who are ruling, care was taken of "latent public opinion wherever sensitivities of certain sections of the population mattered." He cited examples of India's West Asia policy which was devised keeping in mind religious minorities of the country, policy towards Sri Lanka keeping interests of regional groups or hard-line policy towards Pakistan in view of sentiments of majority community. (Kapur 2009: 290)

Not just this, it is also mentioned that there is a broad agreement on the growing role of mass media in shaping public opinion with shifts in the media's role from "a passive transmission mechanism that informed the public of the views of opinion-makers, to a more activist role." (Kapur 2015: 304) Kapur also stated that "the former was perhaps especially the case of the English print media in India. Increasingly, however, the advent of 24/7 TV news and the electronic platforms has made the media an independent actor in its own right, its priming effects on public opinion evident in a range of cases, sometime forestalling, sometimes goading the government to act and circumscribing the traditional autonomy of foreign policy elites." (*ibid.*)

2.1 Different Models of Public Opinion

There has been a debate over several decades among different schools of thought regarding the role which public opinion plays in formulating foreign policy. Many researches, conducted after the Second World War, came to the conclusion that the impact of public opinion on foreign policy is and should be marginal rather than significant. However, several schools recognised tangible links as well as relations between foreign policy and public opinion. The next segment will discuss certain models of public opinion.

According to the elite-centric model, "the general public is ill-informed and ambivalent about foreign policy issues and that mass opinion is subject to wildly swinging moods. The realists see these traits as justification for authorities to base foreign policy solely on the concept of

national interest rather than seeking to divide the preferences of the mass public." (Knecht and Weatherford 2006: 707).

Researchers like Gabriel Almond, Walter Lippmann, James M. Rosenau and Ole R. Holsti who have worked extensively on the dynamics of public opinion and foreign policy have mentioned in their studies that public opinion is volatile and public attitudes on global affairs lack in structure and coherence and therefore, its impact should be very limited and the conduct of foreign policy should be left to the experts. Gabriel Almond's "mood theory" in 1960 was one of the first few models of the study of public opinion and foreign policy. The study which was done on American public figured out that the American citizens did not pay much attention to the foreign policy matters; and Almond suggested, "elite consensus usually creates an acquiescent public and argued that opinion becomes activated as a function of two phenomena: (1) events that directly threaten the 'normal conduct of affairs' (or 'grave crises'), and (2) assertive or self-confident moods among the public. Thus, when these two coincide, activation is possible." (Almond 1960: 71) But as Almond noticed public's response was coming only under extreme conditions or circumstances, he called the "public opinion with regard to foreign policy as essentially unstable and unpredictable." (*ibid*.)

According to Walter Lippmann, if there is a lack of information among public and if their reactions are slow, then it would lead "the foreign policy decision-maker to respond too late." (Lippmann 1955: 14) He explained that this happens because the opinion deals with a situation which no longer exists. Thus, "its role in the conduct of foreign affairs is irrelevant thereby suggesting that public influence in the foreign policy making should be limited." He also mentioned, "the public is a dangerous and irrational force. The public can elect the government, he argued and they can remove it. They can approve or disapprove its performance. But they cannot administer the government... A mass cannot govern." (*ibid*: 20, 21)

Also many realists agreed with Lippmann's words. He wrote:

> "The unhappy truth is that the prevailing public opinion has been destructively wrong at the critical junctures. The people have impressed a critical veto upon the judgments of informed and responsible officials. They have compelled the government, which usually knew what would have been wiser, or was necessary, or what was more expedient, to be too late with too little, or too long with too much, too pacifist in peace and too bellicose in war, too neutralist or appeasing in negotiations or too intransigent. Mass opinion has acquired mounting power in this country. It has shown

itself to be a dangerous master of decision when the stakes are life and death." (Lippmann 1955:20)

Political philosopher, Edmund Burke stated, "A representative's unbiased opinion, his mature judgment, his enlightened conscience, he ought not to sacrifice to you, to any man, or to any set of men living.... Your representative owes you not only his industry, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion." (*cited in* Foyle 1999: 3) Realist Hans J. Morgenthau had said the rational requirements of a good foreign policy may often not find support from public opinion, which could be influenced by emotions rather than a rational thought. On the foreign policy matters, Morgenthau has stated, "It is the accumulation of individual voices, just like the accumulation of drops of water. If you have enough drops of water, it fills a vessel. So this is the general role which public opinion plays in a democracy, and it plays that role in foreign policy, too."[66]

Furthermore, John Mearsheimer, echoed a similar view and said that "when it comes to national security issues, public opinion is 'notoriously fickle' and responsive to 'elite manipulation and world events'." He also mentioned that "policymakers employ liberal talk, realist thinking." (*cited in* Foyle 1999: 5)

Moreover, James Rosenau has produced a model wherein it shows how American public opinion affected foreign policy. For this, he had employed "the two-step flow hypothesis from communications theory". According to his theory, "news flows from major media outlets to opinion makers and then, on to the public." Rosenau also stated that "the media circulate opinions between decision makers and elites whom he labelled 'opinion makers.'" Rosenau also "identified at least sixteen types of opinion makers who could influence foreign policy attitudes and debates, and enumerated three primary and seven secondary channels of communication, but he did not accord mass public opinion an important place in his framework. Using the theatre as an analogy, he equated opinion makers with the actors on the stage. Less than 25 per cent of the audience occupied orchestra seats and were, as a result, able to interpret and communicate to the others in the auditorium what was happening on the stage." (Rosenau 1961: 34) Furthermore, "The overwhelming majority in the remainder of the theatre were 'so far removed from the scene of action' they could 'hardly grasp the plot, much less hear all the lines or distinguish between the actors." (*ibid.*) Thus, the theories of Rosenau belonged to those who did not think highly of common man's involvement in

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[66] Morgenthau, Hans J. (2014), "From the Archives - Enduring Realities and Foreign Policy", *American Foreign Policy Interests,* 36: 1-6.

foreign policy matters. Also, Rosenau like many other experts, have stated that if the public opinion doesn't have any direct role foreign it just means that it does not have any role.

Philip J. Powlick and Andrew Z. Katz mentioned that William Caspary in 1970 had challenged Almond's "mood theory" and Caspary observed that the "instability of opinion predicted by the [mood] theory was not borne out empirically." Powlick and Katz further stated, "In 1992, Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro did an extensive reanalysis of post Second War survey data also 'revealed a basic stability in opinion.' These challenges to mood theory, however, deal with stability in the direction of policy opinions, not with the process of arousing or activating opinion." (Powlick and Katz 1998: 34)

Thus, liberals have challenged the realists and believe that public opinion can definitely make a significant contribution to the quality of foreign policy and diplomacy by putting pressure as well as constraining policy makers. Also with the advancement of technology, people nowadays are well versed with issues related to International affairs. According to them, "public opinion has immense influence, effectively setting foreign policy." Ole R. Holsti stated, "a long liberal tradition dates back to Immanuel Kant and Jeremy Bentham and continuing through Woodrow Wilson, asserts that democracies are more peaceful, at least in part, because the public can play a constructive role in constraining policy makers." (Holsti 2006: *n.d*)

Elihu Root summarised the case for democratising foreign policy as "when foreign affairs were ruled by autocracies or oligarchies the danger of war was in sinister purpose. When foreign affairs are ruled by democracies the danger of war will be in mistaken beliefs. The world will be the gainer by the change, for, while there is no human way to prevent a king from having a bad heart, there is a human way to prevent a people from having an erroneous opinion." (Root 1922: 5)

Liberal scholars like Immanuel Kant however argued that "public opinion, on an aggregate level, is in fact not volatile and irrational but stable and rational." (Page and Shapiro 1992: *n.d.*) According to the liberals, initially the common men are clueless about the foreign policy matters but eventually, over the period of time the general public collects "information to make rational judgments on certain decisions. Indeed, public opinion is a necessary if not sufficient condition for sound foreign policy and thus, a significant contributor to peaceful relations among nations." (Holsti 1996: *n.d.)* Consequently, the leader while knowing the

power of public, keeps in mind that public opinion is rational and thus form any policy. Also, the "leader engages with the public over the proper course of action and listens to their input. In addition, leaders are pressured to make decisions that reflect public opinion because they are concerned with their support in upcoming elections." (Page and Shapiro 1983: 175)

Eugene R. Wittkopf said that although "political realism is often compelling, as a theory it fails to recognise the changes in the world by ignoring the dynamics of systemic transformation such as technological changes and the public opinion that dwell in the attributes of the actors, not the system." Wittkopf further mentioned that "in a democratic nation state, at the end of the day, the leaders are responsible to the public's will, however ill-informed and fickle it may seem to be." (Wittkopf 1990: 219)

Philip J. Powlick and Andrew Z. Katz had explained another theory in which public opinion is considered as "constraining factor on foreign policy". This factor got prominence among few researchers during the end of the Cold War. As per this school of thought, "scholars do not focus on analysing whether the public is rational. Instead, they believe that the public is initially unconcerned with foreign policy issues, allowing leaders to make decisions alone." (Powlick and Katz 1998: 44). They further explained that over the time, public pays more attention to "the policy decisions and forms opinions on whether those decisions were wise or not. Because of this, constraint theorists believe that leaders avoid making decisions that could potentially activate public opposition in the future. Consequently, public opinion constrains foreign policy by eliminating the choices that considered unfavourable to the public. However, public opinion does not influence the decisions leaders make from within the boundaries of acceptable choices." (*ibid.*)

Thus, the realists and liberals hold a quite a strong view on public opinion's role in foreign policy making. As Josh N. Price suggested that public opinion's influence on leaders are minimal. The representatives think quite strongly negatively about public opinion and that is why the role of public opinion, while shaping foreign policies, is questioned. Also, the basic element of the realist theory lies in the fact that public opinion is generally both "volatile" and "irrational".

The theory has the assumption that the general public does not understand the modalities of foreign affairs and is therefore, indifferent to it. However, the liberals, who rejected the theory of realists believe that the public is rational and therefore should be made a part of the

policy-making process. Furthermore, they state that "public opinion could have an important moderating influence on the leaders, preventing them from taking any extreme or 'overambitious' decisions." (Price *n.d.*) The constraint theory also notices the potential and eventually the influence that public opinion has on foreign policy. In the beginning, "this theory agrees with the realist views that public opinion can be ill-informed and indifferent about foreign policy issues. But, constraint theorists argue that public gets enraged over decisions that result in different outcomes than what might be initially perceived." (*ibid.*)

As R. Sobel pointed out that "public's beliefs and attitudes do guide and constrain public policy, in foreign as well as domestic affairs. In the past, public opinion has been considered, at maximum, to constrain policy. Today, public opinion, at minimum, constrains policy and at maximum, sets policy." (Sobel 2001: *n.d.*) J. H. Aldrich et al. state that the public have certain understanding about the foreign policy matters, but "determining which aspects of those attitudes will get expressed is neither straightforward nor automatic. Elites appear to retain some leeway in shaping the expression of public opinion, but the mechanisms that give them that leeway are still little understood." (Aldrich et al. 2006: 487).

Douglas Foyle, on the other hand, incorporated "realist, liberal, and constraint schools of thought into his analysis of the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy." He said that "public opinion influences foreign policy, depending upon the circumstances in which the decision is made and the person making that decision." (Foyle 1999: 267-268) He also suggested, "sometimes, policy-makers lead without public opinion influencing decisions; sometimes, the public broadly constrains a policy-maker's decision; and sometimes, policy-makers largely follow public opinion when forming a decision."(*ibid.*) Thus, Foyle had made a "conceptual framework" according to which "every outcome can hold true under certain conditions. Moreover, the conditions are dependent on what part of the decision-making process a leader is in, and the beliefs of that leader regarding how public opinion should influence policy decisions." (*ibid.*)

It is expected that the foreign policy decisions are made by keeping in mind the public at large in a democratic nation state. Immanuel Kant in "Perpetual Peace (1795)" argued "that governments are responsible to the people and the public would not go to war, since it is they, the public, who ultimately pay the price and suffer the most." (*cited in* Kegley and Wittkopf 2006: 68)

2.2 Relationship among Press, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy

Press has played and still plays an important role in influencing public opinion and the government cannot afford to marginalise the media in a democratic country. However, theorist of communication and media, Jay Blumler raised a question that "how do citizens aim to use their newspapers and television sets when follow politics?" While replying to answer, he mentioned that on a regular day, most people glance at a newspaper and tune into a TV news bulletin. For instance, up to the minute news is mainly from the bulletins. For a detailed account of political or conflict events, people rely on the dailies which can provide more space for analysis and interpretation. (Blumler 1981: 121-122) Media through generating public opinion influences the policy makers. Stuart N. Soroka mentioned that on one side, "the mass media are the primary conduit between the public and policymakers. And policymakers follow media reports on public opinion, and the media are the public's chief source of information on what policymakers are doing." Moreover, Soroka stated, "the media are the principal means by which the vast majority of individuals receive information about foreign affairs, an issue for which personal experience is unlikely to provide much useful information." (Soroka 2003: 28) Also, press can play an indispensible role to keep a check on government's power.

Thus, if the foreign policymakers replies or responds to the common men and the public responds to the press, it becomes significant to study the nature and theories of media influence on public. Therefore, the next section will deal with the relationship between press and public opinion as well as press and foreign policy. It will also mention certain theories and models of mass communication.

- **Press and Public Opinion**

Several studies on foreign news establish that there is a close relationship between media coverage and public opinion. A lot of studies found out that if a particular subject is covered a lot by media, public naturally gives more importance to that particular topic.

"Perceptions acquired from pictures and words have far-reaching implications." Bernard C. Cohen, the political scientist, said, adding that "the press is significantly more than a purveyor of information and opinion. It may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling people what to think about." (Cohen 1963: 13). It was the first of its kind study that connected foreign policy as well as

media. He also said that "if we do not see a story in the newspapers (or catch it on radio or television), it effectively has not happened as far as we are concerned." He further added that "the press is a significant part of the public audience for foreign policy". (*ibid.*) Cohen's writing became the basis of the "agenda setting' function of the media". 'Agenda setting' "describes a very powerful influence of the media – the ability to tell us which issues are important." Lippmann stated that a reporter's "opinion is in some vital measure constructed out of his own stereotypes, according to his own code, and by the urgency of his own interest. He knows that he is seeing the world through subjective lenses" (Lippman 1922: 333). This observation was confirmed by Cohen by saying that "it is hard to find a reporter who carries the myth of objectivity to the point of erasing or denying his own policy preferences." Thus, Lippmann and Cohen contend "that the pictures and words put forth by print or broadcast journalists relate to perceptions and perhaps, to subsequent foreign policy." (*ibid.*)

Apart from press which plays a huge role in formulating public perceptions of foreign countries, there are also a plethora of non-media factors that affect this whole dynamics. For example, those foreign countries which are geographically or culturally closer can be considered more favourable as compared to those countries which are not. This happens regardless of the media's coverage. Thus, the following section would discuss the models of media effects.

Moreover, the media theorist Marshall McLuhan's statement that "the medium is the message" stated that the media itself is a compelling force regardless of the messages or contents involved in it. Media has the power to alter sensory organisation and thought and thereby alter, society, eventually. His theory suggests that media can alter patterns of perceptions. He further wrote indicated that "the slightest shift in the level of visual intensity produces a subtle modulation in our sense of ourselves, both private and corporate. Since technologies are extensions of our own physiology, they result in new programs of an environmental kind." According to McLuhan,

> "All media work us over completely. They are so pervasive in their personal, political, economic, aesthetic, psychological, moral, ethical and social consequences that they leave no part of us untouched, unaffected, unaltered. The medium is the massage. Any understanding of social and cultural change is impossible without a knowledge of the media work as environments."[67]

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[67] McLuhan, Marshall et al. (2001). *The Medium is the Massage: An Inventory of Effects,* New Edition. US: Ginko Press.

- **Models of Media Effects**

It is significant to mention the models of media effects as it will help in understanding how the media effects occur. Elizabeth M. Perse wrote about the "models of media effects", and described these models in a "series of phases marked by paradigm shifts – shifts in theoretical assumptions, the way the scholars look at problems and the ways they interpret empirical results." Before explaining these four "models of media effects", Perse explained the three phases which are important for the study of media effects. (Perse 2001: 23)

Three phases of media effects

The first phase, which Perse mentioned in his research, was the early twentieth century through the 1930s. In the first phase, "the focus on media effects was based on the stimulus-response model drawn from psychology and grounded in mass society theory drawn from sociology. Then, the social and psychological isolation brought on by the industrial revolution created a mass society in which people were aimless and disconnected from others." *(ibid.)* These masses, in that case, were especially susceptible to the influence of powerful, persuasive forces in society, like mass communication. He also explained that both the "hypodermic needle theory" and the "magic bullet theory" were so strong and powerful that the receivers were powerless to resist the influence of media.

He called the next i.e. "the second phase of media effects as the era of limited effects." As the name suggests, in this phase, the media has only minimal influence on the recipients (its audience). About the limits on media effects, he quoted Joseph Klapper's landmark work, "The Effects of Mass Communication", in which it is mentioned, "Mass communication ordinarily does not serve as a necessary and sufficient cause of audience effects, but rather functions among and through a nexus of mediating factors and influences." (Klapper 1960: 8) Klapper further explained two conditions under which the mass communication could influence the audience, "a) if normal barriers to effects are not operating or b) if the mediating factors are congruent with media's influence." (*ibid.*) Also, Perse wrote, "the reason for media's limited effects was the power of the audience to selectively choose and use media content. In other words, people controlled media and their content through various

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McLuhan, Marshall (1964), *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man,* [Online: web], Accessed 8 September 2016, URL:
http://web.mit.edu/allanmc/www/mcluhan.mediummessage.pdf.

selectivity ways."[68] According to Perse, "this phase lasted till the 1960s and it also led to question the value of continuing to study media effects. Then, later after 1970s, other studies found "strong media effects." (*cited in* McQuail 2007: 167-171)

Three Models of Media Effects

The first model is the "direct effects model" which concentrates on "media content" as the most significant reason for "media influence". In this model, "the media's effects are viewed as immediate, relatively similar across all the audience and consistent with the goals of the media producer. Effects are either behavioural, cognitive or affective effects that lead directly to noticeable actions." (*ibid.*) For instance, "in a behavioural effect, the direct effects model is applicable in understanding how political ads might lead to voting for a specific candidate or knowledge gain that would lead to voting decision (a cognitive effect), or attitude acquisition that influences voting choices (an affective effect)." (*ibid.*)

However, it was also said that "the direct effects model ignores the role of the audience in the media effects process." It is assumed that people are incapable of countering the impact of media. Perse also said, "People may lack the mental capacity to analyse media messages. So young children maybe the targets of direct effects or people may have little background knowledge or context about certain events and issues, and may be reliant solely on media content." (*cited in* McQuail 2007: 167-171) Some people look not so interested towards certain aspects of media content, but "people may have the mental ability to evaluate the content. But the direct model holds that they are unable to resist the attention pull of some of the features of presentation. Also, within this model, then, the skilled producers can create media content that is likely to invoke fairly predictable and uniform reactions from large parts of the audience." (*ibid.*) Moreover Perse suggested, there are certain variables in the model and most of the direct effects models are short term.[69]

The second "conditional effects model" is drawn from the limited effects model. Similar to the limited effects model, "the conditional model places emphasis on the audience and is

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[68] Perse further gave the examples of "selection exposure, or control over what they have watched, listened to, or read in the media; selective attention, or control over which elements of media messages people would pay attention to; selective perception or control over how messages were interpreted and selective recall, or control over how and what was learned from the media." (*cited in* McQuail 2007: 167-171)

[69] Perse said, "most important are the aspects of media content that a. perceived more automatically by people such as those that attract orienting responses or unconscious responses and b. are associated with increases in arousal and c. are depicted realistically."

based on the notions of selectivity and social influence. This model is called the conditional model because media effects are conditional with respect to the audience member. This model recognises that all media exposure is not bound to result in media effects. The audience has the power to avoid exposure and reject influence. And, when media effects occur, they are certainly not uniform." (*ibid.*) Furthermore, "different people may be affected quite differently by the same media content. Effects, according to this model can be cognitive, affective or behavioural. The effects can occur immediately after repeated exposure to similar messages and the effects can be short term or long term." (*ibid.*)

In this model, individual, audience member are the focus of media effects. Here, the audience variables have been classified into three namely, social categories, social relationships and individuals differences. Social category variables are aspects of people that are fairly easy to observe or uncover. They may be demographic characteristics of people like ethnicity, age, educational level or gender.[70] The second, social responsibility variable represents the social connections and interpersonal interactions among people that mediate media effects. Several scholars asserted that people play a role in the flow of mass communication. They called it as two step flow which holds that "interested people pay attention to specialised media and pass along that information to others to whom they are socially connected. Researchers have also found that media messages flowed from opinion leaders to family members, friends and even casual co-workers. This flow has multiple implications for media effects. People might become aware of and be influenced by media messages that they have not encountered directly. And, the information passed along by opinion leaders is not necessarily 'isomorphic' with that delivered by the media." Moreover, as individuals, opinion leaders are affected by "selectivity processes of selective exposure, attention, perception and recall." The third, individual differences variables are those aspects that differentiate one person from another. The above mentioned characteristics are considered to be unique to an individual. Some of the many individual differences are personality, attitude towards media and pre-existing attitudes. Thus, these three classes of variables can act either as a barrier to media effects or as a lens to enhance the likelihood of media effects. (Mcquail 2007: 181-183)

Perse further talked about the "cumulative effects model" which is drawn from the return of powerful effects era. "The emphasis of this model is the nature of certain media content that overrides any potential of the audience to limit exposure to certain messages. This model

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[70] In short, "social categories are ways to distinguish people into bigger groups. It could be significant because in this group people in one category are different from those in another category."

focuses on the consonance and repetition of themes and messages across media content. The audience is not relevant to this model because it is not within their power to avoid certain media messages." (*ibid:* 183) Contrary to "the direct effects model", this one explains that "media effects are a result of cumulative exposure, not due to a single event. Through repeated exposure to similar content across channels, people are moved. Effects, according to this model, are limited to cognitions. Agenda setting theory by Mc Combs and Shaw can be seen as a cumulative effect." (*ibid.*)

The variables in cumulative effects model is the media content. The nature of the images and issues in the news media are significant because they define what the effects are. Even in this, the important part is the consistency across all the channels. Because according to this model, selection is not possible. Media messages need to be fairly consistent across all the media outlets. However, if there would be changes in the media environment, it may threaten the validity of the cumulative effects model. The fourth is "cognitive-transactional model of media effects." This model is influenced by "cognitive psychology" and applies the notion that the context of media needs to be processed in a schematic way and "the key to this model is 'schema'. Knowledge, according to this approach, does not exist as isolated chunks in our brains." Furthermore, "a schema is a mental structure that represents knowledge about a concept. The cognitive-transactional model has a number of implications for media effects. In the case of controlled processing, media effects are influenced to a larger degree by the goals of the individual and the schemas that he or she uses to interpret media content." (McQuail 2007: 185-191)

There are two ways that schemas operate and that are through controlled or through automatic processing. Controlled processing is person's controlled mental activity. This process involves a good deal of selectivity. People, according to this model, are often more automatic in their approach to mass media consumption. On the other hand, automatic processing is an effortless and rather "low involved mental processing of environment stimuli." This model has a lot of implications for media effects. In the case of controlled processing, media effects are influenced by the goals of the individual and the schemas a person uses to interpret media content. The effects are likely to be conscious and fairly long term. While, in the case of automatic processing, media content can be especially potent prime and "effective media messages can activate certain 'schemas' that direct attention and influence the interpretation of and reaction to the stimuli. Important variables in this model

are both media content and audience factors. Media content is significant in its ability to prime. So, aspects of content that attract involuntary attention are more likely to prime." (*ibid.*)

Thus, these four models are simplified depictions of explanations for media effects. The impact and influence of media on people are beyond doubt. Thus, the next section would explain the theories of media such as the *Agenda Setting*, the *Media Dependency* and *CNN effect* to understand the nature of the press.

- **Agenda Setting Theory**

One of the prominent theories in the field of mass media is the Agenda Setting theory. Two Professors, Maxwell E. McCombs and Donald Shaw, have published their article in *Public Opinion Quarterly* that became the basis of this new and significant research in the field of mass communication. In its research which is popularly called as the *Chapel Hill* study, McCombs and Shaw both coined the phenomenon "agenda-setting" and observed that "the mass media set the agenda for each political campaign, influencing the salience of attitudes toward the political issues." (McCombs and Shaw 1972: 177) Although, the research on media's "agenda setting" term can be mainly traced to these two professors and their work of 1970s, the whole idea of media's capability of determining what the public considers important has been much older. As suggested by Jian-Hua Zhu and Deborah Blood, "Lippmann (in 1922) had argued that the mass media create images of events in people's minds, and warned of the serious responsibility of the press as purveyors and interpreters of events in society." Also, in recognising the functions of media, "Lazarsfeld and Merton (in 1948) recognised its ability to confer status upon topics it emphasises. Long (1958) and Lang and Lang (1959) respectively also wrote of the tendency for the media to force attention on certain issues." (Zhu and Blood 1997: 88)

In 1963, Bernard Cohen's work in which he mentioned that "press may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about. And it follows from this that the world looks different to different people, depending not only on their personal interests, but also on the map that is drawn for them by the writers, editors and publishers of the papers they read" became the backgrounder of what presently is referred to as agenda setting function of mass media.

(Cohen 1963: 13) With this background work, McCombs and Shaw provided the first of its kind a systematic study of agenda-setting.

According to this theory, the media makes an attempt to suggest ideas or indicate the relative importance of certain thoughts or issues. Upon receiving these messages, the audience then makes a selection in terms of their own preferences and priorities. The role of mass media communication is, therefore, seen as only setting an agenda. How this agenda or theme is taken up and responded to is done by the audience in tandem with its needs, interests, exposure, attitudes and so on. Setting the agenda is like bringing into focus certain issues. Once this is done, the audience then acts on the suggestions that have been made by media.[71]

Through the everyday selection of stories and display of news, the journalists grab people's attention to focus on a given direction and influence their perceptions by informing them the most significant highlights of the day. Thus, "this role of the news media in identifying the key issues and topics of the day and their ability to influence the salience of these issues and topics on the public agenda has come to be called the agenda setting of the news media." (McCombs 1972: *n.d.*)

McCombs further elaborated his theory by saying that on everyday basis the newspapers have certain agenda and they communicate it to people. He said that the "first page story, the lead story, front page versus the inside pages, the size of the headline, the length of the story it all communicates the topic's importance." Also, in electronic media, McCombs stated that "even a mention on the evening television news is a strong signal about the salience of the topic. The cues are provided by the placement in the broadcast and by the amount of time spent on the story." While commenting on the visual power which electronic media has, McCombs explained that "for all the communication media, the repetition of a topic day after day is the most powerful message and the public uses these salience cues from the media to organise their own agendas and decide which issues are most important." (*ibid.*)

Thus, over the period of time, the issues on which the newspapers and news channels focus become the important subject for the masses too. Hence, "the agenda of the news media becomes the agenda of the public and placing a topic on the public agenda so that it becomes the focus of public attention is the initial stage in the formation of public opinion." (*ibid.*)

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[71]McCombs, Maxwell (2014) , *Setting the Agenda: Mass media and Public Opinion Second Edition,* UK: Polity Press.

Thus, media can be seen as manipulating the audience. The level of acceptance and/or rejection determines the extent of influence the agenda set by the mass media has been able to create.

While further explaining the theory, Zhu and Blood maintained that "the media does not have to set the agenda setting by directly informing and telling the public that which issue is more important than the other as this particular method has been proven ineffective and instead, the media has hinted and signalled the important subjects by giving it more space in print media and frequent coverage on their television channels." (Zhu and Blood 1997: 89-90)

In short, Zhu and Blood have suggested that "the agenda-setting hypothesis involves two concepts and that are: media agenda and public agenda," and further added that "because of the causal relationship between them, the media agenda influences the public agenda. They referred that media agenda to be a list of issues or events that receive news coverage." (*ibid*.)

They further gave the examples of the incidents which involved the continuous coverage such as the Watergate scandal, the war in Vietnam, the cause for AIDS or perhaps the recession. Also, according to them, "public agenda" basically refers to those issues which concern the common man and it is usually on the minds of public. They also quoted McLeod, Becker and Byrnes' identification of three versions of public agenda: "an intra-personal agenda (i.e. how important an issue is to the person him/herself); an interpersonal agenda (how important an issue is to others); and a community agenda (how important an issue is to the community/nation)." (Zhu and Blood 1997: 90-91)

In the practical terms, this theory has been further defined as "the idea that the news media, by their display of news, come to determine the issues the public thinks about and talks about." (Severin and Tankard 1988: 164) McCombs further explained that the effects of "agenda-setting" vary from individual to individual, and that primarily "depends on the public's familiarity with the issue". He mentioned that "issues people deal with in their everyday lives are referred to as obtrusive issues", and "issues that individuals cannot experience or verify by themselves are considered as unobtrusive issues" (McCombs 2004: *n.d*). After analysing the theory of agenda setting, the factors that usually influence media's agenda setting are also relevant to study as what are the uncertainties and the nature of an issue which would be obstructive and unobstructive. Since "international news coverage is considered as a fine example of unobtrusive issues, according to the agenda-setting theory, it

will have greater effects on public opinion. It takes time for agenda-setting to propagate. Previous 'media effects' theories, such as 'the hypodermic needle theory', argued for instant effects of media messages. However, modern research suggests that at least one month of consistent media coverage is needed to show any effects on public opinion."[72] McCombs further said that "specifically, a one-month period of coverage prior to assessing public opinion exerted a strong correlation; a two-month period of coverage yielded an even stronger connection; the results for the six-month period of coverage were similar to the results of the two-month period." (McCombs 2004: *n.d.*)

Furthermore, two related concepts priming and framing are associated with the agenda setting theory. Ronald D. Smith mentioned that priming deals with how a news topic reminds media audiences of previous information and framing deals with the way the news media treat a particular topic. According to Smith, "if agenda setting deals with what people think about, priming reminds them what they already know about the topic and framing deals with how they think about the topic." (Smith 2017: 51) Hence, according to this theory, the press certainly enjoys greater powers as compared to others. Framing is "the second order of agenda-setting, deals with the news treatment, structure, arrangement, selection of wordsand the phrasing." Also, "media analyses issues and events that are related with foreign policy effect upon the ultimate objectives of foreign policy. Media, by its virtue of highlighting or marginalising certain discourses, may facilitate or impede the execution of foreign policy." (*ibid.*) While evaluating the research on framing, D'Angelo's work in 2002 suggested "three different framing paradigms." These paradigms are called as "cognitivist, constructionist, and critical." Cognitivist paradigm explains "how media texts embody audiences' cognitive structures, thinking patterns and mental schema. Media texts dominate the cognitive threshold of audience and formulate the consciousness." The other paradigm, "constructionist paradigm views journalists as providing interpretative packages of the world events and issues. For example portrayal of Arabs in Hollywood films as uncivilized, illiterate and conservative serve as media text that dominates the mental images of the West. Discourses of

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[72] The hypodermic theory, also called as magic bullet theory, has equated the media with an intravenous injection through which certain values or ideas are injected into the individual media user. The receiver is usually seen as the helpless and passive victim of the media impact. (Fourie 2007: 232) In other words, the magic bullet that upon hitting the target creates uniformity in thought or action. But several studies later on showed that the media does not influence the person in the same way.

However, strong critic of hypothermic needle theory, Steven Starker in *Evil Influences: Crusades Against the Mass Media* writes this theory of media influence views audiences as the passive receptors of virulent viruses produced by media. (Starker 1991: 12)

'orientalism' are another example of this paradigm." And the third "Critical paradigm sees media outcomes as the embedded values of the elite and the powerful." (*cited in* Eijaz 2012: 79) The "first two paradigms facilitate a state to use media for supporting the foreign policy Government policies are communicated and projected through media. For example, Bush doctrine of 'pre-emptive attacks for security concerns' has been emphasised through media as 'war against terrorism'." (*ibid.*) Also, "the official statement for attacking Iraq was explained by Collin Powell as national security strategy declared that Washington has a sovereign right to use force to defend ourselves from nations that possess weapons of mass destruction and cooperate with terrorists." (Chomsky 2004: 1)

- **Media Dependency Theory**

American mass communication theorists Sandra Ball-Rokeach and Melvin DeFleur's "Dependency Theory" asserts that "the more a person depends on having his or her needs met by media use, the more important will be the role that media play in the person's life and therefore more influence the media will have on person's life." (Baran and Davis 2013: 282) They further said that, "from a macroscopic societal perspective, if many people become dependent on media, media institutions will be reshaped to serve these dependencies, then the overall influence of media will rise and media's role in society would become central." (*ibid.*)

In the words of Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur, "dependency is a relationship between in which the satisfaction of needs or the attainment of goals by one party is contingent upon the resources of another party." (Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur 1976: 6) The Media Dependency theory became "one of the initial mass communication theories that considered its audience as an active part of the process of communication. The theory is said to be developed from the follow-up of researches from the parent theory 'uses and gratification' which is considered as an expansion. Dependency theory indicates that there is a fundamental connection between media, its audiences and the social system."(*ibid.*)

Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur have mentioned that the background of the dependency theory comes from "an ecological model" and both of them have perceived it as

> "a complex of web links encompassing the mass media and the audiences. The society has various parts that interact with each other. Each link in the chain is a separate entity. They come together to form the larger mass media which is composed of Radio, print, television and internet. Because of the need for more information, people

depend on mass media. People have different goals that they would want to satisfy and media always has a solution for them." (Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur 1989: 302)

The theorists gave certain instances of dependency relationship in which one section of society is dependent on other to reach its ends. They gave the example by saying that "a media organisation might be dependent on a political structure (i.e., part of the political system and social environment) for permission to broadcast. Or a manufacturing organization (part of the economic system and social environment) might depend on media systems to advertise its products and enhance sales. Or an individual might rely on the newspaper (part of the media system)."(*ibid*.)

While analysing the Media Dependency theory, Maureen Anne Syallow stated that the founders of dependency theory, Ball-Rokeach and Defleur, have presumed that "the degree of dependency on media is directly proportional to a) the capacity of a medium to satisfy the needs of an individual as much as possible. A person/society will be highly dependent on a medium if it meets a greater percentage of his needs than if it meets a smaller percentage. b) social stability." (Syallow 2015: 50) Also, "during a period of an extreme social change, such as elections people are called to reassess their values, beliefs and practices and consider other new choices. In such instances, the degree of dependence goes up drastically because there is need for strong advice. Therefore, media becomes a focal point for getting such information to guide its audience. When the situation stabilises, people's reliance on medium decreases. c) As an active component of the communication process. Audiences select their ideal media based on individual needs and other external factors such as culture, social political and economical conditions. This indicates that an individual will be less dependent on a medium if there are more alternatives, also non media ones, to satisfy his/her needs. d) The psychological traits of an individual may also determine the level of dependence on media. The media are aware of their ability to create a dependent relationship with their target audience; hence they use this power to achieve their goals." (*ibid.*: 50)

However, the theory has its strengths and weaknesses. Syallow further explained strengths by calling the theory as "elegant and descriptive." It meant that the "theory is well organised and has been put in a way that anyone can understand. Also, the theory allows for systems orientation." Not just this, the Media Dependency theory "ties together the interrelations of broad social systems, mass media and the individual into a comprehensive explanation of media effects." Hence, "it gives direction of where it's coming from and why it has made its

conclusion as 'dependence'." Moreover, "it integrates microscopic and macroscopic theory. Microscopic Theories are those theories that focus on how individuals and social groups use media to create and foster forms of culture that structure everyday life while macroscopic theories that focus on how social elites use their economic power to gain control over and exploit to propagate hegemonic culture as a means of maintaining their dominant position in social order; they are called 'political economy theories because they place priority on understanding how economic power provides a basis for ideological and political power'." (Syallow 2015: 4)

According to Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur, "the cognitive, behavioural and affective consequences of media use are premised upon characteristics of both individuals and their social environment."[73] First, "the cognitive is affected mostly when the information being received by people is not sufficient hence people seek more information from the media. When there is high ambiguity, stress is created, and audiences are more likely to turn to mass media to resolve ambiguity. Ambiguity might be especially prevalent during times of social change or conflict. Secondly, the affective is also mentioned by Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur as a possible way in which an audience can be affected by the media. There is the desensitisation, the creation of anxiety and fear due to exposure to bad news and feelings of alienation due to the degree of positive or negative news from the media about a certain group or a certain issue." (Ball Rokeach 1979: 81-96) Lastly, Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur also identify "behavioural as one of the effects of media dependency. People either activate a certain behaviour or deactivate due to messages received from the media. Behavioral effects are largely thought to work through cognitive and affective effects. These refer to instances in which audiences would have otherwise done something, but don't do or do as a consequence of media messages." (Ball Rokeach 1976: 3-21) Media is an important source of information especially when public wants to know about the foreign policy matters. Theories and concepts of media that can be applied on foreign policy matters are: agenda-setting, Chomsky's propaganda filter and *CNN* effect. Media has turned out to be "an important tool in the pursuit of national interests outlined in the foreign policy. Thus media has been instrumental in creating, perpetuating, and modifying images of foreign nations and international leaders." (Merrill 1991: 66)

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[73]Ball-Rokeach, Sandra and J, DeFleur, ML (1976). "A Dependency Model of Mass-Media Effects" *Communication Research*, 3 (1): 3–21.

Moreover, the public relation theorist James E. Grunig had identified "four types of publics which are based on the way they behave toward messages and issues." Grunig has divided the "public into - all-issue publics, apathetic publics, single-issue publics and hot-issue publics." He identified another way of labelling publics like 'non-publics', 'latent publics', 'aware publics' and 'active publics'. He pointed out that it becomes significant to label the public or categorise them for "the process of public opinion because influencing each of them will require different tactics and we must also consider the elements that make up public opinion" which, Grunig called it as "opinion, belief, attitude and value". He further added that "when people make up their minds, a new public opinion develops. This new public opinion can lead to social action (an election, taking a product off the market, etc.). At this point, a new social value emerges and becomes a part of mass sentiment."[74]

Media plays a major role for government in its approach for the foreign policy by shaping the public perception. The write-ups and news reports contribute to the government in terms of formulating its policies. (Pattanaik 2004:7) She further wrote that this is because newspapers, while reflecting public opinion in the form of criticism and suggestions through the editorial pages, simultaneously also influence people's thinking and the dailies "thereby perform the twin functions of educating the public, and generating debate which is crucial in the context of nation building and democracy." (*ibid.*)

On public opinion and foreign policy decision making, Graham stated that the public opinion can have a substantial impact on both foreign policy formulation and implementation. Graham has suggested four factors which need to be understood to appreciate public opinion's role in foreign policy. "The first factor relates to the magnitude of public opinion. If public opinion is to have a substantial effect on policy, it must exceed majority levels. Secondly, public opinion's ultimate effect depends on the stage in the policy process where that effect is brought to bear. Thirdly, public opinion can play an active role in foreign policy even when officials attempt to implement initiatives that face organised opposition. This particular way, Graham said, in which public opinion can influence foreign policy is

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[74] Aldoory, Linda and Grunig, James E. (2012), "The Rise and Fall of Hot-Issue Publics: Relationships that Develop From Media Coverage of Events and Crises", *International Journal of Strategic Communication,* 6(1): 93-108.

multidimensional as well as complex. Fourthly, public opinion does establish the broad policy boundaries within which the foreign policy establishment must operate."[75]

In the final comments, Graham said if public opinion is strong then powerful players in foreign policy decision making can be superseded. Also, as suggested by him, "the cause and effect linkages between public opinion and policy are complex. However, public opinion can act as a powerful determinant in policy decisions." (*cited in* Ammon 2001: 145)

- **Press and Foreign Policy**

The coverage of foreign policy is considered as a specific area. Usually, the coverage of foreign policy concerning issues has always taken a backseat in Indian dailies and electronic channel when compared to other issues of domestic concern. With probably the exception of Pakistan and China, rarely has Indian media taken a keen interest in foreign policy issues. The reasons for this could vary from an inactive public to lack of specialised personnel and resources.

To cover foreign policy issues, the dailies as well as news channels need special correspondents and trained journalists and not all the newspapers and channels in India employ specialised correspondents to report from the foreign land. Several dailies and channels even now are dependent on news agencies for the story. But eventually, they follow up the story on their own. While giving the details of the number of newspapers and television channels in India, Smruti S. Pattanaik and Ashok K. Behuria write: "In the region, India tops with 82,000 newspapers and over 800 television channels." (Pattanaik and Behuria 2016: 13)

The media coverage of foreign countries not only has the influence on the common man but also affects the foreign policy. However, this relationship has been debated by researchers, journalists and the government officials.

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[75] Graham has also divided the foreign policy decision making into four stages: "a. agenda setting b. policy negotiations, c. ratifications of policy decisions and d. policy implementation." He mentioned that "during the policy negotiation stage or the policy implementation stage, public opinion can only have an indirect influence. And public opinion can directly affect the policy during the first, agenda setting phase as well as where there are ratifications of policy decisions."
Ammon, Royce J. (2001), *Global Television and Shaping of World Politics: CNN, Tele diplomacy, and Foreign Policy*, US: McFarland & Company , Inc, Publishers.

The Indian media and the foreign policy establishment share an uneasy relationship with each other. Ajai K. Rai wrote that it would be improper to blame the officials entirely for this relationship and many times, the media or a section of the media has also shown irresponsible attitude. (Rai 2003: 12) Rai also mentioned that "internal politics of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) contributes many a times for circulation of misinformation or even distortion of certain news reports which often give out vague quotes of unnamed sources. Also, few officers inside the ministry use journalists thereby causing harm on reporting on policy matters. At times, few news items turn into personality reporting as few journalists get into the politics of who is going to be the new foreign secretary and which official is getting posted where etc. In this scenario, misinformation takes place when stories are being planted by one lobby or the other. For the credibility of the press, according to Rai, certain notes need to be taken in the above mentioned aspects. (*ibid.*)

However, according to Manoj Joshi, the media works differently on domestic and foreign policies. While explaining it, he mentioned that in domestic policies, media is just "one of the sources that assist us in understanding our choices and exercising them. In domestic affairs, we could get information from personal or observed experience." (Joshi 2016: 259) But when it comes to covering the foreign policy matters, Joshi said that at least in India, "there is a great dependency on media to explain and report foreign policy developments. For this reason, the journalists and policy makers do have a close relationship which he called as 'a two way street'." Further mentioning the dynamics, he elaborated that at one level, "the government exercises a certain degree of pressure on media professionals in terms of providing or denying access, and on the other hand, the reporters and correspondents through their coverage and commentary, they are able to give certain directions in the policy." (*ibid.)* Additionally, he also mentioned that how the impact of different medium of medium also differs. In the case of electronic media, the public can vary from the educated sector to illiterate person. But in the case of print media, it has to be an educated who buys the dailies also.

Several experts like J.M. Hamilton, R. Coleman, B. Grable and J. Cole had analysed three different types newspapers which they called as "yellow, conservative and mixed newspapers to study the influence and impact of media on the Spanish-American War." In their study these experts revealed that "sensational and conservative newspapers had created a conducive

environment for going to war."[76] W.L. Bennett assessed the direction, frequency and source of opinions on Nicaragua's crisis in 1980s in *The New York Times* in which Bennett noted that a "country's foreign policy is consistent with the international coverage that it carries about other nations." (Bennett 1990: 103-125)

Analysing the role of media in foreign policy, B. Cohen bracketed them as a) observer of foreign policy news, b) participant in the foreign policy process which includes interaction with policymakers, and c) playing role of the catalyst of foreign news. (Cohen 1963). Daya Kishan Thussu and Des Freedman also stated that "there is substantial evidence that media coverage of foreign events closely follows the interpretative frames offered by political elites saying that whenever the phrase 'national security' is invoked with conviction, the mainstream press is likely to adopt a patriotic pose." (Thussu and Freedman 2003: 36)

- **CNN Effect**

The term CNN effect came from the notion that mainstream news media in general, not just CNN, was having an "increased effect upon foreign policy formulations." Warren P. Strobel has described the CNN effect as "the nexus of media power and foreign policy, where television's instantly transmitted images fire public opinion, demanding instant responses from government officials, shaping and reshaping foreign policy at the whim of electrons."[77] There were several events in the 1990s that "elevated news media to the status of being potentially critical actors, with respect to humanitarian crisis and high-level foreign policy decision-making."[78] Piers Robinson while giving the example of CNN Effect stated that "the American television media's coverage of famine in Somalia during the civil war in the 1990s had persuaded then President of United States of America to deploy troops in support to aid the workers." He further mentioned that "For some, at the time, it appeared to be the case that news media were at the centre of an emerging doctrine of humanitarian intervention whereby sovereignty was no longer sacrosanct. The notion that media were driving foreign policy

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[76] Hamilton, J. M., Coleman, R., Grable, B., & Cole, J. (2006). "An Enabling Environment: A Reconsideration of the Press and The Spanish-American War", *Journalism Studies* , 7 (1): 78-93.

[77] Strobel, Warren P. (1996), "The CNN Effect", [Online: web], Accessed 24 March 2015, URL: http://ajrarchive.org/article.asp?id=3572.

[78] Robinson, Piers (2013), "Media as a Driving Force in International Politics: The CNN Effect and Related Debates", [Online: web], Accessed 20 February 2016, URL: http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/08/10/2013/media-driving-force-international-politics-cnn-effect-and-related-debates.

decision-making became widely known as the CNN effect."[79] While explaining further, Robnison has mentioned:

> "The CNN effect debate gained significant attention for a number of reasons. First, the evolution of a doctrine of humanitarian intervention was, for some scholars, a major development and represented an important shift from a statist international society, in which the doctrine of non-intervention prevailed, to a cosmopolitan international society in which justice was allowed to trump order. Because news media were being implicated in this major shift, the suggestion was that media pressure had become a force to be reckoned with."[80]

According to E. Gilboa, CNN has emerged as a global as well as significant actor in international relations during the Gulf War of 1990-1991 as "its successful coverage inspired other broadcasting organisations such as BBC, which already had a world radio broadcast, NBC, and Star to establish global television networks."[81] In the initial analysis of CNN's effect, the writers used to call it "the CNN complex, the 'CNN curve', and the 'CNN factor', each carrying multiple meanings with journalists, officials, and scholars. In recent years, however, researchers have predominantly associated global real-time news coverage with forcing policy on leaders and accelerating the pace of international communication."[82] Moreover, Livingston and Eachus defined the CNN effect "as elite decision makers' loss of policy control to news media." (1995: 413) Phillip M. Seib stated that the CNN effect is "presumed to illustrate the dynamic tension that exists between real-time television news and policymaking, with the news having the upper hand in terms of influence." (Seib 2002: 27)

Eric Louw, who has worked extensively on the media and political process stated that mass media serves elitist interests or, alternatively, plays a powerful role in shaping political outcomes. He has given eight different equations of media and foreign policy matters which are important to mention here. He explained that several people attribute a lot of power to the news media (the so-called CNN effect) while others claim that the media manufactures consent for elite policy preferences. Some journalists have argued that the arrival of global television altered the nature of foreign relations because the conduct of foreign policy decision making was media-ized. He has referred this to as the CNN effect. The journalists

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[79] *Ibid.*

[80] *Ibid.*

[81] Gilboa, Eytan (2005), "The CNN Effect: The Search for a Communication Theory of International Relations", *Political Communication,* 22: 27-44.

[82] *Ibid.*

proposed the idea of CNN and they have introduced a new dimension into the conduct of foreign relations. Originally, "the CNN effect only referred to the impact that CNN itself supposedly exercised on foreign relations because all sides used the same information source. (Robinson 2002: 2) Subsequently, "the notion widened beyond CNN to mean the impact that all globalised media (print and electronic) had on public opinion." As the CNN effect started strengthening, Louw proposed that "it became common place to suggest that US and UN interventions in northern Iraq and Somalia had been driven by emotive media coverage of suffering people and US disengagement from Somalia occurred due to press images of a US soldier being dragged through Mogadishu's streets." (Louw 2010:179) Furthermore, the CNN effect thesis was enhanced by the belief that TV images of starving Ehiopians were responsible for generating food aid which had eventually ended the famine. This also includes coverage of the Chinese government crackdown on students' protest in Beijing's Tiananmen Square in 1989. (*ibid.*) Basically, the CNN effect thesis is based on two assumptions as suggested by Louw. Firstly, the media has influence and power within policy making processes; and secondly, mass public opinion (mediated by the media) influences policy formation. The real role of media within policy making requires identifying the locus of decision making – who sets agendas, who decides and what factors impact decisions in foreign policy." (*ibid*.: 180)

Louw stated that overall, the foreign policy making process involves five sets of players: civil servants/policy officials; politicians; 'unrecognised' public (public opinion); 'organised' public (interest groups and their lobbyists); and the media. Louw suggested a few possible roles of the media in formulating and implementing foreign policy. He called media 'consent manufacturers' in which media simply promote government foreign policy. He quoted Robinson in saying that the extent to which the media have any impact upon policy formulation depends upon three variables namely, how united the governing elite are, the extent of controversies within the policy elite, and the extent to which the executive has a firm policy. (*ibid*.) According to Robinson (2002),

> "if the elite are united, the media tends to simply help them 'manufacture consent' for their foreign policies. The media will have no influence on policy formulation. On the other hand, if there are controversies within the elite, the media will reflect these. But, if policy makers and the executive can still formulate a policy, the media will have no influence on policy formulation. When these two conditions apply, the media tends to simply affirm government foreign policy directions, largely because there exists a policy direction which the government promotes through its publicity machineries.

This view sees the media as simply helping the ruling elite to manufacture consent" (*cited in* Louw 2010: 184).

A second view of the media's role within foreign relations, according to Louw, is that the "media is a tool of the ruling class". He called media a lapdog. This Marxist view argues that an economically dominant class possesses the means to dominate the production and circulation of ideas in society, and a media system necessarily promotes its owner's interests. This thesis suggests that every context has a dominant class (or class alliance), and dominant classes always develop mechanisms to ensure that the ideas in circulation perpetuate the existing social order under which, they are at the top. This view "overlaps with the manufacturing consent thesis except that the 'manufacturing consent' thesis does not focus only on class interests." (*ibid*: 185)

A third view of the media's role within foreign relations is that "media is an independent watchdog. This is the classic liberal view which contends that journalists do not just passively accept the official line but, rather, actively interrogate their environment and act as the (critical) eyes and ears of the masses. This watchdog view is antithetical of the manufacturing consent and dominant ideology view," Louw said, adding that journalists having liberal tendencies believe that they can play a role in policy process if they challenge the authority of ruling class. This class of journalists believe strongly that public's view should have a place in policy agenda which should be taken note of by the policymakers and politicians. A fourth view of the media's role is that the global media is replacing diplomats. This suggests that diplomats are traditionally engaged in intelligence gathering, negotiation, reporting and representation and when diplomatic channels are closed during crisis, the new media can become an alternative vehicle for exchanging information. Louw quoted Mowlana as saying that "with the possible breakdown of diplomatic communications which often characterises some of the most recent phenomena in international relations, the media is burdened with a crucial and delicate role in the confrontation amongst powers. They often become conduits for official exchanges, reluctant publicists for the actors and valuable sources of information for governments" (Louw 2010: 186).

A fifth view of the media's role proposes that the media substantially impacts the foreign policy because firstly, policy makers are personally influenced by emotive stories and secondly, the media is able to shift public opinion. A sixth view is that the media impacts only the hype dimensions of foreign relations. A seventh view of the media's role is that the

media has no effect on foreign policy formulation because foreign affairs officials take decisions based on information and considerations other than the 'moral outcries' generated by the media. According to Louw, an eighth view of the media's role is that it can be part of a hegemonic power game where it becomes embroiled in struggles over policy was being fought by various factions of the governing elite who deploy media releases, briefings and press conferences. (*ibid.*: 187-191) Thus, Eyton Gilboa suggested that scholarly studies on the CNN Effect present mixed, contradictory and confused results. (Gilboa 2002: 734)

Hence, from all the above views, it can be said that there is no consensus about the media's impact on foreign policy making. But, it is seen that the media is one of many but important players which can shape, formulate and influence foreign policy. It is involved in all stages of foreign policy formulation processes and political leaders take the media into consideration in media's national and international aspects. The involvement of media in the decision-making process is complex. When an external, international event occurs, political leaders learn about it from the media. This information is processed through various image components and then the policy or decision formulating process is set in motion. Also, the media advisors and public relation professionals participate in the process; officials consult with them and consider their advice. Finally, they take the media into account when they define their policy and match to it the appropriate media tools. According to Chanan Naveh, "the past studies of foreign policy decision-making neglected to deal with this complex role of the media." Naveh suggested that the past studies described the media (if at all) as one of the channels of informing leaders of international events as input for the decision-making process. Also, "the foreign policy demonstrates that this perspective minimises the place of the media and therefore, it should be dealt theoretically as well as in applied research case studies using a more complex approach, emphasizing the crucial role of the media in foreign policy." (Naveh 2002: 1)

While analysing each and every aspect of role of media in process making, Louw has also explained that foreign policy decisions are made exclusively by a "tight-knit elite team" of cabinet members plus senior foreign affairs and security staffers. Outside consultants are also approached before decisions are made. One different scenario which he suggested is that foreign policy is made largely independently of both mass public opinion and media reports designed for mass publics because foreign policy makers have information sources richer than those available to the journalists or public. Hence, the government doesn't have to rely

on mass media information. Similarly, as governments have multiple sources, policy makers also do not get influenced by the sensational media images. He gave second scenario according to which journalists have possessing influence over foreign policy formulation. He defined that the influence can be derived from the following: a)Journalists can undermine the agenda setting capacity of senior civil servants by publishing stories bureaucrats and or intelligence agencies would rather were not brought to the attention of politics; b) Politicians need to keep their constituencies on side. Otherwise journalists can expose policies politicians would have buried. c) When policy makers are divided over what course of action to adopt, journalists can shift the debate by providing one side with the evidence it needs to out argue its opponents or by shifting or pushing the public opinion in one direction. A third scenario which he discussed "grants the mass influence over foreign policy formulation. Another scenario which is suggested is a "complex interaction between policy making elites and the media." (Louw 2010: 180-182) Philip M. Seib argued that "while television images may not bring down governments, they can capture public interest and guide public attitude; generating a momentum that will shake any policymaker... who is unprepared to deal with it." (Seib 1997: 47)

M. Schudson stated that the "power of the mass media lies not in the direct influence ... but in the perception of experts and decision makers that the general public is influenced by the mass media." (Schudson 2002: 263) Thus, Gilboa's work on media diplomacy showed "how the media acts as a third party pursuing track II diplomacy in the pre-negotiation stages. It is used for trials of policies through press conferences and leaks, and as a de facto hotline when all lines of communication are severed during a crisis." (Gilboa 2002: 193-208)

For instance, post-26/11 Mumbai terror attacks, the press has played the role of peace facilitator between India and Pakistan when the leaders refused to enter into any sort of dialogue. For example, *The Times of India* of New Delhi and Pakistan's *Jang* Group launched *Aman ki Asha* (AKA), hope for peace on January 1, 2010 to promote amity between the two countries. The aim of the campaign is to have mutual peace and development of cultural and diplomatic ties between the two countries.

There have been certain instances when the media tried to influence foreign policies. For instance, in 1999, India and Pakistan fought a war in Kargil. The power and influence of media was such that media's projection of victory not only helped the Bharatiya Janata Party

(BJP) to come to power in the 1999 elections but, it also displayed the power of India's growing media – both print and electronic. It was India's first televised war. Even the Kargil Review Committee Report of 2000 called media as a valuable "force multiplier". The report also mentioned that during the Kargil War, New Delhi "demonstrated its agility in handling a variety of media like print, television, radio and Internet to disseminate to shape and strengthen the Indian stand national and internationally which is evident in the headlines of major Indian newspapers printed during the time." (Tellis et al 2001: 24) In December 1999, again, when Indian Airlines flight IC 814 was hijacked to Kandahar, protests by relatives of those on board the hijacked airliner were taken inside Indian homes by media. Under the media's pressure, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government buckled and a humiliating surrender - the hostages-for-passengers swap - followed. The then External Affairs Minister of India, Jaswant Singh, personally escorted the terrorists to Kandahar in a special aircraft. Moreover, the mainstream Indian media both electronic and print has been a strong supporter of the Indo-US agreement on cooperation in civil nuclear energy with the exception of *The Hindu*, which was quite against the agreement and was towards pro-Communist Party of India (Marxist). The media defended the Indian government back at its home and strengthened the UPA government to go-ahead with the agreement with the USA, against getting criticism from the opposition parties both the Left and Right. Although more than print, television played an extremely influential role in generating public support for the nuclear accord. No major television news channel campaigned against the agreement.

Also, the incident of 2013 in which two Indian soldiers were killed in a cross-border attack by Pakistani troops in the disputed territory of Kashmir has been the lead story in both print and electronic Indian media since January 8, 2013. The television talk shows, newspapers columns and editorials kept debating about the ties between the two countries. On the issue, A.G. Noorani stated in *The Hindu* on January 24, 2013 that "it was the hysterical campaign [especially] by the electronic media that led the Prime Minister to change course on the India-Pakistan dialogue after the LoC hostilities."[83] Noorani in his article further quoted Douglas Hurd, a former British Foreign Secretary as saying: "Like it or not, television images are what force foreign policymakers to give one of the current 25 crises in the world greater priority."[84]

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[83] Noorani, A.G. (2013), "Manmohan Singh's Abject Surrender", *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 24 January 2013.

[84] *Ibid.*

The media's influence on foreign policy matters is shaped by two important factors, Sanjaya Baru said, adding, "firstly, the extent of domestic political disagreement or consensus on foreign policy issues; and secondly, the relationship between the Government of the day and the media." (Baru 2009: 278) He also said the "electronic media, like Parliament, has become an arena in which party political differences on foreign policy do get articulated more forcefully because of the nature of the medium." He also added that "television news channels have contributed to increased public discord on foreign policy by argumentative debates that foster divergence. While television resorts to this practice to increase viewer attention and make news more entertaining, this has increased the role of the media in shaping political thinking on foreign policy." (Baru 2009: 279) He further said:

> "the last decade (2001-2010), therefore, marks a turning point in the role of the media in shaping foreign policy. This is on account of three very different factors: (1) the gradual erosion of the domestic political consensus on foreign policy, giving the media the role of an arbiter and an independent analyst of contending political views; (2) the media revolution and expansion, with the rise of television and business journalism and the growing importance of private corporate advertisement revenues, as opposed to government support for media, in influencing media economics; and (3) the increasing influence of the middle class and the business class in the media has also influenced media's thinking on foreign policy." (*ibid.*)

However, Aruna Zachariah said that the concept that the media has different effects on different types of people is new. Explaining Hypodermic Needle Theory, she said "media could inject ideas into people the way liquids were injected by a syringe. This perception is contrarian to earlier concept of one-to-one relationship between media and people. But Cantril study of 1938 again presented a contradiction saying interpretation of messages depended on high critical thinking and it varied from person to person." (Zachariah 1999: 33). Moreover, Lazarfeld said, "opinion-leaders, who got information from the media, shared it with friends. Instead of changing people's beliefs, media primarily activated people to vote and reinforce the already held opinions. Further findings were that family and friends had more effect on people's decisions than media. Media had different effects on different people, thus reinforcing the Cantril Study. The major source of information about candidates was other people." (*ibid*: 33-34)

The foreign policy makers always try to engage the elites to be surer than the public, Pattnaik (2004) said, adding that "it is rarely a subject for mass politics except, perhaps, in the case of India-Pakistan relations, and that too, is limited primarily to north India." (Pattnaik 2004: 17-18) She also said that emotions as well as sentiments dominate the Indo-Pak relationship.

Further, the mutual feelings of the last so many decades have "hardened each other's perceptions to such an extent that any shift from the present position is politically suicidal for the governing elite. It is worth noting here that while the governments understandably have constraints in breaking the ice in a stagnant relationship, the elites enjoy a degree of autonomy and can alter approaches. This is because, unlike their political masters, the elites do not have many constraints in expressing their opinion. Vested interests apart, the elite can play a significant role in breaking the ice and providing adequate space to the political elite to take necessary steps to be imaginative in solving problems." (*ibid.*) While talking about the importance of elite perceptions in foreign policy, she added, "that formulation of foreign policy in both India and Pakistan has been highly elitist. The reason which she gave for the monopoly of the elite in the foreign policy decision-making apparatus is that there is a need for both knowledge and understanding of international politics and the manner in which the states, as international actors, function in the globalised world. Secondly, a foreign policy-making mechanism also constitutes a sophisticated bargaining tool to maximise national interest, and at the same time, portrays the country's stature in the international sphere. Thirdly, the task of educating people on foreign policy issues is largely done by the elite. Although the people in both countries have a keen interest in Indo-Pak relations, various intricacies of the relations are not known to the masses. It is the elite who inform the masses about various issues and the existing challenges to their resolution. The elites not only articulate the popular views, but also offer opinions that are more apolitical. Fourthly, the elites have access to vast resources of published material both inside the country and as well as outside, about the perception of the other side, which provides them with greater ability to understand the complex nature of Indo-Pak relations while suggesting different policy options." (*ibid*.)

Similarly, Kapur also talked about the role and importance of elite masses. He said that "the public's views on foreign policy seemed to be shaped significantly by the behaviour of policy-making elites, the news media and other opinion leaders." (Kapur 2009: 288) He also quoted "Zaller's Receive-Accept-Sample (RAS) model of public opinion formation which is based on survey answers that are a top-of-the-head response to the questions presented. However, inferential caution is warranted on responses to specific questions since they are affected by framing, priming, and the like. Thus, the public hold attitudes about foreign policy but determining which aspects of those attitudes will get expressed is neither straightforward nor automatic. Elites appear to retain some leeway in shaping the expression

of public opinion, but the mechanisms that give them that leeway are still little understood. And the information the public gets from the government is even more subject to problems of framing, selective use of information, and strategic manipulation than is the information from the mass media." (*ibid.*)

According to Kapur, in a democracy, voters' preferences reign supreme. If a government ignores voters' policy preferences, it can be replaced by a new dispensation. Legislature plays voters' conduit to keep government informed about people's choices. When public feels that the law makers had turned insensitive to their views, opposition capitalises the situation and the people can vote out the government. However, this notion also keeps executive sensitive to public opinion while framing foreign policy. So recent US researches have propounded reciprocal ties between policy makers and public opinion which shapes foreign policy unlike earlier. (Kapur 2009: 287) As the people's participation is coming down, media has been gaining enough power to even bring down presidencies. In case of Watergate scandal, media relentlessly hammered on story exposing the ploys of then US president Richard Nixon's administration and its role in the scandal too. (Zachariah 1999: 35)

In short, the media creates an atmosphere which reflects foreign-policy events through the agenda setting and dependency perspectives, and by influencing decision-makers and compelling them to respond through the media, with their specific characteristics. The concept of media environment also includes the feedback process which, in this context, means media-oriented foreign-policy decisions on the press (like censorship, etc.). Moreover, the whole dynamics of media's role and involvement in shaping foreign policy is thus complex, but it is mainly twofold: "first, the media as an input source for decision making; and second, the media as an environment which leaders must consider and relate to when they make decisions and consider promulgating them." (Naveh 2002: 10)

2.3 Media and Terrorism

This section will give a brief account of various studies related to media coverage of terrorism or conflicts. The role of media in understanding the nature of violence is necessary. It is crucial too as it helps in defining its own role also and, if the journalists are able to conceptualise terrorism, they are in a better position to present before the public the issues of violence like terrorism, war, militancy and ethnic violence. Also, media helps the public to

engage in long and careful considerations on such issues with a better as well as mature perspective.

Political scientist Louise Richardson mentioned that "Publicity has always been a central objective of terrorism and terrorists have been extremely successful in gaining publicity." (Richardson 2006: 94) But Brigitte L. Nacos and Yaeli Bloch Elkon said, "this does not mean that the press is sympathetic to terrorists, their methods, and objectives, it is nevertheless true that terrorist strikes provide what the contemporary news media crave the most."[85] (Nacos and Elkon 2011: 692) Govind Thukral had asserted that deadly conflicts have complicated histories, the international view of them will depend to a large extent on how the media presents and explains the conflict.[86] (Thukral 2009: 81) He also quoted journalist John Pilger's writing on the role of media in the war against terrorism, in which, it is stated that "western media corporations seem to have abandoned the impartial style in their news presentation, and instead cater to public sentiments or reflect government policy." (Thakur 2009: 84)

There have been efforts to explore the relationship between the press and terrorism. Today, with an access to radio, television or printed matter; the terrorists definitely have an easy access to media. Also, the terrorists are well aware of power of media and they try to manipulate them for their own personal gains. Several scholars have suggested in their works that media and terrorists feed off each other.

However, the definition of terrorism still remains the subject of intense debate. But one of the components of most of the definitions which define the relationship between terrorism and media is that the terrorists (or violence) attract a considerable amount of media's attention. But the quality as well as duration of media attention varies and influenced by certain factors such as journalists are dependent on the use of legitimate government sources for stories.

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[85] Both of them also had mentioned that it is "sensation, drama, shock and tragedy suited to be packed as gripping human-interest narratives." As a result, terrorists get precisely what they want: "massive publicity and opportunity to showcase their ability to strike against even the strongest of nation states. Media organisations are rewarded as well in that they energise their competition for audience size and circulation."

[86] Thukral further explained his thoughts by giving the report of *The Carnegie Corporation*, a Washington-based institution, which referred to several deadly conflicts across the globe and the role which media have played. The report suggested a number of examples in the 1990s showed that the impact of media reporting may generate political action. Report (1987), *Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflicts*, Washington DC.

Friendly government sources, not terrorists, influence the extent of coverage which any given act of violence receives.

Before going further, it also becomes significant to mention that at times, administration also create an institutional structure to manage news and issue content for the administration's benefit. There are certain variables for the better understanding of nuances of media and terrorism and that are: corporate milieu and the concentration of media ownership. According to Nacos, during the coverage of terrorism, "commercial imperatives seem to triumph over journalism ethics. Thus, he further added, "while terrorists and news organisations are not loving bedfellows, they are more like partners in the marriage of convenience." (Nacos 2007: 107)

The media should definitely report acts of terror, but when they report on terrorists, "they do not have to view themselves as detached observers; they should not only transmit a truthful account of what's out there." (Reese 1990: 394) Rather they should be free to make certain moral judgements. While mentioning that media has been accused of being the terrorist's best friend, Walter Laqueur explained that "if terrorism is propaganda by deed, the success of a terrorist campaign depends decisively on the amount of publicity it receives. The terrorist's act by itself is nothing; publicity is all." (Laqueur 1987: 121)

Raphael Cohen Almagor further explained it interestingly by suggesting that "media are helping terrorists orchestrate a horrifying drama in which the terrorists and their victims are the main actors, creating a spectacle of tension and agony. The media sometimes do not merely report the horror of terror. They become part of it, adding to the drama." (Almagor 2004: 3) Furthermore, researchers had also spoken about the theatre of terror. According to the researchers, at the heart of the theatre metaphor is the audience. The media personnel are a bit like drama critics who convey information to the public. Also like a critic to the good drama, the media also analyses the whole event. Moreover, "the slant they give by deciding what to report and how to report it can create a climate of public support, apathy or anger." (Rubin and Friedland 1986: 24)

While talking about the symbiotic relationship between press and terrorism, Alex P Schmid and Janny de Graaf said, "By their theatrics, the insurgent terrorists serve the audience-attracting needs of the mass media, and since the media care primarily about holding the

attention audience, this symbiosis is beneficial for both." (Schmid and Graaf 1982: 72) However, this whole relationship is not this simple.

The use of media was so important for "Al-Qaeda that many within the organisation have said that Osama bin Laden was obsessed with the international media, a publicity hound, and that he had caught the disease of screens, flashes, fans and applause," Fawaz Gerges said, adding, "Laden was not the only extremist to value the media so highly. Al-Zawahiri is believed to have said that more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media." (Gerges 2005: 194-197)

Bruce Hoffman said on terrorist attacks that "without the media's coverage the act's impact is arguably wasted, remaining narrowly confined to the immediate victim(s) of the attack, rather than reaching the wider target audience at whom the terrorists' violence is actually aimed." (Hoffman 2006: 174) Likewise, Nacos who has done a lot of research on this subject, said: "Without massive news coverage, the terrorist act would resemble the proverbial tree falling in the forest: if no one learned of an incident, it would be as if it had not occurred." (Nacos 2000: 175) Also, one can't ignore the media blackout of a terrorist attack as "starting with the problem of censoring and restricting media reporting on terrorism, one has to point out that free media, although itself not always a bastion of liberal democratic values, is nevertheless a key characteristic of a democratic society." (Spencer 2012: 13) Spencer quoted Paul Wilkinson as saying that "it is widely recognised that it is important to avoid the mass media being hijacked and manipulated by terrorists, but if the freedom of the media is sacrificed in the name of combating terrorism, one allows small groups of terrorists to destroy one of the key foundations of a democratic society. It is also an insult to the intelligence of the general public, and would totally undermine confidence in the veracity of the media if censorship was to be introduced." (*ibid.*) Boaz Ganor said that the terrorists are not necessarily interested in the deaths of three, or thirty, or even of three thousand people. Rather, they allow the imagination of the target population to do their work for them. In fact, it is conceivable that "the terrorists could attain their aims without carrying out a single attack; the desired panic could be produced by the continuous broadcast of threats and declarations – by radio and TV interviews, videos and all the familiar methods of the psychological warfare." (Ganor 2005 :39)

Nacos identified four goals of terrorists vis-à-vis media which included "gaining attention and awareness, condition the target population (and government) for intimidation so that fear

is created." The second is "recognition of the organisation's motives followed by gaining the respect and sympathy of those in whose name they claim to attack and having a quasi-legitimate status and a media treatment similar to that of legitimate political actors." (Nacos 2007: 20) At the same time, "it also needs to be seen that terrorists provide the media with emotional, exciting and bloody news which helps them sell their product" (Ganor 2005: 231). Therefore, "there are mutual benefits for both, and the relationship could be described as symbiotic." (Schmid 1989: *n.d.*) Apart from it being media's social responsibility, the media covers terrorism extensively because of the sensational nature of terrorism. Nacos further added:

> "After all, terrorism is news and must be covered. Still, the main common denominator seems to be the number of viewers that watch terrorist coverage; people are fascinated by the subject. Much like terrorists, journalists need a public in order to exist. In addition, ratings are directly linked to advertisement income and so, the more people watch the news on a certain channel, the more money that particular channel will make. Also, the media are rewarded (for broadcasting terrorism) in that they energise their competition for audience size and circulation – and thus for all-important advertising." (Nacos 2006: 82)

Laqueur, however, said that publicity, needless to say, is significant and people pay a great deal of money and go through great lengths to achieve it. But, "unless this publicity is translated into something more tangible, it is no more than entertainment." (Laqueur 2001: 216)

In the last two decades, there have been a lot of changes due to globalisation, and with that, the roots of terrorism have also spread. Today, because of the advancement in the technology, the people not only read the hard copies of newspapers but refer the news on internet also through its online edition. Thus, in today's world, the "possibility of gaining media attention can trigger terrorism more than ever." (Frey and Rohner 2007: 140)

There are certain methods through which the government in democratic nation-states can react. Paul Wilkinson has divided the ways into three main policy options. According to Wilkinson, "the first is the policy of laissez-faire where no step is taken by government to check the extent of terror coverage in media regardless of circumstances." According to Wilkinson, "dangers of this approach are fairly obvious with threat of terror outfits using enormous media reach to bolster their cause or to force concessions of ransom out of government, companies or wealthy individuals." (Wilkinson 2006: 154-157)

The second policy to regulate media is by "censorship through statutory norms." Freedom of speech and expression, no doubt, make for basic tenets of democracy but it becomes imperative for the governments to restrict press freedom in fight against terror. Pro-restriction quarters argue that terror will disappear if media will refuse to cover it. Wilkinson, however, underlines the role of third policy to control media, that is, of voluntary self-restrain. (*ibid.)*

As the most gruesome and deadly incidents receive the "greatest volume of reporting, media critics have charged that terrorists resort to progressively bloodier violence to satisfy the media's appetite for shocking news." (Nacos 2000: 175) Louw said, "In societies where the mass media is significantly integrated into the political process, both terrorists and those fighting with terrorists necessarily pay serious attention to the media, and how the media can be used to promote their side of the struggle. He quoted Schlesinger et al., who described three schools of thought concerning the relationship between media and terrorists, that is, terrorists: a. successfully use the media to further their ends; b. are not usually successful in duping journalists, and consequently the media do not generally assist terrorists; and c. seek to use the media: the media sometimes assist terrorists to propagate their symbolism, and sometimes do not. He further said that ultimately terrorists — like all politicians — are in the communication business. And, like other political players, terrorists face an increasingly media-ized political process. Thus, the twenty-first century terrorists pay attention to the media as a site of struggle." (Louw 2010: 176-177)

Sarah Oates came out with two significant points. Firstly, "the media makes an enormous difference in the key definition of terrorists' acts of violence as either criminal or political in nature." Secondly, "the media generally do not provide analysis or background terrorist events, thus making it difficult to understand the root cause of conflict." Oates further suggested that in the case of defining terrorism as criminal, the media do in some ways deprive terrorists of a 'critical element of the oxygen of' media coverage. Although the media report on the acts of terrorism, "they tend not talk about the political aims of the terrorists." (Oates 2008: 135)

One of the social scientists, C Hewitt, highlighted the unevenness in coverage of terrorist groups by country. Hewitt gave an example that "German media have exaggerated the dangers of terrorism and supported government counter-measures wholeheartedly." (Hewitt 1992: 174) Hewitt has cited "biasness and unfairness in the coverage of terrorists in democratic countries, and gave the example of British media in Northern Ireland. He

recognised the tendency in North America and Britain for the media to ignore the social causes and goals of terrorism." (*ibid.*)

Moreover, Thussu and Freedman have figured out three key discourses concerning the role of mainstream media in communicating conflict and they identified them as "critical observer, publicist and most recently, as battleground, the surface upon which war is imagined and executed." (Thussu and Freedman 2003: 4-5) Further they talked about the "adversarial model" which suggests that the "prying eyes and investigative reports of committed journalists force governments to be more open in their justifications for war and more transparent in their conduct of military operations. By this logic, the expansion in the number of media outlets and volume of news has simply fuelled the watchdog role of the media. Increased competition forces reporters to go beyond the handouts and briefings to discover an original story that their rivals may not have discovered. The example of adversarial model will be the journalist's role in US coverage of the Vietnam War. According to Thussu and Freedman, one of the turning points of the war was the transmission of a special report by the country's most celebrated news anchor, Walter Cronkite of CBS. After returning from his visit to Vietnam, he argued that "the war was bloody stalemate" and that outright military victory was virtually impossible. Upon watching this, President Johnson is alleged to have remarked to his aides that 'it is all over." (*cited in* Ranney 1983: 5)

However, Page (1996) has approached the Vietnam War from another perspective. She did an extensive analysis of "Official Propaganda" in that war. She noted that the war required explanation and that the presentation of a Government's position in the best possible light, to both its home audience and the foreign observer is an important feature of (Government) policy. The difficulties the US government had with this presentation resulted in the enormous internal discontent that doomed massive public support for the military effort, as well as set off worldwide opposition. Page further broke down the presentation problem into two groups of factors- the first dealing with the problems of war itself, and the second focussing on the significant impact of new communication technologies on the mass media. She noted that the spread of modern day communication networks enlarged the administration's scope of media activity, but this also enlarged the potential number of rival viewpoints that had to be countered. The worldwide arena of this communication network limited the possibilities for the successful promotion of distinctive propaganda campaigns in

different parts of the world. The spread of communications ensured that it would be difficult to correct mistakes once they were made.[87]

After the Second World War, the researchers' attention was on the studies of propaganda, counter propaganda, attitude and persuasion. The war caused intense concern about the persuasive powers of the mass media and their potential for directly altering attitudes and behaviour. Scanell and Cardiff (in 1991) stated that during the Second World War, the Ministry of Information and the armed forces pressurised *BBC* and asked them to give priority to entertainment in order to boost morale. As a result, the *BBC* responded by rethinking its programme strategy and cultural approach. Before the War, its two channels had a diverse mix of programmes intended to extend listeners' cultural horizons. However, in 1940 the BBC introduced the forces programme devoted mainly to entertainment. (Neelamalar 2010: 38)

T. Wicker also wrote about the control exercised by the military and administration on information flow. In his article, he wrote that "the Bush administration and the military were so successful in controlling information about the war that they were able to tell the public just about what they wanted the public to know. He described the situation to be worse as press and the public largely acquiesced in this disclosure of only selected information."[88]

While mentioning about *CNN's* coverage on 9/11 attacks, M. Neelamalar has mentioned A. Reynolds and B. Barnett's conclusion which stated that "CNN created a powerful visual and verbal frame, establishing that the 9/11 attacks comprised an act of war so horrific that immediate military retaliation was not only justified but necessary and that a US military led international war would be the only meaningful solution to prevent more terrorist attacks." (Neelamalar 2010: 58) She also quoted Rayman-Read and Feinberg's article "Fanning the Flame" in which they analysed the Asian media's coverage of September 11, 2001 terrorist

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[87] Page, Caroline (2016), *US Official Propaganda During the Vietnam War, 1965-1973: The Rights and the Wrongs,* UK*: Leicester,* [Online: web], Accessed 20 February 2017, URL:

https://books.google.co.in/books?id=GkjqDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1&lpg=PA1&dq=war+required+explanation+of +justification+and+that+the+presentation+of+a+Government's+position+in+the+best+possible+light,+to+both +its+home+audience&source=bl&ots=RYmwXijkTW&sig=n4BkFNWuQuS9RdwYWTuPo9EJdyE&hl=en&sa =X&ved=0ahUKEwigueiJmOjUAhUDTo8KHculC9MQ6AEIKzAB#v=onepage&q=war%20required%20expla nation%20of%20justification%20and%20that%20the%20presentation%20of%20a%20Government%E2%80%9 9s%20position%20in%20the%20best%20possible%20light%2C%20to%20both%20its%20home%20audience& f=false.

[88] Wicker, T. (1991), "In The Nation; An Unknown Casualty", *The New York Times,* [Online: web], Accessed 24 July 2016, URL: http://www.nytimes.com/1991/03/20/opinion/in-the-nation-an-unknown-casualty.html.

attacks in the US and the subsequent American attacks on Afghanistan. About the media coverage in Middle East countries, they pronounced that the current reporting echoes their coverage of the Gulf War, but show little more maturity or expertise. About the media coverage in the Asian countries they noted that "the common tenor in Asian opinion writings conveys an ominous sense of worry, with predictions of future instability caused by short-sighted responses to and superficial solutions for, terrorism and the underlying ideological tension that generates it." (*ibid.*) In several areas of the competitive world today, mass media plays increasingly significant roles. As George Gebner suggested that "... through selection, treatment, emphasis and tone, mass media help define their own set of significant realities, structure the agenda of public (and increasingly, of private) discourse and make available dominant perspectives from which realities, priorities, actions and policies might be viewed." (Gebner 1961: 313)

He also pointed out that "as instruments of world communication, national media represent authoritative voices of their society. They establish common ground for communication with other people." *(ibid.)*

However, on the other hand, American journalist Charles Kruthammer explained that not all types of terrorism are dependent on the media. He had separated the terrorist event into certain categories for instance first, he mentioned that in "assassination", the main goal is to eliminate the political important person. Here, the publicity is not required much by the assassin; secondly, he mentioned about the "attacks on a specific group". While explaining this, he had maintained that the aim is to demoralize a group identified as the enemy, with the attacks independent of the media. Thirdly, he said, "random attacks to publicise political grievances", the target population is the world and media coverage is a necessity. (*cited in* Dass 2008: 69)

The role of media -- the newspapers, radio and television has changed over the years and has become more liable to offer a platform for the terrorist agenda. Editorials express certain opinions, perspectives, ideologies, positions and interests; they are widely circulated and have a significant role in shaping public opinion, especially during periods of crises. The question here is how the media should recast their own sense of responsibility when covering conflicts or crises. Whether media is free in totally or not, its influence as a whole is enormous. The electronic media in India withdrew criticism from experts, government officials for its role in the coverage during the terrorist attack. As television media is a powerful medium, its

interpretative representation of violent events has a wide and powerful impact. For instance, post the 26/11 terror attacks in Mumbai, the Sharm-el-Sheikh issue was the perfect example of how Congress-led the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government was scrutinised through the media.

Thussu said that "the media in India was not geared to cover such high-optic unfolding of events, and tended to sensationalism and shortcuts by resorting to Pakistan-bashing. Operating in an extremely competitive commercial environment, the news networks were aiming to be first with the exclusives, and in the process, the line between objective and subjective coverage, and news and entertainment was constantly blurring." (Freedman and Thussu 2012: 177)

Dominic Rohner and Bruno S. Frey mentioned that recent past has provided a lot of instances where the terrorist groups and media have got mutually beneficial relationships. They gave the examples of "the hostage taking by Palestinian terrorists at the 1972 Munich Olympics, the hijacking of TWA flight 847 by Lebanese terrorists in 1985, or the terrorist attack on New York's twin towers on 9/11/2001 were all mediated mega events, where terrorists deliberately wanted the attention of the public and where the media benefited from record sales and huge audiences." (Rohner and Frey 2007: 130) Moreover, the media also benefits from the public's eagerness to obtain information about terrorist attacks. At least for sensationalist television channels and tabloid-newspapers, the fear and fascination generated by terrorism and political extremism is a substantial part of their business. They further added that "most of the literature on terrorism has linked terror to ethnic, religious or geographic factors. The relationship between terrorists and the media has received little attention." (*ibid*.)

The impact of the coverage of the terrorist attack by media was such that even before the three-day saga in Mumbai on 26/11 had ended, public opinion was against the Pakistan and along with the media, public started pointing accusatory fingers at Pakistan, claiming the terrorists had been trained in Karachi.

The media would not have figured out as an actor in Indo-Pak relations till a decade ago, Amit Baruah said and suggested that other short-listed players, in varying degrees of importance, would have, arguably, been accorded pride of place. "If, since the nuclear tests of May 1998, the U.S., which emerged as a third party between India and Pakistan, has played a critical role between the two nations, so has the media. But, just as we are still trying to

understand Washington's growing role in India and Pakistan, we need to pay attention to what I would like to call the 'fourth party' in bilateral relations – the media." (Baruah 2012: 194) He further said that "the role of the media - print or electronic - is linked to the dominant state discourse in both countries. If one government would like to project a particular view of the 'other', the media, in most cases, would go along with such projections. This is not to say that everyone falls in line, or does not ask hard questions but, by and large, the dominant state view is picked up and projected. In recent days, especially after the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks, the Indian media needs no cue; it went far ahead even of the State in bashing Pakistan." (*ibid*.: 195)

Neelamalar said that it comes as no surprise that people who matter in Indian media themselves have openly agreed with their flaws regarding the coverage of 26/11. Udaya Shankar said that "Coverage of the 26/11 terror story by the media, especially by television channels, was amateurish. We need to evolve as journalists. However, it is more important to ensure that no one manipulates the situation for their benefit and gag our freedom. Also, more than analysing media coverage of 26/11, it is important to know who is demanding a review of it, and it was only because of this coverage that political heads rolled and the serious loopholes and laxity in the system were exposed." He further said that "there is a crisis of competence in media. On one hand, upcoming journalists lack professionalism and urge to learn and on the other hand, editors have failed to be mentors to these young guys." (Neelamalar 2010: 60-61) "If the media would announce guidelines restricting the use of material produced by terrorists the incentives for terrorists to produce videotapes could be eliminated. If the media take public statements on record of their position and their efforts to control terrorism, it will be far more difficult for them to explore later in an orgy of media coverage following a major terrorist incident." (Dass 2008: 18) As media gives huge publicity to the terrorists atrocities, in order to minimise the damage, media should have certain ways which could lessen the competition and their aggressive search for scoops that usually lead to media magnification of the violence.

To sum up, one can say that today public is rational and therefore, included (or if not, should be) in the policy process. In fact, public opinion influences the leaders, preventing them from making extreme or overambitious decisions and thus, makes it an important determinant of foreign policy. Also, the way domestic public opinion is an important determinant of foreign

policy. Similarly, world public opinion also plays an indispensible role in today's scenario. Undoubtedly, today people are more aware and conscious about foreign policy matters

Nacos has observed many instances in which media coverage of terrorist events was problematic and irresponsible, evoking public criticism and antagonising the authorities. He said, "Immediately after the September 11, 2001 tragedy the broadcast media played and replayed the recorded exchanges between victims in the World Trade Centre and emergency police dispatchers. They exploited the suffering of the people trapped and soon died inside the struck towers, playing again and again the emotional mayhem of people who were trying to cope amidst overwhelming 15 horror, disbelief, fear and terror. Those sensational broadcasters showed very little sensitivity to the victims in pursuit of better ratings." (Nacos 2002: 53) Nacos and Elchon have also mentioned that today's terrorists can perpetrate violence and report their deeds themselves. They gave the example of Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia where the terrorists beheaded their hostages, shot their films and posted videos of killings on Internet. Thus, terrorists were the source and the reporters of terrifying news, the traditional media is left to report on terrorists' own news productions and spread the terrorist propaganda   masquerading as news. In short, there is nothing new when it comes to terrorists' emphasis on propaganda except the advancement of communication networks and global media. *(ibid.)*

The media performed its role of an opinion maker post the Kargil War, Parliament attack in New Delhi and 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks. It used this position to act as a pressure group in the immediate aftermath of these conflicts and at the same time, it acted as a diplomacy agent for back channel negotiations. It also acts as a feedback mechanism for policy decisions and an opinion shaper.

Also, the relationship between media and terrorists is much more complex than the idea of media fostering terrorists. Like war reporting, coverage of terrorism tends to focus on the immediate news rather than delve into the cause of political violence. To be more specific, the negative reportage tends to have more agenda-setting effects than neutral and positive coverage.[89] Also, media portrays foreign countries in a particular manner fashion by limiting

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[89] Martha Crenshaw said, "A free press serves the interests of terrorist groups whose main goal is to advertise their cause to a wide audience and gain publicity and recognition." (Crenshaw 1981: 379-399). However, Li (2005) and Nacoes (1994) stated that unlike in repressive regimes, terror incidents are more likely to be reported in detail by the free press in democratic societies. Therefore, press freedom in democracies gives a valuable opportunity to publicity-hungry terrorists to create widespread fear. Freedom of press brings up the

the reportage around a few policy issues. Thus, the press benefits from terrorism as reports of terror attacks increase newspaper sales and the number of television viewers. Dominic Rohner and Bruno S. Frey wrote: "There is a common-interest-game, whereby both the media and terrorists benefit from terrorist incidents and where both parties adjust their actions according to the actions of the other player." (Rohner and Frey 2007: 142)

Ayesha Siddiqa has mentioned that "in both India and Pakistan media has generally become a tool for lobbies that broadly pressure foreign policy re-orientation or its direction. This is often done through building a hype on issues or twisting arguments in a way that it moulds public opinion. The hype created thus amounts to pressure on policy-makers."[90]

While comparing the dynamics of relationship between Indian press, public opinion and foreign policy with Pakistan, Hamid Mir in an e-mail interview to the author wrote,

> "Pakistani media is struggling for its freedom since 1958 when General Ayub Khan imposed Martial Law in Pakistan. Eleven years of Ayub, then two years of General Yaya Khan, then eleven years of General Zia ul Haq and nine years of General Pervez Musharraf were spent in fighting for media freedom. Pakistan (We) never had much time to focus India. Yes, Pakistani media is concerned about Kashmir but most of the important newspapers gave attention to Kashmir as an unfinished agenda of the 1947.I have seen Zia era and Musharraf era as a journalist. We were more concerned about our domestic problems than India." He also said that "our media is not important for Foreign Policy makers. Media became important in last 10 years but it is not very independent. Pakistani democracy is going through an evolution process and media is part of this process."[91]

Kapur maintained that news media influences the public opinion and thereby foreign policy, rather than "sculpting or determining policy." The news media pushes a government towards action, forcing it to speed up the decision-making process, with negative coverage being especially potent in this regard. It is more likely to influence symbolic, highly visible agendas with intense emotional characteristics, rather than substantive agendas. However, the media is also often the sounding board for governmental policy decisions in general, including foreign policy. And the extent to which governmental elites react to the media, or are beholden to it,

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issue of potential underreporting of terrorist incidents in countries where the press is not free. Given the restrictions on the media and heavy censorship by the government, terrorist incidents are less likely to be reported in nondemocratic countries (Savun and Phillips 2009: 881).

[90] *Siddiqa, Ayesha (2017), e-mail to the author, 19 March 2017.

[91] *Mir, Hamid (2017), email to the author, 29 March 2017.

is still somewhat contingent on the quality of leadership of the government of the day. (Kapur 2015: 5)

Hence, media can be very influential in telling us how to think about issues or objects. It is especially true in foreign news, because most people do not have first hand experience with foreign countries, and media very much provide us with how we should perceive other countries.

Based on these factors it can be argued that press depends on the public, active press shapes the public and policies and government due to the very nature of policy making decides the timing and the extent to which the public should know (selective leakage). Role of media in shaping and presenting public opinion on a variety of issues in South Asia has indeed been gargantuan, Pattanaik and Behuria suggested, adding: Print media has traditionally played a significant role but the impact of visual media has been far effective over the last few decades in bringing visuals to the drawing rooms of people. Moreover, the electronic channels are no longer restricted to the ones owned by the government and the private sector has emerged as an important player and corporatized the manner in which media reports. (Pattanaik and Behuria 2016: 13)

Thus, it can be said that various theories from different schools of thought have carefully examined the intricate and complex relationship between public opinion, foreign policy formulation and the media. Some have looked to play down media and public opinion's role in foreign policy issues whereas others have given it greater significance. Over the years, mass media technology has advanced to such a level that the outreach is much wider than ever. Thus, a gamut of political thinkers, analysts and journalists have dedicated a great time, zeal and effort to quantify these processes, and a brief glance is provided in this chapter as a background to the main topic of Media and Indo-Pak Conflicts.

CHAPTER 3

MEDIA AND THE KARGIL WAR OF 1999

The Kargil War of 1999 was different from the other conflicts that had occurred in the past between India and Pakistan for a number of reasons. First, the war that had broken out was between two countries that were armoured with nuclear weapons. India had conducted its first peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974, and in 1998, it conducted series of tests under the then newly formed National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government. Following suit, Pakistan also detonated its nuclear devices in 1998.[92] Consequently, the West projected the nuclearised South Asia a threat of unprecedented levels.

In both the countries, especially in India, the supporters of the nuclear tests had predicted that it would bring "peace, cooperation and stability".[93] Unfortunately, instead of peace and cooperation, something else was store for the Indo-Pak relationship. On the other hand, the pessimists believed that the likelihood of these hostilities enlarging and breaching the nuclear threshold was quite high. (Chari 2009: 362)

The Kargil War between India and Pakistan was an unconventional, limited theatre war fought in a specific mountainous region which had resulted in thousands of casualties. This was the fourth war fought between India and Pakistan but was distinctly different on several aspects that need a thorough epistemological analysis. Not just the conflict itself but the aftermath of it was also markedly different for both the countries involved.

Firstly, the study will illustrate how this conflict was unique in its nature, scope, unfolding and even its ending. To do that, some broad, undisputed facts need to be mentioned. The war took place between May and July in the year 1999. It was restricted to the Kargil district of the Ladakh division in Jammu and Kashmir. Spread a little over 14,000 square kilometres and situated at an average height of 5,000 metres, it became one of the highest battlefields on the earth and the inclement weather conditions and the terrain were major hindrances for the

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[92] Pakistan had followed the Indians in conducting nuclear tests just fifteen days later. V. P. Malik said that Pakistan's detonation of nuclear devices was not a surprise as their security policy had always been Indo-centric. Malik, V.P. (2006), *Kargil: From Surprise to Victory,* UP: HarperCollins Publishers, pg: 25.

[93] Bajpai, Kanti (2001), "Bombs, Wars, Coups, and Hijacks: Making South Asia Into a Fashpoint", in Kanti Bajpai, Afsir Kalim and Amitabh Mattoo (eds.) *Kargil and After: Challenges for Indian Policy,* New Delhi: Har Anand Publications.

military operations.[94] Figures of casualty are disputed and even after so many years, the numbers are still contested.

Kargil War came as a shock to India because it had occurred just after the media frenzy when the then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee boarded a peace bus and crossed the border in February 1999. The Kargil War was the "third to be initiated by Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir but this does not include the skirmishes in Siachen and the Pakistan-sponsored proxy war in the state." (Malik 2009: 355) The Lahore Summit between the then Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and the then Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was believed to have de-escalated the tensions and stabilised the continuous decades-long conflict between the two countries. However, within months of the summit, both the countries were at war.

Kanti Bajpai wrote that "the Lahore agreement stands repudiated by the military government of Pakistan. India-Pakistan relations have scarcely ever been worse in its wake. The coming to power of General Musharraf, the person thought to be responsible for the Kargil War at least in India, and the hijacking of Indian civilian airline from Kathmandu to Kandahar in 1999 caused relations to plummet to an all time low." (Bajpai 2003: 230)

The Kargil War was certainly different from the other past conflicts that had occurred between India and Pakistan due to the number of reasons which are as follows:

- **Limited War[95]**

One of the uniqueness of this conflict was that unlike the past conflicts of India-Pakistan which were fought on multiple fronts, Kargil was limited to specific areas like Drass, Batalik, Kaksar, Tololing and Mushkoh Valley.[96] It did not escalate into a multiple frontal

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[94] Government of India (2000), *From Surprise to Reckoning: Kargil Committee Report*, Executive Summary, [Online: web], Accessed 5 May 2017, URL: http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/KargilRCA.html#6.

[95] Limited war is defined as it involves the military confrontation between two belligerents with concrete and well defined objectives; both belligerents believe that such a military confrontation can be confined geographically and have minimum impact on civilians, and such a military confrontation does not demand maximum military efforts.
Chandran, D. Suba (2005), "Limited War: Revisiting Kargil in the Indo-Pak Conflict", New Delhi: India Research Press. Pg: 4

[96]Swami, Praveen (1999), "The Final Assault, and the Withdrawal", *Frontline*, New Delhi, 17-30 July 1999, [Online: web], Accessed 25 June 2017, URL: http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1615/16150040.htm.

engagement. This is perhaps the most distinguishable unique feature of the conflict. However, the planning and execution of the infiltration during the conflict was a result of a concerted, long haul efforts of the Pakistani Army that went on for months, if not years. Many analysts have pointed out that such a covert infiltration plan was devised during the 1980s but it never fructified because Pakistani civilian political leaders vetoed it. They were of the opinion that such an infiltration would risk an all out war with the much superior Indian military. (Abbas 2004: 172)

Additionally, Inder Malhotra wrote that the "Kargil War, while being Pakistan's fourth war against India — except for the 1971 War for the liberation of Bangladesh, all others were launched by our western neighbour with the sole objective of wresting Kashmir from India by armed force — was also the first and, so far, the only limited and conventional war between two countries possessing nuclear weapons."[97]

Having lost three significant wars, Pakistan was clearly wary of engaging India again, and therefore, much effort was put into a localised armed conflict involving irregulars. This enabled concentrated logistical effort to be successfully executed by the Pakistani military. An unconventional war of a limited stature was not even considered a possibility by the Indian side and they were taken by surprise and were rather unprepared. However, the limitedness of the war can also be attributed to the restraint shown by the Indian government to not escalate the conflict (Malik 2009: 1).

After the war, "as the military tensions with Pakistan continue[d] on the Line of Control in Kashmir, the [then] Defence Minister George Fernandes had unveiled the government's new doctrine on fighting 'limited wars' with Islamabad."[98] Given that both had become nuclear weapons states by the time the conflict had started, the limited nature of the conflict was greatly stressed upon by actors on all sides in a bid to avoid a nuclear catastrophe.

Swami, Praveen (1999), "A Worsening War", *Frontline,* New Delhi, 03-16 July 1999, [Online: web], Accessed 25 June 2017, URL: http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1614/16140040.htm.

[97] Malhotra, Inder (2015), "Rear View: The Sudden War", *The Indian Express*, New Delhi, [Online: web], Accessed 28 June 2017, URL: http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/rear-view-the-sudden-war/.

[98]Mohan, C. Raja (2000), "Fernandes Unveils 'Limited War' Doctrine", *The Hindu,* New Delhi, 25 January 2000, URL: http://www.thehindu.com/2000/01/25/stories/01250001.htm.

- **The Surprise Factor**

In other conflicts between India and Pakistan, there have been well-documented, gradual increase of tensions, break down of talks and resultant hostilities. But Kargil War had come as a surprise to India. According to V.P. Malik, the then Army Chief, Kargil War will be always remembered for "its strategic and tactical surprise." (Malik 2009: 1) Some light on the surprise element of the war has been documented in the Indian government appointed fact finding committee which has been rather aptly named, "From Surprise to Reckoning".[99] According to the report,

> "The Review Committee had before it overwhelming evidence that the Pakistani armed intrusion in the Kargil sector came as a complete and total surprise to the Indian Government, Army and intelligence agencies as well as to the J&K State Government and its agencies. The Committee did not come across any agency or individual who was able clearly to assess before the event the possibility of a large scale Pakistani military intrusion across the Kargil heights. What was conceived of was the limited possibility of infiltrations and enhanced artillery exchanges in this Sector."[100]

The report has also illustrated how the tactical surprise element was crafted in Pakistan with precision and guise. The report further stated:

> "It would appear from the locations of 'sanghars' that the plan was to avoid initially confronting the Indian forces by moving stealthily along the unheld gaps. The Pakistani intruders were meant to disclose themselves in the later part of May 1999 and demonstrate that they were in possession of the Kargil heights along a 'new LOC' before the normal opening of the Zojila pass when regular patrolling by the Indian Army would commence. Presumably they felt that with the advantage of the commanding heights, their better acclimatisation and by now their more secure logistics, the situation would be distinctly in their favour. The Indians would need time to assemble their forces, acclimatise their troops and build up their logistics which would be difficult before Zojila opened. They would also have to suffer unacceptable casualties in attacking the heights. This would ensure time enough for an internationally arranged ceasefire."[101]

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[99]A four-member committee was set up by the Government of India on July 29, 1999 to figure out the successes and failures of the Kargil conflict. The report is called as *Kargil Review Committee Report*, which is also known as *Subrahmanyam Report*. It comprised four members, under the chairmanship of K. Subrahmanyam. The other three members of the review committee included Lieutenant General (Retd.) K.K. Hazari, B.G. Verghese and Satish Chandra, Secretary, National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) who was also designated as Member-Secretary.
Government of India (2000), *From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report,* New Delhi: Sage Publications.

[100] Government of India (2000), *From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Committee Report Executive Summary* [Online: Web], Accessed 5 April 2017, URL: http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/KargilRCA.html#6.

[101] *Ibid.*

Moreover, B. Raman on surprise element has stated that it is of "great relevance to toning up the work of the intelligence community in order to prevent similar surprises in the future."[102] Also, Marcos Acosta wrote that "the incursion caught India by surprise."[103] Furthermore, Varun Sahni mentioned that "Pakistan's armed incursions across LoC in Kargil, Batalik and Drass took India completely by surprise."[104]

- **The Bonhomie of Bilateral Relations as a Background**

In 1998, the talks between the foreign secretary levels had failed due to differences, thus, "the Prime Ministers [of] India and Pakistan [had] made another bold attempt to improve relations between the two countries, which [had] resulted in the Lahore Summit and the subsequent declaration in February 1999." (Chandran 2005: 31) The guiding principle of the negotiations was to robustly build a security paradigm that would ensure peaceful methods to solve all disputes and avoid conflicts of a military nature. The logical outcome of it was the historic visit to Lahore by the then Prime Minister Vajpayee on the friendship bus and adoption of the Lahore Declaration amidst much fanfare and publicity. The Lahore Declaration noted, "Pursuant to the directive given by the two Prime Ministers, the Foreign Secretaries of Pakistan and India signed a Memorandum of Understanding on February 21, 1999, identifying measures aimed at promoting an environment of peace and security between the two countries."[105]

Thus, this defines the Kargil War as one of the unique ones because in previous conflicts there had been a breakdown of talks prior to their commencement. Kargil War had happened in completely different scenario of apparent calm, understanding and warmth in the relationship of the two South Asian arch rivals. Thus, the above three factors make the case of Kargil War as unique in nature.

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[102] Raman, B. (1999), "Was There an Intelligence Failure", *Frontline,* New Delhi, [Online: web], Accessed 25 June 2017, URL: http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1615/16151170.htm..

[103] Acosta, Marcus P. (2007), "The Kargil Conflict: Waging War in the Himalayas", *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 18:3, 397-415.

[104] Sahni, Varun (2001), "Preventing Another Kargil, Avoiding Another Siachen: Technical Monitoring of The Line of Control in Kashmir", in Kanti P. Bajpai, Afsir Karim and Amitabh Mattoo (eds.), *Kargil and After: Challenges for Indian Policy,* New Delhi: Har Anand Publications.

[105] *Ministry of External Affairs (1999), *Lahore Declaration February, 1999*, [Online: web], Accessed 20 June, 2016, URL: http://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18997/Lahore+Declaration+February+1999.

The Kargil War had also altered United States' stance on the Indo-Pak issue and American winds had started favouring India.[106] Additionally, New Delhi had garnered greater international support.[107] Moreover, the Kargil War coincided with the Indian electronic media revolution and thus became the country's first televised war. While recalling the role of media in the earlier wars, Singh stated, "Media in India was called upon to play an active role during the mid 1960s in the wake of deterioration in India's relations with Pakistan following the exchange of armed skirmishes in Rann of Kutch area in Gujarat."[108] (Singh 2006: 99) However, the Kargil War of 1999 saw a proactive media bringing the war to the drawing rooms of common people -- bullet by bullet.

While calling the Kargil conflict unique in nature, V.P. Malik, who was the Chief of Army staff in 1999, pointed out the unique aspect of Kargil War was that it was "initiated by Pakistan within three months of Pakistani and Indian Prime Ministers agreeing and committing in the Lahore Agreement that they will find peaceful solutions to all Indo-Pak problems in peaceful talks and avoid wars."[109] The other unique aspect, he mentioned, was "the nature of terrain on which this war was fought; high altitude, snow covered mountains with limited communications in a very remote area. The terrain affected logistics, equipment, and physical capability. It was probably the highest battlefield in the world."[110]

The Kargil incursion stood out as a sharp discontinuity in the already troubled Indo-Pak relations. As author and journalist Manoj Joshi mentioned, "Pakistan's action of 1999 of

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[106] Mahapatra, Chintamani (1999), "Analyzing American Approach to Kargil Conflict", *IPCS,* New Delhi, [Online: web], Accessed 25 June 2016, URL: http://www.ipcs.org/article/indo-pak/analyzing-american-approach-to-kargil-conflict-227.html.

Agencies (2014), "Exit Occupied Areas in India, US Told Pak During Kargil War: Riaz Khokar", *The Times of India*, New Delhi, [Online: web], Accessed on 20 August 2016, URL: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/Exit-occupied-areas-in-India-US-told-Pak-during-Kargil-war-Riaz-Khokhar/articleshow/34311350.cms.

[107] Chengappa, Raj (1999), "On High Ground", *India Today,* New Delhi, [Online: web], Accessed 25 June 2016, URL: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/kargil-war-with-international-opinion-backing-indias-stand-pakistan-stands-isolated/1/254373.html.

[108] Singh wrote: "Though the media was not directly involved in covering the war from the front, yet it did play a crucial role between the Army and the general public by informing the people about the ongoing developments with a reasonable amount of analysis."
Singh, Anil Kumar (2006), *Military and Media,* New Delhi: Lancer Publishers and Distributors.

[109] *Malik, General V.P. (2017), e-mail to the author, 12 May 2017.

[110] *Ibid.*

occupying the heights overlooking the National Highway 1A linking Srinagar to Leh – appears in retrospect, to have been aimed at an outcome beyond merely the tactical aim of preventing traffic on the road or internationalising the Kashmir issue." (Joshi 2001: 32)

Kargil occupies a strategic location as it connects Srinagar–Leh highway. Thus, it becomes quite essential to discuss the geographical layout of Kargil. Joshi suggested that there has been a strategic element attached to Kargil's location. P. Stobdan while giving details had said that "the name read in Tibetan gar-gil suggests a cross- junction – the place where the route between Skardu and Leh and that between Kashgar and Srinagar intersect. It is located at a point which opens up to four valleys – the Drass, Suru, Wakha and Indus."[111] (*cited in* Joshi 2001: 33) Joshi also added that the "Kargil Sector extends 168 km from Chorbatla to Kaobal Gali and the average height of the peaks is some 5000 m. The area has no vegetation and is usually covered under snow between November to [and] May."[112]

In addition to that, while emphasising the strategic importance of Kargil, Mattoo mentioned that NH 1 is the jugular vein of the state as "it is the only road link between the Kashmir Valley and Ladakh and any disruption of this link would have profound strategic consequences for India."[113] Moreover, "controlling the high ground over Kargil would allow Pakistan to cut off the Indian supply route." (Leng 2006: 114) Giving an account of how the Kargil conflict started, R Sukumaran wrote that in early May 1999 that the "local shepherds had spotted strangers digging on the Kargil heights in Jammu and Kashmir. Three army patrols sent to investigate were repulsed with heavy casualties. By May 11, 1999 it had become clear that intrusion was taking place on a large scale. The use of offensive air power was sought as early as May 7, 1999. However, use was sanctioned by the Cabinet only on

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[111] Joshi, Manoj (2001), "The Kargil War: The Fourth Round" in Kanti Bajpai , Afsir Karim and Amitabh Mattoo (eds), *Kargil and After: Challenges for Indian Policy,* New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications.

[112] Further, writing about its access, Joshi has mentioned, "The main routes of ingress follow north-south tracks developed from the main Pakistani the Mashkoh valley to the Kaksar area is especially difficult. The Kargil sector is divided into the Drass, Kaksar, Channigund and Batalik sub-sectors, each with a battalion to look after it. The 121 Brigade responsible for the area since the departure of the 28 Mountain Division to the Valley in 1991 was somewhat larger than the usual formation and had four infantry battalions as well as a BSF battalion under its command." (*ibid*: 36)

[113] He also mentioned that "it would also leave a deep impact on the psyche of the people in Ladakh. In any case, occupation of a key strategic location within Kargil could be of potentially tremendous diplomatic advantage, particularly during negotiations to settle the Siachen glacier."
Mattoo, Amitabh (1999), "Trespassers will be Bombed", *The Telegraph*, Kolkata, 28 May 1999.

May 25, 1999, with the stipulation that the Line of Control was not to be crossed." (Sukumaran 2003: 332)

Furthermore, V.P. Malik while giving the details about the Kargil conflict, mentioned:

> "Operation Vijay was launched on 08 May, 1999 and our [Army's] first objective was to fix and contain the intrusions and ensure that the NH 1A is kept open. The full dimension and impact of the intrusions was perceived by the end of second week of May 1999, and a coordinated strategy for our national response to this challenge was evolved… By the first week of June, the Indian juggernaut had started gaining momentum and by the end of the first week of July [1999], the Pakistanis were evicted almost completely from the Batalik and Drass Sectors and our troops were poised to throw them out from the other sectors. The rapid advance by the ground forces coupled with diplomatic initiatives completely unnerved the Pakistanis, who sought talk on 10 July [1999] between the two DGsMO for a cessation of operations and to discuss terms of withdrawal from the remaining pockets of intrusion. Following a cease-fire to allow the enemy some time to disengage and withdraw, further operations were resumed only on 17 July [1999]. After some resistance, the enemy was evicted from the three remaining pockets and the sanctity of Line of Control and national honour had been restored. This conflict terminated in a resounding military and diplomatic triumph for India and a humiliating setback for Pakistan."[114]

The Kargil crisis has its own genesis and there have been a lot of factors influencing this intrusion. Bhaskar Sarkar explained that the intrusion by Pakistan across LoC had been influenced by several factors among which one is that "it is a manifestation of the desire of the political leadership to internationalise the Kashmir issue".[115] (Sarkar 1999: 7)

The far reaching political implications of the Pakistani game plan in the Kargil peaks put a question mark on the future of the India-Pakistan relationship. As Kalim Bahadur observed, "the bloody conflict will cast a lasting shadow over the India-Pakistan relationship. The widespread feeling of betrayal and of being let down after the exhilarations of the Lahore

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[114]Malik stated that "despite some initial reverses [reversal] due to terrain, weather, lack of intelligence and at times inadequate preparation, the Army rose heroically to its task. With great determination, high morale and brilliant leadership, our troops performed gallantly to capture peak after peak.
*Malik, V.P. (2017), e-mail to the author, 12 May 2017.

[115]Echoing similar views, V.P. Malik gave the following reasons for the Kargil conflict. According to him, the primary reasons why Pakistan attacked the Kargil are: "Pakistan wanted to highlight Indo–Pak dispute over Jammu and Kashmir to the international community; Revive terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir which had been brought under control by India substantially by 1998; Pakistan Army wanted to re-capture Turtuk in Siachen Sector, which it had lost to India in 1971. General Pervez Musharraf wanted to prove his merit to the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif who had appointed him as Chief of Pakistan Army over two senior officers." *(ibid.)*

spirit will continue to colour India's vision of neighbour."[116] The Indo-Pakistani confrontation was mainly the outcome of the "hybrid regime composed of Nawaz Sharif, Islamists, and Siachen/Kashmir-focused military interests. The conflict itself was over an issue of significant symbolic value carried out with widespread public support in Pakistan. Conducted by Pakistan's military Intelligence Branch, Kargil was essentially a military operation that was beyond the reach of civilian control."[117]

The Kargil War which was code-named *Operation Vijay* had certain phases. It was India's response to Pakistan's actions. Ayesha Ray mentioned:

> "The initial phase began in early May 1999, during which Indian soldiers suffered heavy casualties and most Indian military operations failed until the introduction of airpower. On receiving reliable information on the location of intruders along the Drass-Batalik-Kaksar heights, the air force was called in to launch air strikes on Pakistani positions. During the second phase of the war, the Indian army consolidated its positions, cleared the Drass heights, and launched a systematic campaign to evict the intruders. Following the Indian army's capture of the Tololing peak on June 13, 1999, the armed forces held an advantageous position vis-à-vis Pakistan. The third and final phase of the war was characterised by significant military victories on the Indian side. The Indian army captured vital positions, such as Tiger Hills, and successfully evicted intruders from the Mushkok, Kaksar, and Turtuk sectors in Jammu and Kashmir with the support of international community." (Ray 2008: 107)

According to Gurmeet Kanwal, *Operation Vijay* "had calibrated to limit military action to the Indian side of the LoC, included air strikes from fighter-ground attack (FGA) aircraft and attack helicopters. Even as the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force (IAF) employed their synergised combat potential to eliminate the intruders and regain the territory occupied by them, the government kept all channels of communication open with Pakistan to ensure that the intrusions were vacated quickly and Pakistan's military adventurism was not allowed to escalate into a larger conflict. On July 26, 1999, the last of the Pakistani intruders was successfully evicted." (Kanwal 2009: 53)

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[116] He also mentioned that "Pakistan has attempted to link the Kargil intrusion with the larger issues of Jammu and Kashmir while denying its own involvement in the fighting claiming that only local Kashmiri militants were involved. No one in India is taken in by this version of events."
Bahadur, Kalim (1999), *India-Pakistan relations in the context of Kargil Conflict, in Kargil*: *The crisis and its implications,* New Delhi: Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, pg 13-20.

[117] Tremblay, Reeta Chowdhari and Schofield, Julian (2006), "Institutional Causes of the India-Pakistan Rivalry", in T.V. Paul (eds), *The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry,* UK: Cambridge University Press.

For some time, "Pakistan's Kargil plan was appearing well for Pakistan as its troops had reached the important posts who were well armed with guns and mortars. For Indians, initially the whole Operation Vijay, was brutal as poorly equipped and poorly acclimatised troops, with no time for reconnaissance had to scale mountains whose steep flanks were almost devoid of cover." (Macdonald 2017: 56) The troops could move only at night. During the day, "the Indian attackers were pinned down by artillery fire with only some scattered boulders for cover. There they would remain thirsty, hungry and soaking wet from snow and sweat until nigh fall when supplies of ammunition and food were brought up and casualties evacuated." (*ibid*.)

Many had raised eyebrows about the stability of India and Pakistan's relations. Amitabh Mattoo on Indo-Pak relations mentioned: firstly, "it would test the resolve of the Indian armed forces and the political leadership. If New Delhi was willing to tolerate a physical occupation of its territory inside the Indian side of the line of control, it could be replicated elsewhere by Pakistan. Such a strategy based on incremental incursions at various points would not only help establish a strong Pakistani presence on key strategic locations, but also create a base from where militants and mercenaries could be pushed into the Kashmir valley."[118] After the war, it became significant to examine the chain of events and make certain suggestions for future. So a four-member committee was set up by the Government of India on July 29, 1999 to figure out the successes and failures of the Kargil conflict. While explaining the chains of events, the committee had noticed and highlighted intelligence failures and other loopholes and structural issues in the Defence organisation of India. The findings of the review committee exposed the country's security management system. The committee highlighted that very little had changed over the past five decades despite three full blown post- independence wars, including 1962, 1965 and 1971, which the country engaged in. The panel strongly felt that in the wake of growing nuclear threat, end of the cold war, continuance of proxy war in Kashmir for over a decade and the revolution in military affairs, it was imperative for the political, bureaucratic, military and intelligence establishments to re-strategise country's security management in totality.[119]

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[118] Mattoo, Amitabh (1999), "Trespassers will be Bombed", *The Telegraph*, 28 May 1999.

[119] *Ibid.*

The Committee felt that the Kargil experience, the continuing proxy war and the prevailing nuclearised security environment justify a thorough review of the national security system in its entirety and it can't be undertaken by an over-burdened bureaucracy. It said that an independent body of credible experts, whether a national commission or one or more task forces or otherwise as expedient, is required to conduct such studies which must be undertake expeditiously. Thus, according to the Committee, there must be a full time National Security Adviser (NSA) and a second line of personnel be inducted into the system. The "members of the National Security Council, the senior bureaucracy servicing it and the Service Chiefs need to be continually sensitised to assessed intelligence pertaining to national regional and international issues."[120]

It also mentioned that a number of experts have at various times suggested the need to enhance India's Defence outlays as budgetary constraints have affected the process of modernisation and created certain operational voids. The Committee had mentioned that "it would not like to advocate any percentage share of GDP that should be assigned to Defence. This must have been left to the Government to determine in consultation with the concerned Departments and the Defence Services. Among aspects of modernisation to which priority should be given is that of equipping infantrymen with superior light weight weapons, equipment and clothing suited to the threats they are required to face in alpine conditions."[121]

The report also pointed out problems in coordinating between different intelligence operations within India. The committee observed that "the present structure and processes in intelligence gathering and reporting" had led to "an overload of background and unconfirmed information and inadequately assessed intelligence." It mentioned that there was an absence of an institutionalised process which could allow different intelligence agencies such as the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), Intelligence Bureau (IB), and Border Security Forces (BSF) to interact periodically below the level of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). A gap between various intelligence agencies had led to faulty intelligence reports during the Kargil war.[122] The report also mentioned that there are no checks and balances in the intelligence system to ensure that the consumer gets all the intelligence that is available and is

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[120] Government of India (2000), Kargil Review Committee Report, [Online: web], Accessed 20 February 2016, URL: http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/KargilRCC.html.

[121] *Ibid.*

[122] *Ibid.*

his due as there are no systems of regular, periodic and comprehensive intelligence briefings at the political level and to the Committee of Secretaries. Thus, "in the absence of an overall, operational national security framework and objective, each intelligence agency is diligent in preserving its own turf and departmental prerogatives. Hence, as a result of these issues, an immediate upgrade in India's intelligence services was considered necessary."[123]

Not only this, the Committee had also suggested that there is a need to evolve procedures that ensure improved border management and a reduction, if not elimination, in the inflow of arms, terrorists as well as narcotics. While mentioning Indian military's professional role in nuclear strategy, the Kargil Report had made a recommendation that suggested the Indian military had to be made as well informed as its Pakistani counterpart on nuclear policy.[124]

While analysing the Kargil Review Committee report, Ayesha Ray stated that the committee members noted that during the Kargil War, Pakistani political leaders had been thinking very clearly about the role of nuclear weapons. She mentioned that

> "The clarity in Pakistani political thought about the role of nuclear weapons was a result of strategic decisions being taken jointly by both civilians and the military. In India, the military's exclusion from nuclear policy for several decades had left it at a more disadvantaged position. Senior Indian military officers had alerted the committee to contradictory approaches taken by civilians on nuclear policy. Air Chief Marshal Mehra had observed that even though flight trials for the delivery of Indian nuclear weapons were conducted in 1990 and several political leaders from V.P. Singh to Rajiv Gandhi had sustained a nuclear weapons program [programme], most Indian Prime Ministers had tried to keep the program [programme] confidential. Again, while civilians had routinely reassured the Indian public that the country's nuclear weapons option would remain open if Pakistan developed nuclear weapons, they had said very little about what a functional nuclear weapons program [programme] would entail. In sharp contrast to the political indecisiveness displayed by Indian leaders, several Pakistani political and military leaders such as Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif, and Chief of Army Staff, General Aslam Beg had openly shared information with the public about Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability."[125]

The Committee had believed that a comprehensive manpower policy is required as in the "present international security environment, proxy war and terrorism have become preferred means of hurting a neighbour's social, political and economic wellbeing. Given Pakistan's

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[123] *Ibid.*

[124] *Ibid.*

[125] Ray, Ayesha (2013), *The Soldier and the State in India: Nuclear Weapons, Counterinsurgency, and the Transformation of Indian Civic-Military Relations,* New Delhi: Sage.

unrelenting hostility towards this country, it is necessary to evolve a long-term strategy to reduce the involvement of the Army in counterinsurgency and devise more cost-effective means of dealing with the problem."[126]

While focusing on the issues of exclusion of the military from nuclear policy, the Kargil Report also noted that "the nuclear posture adopted by successive Prime Ministers had put the Indian Army at a disadvantage vis-à-vis its Pakistani counterpart. While the former was in the dark about India's nuclear capability, the latter as the custodian of Pakistani nuclear weaponry was fully aware of its own capability. Three former Chiefs of Army Staff had expressed unhappiness about this asymmetric situation." (Ray 2008: 112)

Moreover, the lack of an open dialogue between civilians and the military on nuclear strategy had the potential of harming the Indian military's position in the management of nuclear weapons in future. At the end of the Kargil War, disturbed by the political neglect of its role in the management of nuclear weapons, the Indian military had expressed its dissatisfaction for not being included in the nuclear decision making loop. And so, to facilitate greater transparency in civil-military relations on nuclear strategy, the Kargil Report suggested the publication of a White Paper on India's nuclear weapons programme. Apart from the above mentioned findings and suggestions, the Kargil Review Committee also "contained ideas that would increase the army's role in counter-insurgency operations."[127]

Additionally, the members of the Committee had alerted the government to the inherent defects of using the military as a police force in counter-insurgency operations. In its recommendations, the committee noted that heavy involvement of the Indian Army in counter-insurgency operations had affected its military preparedness in defending the country against external aggression. The Committee further noted that such a situation has arisen because successive Governments had not developed a long-term strategy to deal with insurgency. Moreover, the members of the committee had feared that "the military's prolonged deployment in counterinsurgency operations would not only impede its training programme in the future but could also lead to a military mindset which detracted from its

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[126] Government of India (2000), Kargil Review Committee Report, [Online: web], Accessed 20 February 2016, URL: http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/KargilRCC.html.

[127] *Ibid.*

primary function of fighting wars. The Ministry of Home Affairs, state governments and paramilitary forces has also frequently assumed that the military would always be available to combat insurgency." (*ibid.*)

In addition, law enforcement agencies such as the Indian Paramilitary and Central Police Forces had not been adequately trained to deal with counter-insurgency operations. This had led to an increased dependence on the military and "transformed it into an ordinary police force." The report has also suggested that to strengthen the military's professional role, civilians would need to use the military in fighting conventional wars only. The Kargil Committee's recommendations outlining a professional role for the Indian military in future wars with Pakistan were an important development in Indian civil-military relations. It suggested that the formation of civil-military liaison mechanism is significant for smoothening the relationship. Hence, the committee came out with several lessons that the Army, the Intelligence Agencies as well as government had to learn.[128]

The Review Committee also contained Pakistan's strategic motives behind the Kargil War. Committee's suggested politico-strategic motives of Pakistan are: to "internationalise Kashmir as a nuclear flashpoint requiring urgent third party intervention; to alter the LoC and disrupt its sanctity by capturing upheld areas in Kargil and to achieve a better bargaining position for a possible trade-off against the positions held by India in Siachen."[129] Also, the Committee had mentioned Pakistan's military or proxy related motives and it stated, "Pakistan tried to interdict the Srinagar-Leh road by disrupting vital supplies to Leh; to outflank India's defences from the South of Turtok and Chalunka sectors through unheld areas, thus, rendering its defences untenable in Turtok and Siachen. The Committee has further mentioned that Pakistan tried to give a fillip to militancy in Jammu and Kashmir by military action designed to weaken the counter-insurgency (CI) grid by drawing away troops from Valley to Kargil – it would also give a boost to the moral of the militants in the Valley. Also, to activate militancy in the Kargil and Turtok sectors and open new routes of

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[128] *Ibid.*

[129] Government of India (2000), *From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report,* New Delhi: Sage Publications.

infiltration into the valley, and to play to the fundamentalist lobby and the Pakistani people by bold action in Kashmir, which continues to remain a highly emotional issue."[130]

While commenting on the Kargil Review Committee Report, V.P. Malik pointed out that despite far-reaching developments affecting India's national security in the past few decades, the country's higher and defence-related decision-making system had not changed. It urged a thorough and expeditious review of the national security system by an independent body of credible experts. He also mentioned that the Prime Minister had set up a Group of Ministers (Ministers of Home, Defence, External Affairs and Finance) to review the national security system in its entirety and formulate specific proposals for implementation. But, according to Malik, "most of the recommendations were implemented half-heartedly to suit the bureaucracy and political leaders who even now have little knowledge of the armed forces' working."[131] He called the report as "a good, objective report in which many good recommendations were made.[132]

On Indo-Pak relations, Varun Sahni wrote that by its actions, "Pakistan in effect wiped out even the residual traces of trust that existed between the two countries."[133] He further wrote that the negative impact was felt just after the war at very two different levels. He stated that at the "political level, the Pakistani incursions destroyed the process of mutual engagement that began with the Indian Prime Minister's overland visit to Lahore. The sheer size of the Pakistani invasion force, coupled with the logistics involved in deploying and supporting the invaders, strongly suggest that the operation had been planned and set into motion while Pakistan was ostensibly talking peace with India. By duping the Indian government so visibly, Pakistan has made it extremely difficult for any Indian government to trust any

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[130] *Ibid.*

[131] *Malik, V.P. (2017), e-mail to the author, 12 May 2017.

[132] When asked whether the recommendation of Kargil war has been implemented well, Malik said, "Unfortunately, not." He elaborated his answer by saying that the Kargil Review Committee report brought out many serious deficiencies in India's security management system, particularly in the areas of intelligence, border patrolling and defence management.
Ibid.

[133] Sahni, Varun (2001), "Preventing Another Kargil, Avoiding Another Siachen: Technical Monitoring of The Line of Control in Kashmir", in Kanti P. Bajpai, Afsir Karim and Amitabh Mattoo (eds.), *Kargil and After: Challenges for Indian Policy,* New Delhi: Har Anand Publications.

Pakistani peace overtures in the future. The second level at which the Paksitani action demonished trust was in 'military-to-military understanding'." (Sahni 2001: 148-149)

3.1 Security Implications and Lessons Learnt from the Kargil War

The study will elaborate some of the salient features of all that went wrong for India in the Kargil War.

- **Intelligence Failure**

Multiple accounts, analysis and reports had confirmed that the intelligence failure to detect movements of intruders inside the Line of Control was the primary reason why India was taken by surprise – both politically and strategically. Strategic intelligence of the external kind is widely understood to be in the domain of Research and Analysis Wing and Director General of Military Intelligence (DGMI). The internal intelligence gathering which particularly checks militancy in Kashmir is done by the Intelligence Bureau (IB). Post mortem of the conflict revealed that all three were understaffed, underprepared and lacking in coordination. According to the Kargil Committee Report, "Unfortunately the RAW facility in the Kargil area did not receive adequate attention in terms of staff or technological capability. The station was under Srinagar but reported to Leh which was not focussed on Kargil but elsewhere. Hence intelligence collection, coordination and follow up were weak."[134]

A close analysis of different reports compiled months prior the invasion has revealed that there was not any indication of a large scale Pakistani attack. Rather the RAW reports summarily rejected a likely possibility of an all out Pakistani attack. The RAW report of 1998 which was accessed by V.P. Malik, in which he said that it was claimed with considerable authority that "waging a war against India in the immediate future would not seem to be a rational decision from the financial point of view...[the] Nawaz Sharif government would be left with little option but to pursue belligerence, abet infiltration, and indulge in proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir as part of an attempt to keep the hardliners subdued" (Malik 1999: 3). He also lamented the lack of inter-agency cooperation that created lacuna of real time intelligence and their assessment.

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[134] Government of India (2000), "From Surprise to Reckoning: Kargil Committee Report" Executive Summary, [Online: web], Accessed 20 March 2015, URL: http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/KargilRCA.html.

Writing during the beginning of the conflict, Manoj Joshi and Harinder Baweja said, "Kargil is a massive systemic failure for which Indian is already paying a heavy price. The intruders have to be evicted because from their pickets overlooking the vital Srinagar – Leh highway they can cause havoc. Given the disadvantage of height the battle to push them back is going to be long drawn and costly."[135]

- **Lack of Preparedness**

An inevitable fallout of total intelligence failure was lack of preparedness but it was just one of the reasons. There was lack of aerial surveillance, most of the ground surveillance devices were outdated and equipment's soldiers used in extreme cold conditions were woefully bad in quality. In such tough conditions, maintaining boots on grounds was almost impossible.[136]

The patrols used to take place after every three months in more frugal fashion instead of the 100 odd men who used to take part in the long range patrol. This was a result of the cost cutting exercise initiated by the government. It can be deducted that such patrols with extensive logistical support could have been successful in detecting the large Pakistani troop formation and invasion. Consequently, when the war began, the Indian soldiers were at considerable disadvantage because of lack of acclimatisation in high altitude and severe cold. According to Marcus P. Acosta of the Naval Postgraduate School in California in his doctoral thesis on challenges of high altitude warfare has pointed out, "Units that deployed to Kargil in early May suffered several disadvantages. Soldiers arrived ill equipped for survival in the harsh Himalayan landscape, much less up to the task of defeating a determined foe atop the heights." (Acosta 2003: 50).

In terms of lessons learnt, it should be recognised that it was indeed a costly lesson learnt. As Nitin Gokhale observed, "A decade down the line, the Batalik-Kargil sector has witnessed quality improvement in infrastructure and troop deployment and roads have come up."[137] Politically speaking, lessons learnt in terms of dealing with Pakistan are manifold. It was understood in no uncertain terms that India can never keep its guard down even if there is a

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[135] Joshi, Manoj and Baweja, Harinder (1999), "Intelligence Failure", *India Today*, New Delhi, 14 June 1999.

[136] Pillai, Ajith et al (1999), "Kargil, Post Mortem", *Outlook,* New Delhi, 26 July 1999.

[137] Gokhale, Nitin (2009), "Back to Kargil: Lessons Learnt in Batalik", *NDTV,* [Online: web], Accessed 25 June 2016, URL: http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/back-to-kargil-lessons-learnt-in-batalik-398586.

political bonhomie. Ajith Pillai et. al wrote, "It has also underlined the need for beefing up our intelligence and keeping our armed forces on the alert. And more importantly, it has stressed the need for the political class and the bureaucracy to give a more considerate hearing to the needs of the armed forces. In the days to come, for the country's well-being, an alert and forewarned army will be more relevant than a dozen nuclear bombs."[138] Such a similar thought has also been echoed by V.P. Malik wherein he noted and urged, "Kargil was a limited war; the first of its kind after the Indo-Pak nuclear weapons tests and the Lahore Declaration. It has now become a more likely operational norm in the strategic environment where large scale capture of territories, forced change of regimes, and extensive military damage on the adversary are ruled out politically. It was not the first time when Pakistan initiated a war; and we must not assume that it would be the last time. Every good military would like to be proactive. However, it has also to develop the will and capability to react. The essence of military leadership lies in the manner in which we react to restore a situation, however, adverse the circumstances of the battle. The most important lesson I believe is that sound defence makes sound foreign policies." (Malik 2009: 17)

While talking about the strategic lessons that emerged from the Kargil War, Malik further mentioned,

> "There may be less chances of a full scale conventional war between two nuclear weapon states. But as long as there are territory-related and other disputes, an adversary may indulge in a limited border war. A proxy war too can lead to a limited war. A major military challenge in India is political reluctance to a pro-active grand strategy or engagement. This disadvantage is enhanced because no loss of territory is acceptable. This is a strategic handicap and a risk in any war setting, which increases in a limited war scenario. It implies greater attention to surveillance and close defence; having to commit large force levels along the borders/ LoC and depletion of combat reserves. He further observed that the new strategic environment calls for speedier, more versatile and flexible combat organisations in mountainous as well as non- mountainous terrain. The successful outcome of a border war depends upon the capacity to react rapidly to an evolving crisis. For this, he suggested that a pro-active grand strategy and capability to wage a successful conventional and nuclear war is a necessary deterrent. A war may remain limited because of credible deterrence or Escalation Dominance, when one side has overwhelming military superiority at every level. The other side will then be deterred from waging a war."[139]

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[138] Pillai, Ajith et. al (1999), "Kargil, Post Mortem", *Outlook,* New Delhi, 26 July 1999.

[139] Moreover, he stated that a "limited conventional war will require close political oversight and politico-civil-military interaction. It is essential to keep the military leadership within the security and strategic decision-making loop."
*Malik, V.P. (2017), e-mail to the author, 12 May 2017.

Gurmeet Kanwal called the Kargil War as a "strategic blunder" on the part of Pakistan. He said, "Clearly, the Pakistani military establishment was becoming increasingly frustrated with India's success in containing the military in J&K to within manageable limits and saw in the Kashmiri people's open expression of their preference for returning to normal life, the evaporation of all their hopes and desires to bleed India through a strategy of "a thousand cuts." (Kanwal 2002: 44) While discussing about the effect of Kargil on both India and Pakistan, Malik had sent certain figures, which he mentioned appeared in Pakistan's press and which he thinks appropriately sums up the adverse fallout on Pakistan of Kargil operations as follows:

> "(a) Casualty I   - National Pride and morale.
> (b) Casualty II   - Freedom struggle of militants.
> (c) Casualty III - Assumption that Americans are friends.
> (d) Casualty IV   - LC in Kashmir. Americans have given status of an IB.
> (e) Casualty V   - Pak Democracy.
>
> Effect on India: From the Indian point of view, the following advantages have accrued from Kargil Operations:
> (a) The LoC stands sanctified internationally, with Pak acceptance to honour it.
> (b) Major gains made at the diplomatic level in international fora.
> (c) The image of Army stands enhanced.
> (d) The Nation stands better educated on national security matters.
> (e) A positive role was played the media in giving a true picture and building public support.
> (f) A major setback to the proxy war."[140]

However, Pakistan's calculations also highlighted its chronic inability to correctly assess and predict Indian actions. Journalist and author Maya Macdonald pointed that Pakistan wrongly assumed that India would negotiate more flexibly under pressure and the Indians would not fight back.[141] Further explaining, Macdonald stated that having planned the operation well before Prime Minister Vajpayee travelled to Lahore in February, Musharraf also failed to anticipate how it would be seen both internationally and in India as an attempt to sabotage peace talks. Instead, he focused on extracting revenge for Siachen, while governments in world capitals were transfixed by the fear of nuclear war. (Macdonald 2017: 54)

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[140] *Malik, V.P. (2017), e-mail to the author, 12 May 2017.

[141] Macdonald, Maya (2017), *Defeat is an Orphan: How Pakistan lost the great South Asian War,* Penguin: Gurgaon, pg. 54.

3.2 Indian Media and the Kargil War

When the nation is at war, all its institutions also stand united and become part of that conflict, and press, which is known as the fourth pillar of democracy, was no exception. In the hour of crises, the government, the military and public get united. Media, in different forms, have been playing a significant role in shaping up perspectives and firming up opinions through war coverages across the globe. Beginning with the coverage of both the World Wars to the prolonged Gulf Wars, from time to time, conflicts and wars have become the centre stage of media which includes newspapers, books, cinema, radio and television. The wars had occurred between India and Pakistan even in the past but the Kargil war was different, thus, it becomes significant to analyse its content.

Ban on travel for journalists

It was not easy to do reporting at such a difficult terrain in Kargil and with the dangers attached to it. As Geeta Seshu wrote that "covering the war from the battle lines was easier said than done, for the army clamped down on direct coverage barely a few days after the air strikes were launched on May 8, [1999]." (Seshu 1999: 2917) As it was the first time that the journalists were covering the conflict, similarly for the first time, the Army also had to deal with the media in the battlefront. Initially, there was no restriction by the Government on journalists. But later, journalists were banned from entering the war zone. "For nearly two thirds of the eight week war, the Indian defence ministry restricted journalists from visiting the battle sector, except on guided tours. Once the media got access, a battery of photographers, reporters, cameraman made their way upto a battle zone, through courtesy the Indian army, and gave minute by minute and breathless coverage of the Battle of Tiger Hill." (Singh 2006: 116)

Praveen Swami, who has extensively covered and written about Indo-Pak conflicts, wrote that when the conflict occurred in Kargil, the Army had responded by keeping all the journalists out. "The ban appeared to have been the consequence of 15 Corps being as confused as anyone else about exactly what was happening in Kargil, and not wanting journalists to get hurt. This correspondent was the first to enter the area, on May 19, [1999], breaking official travel restrictions. Army officials proved impeccably cooperative. Then,

from May 25, [1999] to June 4, [1999] journalists were formally allowed in, and faced no problems."[142]

He further wrote,

> "On the night of June 4, [1999], the Army Headquarters in New Delhi abruptly cancelled permits to journalists to travel. Seventeen journalists who had been scheduled to leave from Srinagar the next morning had their valid travel permits terminated. No clear reasons were given for the decision, but senior Army officials in New Delhi privately put forward some claims... Photographs that had appeared in some newspapers and magazines as well as television footage, they said, had exposed Indian gun positions. At least two forward positions had been badly hit. After the ban on travel, journalists pointed to its patent flaws. The gun positions, they said, could just have well been compromised by Pakistan field and technical intelligence. If photographs had given away gun positions, that was because no ground rules had been issued."[143]

Sankarshan Thakur has reported that in the beginning, the Indian Army was too busy in getting its "act together to bother with the media." (1999: 26) Later, the ban was imposed for journalists to visit the conflict zone independently. Although it was imposed on June 5, 1999, eventually it drew criticism from the media fraternity. A.K. Sachdev had argued that "there is a definite and direct proportionality relationship between the health of a nation's democracy and the degree of freedom of its national media. Attempts to curb the media have uncertain success probabilities and can rarely be set into motion without negative fallouts."[144]

The Hindu on May 30, 1999 mentioned that how in the initial days, in the first week, the media was left in the dark because the Army was silent on the subject.[145] Likewise, the op-ed in *The Indian Express* on June 11, 1999 lamented that such censorship would not help the war efforts, it would only provoke that the government and army had something to hide. The ban, the op-ed had mentioned, showed that the government didn't have confidence in media. It further added, "The reason given for banning journalists except on guided tours is the

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[142] Swami, Praveen (1999), "A Question of Credibility"*, Frontline*, New Delhi, [Online: Web], Accessed 20 May 2017,
URL: http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1614/16141300.htm.

[143] *Ibid.*

[144] Sachdev has further added: Whenever nations are at war, be it a legally declared one as was the 1971 Indo-Pak war, or an undeclared one like the Pak misadventure in Kargil, national media and the military need to work synergistically in the pursuit of national aims and objectives while international media needs to be turned into an ally, or at least used to advantage.
Sachdev, A.K. (2000), "Media Related Lessons from Kargil", *Strategic Analysis*, 23(10):1797-1808.

[145] "Was There a Lowering of Guard?", *The Hindu,* New Delhi, 30 May 1999.

danger they face. This is misleading. It is the job of war correspondents to accept risks to fill out the bare bones of official handouts, and sometimes correct them."[146] *The Indian Express* on the same day had come up with an editorial which mentioned that the ban would certainly be detrimental in its efforts to get international support.[147]

The Hindu in an op-ed article on June 16, 1999 commented that it is "New Delhi's ignorance of infowar."[148] Also, an op-ed in *The Indian Express* on June 14, 1999 asked the government not to hoard the information and rather deploy it.[149] According to Thakur, the ban was "lifted as inexplicably as it had been imposed - in a fortnight." (1999: 26)

Moreover, Swami added that the United States-based Cable News Network (CNN) was allowed to travel in comfort as the journalists commuted in hired cars, with a small convoy of other vehicles carrying technical equipment following along. It was the same for British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). But on the other hand, the officials at the headquarters didn't give any information to Indian journalists. Swami said, "Indian representatives of Indian media organisations were told flatly that they could not film gun positions or artillery actions... At one point, when chaotic organisation led to protests, journalists were told in true schoolmaster style, not to 'behave like children'."[150] This is how military tried to manage the news content during the time of crises. Further, the coverage of conflict or "wars in which the media's own state is involved is also likely to depend, in large part, on domestic elite sources – within government and the military." (Carruthers 2000: 16)

In the beginning, from May 8, 1999 till May 25, 1999, all the newspapers had carried a small piece of news either on the front page or in the middle pages related to Kargil. There were no editorials or op-ed articles initially as no one had any idea what was happening. There were hardly one or two small pieces per day on the regular events of Kargil. Slowly, when the

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[146] Bhattacharjea, Ajit (1999), "Censorship Won't Serve Out Soldiers Well", *The Indian Express*, New Delhi, 11 June 1999.

[147] Editorial (1999), "War of Knaves – They Have Their Mushahid, We Have Our Ban", *The Indian Express*, New Delhi, 11 June 1999.

[148] "Pak's Betrayal and India's Vulnerability", *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 16 June 1999.

[149] Kanjilal, Pratik (1999), "Don't Hoard Information, Deploy It", *The Indian Express*, New Delhi, 14 June 1999.

[150] Swami, Praveen (1999), "A Question of Credibility", *Frontline*, [Online: Web], Accessed 20 May 2017, URL: http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1614/16141300.htm .

crises started unfolding, all the dailies, *The Indian Express, The Hindu, The Hindustan Times, The Telegraph* and *The Times of India* started filling up their pages with the Kargil story as soon as they were getting the information about the conflict from their correspondents or through news agencies and from the press handouts.

For the common man and the media, the conflict had begun when the government had announced about the aerial bombings. After the announcement, there was a substantial increase of news reports in the newspapers thereafter. Based on the available information from the government sources or through alternative ways, the Indian media had highlighted a variety of issues and there are certain themes under which the role of media during the Kargil conflict could be understood.

3.3 Print Media and the Kargil War

In the study, the themes are categorised on the basis of their appearances in these dailies and also for the in-depth analysis on the coverage. The themes are also selected by keeping in mind the allotted space designated for particular news. Undoubtedly, the newspapers' opinions and views are reflected through its editorials and op-ed articles. Hence, the majority of the themes are chosen by analysing the front page, editorial and op-ed page articles during the phase of conflict. Some of the themes which were found while analysing the newspapers and doing the study are:

Theme 1: To Uphold the Sanctity of LoC

All the newspapers had insisted that the Line of Control (initially know as the Cease Fire Line), which came into being between India and Pakistan by the direction of United Nations in 1949, should not be violated by Pakistan. The dailies stated that Pakistan-backed infiltrators, who had crossed the LoC and entered the Indian side, had violated the sanctity of LoC. For the first time, the then Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee acknowledged the gravity of the situation during a press conference in May, 1999 and stated that a new challenge was being posed in Kargil. "It is not just an intrusion which takes place when the snow starts melting. This time, the design is to occupy some territory and stay put there. Infiltrators are

being helped by armed forces. The situation is totally unacceptable to us."[151] He also mentioned: "what was happening in Kargil was a violation of the Lahore Declaration, sealed after his path-breaking bus ride across the Wagah border."[152]

Later, speaking out for the first time in the first week of June, 1999, the then President K.R. Narayanan had also accused "Pakistan of hoodwinking the world by questioning the sanctity of the LoC".[153] Soon after, all the dailies maintained that the sanctity of LoC would not be compromised as this had strained the bilateral relations between both the nations. *The Indian Express* has carried an interview of the former Indian Prime Minister, Inder Kumar Gujral, on May 30, 1999 in which he mentioned that the seriousness of relationship has been increased and it is a setback for the friendship "because ever since the Simla Agreement, this is the first time that air action had to be taken. This is also the first time that the LoC has been crossed." [154] Not just this, *The Indian Express* a day before on May 29, 1999, had carried an op-ed article which stated, "The LoC is not vague or undefined as claimed by Pakistani spokesmen, nor is it governed by the Lahore or Simla declarations. It was delineated by the ceasefire line at the UN sponsored Karachi agreement as long back as July 1949."[155]

The Telegraph in its editorial on June 5, 1999 mentioned that "New Delhi will demand a formal commitment on restoring the territorial holdings to the *status quo ante*."[156] It further had stated that the real icing on the cake would be a "Pakistani declaration iterating a respect for the sanctity of the line of control that this type of foolhardiness will not occur again. Additionally, it would be nice if Islamabad admitted it is behind the infiltrators."[157]

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[151] Correspondent (1999), "Atal Dials Keep-Off Kargil Message to Sharif", *The Telegraph*, Kolkata, 26 May 1999.

[152] *Ibid.*

[153] Correspondent (1999), "Pak Warns of War after Date Snub", *The Telegraph,* Kolkata, 6 June 1999.

[154] Gujral, I.K. (1999), "It would be Wrong to Assume that Sharif is Not in Command", *The Indian Express,* New Delhi, 30 May 1999.

[155] Verghese B.G. (1999), "Drawing the Line at Kargil", *The Indian Express*, New Delhi, 29 May 1999.

[156] Editorial (1999), "Hard Talk", *The Telegraph*, Kolkata, 5 June 1999.

[157] *Ibid.*

In an editorial on June 22, 1999, *The Hindustan Times* had mentioned the Group of Eight (G8) had unanimously declared that it disapproved of any action to alter the status quo through military actions.[158] In another news piece, it reported the issue on July 13, 1999, in which the daily published Clinton-Sharif joint statement that "the restoration of the Line of Control's sanctity was the bedrock on which Indo-Pak relations could be improved."[159] *The Times of India* in its editorial mentioned that the whole world knows the truth of Pakistan. The leaders of the G8 had rejected Pakistan's attempts to alter any situation and reiterated it to uphold the sanctity of LoC.[160] Also, *The Hindu* had maintained that "there were differences in the interpretation of the LoC."[161]

Theme 2: Intelligence Failure Led to Conflict

All the dailies maintained that Kargil conflict occurred due to the failure of intelligence agencies. *The Telegraph* on June 17, 1999 wrote it is the product of "Pakistan's perfidy as of the goofiness of India's intelligence agencies. For months infiltrators were crossing over to the Indian side of the LoC, building bunkers, including a three-storeyed structure equipped with heavy generators, at great heights, establishing supply lines and even constructing a complex of helipads and yet even MI15, a military intelligence cell set up to collect cross-

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[158] The G8 (Group of Eight) is made up of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the USA and the UK. The aim of G8 is to try to tackle global problems by discussing big issues and planning what action to take. The first summit was in 1975 but back then it was just six countries, known as the G6. The G6 was made up of France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and America. It then changed to G7 when Canada joined in 1976 and G8 with Russia in 1998. However, Russia was temporarily suspended by the other members of G8 for its annexation of Crimea in March 2014, and the G8 is effectively suspended and now the other member nation-states meet as the G7. On the other hand, recently, Russia has announced its intention to permanently walk away from the G8.

Batchelor, Tom (2017), "Russia Announces Plan to Permanently Leave G8 Group of Industrialised Nations After Suspension for Crimea Annexation", *The Independent*, [Online: web], Accessed 27 June 2017, URL: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/russia-g8-kremlin-crimea-ukraine-vladimir-putin-g7-g20-a7525836.html

Waterfield et. al (2014), "G8 Suspends Russia for Annexation of Crimea", *The Telegraph*, [Online: Web] Accessed 28 June 2017, URL: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/10720297/G8-suspends-Russia-for-annexation-of-Crimea.html

"What is the G8? What Does It Do?" [Online: web], Accessed 27 June 2017, URL: http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsround/22937970

[159] Editorial (1999), "Cross Border Terrorism", *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, 13 July 1999.

[160] Editorial (1999), "Pakistan on Notice", *The Times of India,* New Delhi, 22 June 1999.

[161] "Pakistan Betrayed Our Trust" *The Hindu,* New Delhi, 14 June 1999.

border intelligence, had no scent of these goings on."[162] In another editorial, *The Telegraph* on June 21, 1999 again mentioned that the crossing of LoC and occupying the hills of Kargil could not happen in one night. Thus, "the government was not particularly aware of the extent of the infiltration. This can only be described as a major intelligence gaffe."[163]

On the other hand, *The Indian Express* on May 29, 1999 in its op-ed article stated that "Pakistan's invasion is no infiltration but it was a long planned but a desperate move to take control of the territory, further threatening the line of communication to Ladakh and Siachen. The fault is at all levels and no one can escape the blame: the political leadership, bureaucracy, academia and the media."[164] Not just this, *The Indian Express* on June 2, 1999 has mentioned that "facts are emerging that point to laxity in anticipation and surveillance as well."[165]

Moreover, *The Hindustan Times* in its several editorials has blamed the military and intelligence agency for the crises. In one of its editorials, it mentioned while "Pakistan's tactics are understandable – it is always at the onset of summer that it has sent in the militants – what is inexplicable is the failure of Indian intelligence to get early information about the hundreds of infiltrators who were gathered near the border. Had our forces been alerted on time, they could have moved in much earlier to evict the militants so that the present extreme measures of utilising the services of the force need not have been taken."[166]

In another op-ed article, it mentioned that military and intelligence agencies begun blaming each other. But, both are clearly responsible as well as those responsible for interpreting and reacting to their reports in New Delhi.[167] Not just this, it pointed out that there is a puzzlement in Washington how the Kargil intruders were able to enter Indian territory, bring in sophisticated weapons and set up fortifications and supply lines over a period of several

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[162] Lal, Sham (1999), "Myopia, Mon Amour", *The Telegraph*, Kolkata, 17 June 1999.

[163] Editorial (1999), "Breaking Silence", *The Telegraph,* Kolkata, 21 June 1999.

[164] Verghese, B.G. (1999), "Drawing the Line at Kargil", *The Indian Express*, New Delhi, 29 May 1999.

[165] Singh, Vikram Jit and Masoodi, Nazir (1999), "Warning of Pakistan Action Ignored", *The Indian Express*, New Delhi, 2 June 1999.

[166] Editorial (1999), "Ominous Signs", *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, 28 May 1999.

[167] "High Level Incompetence", *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, 4 June 1999.

weeks without Indian authorities having any inkling of what was going on. Such a massive intelligence failure is unpardonably embarrassing for a nation that projects itself as a superpower.[168] In its article, *The Hindu* also had called out a failure of intelligence agencies. It stated that intrusion in May 1999 was the result of the lack of the army and intelligence's failure.[169]

However, *The Times of India* carried an article wherein the various intelligence agencies were blamed, albeit in different proportions. According to the article, "RAW's share would be between 50-60 per cent and the Intelligence Bureau's (IB) would be 30-40 per cent and Military Intelligence's (MI) responsibility would rest at 10-20 per cent."[170] The sub-theme which falls under the "Intelligence failure" theme is

- **Government's Inability to Understand Pakistan's Actions and Failure to Upgrade Defence Equipment to Soldiers**

All the newspapers had maintained that Kargil crisis represented a major Intelligence failure. However, while exploring the theme further, it was found that some section of media had also criticised the Indian government's inability for not understanding Pakistan's actions, and eventually, media called it a major diplomatic failure on the part of then PM Vajpayee's government. *The Telegraph* on June 17, 1999 wrote that the current war is partly the result of the "government's inability to understand how the enemy's mind ticks." [171] The paper further scrutinised the government's inaction and mentioned, "As long back as in January [1999] the Union Home Ministry received a report from the intelligence wing of the Border Security Force that hundreds of guerrillas had taken up positions in the Kargil region. It even informed the officials concerned later about the occupation of vantage points by the intruders. But no one bothered to do anything about it."[172]

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[168] Menon, N.C. (1999), "Misbegotten Misadventure", *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, 14 June 1999.

[169] "Was There A Lowering of Guard?", *The Hindu,* New Delhi, 30 May 1999.

[170] Mehta, Mona (1999), "Lessons from Kargil", *The Times of India,* New Delhi, 2 August 1999.

[171] Lal, Sham (1999), "Myopia, Mon Amour", *The Telegraph*, Kolkata, 17 June 1999.

[172] *Ibid.*

The dailies have also done sharp criticism of the Centre for lack of defence upgradation and for not providing special training to soldiers to fight in such difficult terrain. *The Telegraph* on June 30, 1999 said that the soldiers needed to be better clothed, better equipped and have better communication systems.[173] The dailies have maintained that defence expenditure suffers from major distortions and the defence budget needs to be updated. While further explaining, the newspaper wrote:

> "Places like Kargil and Siachen call for unconventional warfare. Indian troops are facing people who are trained in such warfare. They need special training for carrying out assaults in areas with no security cover. Sending troops not properly trained and attired into hostile surroundings is self-defeating. From helmets to goggles to boots[,] the jawans need special equipment to drive the intruders away from the LoC at Kargil. Army sources feel that what are needed are not heavy guns but equipment like lightweight bullet proof vests and low interceptor radar transmitters, among other things, to help push the intruders back," it added.[174]

In yet another editorial, *The Telegraph* on July 17, 1999 strongly mentioned: "The artillery pieces were short of spares and ammunition. They lacked specialised anti-personnel shells... Similarly, most early airstrikes had little impact on bunkers because so few bombs were precision guided."[175] *The Indian Express* has also stated: "Kargil has underlined the glaring lack of modern equipment in the Indian Army... Army *jawans* have had to fight their way up the steep slopes of Kargil without proper clothing, snow shoes, light bullet-proof vests and modern rifles. Add to this the lack of proper surveillance equipment, armed helicopters and artillery and you have the full picture of the odds against which the Army was required to evict the well-dug-in intruders."[176] *The Hindustan Times* had also followed the same arguments. However, *The Hindustan Times* on June 14, 1999 in an editorial had mentioned that the army had been always neglected.[177]

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[173]Singh, Gajinder (1999), "Get the Right Things to Fight With", *The Telegraph,* Kolkata, 30 June 1999.

[174] *Ibid.*

[175] Editorial (1999), "Cartridge Grease", *The Telegraph,* Kolkata, 17 July 1999.

[176] Nadkarni, J.G. (1999), "We Love Quantity", *The Indian Express*, New Delhi, 11 August 1999.

[177] "Hi Tech Border War", *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, 14 June 1999.

While getting critical of the government, *The Times of India* mentioned that "even as the country marvels at the heroism of its soldiers, there is a considerable anguish over the fact that their sacrifice might have been avoided had the government been better prepared."[178]

Theme 3: India Got Positive International Response

The dailies have emphasised on how the world community stood behind India. United States of America from the beginning of the conflict had sent strong signals in favour of India and branded Pakistan as an aggressor. *The Telegraph* on June 3, 1999 came out with the conversation of the then US President Bill Clinton and Pakistani PM Nawaz Sharif wherein Clinton administration told Pakistan to get the infiltrators out from Kargil and "move quickly toward normalisation with India to save whatever remains of his country's international reputation."[179] In another editorial on June 4, 1999, *The Telegraph* stated the "battle for international opinion has been all but won."[180] The editorial has further added that there has been "public evidence of Western irritation at the foolhardy and blatant manner in which Pakistan violated the line of actual control and triggered a major military confrontation."[181] Moreover, the editorial stated that "London had rebuffed Pakistani attempts to take the matter to the United Nations making it clear the West would join Russia in blocking such a move. Implicit was the view Pakistan was the aggressor, no ifs and buts about it. And aggressors cannot be rewarded."[182] On June 18, 1999, *The Telegraph's* report mentioned: "The EU's position on the Kargil crisis is similar to that of the US."[183]

"India has Reasons to Get Satisfied", *The Indian Express* on June 21, 1999 said, adding that "by and large, international opinion accepts Pakistan as the aggressor and the violator of the LoC."[184] However, *The Times of India* stated with each passing day, the pressure on Pakistan

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[178] Editorial (1999), "No More Kargil", *The Times of India*, New Delhi, 26 July 1999.

[179] Sirohi, Seema (1999), "Washington Reads Out Riot Act to Islamabad," *The Telegraph*, Kolkata, 3 June 1999.

[180] Editorial (1999), "World Winning", *The Telegraph*, Kolkata, June 4 1999.

[181] *Ibid.*

[182] *Ibid.*

[183] Sharma, Pranay (1999), "India Flashes Global Alert on Kargil", *The Telegraph*, Kolkata, 18 June 1999.

[184] Editorial (1999), "Prepare for the Information War, Too", *The Indian Express*, New Delhi, 21 June 1999.

to vacate aggression in Kargil is increasing. It mentioned the latest countries to make known their stand are Britain and China. At the same time, "the Asia Pacific panel of the International Relations Committee of the US Congress had put forward an amendment urging the administration to block IMF and World Bank loans to Pakistan."[185] *The Hindustan Times* maintained on June 1, 1999 that there have been positive developments in the diplomatic field for India. The editorial stated that one of the apparent realisations in the world capitals is that Pakistan is the main culprit. It also said that for once, the United States of America has been quite categorical from the beginning that "the Indians have been operating on their own side of the LoC in their efforts to drive out mercenaries."[186] The other secondary themes on which Indian media particularly paid attention are:

- **On India-China Relations**

As the threat of nuclear weapons was looming over the South Asian region, the media also focussed on the equation between India and China. The world community had favoured India on Kargil issue but initially, China remained a little aloof to the issue. Later on, it took a neutral side under global pressure. But, media observed China's steps very closely and started focussing on the equation between India and China. *The Telegraph* on June 10, 1999 stated "Beijing has so far stayed out of the Kargil developments."[187]

In the same article, it added that Beijing has only expressed its concern officially and the "Chinese media has criticised the role of Indian troops."[188] Later on June 15, 1999, *The Telegraph* again carried a report which stated that China has opted for a neutral stand. The daily wrote, "China has made it clear it will maintain neutrality in the Kargil conflict."[189] And by the first week of July, China has indicated that in "no uncertain terms that respecting the LoC is crucial to normalising Indo-Pak relations."[190]

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[185] Editorial (1999), "Mounting Pressure", *The Times of India,* New Delhi, 3 July 1999.

[186] Editorial (1999), "Gains for India", *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, 1 June 1999.

[187] Sharma, Pranay (1999), "Pak Springs China Trap on Talks – Eve", *The Telegraph*, Kolkata, 10 June 1999.

[188] *Ibid.*

[189] Sharma, Pranay (1999)," Neutral China to Talk Security", *The Telegraph*, Kolkata, 15 June 1999.

[190] Sharma, Pranay (1999), "China Joins Chorus for Pak Pullout", *The Telegraph*, Kolkata, 2 July 1999.

While expressing concern about the relations between India and China, in an editorial on June 17, 1999, *The Indian Express* stated that dragon has been defanged. It further stated that "Beijing has called for both sides to show restraint, solve the problem peacefully and bilaterally."[191] *The Indian Express* on June 16, 1999 carried an article in which it mentioned that "China is no longer a threat for India."[192] In an editorial, *The Hindustan Times* on June 17, 1999, stated, "while the foreign minister Jaswant Singh's visit to Beijing may have imparted new and better understanding between the two countries, it would be unrealistic to claim it would herald a return to normalcy."[193] Moreover, *The Times of India* has carried an article which stated, "China adopts even-handed stance on Kargil conflict."[194] It said that as the pace of Sino-Pakistan-Indian triangular diplomacy quickens, there is a hint of a change in the air, but it remains unlikely that either India or Pakistan will be wholly satisfied with Chinese response on the Kargil conflict. Also, the same daily on July 3, 1999 in its editorial maintained that by "formally drawing attention to the sanctity of the LoC, the Chinese government has, in its own elliptical style, made it clear to Pakistan that the intruders should immediately be pulled back."[195] Similarly, *The Hindu* mentioned that on the issue of nuclear weapons, China may prefer "engagement to confrontation."[196]

- **On Indo-US Relations**

Pakistan was rebuffed by everyone from all the powerful nation-states including China at the end of the conflict. But Washington had played a decisive role in ending Pakistan's intrusion in Kargil. The media had noticed US's inclination towards India, but the media fraternity also started speculating the future course of India-US relationship. However, not all the newspapers had given importance to the related themes.

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[191] Editorial (1999), "Dragon Defanged", *The Telegraph*, Kolkata, 17 June1999.

[192] Malhotra, Jyoti (1999), "China's No Threat, Talks Clear Bad Air", *The Indian Express,* New Dehi, 16 June 1999.

[193]Editorial (1999), "Indo-China Befriending", *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, 17 June 1999.

[194] Stockwin, Harvey (1999), "China Adopts Even Handed Stance on Kargil Conflict", *The Times of India*, New Delhi, 11 June 1999.

[195] Editorial (1999), "Mounting Pressure", *The Times of India,* New Delhi, 3 July 1999.

[196] "The Neighborhood Diplomacy", *The Hindu,* New Delhi, 14 June 1999.

In an editorial on July 14, 1999, *The Telegraph* stated: "There should be no exaggerated ideas of where Indo-US relations will go from here. Alliances or security pacts are passé. The US will also continue to press for India to sign the comprehensive test ban treaty or otherwise integrate itself into the global non-proliferation regime."[197] *The Indian Express* has also in its article on June 16, 1999 lamented that US has the similar stance as India's.[198]

Theme 4: Impact of War on Economy

Recognising that more than two months long military conflict will have an impact on economy, the media in India started writing its cascading effect. *The Telegraph* in its editorial on June 28, 1999 wrote: "The rupee rallied, but only after the RBI spent between $ 80-100 million in a single day defending the currency."[199] The same article further mentioned that "India's economy will bleed if Kargil continues. Pakistan's, however, will haemorrhage. Its foreign exchange reserves are a mere $ 1.8 billion, its public finances shakier."[200]

The Indian Express on June 18, 1999 stated, "The Kargil conflict will definitely have its costs, but the Indian economy is robust enough to bear it even if the conflict takes a couple of months before it is resolved."[201] It further added that if the Kargil crises "drags on for three months, the drag on the exchequer would be between Rs 5,000 and Rs 9,000 crore, which is between 0.3 to 0.6 per cent of the GDP."[202] Additionally, an editorial in *The Indian Express* on June 19, 1999 stated that despite several strengths, no one can pretend that the "economy is as robust as the Foreign Minister would wish when the country faces an external threat."[203] While attacking the government, the editorial further added that the government still has to

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[197] Editorial (1999), "Eagle has Landed", *The Telegraph*, Kolkata, 14 July 1999.

[198] Agencies and ENS (1999), "Withdraw from Indian Soil, Clinton Tells Sharif", *The Indian Express,* New Delhi, 16 June 1999.

[199] Editorial (1999), "Costing War", *The Telegraph*, Kolkata, 28 June 1999.

[200] *Ibid.*

[201] ENS (1999), "Kargil--Economy to Take Rs 5,000 and Rs 9,000 Cr Hit in 3 Months", *The Indian Express*, New Delhi, 18 June 1999.

[202] *Ibid.*

[203] Editorial (1999), "Cost of Kargil", *The Indian Express*, New Delhi, 19 June 1999.

get the economic and budgetary impact of Kargil into clear focus. Furthermore, *The Times of India* has stated that Kargil is taking the main blame for the rupee slide, but the fall has much to do with the economic basics.[204]

Theme 5: Internationalisation of Issue

Media had focussed on Pakistan's ambitions of internationalising the Kargil issue and hence the Kashmir issue. India had the fear that if the issue gets internationalised, then there are chances of meddling of US and China in Indo-Pak bilateral affair. Thus, it becomes one of the major themes wherein media had carried out a lot of articles on this issue.

In an editorial on June 11, 1999, *The Indian Express* stated that Kargil has been an exhibition of Pakistan's "growing desperation, of creating a warlike situation and inviting the world to Kashmir."[205] One more article in *The Indian Express* mentioned that India should not depart from its bilateral position. Also, in yet another editorial on June 16, 1999, *The Indian Express* lamented that there has been "continuing fear of 'internationalisation' of Kashmir, and indeed the larger India-Pakistan relationship."[206] It said that practically, the issue has been internationalised for years. If the Pakistanis had hoped that "Kargil would bring international focus back on Kashmir in a manner favourable to them they have miscalculated."[207] On the contrary, Kargil has persuaded the world to focus on the larger question of an unstable India-Pakistan relationship and the more complicated issue of what the international community can do to improve this situation. Moreover, *The Times of India* on June 18, 1999 pointed out that "rather basking in the seemingly benign interference of big powers, India needs to solve its problems by itself, acting all the time in a restrained and responsible manner."[208] *The Hindu* had also maintained the similar lines and added that Pakistan would not be able to succeed in its efforts to ask for third party intervention on the crisis.[209]

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[204] Tudor, Gill (1999), "More to Rupee Slide Than Kargil", *The Times of India,* New Delhi, 18 June 1999.

[205] Editorial (1999), "Firmness and Fortitude", *The Indian Express*, New Delhi, 11 June 1999.

[206] Gupta, Shekhar (1999), "Misplaced Paranoia", *The Indian Express*, New Delhi, 16 June 1999.

[207] *Ibid.*

[208] Varadarajan, Siddharth (1999), "Don't Escalate Kargil to All-Out War", *The Times of India*, New Delhi, 18 June 1999.

[209] Editorial (1999), On Expected Lines", *The Hindu,* New Delhi, 14 June 1999.

However, *The Telegraph* had opposed those who were opposing the internationalisation of the issue. In an editorial on June 26, 1999, it mentioned that "Many Indians are uneasy that New Delhi's hectic parleys with Western powers over the Kargil conflict will undermine a long standing pillar of Indian foreign policy. Namely, that the Kashmir dispute should be settled only between India and Pakistan, there should be no internationalisation of the issue. These fears are misplaced."[210] The editorial further added that "internationalisation is in itself a meaningless term. What is important is to take a close look at the circumstances that led India to so stiffly oppose third party involvement in Kashmir. If those circumstances have changed, there is every reason for the policy to be modified. Opposing internationalisation should not be a *mantra*."[211] The daily, in another editorial, mentioned that India had realised the power of media and even media organisations had utilised their own characteristic during the time of crises. In another editorial in *The Telegraph* on June 22, 1999, it strongly wrote that India should be "aggressively selling whatever evidence it has."[212] It also mentioned that New Delhi needs to share intelligence reports with other governments perhaps even with the international media. While reminding the power of media, the editorial had added: "It should remember that in an information war, victory goes to the country that shows more openness, not to the one that buttons its mouth."[213]

Theme 6: To Build National Consensus

During the time of Kargil, the media had built this theme by focussing on the role of opposition parties and ruling political party and by asking them to stand united and present a unified stand at the time of crises. All the newspapers had played a role in which it asked the leaders of ruling party to form a constructive consensus among the political parties so that it creates an atmosphere that helps in formation of national consensus. In an editorial, *The Indian Express* on May 29, 1999 suggested that it becomes important to strengthen political consensus on Kargil.[214] The editorial stated that the Prime Minister and other members of the Cabinet have joined hands and "a picture of unity is just what the country would like to see.

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[210] Editorial (1999), "Sing the Internationale", *The Telegraph*, Kolkata, 26 June 1999.

[211] *Ibid.*

[212] Editorial (1999), "Burden of Proof ", *The Telegraph*, Kolkata, 22 June 1999.

[213] *Ibid*.

[214] Editorial (1999), "Picture of Unity", *The Indian Express,* New Delhi, 29 May 1999.

Stressing on the issue further, the same daily on June 3, 1999 mentioned that the governments should speak in one voice on Kargil as everything goes on air through media which shows that there is a "lack of clarity of purpose".[215] It further suggested that the government should speak in one voice comprehensively and preferably through well briefed spokespersons. Yet another article on July 13, 1999 in *The Indian Express* mentioned that bilateral dialogue between India and Pakistan are needed but this requires a national consensus. *The Hindustan Times* carried a report on May 30, 1999 in which the opposition parties had criticised the ruling BJP for not talking one voice. Even the *The Telegraph* on May 28, 1999 had reported that opposition parties, including the Congress and the Left, have rallied behind the government on the strikes and said no effort should be spared to protect India's territorial integrity.[216] Moreover, *The Times of India* in an editorial on May 28, 1999 wrote, "This is not the time for the opposition parties to play politics. Like all other citizens, they should demonstrate total national solidarity in support of our *jawans* and airmen. They should do well to remember the Pakistani army leadership is tempted to act whenever they sense political."[217] Also, in an article on May 30, 1999, *The Times of India* has mentioned that the government seems to be speaking in different voices.[218]

Apart from above-mentioned themes, there are some other issues also on which the Indian newspapers had focussed. For instance, the dailies kept reminding that India and Pakistan are nuclear capable countries. Indian dailies also suggested for diplomatically handling the Kargil issue. The newspapers suggested that New Delhi can't take an aggressive step without losing the diplomatic credibility it has built up over the years as a responsible nuclear power nation-state. Kargil War was the big news for Indian print and electronic media as for the first time significant number of Indian journalists went to the battlefield to cover the war. For nearly two and a half months of the conflict, the newspapers, magazines and news channels had tried to cover all the possible aspects of the conflict.

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[215] Editorial (1999), "Multispeak Disorder", *The Indian Express,* New Delhi, 3 June 1999.

[216] Thakur, Sankarshan (1999), "Pak Shoots Down Two Fighters", *The Telegraph*, Kolkata, 28 May 1999.

[217] Editorial (1999), "Heightened Conflict", *The Times of India*, New Delhi, 28 May 1999.

[218] TNS (1999), "George, Army Give Different Statements on Drass Invaders", *The Times of India,* New Delhi, 30 May 1999.

3.4 Electronic Media and the Kargil War

As the Kargil conflict coincided with the revolution in India's electronic media, with this, there was an emergence of many foreign players including Rupert Murdoch's *Star TV* Network. Soon after, India's first private owned channel *Zee TV* came. However, *Star TV's* 24-hour news channel got live in 1999. But for the study, the government-owned *Doordarshan* and private news channel *Star News* (English) have been chosen. However, there were certain constraints too while covering the war. As throughout the war, "clips were transported to Srinagar and from there it was often the visiting VIPs and army convoys returning to Delhi who carried them." (Joshi 1999: *n.d.*)

Thus, Kargil coverage was widespread thanks to technological advancements and presence of private satellite channels in abundance. Sachdev stated: "The two factors i.e. the refined information flow milieu and exemplary *CNN* coverage of the Gulf War — should have predicated for media coverage of the Kargil episode a seamless relationship between the media on the one hand and the political/bureaucratic/military centres of influence on the other."[219] Singh said that "India has fought two simultaneous wars over the Line of control in Kargil. The first was against Pakistani Army aggression, which was fought with aircraft and ground forces. The second one was an information warfare, which is fought across the electromagnetic spectrum using visual images on TV screens and words. With the globalisation of TV, the information war has become as important as the war with Armed force personnel and their sophisticated equipment." (Singh 2006: 114)

As the media got access to the war zone after the ban, a battery of photographers, cameramen and reporters made "minute by minute and breathless coverage of the battle for Tiger Hill. The mass media's impact on boosting morale, national resurgence and patriotic fervour, saw the armed forces strike up a chorus of praise for the media's role as force multiplier." (Manchanda 2001: 76) Thus, when the Kargil war happened, the Indian electronic media was ready not just for reportage but also to play a significant role in the crises which were emerging.

Undoubtedly, India's first televised war was successful in bringing moving images of the battleground to the common man's house. It was not just the first time for Indian media to be reporting from the conflict zone, but also a first for the military to see reporters on a

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[219] Sachdev, A.K. (2000), "Media Related Lessons from Kargil", *Strategic Analysis*, 23(10):1797-1808.

battlefield. The then Information and Broadcast Minister Pramod Mahajan had "geared up *Doordarshan* in the region to counter Pakistani propaganda."[220] Also, just before the war, "*Doordarshan* was off the air in the LoC because of the minor snag in its very low power transmitter (VLPT)." (Bhatt 2006: 271) During the war, "the silver lining to the crisis was that the government rapidly started raising more stations along the border from Kargil to Kutch with an investment of Rs. 400 cr." (*ibid.*) Bhatt wrote that in the beginning, the "Pakistani troops were at the advantageous position but soon, when the war progressed; Indian electronic media started focussing on the heroism of the military. A lot of journalists took the interviews of soldiers and the electronic channels indulged in glorification of the Indian army." (*ibid*: 272) The dominant themes of electronic media for the coverage of Kargil War were similar to those of the print media.

The main source of information, even for electronic media, was the government and the news channels kept informing the country about the details of the war which truly moved people. According to Namrata Joshi, television channels were successful in putting a human face to the tragedies of war besides it building up a drama. She wrote that the "endless pictures of wounded soldiers, body bags and coffins, bereaved but brave families and tearless widows rekindled patriotism in even the most cynical viewer. While mentioning that something was different this time, she said that "what was different this time was each wounded soldier, each coffin and each widow was not a mere statistic. He or she had a name, an address, a relationship with the village, the community and the country."[221] The role of *Doordarshan* was very limited. Being the government owned news channel, it had put forth only the government's side of story. Thus, the government's official channel *Doordarshan* "woefully lacked behind in the coverage of Kargil operations." (Chakraborty 2000: 152)

While realising the importance of electronic media as a "powerful force multiplier", A.K. Chakraborty also wrote that officials were unable to gauge the significant role which the press can play. He mentioned that "the Minister for information and Broadcasting in fact played roughshod and perhaps felt that whatever was dished out at the daily joint briefing of External Affairs and Armed forces were sufficient."[222] Additionally, on the role of

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[220] "Media Backup", *India Today,* New Delhi, 26 July 1999.

[221] Joshi, Namrata (1999), "Telling Shots", *India Today*, New Delhi, 26 July 1999, [Online: Web], Accessed 25 June 2016, URL: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/tv-coverage-of-kargil-war-becomes-indian-army-biggest-ally-moulds-public-opinion/1/255770.html

[222] Chakraborty, A.K. (2000), *Kargil: Inside Story*, New Delhi: Trishul Publications.

Doordarshan during the Kargil War, Chakraborty stated that the then "Minister of Information and Broadcasting Pramod Mahajan [had] acted like a censor. He wanted various interviews on Kargil to be shown to him before being telecast."[223] Further, commenting on *Star TV's* role, he mentioned, "To a large extent, the coverage by *Star TV* helped the Indian Army and the people at large to get glimpse of the day to day briefing done by the Army, Air Force and the Spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs. Every evening, the entire press conference was flashed around 6.30 pm and it did benefit a large number of people following the Kargil conflict."[224]

As the electronic media's crew managed to go up till the battlefront, it appeared that their live reportage had compromised the Army's operations. As Joshi pointed out that "There were slip-ups like the time when the blazing lights of cameramen outside the Brigade Headquarters at Drass drew the attention of the enemy. This led to heavy shelling in which four soldiers were killed and the correspondent of a national daily was injured."[225]

She further wrote there was "uproar over *Star News* announcing the date and time of the assault on Tiger Hill, three days before it actually was to take place."[226] The power of Indian news channels was on show during the "mini war" in Kargil, Amit Baruah said, adding that "Not only did the media projection of 'victory' help the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to come to power in the 1999 elections, it displayed the power of India's growing 24/7 television channel." (Baruah 2008: 195)

However, as suggested by Geeta Seshu, the media had done "the best thing: it manufactured stories. Stories, euphemism in journalistic parlance for reports/features/analysis, were written up on every aspect of the conflict, often going far beyond government briefings and reports of the army handouts to bring us second hand accounts of various actions in the battle." (Seshu 1999: 2917) Seshu further stated that the media reports tried to "cover plethora of possible angles of the conflict. We had human interest profiles of families of martyrs and the plight of

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[223] *Ibid.*

[224] *Ibid.*

[225] Joshi, Namrata (1999), "Telling Shots", *India Today*, New Delhi, 26 July 1999, [Online: web], Accessed 25 June 2016, URL: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/tv-coverage-of-kargil-war-becomes-indian-army-biggest-ally-moulds-public-opinion/1/255770.html.

[226] *Ibid.*

villagers in border areas, poignant reports of letters from home and STD calls home and little spot stories on tailors stitching shrouds for the dead soldiers, the food we feed our soldiers, corporate responses to Kargil and views of celebrities on the conflict."[227]

As a part of its strategy, *PTV* was banned from Cable networks in India and Pakistani newspapers were blocked on the Internet. (Bhatt 2006: 272) But the government's move to ban *PTV* was unanimously opposed by Indian media. In an editorial, *The Telegraph*, pointed out what was lacking in this government's move was a "recognition that the principle of freedom of information is of overriding importance to a healthy society. If this principle is bent at all, it should be done so only in the most exceptional of circumstances. *PTV's* contribution, negative or positive, to the Kargil crisis is negligible. Preserving the principle is far more important to India than the showy nationalism of curbing *PTV*. If anything, *PTV's* crude news broadcasts helped strengthen the average Indian's view that his society is the more vibrant. Ironically, Indians living along the security sensitive border areas will be unaffected by the ban. They will catch *PTV* by antennae."[228] Also, the Indian authorities had made use of the Internet and dedicated an exclusive website www.vijayinkargil.com to spread the word about Indian stand on the conflict. Malik while commenting on the role of journalists said that as being the first televised war, every Indian was interested to learn what was going on in Kargil and that too instantly. Every young and enthusiastic media person wanted to go the front, shoot pictures and interrogate every soldier and build stories without understanding the context. He further said that "media stories without an understanding of context and larger picture became our [the Army's] big headache. However, after some time by creating a desirable system of official briefings and ready availability of our spokespersons, there was better understanding and such stories reduced."[229]

Analysis of Indian Media on Kargil

Kargil is regarded as the first televised war of India and both print and electronic media played an important role in reporting the war to an eager and anxious public. The media policy of the government during the war has been subjected to scholarly scrutiny and

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[227] Seshu, Geeta (1999), "Media and Kargil: Information Blitz with Dummy Missile", *Economy and Political Weekly,* 34(41): 2917-2919.

[228] Editorial (1999), "Closed Circuit", *The Telegraph,* Kolkata, 9 June 1999.

[229] *Malik, V.P. (2017), e-mail to the author, 12 May 2017.

analysis. It actually provided an opportunity to develop and refine a proactive media strategy to stay ahead in the information war. It cannot be emphasised more that reigning news coming out of a warfront is of immense value both domestically and internationally. Domestic public opinion is to be firmly behind the government and the military to keep the morale and national mood high. Internationally, it works to diplomatically isolate the enemy country and also to create pressure by other friendly nations.

As Ashley J. Tellis, C. Christine Fair and Jemison Jo Medby wrote: "India recognizes the utility of the media in contemporary conflicts and will continue its offensive in the information war. India believes that it won Kargil politically in part because of its dexterous capability of shaping international perception. India also values the role of perception management in affecting public opinion domestically as well as influencing the morale of the Indian and Pakistani militaries."[230]

The themes were common between print and electronic media while covering the Kargil conflict. But the thread which bound the Indian media together was Pakistan bashing and instilling patriotic feelings among masses. As *The Hindustan Times* on May 27, 1999 wrote that India's response of air strikes to Pakistan's actions were "right answer to the treacherous manner in which the encroachment took place."[231] Moreover, Swapan Dasgupta has mentioned that the Kargil War had "brought about a fierce patriotic upsurge throughout the country. Solidarity with the soldiers apart, it's a renewed expression of people's faith in India."[232]

Adding to this, Devesh Kapur mentioned that "a mass outpouring of support for the soldiers and officers spanned the country. There were Kargil sales, Kargil pop concerts, Kargil fundraisers in schools and offices, Kargil episodes in soap operas." (Kapur 2000: 197) He further added that the extent with which it had touched the mind of common man was visible the most in the "funerals of dead soldiers in rural areas and small towns from where India's army increasingly draws its officers and men-which drew tens of thousands of mourners.

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[230] Tellis, Ashley J. et al. (2001), *Limited Conflicts Under the Nuclear Umbrella: Indian and Pakistani Lessons From the Kargil Crisis*, California: Rand.

[231] Editorial (1999), "The Right Response", *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, 27 May 1999.

[232] Dasgupta, Swapan (1999), "It's Their War Too", *India Today,* New Delhi, [Online: web], Accessed 10 April 2017, URL: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/kargil-war-brings-a-fierce-patriotic-upsurge-throughout-india/1/256181.html.

Although India's politicians, (and especially the BJP) wrapped themselves in the garb of patriotism, for the most part they followed rather than led the public mood." (*ibid.*) During the war, the World Cup cricket was going on and when India and Pakistan had their match, on one hand, the media was reporting the stories related to war but on the other hand, the newspapers gave much space for the cricket commentary. Even the channels gave more air coverage to the India-Pak cricket match. Not just this, there were distasteful headlines too which media had used. Also, Indian media's terminology was also very selective. The newspapers had used words like infiltrators, enemies, intruders and Pakistan-backed intruders. The dailies have interchangeably used these words according to their conveniences. Not just this, the newspapers' tone and structure in disseminating information is one major factor in determining its role, position and nature of the media.

The front-page reports in all dailies had mentioned the government and army's version of the mutilation of the soldiers. At the height of the Kargil War, the Indian newspapers had paid attention to the Pakistani press. *The Times of India* had its section "The other side" and *The India Express* had the column under the section "Periscope on Pak" in which the dailies used to carry stories from Pakistani media. Every newspaper had its pet project for Kargil. As Geeta Seshu wrote that *The Times of India* fund was entitled *'Zara yaad karo qurbani'* while *The Indian Express* tied up with Iridium to provide phones for soldiers at the front. Seshu further wrote that *The Indian Express* even "co-sponsored a programme, presumably a fund-raiser, *'Aye watan tere liye'* in Delhi on July 17, 1999, utilising for publicity, a photo- graph captioned 'tears of pride', showing the wife of an officer saluting the coffin of her husband." (Seshu 1999: 2918) Thus, the Indian media, by focussing on the Army's successes and sacrifices created a national fervour. *The Indian Express* in its article on June 17, 1999, mentioned that "the slaying of Indian soldiers in the ongoing battle with Pakistan aided infiltrators has provoked an upsurge of public emotion. Funerals of martyred army and air force men in towns all over the country are reportedly drawing crowds of commoners."[233]

By showing the gory pictures, successes and sentiments of army men, television cameras and print media had manufactured images for nationalism for the first time in Indian media history. (Chakravarti 2000: WS-16) On the other hand, according to Singh, India had fought two simultaneous wars over the Line of Control in Kargil. The first was against Pakistani Army aggression, which was fought with aircraft and ground forces. The second one was an

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[233] Shah, Amrita (1999), "No Romance in His Death", *The Indian Express*, New Delhi, 17 June 1999.

information warfare, which is fought across the electromagnetic spectrum using visual images on TV screens and words. With the globalisation of TV, the information war has become as important as the war with Armed force personnel and their sophisticated equipment. (Singh 2006: 114) Further, while criticising the media, he mentioned: "From the media's perspective, the Kargil war was characterised by two images. In the first was the detailed description of the (*jawan*) soldier unyielding, etched against the silhouette of dangerous mountains that served as a natural identification of the boundaries of India. It could be termed as a statement of aggressive nationalism. In the second place was the incessant televised coverage of ceremoniously draped coffins, ritualistic public mourning of fallen heroes."[234]

Moreover, India had an edge over Pakistan over the usage of media during the Kargil conflict as India had given permission to private news channels too to cover the Kargil war. With the help of media, India was presented in a positive and favourable way among world community. Granting permission to two private television channels to cover the war zone in Kargil had a salutary impact. It presented India in a more favourable light and perhaps, helped in forming a more sympathetic view to the world of it being a victim of aggression. However, Pakistan's restrictive policy in disallowing foreign media in any form put it at a disadvantageous position. As it was for the first time for journalists to cover a conflict situation, the reporters did not know which principles of journalism need to apply, Barkha Dutt wrote, adding that "the media headlines for days had played tales of mutilation and horror." (Dutt 2001: 64)

While talking about the ironies of this war, she said that as the war was occurring miles away but the "cities were debating notions of nationalism, an entire section of people were convinced that Kargil had given birth to a monstrous, chest-thumping brand of patriotism." (*ibid:* 66) On the other hand, according to Rita Manchanda, even the television fillers had appealed to the patriotism. She said that "every commercial break recited poignant tributes to brave soldiers. Full page newspaper advertisements and hoardings urged the youth of the country to prove their mettle in battle. Not just this, newspapers by reporting the war had become participants as they were generating war funds and providing food and drinks to

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[234] Not just this, too much was happening at such a fast pace that no time was left with the public to think about any discussion on the why and wherefore of the Kargil conflict.
Singh, Anil Kumar (2006), *Military and Media*, New Delhi: Lancer Publications.

soldiers." (Manchanda 2001: 74) On one hand, it was South Asia's first televised war and on the other hand, for the first time Indian army too had to handle the media from the battle ground. The media kept interfacing with the army men as the conflict was proceeding right in front of their eyes as well as cameras. But media in general and electronic media in particular had faced sharp criticism from various quarters for its coverage during the Kargil War.

The critics had accused electronic media for being an ally of Army. Not just this, they accused media for turning the war into a television serial. According to them, the media had failed in doing an in-depth coverage of war. Also, critics mentioned that the press by and large were not at all familiar with the language and idiom of expressions used by the Defence spokesman during the daily briefings. Moreover, the Indian electronic media had hyped the issue a lot for its own commercial benefits. Several critics stated that Indian media was over enthusiastic and electronic media particularly could not gauge the after effects of such live reporting.

After the conflict was over, all the departments started scrutinising their roles and the blame game had started, and especially the role of media had raised eyebrows among many. The military force has called the media's role as a force multiplier. Furthermore, Rita Manchanda has cited the example of a senior journalist Shekhar Gupta of *The Indian Express* where he had lauded the media's role as a force multiplier and referring to the then Army Chief General VP Malik's recommendation of the media's contribution to the war effort and for generating national resurgence. She further added: "Understandably, Gupta welcomes the Army's newly found trust and confidence in the media and hopes to persuade the Defence Ministry to open up its highly secretive, non transparent functioning, to build a more communicative relationship in times of war and peace."[235] However, "the Kargil war was morphed as the mega event in a cascading blitz of bollywood style concerts, celebrity football matches and fashion shows. War was trivialised, as fizzy patriotism spilled out into the streets. It was India's first experience of war as spectacle, war as infotainment. The general public was apparently swayed by jingoistic anti Pakistan rhetoric and ultra nationalistic fervour to cross LoC and teach Pakistan a lesson." (Singh 2006: 118)

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[235] Manchanda, Rita (2001), "Covering Kargil: South Asia's First 'Media War'" in Kanti Bajpai, Afir Karim and Amitabh Mattoo (eds) *Kargil and After: Challenges for Indian Policy*, New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications.

On asking V.P. Malik if the media in India had reflected opposition's point of view, he mentioned that "in any crisis situation, including when a conflict is initiated by a nation's adversary, there is a need for national consensus. There was no bar on any one commenting or speaking against the government. Opposition parties played their role but political polarisation was evident. Some opposition parties even played up wrong stories based on a disgruntled officer till the whole truth was revealed to them. Other than that, there was very little criticism of the armed forces."[236]

It was not a smooth sailing for the media during the span of Kargil War. The Indian media withheld uncomfortable questions and disclosures from the politicians and military men. After analysing the print and electronic media, it can be said that all the newspapers have worked over time and tried to cover all the possible angles related to Kargil War. The themes of all the dailies, *The Telegraph, The Hindu, The Indian Express, The Times of India* and *The Hindustan Times* were similar. But the tone and usage of words vary from daily to daily depending on the newspaper's policies and its editors.

As the crises started unfolding, all the dailies sent their respective correspondents on the battle field. Even then, *The Telegraph*'s reportage was quite balanced in nature which was followed by *The Hindu* which also had sincerely made efforts to stay balanced. It was further followed by *The Indian Express*, *The Hindustan Times* and *The Times of India. The Telegraph* followed by *The Hindu*, mostly carried the hard news. *The Telegraph* and *The Hindu* didn't try to portray jingoism while reporting the deaths of Indian soldiers. Their editorials were direct and simple. In these dailies, they featured more analytical articles, but because of their comparatively limited readership, their views were circulated among less and particular groups. Thus, the reports carried out by the *The Indian Express, The Hindustan Times* and *The Times of India* were noticed by the majority.

However, *The Indian Express*, *The Hindustan Times* and *The Times of India* were quite critical of Pakistan. All the dailies but especially *The Times of India* had covered the issue in such a way that proved that media had set an agenda and it showed how media can act as a force multiplier. It had carried the stories in which it lauded the government's move. The daily had also carried reports which could create jingoist views. Media's coverage on Kargil

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[236] *Malik, V.P. (2017), e-mail to the author, 12 May 2017.

and particularly *The Times of India's* centred on the idea that Pakistan is an enemy. There were certain hawkish reports and articles of big wigs which have got a wider space in *The Times of India*. Additionally, a lot of critical stories about Pakistan which includes the torture of Indian soldiers by Pakistani troops were splashed in the *Times of India*. Moreover, *The Times of India* had carried the opposition, primarily the Congress' views. *The Hindustan Times* had also done similar stories but it was not as juicy as it was of *The Times of India***.** *The Indian Express* had dedicated several pages to cover the Kargil conflict. All the dailies have covered the reporting combat and reactions of leaders as well as everyday policy statements. More importantly, there were a lot of issues which media didn't cover. For instance, "the continual non-representation of certain issues, such as the reactions of Kashmiris and events there, served to erase them from the reader's consciousness. This gradual and subtle process of evasions contributed towards a type of censorship that helped in the creation of larger political and media consensus regarding the war."[237]

Media, both print and electronic had acted as a catalyst through its repeated appeals and messages in making the people realise the importance of contributing to the welfare fund created for soldiers fighting in Kargil. The media - both electronic and print - have been generous with and taken pains on coverage. This display of pride and public support is touching; it has also been aided in large measure by the proliferation of the media. In Kargil war too, objectivity, with some very significant exceptions got swept away in whipping up war hysteria, egging on India to teach Pakistan a lesson, and suspending scepticism about the government's handling of the war. (Singh 2006: 117)

While analysing the role of Indian media, V.P. Malik also maintained that Kargil War is often known as India's first televised war, in which "trying to 'manage' or 'conduct' the media did not work. Most ground reporters had no knowledge or experience of war reporting. Many stories that appeared in the media had little relevance to the ground situation. None of these had any impact on our operational plans or actions on the ground. As the war went on, both the media and the army kept learning from experience."[238] Furthermore, on asking whether

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[237] Chattarji, Subarno (2008), *Tracking the Media: Interpretation of Mass Media Discourses in India and Pakistan*, New Delhi: Routledge.

[238] *Malik, V.P. (2017), e-mail to the author, 12 May 2017.

there was any media policy in place regarding dissemination of information on the conflict, Malik stated:

> "After some experience, we were able to lay down a broad media policy in place, which was:
>
> - Expose Pakistani lies about the Pakistan Army not being involved in the operations and about the LoC in the Kargil sector not being clearly delineated. Counter any other Pakistani disinformation campaign.
> - Put across the national policy of restraint, emphasize the probity of, and the justification for, our military action and support the military strategy for war.
> - Make people aware of the traditional strength and the organizational capabilities of the Army. Also, highlight gallantry displayed by the troops, their high morale, the espirit de corps in and among the various units, the competent leadership and, above all, the determination to win the war.
> - Convey the news from the war zone as soon as possible without compromising on security.
> - Do not deviate from the truth. Give out only facts and establish trustworthiness. (Views and analysis to be given by senior officers only.)"[239] (*For full interview, please see Appendix*)

Thus, the way Indian media responded to the crisis, mobilised its resources and organised television programmes, newspaper reports, analyses, discussions, features, the famous army posters and a wide array of coverage had eventually convinced the world that Pakistan was on the wrong foot. Pakistan's bashing kept boomeranging. India had blamed Pakistan in all its articles, its editorials and op-ed articles.

The Kargil War was undoubtedly influenced in a crucial manner by the media. It took it to a different dimension and helped India gain international diplomatic advantage. Also, it had helped to create euphoria of nationalism among people. There has been one section too which claimed that India's media had gained widespread claim. "The national media's coverage on Kargil has won widespread acclaim. But it feels that the section of press has been irresponsible. The armed forces, for their part, are satisfied with the war reportage. By and large, they say the media has been responsible and understanding. But there were certain exceptions too and to cite a few instances: a news channel carried footage of a picket, which was within minutes shelled by the enemy. A newspaper carried a photo of a bunker, which had to be shifted."[240]

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[239] *Ibid*.

[240] Kang, Bhavdeep (1999), "A News Twist", *Outlook*, New Delhi, [Online: web], Accessed 25 May 2017, URL: http://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/a-news-twist/207735.

In short, as suggested by Rita Manchanda also, there were two images which had dominated the Kargil War. Firstly, "the graphic presentation of the *jawan*, unyielding, etched against the silhouette of dangerous mountains, the natural markers of the boundaries of the motherland, the nation. It was a statement of aggressive territorial nationalism. Secondly, the endless televised spectacle of ceremonially draped coffins, ritualistic public morning of fallen heroes while dry eyed families waited for the privacy to weep. Conflict is the adrenalin of the media. Journalists are trained to look for disagreements and find war irresistible." (Manchanda 2001: 74) According to her, that is the reason why peace is not news for media and in this process, violence is perceived as normal. Also, "the lack of in-depth reporting on what led to Kargil – a discussion closed off by a self induced censorship-slanted public opinion to believe that war is inevitable and military force is the only way. The media not only reported the Kargil war, but endowed militarism with a nobility of purpose and defined nationalism as practice flag waving, dangerously intolerant and demonising of the other in this case was Pakistan." (Manchanda 2001: 74) Thus, with its detailed coverage on television, media has played a very important role in moulding public opinion against Pakistan and blowing up a patriotic fervour in the country.

As media has a lot of power, it has certain duties towards the society also. Sagarika Ghose wrote "news television, by its service, is public service television. News is not entertainment and broadcasting the news contains an implicit notion of duty... Glorifying soldiers and according mythic structure to men in uniform is the job of the army, the state and other wings of government. If TV galmourises war, it becomes a propaganda wing of the state."[241]

Thus, the media models with which the electronic media has done reportage can also be represented through the propaganda model by Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky. Moreover, there was an agenda which was set up by print media while covering the crises. Also, while writing about the information battle, Malik had added, "media moulds national and international opinion. It can be a potent force multiplier, or a force degrader. Even in circumstances of proxy war, the battle for the hearts and minds is of paramount importance. There is no point in winning the battle of bullets if you lose the war as a result of alienating the masses." (Malik 2010: 319) Moreover, the media coverage of Kargil War had created a kind of national awareness among masses which the common people had never felt before in

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[241] Ghose, Sagarika (1999), "Not The Whole Picture", *Outlook*, New Delhi, [Online: web], Accessed 26 May, 2017, URL: http://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/not-the-whole-picture/207836.

terms of how the conflicts or war are covered and how the families of the soldiers deal   with such situation. With the moving images, with its speed, the electronic media showcased that "death was no longer a statistic, but 'bravehearts-in-bodybags' coming back home. This was accompanied by a sense of national unity and nationalism with TV sets, newspapers and radio becoming the glue."[242]

In the reportage of Kargil, many journalists had their first experience in reporting from an active war zone. Also, much of the army retaliation was kept classified. It gave rise to speculative reports. The Kargil Committee Report had noted in its observation, "Neither the Northern Army Command nor HQ 15 Corps nor the lower field formations had media cells which could cater to the requirements of the press corps. This reveals an obvious lacuna which must be plugged."[243]

Code of conduct of the journalists with regard to war reporting is still nascent in India and Kargil was fought almost two decades back. Therefore, all possible shortcomings were on display while reporting it. True that there was an information draught in the initial days but that almost meandered into the zone of journalistic triviality of reporting half truths and outright myths.

The media coverage was extensive, relentless and with the advent of cable television, widely followed. It created opportunities as well as disadvantages for both the media and the various arms of the government**.** Initially, almost all foreign English media was neutral or mildly critical of India on Kargil. The clear imposition of such views happened because there was hardly any information on Pakistani troop movements inside Indian territory. In the backdrop of Lahore Declaration, the war in itself was major breach of Indian and international trust. But it was never properly articulated during the initial stage. However, as the war progressed, Indian media was given accurate information on the misadventures of Pakistani forces and those reports changed perception, globally. If India today considers that Kargil was a major diplomatic embarrassment for Pakistan, much credit goes to Indian media that reported the

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[242] Seshu, Geeta (1999), "Media and Kargil: Information Blitz with Dummy Missile", *Economy and Political Weekly,* 34(41): 2917-2919.

[243] Rediff (2000), "The Fallacy of Showing the LoC as Running Northeast to the Karakoram Pass Must be Exposed", *Rediff* [Online: web] Accessed 10 January 2016, URL: http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/mar/04kargil.htm.

unprovoked invasion, war crimes of beheading soldiers and use of irregulars with consistency, gusto and remarkable accuracy.

As it was the first time when the Indian journalists of print and electronic media got the access to reach the place where the war broke out, they left no stone unturned to do as many stories as they could do to compete with each other. But just as India's political leadership began to follow through with the committee's recommendations, the terrorists had launched another attack on India in 2001-2002, which threatened the outbreak of yet another crisis in the sub-continent.

CHAPTER - 4

MEDIA AND THE ATTACK ON INDIAN PARLIAMENT IN 2001

The attack on Indian Parliament by five armed terrorists on December 13, 2001 was one of the most audacious and notorious attacks on the heart of Indian establishment. The attack set off a chain of events that led to deterioration of India and Pakistan's already fraught relationship and brought the two nuclear-armed nations almost at the brink of war. Though war was avoided at that point of time but it underscored the fragility and unpredictability of the bilateral relations between India and Pakistan. It also brought forth the spectre of proxy war by Pakistan waged against India and how non-state actors can get states to act against each other. The latter was truer in the light of 9/11 attacks on United States of America (USA) and its impact the world was still reeling from when the Parliament attack was carried out.

Before going into the details of the attack, it is pertinent to contextualise it within the framework of bilateral relations between India and Pakistan at that point of time. The relations were at an abyss during the Kargil War of 1999. After the military coup in Pakistan and the then General Pervez Musharraf's usurping of power by unseating the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, moves were made by both the countries to initiate dialogue on resolving all outstanding issues in an atmosphere of cordiality and markedly toned down aggression at the borders.

Taking forward the hectic diplomacy by the foreign office and High Commissioners of the two nations, the then President Musharraf landed in India for a bilateral summit, now famously known as the Agra Summit. However, despite strenuous preparation and apparent warmth, the summit level talks failed spectacularly with neither of the sides backing down on key points of negotiations. The dialogue broke down in July 2001, a few months before a Pakistan-based terror group launched this heinous attack on the 'temple' of Indian democracy.

4.1 Genesis of the Attack

The sheer audacity of the attack took everyone by surprise. Later studies reveal glaring intelligence failure but the planning and execution of the attack was swift and carried out with utmost secrecy. According to the Supreme Court verdict that confirmed the death sentence for one of the conspirators,

> "The genesis of this case lies in a macabre incident that took place close to the noon time on 13th December, 2001 [December 13, 2001] in which five heavily armed persons practically stormed the Parliament House complex and inflicted heavy casualties on the security men on duty. This unprecedented event bewildered the entire nation and sent shock waves across the globe. In the gun battle that lasted for 30 minutes or so, these five terrorists who tried to gain entry into the Parliament when it was in session, were killed. Nine persons including eight security personnel and one gardener succumbed to the bullets of the terrorists and 16 persons including 13 security men received injuries. The five terrorists were ultimately killed and their abortive attempt to lay a seize of the Parliament House thus came to an end, triggering off extensive and effective investigations spread over a short span of 17 days which revealed the possible involvement of the four accused persons who are either appellants or respondents herein and some other proclaimed offenders said to be the leaders of the banned militant organization known as 'Jaish-e-Mohammed'".[244]

Even though the Parliament had been adjourned around 40 minutes before the attack, it still had hundreds of Members of Parliament (MPs) inside including the then Deputy Prime Minister, L.K. Advani and Leader of the Opposition Ms. Sonia Gandhi. In the event of the terrorists actually gaining access to the main hall of the Parliament, one must shudder to think the endangerment of lives of senior politicians of the country and potential chaos it could have unleashed on the nation. Hence, the attack was treated as an act of war against the Indian state and full might of the state was unleashed not only the attackers but also on their handlers, planners and conspirators. The then Prime Minister of India A.B. Vajpayee had addressed the nation two hours after the attack and reassured the shocked population. He said, "This was an attack not just on Parliament house, but a warning to the entire country. We accept the challenge. We will foil every attempt of the terrorists."[245] He remarked that the battle against terrorism has reached a decisive phase thereby, indicating that tough and strict

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[244] *Supreme Court of India (2005), *State (N.C.T of Delhi) Verses Syed Abdul Rehman Gilani*, [Online: web] Accessed 10 August 2016, URL: http://www.judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=27092.

[245] George, Nirmala (2001), "Terrorist Attack on Indian Parliament Leaves 12 Confirmed Dead", [Online: web] Accessed 10 May 2016, URL: http://onlineathens.com/stories/121401/new_1214010070.shtml#.WT5eAoxEnIU.

actions were to be followed soon. Indeed, this terror strike was the most serious breach of security in the heart of the capital of India since the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1984. There was an outpouring of swift condemnation from across the world. Britain, United States and even Pakistan expressed shock and dismay at the attack.[246]

As 9/11 memory was still afresh, America's response to the attack was much harsher than its earlier mere criticism of such acts. K. P. Nayar has noted in his report that the United States of America went well beyond any previous condemnations of terrorist attacks against India when state department spokesman Richard Boucher said, "those responsible (for the attack on Parliament) should be identified and quickly brought to justice".[247]

Two days after the attack, without naming Pakistan, the Prime Minister of India, the Chancellor of Visva-Bharati University, spoke of September 11, 2001 and December 13, 2001 in the same vein. He said, "Indian troops could have crossed the border during the Kargil War, but we exercised restraint and only snatched back our land. We have reached the limits of our tolerance. We will face terrorism with all our might."[248] He also said that India has launched a diplomatic mission to garner support for the campaign against terror. He added, "We saw it (the effects of terrorism using religion as a mask) on September 11 [2001] and we have seen it again on December 13 [2001]."[249]

While there have been worst attacks in the country in terms of loss of life, this was by far the most dangerous and outrageous since it struck at the very heart of Indian nationhood. Prior to the incident, the Parliament was adjourned but several politicians and many government officials were present at the premises of Parliament. Five Pakistani armed persons entered the Parliament complex around 11.30 am in a white ambassador and triggered a major crisis for New Delhi. But all five persons had died on the spot before they could enter the Parliament building. Nine other people, including some members of security personnel, a gardener and a journalist had died in the attack while 16 persons from the security forces were injured. (Mukherji 2005: 1) A major disaster was averted but in small time, the terrorists had attained

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[246] BBC (2001), "Indian Parliament Attack Kills 12", *BBC*, [Online: web], Accessed 20 February 2016, URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1707865.stm.

[247] Nayar, K.P. (2001), "US Speaks Sept 11 Language", *The Telegraph,* Kolkata, 14 December 2001.

[248] Sarkar, Sunando (2001), "PM's Patience at Breaking Point", *The Telegraph*, Kolkata, 16 December 2001.

[249] *Ibid.*

the maximum publicity. Just before the December 13, 2001 attack, there was a similar suicide attack on Jammu and Kashmir Assembly in October, 2001.[250]

4.2 Immediate Aftermath and Investigations

The seriousness of the attack was summed up by L.K. Advani while addressing the Parliament five days after the attack. He remarked,

> "This terrorist assault on the very bastion of our democracy was clearly aimed at wiping out the country's top political leadership. It is a tribute to our [India's] security personnel that they rose to the occasion and succeeded in averting what could have been a national catastrophe. In doing so they made the supreme sacrifice for which the country would always remain indebted to them." (Parliament Speeches Archive 2001: 1)

In the same address, he informed the nation that the attack was carried out by the militants of Pakistan-based terror outfits Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) (*ibid.*). The domino effect of this attack was beginning to take shape with such assertions that clearly indicated a fallout that was going to be widespread and exhaustive for not only India's security apparatus but also on the civilian arms of the government.

The investigations launched, and since completed, reveal various actors and details related to the attack. Though Mr. Advani named both JeM and LeT for the attack, it was established that only JeM carried out the terror strike. It remains one of the most high profile attacks the terrorists could have launched till date in India. The Supreme Court while giving its verdict on the case had noted the details of it. The main planners and conspirator were identified as Mohammad Afzal Guru, Showkat Hussain (Afzal's cousin), Ghazi Baba (JeM commander of Jammu and Kashmir who actually ordered the attack), Ahsan Guru (Afzal's wife) and SAR Geelani (was acquitted later on the ground of lack of evidence). Ghazi Baba was eliminated in an encounter with the security forces in Jammu and Kashmir in 2003.[251]

All the rest were arrested within a week of the attack. Among them, Afzal was identified as the mastermind behind the attack after a thorough investigation. He was convicted by the courts and was awarded the death penalty. He was hanged in the Tihar jail, which had created

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[250] BBC (2001), "Militants Attack Kashmir Assembly", *BBC*, [Online: web], Accessed 15 October 2014, URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1574225.stm.

[251] *Supreme Court of India (2005), *State (N.C.T of Delhi) Verses Syed Abdul Rehman Gilani*, pg. 2, [Online:web] Accessed 10 August 2016, URL: http://www.judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=27092.

much furore in the Kashmir Valley as it was widely believed both in the Valley and among the human rights activists, that the investigation was botched up and he had not played a direct role in the attack.[252].

The part which is relevant, however, is that Afzal was trained and aided by Pakistan. The Supreme Court judgement, which had confirmed his death sentence stated, "First, he mentioned about joining JKLF, a militant outfit during the year 1989-90, receiving training in Pak Occupied Kashmir in insurgent activities and coming back to India with arms," (Supreme Court Archives 2004: 59).

The course of the investigation also established firmly that all the five terrorists who lay siege at the Parliament and were subsequently neutralised were "Pakistani nationals who came across the border to carry out the attack with active help of some Indian nationals as well. Long drawn court procedures aside, such links were discovered very early in the investigation and was conveyed to the government to formulate a policy to deal with Pakistan."[253]

The foremost response of the government was predictable. It approached Pakistan with the initial findings of the investigation diplomatically. L.K. Advani informed the Parliament on December 18, 2001, five days after the attack that

> "The incident once again establishes that terrorism in India is the handiwork of Pakistan-based terrorist outfits known to derive their support and sustenance from Pak ISI… The Pakistan High Commissioner in India was summoned to the Ministry of External Affairs and issued a verbal demarche demanding that Islamabad take action against the two terrorist outfits involved in the attack on the Parliament House."[254]

Interestingly, the verbal demarche was issued by the then Foreign Secretary of India Chokila Iyer to Pakistan's senior envoy to New Delhi, Asraf Jehangir Qazi.[255] Though sympathetic to Indian government, General Musharraf had issued a strict warning to India later against any

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[252] Harrison, Frances (2001), "Militants Attack Kashmir Assembly", *BBC*, [Online: web] Accessed 1 June 2017, URL: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-21406874.

[253] Chakravarty, Sayantan (2001), "The Plot Unravels", *India Today*, New Delhi, [Online: web] Accessed 1 June 2017, URL: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/parliament-attack-well-planned-operation-of-pakistan-backed-terror-outfits-evidence-shows/1/233791.html.

[254] *Advani, L.K. (2001), "Statement by Minister Re: Terrorist Attack on Parliament House" *Parliament of India* [Online: web], Accessed 1 June 2017, URL: http://www.parliamentofindia.nic.in/lsdeb/ls13/ses8/181201.html.

[255] Press Trust of India (2001), "Govt Blames LeT for Parliament Attack, Asks Pak to Restrain Terrorist Outfits", *Rediff*, [Online: web] Accessed 1 June 2017, URL: http://www.rediff.com/news/2001/dec/14parl12.htm.

misadventure across the Line of Control (LoC) to mount an attack on the training camps of terrorists through military channels.[256]

Pakistanis had denied involvement of groups based there and instead had brought up the unrest in Kashmir and the attack being a direct fallout of it. The Pakistani forces were put on high alert immediately after the attack because they could anticipate India's anger and willingness to take action. *The Dawn* newspaper has quoted the then Pakistani army spokesperson vehemently denying Indian charges by contending, "The attack on Parliament is a drama staged by Indian intelligence agencies to defame the freedom struggle in occupied Kashmir."[257]

In India, the patience was wearing thin as there was fermentation of a strong public opinion against Pakistan post failure of talks in Agra. This daring attack had made an already peeved public baying for justice. Media, too, took an exceptionally strong stand. (Joshi 2004: 129)

On the very next day in a scathing piece indicting the role of Pakistan, Brahma Chellaney explained in *The Hindustan Times* that the terrorist assault on the symbol of Indian democracy at a time when extremists are on the run elsewhere in the world reflects the widely perceived softness of the Indian state and the costs it is paying for its compromises with the forces of terrorism. The article further suggested that apart from waging economic war, India must take decisive covert action against Pakistan. The article asserted:

> "Despite its strong anti Castro rhetoric, the US has generally avoided any direct military action against Cuba which it was, in the past, accused of sponsoring of terrorism and insurgence in Latin America... The need for the hour is a counter proxy war doctrine incorporating its political, diplomatic, economic and covert components and its implementation in determined and consistent manner."[258]

In a more subdued but equally assertive piece that came out two days after the attack. C Raja Mohan writing for *The Hindu* stated,

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[256] Reuters (2001) ,"Pakistan Slams India for Attack Response", *CNN* [Online: web], Accessed 1 June 2017, URL: http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/south/12/22/india.diplomat.musharraf/index.html.

[257] "Pakistan Forces Put On High Alert: Storming of Parliament", *The Dawn*, [Online: web], Accessed 25 August 2001, URL: https://www.dawn.com/news/10821/pakistan-forces-put-on-high-alert-storming-of-parliament.

[258] Chellaney, Brahma (2001), "India Paying for Its Soft Response of Terror", *The Hindustan Times,* New Delhi.

"If diplomacy fails, India might have few options left but to retaliate with military force... In communicating a set of demands for Pakistani action against terrorist groups, India has put Islamabad on notice. It is now entirely up to Pakistan to act in consonance with its international obligations on acting against terrorism."[259]

He had also captured the mood of the nation after this 'breath taking' assault in the following manner that encapsulates the tremendous pressure Indian government was under to act against the perpetrators of the attack. He said,

"The threshold of Indian tolerance against cross-border terrorism appears to have been breached by the attack on the Parliament on Thursday. The Government may find it difficult resist internal pressures to act decisively against terrorist groups."[260]

The security was not beefed up despite specific intelligence input gathered from an arrested Al-Qaida suspect about an imminent attack on the Parliament. *The Telegraph* quoted the then Mumbai Police Commissioner M.N. Singh the very next day of the attack saying, "If the Union Home Ministry had taken the report we had sent on the basis of the confession Afroz made, today's terrorist attack might have been averted."[261] Many commentators were unsparing in their criticism of the government's inaction. Purnima S. Tripathi wrote,

"The incident exposed glaring lapses in the security system. Despite intelligence inputs pointing to the possibility of such attacks, no precautionary measures had been taken to keep a close watch on movements in the highly fortified area in the heart of the national capital. The extent of negligence becomes clear from the fact that a car sporting a Home Ministry label and a red beacon light atop and packed with 30 kg of RDX (Research Department Explosive) and bagfuls of hand grenades got inside the complex, breaching the first layer of security. It was only the lightning reflexes of personnel in the next two layers that prevented a catastrophe."[262]

In a similar vein, K. K. Katyal observed in *The Hindu* that the government should better avoid lame excuses that there was no specific intelligence input to thwart such an attack.[263] Overwhelmingly, reports had suggested that the political class had failed to take notice of the

[259] Mohan, C. Raja (2001), "Diplomacy Precedes Military Response", *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 15 December 2001.

[260] *Ibid.*

[261] Bhattacharyya, Debashis (2001), "Al Qaida Suspect Said It All", *The Telegraph*, Kolkata, 14 December 2001.

[262] Tripathi, Purnima (2001), "Terror in the Parliament House", *Frontline,* New Delhi, 18(26), 22 December 2001-04 January 2002.

[263] Katyal, K.K. (2001), "Dealing with December 13", *The Hindu,* New Delhi, 18 December 2001.

seriousness of an imminent attack. Therefore, the government needed to come out as strong and decisive in face of an adversary like Pakistan. Against such a backdrop, the Indian military was mobilised on December 20, 2001 with the code name Operation *Parakram.*[264]

It was followed up by diplomatic offensive as well. The cabinet committee on security met on December 21, 2001 to review the situation and take further actions. In this meeting, the then Prime Minister Vajpayee had decided to recall the Indian High Commissioner to Islamabad, signalling the toughness of India's stance in no uncertain terms.

The significance of the move can be gauged from the fact that despite extreme ups and downs in their relationship, the two countries had maintained diplomatic presence in each other's countries since the 1971 War of liberation of Bangladesh. The move was explained by the Ministry of External Affairs then spokesperson, Ms. Nirupama Rao in the following manner,

> "Since the December 13 [2001] attack on Parliament, we have seen no attempt on the part of Pakistan to take action against the organizations involved. India's Foreign Secretary had, in a meeting with the Pakistan High Commissioner on December 14 [2001], elaborated on some of the steps that were required…in view of this complete lack of concern on the part of Pakistan and its continued promotion of cross-border terrorism, the government of India has decided to recall its High Commissioner in Islamabad."[265]

Also, the services of the Samjhauta Express train and Lahore bus services were terminated. The reaction from Pakistan was also swift. Though they ruled out recalling their High Commissioner from New Delhi, they had criticised New Delhi's move. General Musharraf had termed it as an "arrogant and knee-jerk" response from India.[266] Therefore, the atmosphere in which Operation *Parakram* was launched can be described as acrimonious, mistrustful and fraught between the two nuclear-powered neighbours.

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[264] It is a Sanskrit word which means valour.

[265] "Angry India Recalls High Commissioner to Pak," *The Times of India,* New Delhi, 21 December 2001.

[266] PTI (2001), "Musharraf Says India's Actions 'Very Arrogant'", [Online: Web], Accessed 25 August 2016, URL: http://www.rediff.com/news/2001/dec/22parl4.htm

4.3 Operation *Parakram*

It was one of the biggest military mobilisations by the Indian military post 1971 War and it was responded with equal measure from Pakistan. By the beginning of New Year 2002, the deployment was completed. It did not end up in a full scale war but small confrontations in the form of firing across the border took place. The build-up included moving of ballistic missiles close to each other's borders along with substantial number of troops (50,000 on Indian side and 30,000 on the Pakistani side). None of the sides had crossed the LoC and eventual de-escalation and counter mobilisation started in July 2002 and by end of October 2002, the operation was over. However, India suffered huge casualties in mounting the operation. It again exposed our superlative lack of state of the art defence infrastructure just three years after the Kargil War. In total, Indian side recorded 1874 casualties without actually going for war, as informed by George Fernandes, the then defence minister to a session of Rajya Sabha in July 2013.[267] This included the lives lost during counter insurgency operations in Jammu and Kashmir as well. Strictly, the operation resulted in total of 798 army personnel losing their lives.[268]

At the very beginning of the troop build-up, there were some signs of a possible thaw as Indian Prime Minister met the President of Pakistan at the South Asian Association of Regional Conference (SAARC) summit which commenced on January 5, 2002 in the Nepalese capital of Kathmandu. Surprising everyone, the then General Musharraf announced at the end of his speech, "As I step down from this podium, I extend a genuine and sincere hand of friendship to Prime Minister Vajpayee. Together we must commence the journey for peace, harmony and progress in South Asia."[269] In comparison, the then Prime Minister Vajpayee though good naturedly accepted the handshake proposal and he had reminded Pakistan of the sufferings India had to endure from terrorism emanating from its soil. He reiterated quite strongly,

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[267] Pandit, Rajat (2003), "India Suffered 1,874 Casualties Without Fighting A War", *The Times of India,* New Delhi, [Online: web], Accessed 1 May 2003, URL: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-suffered-1874-casualties-without-fighting-a-war/articleshow/45016284.cms.

[268]TNN (2003), "Op Parakram Claimed 798 soldiers", *The Times of India*, New Delhi, [Online: web], Accessed 25 December 2015, URL: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Op-Parakram-claimed-798-soldiers/articleshow/104948.cms.

[269] Naqvi, Javed (2016), "From the Archives: The SAARC Handshake That Broke the Ice Between Pakistan, India", [Online: web], Accessed 20 August 2016, URL: https://www.dawn.com/news/1286661.

"I am glad that President Musharraf extended a hand of friendship to me I have shaken his hand in your presence. Now President Musharraf must follow its gesture by not permitting any activity in Pakistan or any territory in its control today which enables terrorists to perpetuate mindless violence in India. I say this because of our past experience. I went to Lahore with a hand of friendship. We were rewarded by aggression in Kargil and the hijacking of the Indian Airlines aircraft from Kathmandu. I invited President Musharraf to Agra. We were rewarded with the terrorist attack on the Jammu and Kashmir assembly and last month on the Parliament of India. But we would be betraying the expectations of our peoples if we did not chart out the course towards satisfying the unfulfilled promises of our common South Asian destiny."[270]

Apart from the spectacle of the public diplomacy, de-escalation through diplomacy was tried at the level of External Affairs Ministers of both the countries, but yielded no breakthrough. However, on January 12, 2002, General Musharraf had addressed Pakistan and announced, "no organization will be allowed to perpetuate terrorism behind the garb of the Kashmiri cause…we will take strict action against any Pakistani who is involved in terrorism inside the country or abroad"[271]. Perhaps this announcement and constant pressure from the US to refrain from starting an all-out war, stopped India from crossing the border and mounting an offensive (Stolar 2008: 17)

In terms of objectives, it was never clear why such an incredibly massive operation was undertaken without a stated goal. Alex Stolar, in an excerpt of an interview of the then External Affairs Minister of India, Jaswant Singh had tried to shed some light on this. According to Singh, "the objective of the operation was to defeat cross border terrorism without conflict, to contain the national mood to teach 'Pakistan a lesson' and in case war broke out, to seek and destroy Pakistan's military assets and capabilities." (*ibid*: 14) Various accounts of military strategies included plans of surgical strikes, aerial raids, crossing the border and taking control of the Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) but none of it happened. One important thing that needs to be acknowledged was that Pakistani Army was hard pressed during that time with considerable resources deployed at the Afghan border as the US-led war on terror raged. In case of an actual attack by India, it could have compelled Pakistan to use its nuclear weapons as they would have been cornered. (*ibid.*)

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[270] *PMO (2002), *Prime Minister's Speech at the SAARC Summit in Kathmandu*, [Online: web], Accessed 5 January 2002, URL: http://archivepmo.nic.in/abv/speech-details.php?nodeid=9034.

[271]Eckholm, Erik (2002), "The India-Pakistan Tension: Islamabad; Pakistan Pledges to Bar Any Groups Linked to Terror", *The New York Times*, [Online: web], Accessed 15 December 2015, URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/13/world/india-pakistan-tension-islamabad-pakistan-pledges-bar-any-groups-linked-terror.html.

Although, another school of thought exists that had denounced such a situation as an elaborate nuclear bluff by Pakistan. According to Ashok Mehta, "Pakistan's nuclear bluff (make Kashmir a nuclear flashpoint) needs to be called and its military disabused of its delusion of deterrence."[272] All in all, this operation had again brought in the urgent need to evaluate India's defence capabilities and its modernisation.[273] Both were neglected and were crying out loud for attention from the political leaders and the government. Though an impressive deployment of forces in record time was achieved, the success was marred by unprecedented amount of lives lost during operation manoeuvres by India. As for teaching Pakistan a lesson, at best the operation had served a posturing purpose to bring home the message to the Indian public that government can take tough calls when required.[274]

Despite a lot of differences, several commentators have compared the December 13, 2001 terrorist attack with America's 9/11 attacks. For India, the September 11, 2001 event and its aftermath were inextricably bound to the December 13, 2001 attack on Parliament. While for the USA, the former was the first major terrorist attack on its homeland, the attack in New Delhi was a culmination of sorts of terrorist violence that went back two decades ago. The commentators saw the attack on the USA as an extension of what India had been facing for over a decade. As Joshi suggested, "There was a hubristic edge in the reaction of many that the United States had been made to confront what India had endured for so long." (Joshi 2004: 129) Moreover, "The Indian discourse on the events of September 11 [2001] and after has been shaped by a long and painful experience with terrorism. The September 11 [2001] attacks had changed the international politics. 9/11 became a kind of a bridge by which the average Indian linked concerns with people around the world, especially in the United States."(Veer and Munshi 2004: 134,135)

In India, despite a wave of anger following the December 13, 2001 attack on Parliament, the government reaction was carefully calibrated and cautious. The government of India did talk and act tough as it withdrew its High Commissioner from Islamabad, reduced diplomatic staff

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[272] Mehta, Ashok K. (2003), "Pakistan's Nuclear Buff", *Ministry of External Affairs*, *Government of India*, [Online: web], Accessed 25 October 2016, URL: http://www.mea.gov.in/articles-in-indian-media.htm?dtl/15297/Pakistans+nuclear+bluff.

[273] Singh, Lt. General A.K. (2011), "Mobilization Strategy of Troops Changed after Op Parakram" *The Indian Express,* New Delhi [Online: web], Accessed 1 June 2017, URL: http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/mobilisation-strategy-of-troops-changed-after-op-parakram/884589/.

[274] Mehta, Major General Ashok (2002), "Coercive Diplomacy: Operation Parakram: An Evaluation", *Seminar at Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS)* [Online: web], Accessed 1 June 2017, URL: http://www.ipcs.org/seminar/indo-pak/coercive-diplomacy-operation-parakram-an-evaluation-577.html.

there, cut rail and air links with Pakistan, and had asked for the extradition of twenty 'most wanted' terrorists who it said were residing in Pakistan. Moreover, "the country's armed forces were mobilised and massed near the border, but withdrawn nine months later, despite another horrific terrorist incident at Kaluchak." (Veer and Munshi 2004: 134,135)

Veer and Munshi also maintained that Indian commentators had pointed out some important differences. For instance, 9/11 led to unprecedented unity of peace with the administration and opposition dealing with it in a bipartisan fashion. The Indian experience of various terrorist 'events', on the other hand, has been one of immediate recriminations and charges of intelligence or security failures. It was quite apparent for many to draw a parallel between the Parliament attack and any similar operation that took place prior to this. (*ibid.*) Turning into the Indian scene, the actions of the government of India in the aftermath of December 13, 2001 had matched US actions almost point by point, "except for the scale – understandable, due to the vast differences in the economic and military might of US and India." (Mukherji 2005: 9) As K.K. Katyal had noted: "In both the cases, the motive and objective was the same - to strike at the country's icons, the symbols of Parliamentary democracy in the case of India and the emblems of economic and military power in the case of the U.S. This is not obscured by the fact that in New York and Washington it was a high-tech operation, and in New Delhi a crude exercise. Though investigations into the New Delhi attack are still on, both the assaults may turn out to be the handiwork of the same elements. The evidence, available so far point to the involvement of the two notorious outfits, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed. In the U.S., September 11, [2001] found the country united, with the opposition and the government seeing the gory episode from the same angle, in India, we witness a regrettable divergence on key aspects of the attack, as already noted."[275]

The trial of the Parliament attack started in February 2002, and a year after the attack, on December 16, 2002, a special Prevention of Terrorists and Disruptive Activities Act (PoTA) court had convicted three of the four accused in the Parliament attack conspiracy. The evidence produced by the prosecutor did not withstand judicial scrutiny and in October 2003, the Delhi High Court, while acquitting two accused on account of lack of evidence, rejected the plea to reconsider the death sentences of Shaukat and Guru. In August 2005, the Supreme Court had converted Shaukat's death sentence into a ten-year rigorous imprisonment, and rejected the appeal for Guru. After this, in 2006, a warrant of execution of Afzal's death

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[275] Katyal, K.K. (2001), "Dealing with December 13", *The Hindu,* New Delhi, 18 December 2001.

penalty was issued by Additional Sessions judge Ravinder Kaur, who ordered that the convict be hanged till death at Tihar jail on October 20, 2006, five years after the Parliament attack. Political and bureaucratic considerations cost India four years to get a mere opinion of the Delhi government on Afzal Guru's mercy plea, which he had placed before the President of India. But after a much delay, in February 2013, Afzal Guru was secretly hanged in Tihar jail and buried in the jail's graveyard. (Rath 2014: *n.d.*)

There have been a series of skirmishes at the Line of Control even after the Kargil War and Indian media kept reporting it like its regular feature. But, the mistrust which India and Pakistan had always shared further got deepened with the terrorists' attack on Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001. The attack on Indian Parliament is one of the shocking as well as provocative acts of terrorism in the recent history of attacks on India. There have always been debates about the role of media in covering terrorist activities and events. The governments have wanted the media to highlight the misdeeds of the terrorists and ignore the sometimes extra legal methods used by the authorities to combat them, or to focus on issues that give birth to terrorism. The media, on the other hand, would like to tell the whole story without necessarily glorifying terrorists or terrorism. (Joshi 2004: 120)

4.4 Print Media and the Parliament Attack

In the aftermath of December 13, 2001, India had demanded that Pakistan brings the militant groups who were responsible for the attacks to the book. As the diplomacy was running out of options and both the armies were inching each day, the Indian media had brought the fresh developments every passing day. All the newspapers had carried stories related to Parliament terror attack the next day. Some had carried a full page story in which the chronology of the attack was mentioned. Few dailies had put the factual stories related to the attack, and some gave different angles to the story on the front page itself.

Since it was an attack on the Indian Parliament, the print media had unanimously carried banner headlines to prove that it was an attack on the largest democracy. *The Telegraph* on December 14, 2001 carried stories like "Terror War in Last Phase: PM", "US Speaks Sept.11 Language", "Al Qaeda Suspect Said It All", "Massacre That Would Have Been" and "Fortress Capital." The other stories which *The Telegraph* carried on December 14, 2001 were "Advani in the line of fire", "Congress soft on Advani, hard on terror law", "Bush quick, Pervez quicker". *The Indian Express*'s master headline was 'Parliamenterror'. The

newspaper had given preference to the stories like "Delhi's December 13 wasn't New York's September 11: Thanks to these men, a woman", "This is our September 11, world must support us: Delhi" and "BJP likely to use attack as poll ammunition in UP". As the attack was on the Capital, the daily's supplement *Express News Line* had carried a story on how Delhiites were affected by the terror strike. Its headlines stated: "It's no big deal, says Delhiites as life goes on at usual place" and "Delhi's December of discontent continue for the third year."

Similarly, *The Hindu's* main headline on December 14, 2001 was "Suicide Squad Storms Parliament; 5 Militants Killed; Army Deployed". The other headlines which the daily had carried the same day were: "A decisive battle has to take place: PM", "I am shocked: Musharraf" and "Congress, Left blame Govt. for lapse." *The Hindustan Times'* headline titled "Democracy Attacked" mentioned that it was a fifty minutes of mayhem in Parliament House. Under the section 'Democracy under attack', *The Hindustan Times* had dedicated the first three pages to the terror strike where it mentioned stories such as "Black Thursday brings home", "Many loopholes in Parliament's security rings" and "Cabinet vows to eliminate terror."

While mentioning that no force can destroy the idea of Indian democracy, *The Indian Express'* editorial mentioned that an attack on Parliament of this kind could not have been assumed earlier but India needs to make arrangement so that it could be the last one.[276] *The Hindu* had echoed the similar voice. According to its editorial on December 14, 2001, it is far from being the worst terrorist attack India has suffered in terms of casualties or scale of the attacks. There are no parallels with the audacity of the choice where the attack has perpetrated. "The siege on the Parliament represents an attack on the citadel or the very symbol of India's democracy."[277] All the newspapers the next day had carried reactions of the politicians and the big wigs. The Indian media mostly stood united while reporting about the attack but there are certain themes under which the role of Indian print media can be understood.

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[276] Editorial (2001), "Parliament Stands Firm", *The Indian Express*, New Delhi, 14 December 2001.

[277] Editorial (2001), "Ugly Terror Strikes Again", *The Hindu,* New Delhi, 14 December 2001.

Theme 1: Lack of Security at the Parliament

The Indian media was stunned by the ease with which the terrorists had entered the Parliament House because in 1999, the press had blamed intelligence agencies for the Kargil conflict. The Home Minister and his team may have claimed to have successfully warded off the attackers since they could not enter the Parliament building, a powerful section in government and media believed the home ministry was also responsible for the security breach. As the ministers in Parliament post attack called it as a security lapse, *The Indian Express* had come up with a report on inviting terrorism. The article had emphasised on how the parking stickers which were meant for the ministers had gone beyond the authorised limits. While giving the facts, the daily stated, "In 2001, until December 11, over 100 parking stickers meant for MPs have been issued beyond the authorised limit. According to figures, 650 stickers have been issued for Lok Sabha MPs alone, 108 more than the strength of 542. On the other hand, in Rajya Sabha also, where the strength is just 250, 305 stickers were issued in the year 2001."[278]

Much before this, the daily had written an editorial about the attitude of VIPs in which it mentioned that how difficult it is for security guards to do their job. According to the daily, "Poor police constables are constantly being shouted at for daring to ask for a pass or for insisting on checking a car. "Don't you know who I am?" is the question that is used to bludgeon one's way into the most sensitive zone."[279] Over the days, *The Indian Express* had carried stories in which it suggested that the time has come to take a hard look at the security regime. It said that to be personally frisked is somehow perceived as demeaning.

The Hindustan Times had raised concern about the security failure at Parliament and in its editorial, it mentioned that the terror can strike without warning and despite all measures which were taken to prevent it, it had occurred. It further added that if the existing measures were not strictly enforced, there are chances to spread mayhem in future as they effortlessly did on December 13, 2001.[280] *The Telegraph* had given wide coverage to the lack of security at Parliament Houses.

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[278] Suri, Ajay (2001), "Inviting Terror: LS Issued 108 Extra MP Car Passes", *The Indian Express*, New Delhi, 21 December 2001.

[279] Editorial (2001), "Bolting the Stable Door", *The Indian Express*, New Delhi, 15 December 2001.

[280] Editorial (2001), "Terror in the Backyard", *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, 14 December 2001.

The daily in its editorial on December 14, 2001 said, "The security of Parliament does not depend on the half-aware populace, but on intelligence and security systems that have presumably been put on high alert recently. There can be no adequate explanation or excuse for such a breach in the system."[281] Not just this, the daily in its article the next day had pointed fingers at the home ministry for security lapses as it handles the internal security of India.[282] *The Telegraph* had given importance to a lot of editorials and articles on security challenges.

In an editorial on December 18, 2001, *The Telegraph* had cautioned that the terrorist attack presented India with major security challenges and unless India responds with determination, New Delhi will be seen as an easy target by those who wanted to destabilise New Delhi. It also stated that time has come to adopt policies that are "proactive, anticipatory and integrated to make sure that no one is left in any doubt about the nation's firm resolve to fight terrorism and states that back terrorists."[283] Also, according to the editorial, it is "perhaps the most critical security challenge is to improve the preparedness of the security forces to deal with terrorists who are willing to kill themselves. Even countries with the most sophisticated security apparatus find it extremely difficult to deal with the threats posed by suicide bombers."[284]

While explaining the lack of coherent policy among Indian Intelligence agencies, the paper suggested that there are two steps which are particularly necessary. It stated that primarily, it is significant to have a more "efficient unified intelligence network throughout the country and especially in the region that can use human and electronic means to tap and intercept communication between terrorists. Only through systematic intelligence gathering can suicide missions be anticipated and aborted before the event."[285] It also explained: "The Intelligence Bureau (IB) ordinarily is responsible for gathering intelligence about threats from within the country, while the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) gathers information largely from abroad. Military intelligence confines itself to external military threats from belligerent

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[281] Editorial (2001), "Point of Order", *The Telegraph,* Kolkata, 14 December 2001.

[282] Guha, Seema (2001), "Behind Show of Unity, Security Potshots", *The Telegraph,* Kolkata, 15 December 2001.

[283] Editorial (2001), "Hunt the Hunter", *The Telegraph*, Kolkata, 18 December 2001.

[284] *Ibid.*

[285] *Ibid.*

countries, particularly on the border. On paper, intelligence wings of the local police are supposed to coordinate with the IB, but in reality this never happens. Moreover, the IB and RAW often compete with each other, and rarely do they actually share hard information with what used to be known as the Joint Intelligence Committee, but has now become the secretariat of the National Security Council. The result is that there is very little possibility of a unified high-level assessment of every day threats and, therefore, the absence of a coherent policy response."[286]

In another article on January 8, 2002, it mentioned that despite spending millions of rupees every year on intelligence organisations, the outcome is disheartening. It also added, "Be it cross-border terrorism or internal rebellion, both thoroughly expose the failure of the intelligence network in our country."[287]

The Hindu also talked about the security breach. In its editorial, on December 14, 2001, it raised a valid question that how a car with militants armed to the teeth was allowed to pass through the gates and enter the compound. It further stated: "Clearly, the checks conducted on vehicles need to be tightened much further; one of the things that this attack establishes is that such checks should be thorough and go far beyond a cursory examination of an entry pass."[288]

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[286] *Ibid.*

The Intelligence Bureau (IB) in India is seen as an off-shoot of Indian Political Intelligence set up during the British era. It was named as Central Intelligence Bureau in 1947 mainly tasked with gathering intelligence within the country. In the past it was tasked with all intelligence targeting but in recent times it has focused on internal security. Until 1968, the Intelligence Bureau, which is responsible for India's internal intelligence, also handled external intelligence. But after India's miserable performance in a 1962 border war with China, the need for a separate external intelligence agency was felt. The Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), India's most powerful intelligence agency, is India's external intelligence agency. Source: http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/india/raw.htm.

The National Security Council (NSC) is an executive government agency tasked with advising the Prime Minister's office on matters of national security and strategic interest. It was established by the Atal Bihari Vajpayee government on November 19, 1998, with Brajesh Mishra as the first National Security Adviser. Prior to the formation of the NSC, these activities were overseen by the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister.. *Government of India, *National Security Advisory Board,* [Online: Web], Accessed 21 June 2017, URL: http://nsab.gov.in/?1001.

The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) of the government of India analyses intelligence data from the Intelligence Bureau and the RAW, Directorate of Military Intelligence, Directorate of Naval Intelligence, Directorate of Air Intelligence. JIC has its own secretariat that is under the Cabinet Secretariat

[287] Mishra, Sudhir Kumar (2002), "The Military and the Militants", *The Telegraph,* Kolkata, 8 January 2002.

[288] Editorial (2001), "Ugly Terror Strikes Again", *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 14 December 2001.

Moreover, *The Telegraph* had cautioned that a major attack on India had been averted otherwise it would have a massive massacre. While giving the details of lack in the security system, the newspaper wrote, "Had the assassins entered from Gate No. 11 or managed to avoid the armed guards of Vice-President Krishan Kant, there would have been a large-scale massacre." It also mentioned that watch man and the ward guards of Parliament security are usually unarmed and the distance from the gate to the Upper House of Parliament can be covered in few seconds. While talking about the training of the guards, it said that "the watch-and-ward staff is selected by Parliament's recruitment cell and given lessons in judo and karate. They are also given some training in handling firearms but once posted inside, are equipped with just a wireless set and the authority to demand passes."[289] Similarly, *The Times of India* in its article while targetting the elite class, wrote that "the problem for this country is that our elite is neither security conscious nor security–educated."[290] As a result, the security agencies are neither properly equipped nor organised and are not adequately coordinated. *The Times of India* in another article had interviewed Former chief of Army Staff and ex-governor of Jammu and Kashmir, General K.V. Krishna Rao. In the interview, he said that the terrorists could gain entry into the Parliament complex only because the intelligence agencies had paid little attention to the field intelligence. While further criticising the role of IB and talking about how the attack could have been prevented, he said, "if only our intelligence agencies did what they were supposed to do... Our Intelligence Bureau is more occupied with gathering political intelligence to benefit any party that's in power than go out and gather field intelligence about the activities and plans of militants and terrorists."[291]

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[289] The article also mentioned that the Security experts said there were several problems in the present set up of security system in and around Parliament. It also mentioned that the House was too ill-equipped to deal with attacks by suicide squads. While giving the examples, the daily wrote: "Any car (stolen or otherwise) with a "P" sticker can reach the sensitive security zone like the main entrance of Parliament without any scrutiny. Also, security personnel seldom check the antecedents of those inside the car." There have been numerous instances when car stickers were liberally distributed even to unauthorised persons.
Correspondent (2001), "Massacre That Would Have Been", *The Telegraph*, Kolkata, 14 December 2001.

[290] Subrahmanyam, K . (2001), "Security Faultlines: Our MPs Need House Training", *The Times of India,* New Delhi, 15 December 2001.

[291] Rao, K.V. Krishna (2001), "Intelligence Quotient", *The Times of India,* New Delhi, 17 December 2001.

Theme 2: Diplomacy and Not Military Action Will Succeed Against Terrorism

The Indian newspapers, experts as well as strategists were of view that cutting off the diplomatic ties with Pakistan would not help either of the two countries. Thus, the dailies had carried a lot of articles and editorials on not taking military actions against Pakistan. On December 16, 2001, *The Telegraph* in its article mentioned: "Despite the warnings to Pakistan and the use of strong language by politicians, strategists are still not convinced that the military option to strike across the Line of Control in the wake of the attack on Parliament will be exercised in a hurry... In any case, the decision to enter into an armed conflict is political and not military."[292] In the two days since the firing in Parliament, too, "there is no military signal that units crucial to an operation are on the move. Armoured units have not moved closer to the border. Neither have aircraft shifted bases nor have there been intensified sorties for recce... Military strategists in both India and Pakistan presume that in any case there is practically no 'element of surprise' in a conflict between the two countries. For them, the situation even when battles are not actually raging, continues to be one best described as 'no war, no peace'."[293]

The Hindustan Times had maintained the same chord and carried the article which said diplomacy, not military action, will succeed against the terrorism. "The diplomatic measures that India is taking against Pakistan are extreme and won't encourage responsible, reasonable conduct on Islamabad's part... Cancelling the bus and rail services does not hurt Musharraf. It hurts the poor travellers, the coolie with relatives across the border. These must be reversed."[294] *The Hindustan Times* in another article mentioned that war hysteria won't work. It stated that "at this crucial juncture, India needs cool heads, not belligerent sabre rattling... The war between two nuclear states was never an option nor the crossing of the Line of Control which would have entailed war. If Kennedy and Khrushchev could have a dialogue at the height of Cuban missile crisis when the very existence of the US was threatened,

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[292] Dutta, Sujan (2001), "Rhetoric Rolls, Not Military Machine", *The Telegraph,* Kolkata, 16 December 2001.

[293] *Ibid.*

[294] Bidwai, Praful (2001), "Sow Seeds of Construction", *The Hindustan Times,* New Delhi, 28 December 2001.

Vajpayee should not allow the crime of December 13 to prevent him from pursuing the vision he had outlined a year ago in Kumarakom musings."[295]

In an op-ed article on the December 13, 2001 attack, Kuldip Nayar in *The Indian Express* said that he didn't see the logic of closing all avenues, of people-to-people contact between India and Pakistan. He further mentioned that his impression is that the hawks have won their mindset. Their mindset has dictated a new thorn. He also said that they were always against any contact beyond the formal and diplomatic. *The Hindu* had also carried an article "Diplomacy Precedes Military Response". It also said "If diplomacy fails, India might have few options left but to retaliate with military force... Until now, two factors have prevented India from responding vigourously against Pakistan's acts. First, the U.S. did not want the focus to shift away from the immediate objective of defeating the Taliban and destroying the Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. There is a second abiding concern in the U.S. - that an Indian military response to cross-border terrorism from Pakistan could escalate the confrontation between the two nations to the nuclear level."[296] Further, writing on the reasons for not attacking Pakistan, *The Hindu* wrote: "If India cannot realistically consider launching overt military strikes against the terrorist networks inside Pakistan, the reason is weighty. It has much to do with not only the avoidable risk of an escalatory war but also the usual practices of organised terrorist groups to shift their operational bases to ward off strikes."[297]

Even *The Times of India's* article "Reckless Rhetoric: Tanks No Answer to Terrorism" cautioned that it will be a strategic and diplomatic blunder to start the war with Pakistan. It said that there is no dearth of people in government who would be itching for such actions. The military action would lead to a disastrous war, which will only strengthen America's political and military presence in South Asian nation states and it won't curb terrorism.[298] It also mentioned that vigilant security and intelligence gathering coupled with imaginative diplomacy are more than enough to deal with the problem. Moreover, the article suggested that India should file a formal complaint at the United Nations against Pakistan for being in

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[295] Noorani, A.G. (2001), "War Hysteria Won't Work", *The Hindustan Times,* New Delhi, 26 December 2001.

[296] Rajamohan, C. (2001), "Diplomacy Precedes Military Response", *The Hindu,* New Delhi, 15 December 2001.

[297] Editorial (2001), "Stepping Up International Pressure on Pakistan", *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 19 December 2001.

[298] Varadarajan, Siddharth (2001), "Reckless Rhetoric: Tanks No Answer to Terrorism", *The Times of India*, New Delhi, 27 December 2001.

breach of resolution 1373 of UN.[299] The resolution makes it mandatory for countries to take legal action against terrorist groups in their jurisdiction.

While analysing the diplomatic steps which the Vajpayee government has taken, the article further said that the problem with the diplomatic measures against Pakistan is that the government primarily aimed at "drawing the US in as enforcer". The article cautioned that certain other diplomatic measures which were being contemplated such as "abrogating the Indus Waters Treaty are so dramatic that they will establish a point of no return after which any semblance of bilateral normality will be impossible to establish without any third power intervention. Thus, this step would further kill the Iran gas pipeline project for all the time to come."[300]

Theme 3: To Put Pressure on Pakistan

India's diplomatic relations with Pakistan had reached a new low after the December 13, 2001 terrorist attack on Parliament as India had withdrawn its High Commissioner from Islamabad and decided to terminate the Amritsar-Lahore Samjhauta Express as well as the bus service between Delhi and Lahore. *The Telegraph,* in an article on December 22, 2001, mentioned that India had sent a warning to Pakistan by recalling the High Commissioner to Islamabad and that the absence of action by President Pervez Musharraf on terrorist outfits was pushing the situation in South Asia towards a flashpoint. The article mentioned that "this was only the second time when India had decided to downgrade its diplomatic relations with Pakistan. It said the first was during the 1965 war. During the 1971 war, the two countries had temporarily closed down their missions. Along with the decision to recall Vijay Nambiar,

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[299] According to "the terms of the text, the Council decided that all States should prevent and suppress the financing of terrorism, as well as criminalize the wilful provision or collection of funds for such acts. The funds, financial assets and economic resources of those who commit or attempt to commit terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts and of persons and entities acting on behalf of terrorists should also be frozen without delay. The Council also decided that States should prohibit their nationals or persons or entities in their territories from making funds, financial assets, economic resources, financial or other related services available to persons who commit or attempt to commit, facilitate or participate in the commission of terrorist acts. States should also refrain from providing any form of support to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts; take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts; deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, commit terrorist acts and provide safe havens as well." Source: *UNSC (2001), *Security Council Unanimously Adopts Wide Ranging Anti-Terrorism Resolution; Calls for Suppressing Financing, Improving International Cooperation,* 4385th Meeting, [Online: Web], Accessed 30 June 2017, URL: https://www.un.org/press/en/2001/sc7158.doc.htm.

[300] Varadarajan, Siddharth (2001), "Reckless Rhetoric: Tanks No Answer to Terrorism", *The Times of India*, New Delhi, 27 December 2001.

India terminated the highly symbolic Delhi-Lahore bus service opened by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in 1999, and the Samjhauta Express — the only rail link between the two nations. Both services will stop from January 1 [2001]."[301]

The newspapers highlighted that it is significant to put pressure on Islamabad to bring down terror groups which are working against India. From the next day onwards, New Delhi had asked Islamabad to act immediately against the LeT and JeM and media had clearly put across this view through its articles and editorials. As *The Hindu,* in the editorial, stated that "The country's intelligence agencies and investigative authorities seem to have already achieved a significant breakthrough in tracing a politically motivated terrorist attack, which was bravely aborted outside Parliament House in New Delhi on December 13, [2001], to the JeM and the LeT, which freely operate impunity from Pakistani territory. Required as an immediate follow up is a well-conceived blue print of diplomacy that can also be backed by a reasonably fool-proof case against the Pakistan encouraged terrorist organisation. Instead Mr. Advani is setting out the nation's priorities in a bellicose fashion that does little justice to the sophistication and maturity of the political attitudes of the Indian people. This is not the time for any cliché driven political sabre rattling against the genesis of Pakistan as a "theocratic" state and, that too, in the bygone context of an indefensible two nation theory."[302] To put pressure on Pakistan, *The Hindustan Times'* article suggested that apart from waging economic war, India must take decisive covert action against Pakistan. The article said: "despite its strong anti Castro rhetoric, the US has generally avoided any direct military action against Cuba which it was, in the past, accused of sponsoring of terrorism and insurgence in Latin America... The need for the hour is a counter proxy war doctrine incorporating its political, diplomatic, economic and covert components and its implementation in determined and consistent manner. The results would not come dramatically but slowly and almost imperceptibly."[303]

The Telegraph on December 25, 2001 in its editorial wrote, "It is important for India to continue to put maximum pressure on Islamabad to clamp down on organizations spreading

[301] Sharma, Pranay and Bakhtiar, Idrees (2001), "Delhi Drops Diplomatic Bomb", *The Telegraph*, Kolkata, 22 December 2001.

[302] Editorial (2001), "Stepping Up International Pressure on Pakistan", *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 19 December 2001.

[303] Raman, B. (2001), "Proxy War, Indian Style", *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, 31 December 2001.

terror in India, its policies should be carefully calibrated and linked to the response of Pakistan and the international community."[304] The editorial further added: "New Delhi also needs to step up the diplomatic pressure. While it is necessary for Mr Atal Bihari Vajpayee to attend the forthcoming Kathmandu summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation to further cement its relationship with the smaller countries of south Asia, it is equally vital that there is no truck with Mr Musharraf or members of his delegation. It is essential to realise that much of the diplomatic leverage that India enjoys today could be lost if India undertook a military offensive against Pakistan. Only if the US is unwilling to put pressure on Pakistan even after the war against al Qaida is over should New Delhi think in terms of exercising the military option."[305] As US had been supportive to India, the European Union also had lent its voice in favour of India. *The Telegraph* in its article stated, "The EU, which is offering financial support to Pakistan, issued a statement calling for "rapid and firm action" against terrorists by Islamabad. It argued that Islamabad should fulfil its role as part of the anti-terror coalition by acting "particularly against those terrorists based in Pakistan" and working against India."[306]

The Hindustan Times in another editorial titled on December 24, 2001 mentioned that it is doubtful whether Pakistan will understand the diplomatic measures or not. It stated: "New Delhi's decision to pull out its High Commissioner from Islamabad had come in the wake of the government's assertion that it would explore diplomatic and other avenues to carry home the message to the Pakistani government about the need to act against terrorist outfits operating from its soil."[307] The editorial further stated that "Pakistan has never been too eager to develop the people to people contacts between the two countries, and at one point had even created difficulties in the way of Pakistanis seeking visas to visit this country (India). It is therefore doubtful if Islamabad will find much complain about these measures beyond the fine print of diplomatic language."[308] Also, *The Telegraph* had carried another titled "US Echoes India, Pak Echoes US" by K.P. Nayar on December 27, 2001 which stated that the

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[304] Editorial (2001), "The Last Resort", *The Telegraph*, Kolkata, 25 December 2001.

[305] *Ibid*.

[306] Sharma, Pranay (2001), "Donor Pressure on Pervez", *The Telegraph*, Kolkata, 24 December 2001.

[307] Editorial (2001), "Terminating Terror" *The Hindustan Times,* New Delhi, 24 December 2001.

[308] *Ibid.*

US has accepted "India's contention that terrorist organisations based in Pakistan were responsible for the attack on Parliament on December 13, 2001."[309]

Theme 4: Coverage of S.A.R. Geelani's Role in the Attack

It was fascinating to notice media's relentless coverage of S.A.R. Geelani's role in the attack. Soon after his arrest, the leading dailies started reporting on Geelani's role in the attack with minute details within two to three days. *The Hindu* carried an article titled "Professor guided the *'fidayeen'*" in which the daily wrote about his background. The article mentioned that during interrogation, Geelani had disclosed that he knew about the conspiracy since the day the attack was planned. *The Hindu* had quoted the sources which said, "Intelligence agencies had been tapping Geelani's telephone for some time as he had contacts in Pakistan. Geelani had revealed that he became part of the conspiracy due to his ideological leanings. He was closely related to the main Jaish-e-Mohammad co-ordinator in Delhi, Mohammad Afzal, and his cousin, Shaukat Hussain Guru, who have also been arrested. He also knew the terrorists who had come to the Capital to execute the plan."[310]

The Hindustan Times' article titled "Don Lectured on Terror in Free Time" on December 17, 2001 was written after taking the interview of Principal of the Zakir Hussain College where Geelani used to teach. In the article, the Principal had said positive things about Geelani. For instance, "mixed around as any other professor", "students liked him", "have also not heard any colleague complain about his behaviour" and "there was nothing extraordinary in his character".[311] This has given an image of a good teacher. But, the article had the picture of Geelani and Afzal with captions attached to it which called Geelani "The Ideologue and Guru as "The mastermind" of attacks. Also, its headline was taken from the end most lines of the article, which stated: "in his free time, behind closed doors, either at his house or at Shaukat Hussain's, another suspect to be arrested, he took and gave lessons on terrorism".[312]

The same newspaper had carried another story the same day titled "Hunt for Teacher's Pet in Jubilee Hall" which had explored Geelani's global contacts. The author had mentioned that

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[309] Nayar, K.P. (2001), "US Echoes India, Pak Echoes US", *The Telegraph,* Kolkata, 27 December 2001.

[310] Pandey, Devesh K. (2001), "Professor Guided the 'Fidayeen'", *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 17 December 2001.

[311] Patranobis, Sutirtho (2001), "Don Lectured on Terror in Free Time", *The Hindustan Times,* New Delhi, 17 December 2001.

[312] *Ibid.*

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"a Jordanian doctoral student of Delhi University in Astrophysics knew Geelani. He reported that both had spent long hours together, lengthy phone calls were made to West Asia from booths located in the Delhi University campus".[313] Also, the author had mentioned certain points in the box which was titled as "Professor's Proceedings" in which it stated: "Geelani had recently purchased a house for Rs. 22 lakhs in West Delhi, Delhi police are investigating how he came upon such a windfall, the terrorism who planned the operation were flush with funds, before carrying out the attack on Parliament, the terrorists had sent back to Srinagar Rs. 10 lakhs of unspent money and a laptop."[314]

Also, *The Times of India* carried a report which mentioned that "Geelani was part of the relief team sent to this district bordering Pakistan by SIMI. Instead of engaging in relief works, the SIMI activists allegedly tried to fan communal feelings among the victims and organised protest marches and demonstrations."[315] The idea behind doing such story was to link Geelani with the banned SIMI organisation. The daily had carried another article on December 22, 2001, titled "Terror suspects were zealots cloaked in western attire" which said that all the five terrorists were a "close-knit, highly motivated and fanatically religious group."[316] The article was written after Afzal Guru's meet with the journalists. The article quoted Guru as saying, "They used to pray regularly and were always focussed on the attack. They spent much time in studying the photographs of Parliament House they had downloaded from various television channels."[317] While giving more details that the suicide squad used to go over there for the strategy, the article wrote what Guru had mentioned to reporters. He said, "They used to hide behind the facade of a westernised lifestyle. They would wear western clothes. The idea was to mislead any intelligence agencies that were onto them."[318]

"Pak uses fanatics to spread terror in India" was written by Neetu Sharma of *The Hindustan Times* in which it was mentioned had he (Afzal) not been caught, he would have worked to inflict another strike against India. The same day, under the title "Terror Suspect Frequent

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[313] Sharma, Rajnish (2001), "Hunt for Teacher's Pet in Jubilee Hall", *The Hindustan Times,* New Delhi, 17 December 2001.

[314] *Ibid.*

[315] TNN (2001), "Police Probing Whether Gilani Was in Bhuj After the Earthquake", *The Times of India*, New Delhi, 19 December 2001.

[316] *Ibid.*

[317] *Ibid.*

[318] *Ibid.*

Visitor to Pak Mission", Swati Chaturvedi of *The Hindustan Times* on December 21, 2001 wrote that Geelani had visited the High Commission of Pakistan on two different social gatherings: at an *iftaar* party and a national day celebrations. Nirmalangshu Mukherji while analysing Chaturvedi's story stated that she failed to mention whether officials of the Indian government, politicians, film stars, journalists and prominent citizens of Delhi, including some from the academia, also attended these functions. When contacted by the paper, a senior officer of the High Commission had reportedly said, "We will have to go over our records. Since a large number of people are invited to these occasions. As for Geelani in particular, "we do not know him and Pakistan has nothing to do with him." (Mukherji 2005: 20) After further analysis, Mukherji said that Chaturvedi found these responses non-committal; she also reported that the security sources didn't buy this argument. In the very next paragraph, she reverted to Geelani's admission that he was in touch with militants of the JeM in Pakistan. (*ibid.*) *The Indian Express's* article on December 16, 2001 mentioned: "London link: Police Question DU lecturer" by Atir Khan in which he quoted the sources which said "S.A.R Geelani is alleged to be the main coordinator for the entire operation."[319]

However, *The Telegraph* had carried a simple report about Geelani. Its article titled "Teacher Twist Strikes Terror" had given profile and background of S.A.R. Geelani. It said, "frisson of fear runs through Delhi's academia as it contends with the arrest of one of its own — lecturer Abdul Rehman Geelani — on charges of having been among the conspirators who planned the attack on Parliament on 13/12."[320] The article also pointed out that since Geelani's arrest, "his colleagues and acquaintances are afraid to go on record about him."[321]

All the dailies had quoted their own sources for doing the story on Geelani, and as pointed out by Nirmalangshu Mukherji, the media coverage reached at a new high the day when the then ACP Rajbir Singh who was the incharge of the case had organised a press meet. Later, a high profile national defence committee was formed for Geelani with Rajani Kothari as the chairperson. Several teachers from the Delhi University and Jawaharlal Nehru University signed a petition to the Chief Justice of India pointing out problems with the trial and asking for the fair trial, especially for Geelani. After a massive campaigning for him, the trial began

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[319] Khan, Atir (2001), "London Link: Police Question DU Lecturer", *The Indian Express*, New Delhi, 16 December 2001.

[320] Dutta, Sujan (2001), "Teacher Twist Strikes Terror", *The Telegraph*, Kolkata, New Delhi, 17 December 2001.

[321] *Ibid.*

to appear in few dailies, mainly the Indian Express and the Hindu. In comparison to Geelani, trials of Afzal's and Shaukat's remained unexamined by the media. Also, in certain articles, an attempt was made to keep the Geelani's case separate from the Afzal's and Shaukat's. (Mukherji 2005: 18-26)

After the court confirmed the death sentences of Afzal Guru and it acquitted Geelani, most of the newspapers had welcomed the court's decision. In an editorial "Justice done" in *The Hindu* on October 31, 2003, the paper wrote: "the judgement was a welcome reflection of the strength of the judicial process, particularly its capacity for self correction."[322] According to *The Indian Express*, the judgement stated the eternal quest for justice.

Theme 5: On Indo-Pak Relationship

Apart from reporting and analysing other themes, the Indian print media had discussed the relationship between India and Pakistan. Prem Shankar Jha in an op-ed article in *The Hindustan Times* on December 21, 2001, suggested that India should give Pervez Musharraf one more chance to set Pakistan's chaotic house in order. He said: "If there is any lesson India needs to learn from this bitter experience – by no means its first – it is the importance of being strong... There are no friends in International Relations. A country that runs a fiscal deficit of 11 per cent of the GDP and starves its armed forces of the funds it needs to maintain its military capability and make the expensive transition to modern electronic warfare and cannot expect its sovereignty to remain unchallenged."[323] He further said that "India has the same right to retaliate against Pakistan for sheltering and abetting those responsible for the December 13 [2001]... The attack on the Parliament was meticulously planned. The terrorists had observed how MPs went in and out of the compound, the behaviour of the guards, the number of people in the cars, the number of bodyguards and the clothes they wore, the times when attendance was highest and the times when senior ministers were most likely to be present."[324] He in another op-ed on January 4, 2002, had also mentioned that "India should be ready to wage war if Pakistan does not stop cross border terrorism."[325]

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[322] Editorial (2003), "Justice Done", *The Hindu,* New Delhi, 31 October 2003.

[323] Jha, Prem Shankar (2001), "Hold Your Guns", *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, 21 December 2001.

[324] *Ibid.*

[325] Jha, Prem Shankar (2002), "Apply Relentless Pressure", *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, 4 January 2002.

There were critics who wanted Pakistan to be declared as a rogue state. Pankaj Vohra in *The Hindustan Times* on December 23, 2001 had mentioned that "Pakistan has been fermenting trouble in one form or the other in this country for the past twenty years and there is a very strong case for declaring Pakistan as a rogue state."[326] Talking tough on Indo-Pak relations post attacks, G Parthasarthy also maintained in *The Hindustan Times* on December 23, 2001 that "if it does seem clear to us that General Pervez Musharraf is not going to put an end to his policy to bleed India, should we not consider measures to deprive Pakistanis of the water they need to quench their thirst and grow their crops? Should we not seriously consider whether it is necessary for us to adhere to the provisions of the Indus Water treaty of 1958?"[327] He added that there are people who say that India should not violate such treaty commitments, but then extraordinary circumstances demand extraordinary responses.

Unlike *The Hindustan Times'* articles, *The Telegraph's* editorial on December 28, 2001 titled "Sign of Change'" while getting positive about the future relationship between India and Pakistan said: "There is growing evidence that Pakistan's President, General Pervez Musharraf, may be willing to act against terrorist organizations responsible for acts of violence in India. If indeed Mr Musharraf is going to be steadfast in this endeavour, New Delhi must resist upping the ante even while it continues to sustain maximum diplomatic pressure on Pakistan's military regime."[328] The editorial stated that given the developments, India needs to monitor developments in Pakistan and also, "if indeed these early signs of a change translate into a decisive policy shift, New Delhi must be willing to give Mr Musharraf the space to act against extremism without being burdened by fears of a possible war against India. However, if he is merely making cosmetic changes for tactical reasons, New Delhi must be prepared to act decisively. In any case, it is critical that India sustain high-level contact with the powers that have influence and leverage within Pakistan, particularly the US. The battle against terrorism may have to be fought alone, but the international community must be made constantly aware of India's concerns and compulsions."[329]

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[326] Vohra, Pankaj (2001), "Enough is Enough: Declare Pakistan a Rogue State", *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, 23 December 2001.

[327] Parthasarthy, G. (2001), "Price for Supporting Terrorism", *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, 23 December 2001.

[328] Editorial (2001), "Sign of Change", *The Telegraph,* Kolkata, 28 December 2001.

[329] *Ibid.*

On December 14, 2001, Brahma Chellaney explained in *The Hindustan Times* that New Delhi is paying for its "soft response of terror" in which he mentioned that the "terrorist assault on the symbol of Indian democracy at a time when extremists are on the run elsewhere in the world reflects the widely perceived softness of the Indian state and the costs it is paying for its compromises with the forces of terrorism... India's talk tough but act-act meek approach has emboldened transnational terrorists, who pick their targets carefully to get maximum propaganda value and show that they can strike anywhere, anytime."[330] Further, western policy makers should be concerned over the Parliament attack because "India is a sort of laboratory where major acts of terror are first tried out before being replicated in the West. The logic is that if India, the world's largest democracy, can be shaken, so can other democracies."[331]

Every newspaper had set its own agenda in terms of highlighting a particular issue. For instance, *The Telegraph* had given importance to America's statements on incidents of terror. The daily, throughout the month in its coverage, maintained that India needs to make aware the world community of New Delhi's concern vis-a-vis Pakistan. The paper highlighted that as the US had gone through the terror attack, it was talking tough to Pakistan. Earlier American statements were stuck only till criticism of such acts. *The Telegraph* on December 14, 2001 carried the story: "The US today went well beyond any previous condemnations of terrorist attacks against India when state department spokesman Richard Boucher said those responsible (for the attack on Parliament) should be identified and quickly brought to justice."[332] The next day, as India was building the case against Pakistan, the newspaper had hoped that the US would exert enough pressure on Islamabad to give up its policy of cross-border terrorism.[333]

The daily had closely followed America's statements on Parliament attacks as on December 16, 2001 it carried a headline "US Sends Crackdown Message to Pak" which stated: "The Bush administration has asked Pakistan to arrest leaders of the Lashkar-e-Toiba and the

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[330] Chellaney, Brahma (2001), "India Paying For Its Soft Response of Terror", *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, 14 December 2001.

[331] *Ibid.*

[332] Nayar, K.P. (2001), "US Speaks Sept 11 Language", *The Telegraph*, Kolkata, 14 December 2001.

[333] Sharma, Pranay (2001), "Wait for Signal from Washington", *The Telegraph*, Kolkata, 15 December 2001.

Jaish-e- Mohammed to assuage Indian anger on the attack on Parliament. Sources privy to the administration's response to the terrorist outrage said General Pervez Musharraf is being prodded by Washington through diplomatic channels."[334] As the USA had given positive response to India in putting pressure on Pakistan to take actions against the terrorist groups, the daily carried an article, "Delhi Pins Hope on US Promise" which stated that the Bush administration has assured New Delhi that it is trying to persuade President Pervez Musharraf to act against leaders of the Jaish-e-Mohammad and the Lashkar-e-Toiba — the two terrorist outfits India accuses of being behind last week's attack on Parliament."[335] In another article, the daily pointed out that India needed to send two messages to US. "First, if 9/11 (as Americans call it) determined the United States of America's policing role in the new millennium, the Srinagar and New Delhi attacks will be the touchstone of India's new relationship with the US. Second, India will apply George Bush's own principle, 'If you do business with terrorists — you will not do business with the US', to Pakistan."[336] *The Hindu* had also carried articles and editorials that were similar to the articles of *The Telegraph* but the number of articles was not as much as was splashed in *The Telegraph*. Also, *The Times of India* in its several reports mentioned that UK supports India's stand. One of its articles on December 21, 2001 titled "UK supports India's stand on JeM, Lashkar" said, "Unlike the US, Britain supports India's demand that Pakistan hand over the terrorists responsible for Parliament attacks."[337]

Similarly, *The Hindu* had appreciated the role of the security guards who had protected the country from a major disaster. Although there was a lack of security at Parliament complex, the daily had lauded the role that the security personnel had played during the hour of need and had averted a major attack. In the editorial on December 18, 2001 titled "Unravelling the Conspiracy", it mentioned that a couple of things got clearer just three days after the attacks. It said that the terrorists had failed to wreak even more damage partly because of sheer fortuitousness. It is true that the alertness and bravery of the security personnel, who deserved nothing but unstinted praise, had played an extremely important role in limiting the damage.

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[334] Nayar, K.P. (2001), "US Sends Crackdown Message to Pak" *The Telegraph,* Kolkata, 16 December 2001.

[335] Sharma, Pranay and Guha, Seema (2001), "Delhi Pins Hope on US Promise", *The Telegraph*, Kolkata, 20 December 2001.

[336] Ray, Sunanda K. Datta (2001), "War by Other Means", *The Telegraph*, Kolkata, 22 December 2001.

[337] Mishra,Bisheshwar (2001), "UK Supports India's Stand on JeM, Lashkar", *The Times of India,* New Delhi, 21 December 2001.

The Telegraph had also lauded the security men's role. It stated, "Thursday's attack within Parliament precincts was successfully repulsed by the police guard that protects the chambers of Indian democracy. And this has been the trend since the last of the two successful suicide attacks. That was in May, 1991, when Rajiv Gandhi fell to a human bomb attack. His mother's assassination was the first successful suicide attack. Since 1991, no suicide mission has been able to succeed in its objectives. To recapitulate, there has been no damage inflicted on the Red Fort (December, 2000), Srinagar airport (February, 2001), or even the Jammu and Kashmir state assembly from last October's car bomb."[338]

Not just this, there were other minor themes also. For instance, *The Telegraph* wrote that an unexpected sense of solidarity was seen in Parliament at the time of crises.[339] Similarly *The Hindu* carried an article where The Lok Sabha and The Rajya Sabha had condemned the terrorist attack and the members of the Parliament had resolved to protect the sovereignty and integrity of the country.

Also, in an article, *The Telegraph* had brought in notice the condition of the equipment of the armed forces. In its article "Get the Arms for the Man" on January 8, 2002, Brijesh D. Jayal wrote, "As war cries once again reverberate across the sub continent, one cannot help but ponder over the state of preparedness of our armed forces. Not in respect of their training, determination or indeed morale, as historically these have never been found wanting, but their state of re-equipment and modernization. Clearly the then chief was bemoaning the cumulative effect of the Bofors syndrome, which had left modernization and military procurement in the armed forces in a state of perpetual paralysis."[340]

On the other hand, Pakistani newspapers stated that war hysteria was building up to a frenzy, fuelled by the government egging on the populace rather than trying to rein them. Vir Sanghvi wrote in *The Hindustan Times* on December 23, 2001 that "even if the terrorists themselves go to TV and say that they are backed by Pakistan, these confessions will be dismissed by Pakistan as being secured through torture."[341] Ayaz Amir wrote in *The Indian*

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[338] Singh, Manvendra (2001), "Shaking the Symbols", *The Telegraph,* Kolkata, 18 December 2001.

[339] Ramaseshan, Radhika (2001), "Attack Sparks Parliamentary Unity", *The Telegraph*, Kolkata, 18 December 2001.

[340] Jayal, Brijesh D. (2002), "Get the Arms for the Man", *The Telegraph*, Kolkata, 8 January 2002.

[341] Sanghvi, Vir (2001), "Are We the Soft State", *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, 23 December 2001.

Express on December 22, 2001 that "Pakistan's intelligence outfits would have to be insane to be involved in the attack on Parliament. But those of us in Pakistan who suggest that India itself could be behind the attack are being unfair. There is nothing more absurd than conspiracy theories stretched beyond the limits of credulity. But this is the spirit of India-Pakistan relations, tending to believe the worst of each other."[342] Najam Sethi in *The Indian Express* on December 25, 2001 wrote that "Pakistan has been pushed to the brink, only a policy overhaul can stop it from free falling."[343] Moreover, *The Nation* in an editorial titled "India's rebuff" on December 22, 2001 stated that "India's surprising move to recall its HC from Islamabad and to snap the Lahore-Delhi bus and train services is a quantum jump, apparently designed to browbeat Pakistan into acceding to its demands for the banning of two Pakistan-based terrorist outfits, represents the greatest threats to peace in South Asia."[344]

4.5 Electronic Media and the Parliament Attack

As the news of the attack broke mid-morning, a shocked and anxious nation turned to news channels. As Parliament was in session, most television channels had their cameras in place, and were able to capture some of the dramatic footages. The hassled people were running for some cover, security men were taking positions and in the back ground, there was a spine chillingly sense of gunfire.

During the initial few hours after the attack, most viewers were confused as to the sequence of events. All the channels were giving bits of information as and when they got them, but the full scenario remained hazy the first day.

Indian news channels such as *Star News*, *Aaj Tak*, *DD News* and the English language channels like *NDTV*, all dispensed with their regular schedules and instead went live. All the channels had concentrated on getting the live updates from correspondents stationed outside and inside the Parliament. The channels had given minute to minute account of what was happening. As Nandita Haskar wrote: "No one questioned the government's story that the attack was the handiwork of Pakistan-based terrorists belonging to the Lashkar-e-Toiba and

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[342] Amir, Ayaz (2001), "Just the Sub-continent's Way of Doing Diplomacy", *The Indian Express,* New Delhi, 22 December 2001.

[343] Sethi, Najam (2001), "A Nation on the Edge: About, Retry, Escape", *The Indian Express*, New Delhi, 25 December 2001.

[344] Editorial (2001), "India's Rebuff", *The Nation,* Islamabad, 22 December 2001.

Jaish e-Mohammad. The media, in a willing suspension of disbelief, published whatever the police and investigating agencies put on." (Haskar 2013: *n.d.*)

The Prime Mnister's address to the nation was shown on all the channels and Home Minister Advani's press conference came in for discussion and analysis. The studio guests, the experts on terrorism, retired army men and police officers did show up on the channels. However, the public broadcaster *DD* failed to broadcast the events. *Aaj Tak* news channel had scooped the events live outside the gate but *DD's* news channel team which had been given the digitally satellite news gathering system to cover the events live outside parliament premises failed to get its act together. On *DD* news channel, which was watched by majority of the population, regular sponsored programme continued with the news flash appearing at 1230 pm only. *DD* officials were quoted in *The Indian Express* as saying that the "correspondents could not reach the scene of action unlike *Aaj Tak* which had its broadcasting van in place with cameras and half a dozen correspondents taking their position soon after the attack."[345] Poonam Saxena mentioned that "the first time things got a little clearer when Prabhu Chawla (who was in *Sansad Bhawan*) came on air on *Aaj Tak* and along with Mrityunjay Kumar Jha, explained everything in perfect detail with the aid of some excellent graphics."[346] She wrote in *The Hindustan Times* that *Aaj Tak* was also the first channel to get senior politics like L.K. Advani on air. Saxena while analysing the role of anchors, stated, "Newshour" (on *Star News*) on Thursday (December 13, 2001) night struck exactly the right pitch, echoing the mood of the nation when Rajdeep Sardesai and Arnab Goswami had opened the bulletin by saying that the attack on Parliament had failed and ended by saying that it was a victorious day for the Indian democracy. Both the anchors' job was appreciated by many for questioning their studio guests who were Kamal Nath, Pramod Mahajan and Somnath Chatterjee. Even as Nath and Chhaterjee went into full flow about the shocking security lapse, they were cut short by the anchors, and Sardesai pointed out that the opposition parties were using to score points against the government.[347]

Like September 11, 2001, the December 13, 2001 terror strike was played out in front of the television cameras. The site for the television crews had been placed some 60 metres away from the scene of the action. TV had played a major role in reporting both September 11,

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[345] "DD Loses Out to Private Channels Yet Again", *The Indian Express*, New Delhi, 15 December 2001.

[346] Saxena, Poonam (2001), "Indian TV Audience Get Their September 11", *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, 14 December 2001.

[347] Saxena, Poonam (2001), "Terror on Home Ground", *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, 16 December 2001.

2001 and December 13, 2001 incidents. Manoj Joshi while commenting on the role of media stated that there was a commonality of sorts in the manner in which the media, especially the electronic media had shaped the discourse. This was best illustrated by the case of the Bombay blasts of 1993 that took place before the era of 24-hour private news channel and the December 2001 attack on Parliament. In the former case, most people got the import of the news over a 12-hour period through their morning dailies, while in the latter case, the event was actually carried live because it happened in front of the television position in Parliament. (*cited in*Veer and Munshi 2004: 134)

On all the news channels, the excitement of the events seemed to be taking over as reporters struggled to temper their zeal with the correct information. But all the Indian news channels struck the same chord and mirrored the mood of the nation. Just before the Special Court Judgement was to be delivered, the Zee television network, repeatedly telecast a film on the Parliament attack case, entitled "December 13". The film was not only a re-enactment of the chargesheet, Nandita Haskar wrote, "it in fact made allegations against Geelani that went far beyond the prosecution case. For example, the film portrayed Geelani as the mastermind and showed scenes of him talking to the five dead attackers and planning the attack." (Haskar 2013: *n.d.*) Haskar also mentioned that the film was shown to the Prime Minister and then the Home Minister and the media recorded their approval of the film. Although the defence secured a stay from the High Court restraining the broadcast of the film, the Supreme Court of India vacated it on the ground that judges could not be influenced. *(ibid.)*

The foreign news channels, *BBC* and *CNN*, had given wall to wall coverage of the 9/11 attack but they treated the New Delhi attack as just another story and soon it became the second lead story for them and after two days, the attack on Indian Parliament did disappear completely from their bulletins. The terrorists responsible for the attack were termed as "gunmen" by the *BBC* and "intruders" by the *CNN*. On the other hand, Pakistani news channel, *PTV* reported the news of the attack on Parliament by "armed intruders" and left it at that even as General Pervez Musharraf had condemned the attack. However, as the diplomatic ties between both the nations turned to a new low, in Pakistan, the Indian channels were banned. The Pakistan's government on December 29, 2001 (a Saturday) directed its Cable TV operators in the country to stop relaying broadcasts of all the Indian satellite TV channels including the *STAR TV* network, on the ground that they indulged in propagating injurious material against the security of Pakistan. An official press release issued in Islamabad said Indian channels were propagating injurious material against the security of Pakistan. Then relay by cable TV

operators was in violation of the conditions of the license issued by Pakistan TV authorities, it said.*[348]*

On electronic channel's role, Brijesh D. Jayal in an op-ed in *The Telegraph* on December 26, 2001, said: "Ever since the aborted terrorist assault on the Indian Parliament, there has been abundant speculation on the likely Indian response. Thanks to the electronic media there is no dearth of analysts and panellists who have endlessly been advising on what should be the Indian government's reaction."[349] While mentioning about the role of newspapers and electronic media, Arundhati Roy wrote the newspapers had carried details descriptions of "an entirely imaginary, non-existent confessions. The Delhi Police portrayed Geelani as the evil mastermind of the Indian end of the conspiracy. Its scriptwriters orchestrated a hateful propaganda campaign against him, which was eagerly amplified and embellished by a hyper-nationalistic, thrill seeking media." (Roy 2013: *n.d.)*

In a nutshell, as it was an attack on the Parliament, the newspapers started carrying the reports as much as they could gather from the different sources. But soon, after almost two weeks, the numbers of articles got lesser. All the dailies had focused on the above mentioned themes but overall, *The Indian Express* had maintained that India will soon return to normalcy and it itself has been a welcome gesture. On the other hand, the first day coverage of *The Hindustan Times* was more elaborate than any other daily. Both *The Hindustan Times* and *The Indian Express* stressed that situation remained tensed and any small act of provocation could snowball into a full scale war. Moreover, *The Telegraph* stressed on US' response to the terror attacks. The editorials shrank after initial two days in *The Telegraph*. It also had given a lot of coverage to issues relating to security challenges and *The Hindu* had carried a lot of official reports.

Also, in electronic media, there was no dearth of analysts who could discuss on Indo-Pak relations and suggest the government on how India should react on the issue. The options that the panellists had suggested were as varied as the political or strategic giving pictorial warnings in the dailies and by writing that army is inching more towards the border. For instance, *The Times of India* on December 21, 2001 carried a picture of army tanks. However, it carried a caption: "An army tank moves to the Indo-Pak border in Amritsar. Army has been

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[348] "Indian Channels Banned", *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, 30 December 2001.

[349] Jayal, Brijesh D. (2001) "Open to Evil Eyes", *The Telegraph*, Kolkata, 26 December 2001.

put on high alert following terrorist attack on Parliament House." The pictorial warning was enough to put pressure and to build war hysteria among public. As Varadarajan suggested that "Media speculation about weapons deployment is further ratcheting up the military temperature, with each side responding in kind to unconfirmed reports about the other already having acted."[350] The Government of India had come up with the Kargil Review Committee which brought up the inadequacies in the security system of India. But the politicians, the media persons and academia were least interested in talking about it.[351]

Moreover, the landscape of international politics changed after the 9/11 attacks in America. The US had supported India in its attempt to bring in notice the terrorists activities which were emerging from Pakistan. The relationship between India and Pakistan had always been strained especially after the Kargil War, then the attack in Jammu and Kashmir's Assembly, but the December 13, 2001 attack on Indian Parliament had reached the relationship to a nadir.

The terrorists who struck at Parliament in a broad day light when the Parliament was in session were successful in breaking the security at the most important zone. They were also successful in creating deaths, panic and fear among people but at the same time, it had generated public anger and outrage in the country. C. Uday Bhaskar wrote, "the incessant audio-visual media coverage, occasionally excitable, beginning with the actual attack and the current evidence pointing to terrorist groups liked to the Pakistani ISI has added the heat."[352] But by the end of 2001, New Delhi's frustration in its relation with Pakistan had reached at a point where it had to brought its High Commissioner back.

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[350] Varadarajan, Siddharth (2001), "Reckless Rhetoric: Tanks No Answer to Terrorism", *The Times of India*, New Delhi, 27 December 2001.

[351] Subrahmanyam, K. (2001), "Security Faultlines: Our MPs Need 'House' Training", *The Times of India,* New Delhi, 15 December 2001.

[352] Bhaskar, C. Uday (2001), "Restraint, Not Revenge: December 13 as Test of Maturity", *The Times of India*, New Delhi, 22 December 2001.

CHAPTER -5

MEDIA AND THE 26/11 MUMBAI TERROR ATTACKS IN 2008

The 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack is one of the most horrific as well as audacious acts of terrorism that has ever occurred in India. The 60-hour-long multiple strikes that started on the night of November 26, 2008 lasted till November 29, 2008 across Mumbai. The attack on Mumbai, which is one of the busiest metropolitan cities and known as India's financial capital, had left at least 166 civilians and security personnel dead (including foreign nationals) and 304 people injured.[353] Subsequent investigations revealed the attack was carried out by Pakistan-based terrorists and the attacks inflicted fresh strains on the already troubled Indo-Pak relationship.

Before discussing the actual attack, it is also pertinent to note that it was not the first time that Mumbai had witnessed a terrorist attack. Several attacks had occurred in the city even in the past. For instance, in December 1992, the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya was destroyed, which resulted in a massive Muslim backlash in Mumbai leading to communal riots in the city. The killing of several Hindus in an area called Dongri, South Mumbai, resulted in counter violence by the Hindus in the city. The subsequent massacre of Muslims in Mumbai led to the 1993 bombings carried out by the D-Company in retaliation which claimed hundreds of lives. These bombings occurred at different locations in Mumbai including the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE).[354] Moreover, in July 2006, Mumbai was again attacked when a series of bombs exploded in the local commuter trains during the peak hours of the evening, which claimed lives of more than 200 people. But the pattern of 2008 Mumbai terror strike was different from the above mentioned attacks.

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[353] Duraphe, Ashok T. (2009), "Final Report: Mumbai Terror Attack Cases 26th November 2008", *South Asian Terrorism Portal,* [Online: web], Accessed 25 November 2015, URL: http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/document/papers/kasab-chargesheet.pdf.

[354] Kaur, Naunidhi (2003), "Mumbai: A Decade after Attacks", *Frontline*, New Delhi, 5-18 July 2003.

Fair, C. Christine (2009), "Antecedents and Implications of the November 2008 Lashkar e-Taiba (LeT) Attack Upon Several Targets in the Indian Mega City of Mumbai", *Rand Corporation*, [Online: web], Accessed 15 September 2016, URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2009/RAND_CT320.pdf.

After the 2006 Mumbai bombings, the terrorist attack on November 26, 2008 was probably the worst the city and even India had seen in a very long time and with this, the spiralling down of bitter relationship between India and Pakistan looked quite imminent. Just after the November 26, 2008 attack, this coordinated series of strike took the nomenclature of 26/11 with the analogy being drawn from the America's 9/11 attacks. However, there were many like B. Raman who contested calling November Mumbai terror attack as "India's 9/11" unreservedly.[355] Moreover, the distinct style of the attacks caught everybody's attention. The Mumbai attack was the "shift in tactics from suicide bombs to a commando-style military assault with small teams of highly trained, heavily armed operatives launching simultaneous, sustained attacks." (Rath 2010: 360) B. Raman while discussing the nature of Mumbai attacks said that it was neither 9/11 nor Madrid 2004 or not London 2005 attacks. He mentioned that it was a kind of an attack the world had not witnessed before and a "mix of a commando style of military special forces and terrorist attack typical of Lashkar e Taiba." (Raman 2013: *n.d.*)

Furthermore, the three day-and-night long siege drew worldwide attention because of the live unfolding nature of the attack. The Mumbai attack (now commonly known as "26/11 attack") differed from most of the attacks that had occurred in India for a number of reasons. First, the attack was so well coordinated that it could hold the hostages for nearly 60 hours. Also, there were high profile hostages at high profile places. One of the reasons for the global attention was the specific targetting of foreign nationals including Israelis in the attack. Second, the attackers used sophisticated technology and equipment for their operation and "there was constant communication between the attackers and their handlers, the global prominence of the event and the complicated ways in which television and new media technologies were enmeshed in the event's unfolding." (Kumar 2012: 534)

In the beginning, the reports were mistaken and everyone perceived the attacks to be a gang-war but later on, when the police and eyewitnesses saw the AK-47s, rifles and hand grenades, it was established to be a terror attack. It was quite prominent that the attackers had some foreknowledge about Mumbai. The Mumbai Police in its final report which was submitted to

[355] Gopal, Priyamvada (2008), "Comparing Mumbai to 9/11 Diminishes Both Tragedies", *The Guardian* [Online: web], Accessed 6 July 2017, URL: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/dec/04/india-terrorism-mumbai-terror.

Dutta, Divyangshu (2008) "26/11 Versus 9/11" *Business Standard* [Online: web], Accessed 6 July 2017, URL: http://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/devangshu-datta-26-11-versus-9-11-108120601024_1.html.

the court stated, "The military precision with which all these attacks were conducted, the commando like action, the complexity of the operation, the detailed and meticulous planning, the familiarity and dexterity in the handling of sophisticated weaponry and electronic equipment all undoubtedly and conclusively point to training by professionals in Pakistan."[356] (Duraphe 2009: 2) Initially, the officials were unclear about the number of terrorists but the sheer audacity of the attack created an impact that led the then Chief Minister of Maharashtra, Vilasrao Deshmukh to indicate that at one time there were 20-25 men, who had struck the financial capital of India. However, the Mumbai Police later confirmed that there were only 10 terrorists and after the operation was over, Deshmukh confirmed that the terrorists came by the sea during a press conference on November 30, 2008. He also mentioned that they believed that 10 terrorists had entered the Mumbai and "other than at the Taj hotel where four people entered, they broke up into groups of two and carried out the attack at six locations."[357]

Out of the 10 terrorists, who directly participated in the 60-hour long siege, nine were subsequently killed in encounters with the Police and National Security Guards (NSG) commandos and only one individual, named Ajmal Amir Kasab was captured alive.[358]

Prominent places where the terrorists attacked included two luxury hotels -- the Taj Mahal Palace hotel and the Oberoi–Trident hotel as well as the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus (CST) (earlier known as Victoria Terminus or VT), the Leopold Café in Colaba Causeway in South Mumbai (usually a crowded place mostly frequented by tourists), Chabad House (a Jewish outreach centre) that was located in the building named Nariman House. The other targets were Cama Hospital; the area around Metro Cinema; a petrol pump station near Nariman House in Colaba. Besides, two taxis were also targets of explosion in Ville Parle and Wadi Bunder. Hence, the target areas were carefully chosen and examined beforehand. After the attacks, the then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said that "external forces" were behind the attack, in a clear hint for Pakistan. He also said that the attackers had come with a "single minded determination to create havoc" in Mumbai. Moreover, he stressed that the issue

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[356] *Ibid.*

[357] Katakam, Anupama (2008), "Terrorist Takeover", *Frontline*, New Delhi, 6-19 December 2008.

[358] Duraphe, Ashok T. (2009), "Final Report: Mumbai Terror Attack Cases 26th November 2008", [Online:web], Accessed 25 November 2015, URL: http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/document/papers/kasab-chargesheet.pdf

would be taken up strongly with the neighbours that the use of their territory for "launching attacks on us will not be tolerated, and that there would be a cost if suitable measures are not taken by them." [359]

Later, the Mumbai Police in a report (Final Form/ Report (Under Section 173 Cr. P. C.) submitted to the court on February 25, 2009 stated that the main intention behind the terrorist attack was "to create unprecedented raw fear and panic in the minds of the Indian citizenry and foreign visitors to Indian soil."[360] It was also mentioned in the report that the terrorists had sent misleading messages to several news channels through e-mail and its only objective was to mislead the public and confuse the investigation agencies. The report further mentioned that while attacking, "the terrorists were in constant touch with their handlers in Pakistan. The Indian intelligence agencies were able to intercept their conversations on mobile and satellite phones as the attacks were in progress."[361] The same report by the Mumbai Police has added that Ajmal Amir Kasab, the only terrorist who was captured alive, had disclosed that "the attackers were members of Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Pakistan-based militant organisation."[362] Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) is designated as a terrorist organisation by India, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and a number of other nations. Kasab, the lone surviving terrorist was put on trial in 2009 and in 2010, he was convicted and awarded death sentence. In 2011, the Supreme Court had stayed the execution of the death sentence awarded to Kasab but later, in 2012, it upheld the decision and, later, the President had also rejected Kasab's mercy plea and he was hanged in November 2012.[363]

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[359] "Text-Prime Minister's Speech on Mumbai's Attacks", *The Reuters*, New Delhi, [Online: web], Accessed 15 May 2016, URL: http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-36741320081127.

[360] Duraphe, Ashok T. (2009), "Final Report: Mumbai Terror Attack Cases 26th November 2008", [Online:web], Accessed 25 November 2015, URL: http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/document/papers/kasab-chargesheet.pdf.

[361] *Ibid.*

[362] *Ibid.*

[363] Agencies (2012), "Ajmal Kasab Trial", *The Hindu*, New Delhi, [Online: web], Accessed 10 June 2016, URL: http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/Ajmal-Kasab-trial-%E2%80%93-Timeline/article12515678.ece.

5.1 Unfolding the Sea -Borne Terrorist Attack

The 10 Pakistani nationals, who had terrorised Mumbai sneaked into India through the shores by crossing the sea aiming high value targets across the city. The terror group started from Karachi on the cargo vessel, *Al Husaini* through the Arabian Sea and after sailing for 38 hours, they reached the high seas off Jakhau port in Gulf of Kutch where they hijacked an Indian fishing trawler, the M V Kuber, and proceeded towards Mumbai. The boat, after sailing for more than two days, was stopped four nautical miles (seven kilometres) away from the Mumbai coast, where they killed its captain, Amar Singh Solanki. On reaching the Mumbai shore, the terrorists divided themselves into four teams, one with four men for the Taj Mahal Palace hotel via Leopold Café and three with two members each. They attacked the Leopold Cafe in Colaba area on November 26, 2008. The terrorists had sprayed bullets on the premises and killed many. The terrorist attack at the railway station was to target common man but on the other hand, the attackers were aiming to kill foreigners at other places. (Rabasa et al 2009: 5)

They then moved to the rear entrance of the Taj hotel, which is only 100 metres away from Cafe Leopold. Another two-men team attacked the CST at almost the same time as the Leopold and opened fire on commuters, killing indiscriminately. On being engaged by armed Railway Protection Force (RPF), the terrorists ran out of the railway station and then they moved towards Cama & Albless Hospital, where they killed few people.[364]

The terrorists were at the hospital till about midnight, and, thereafter, they moved out. A police vehicle with an Anti-terrorist Squad (ATS) team spotted the terrorists and engaged them. In the encounter, ATS Joint Commissioner of Police Hemant Karkare, Additional Commissioner of Police Ashok Kamte and encounter specialist Vijay Salaskar were killed.[365] Moreover, the police vehicle was hijacked and driven towards Girgaum Chowpatty. One of the tyres of the vehicle got damaged and then the terrorists hijacked a Skoda (belonging to a civilian) and moved towards Chowpatty. The terrorists were intercepted by the police and in

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[364] Rabasa, Angel et al (2009), "The Lessons of Mumbai", Rand Corporation, [Online: web], Accessed 15 July 2016, URL: https://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP249.readonline.html.

[365] TNN (2008), "Three Top Cops Die on Duty", *The Times of India,* New Delhi, [Online: web], Accessed 24 July 2016, URL: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mumbai/Three-top-cops-die-on-duty/articleshow/3762023.cms.

an ensuing encounter, one terrorist got killed and another by the name of Ajmal Amir Kasab was captured.[366]

Another team headed towards the Nariman House. The building had six floors and here the main intention was to take hostages. The terrorists threw grenades at a petrol pump near the complex, opened fire and entered the lobby and started shooting indiscriminately. They took hostages and later killed many of them. This team accounted for nearly eight deaths, including those of Rabbi Gavriel Holtzberg from Brooklyn and his wife Rivka from Israel. (Bhonsle 2009: 21) Another team reached the Trident Oberoi Hotel. They placed a bomb near the entrance, which was later defused by the Mumbai Police Bomb Disposal Team. The terrorists took hostages, moving from room to room and started firing indiscriminately but Trident was cleared by the NSG before the Taj Hotel. The group which attacked the Leopold Cafe made their way to the Taj Hotel. They moved through the grounds to the hotel and then moved to the upper floors, setting fires and killing people. (*ibid:* 18) The siege at the Taj ended nearly 60 hours later when commandos killed the last of the four terrorists.[367]

Apart from the above mentioned major locations, the attack also included two bomb blasts in two separate taxis. On November 26, 2008, a bomb exploded in the suburb of Ville Parle, situated close to both the International and Domestic airports of Mumbai. The blast killed at least two: the taxi driver and the passenger while injuring two others. The same night, another bomb, placed in a taxi, exploded in the Wadi Bunder area. Three people were killed in this explosion and more than 10 people were injured.[368] By the early morning of November 28, 2008, all the places except the Taj hotel had been secured by the Mumbai Police and security forces. All these attacks were carried out simultaneously by multiple teams at locations where the citizens of Mumbai as well as foreign nationals frequent. Mumbai's long nightmare of

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[366]Agencies (2008), "The Man Who Caught Ajmal Kasab", *NDTV,* [Online: web], Accessed 24 July 2016, URL: http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/the-man-who-caught-ajmal-kasab-505162.

[367]Randall, David (2008), "Mumbai: Sixty Hours of Terror and Chaos", *The Independent,* [Online: web], Accessed 20 August 2016, URL: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/mumbai-sixty-hours-of-terror-and-chaos-1041646.html.

[368]Khetan et. al (2015), *26/11 Mumbai Attacked,* [Online: web], Accessed 24 June 2017, URL: https://books.google.co.in/books?id=2HmEBwAAQBAJ&pg=PT166&lpg=PT166&dq=another+bomb,+placed +in+a+taxi,+exploded+in+the+Wadi+Bunder+area&source=bl&ots=G42PbmYMx4&sig=aK9CQVrMVxid_W XJ8mDWVCrefYc&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiz4KWnyfXUAhUJuI8KHZo8CJQQ6AEIJzAA#v=onepage &q=another%20bomb%2C%20placed%20in%20a%20taxi%2C%20exploded%20in%20the%20Wadi%20Bund er%20area&f=false

terror continued through the night and the day of November 27, 2008. As a number of hostages were trapped in high profile places, it took the entire afternoon of November 27, 2008 before the trapped guests could be evacuated from the Taj. Thus, on November 29, 2008, the National Security Guard finally managed to finish the Taj Mahal hotel encounter, thereby ending the 60-hour long siege.[369]

The fallout of the attacks was far reaching as the then Indian Home Minister Shivraj Patil and National Security Advisor (NSA) M K Narayanan had submitted their resignations in the wake of it but NSA's resignation was rejected by the Prime Minister.[370] Nine terrorists were killed by the security forces during the operation but only one, Ajmal Amir Kasab, was captured alive. Later, P. Chidambaram took over the post of the Home Minister and in his speech at the Lok Sabha in December 2008 said that the "interrogation and investigation have revealed that he belongs to Village Faridkot , in District Ukada, in the province of Punjab in Pakistan."[371]

The Government of India had claimed and substantially proved that the attackers had their roots in Pakistan while the neighbour was, as usual, in the denial mode. However, the attacks drew widespread condemnation from across the world as a number of foreign nationals had lost their lives this time. The immediate political fallout of the Mumbai attacks was majorly on India and Pakistan's relationship as the peace process which was initiated in 2004 got suspended. The Ministry of Home Affairs, in its Annual Report, had mentioned that in the wake of the terrorist attacks in Mumbai, the dialogues with Pakistan had suffered a serious

[369] Gray, Sadie and Agency (2008), "Mumbai Police Declare Taj Mahal Hotel Siege Over", *The Guardian*, [Online: web], Accessed 25 August 2016, URL: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/nov/29/mumbai-tajmahalhotel-terror-siege-india.

Chandran, Rina and Beitchman, Greg (2008), "NGS Commandoes End Mumbai Seige", *Mint*, [Online: web], New Delhi, Accessed 10 September 2016, URL: http://www.livemint.com/Politics/J9p2tKddFmJhrWrWjOYPiO/NSG-commandos-end-Mumbai-siege.html.

[370] PTI (2008), "Home Minister Shivraj Patil Resigns", *Mint*, [Online: web], Accessed 20 August 2016, URL: http://www.livemint.com/Home-Page/RdHy15JW6GB4xutudro2tO/Home-Minister-Shivraj-Patil-resigns.html.

Agency (2008), "M. K. Narayanan to Remain NSA", *The Times of India,* [Online: web], Accessed 10 September 2016, URL: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/M-K-Narayanan-to-remain-NSA/articleshow/3776113.cms.

[371] IANS (2008), "Text of Home Minister Chidambaram's Parliament Speech", The *Hindustan Times,* New Delhi, 11 December 2008.

setback. The same report by the Home Ministry also mentioned, "The Government of India has urged the Government of Pakistan to take effective steps to bring those involved in the planning and execution of this attack to justice and to dismantle terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan."[372]

The Mumbai attacks had assumed an international characteristic because they were carried out with a deliberate intention to target a number of foreign nationals in Mumbai. Covertly crafted and surreptitiously executed, these attacks were aimed at causing as much destruction of life and property as possible. Any attack on CST would cause widespread damage to human life and would cripple the backbone of the commuting network in the city. A popular eating joint with both locals and the foreign tourists was attacked. Café Leopold was chosen as one of the primary targets because of its popularity with foreign tourists, while Nariman House became the target as it was a centre for the Jewish community in Mumbai. The foreign casualties were less but the psychological effect and panic it created on people was severe. It was the longest attack ever carried out in India. The attack was planned in Pakistan by the internationally banned LeT. According to the charge sheet filed against Kasab, the main intention behind the attack was "to destabilise India, wage war against the country, terrorise its citizens, create financial loss and issue a warning to other countries whose citizens were also targeted, humiliated and cold-bloodedly killed." (Mahan and Griset 2013: *n.d.*)

Through these systematically executed terrorist attacks, the Mumbai Police in its report had mentioned the following crimes which the terrorists have committed:
- Encouraging, Instigating and Waging war against the Government of India.
- Hatching a conspiracy to wage war against the Government of India.
- Collecting arms to wage a war against the Government of India.
- Ruthlessly murdering Indian as well as Foreign Nationals.
- Attempt to wantonly murder Indian as well as Foreign Nationals.
- Inflicting grave injuries to Indian as well as Foreign Nationals.
- Set afire private properties with an intention to destroy.
- Trespassing without any right for murdering or for an attempt to murder.
- Threatening to kill with firearms and committing an armed robbery.

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[372] *Government of India, *Annual Report 2008-2009,* Ministry of Home Affairs, [Online: web], Accessed 12 June 2016, URL: http://mha.nic.in/hindi/sites/upload_files/mhahindi/files/pdf/AR(E)0809.pdf.

- Abducting Indian and Foreign nationals.

- Preventing a public servant from performing his lawful duty by threatening and harming him seriously.

- Kidnapping and keeping Indian as well Foreign Nationals as captive for achieving objectives.

- Possessing firearms without any licence.

- Firing from firearms in their illegal possession.

- Destruction of properties belonging to Indian Railways.

- Attacking passengers of Indian Railways and killing them.

- Endangering the lives of the passengers of the Indian Railways.

- Possessing explosive material and using it for causing violent explosions.

- Possessing, transporting and exploding dangerous explosives.

- Damaging public properties.

- Possessing articles banned by the Government.

- Illegally entering into India without valid travel documents.

- Becoming a member of the banned Lashkar- e- Taiba organization and committing illegal deeds, using explosives, hand grenades, fire arms, etc. and executing terrorist attacks.

- Procuring SIM cards by using fake documents and by cheating the vendor.

- Obtaining and possessing forged Identity cards by cheating in assumed names. (Duraphe 2009: 19-20)

After the attacks, the then External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee outlined New Delhi's diplomatic moves and options and he maintained that the "terrorists did come from Pakistan."[373] Pakistan, on the other hand, denied of Kasab's nationality and showed reluctance to accept any responsibility and demanded proof from India against them. As a result, New Delhi had handed over dossiers of evidence to Pakistan on the 26/11 terrorist attacks, which contained detailed information on those who were involved in the attacks. In addition, in the process of investigation, it was found that a Pakistani-American national

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[373] IANS (2008), "Indian Government, Opposition Dub Pakistan 'Epicentre of Terrorism'", New Delhi, 11 December 2008.

David Headley was also involved in the terrorist attack. Thus, the overall evidence whether it was technical or circumstantial, or Kasab's confession or "Headley's plea agreement with the US made it clear that Pakistani army personnel and ISI alumnus were involved in the Mumbai attacks, and the ISI is using LeT as proxy to unsettle New Delhi." (Rath 2010: 362)

There have been several facets of the terrorist attacks. Firstly, the control mechanism took time to be in place.[374] Secondly, people's helplessness turned into anger which was difficult to contain and it led to the resignations of political leadership.[375] Thirdly, new legislations were brought in by the central government with the hope of preventing attacks in future.[376] Also, security was beefed up at stations and airports and all the major cities where the threat was perceived. The attack raised several questions regarding the nature of terrorism, the repercussions of the attacks etc. which had altered the security atmosphere.

Moreover, the attacks drew extensive coverage from the media. It was for the first time that a major terror attack was beamed live across the country and it offered a peek into the nature of news coverage in India.[377] The Mumbai terror attacks in 2008 were a tragic event that resulted in great loss of human lives. These events were also surrounded by controversies that the media helped to promote through its news coverage.

5.2 Print Media and the Mumbai Attacks

The Mumbai terrorist attacks mesmerised the Indian media and foreign press as well. In the beginning, when the series of strikes started, everything was sketchy and with this, the volume of information and misinformation grew simultaneously for another 12 hours. Both the print and electronic media in India gave huge coverage to the incident and an equally

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[374] Banerjie, Indranil (2008), "INDIA – Caught Unprepared for Mumbai Terror" *Inter Press Service,* [Online: web] Accessed 5 July 2017, URL: http://www.ipsnews.net/2008/11/india-caught-unprepared-for-mumbai-terror/.

[375] Majumdar, Bappa (2008), "NEWSMAKER – Home Minister Patil Resigns Over Mumbai Attacks" *Reuters,* [Online: web] Accessed 6 July 2017, URL: http://www.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-36790120081130.

[376] BBC (2008), "India to Tighten Anti-Terror Laws" *British Broadcasting Corporation,* [Online: web] Accessed 6 July 2017 URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7787434.stm.

[377] Gokul, T.G. (2011). "Covering Crises – Indian News Channels and Mumbai Terror Attacks" *Global Media and Communication,* [Online: web] Accessed 6 July 2017, URL: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1742766511427501?journalCode=gmca. Pg 11.

elaborate analysis of the tragedy. Thus, this section will examine the role and coverage of *The Times of India*, *The Hindustan Times*, *The Hindu*, *The Indian Express* and *The Telegraph* in the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks. All the newspapers did not have much information the next day as the attacks had occurred the previous night itself. The coverage and the detailed analysis were done by the above mentioned newspapers for the next few days and then the volume of the news on it came down. However, some aspect or the other of the Mumbai attacks kept appearing in the print media for the months and years to follow till the lone survivor, Ajmal Amir Kasab was hanged.

On November 27, 2008, all the newspapers perceived the Mumbai terrorist attacks as a war against India. As the attack occurred on the night on November 26, 2008, the newspapers carried lesser stories on November 27, 2008. Still while reporting this well-coordinated series of attacks, *The Hindu* on November 27, 2008 carried the headline saying "Rash of Terror Attacks in Mumbai." *The Times of India* wrote "It's War on Mumbai" and *The Indian Express'* headline was "Mumbai's Night of Terror without End." *The Telegraph* called it as "War on Mumbai". Similar headlines were carried by *The Hindustan Times* also and one of them was "A Nation that Cannot Afford to Sleep". The newspapers in India carried the banner headlines on the front page to show and convey to the audience the gravity of the attacks. All the dailies carried police as well as eye witnesses' views. There were no editorials at least on November 27, 2008 regarding the attacks.

The mainstream newspapers had dedicated exclusive pages to cover the attacks. For instance, *The Times of India's* dedicated page was called as "Warfront Mumbai." The dailies had also shown pictures of the attacks on the front page. Another daily carried a picture of Ajmal Kasab and its caption said, "A picture of one of the assailants, taken by our photographer from the window of the TOI office in Mumbai."[378]

On November 28, 2008, the newspapers carried stories of the death toll, wrote reports about the ongoing and unfolding operations. Till November 30, 2008 at least, the newspapers splashed not just previous day's stories but pictures also. The dailies showed pictures, which varied from the body of a suspected militant inside Nariman Houseto a photo of a commando, who was rappelling down to the roof of the Nariman House from an Mi-17 helicopter. There

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[378] Vernekar, Sriram (2008), *The Times of India,* New Delhi, 27 November 2008.

were images of a terrorist running with a gun at the CST as well as one of trapped guests and staff of the Taj Mahal hotel. The newspapers tried to carry as powerful pictures as they could to leave a lasting impact on its readers.

After the initial three-day reportage of the attack, the print media shifted its role from reporting about the incidents to investigation. Following are certain themes under which the media's role and its reportage can be categorised.

Theme 1: Role from Reporting to Investigating

The mainstream newspapers started analysing the nature of the strikes even when the attacks were going on. Media had perceived the attack to be the handiwork of LeT based on the inputs by the Mumbai police investigators. From the beginning, most of the newspapers called it as a "fidayeen attack" (a suicide attack). On November 28, 2008, *The Hindu* carried a news report which said that Mumbai Police investigators had evidence that operatives of the "Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba carried out the fidayeen-squad attacks in Mumbai — a charge which, if proven, could have far-reaching consequences for India-Pakistan relations." The report also quoted police sources and added that an injured terrorist captured during the fighting was "tentatively identified as Ajmal Amir Kamal, a resident of Faridkot, near Multan, in Pakistan's Punjab province." [379]

In an editorial on the same day, *The Hindu* clearly called the terror attacks the handiwork of LeT. It stated that LeT and its several variants were involved in the Mumbai attacks and the terrorists targeted these places to garner international attention. It stated that the sophisticated weapons the terrorists used and the manner of the attacks point to "a well-funded, well-trained group that bears the signature of the Lashkar-e-Taiba and its several variants."[380] Similarly, *The Times of India* on the same day carried an article which stated that the attack was carried out by a "Pakistani fidayeen gang belonging to the fundamentalist Lashkar-e-Toiba."[381]

The Telegraph in its article on November 30, 2008 mentioned that the clues available from

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[379] Swami, Praveen (2008), "Three Lashkar Fidayeen Captured," *The Hindu,* New Delhi, 28 November 2008.

[380] Editorial (2008), "An Affront to the Indian State", *The Hindu,* New Delhi, 28 November 2008.

[381] TOI Team (2008), "LeT Did It: Arrested Gunman" *The Times of India*, New Delhi, 28 November 2008.

the attack on Mumbai "point to a very close Pakistan link".[382] On Kasab's nationality, *The Telegraph's* editorial stated that the subject himself has confessed that he was born in Pakistan. The editorial added that now it is even more significant that "the entire operation was conceived in Pakistan and masterminded from there. In fact, the boat carrying the terrorists sailed out of Karachi." The same editorial further added that it does not mean or imply that "the Pakistan State was directly involved in either the planning or the execution of the terror unleashed on Mumbai but it does mean that there exist in Pakistan centres for the training of militants who are brainwashed into dying for the cause."[383] *The Hindustan Times* on November 28, 2008 under the title "Lashkar is the prime suspect" wrote that the attacks bore all the hallmarks of LeT which was inspired by the al-Qaeda.

Theme 2: 26/11 Wasn't an India Specific Attack

The print media also felt that the Mumbai attacks were not India-specific because the attackers had deliberately chosen different sites like a Jewish religious centre, luxury hotels and a railway station that had global implications. *The Indian Express*, on November 29, 2008 carried an article saying "Mumbai Attack was Attack on World".

The Indian Express' report said that five Israelis, three Germans, one each from Japan, Canada and Australia, and two victims of unknown nationalities had been killed. Similar report was also carried by *The Times of India* on November 28, 2008. It stated that a conscious decision seemed to have been made to focus on American, British and Israeli nationals. Thus, it was a clear signal that the attack on Mumbai was a spill over from the larger war on terror.[384] Its editorial on December 1, 2008 said that the terror attack on Mumbai was not just about India. It said that while keeping in mind the gravity of this particular assault, international news channels had almost matched Indian outfits in tracking the developments by the hour, on the hour. It stated that this might be partially because "foreign nationals were taken hostage by the terrorists but that's not the only reason and the world realises that an attack of this nature on India has ramifications not just for this country,

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[382] Mukherjee, Rudrangshu (2008), "In Dubious Battle - – The Threat of Terrorism is Global, It Must be Countered Globally", *The Telegraph,* Kolkata, 30 November 2008.

[383] Editorial (2008), "Identity Blues", *The Telegraph*, Kolkata, 5 December 2008.

[384] TOI (2008), "It's War", *The Times of India*, New Delhi, 28 November 2008.

but for the global community as well." *The Hindu*, on November 28, 2008 took the interview of an escapee, Alex Chamberlain, who said that the attackers were specifically asking for any British or American citizens.[385]

Additionally, *The Times of India* had carried a lot of stories on the attack on foreign nationals. One of its articles titled "Foreign nationals in terror cross-hairs" stated if the idea was to make an impact globally then it certainly got succeeded as the global media scrambled to cover the attacks. Also, as the attack occurred in the night here, it was daytime in the United States and television channels across America followed all the actions the whole day. The daily had also mentioned in the story that the terrorist knew who they were targeting as it was a conscious decision to attack the foreign nationals.[386]

Similarly, *The Telegraph* also maintained that it was a global war. The article stated that an American can no longer feel safe in Mumbai, "just as an Indian is unsafe in any major Western city. Anyone can be a target anywhere. This is the unpredictability embedded in a terror mechanism that is mobile and global."[387] *The Hindustan Times* also echoed the same voice and stated that the Mumbai attacks fit very neatly into the paradigm of suicide attacks internationally. In an attempt to prove this statement, the daily gave an example of suicide attacks on Marriot Hotel in Islamabad and Serena Hotel in Kabul in 2008 wherein the westerners were particularly targeted.[388]

Theme 3: Criticised the Government and Intelligence Agency for Security Lapses

The newspapers had unanimously criticised the Indian government and intelligence agencies for the security lapses which, the media perceived, led to these attacks. The media also claimed that 26/11 attacks could have been prevented if the warnings had been taken seriously. Additionally, the newspapers maintained that the government had neglected the

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[385] "Tense Minutes and Hours", *The Hindu,* New Delhi, 28 November 2008.

[386] TOI Team (2008), "Foreign Nationals in Terror Cross-Hairs", *The Times of India*, New Delhi, 28 November 2008.

[387] Mukhejee, Rudrangshu (2008), "In Dubious Battle – The Threat of Terrorism is Global, It Must be Countered Globally", *The Telegraph,* Kolkata, 30 November 2008.

[388] "The Age of Suicide Fighters", *The Hindustan Times,* New Delhi, 29 November 2008.

coastal security as all the dailies came to the early conclusion that it was a maritime originated attack. *The Telegraph* in its editorial on November 28, 2008 wrote that the horror in Mumbai is happening because of the "incompetence of the government and intelligence agencies." The editorial stated that either the flow of information has dried up or the information they provide is not acted upon. Incompetence is the only word to describe the situation.[389] The same day, Singh wrote an article in *The Telegraph* where she maintained that initial 14 hours of this brutal, meticulously planned, carefully orchestrated assault have "exposed the incompetence of both the government of Maharashtra and the government of India in dealing with such situations."[390]

Praveen Swami, who did an extensive coverage of the attacks for *The Hindu*, in an opinion piece on November 29, 2008, wrote about the failure of government agencies in preventing the carnage. He mentioned:

> "Last month, the Lashkar-e-Taiba's supreme religious and political head, Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, made a signal speech to top functionaries: "The only language India understands is that of force, and that is the language it must be talked to in ..." Had India's strategic establishment listened, at least 127 people [sic] who made the mistake of being in Mumbai on 26 November [November 26, 2008] would still have been alive. If more carnage is to be prevented, it is imperative to understand the culture of strategic deafness that facilitated the murderous attacks."[391]

He further wrote in the same article that Indian politicians were rather quick to agree and blamed India's intelligence services for failing to predict the 26/11 Mumbai terror attack. Also, he stated that the available evidence said something else and "despite credible intelligence that terrorists were planning attacks in Mumbai and elsewhere, India's political leadership failed to act."[392]

The Times of India on November 28, 2008 carried the *Times' view* on the front page which stated that the then Prime Minister's assertion that no one involved in the terror attacks would be spared rings hollow. It said that India had lived with terror for over 25 years, but India had not got any better at pre-empting attacks or punishing those responsible. Also, it cautioned to

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[389] Editorial (2008), "Season in Hell", *The Telegraph,* Kolkata, 28 November 2008.

[390] Singh, Malvika (2008), "When the Plot is Lost", *The Telegraph,* Kolkata, 28 November 2008.

[391] Swami, Praveen (2008), "India's Strategic Deafness and Massacre in Mumbai", *The Hindu,* New Delhi, 29 November 2008.

[392] *Ibid.*

stop the posturing and playing politics with terror, and asked to put in place a modern, professional infrastructure to deal with terror.

The same newspaper had carried an article headlined "Intelligence Lapse or Navy's Failure to Act?" on December 1, 2008 wherein the newspaper reported regarding the accusation and denial between the R&AW and the Navy over communicating a terror intercept in time. The paper said that the Intelligence Bureau had told the National Security Council in September that the Taj hotel could be a terror target. The article said that on November 12, 2008 another intelligence advisory had warned of terrorists planning to come through sea route.

In another article in November, *The Times of India* while analysing the security failures stated that counterterrorism efforts in India were fragmented among the state and central agencies. It further stated that efforts to have an "integrated central agency to deal with terrorism have so far been thwarted by political parties who tend to place their own parochial interests higher than national interests."[393]

The Indian Express had carried a lot of stories in which it called the attacks as LeT's maritime operation. It said that the "terrorists had used the sea route to reach Mumbai from Karachi."[394] *The Indian Express* in an article on November 29, 2008 reminded that the then Defence Minister A. K. Antony had referred to the possibility of a sea-borne attack some six times. He talked about the threat of terrorists using the sea route to infiltrate into the country at least six times in the past two years, but little was done to provide adequate number of surveillance vessels and aircraft to the Coast Guard that protects India's vast maritime borders. The Minister, in March 2007, had informed the Parliament about intelligence reports of "terrorists of various tanzeems [terrorist outfits] being imparted training" and how there is [was] a likelihood of them infiltrating through sea routes."[395]

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[393] Subrahmanyam, K. (2008), "Neighbours Create Trouble", *The Times of India*, New Delhi, 28 November, 2008.

[394] Gupta, Shishir et al. (2008), "Lashkar Came Via Sea from Karachi, Used Gujarat Boat to Reach Mumbai", *The Indian Express,* New Delhi, 28 November 2008.

[395] Express News Service (2008), "Antony Warns Six Times of Sea Attack", *The Indian Express*, New Delhi, 29 November 2008.

In another article, the daily said that terror through sea route may have come as a surprise to many, but intelligence agencies have for long known that the country's long coastline is its most vulnerable border. It stated that most land borders with Pakistan have been sealed with a permanent fence, but "the Saurashtra/Kutch patch of the coastline—which came under the scanner about 15 years ago when a consignment of RDX [was] sent by underworld don Dawood Ibrahim to be used in the Mumbai serial blasts landed off the Gosabara coast in Porbandar—has been a major cause for concern."[396]

The Times of India also carried an article on November 30, 2008 under the headline, "Why Did NSG Take 9 Hours to Arrive?" in which while giving a detailed account of the reason, the daily wrote that most of the national security guards had to be woken up from sleep. The article further read:

> "only plane that can take 200 men, the IL 76, is not in Delhi but Chandigarh. Precious minutes are ticking by. The IL 76 pilot is woken, the plane refuelled. It reaches Delhi at 2 am. By the time the commandos get in and the plane takes off, four-and-a-half hours have elapsed... It takes the aircraft almost three hours to land at Mumbai airport. Unlike the Boeing and Airbus, IL 76 is a slow plane. By the time the NSG commandos board the waiting buses it is 5.25 am. The buses take another 40 minutes to reach the designated place in south Mumbai where the commandos are briefed, divided into different groups and sent out on their mission. By the time they start their operation, it is 7am — in other words, nine-and-a-half hours after the terror strike."[397]

Strongly criticising the delay, the article also questioned why the National Security Guards were located only in Delhi and why commando forces or its units are not placed in every city.

Theme 4: On Kasab and Linkages with Pakistan

The media focussed on security and intelligence lapse but its analysis didn't come in the way of the "war on terror" and its focus on Kasab and the links with Pakistan. Manmohan Singh, who was the Prime Minister at that time, had said the attacks had "external linkages" and assured the nation that the government would take up the matter strongly with our neighbours that using their territory for launching attacks on India would not be tolerated. Following this,

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[396] Pubby, Manu and Rautela, Vikram (2008), "Terror Wave", *The Indian Express*, New Delhi, 30 November 2008.

[397] Times News Network (2008), "Why Did NSG Take 9 Hours to Arrive?", *The Times of India,* New Delhi, 30 November 2008.

all the dailies minutely started writing articles on Kasab and his linkages and role of Pakistan in the Mumbai attacks.

The Times of India carried an article on November 28, 2008 which raised doubts about "ISI's non-involvement in the attacks". The report said, "... whenever Pakistani agencies have thought of delivering a massive strike against India, they have tended to use Lashkar and Jaish operatives. This has been the case in the Parliament attack case, the Ayodhya terror episode, attacks on the outskirts of Jammu, and the Mumbai suburban train bombings." It also said, "The Pakistani project to foster ''home grown'' terror through IM was intended to create the impression that India's internal conditions were responsible for terrorism, not the cross-border traffic." *The Indian Express* pointed out the linkages with Pakistan by carrying this article "Parliament, Mumbai: grenades of same make" on December 3, 2008. The article stated: "Most of them [the grenades] have their source in Pakistan and some are from the Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF) in Wah city in the north of Pakistan's Punjab Province — also the source of grenades and explosives used in the 1993 Mumbai serial blasts, the 2001 Parliament attack and this year's Kabul embassy attack."[398] *The Hindu* on December 1, 2008, wrote that India had assembled some evidence that linked the "Mumbai fidayeen attack to Lashkar-e-Taiba commanders based in Muridke, near Lahore in Pakistan" and that the investigators had reached a point where little progress could then be made unless Pakistan arrested key suspects based in that country.

Likewise, *The Times of India* in its editorial on December 1, 2008, wrote that while investigating India should go to the source of it. It said that "all roads from the Mumbai terror attacks seem[ed] to lead to Pakistan. The only captured terrorist is a Pakistani."[399]

The Hindu directly pointed out that India was facing two challenges. First, according to the newspaper was the "task of ensuring that the Pakistan-based Lahkar-e-Taiba commanders responsible for the horrific massacre are delivered to justice." The second challenge was of

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[398] Chowdhury, Sagnik (2008), "Parliament, Mumbai: Grenades of Same Make", *The Indian Express*, New Delhi, 3 December 2008.

[399] Editorial (2008), "Go To the Source", *The Times of India*, New Delhi, 1 December 2008.

strengthening security capabilities of India that would ensure that "terrorists from across the border can never again menace the people of this country."[400]

The same daily had done a lot of investigative stories about the whereabouts of Kasab. *The Hindu's* story on Kasab was based on interviews of key investigative officers and interrogation reports. Therein, it informed that the group of 10 had spent months training in marine combat and navigation in Pakistan before sailing for Mumbai. The article further mentioned that "Lashkar military commander Zaki-ur-Rahman had showed them the detailed maps of Mumbai and films of the targets they had been asked to attack." The article further stated that throughout the fighting, "the Laskhar headquarters remained in touch with the group, calling on their phones through VOIP (voice-over-internet services)."[401] Then on December 11, 2008, Kasab's entire confession became available to the newspapers and *The Telegraph* reproduced it verbatim. The story of his training, companions, and preparation for mission in Pakistan, sailing for Mumbai and the assault had come out in details.[402] But, on one hand, the security forces were trying to join hints and on the other hand, they were largely dependent on the information which was provided by Kasab. Thus, as the media got the confession copy, the newspapers published Kasab's story. Similarly *The Indian Express* also carried the confessions of Ajmal Kasab.[403]

Moreover, on December 13, 2008, most of the Indian newspapers quoted *The Dawn's* (Pakistan's English newspaper) report in which a person from Faridkot village of central Pakistan had admitted to this Pakistani daily that the lone terrorist, Ajmal Kasab who was captured alive for the Mumbai attacks, is his son. *The Telegraph* while quoting *The Dawn* carried the headline, "'Truth: This is My Son Ajmal.'" Similarly, *The Indian Express* also carried this story and attributed it to *The Dawn*. Its headline suggested: "I Accept the Truth, This is My Son Ajmal."

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[400] Editorial (2008), "Necessary But Insufficient", *The Hindu,* New Delhi, 2 December 2008.

[401] Swami, Praveen (2008), "Mumbai's Massacre Story Unfolds in Terrorist's Interrogation", *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 2 December 2008.

[402] "We Were Told to Open Fire at Rush Hour, Kidnap People& Take Them to the Roof", *The Telegraph,* Kolkata, 11 December 2008.

[403] Chowdhury, Sagnik (2008), "The Confessions of Ajmal Ameer Kasab", *The Indian Express*, New Delhi, 14 December 2008.

But, *The Hindu* went a step further, and on December 13, 2008, the daily quoted *Geo News* (a Pakistani news channel) television's report on the same. The daily did its story by confirming it from two sources, one was *The Dawn* and the other was *Geo TV*.[404] *The Times of India* on the next day published Kasab's own words. *The Times of India* reported that Kasab wrote a letter to Pakistani High Commissioner, "stating his entitlement to legal help from his country to fight his case in the Indian courts. The document not only settles the debate about Kasab's origins and that of his fellow terrorists."[405] The newspaper wrote that it was a major embarrassment for Islamabad which had "dithered over publicly accepting that the Mumbai attack was launched from Pakistani soil."[406] The newspaper carried this story on the front page and it reproduced some excerpts from the letter, which was written to Pakistan's High Commissioner.

Apart from the above mentioned themes, the newspapers also recommended the ways in which India should act with its neighbouring country, Pakistan. *The Hindu*, in an editorial wrote that New Delhi must test the then Pakistan's President Asif Ali Zardari's public expression of solidarity with India and his offer of practical cooperation at that time of crises. The editorial stated that New Delhi had given evidence to Islamabad that the terrorists came from Pakistan and there were proofs of the nationalities of the attackers as well. Thus, with evidence in hand, New Delhi should make a demand on Islamabad "to cooperate with the ongoing criminal investigation in accordance with bilateral understandings and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373."[407]

The Indian Express however stated that, to deal with Pakistan, the Indian government must set right its internal security regime and it recommended certain measures which the UPA should look at. *The Telegraph* also wrote that Islamabad's decision to send a junior official to India instead of the ISI chief has led to a hardening in Delhi's stand and sources said ties

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[404] Subramanian, Nirupama (2008), "Ajmal is a Pakistani: Geo TV", "*The Hindu*, New Delhi, 13 December 2008.

[405] Ali, S Ahmad (2008), "Kasab in His Words: I Am a Pakistani Terrorist", *The Times of India*, New Delhi, 14 December, 2001.

[406] *Ibid.*

[407] Editorial (2008), "Necessary But Insufficient", *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 2 December 2008.

between the neighbours looked set to plummet.[408] *The Times of India* hardened its stand towards Pakistan and said that peace process may be hit. Its article stated that in the wake of Mumbai attacks, "India would not rule out the military option in dealing with the continued terror threat emanating from Pakistan."[409]

Moreover, the newspapers lauded the resignation of the then Home Minister Shivraj Patil. *The Indian Express* was sharply critical of Patil for his pathetic internal security record as a Home Minister. Thus, while welcoming the decision, the daily stated that "there was a startling swiftness with which the resignation came and as a token of accountability, it was apt, especially with the indication that more resignations and transfers could follow."[410] Similarly, *The Times of India* also welcomed this decision and called the opportunity as government's damage control mode. The daily stated that public anger was at its peak and this was the right decision to take. The article read:

> "Public opinion has also forced the Maharashtra Chief Minister Vilasrao Deshmukh and Home Minister R R Patil to resign. Deshmukh and Patil have exposed themselves as inept administrators and insensitive people. The CM's visit to the Taj Mahal hotel with his actor son and a noted Bollywood director made the inspection tour almost look like a location scout for a film shoot. R R Patil's remark that these things happen in a big city was irresponsible and unbecoming of a public official. These resignations are most welcome because public anger against inefficient and callous administrators is at a peak, and rightly so."[411]

Likewise, *The Hindu* also wrote that it was definitely a necessary step but it was insufficient too. The daily also mentioned that Mr. Patil could not be alone held responsible for the crises in Mumbai.[412]

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[408] Jacob, Jayanth and Dutta, Sujan (2008), "Delhi Stiffens at ISI U-Turn – Shadow Falls on Pak Ties, Talks May Come Under Srain", *The Telegraph*, Kolkata, 30 November 2008.

[409] Bagchi, Indrani and Parashar, Sachin (2008), "India Open to Military Action Against Pakistan", *The Times of India,* New Delhi, 3 December 2008.

[410] Editorial (2008), "After Patil", *The Indian Express,* New Delhi, 1 December 2008.

[411] Editorial (2008), "People Do Matter", *The Times of India*, New Delhi, 2 December 2008.

[412] Editorial (2008), "Necessary But Insufficient", *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 2 December 2008.

5.3 Pakistani Newspapers on 26/11 Attacks

A day after the Mumbai mayhem, Pakistani newspapers reported the terror attacks as a matter of regular news only. *The Dawn* newspaper's headline on November 27, 2008 was "Mayhem in Mumbai: Terrorist Attacks Claim At Least 80 Lives; Hundreds Taken Hostage" while *The Daily Times* read, "Over 80 killed in series of gun and grenade attacks in India's financial hub: Mumbai under attack". A similar story was carried by *The Nation* newspaper also. None of the newspapers wrote any editorial content on the Mumbai terrorist attack which had the potential of triggering a conflict between the two nation-states. But, from November 28, 2008 onwards, as the Pakistani papers started understanding the magnitude of the terror tragedy, they started critically analysing the situation and its implications on Pakistan and Indo-Pak relations. *The Dawn* mentioned Pakistan's the then President Asif Ali Zardari's reaction to the terror strike who called the Mumbai attacks "a detestable act". In a message to the Indian leadership, he said that "militancy and extremism in all their forms and manifestations have to be eliminated and all countries need to cooperate with each other in this regard."[413] The editorial on the same day discussed the ironic nature of the fact that the Mumbai attacks occurred in the wake of a two-day talk between the home secretaries of India and Pakistan in Islamabad.

The Daily Times also interviewed the Pakistani President on November 30, 2008 in which he denied any Pakistani role in the Mumbai attacks and pledged action against any group found to be involved, while advising New Delhi not to "over-react". Pakistan's dailies were toeing the similar lines of their government and collectively they were blaming Deccan Mujahideen and Indian Mujahideen for the attacks. *The Daily Times* kept publishing editorials which believed and encouraged the rumour that home-grown terrorists were behind the Mumbai attack. In the editorial "The Times of Terror" published on December 2, 2008, *The Dawn* said that "the crisis might not escalate as the troop movement along the borders had not been detected. But, the attacks had struck a serious blow to the Indo-Pak peace process." The paper further alleged that "for hampering bilateral relations between India and Pakistan, New Delhi and the Indian media must shoulder most of the blame." For the next few days, *The Dawn*

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[413] Raza, Syed Irfan (2008), "Zardari Calls It a detestable Act", *The Dawn*, [Online: web], Accessed 25 June 2015, URL: https://www.dawn.com/news/332121/zardari-calls-it-a-detestable-act.

carried news articles with headlines: "Pakistan proposes joint probe"; "Gilani seeks Mumbai evidence"; "Nothing new in India's list of wanted persons: Pakistan seeks credible evidence".

The Dawn in one of its articles titled "What After Mumbai", published in *The Dawn* on December 5, 2008 talked about the threat that Pakistan was facing post the Mumbai attacks. The article stated,

> "The threat that Pakistan is facing after Mumbai is twofold: external and internal. Externally, there will be mounting pressure because such statements and India's position will make the world more suspicious of Pakistan's inclinations. There is already a perception that the country possibly lacks the will, capacity and intent to fight terrorism. More importantly, if the political government does not give some thought to its style of decision-making and governance, there is a possibility that various anti-democracy forces could win once again. Internally, we stand more exposed and vulnerable than ever before."[414]

5.4 Electronic Media and the Mumbai Attacks

During the three-day standoff between the Indian security men and the attackers, probably for the first time Indian audience got lurid details of a hostage situation on their television screens. What started as a minute-by-minute reportage of casualties and death tolls, gradually turned into a race with each channel reporting "exclusive stories" or "breaking news" and claiming that their channel was the first to have the news. The biggest casualty amidst all this was perhaps the principles of journalism. In a rush to report "exclusives", a term that is often misused nowadays, saw news channels forgetting to check the facts before presenting them to viewers across the world. As everything was sketchy in the beginning of the terrorist attack, the live reportage of the fear and tragedy at the multiple locations added to the confusion and intensity of terrorised environment. The journalists called the Mumbai attacks as "India's 9/11". The entire episode – the coverage of 26/11 Mumbai attacks brought the role of electronic media during those 60 hours - under scrutiny for not bothering about its after effects. The criticism of electronic media came from all walks of life, be it the security personnel, fellow journalists, media commentators, viewers and even the government officials themselves. There was public outrage against the electronic media's coverage of the Mumbai attacks and it could be understood in certain broader themes which are as follows:

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[414] Ayesha (2008), "What After Mumbai", *The Dawn,* [Online: Web], Accessed 25 January 2016, URL: https://www.dawn.com/news/432107.

Theme 1: Compromising the Security Operation

On the day of attack, the news channels created confusion over information such as: the number of terrorists, the transportation the terrorists had used; their origins and their affiliation to organisations. The number of terrorists varied from channel to channel. It ranged anything between 10-25, but later on, they finally called it 10 after getting the confirmation from the Police. The newspapers, as a principle, refrained from publishing gory pictures, especially those of dead bodies. However, there seemed to be no such rules for television channels that flashed these gruesome images live on television and electronic media's role was seen as immature in coverage of terrorist attacks.

The competition between the channels, in fact, was so intense that some resorted to showing the positions and movements of the security forces engaged in flushing out the terrorists just to score over the rival television channels. As Professor Thussu suggested that "the compulsion of breaking news forced journalists to unwittingly endanger the lives of hostages and security forces by providing live telecast of commandos of the National Security Guards being air dropped." (Thussu 2009: 15) Thus, significant information about the operation was passed to the perpetrators by news broadcasters themselves and media compromised the ongoing security operations. Additionally, the battle for TRPs seemed to have provoked the channels to broadcast the entry of commandos at the Nariman House live. This action of media came under heavy criticism as it gave minute details on television. For instance, the equipment which the commandos were carrying even when the operation was going on. Also, the channels revealed more details of the operation due to positioning of their cameras.

The critics have called the coverage of the Mumbai terrorist attack by electronic media as unethical and immature. They described it as "TV terror for showing gory scenes, being too aggressive, and often reporting incorrect information as fact." (Pepper 2008: *n.d.*) The whole coverage was callous in nature and "with no coherent media strategy in place and little self-regulation by journalists, the live coverage spanning nearly 72 hours descended into a litany of errors, with fatal consequences for the hostages." (Kumar 2012: 532) This reckless coverage of the terrorist attack by the television channels gave rise to a situation where the security forces had no knowledge of where the terrorists were hiding and they had no means to know the exact position of these militants or even the kind of firearms and explosives they possessed. However, the perpetrators not only knew the positions of the security personnel

but also had up-to-date information about the weapons the Indian fighters were carrying as well as their operational movements, courtesy the television channels. The information was being watched by the collaborators across the border on their television screens and being communicated to the terrorists in the city.[415]

The channels had debates on almost all the aspects of attacks, ranging from how India remained soft on terror to how the defence budget should have gone up, to how the country's coastline should have been secured. The television channels showed the gunmen as clean-shaven and dressed up in T-shirt and jeans.

Soon after the operation, the then Chief of the Naval Staff Admiral Sureesh Mehta said in a press conference that one of the commandos had lost his life because of the coverage of television channels. He pulled up the media and said that the competition among the news channels "to score browny points reminded him of the famous shot during the Kargil War that led to the destruction of an ultra-powerful artillery gun of the Army."[416]

Theme 2: Bias towards the Elite

The electronic media was biased towards the elite in covering the Mumbai terror attacks as the television news channels started beaming videos but much of it were from outside the Taj hotel, the Nariman House and the Oberoi-Trident. The victims who lost their lives in the hospital or at CST railway station, unfortunately, didn't get much attention from electronic media. Several people had lost their lives at CST as well and this was the hub of the working class. The news channels kept showing the pictures and videos of the Taj hotel and lauded this to be the icon of Mumbai. However, critics had argued whether the Taj hotel was the icon or not. As Mukul Kesavan pointed out that those who were killed at the commuter station had probably not seen the insides of Taj, which was being presented as the icon of Mumbai. As the coverage was largely concentrated on the victims at these five-star hotels and the foreigners, these images circled worldwide and it reinforced "a widespread misconception that the violence was centered mainly at the hotels, where affected foreigners were concentrated." (Nayak and Krepon 2012: 6) While analysing this, Sankaran wrote:

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[415] Legal Correspondent (2008), "Live TV Coverage Put National Security in Jeopardy, Says Bench", *The Hindu,* New Delhi, [Online: Web], Accessed 25 January 2016, URL: http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/live-tv-coverage-put-national-security-in-jeopardy-says-bench/article3836676.ece

[416] Dikshit, Sandeep (2008), "Mumbai Coverage Reminded Him of 'Famous' Kargil War Shot", *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 3 December 2008.

> "No Barkha Dutt went there to tell us who they were. But she was at Taj to show us the damaged furniture and reception lobby braving the guards. And the TV [television] cameras did not go to the government run-JJ hospital to find out who those 26 unidentified bodies were. Instead they were again invading the battered Taj to try in vain for a scoop shot of the dead bodies of the page 3 celebrities." (Sankaran 2010: 17)

Kumar also mentioned that when journalists were allowed access inside the hotels, reporters had

> "painstakingly elaborated on the loss of life and property in these landmark buildings. The elite (which included media personalities) wrote glowing accounts of the hospitality they experienced in these hotels. As opposed to this, the nameless faceless victims of the CST remained forgotten. Since the station receives countless new immigrants starting out fresh in Mumbai everyday, their dead bodies often had no identification, thus providing yet another excuse for channels already disinterested in talking about the victims." (Kumar 2012: 536)

Thus, electronic media's role was insensitive towards certain sections of society.

Theme 3: Jingoism

The electronic media outpaced the print media in creating hysteria and pointing fingers at Pakistan, even when the "Operation Tornado" was not over. It left no stone unturned in trying to prove that the perpetrators were of Pakistani-origin. All the channels took the anti-Pakistan stand and it put the pressure on the government to take a strict stand towards the neighbour. On *NDTV*, Simi Garewal said that "she would like to see Pakistan carpet-bombed."[417] Many news anchors were seen playing patriotic songs in the background even while having a debate. This was probably done to stir patriotic sentiments among viewers and garner more TRPs than their competitors. During the debate hour, all the channels brought in their own set of experts, journalists, former army men, politicians and social scientists as panelists to analyse the situation. All of them presented their views and theories, which were on air during debates in which Pakistan-bashing was evident.

While commenting on the jingoist views of these electronic channels, Jayati Ghosh said,

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[417] Zehra, Nazim (2008), "Conveyor Belt Hacks", *Outlook,* New Delhi, [Online: Web], Accessed 25 December 2016, URL:
https://books.google.co.in/books?id=YTEEAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA81&lpg=PA81&dq=On+NDTV,+Simi+Garewal+said+that+%E2%80%9Cshe+would+like+to+see+Pakistan+carpet-bombed.%E2%80%9D&source=bl&ots=s-wxD6y6DX&sig=GJzm4Ud0UQjeQh4N_BlszE1y5Iw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjexpyVnoTVAhVLL48KHemoBrIQ6AEILjAB#v=onepage&q=On%20NDTV%2C%20Simi%20Garewal%20said%20that%20%E2%80%9Cshe%20would%20like%20to%20see%20Pakistan%20carpet-bombed.%E2%80%9D&f=false.

"The terror attacks in Mumbai evoked many responses, but among the media, the electronic media in particular, one dominant response has been to engage in aggressive jingoism and war-mongering. The 'enough is enough' brigade has moved on from criticising politicians in general for not safeguarding the elite to demanding not just that Pakistan accept its culpability but that India punish Pakistan by engaging in military strikes, along the lines of their current role-model – the George W. Bush regime in the United States. And the attempt to whip up pro-war sentiment has continued apace even when it is only too evident that the only gainers from such a war would be the terrorists who wish to destabilise both India and Pakistan."[418]

All the news channels came up with their own campaigns with catchy labels at that hour of crises. For instance, *NDTV* had its "Enough is Enough" and *Times Now* had launched "India Stands United." Terror has its own narratives within media. This would be true for journalists across countries, be it in India, the US or even battle-torn nations like Iraq and Syria. But in case of Mumbai attacks, with the nationalistic and patriotic views, it is found out electronic channels were having competition among themselves for their own TRPs and this made the live coverage of the tragedy on television shrill.[419] They sensationalised news to increase their TRPs but also gave the publicity that the terrorists wanted.

The Indian media – both electronic and print - chose to give a vivid description of the modus operandi of the perpetrators while covering the 26/11 attacks, and hence, drawing intense criticism from several quarters for going ahead with the coverage while ignoring the norms and security concerns as well as the repercussions of such reportage.[420] The coverage by Indian news channels drew widespread wrath, including from the Supreme Court.

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[418] Ghosh, Jayati (2009), "War and Peace", *Frontline,* New Delhi, 03-16 January 2009.

[419] Legal Correspondent (2012), "Live TV Coverage Put National Security in Jeopardy, Says Bench" *The Hindu* [Online: web] Accessed 6 July 2017. URL: http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/live-tv-coverage-put-national-security-in-jeopardy-says-bench/article3836676.ece.

[420] Kumar, Sangeet (2012), "The Fatal Snare of Proximity: Live Television, New Media and the Witnessing of Mumbai Attacks, *South Asian History and Culture Volume 3:Issue 4: Television at Large* [Online: web] Accessed 6 July 2017 URL:
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19472498.2012.720068?scroll=top&needAccess=true.

5.5 Supreme Court on Media's Coverage

Coming down heavily on the nature of coverage of 26/11, the Supreme Court pulled up the electronic media for an irresponsible approach while covering the terrorist activities. It said that the way the operations were being aired on television channels made the task of the security agencies very difficult, exceedingly dangerous and risky. According to Justices Aftab Alam and C.K. Prasad,

> "reckless coverage.. gave rise to a situation where, on the one hand, the terrorists were completely hidden from the security forces and they had no means to know their exact positions or even the kind of firearms and explosives they possessed, and on the other, the positions of the security forces, their weapons and all their operational movements were being watched by the collaborators across the border on TV screens and being communicated to the terrorists."[421]

The Supreme Court also pointed out that at one place, in the transcript, the collaborators and the terrorists appear to be making fun of the speculative report in the media that the person whose dead body was found in Kuber was the leader of the terrorist group whom his colleagues had killed for some reason before leaving the boat. The Court observed from the transcripts, especially those from Taj Hotel and Nariman House that "it was evident that the terrorists who were entrenched at those places and more than them, their collaborators across the border were watching the full show on TV."[422]

The apex court also observed that the conduct of the channels could not be justified on the pretext of right to freedom of speech and expression at any cost, especially in such a situation. The visuals of the ongoing operations could have been shown after all the terrorists were neutralised. But, it would certainly have taken the element of sensation, shrill and chilling effect of the news item away, thereby, costing the channels their TRP ratings, it said. The Supreme Court also noticed, "It must, therefore, be held that by covering live the terrorists attack on Mumbai in the way it was done, the Indian TV channels were not serving

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[421] Legal Correspondent (2012), "Live TV Coverage Put National Security in Jeopardy, Says Bench", *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 29 August 2012.

[422] Ali, S. Ahmed (2008), "26/11 Attack: Media Pulled by Supreme Court for Its Role", *The Times of India*, New Delhi, 31 August 2012.

any national interest or social cause. On the contrary, they were acting in their own commercial interests putting the national security in jeopardy."[423]

Analysis of Print and Electronic Media

In a nutshell, the Indian print media and electronic media perceived the Mumbai attacks as a war against India. All the Indian dailies took a nationalistic position while reporting and analysing the entire event. The Indian political arena, too, came under the influence of the critical views that the media presented and consequently, it resulted in an upheaval at the top level with a few prominent heads rolling. But after critically analysing the newspapers and the channels reportage, it seems that a lot of stories did not make it to the headlines, either in print or electronic during live coverage.

After an evaluation of the contents of newspapers, it is found out that *The Telegraph* and *The Hindu's* coverage was comparatively sober than *The Indian Express*, *The Hindustan Times* and *The Times of India*, which sensationalised the issue to a large extent. *The Telegraph* had carried most of the stories from the government-based sources and its editorial for the next month was less than the other newspapers. However, *The Hindu* had done a lot of investigative stories about the Mumbai attacks. *The Hindu's* coverage had tried to connect the dots while writing its investigative reports. Moreover, *The Indian Express*, *The Hindustan Times* and *The Times of India* had dedicated a lot of pages to the Mumbai attacks and had tried to do the story from all possible angles. But, few things were common among newspapers. For instance, Ajmal Amir Kasab's photo walking through a CST with a gun was splashed across both electronic and print media. Likewise, picture of Moshe Holtzberg (the two-year-old orphan of Rabbi Gavriel and Rivika Holtzberg, who died in the Mumbai attack), also appeared in newspapers and television channels.

Furthermore, just like the media that was covering the hostage-like situation for the first time, the government authorities, too, were unprepared for dealing with the media in covering the issue. Kumar mentioned that "the lack of any guidance or a clear media strategy from government agencies was a crucial reason for the chaotic response by the media." (Kumar 2012: 534)

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[423] Legal Correspondent (2012), "Live TV Coverage Put National Security in Jeopardy, Says Bench", *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 29 August 2012.

Also, Security and Strategic Affairs Editor of Press Trust of India (PTI), Sumir Kaul, while getting critical about the electronic media's coverage on the Mumbai terror strike wrote: "The overzealous television channels repeatedly crossed line by beaming live shots of commando action which resulted in rap on their knuckles from the government and the Supreme Court. The television helped the terrorists who were informed by their handlers in Pakistan about the movement of troops on the ground. Some things never change right from the Kargil War to Mumbai attack."[424]

T.G. Gokul while talking about the role of media both print and electronic stated:

> "It would be totally erroneous and futile to import the ethics and rules set for the print media on to practioners of television journalism, for both these forms seek to fill totally disparate dimensions. While print is primarily concerned with the filling of space – which affords it the luxury of contemplation and distance – television engages time. Unlike print where "brand loyalty is fairly high, television is burdened with the necessity to bombard the viewer with the 'latest', lest they switch to another channel." (Gokul 2011: 271-273)

All the dailies took a strong anti-terror and pro-security stand and published a number of articles presenting divergent viewpoints on the issue. Almost all the newspapers across the country had made a sincere effort to firm up different opinions, adding more value and substance to the coverage of the dastardly attacks. However, to some extent, overall Indian media was found to be jingoistic and relatively indulged in war mongering.[425]

Even when the attacks were unfolding and nobody knew what was happening, the media – both electronic and print – had started raising fingers of suspicion at Islamabad. But at the same time, several important things appeared in the media, which also went deeper and tried to analyse as to what was the nature of the attack and how one needed to look at it. However, with all the drawbacks, the television coverage attracted attention of the most of Indians. Still it can be said that print media's coverage of the attack was more ethical and balanced than the electronic media.

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[424] Kaul, Sumir (2017), e-mail to the author, 12 July 2017.

[425] Chandran, Rina (2008), "Indian Media Under Fire for Mumbai Attacks Coverage", *Reuters* [Online: web] Accessed 6 July 2017, URL:
http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-india-mumbai-media-sb-idUKTRE4B43GI20081205?mod=related&channelName=worldNews.

On the other hand, the Pakistani dailies were not ready to accept the role of Pakistan in 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks in any way. Towing their official line, the dailies kept demanding the credible evidence showing Pakistan's role. Instead, the Pakistani media sought to blame the attacks on "India's home grown militancy, that is, the Indian Mujahideen or Deccan Mujahideen."[426] Attacking the Indian government, Pakistani media rejected the Indian claims as unfounded. The dailies started reporting the attacks from the second day onwards followed by numerous editorials and opinions. Launching an attack on Indian media, *The Dawn* went on to claim that it was the nadir of Indo-Pak ties majorly due to the kind of reportage being done in India. Accusing the Indian media of presenting half truths, the Pakistani media termed it as too nationalistic in nature. They claimed that the Indian media had mastered the art of finger pointing and projecting Pakistan as an enemy nation vis-à-vis 26/11 terror strikes. Beena Sarwar, a Pakistani journalist said that Indian peace groups, who visit Pakistan or Pakistani groups visiting India, got a great deal of media attention. She also mentioned that "Pakistani or Indian governments and/or politicians are so quick to blame the other country for any unrest or violence within their borders that these accusations have become routine and have lost credibility". (Sarwar 2008: 189)

Moreover, after analysing the news channels, it is found out that *DD* news channel which is a government news channel had towed the government's views and there were hardly any independent story. It was the most sober in its reportage compared to the other private news channels which was followed by *NDTV*, *Star News (now ABP)* and *Times Now,* which had sensationalised the attacks in its coverage.

The attacks were condemned from all corners of the media but the conflict arose because of the initial ambiguity about the nationalities and motives of the 10 terrorists, who carried out this inhumane carnage. Retrospectively, when it was established that Pakistani nationals with active support from the Pakistan carried out the attack, the media did follow up the stories by going as far as the alleged residence of Ajmal Amir Kasab. However, objectivity, which is considered as a cornerstone of good journalism, was a clear victim in the conduct of the media of both the countries as 26/11 attack unfolded. The scathing criticism of media coverage of the 26/11 attacks had prompted the News Broadcasters Association to unveil self

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[426] "Is India Facing Threat of Home-Grown Militancy?", *The Dawn,* [Online: web], Accessed 25 December 2016, URL: https://www.dawn.com/news/430797

regulatory guidelines for telecast of sensitive events. While commenting on electronic media's coverage of the Mumbai terror attacks, Thussu said that media was criticised for reportage, but "in India, the Bollywood factor converted TV news into showbiz"[427] He further mentioned that

> "Even before the tragedy was over, reports were circulating of producers registering names for action thrillers based on the macabre events of Mumbai: titles include 26/11 – Mumbai under Terror and Operation Five Star Mumbai. Even the more sober networks such as NDTV 24x7 (part of New Delhi Television, which was founded in 1988 as India's first private news content provider for Doordarshan) have been Bollywoodised to a significant degree. One indication of this was its flagship programme We the People, telecast on November 30 [2008] just hours after the end of anti-terrorist operations, where Bollywood personalities dominated panels of "experts" dissecting, often in frivolous terms, the terrorist actions and how to deal with the menace. (Thussu 2009: 17)

Moreover, it is significant to observe that how media can impact the extent of a terrorist attack. Media has a capability of evading the situation of panic by positively informing people and on the other side, it can easily create fear and terror among common people which could further complicate the situation for Indian electronic media more than the print media. But the already strained relations had reached a nadir after the 26/11 terror attacks in Mumbai as India had raised its voice against terror and projected Pakistan as the epicentre of terrorism.[428] This had furthered the trust deficit and tension that already existed between the two countries.

Thus, it becomes essential to discuss the impact of 26/11 Mumbai attack on the bilateral relations of India and Pakistan and how for media it became an event-based reporting. Therefore, the following section will discuss how this terror attack affected the relationship between India and Pakistan from the year 2008 (when the attack happened) till 2012 (the year Ajmal Amir Kasab, the lone surviving terrorist responsible for the gruesome 26/11 Mumbai attacks, was hanged).

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[427] Thussu, Daya (2009), "Turning Terrorism into a Soap Opera", *British Journalism Review*, 20(1): 13.

[428] Raman, Bahukutumbi (2009), "India Pakistan Relations After 26/11" *Royal Instituto Elcano: Strategic and International Studies* [Online: web] Accessed 6 July 2017, URL: http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/asia-pacific/ari20-2009.

5.6 Impact of 26/11 Attacks on Bilateral Relations

Soon after the 26/11 attacks, India had given a series of dossiers as an evidence to Pakistan. India also maintained that it would not resume talks with Pakistan on normalising bilateral relations until the perpetrators of the attacks will be brought to justice. However, Pakistan remained adamant and kept denying Indian government's allegations that the attackers were of Pakistani-origin.[429] Pakistan also rejected India's claim of ISI's involvement in the attacks.

As the initial fears of the military confrontation between India and Pakistan subsided, the bilateral talks on various political and economic issues had been suspended, thereby adversely affecting the bilateral relations. The secretary-level dialogue between both sides on significant matters like foreign policy, commerce, border issues and disputes in the water sharing treaty had been put off indefinitely unless and until some concrete step is taken by the Pakistan's government to curb the global menace called terrorism and the perpetrators of Mumbai attacks were arrested and put on trial.

Indo-Pak relationship had shown some signs of normalcy before the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in 2008 as there were several rounds of composite dialogues between both the nations. There were back channel diplomacies in which people to people contact had increased and just on the day of the attacks, "Pakistan's foreign minister was signing bilateral agreements in Delhi and home secretary level talks were being held in Islamabad." (Gupta et al. 2012: 319).

The talks were stalled on every issue. India also cancelled the cricket tour of Pakistan which was scheduled for February 2009. The announcement of not travelling to Pakistan came from the then Sports Minister M.S. Gill in Parliament as relationship between India and Pakistan continued to deteriorate post terrorist attacks.[430]

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[429] Shah, Saeed (2009), "Pakistan Dismisses Indian Dossier on Mumbai Attacks", *The Guardian* [Online: web] Accessed 6 July 2017, URL: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jan/14/mumbai-terror-attacks-india-pakistan.

[430] Just before the attacks in Mumbai, the Indian Cricket Board (like its normal procedure) had written to the government seeking permission to travel to Pakistan for the tour. Also, before this, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) had by then already refused permission for a junior hockey team to travel to Pakistan due to safety concerns.

CNN, "India Cancel 2009 Cricket Tour to Pakistan", [Online: web], Accessed 16 November 2016, URL: http://edition.cnn.com/2008/SPORT/12/18/india.pakistan.cricket.tour/index.html?iref=nextin.

The charge sheet in the Mumbai terror case was filed against the perpetrators of the attack in February 2009 and it alleged that the conspiracy was conceived in Pakistan and masterminded by the terrorist outfit, Lashkar-e-Taiba. It also included comprehensive evidence that included a confession by one of the perpetrators, Ajmal Amir Kasab. The Ministry of Indian External Affairs, in its 2009-10 annual report also spoke about the challenges faced by it in post-Mumbai era. It stated that there were a lot of challenges in the aftermath of Mumbai attacks, and with the global financial meltdown. But while getting positive about the Indo-Pak relations, the report maintained:

> "Admitting that post Mumbai attacks, there was a pause in the Composite Dialogue process as India expected that Pakistan acts with purpose against the perpetrators of the Mumbai attack as also unearths the wider conspiracy behind the attack has been conveyed on several occasions, including at the highest level."[431]

At India's invitation in 2010, Foreign Secretary level talks between the two countries were held in New Delhi. This was in the context of the Government of India's desire to ensure communication between the two countries to address the core concerns relating to terrorism directed against India, and pending humanitarian issues. According to the MEA's report in 2009-2010,

> "Despite the terrorist attack on Mumbai and ongoing investigations into the involvement of David Coleman Headley and Tahawwur Hussain Rana in various terrorist acts, including the Mumbai terrorist attack and continuing cross-border infiltration from Pakistan and ceasefire violations by Pakistan across the Line of Control and International Border, people-topeople contacts were allowed to continue. A number of Pakistani cultural, academic and trade delegations visited India. Government also facilitated visits to places of pilgrimage under the Protocol on Visits to Religious Shrines (1974). India's bilateral trade with Pakistan in 2008-09 was US$ 1.78 billion." (MEA 2009-2010: V)

After the Mumbai terrorist attack, the first important meeting between the then Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, and the then Pakistani President, Asif Ali Zardari, took place on the sidelines of BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summits in the Russian city of Yekaterinburg on June 16, 2009. Singh was quoted as saying by *The Indian Express* on June 17, 2009 that New Delhi wanted to make efforts to bring peace with Islamabad but Pakistan needs to take strong as well as effective steps to end terrorism against its country like it had done with regard to Taliban. As

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[431] *Ministry of External Affairs, "Annual Report – 2009-2010", New Delhi, [Online: web], Accessed 6 June 2016, URL: https://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/171_Annual-Report-2009-2010.pdf, Pg . V.

both the leaders met a day later in Yekaterinburg, Singh mentioned that "if the Pakistani leadership shows courage, determination and statesmanship to take the high road to peace, India will meet it more than half the way."[432]

The Hindu on the other hand, advocated that apart from engagement and talks with Pakistan, there was no other alternative to deal to such a course. The newspaper in its editorial stated that there was no dramatic breakthrough in the meeting but the initiative by Dr. Singh showed his statesmanship in trying to resolve the issues between the neighbouring countries. *The Hindu's* editorial further said that this meeting had surely provided a fresh impetus to the process of India-Pakistan engagement. The paper further said, "Pakistan's repeated failure to deliver on the assurance that its territory would not be used to mount acts of terrorism against India is partly political and partly institutional."[433]

While commenting that the option of "No Dialogue" is really not feasible, *The Hindu* wrote that "suspending the composite dialogue but not trade and cultural contacts was seen as a useful halfway house."[434] The paper maintained that it conveyed "India's outrage to the Pakistani state and people while leaving open the room for mutually beneficial interaction."[435] However, *The Times of India* carried an op-ed article in which it stated that moderation was not always a virtue in diplomacy and while commenting on Pakistan, the op-ed stated, "It is Pakistan, not India, which has *[sic]* prevented the normalisation of bilateral relations by making it contingent on the resolution of the Kashmir issue."[436] Thus, the article maintained it is Islamabad that needed to reshape its policy towards New Delhi and not vice versa."[437] But, *The Telegraph's* editorial on the leader's meeting in Russia stated that "Mr Singh's opener has put Pakistan back on the mat by firmly reiterating that the talks are still conditional."[438]

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[432] Agencies (2009), "PM's Wishlist: Peace with Pak, End of Terrorism", *The Indian Express*, New Delhi, 17 June 2009.

[433] Editorial (2009), "A Fresh Start", *The Hindu,* New Delhi, 18 June 2009.

[434] *Ibid.*

[435] *Ibid*.

[436] Bansal, Kanwar (2009), "Why Talk to Pakistan?", *The Times of India,* New Delhi, 17 June 2009.

[437] *Ibid*.

[438] Editorial (2009), "Hard Talk", *The Telegraph,* Kolkata, 18 June 2009.

One month after the meetings at the sidelines of SCO and BRICS summits, on July 16, 2009, Manmohan Singh and Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani met at the annual meet of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) at Sharm-el-Sheikh, Egypt. They issued a joint communiqué that focused mainly on terror-related issues. The two much debated and controversial points of the statement were: de-linking action on terrorism and composite dialogue process; and the mention of Balochistan issue in the joint statement. The statement received different responses in both the countries as the respective political parties and media analysed the same thing in ways which suited their interests and made it a subject of debate in the Indian and Pakistani political circles and media. For instance, *The Times of India* said in an article on July 17, 2009 that India had walked more than the extra mile for Pakistan. It also said that this was a new beginning between India and Pakistan but cooperation on terrorism was essential for India-Pakistan talks to go forward. *The Hindu*, in its editorial "There Must Be No Backsliding" published on July 18, 2009, stated, "In plain English, this means both processes must proceed on the basis of their own logic, independently of each other. Pakistan must take action against terrorists regardless of whether the composite dialogue process resumes; and India must not link the process of composite dialogue to the quantum of action Pakistan takes against terrorism ... The Prime Minister (Singh) struck the right note in Parliament by clarifying what India expects Pakistan to do but emphasising that the only way forward in the coming months is engagement. This newspaper could not agree with him more — and expects him to hold firm on the course worked out."[439]

These attacks have had a lot of internal and external implications for India, Pakistan and for their bilateral relationship. India had expressed its readiness to talk only on topics related to terrorism and security, and kept reiterating throughout that Pakistan should bring the perpetrators of Mumbai tragedy to justice. The cross-border terrorism issue had always been significant to India but the Mumbai terrorist attack made it imperative for Pakistan to take action on this issue. But this certainly had jeopardised the reconciliation process between India and Pakistan on several issues like Kashmir, Siachen and Sir Creek as well as those related to visa, trade and the status as Most Favoured Nation (MFN).

- Initially, after the 26/11 attacks, no statements released by the Indian government made any mention of Kashmir. But later on, the dialogue related to Kashmir took place. Former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan, G Parthasarathy, in an article in

[439] Editorial (2009), "There Must Be No Backsliding", *The Hindu,* New Delhi, 18 July 2009.

The Economic Times mentioned that India had to make it clear that any dialogue on Jammu and Kashmir will be based on "what was agreed upon in the earlier track-II diplomacy talks being carried out by [the then] Indian diplomat Satish Lambah [and former] Pakistan foreign Secretary Sartaj Aziz. But a meaningful dialogue on such issues will be possible only after Pakistan acts to bring to justice those responsible for the 26/11 carnage, and to dismantle the ISI's infrastructure of terrorism."[440] Later, in 2010, the Centre had appointed a Group of Interlocutors for Jammu and Kashmir.[441]

- The other issues which are sources of dispute between the two nations are Siachen and Sir Creek. The dialogue related to Siachen Glacier occurred in New Delhi in May 2011 and in Islamabad in June 2012. But, both the meetings were inconclusive. *The Dawn* described this problem as a "pointless conflict" in an editorial on April 9, 2012. On the other hand, *The Nation*, in an editorial of June 13, 2012, said that the "Siachen remains frozen and the golden opportunity of resolving the issue has been missed." On the other hand, *The Hindu* carried an article by A.G. Noorani on June 11, 2012 which asked the countries to "settle the Siachen dispute now [then]."[442] New Delhi in 2009 cancelled previously scheduled talks on the Sir Creek maritime dispute and since then, the composite dialogue has remained officially suspended.

But the Indian and Pakistani officials met twice in May 2011 and June 2012 to talk about the demarcation of the boundary but these meetings were also inconclusive. Pakistani newspaper, *The Dawn*, reacted positively over the meetings on June 20, 2012 and stated that both the countries expressed their desire to find an amicable solution of the Sir Creek issue through sustained and result oriented dialogue. The other papers, like *The Nation* and *The Daily Times*, reacted similarly and said that they (India and Pakistan) agreed to hold the next round of the talks on Sir Creek issue in Pakistan at mutually convenient dates, to be determined through diplomatic channels. On the other hand, the Indian newspaper, *The Indian Express* discussed the meetings in the same tone as the Pakistani daily. It said that although the talks were

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[440] Parthasarthy, G. (2009), "Abetting Terror Won't Help Resolve Kashmir Dispute", *The Economic Times,* New Delhi, 3 March 2009.

[441] Kumar, Vinay (2012), "J&K Interlocuters' Report For Reviewing All Central Acts", *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 24 May 2012.

[442] Noorani, A.G. (2012), "Settle the Siachen Dispute Now", *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 24 August 2015.

held in a friendly and cordial atmosphere, both India and Pakistan stood steadfast by their respective stands on Sir Creek. "Both the issues [Siachen Glacier and Sir Creek] have not moved beyond the position of 2007-2008. These are good examples of how the notion of state sovereignty and political ego of the military and civilian leaders can become an obstacle to a working solution," Hasan Askari Rizvi, a senior Pakistani political analyst, said, adding that "the resolution to these problems will generate a lot of goodwill for each other in both countries. It will then be possible for them to address more difficult problems. The resolution of these problems will be a trend setter for resolving other problems." (Rizvi 2012: 23)

- Moreover, the water sharing issue which has been an irritant among India and Pakistan had again become prominent. *The Hindu* carried an opinion piece which stated that water had the potential of becoming a "new core issue of even greater prominence than Kashmir and called for urgent attention."[443] Furthermore, it also carried an opinion piece by John Briscoe on February 22, 2013, titled "Winning the Battle but Losing the War", which stated while allowing "India to build the Kishenganga project, the International Court of Arbitration has de facto ruled that the Baglihar decision was wrong and should not be applied to future projects."[444]

- India and Pakistan have had very little trading relations for the last many decades. Trade and economy are other significant areas which were affected by the Mumbai terror attacks but both the countries over the years have wanted to bridge the gap in these sectors. A shift was seen late 2011 onwards that bolstered economic ties which provided an opportunity to boost the economy of the both the countries and to work together in bringing the perpetrators of the 26/11 attacks to justice. Undoubtedly, political conflict is the main element that obstructed bilateral trade between India and Pakistan**.** Moreover, the Mumbai terror attack also hampered the sports' ties between the two nations. The attack didn't end just the South Asian *entente cordiale* but also one-on-one cricket matches between the two nuclear nations. Although it was not the first time, the cricket ties had suffered between both the nation states. It happened during the Kargil War and then later during the 2001 Parliament attack. India and Pakistan played cricket against each other for the first time since the 26/11 attacks on

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[443] Iyer, Ramaswamy (2011), "Pakistan: Water on the Boil Again", *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 26 July 2011.

[444] Briscoe, John (2013), "Winning the Battle But Losing the War", *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 22 February 2013.

March 30, 2011 in Mohali, India. As it was a World Cup semi-final, its high-profile nature provided an opportunity for equally high-profile cricket diplomacy. *The Times of India* carried an editorial, titled "Bat for Amity" on March 28, 2011, which read, "Inviting Pakistan's President and Prime Minister for the Mohali encounter, Prime Minister <u>Manmohan Singh</u> did well to seize it."[445] Later on, in 2012, India invited Pakistan for a series of cricket matches but it evoked a mixed response from people of both the nations. The diplomacy via cricket was something that helped the two countries ease tensions. The relations between India and Pakistan also affected the hockey bilateral series between the countries.

- As the anniversary of the Mumbai terrorist attacks approached, all the Indian newspapers and magazines came up with op-ed articles, analysis and statements — mostly related to the impact of 26/11 on Indo-Pak relations. After the first anniversary, the newspapers and channels used to cover the issue like an event based story as whenever something used to happen in India and Pakistan relations, the media used to give it prominence. Ajmal Amir Kasab, the only gunman who was captured alive by the police, was hanged on November 21, 2012 at Yerwada Jail, Pune. Consequently, the Indian media was flooded with news related to his hanging and its implications on the bilateral relations. Moreover, a lot of editorials in the Indian media criticised the hanging of Ajmal Amir Kasab. According to India's well reputed magazine, *Economic & Political Weekly'*s editorial in December 2012 edition which discussed about Ajmal Amir Kasab's hanging mentioned whether it was an act of justice or revenge. The article read, "India's first execution of a death penalty in eight years, the speed with which Ajmal Kasab (the only perpetrator of the November 26, 2008 killings to have been held) was hanged after his mercy petition was rejected by the President, the public celebrations that erupted in a few parts of the country and the manner in which the media has reported/commented on the hanging in Pune on November 21, 2012 must force us to ask ourselves: Are we a society that seeks justice or prefers to lust for revenge?" *The Hindu*, in its editorial, on November 22, 2012 wrote that it was opposed to the death penalty on principle — often in the face of intense public disapproval. The editorial read:

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[445] Editorial (2011), "Bat for Amity", *The Times of India*, New Delhi, 28 March 2011.

"Ever since that traumatic night we now denote by the veiled abbreviation 26/11, Kasab has justifiably been the face of evil for millions of Indians. He took part in a monstrous plot against the people of India and Mumbai, killed innocent people with abandon, and showed no remorse for his actions ... Kasab was neither the architect of 26/11 nor its strategic mastermind; the men who indoctrinated and controlled him remain safe in Pakistan, where most will likely never see the inside of a courtroom." It added that "the arguments against the death penalty are well known. There are pragmatic ones — in this case, that Kasab could have provided valuable testimony in future trials of yet-to-be-arrested 26/11 perpetrators."[446]

However, *The Times of India* in its November 22, 2012 editorial wrote that the daily usually opposed the death sentences in most of the cases but with Ajmal Amir Kasab's hanging, there were legal, moral as well as practical reasons for the death penalty. The editorial further said,

"In coming to India with the express purpose of slaughtering as many people as he could find, Kasab and his comrades mounted a mini-invasion of the country, committing effectively an act of war. And in war there are casualties. Will Kasab's hanging bring about closure on 26/11? Far from it. Kasab was merely a foot soldier, and the masterminds of 26/11 are still around in Pakistan and freely venting their venom against India."[447]

The Indian Express in its editorial on the same day wrote,

"It is unseemly that Wednesday's denouement should be received with a jingoistic glee, with some, like Gandhian activist Anna Hazare, regretting that Kasab was not given a public hanging. What is a sombre moment of closure, even if partial, for the monstrous attacks of 26/11, after a difficult legal process, should not be converted into an opportunity to chant for blood, or for political point-scoring. The death penalty is a grim responsibility. As long as capital punishment exists in the statute book, the government must follow due procedure with utter sobriety. It must not contribute to, or cede space for, a petty politics to surround these cases."[448]

On the other hand, Pakistani media had reacted very cautiously to the news of 26/11 Mumbai terror attack convict Ajmal Amir Kasab's hanging as *The Daily Times* stated that India secretly hanged the sole surviving gunman from the 2008 Mumbai attacks, sparking celebrations days before the fourth anniversary of the assault on the financial capital. The Mumbai terrorist attack irrevocably affected the ongoing peace process and the immediate reaction after the Mumbai siege was that of anger among the people of India. These attacks

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[446] Editorial (2012), "The Hangman's Justice", *The Hindu,* New Delhi, 22 November 2012.

[447] Editorial (2012), "Lesser Evil", *The Times of India*, New Delhi, 22 November 2012.

[448] Editorial (2012), "Process and Punishment", *The Indian Express*, New Delhi, 22 November 2012.

have also raised several questions regarding the Indian security and intelligence systems that could not protect one of its biggest cities. As the attacks had proved to be detrimental to the progress made in the Indo-Pak peace dialogue, the media in India and Pakistan had acted as facilitator for providing a platform for having a people-to-people contact with each other. One such initiative was "*Aman ki Asha*".

5.7 *Aman Ki Asha*[449]

As the relationship came to a halt after the terrorist attacks, the press had tried to do its own bit in normalising the relationship between India and Pakistan by acting as a peace facilitator between both the counties when the leaders of the two nuclear-armed nation-states had shunned any semblance of dialogue between them. For example, *The Times of India* and Pakistan's *Jang Group* launched "Aman ki Asha" (AKA), a peace movement, on January 1, 2010 to promote amity between the two countries. Their joint statement said, "It is one of history's ironies that people who share so much, refuse to acknowledge their similarities and focus so avidly on their differences. We believe it is time to restore the equilibrium. Public opinion is far too potent a force to be left in the hands of narrow vested interests." It further said,

> "The media in India and Pakistan speaks directly to the hearts and minds and stomachs of the people. It can help in writing a final chapter, adding a happy twist to a story that seemed headed for tragedy. It can do so by shaping the discourse and steering it away from rancour and divisiveness. It has the maturity to recognise the irritants and obstacles to peace and will not take a timid stance towards the more intractable and contentious issues — whether relating to Kashmir, water disputes or the issue of cross-border terrorism. It can offer solutions and nudge the leadership towards a sustained peace process. It can create an enabling environment where new ideas can germinate and bold initiatives can sprout. The media can begin the conversation where a plurality of views and opinions are not drowned out by shrill voices."[450]

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[449] It means "hope for peace".

[450] "An Idea Whose Time has Come", *The Times of India*, New Delhi, [Online: Web], Accessed 25 December 2016, URL: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/the-campaign/An-Idea-Whose-Time-Has-Come/articleshow/5621301.cms.

This initiative is viewed as a Track II channel which seeks to improve people-to-people contacts, diplomatic as well as cultural ties with Pakistan. In May 2012, a two day economic meet was organised in Lahore by the joint initiative of "Aman ki Asha".[451]

On Track II diplomacy, Ayesha Siddiqa mentioned:

> "It does help in developing some understanding of each other but largely it has zero results because track-II in both countries works closely with track-I. As a result, track-II becomes a good paid holiday for some."[452]

Amit Baruah while commenting on Track II diplomacy, stated:

> "It has been helpful in the past. Indians and Pakistanis do not always meet. They have all kinds of notions about each other. It is good to meet and talk. But the problem with track II is that it has become very institutionalised. Same 20 people meet on Indian side and same 20 people on the Pakistani side meet. The idea of genuine Track II diplomacy should be to expand. To expand to students, to university teachers to business persons, to civil societies there is really a need for that."[453]

On Indo-Pak relationship, Sanjaya Baru wrote that all this while Pakistan has done very little in last so many years to "respond to Indian concerns about terrorism in the region emanating from territories under its control and command."[454] He also mentioned that since the Mmbai terrorist attacks and "in the face of extreme provocation, Indian political leadership across the ideological divide has tried to mend fences with Pakistan and failed. The attack on Uri brought India's simmering mood to a boil... [But] Pakistan's response of denial should not surprise anyone.[455]

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[451] "Aman Ki Asha Economic Conference 2012" [Online: web], Accessed 6 July 2016, URL: http://amankiasha.com/?p=2748.

[452] *Siddiqa, Ayesha (2017), e-mail to the author, 19 March 2017.

[453]*Baruah, Amit (2017), personal interview, ITO, New Delhi, 8 June 2017.

[454] Baru, Sanjaya (2016), "An Indo-Pak Cold War", *The Indian Express*, New Delhi, 6 October 2016.

[455] *Ibid.*

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The Indian media, both print and electronic, have played a pivotal role in covering the conflicts between India and Pakistan. The India-Pakistan relationship has always been marked by mistrust, animosity and has been conflict ridden in the last six decades. Thus, to understand the role of media in this context, one needs to understand the coverage in historical perspective as well.

In an interview with author, A. K. Tandon, who was the media advisor to the then Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee in 2001 mentioned that "the scars of the Partition have not been forgotten by the first generation of media journalists since India's Independence, but the hostility was gradually toning down and things were moving towards normalcy."[456] He also stated that during the conflicts of 1947-1948, 1965 and 1971, the focus of media was very different but things changed when the element of terrorism made its roadway into the Indo-Pak relationship. Thus, from 1947 till 1971 War, it was print media, *AIR* and *Doordarshan* which covered the Indo-Pak conflicts and tensions. Even, with all its limitations, the press at that time, remained "objective" in its. By and large, the media used to only react when there was an escalation of conflicts or war. But during normal circumstances, there was not much focus on the Indo-Pak relations or tensions. Also as the print media chiefly covered the events, most of the reporting was briefing oriented.[457]

Moving towards the late 1990s, two key factors which dominated the coverage of Indo-Pak relations were a) the advent of electronic media and b) cross-border terrorism and terrorist attacks on India by Pakistan-based terrorist groups. Indian media, both print and electronic, undoubtedly has played a significant role in bringing the India's point of view to the fore during Indo-Pak conflicts through its minute, thorough and relentless coverage and its ability to mould public opinions.

Several experts from various schools of thought have examined the intricate and complex relationship between press, public opinion and foreign policy formulation. Many researchers

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[456] *Tandon, A. K. (2017), personal interview, Transport Bhawan, New Delhi, 16 June 2017.

[457] *Ibid.*

find that public opinion does not make a useful contribution to diplomacy and foreign policy matters whereas others hold it in higher significance. Realists like Walter Lippman, E. H. Carr and Hans J. Morgenthau were quite sceptical about the role of public opinion in foreign policy. According to them, the public opinion is volatile and it lacks coherent opinion and structure as their theory presumes that the general public has no knowledge of day-to-day foreign affairs and is indifferent to foreign policy.

However, liberals like Ole R. Holsti and Immanuel Kant have challenged the realists' view and believe that public opinion does influence foreign policy immensely and effectively helps in setting up foreign policy. This theory presumes that public opinion is rational and stable. But irrespective of the differences, these schools recognise the tangible relationship between foreign policy and public opinion.

Moreover, the media has played and continues to play an important role in influencing public opinion and the government cannot afford to marginalise the media in a modern society and democratic country like India. This has become all the more true in the present scenario because of the advancement in technology, revolution in Information Technology, telecommunications and mass media. Nowadays, people are more aware about their surroundings with regard to national and foreign discourses.

Within this context, it becomes worthwhile to mention that the behaviour of countries, their policy priorities and their approaches to foreign policy are moulded on perceptions which shape their foreign policy outlook. Media plays a significant role in shaping some of these perceptions and thus influences "foreign policy decision making not only in terms of providing inputs in the form of news reports, but also having the potential to contribute substantially in terms of policy formulation." (Pattanaik 2004:7*)*

The print media builds up public's perception by giving a prominent space to a particular subject in their dailies and also by putting images with flashy captions. Also, the newspapers, while reflecting public opinion in the form of criticism and suggestions through their editorial pages and op-ed articles, simultaneously influence common man's thinking.

In electronic media, because of its power to show videos, pictures and live coverages, the impact on people is observed more. In today's competitive world, mass media plays an increasingly significant role. As George Gebner suggested that "... Through selection, treatment, emphasis and tone, the mass media help define their own set of significant

realities, structure the agenda of public (and increasingly, of private) discourse and make dominant perspectives [available], from which realities, priorities, actions and policies might be viewed." (Gebner 1961: 313)

B. Cohen bracketed the role of media in influencing foreign policy formulations as "a) an observer of foreign policy news, b) as a participant in the foreign policy process which includes interaction with the policymakers, and c) as playing role of the catalyst of foreign news." (Cohen 1963: *n.d.*). As suggested by Manoj Joshi, the media works differently on domestic and foreign policies. While explaining it further, he mentioned that in domestic policies, media is just "one of the sources that assist us in understanding our choices and exercising them. In domestic affairs, we could get information from personal or observed experience." (Joshi 2016: 259) But when it comes to covering the matters of foreign policy, Joshi said that "at least in India there is a great dependency on media to explain and report foreign policy developments. Additionally, he also mentioned that how the impact of different medium differs. In the case of electronic media, the public can vary from the educated sector to illiterate person. But in the case of print media, it has to be an educated person who buys the dailies." *(ibid.)*

Moreover, the media's influence on foreign policy matters is shaped by two important factors, Sanjaya Baru said, adding, "Firstly, the extent of domestic political disagreement or consensus on foreign policy issues; and secondly, the relationship between the Government of the day and the media." (Baru 2009: 278)

Thus, the whole dynamics of press, public opinion and foreign policy is a little complex but undoubtedly the press plays a pivotal role in influencing foreign policy by generating public opinion. Amit Baruah, who is the resident editor with *The Hindu* and was posted in Pakistan from 1997-2000, said in a personal interview that "there has always been an effort to influence foreign policy through the media. Print, of course, is also an important mechanism to influence people but [and] there are more critical voices in the print media than there are in the electronic media."[458] He further added that nowadays the social media (like Twitter and Facebook) has become a new ground of contest.

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[458] *Baruah, Amit (2017), personal interview, ITO, New Delhi, 8 June 2017.

While commenting on the relationship between the press, public opinion and foreign policy, Ayesha Siddiqa in an e-mail interview mentioned to the author that "in both India and Pakistan, media has generally become a tool for lobbies that broadly pressure the re-orientation or the direction of foreign policy. This is often done through [by] building a hype on issues or twisting arguments in a way that it moulds public opinion. The hype created thus amounts to pressure on policy makers."[459] But, according to Hamid Mir, who opined about this press-public opinion-foreign policy relationship in Pakistan, stated, "We [Pakistanis] were more concerned about our domestic problems than India. I [He] think [thinks] our [Pakistan's] media is not important for foreign policy makers. Media became important in [the] last 10 years but it is not very independent. Pakistani democracy is going through an evolution process and media is part of this process."[460] Manoj Joshi, who is a commentator and analyst of national and international politics, in an e-mail interview to the author stated that "as such government dominates the foreign policy discourse in the country. However, whenever the government position is ambiguous and unclear, the media tends to take the lead and push in this or that direction."[461]

Furthermore, it is pertinent to discuss media's coverage of terrorism. Lot of researchers have worked on media's coverage of conflicts. According to Bruce Hoffman, "without the media's coverage the act's impact is arguably wasted, remaining narrowly confined to the immediate victim(s) of the attack, rather than reaching the wider target audience at whom the terrorists' violence is actually aimed." (Hoffman 2006: 174)

Likewise, Brigitte Nacos who is also an expert on the issue, said: "Without massive news coverage, the terrorist act would resemble the proverbial tree falling in the forest: if no one learnt of an incident, it would be as if it had not occurred." (Nacos 2000: 175)

In the last two decades, as there have been a lot of changes due to globalisation, it has also led to the spread in the roots of terrorism. Today, because of the technological advancements, people not only read the hard copies of newspapers but refer to their online edition. Thus, in the present scenario, the "possibility of gaining media attention can trigger terrorism more than ever." (Frey and Rohner 2007: 140) Moreover, Thussu and Freedman have figured out

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[459] *Siddiqa, Ayesha (2017), e-mail to the author, 19 March 2017.

[460] *Mir, Hamid (2017), e-mail to the author, 29 March 2017.

[461] *Joshi, Manoj (2017), e-mail to the author, 14 July 2017.

three key discourses concerning the role of mainstream media in communicating conflict and they have identified them as "critical observer, publicist and most recently, as battleground, the surface upon which war is imagined and executed." (Thussu and Freedman 2003: 4-5) Hence, media can be very influential in moulding public's opinion on the issue of foreign policies and on terrorism or conflict as how to think about issues or objects. As most of the people do not have first-hand experience with foreign countries, therefore in such a scenario, media becomes a powerful medium and provides us with how we should perceive other countries.

When one's nation is facing a war-like situation, all its institutions also stand united and become part of that conflict. The media, which is described as the fourth pillar in a democratic nation like India, is no exception.

In the hour of crises, the government, the military and public get united. For example, in the beginning of the 1999 Kargil War (from May 8, 1999 till May 25, 1999), newspapers such as *The Telegraph*, *The Hindu, The Indian Express, The Times of India* and *The Hindustan Times* had carried small pieces of news either on the front page or in the middle pages related to Kargil.

There were no editorials or op-ed articles initially, as no one had any idea about the state of affairs. There were hardly one or two small pieces per day on the regular events from Kargil. Slowly, when the crises started unfolding, all the dailies, *The Indian Express, The Hindu, The Hindustan Times, The Telegraph* and *The Times of India* started filling up their pages with the Kargil story as soon as they started getting the information about the conflict from their correspondents, through news agencies and from the press handouts.

For the common man and the media, the conflict had begun when the government had announced about the aerial bombings. After the announcement, there was a substantial increase of news reports in the newspapers there after. Based on the available information from the government sources or through alternative ways, the Indian media had highlighted a variety of issues. There are certain themes through which the role of print media during the Kargil War has been analysed. The themes of the dailies during the Kargil War have been identified after analysing the newspapers for almost two and half months i.e. from May 1999 to July 1999.

According to these dailies, the main focus of newspapers during the Kargil War was on 1) "To Uphold the Sanctity of LoC". Under this theme, all the newspapers had insisted on the Line of Control, which came into being between India and Pakistan by the direction of United Nations in 1949, should not be violated by Pakistan. The dailies stated that Pakistan backed infiltrators who had crossed the LoC and entered the Indian side and, had violated the sanctity of LoC.

2) "Intelligence Failure Led to Conflict", in which all the newspapers had maintained that the Kargil conflict occurred due to the failure of intelligence agencies. Moreover, there was a sub-theme which falls under this section. For instance, the media had focussed on government's inability to understand Pakistan's actions and the media blamed the government for its failure in upgrading the defence equipment for the soldiers.

3) "India Got Positive International Support", in which the newspapers emphasised on how the world community stood behind India which included the USA, Britain and the EU. The newspapers in their editorials and op-ed articles reflected that United States of America from the beginning of the conflict had sent strong signals in favour of India and branded Pakistan as an aggressor. Newspapers have given attention to America's stance on the Kargil War. But simultaneously, the media fraternity also started speculating the future course of India-US relationship. Additionally, as the threat of nuclear weapons was looming over the South Asian region, the media also focused on the equation between India and China.

Newspaper articles have displayed that in the beginning China remained aloof towards the issue but by the end of the conflict, the newspapers focused on the equation between India and China's future relationship.

4) The theme, "Impact of War on Economy" appeared in the newspapers in the middle of conflict. The dailies recognised that more than two-months-long military conflict will have an impact on the economy so it started writing on its cascading effect. The newspapers stated that even though the Indian economy had been robust enough during the time of Kargil War, the country will definitely have to pay its cost.

5) The next theme on which the media focused was the "Internationalisation of Issue". The media has focussed on Pakistan's ambitions of internationalising the Kargil issue and hence

the Kashmir issue. "To Build National Consensus" was another theme on which media focused on during the Kargil War. All newspapers played a role in which the leaders of ruling party were asked to form a constructive consensus among the political parties so that it created an atmosphere that helped in the formation of national consensus.

These were broader themes on the role of print media during the Kargil War. The Kargil War was big news for Indian print and electronic media as for the first time significant number of Indian journalists went into the battlefield to cover the war. Nearly for those two and a half months of conflict, the newspapers, magazines and news channels had tried to cover all the possible aspects of the conflict.

Interestingly, the Kargil conflict coincided with the revolution in India's electronic media. The coverage of War by the electronic media was widespread thanks to technological advancements and presence of private satellite channels in abundance. As the media got access to the war zone, a battery of photographers, cameramen and reporters made minute by minute and breathless coverage of the battle.

Undoubtedly, India's first televised war was successful in bringing things to the common man's house. It was the first time in the history of Indian media that the journalists were reporting from the conflict zone. Similarly, it was the first time even for the military to see television reporters at a battlefield. However, the main source of information, even for electronic media during the Kargil War, was the government as the channels had attributed the news or story to the government sources in all its reports.

While mentioning about reporting on the war-like situation, A.K. Tandon said, "Electronic media wants to cover conflicts from the theatre of war because you get visuals and even till today, the armed forces would not allow media to reach the theatre of conflict on its own. They [The Army] will conduct press party, take them to the area wherever they want [desired by them]. The media even today is not free to visit."[462]

Likewise, Amit Baruah also wrote that "as a reporter, we should be interested in the facts. We have limitations on the facts because we don't have access. So, [we are] dependent on what

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[462] *Tandon, A. K. (2017), personal interview, Transport Bhawan, New Delhi, 16 June 2017.

the governments tell us. A good practice is to try and check the claims being made by either side on situation of conflict."[463]

Ashley J. Tellis, C. Christine Fair and Jemison Jo Medby wrote: "India recognizes [*sic*] the utility of the media in contemporary conflicts and will continue its offensive in the information war. India believes that it won Kargil politically, in part because of its dexterous capability of shaping international perception. India also values the role of perception management in affecting public opinion domestically as well as influencing the morale of the Indian and Pakistani militaries."[464]

But the role of electronic media came under scrutiny from the experts for its coverage of Kargil War. Geeta Seshu said that the media had done "the best thing: it manufactured stories. Stories, euphemism in journalistic parlance for reports/features/analysis, were written up on every aspect of the conflict, often going far beyond government briefings and reports of the army handouts to bring us second hand accounts of various actions in the battle." (Seshu 1999: 2917)

Seshu further stated that the media reports tried to "cover plethora of possible angles of the conflict. We had human interest profiles of families of martyrs and the plight of villagers in border areas, poignant reports of letters from home and STD calls home and little spot stories on tailors stitching shrouds for the dead soldiers, the food we feed our soldiers, corporate responses to Kargil and views of celebrities on the conflict."[465]

There was *Doordarshan* which had towed the lines of the government officials in its coverage. On the other hand, the privately-owned *Star News* had done critical reporting during the Kargil War. Moreover, Tandon criticised the role of a journalist belonging to the electronic media and without naming anyone, stated that during the Kargil War, there was "one television journalist [who] managed to reach the theatre of conflict in Kargil and there was a code of conduct how the journalist reached Kargil.... [but] those days there were only satellite phones which you can [*sic*] operate in the region and the journalist and the journalist

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[463] *Baruah, Amit (2017), personal interview, ITO, New Delhi, 8 June 2017.

[464] Tellis, Ashley J. et al. (2001), *Limited Conflicts Under the Nuclear Umbrella: Indian and Pakistani Lessons From the Kargil Crisis*, California: Rand.

[465] Seshu, Geeta (1999), "Media and Kargil: Information Blitz with Dummy Missile", *Economy and Political Weekly,* 34(41): 2917-2919.

used the satellite phone for the channel... Within few minutes, the enemy traced the phone call and started shelling on that particular bunker. The channel was held responsible for casualties at our side because of its coverage. Later, there was a code of enquiry but nothing came up. However, the journalist ended up becoming a celebrity."[466]

The critics had then accused electronic media for being an ally of the Indian Army. Not just this, they accused media for making the war into a television serial. According to them, the media had failed in doing an in-depth coverage of war.

Also, the critics mentioned that the press by and large was not at all familiar with the language and idioms used by the Defence spokesman during the daily briefings. Moreover, the Indian electronic media had hyped the issue for its own commercial benefits. Several critics stated that Indian media was overenthusiastic and electronic media particularly could not gauge the effects of such live reporting.

As the crisis in 1999 started unfolding, all the dailies had sent their respective correspondents on the battle field. Even then, *The Telegraph*'s reportage was quite balanced in nature which was followed by *The Hindu* which also sincerely made efforts to stay balanced. It was further followed by *The Indian Express*, *The Hindustan Times* and *The Times of India. The Telegraph* followed by *The Hindu*, mostly carried the hard news. *The Telegraph* and *The Hindu* didn't try to paint the story with jingoism while reporting the deaths of Indian soldiers. Their editorials were direct and simple. In these dailies, they featured analytical articles more, but because of their comparatively limited readership, their views were circulated among less and particular groups. Therefore, the reports carried out by the *The Indian Express, The Hindustan Times* and *The Times of India* were noticed by the majority. *The Indian Express*, *The Hindustan Times* and *The Times of India* were quite critical of Pakistan. All the dailies but especially *The Times of India* had covered the issue in such a way that proved the media had set an agenda and this showed how it can act as a force multiplier. It had carried the stories in which it lauded the government's move.

During the Parliament attack in New Delhi in 2001, the Indian print media carried stories related to Parliament terror attack the very next day. Some carried a full-page story in which the chronology of attacks was mentioned. Few dailies put the factual stories related to the

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[466] *Tandon, A. K. (2017), personal interview, Transport Bhawan, New Delhi, 16 June 2017.

attack and some gave different angles to the story on the front page itself. All the newspapers the next day had also carried reactions of the politicians and the big wigs.

Since it was an attack on Indian Parliament, the newspapers such as *The Telegraph*, *The Hindu, The Indian Express, The Times of India* and *The Hindustan Times* unanimously carried banner headlines to prove that it was an attack on world's largest democracy. Moreover, the Indian print media mostly stood united while reporting the attack, but the themes on which the newspapers mainly focused upon were:

1) "Lack of the Security at Parliament", in which all the newspapers highlighted that how easily the terrorists had entered the Parliament House. The Home Minister and his team may had claimed to have successfully warded off the attackers since they could not enter the Parliament building, but a powerful section in government and media believed that Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) was also responsible for the security breach.

2) In the theme titled "Diplomacy and Not Military Action Will Succeed Against Terrorism", the Indian newspapers, experts as well as strategists were of the view that cutting off diplomatic ties with Pakistan would not help either of the countries. Thus, the dailies had carried a lot of articles and editorials on not taking military actions against Pakistan.

India's diplomatic relations with Pakistan had reached a new low after the December 13, 2001 terrorist attack as India had withdrawn its High Commissioner from Islamabad and decided to terminate the Amritsar-Lahore Samjhauta Express along with the bus service between Delhi and Lahore. Under the third theme titled 3) "To Put Pressure on Pakistan", the newspapers highlighted that it was significant to put pressure on Islamabad to bring down terror groups, which are working against India. From the next day onwards i.e. December 14, 2001, New Delhi had asked Islamabad to act immediately against terror outfits LeT and JeM and the dailies had clearly put across this view in its articles and editorials.

The print media's next theme was on 4) "Coverage of S.A.R Geelani's Role in the Attack". Under this theme, the newspapers had done quite relentless coverage of S.A.R. Geelani's role in the attack. Soon after his arrest, the leading dailies started reporting on Geelani's role in the attack, with minute details within two to three days. This was followed by a next theme titled "On Indo-Pak Relationship", wherein the newspapers had carried many editorials and

op-ed articles by experts on the future course of relationship between India and Pakistan. These themes were formed after analysing the above mentioned newspapers for one month from the next day onwards of the attack.

In short, the newspapers started carrying the reports as much as they could gather from the different sources. But, after almost two weeks, the numbers of articles carried by the print media started getting lesser. All the dailies focused on the above mentioned themes but overall, *The Indian Express* had maintained that India will soon return to normalcy and it itself was a welcome gesture.

On the other hand, the first day coverage of *The Hindustan Times* was more elaborate than any other daily. Both *The Hindustan Times* and *The Indian Express* had stressed that situation remained tense and any small act of provocation could snowball into a full-scale war. Moreover, *The Telegraph* stressed on the US' response to the terror attacks. The editorials shrank after initial two days in *The Telegraph*. It also gave a lot of coverage to issues relating to security challenges. On the other hand, *The Hindu* had carried a lot of official reports.

During the Parliament attack in 2001, as the news of the terror attack broke mid-morning, a shocked and anxious nation turned to news channels. As Parliament was in session, most television channels had their cameras in place and were able to capture some of the dramatic footage. People were running for some cover, security men were taking positions and the sense of gunfire sent chills down people's spine; it all was shown in the television live coverage. Then a little later, all the channels broadcast the eye-witnesses' accounts of visibly shaken people. Initially, all the channels were giving bits of information as and when they received them, but the full scenario remained hazy the first day. Hindu news channels, such as, *Star News*, *Aaj Tak*, *DD News* and the English language channels like *NDTV*, all dispensed with their regular schedules and instead went live. Like September 11, 2001, the December 13, 2001 terror strike was played out in front of the television cameras. The site for the television crews had been placed some 60 metres away from the scene of the action. Television played a major role in reporting both September 11, 2001 and December 13, 2001 incidents.

Manoj Joshi, while commenting on the role of media stated that, there was a commonality of sorts in the manner in which the media, especially the electronic media shaped the discourse.

This was best illustrated by the case of "the Bombay blasts of 1993 that took place before the era of twenty four hour private news channel. In the former case, most people got the import of the news over a 12-hour period through their morning dailies, while during the Parliament attack, the event was actually carried [telecast] live because it happened where the cameras were positioned in front of the Parliament." (*cited in* Veer and Munshi 2004: 134) On all the news channels, the events were taking over as reporters struggled to temper their excitement with the correct information. But all the Indian news channels struck the same chord and mirrored the mood of the nation. On electronic media's role, Brijesh D. Jayal in an op-ed in *The Telegraph* on December 26, 2001, said: "Ever since the aborted terrorist assault on the Indian Parliament, there has been abundant speculation on the likely Indian response. Thanks to the electronic media there is no dearth of analysts and panellists who have endlessly been advising on what should be the Indian government's reaction."[467]

Then the November terrorist attack struck Mumbai in 2008 that strained the already troubled Indo-Pak relationship. The Mumbai terrorist attacks had surprised the Indian print and electronic media, both. Initially, when the series of strikes started, the picture was sketchy, and with this, the volume of information and misinformation both grew simultaneously for another 12 hours.

The print media in India gave huge coverage to the incident and did an equally elaborate analysis of the tragedy. All leading newspapers, *The Telegraph*, *The Hindu, The Indian Express, The Times of India* and *The Hindustan Times* did not have much information on the next day as the attacks had occurred the previous night itself.

The coverage and the detailed analysis were done by the above mentioned newspapers for the next few days and then the extent of the news dropped. However, some aspect or the other of the Mumbai attacks kept appearing in the print media for many months and years to follow, till the lone survivor was hanged. But the themes of newspapers during the Mumbai terror attack were figured out after analysing these dailies for an entire month from the day of the attack.

The newspapers in India carried the banner headlines on the front page to show and convey the gravity of the attacks to the audience. After the initial three-day reportage of the attack,

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[467] Jayal, Brijesh D. (2001) "Open to Evil Eyes", *The Telegraph*, Kolkata, 26 December 2001.

the print media shifted its role from being just a reporting hand to investigation. So the first theme was print media's 1) "Role from Being Reporting to Investigating". The mainstream newspapers started analysing the nature of the strikes even when the attacks were going on. The dailies perceived the attack to be the handiwork of the LeT, as was reported by the Mumbai Police investigators.

2) The second theme was titled "26/11 wasn't an India Specific Attack" in which the newspapers carried a lot of articles, which suggested that the Mumbai attacks were not India-specific because the attackers had deliberately chosen different sites like a Jewish religious centre, luxury hotels and a railway station that had global implications.

3) The next theme was "Criticised the Government and Intelligence Agency for Security Lapse" in which the media highlighted that these lapses led to an attack in Mumbai. The dailies also mentioned that the 26/11 attacks could have been prevented if the earlier warnings had been taken seriously. Additionally, the newspapers maintained that the government had neglected the coastal security as all the dailies had together called it a maritime attack. Media also focused "On Kasab and Linkages with Pakistan". The media had highlighted the security and intelligence lapse but its analysis didn't come in the way of the "war on terror" and its focus on Kasab and the links with Pakistan.

After an evaluation of the contents of newspapers during the Mumbai terrorist attacks in 2008, it was found out that *The Telegraph* and *The Hindu's* coverage was comparatively sober than *The Indian Express*, *The Hindustan Times* and *The Times of India*, which sensationalised the issue to a large extent. *The Telegraph* had carried most of the stories from government-based sources and the number of editorials in the daily for the next month was less than the other newspapers. However, *The Hindu* had done a lot of investigative stories about the Mumbai attacks. *The Hindu's* coverage had tried to join the dots while writing its investigative reports.

While, *The Indian Express*, *The Hindustan Times* and *The Times of India* had dedicated a lot of pages to the Mumbai attacks and tried to do the story from all possible angles. But, few things were common among newspapers, for instance, Ajmal Amir Kasab's photo of walking through the CST with a gun was splashed in both electronic and print media. Likewise, picture of Moshe Holtzberg, (the two-year-old orphan of Rabbi Gavriel and Rivika Holtzberg who died in the Mumbai attack) also appeared in newspapers and on television channels.

But the coverage of terrorist attacks during the Parliament attacks in 2001 and the Mumbai terrorist attack in 2008 have shown some similar features too, for instance, all the newspapers gave the date and time of the attacks, the number of casualties, the reason behind the attack and the instant reactions of the big wigs. Moreover, the newspapers had given prominent spaces to the backgrounders. The dailies had also put up the timeline of similar kinds of attacks in a catchy tabular manner.

Moreover, during the November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack, it was probably for the first time Indian audience got lurid details of a hostage situation on their television screens. What started as minute-by-minute reportage of casualties and death tolls, gradually turned into a race with each channel reporting "exclusive stories" or "breaking news" and claiming that their channel was the first to have this news and enter the particular targetted area. As everything was sketchy in the beginning of terrorist attacks, the live reportage of the fear and tragedy at the multiple locations had added to the confusion and intensity of terrorised environment.

The entire episode – the coverage of 26/11 Mumbai attacks of the electronic media during those 60 hours – came under scrutiny for not bothering about its impact. There were certain themes under which the role of electronic media can also be understood during the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack. 1) "Compromising the Security Operation", in which the news channels created confusion over information such as: the number of terrorists, the transportation the terrorist had used; their origins and their affiliation to organisations. The number of terrorists varied from channel to channel. It raged anything between 10 and 25, but later on, they finally called it 10 after getting the confirmation from the police. The television channels that flashed gruesome images live on television and electronic media's role was seen as an immature coverage of terrorist attacks.

Additionally, the battle for TRPs seemed to have provoked the channels to broadcast the entry of commandos at Nariman House live. This action of media came under heavy criticism as media gave minute details, such as the commandos were carrying night vision equipment even when the operation was going on. Also, the electronic media revealed more details of the operation due to positioning of their cameras. While the jury was still out on whether news channels wanted to educate or entertain viewers with such programming, the critics had called the coverage of the Mumbai attacks by electronic media as unethical and immature.

2) The electronic media was "Bias Towards the Elite" in covering the Mumbai terror attacks as the television news channels had flashed videos but much of it were from outside the Taj hotel, the Nariman house and the Trident. The victims who lost their lives in the hospital or at CST railway station, unfortunately, didn't get much attention from them. Thus, the electronic media's approach was dubbed insensitive towards certain sections of society.

3) The next theme was "Jingoism", wherein the electronic media created hysteria and pointed fingers at Pakistan, even when the "Operation Tornado" was not over. It left no stone unturned in trying to prove that the perpetrators were of Pakistani-origin. All the channels had taken the anti-Pakistani stand and this put the pressure on the government to take a strict posture against Pakistan. All the news channels came up with their own campaigns with catchy labels at that hour of crisis. For instance, *NDTV* had its "Enough is Enough" and *Times Now* had launched "India Stands United."

The coverage of electronic media also pulled up by the Supreme Court. Justice Aftab Alam and C.K. Prasad stated on record that "reckless coverage... gave rise to a situation, where, on one hand, the terrorists were completely hidden from the security forces and had no means to know their exact positions or even the kind of firearms and explosives they possessed, and on the other hand, the position of the security forces, their weapons and their operational movements were being watched by the collaborators across the border on TV screens and being communicated to the terrorists."[468]

The themes were more or less common between print and electronic media while covering the Kargil War in 1999, the Parliament attack in New Delhi in 2001 and the November Mumbai terrorist attack in 2008. But the thread which bound the Indian media, both print and electronic together, was Pakistan bashing and instilling patriotic feelings among masses during the time of conflict.

Swapan Dasgupta mentioned that the Kargil War had "brought about a fierce patriotic upsurge throughout the country. Solidarity with the soldiers apart, it's a renewed expression of people's faith in India."[469] Devesh Kapur stated that Kargil, to an unprecedented extent

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[468] Legal Correspondent (2012), "Live TV Coverage Put National Security in Jeopardy, Says Bench", *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 29 August 2012.

[469] Dasgupta, Swapan (1999), "It's Their War Too", *India Today,* New Delhi, [Online: web], Accessed 10 April 2017, URL: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/kargil-war-brings-a-fierce-patriotic-upsurge-throughout-india/1/256181.html.

had affected the national mood all across India. Also, "A mass outpouring of support for the soldiers and officers spanned the country. There were Kargil sales, Kargil pop concerts, Kargil fundraisers in schools and offices, Kargil episodes in soap operas." (Kapur 2000: 197) By "showing the gory pictures, successes and sentiments of Army men, television cameras and print media had manufactured images for nationalism for the first time in Indian media history." (Chakravarti 2000: WS-16) According to Rita Manchanda, even the television fillers had appealed to the patriotism. She said that "every commercial break recited poignant tributes to brave soldiers. Full page newspaper advertisements and hoardings urged the youth of the country to prove their mettle in battle. Not just this, newspapers, by reporting the war, had become participants as they were generating war funds and providing food and drinks to the soldiers." (Manchanda 2001: 74)

During the December 13, 2001 terrorist attacks, all the channels had concentrated on getting the live updates from their correspondents stationed outside and inside the Parliament. The channels had given minute-to-minute account of what was happening. As Nandita Haskar wrote: "No one questioned the government's story that the attack was the handiwork of Pakistan-based terrorists belonging to the Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish e-Mohammad. The media, in a willing suspension of disbelief, published whatever the police and investigating agencies put on." (Haskar 2013: *n.d.*) Moreover, C. Uday Bhaskar wrote that "the incessant audio-visual media coverage, occasionally excitable, beginning with the actual attack and the current evidence pointing to terrorist groups liked to the Pakistani ISI, has added the heat."[470]

The impact of the coverage of the terrorist attack by media was such that even before the three-day saga in Mumbai on 26/11 had ended, public opinion was against the Pakistan and along with the media, public started pointing accusatory fingers at Pakistan, claiming the terrorists had been trained in Karachi. The media would not have been figured out as an actor in Indo-Pak relations till a decade ago, Amit Baruah said and suggested that "the role of the media - print or electronic - is linked to the dominant state discourse in both countries. If one government would like to project a particular view of the 'other', the media, in most cases, would go along with such projections. This is not to say that everyone falls in line, or does not ask hard questions but, by and large, the dominant state view is picked up and projected. In recent days, especially after the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks, the Indian media needs no

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[470] Bhaskar, C. Uday (2001), "Restraint, Not Revenge: December 13 as Test of Maturity", *The Times of India*, New Delhi, 22 December 2001.

cue; it went far ahead even of the State, in bashing Pakistan." (Baruah 2012: 195) The Kargil War was undoubtedly influenced in a crucial manner by the media. It took the War to a different dimension and helped India gain international diplomatic advantage. Also, it had helped to create euphoria of nationalism among people.

A.K. Tandon said that a lot of comparisons were made about Indian media with the Western media on the coverage of conflicts. Several scholars mentioned that the American media didn't show any dead bodies and didn't indulge in any kind of TRP competitions during the 9/11 attacks. Although the footage was available, the reporting was largely restrained, keeping in view the sensitivity rather than creating panic or fear among the people. The media was reassuring people that they are safe. A lot of articles were written and debates were staged that American media didn't go overboard on the issue. On the other hand, the Indian media tends to go overboard even if it has compromised the security of Army men.[471] While talking about the Parliament attack and the Mumbai attacks, Tandon said,

> "The electronic media was inside the Parliament premises [when the attack occurred] but the risk of their own life was much more, therefore, they ran for shelter first and then covered [the attack on the Parliament] from a distance. Nobody at that time dared to enter the Parliament house from the main gate where the terrorists were in operation and they were, all were hiding (rightly so). They shot whatever they could manage. But the coverage got restrained automatically because they themselves were in the position where their own lives were threatened like the MPs and security personnel. So there was no controversy involved. People could see shots being fired by terrorists and people were getting killed. But in the Mumbai attacks, they were covering the event in a manner that their own lives were not under threat. Had some of them been present at the Taj hotel, it would have been different. Electronic media showed the bullet marks but saved their lives."[472]

The media coverage on 1999 Kargil War and the conflicts during 2001 Parliament attack and 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack was extensive, relentless and with the advent of cable television, widely followed. With the growth of media, the press has also witnessed certain negative trends for instance its corporatisation over the years. Today, the leading dailies as well as news channels are run by the corporate houses. Eventually, this is running fast towards the monopoly by certain sections in the media.

Also, like any other organisation, media is also plagued with corruption. Such things operate both explicitly and implicitly. It is said that yellow journalism as well as blackmailing are the

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[471] *Tandon, A. K. (2017), personal interview, Transport Bhawan, New Delhi, 16 June 2017.

[472] *Ibid.*

common practices that are found in media circles. The distortion of news and paid news syndrome has become a regular feature in media. Also, earlier the content of newspaper, including the advertisements, was controlled by the editor. But today, the role of editor and that of the head of the advertising section –either manager or director – have pretty well-defined role with lesser intrusion into each other's territory. However, as stated earlier, there has been a growing influence of owner in the content which goes into the newspaper is witnessed. (Ray 2009: 12) Within this context also, all the Indian dailies took a nationalistic position while reporting and analysing the entire event. Indian media was found to be jingoistic even when the attacks were unfolding and nobody knew what was happening – both electronic and print – had started raising fingers of suspicion at Islamabad.

But at the same time, several important things appeared in the media. Daya Kishan Thussu and Des Freedman also stated that there is substantial evidence that media coverage of foreign events closely follows the interpretative frames offered by political elites saying that whenever the phrase 'national security' is invoked with conviction, the mainstream press is likely to adopt a patriotic pose. (Thussu and Freedman 2003: 36)

Thussu said that "the media in India was not geared up to cover such high-optic unfolding of events, and tended to sensationalism and shortcuts by resorting to Pakistan-bashing. Operating in an extremely competitive commercial environment, the news networks were aiming to be first with the exclusives, and in the process, the line between objective and subjective coverage, and news and entertainment was constantly blurring" (Freedman and Thussu 2012: 177)

In a nut shell, one can say that the media performed its role of an opinion maker during the Kargil War, Parliament attack in New Delhi and 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks and has used its position to act as a pressure group in the immediate aftermath of these conflicts.

The coverage of conflicts by the print media and television channels were thorough and minute but electronic, in particular, withdrew sharp criticism from several experts on its reportage. When it comes to Indo-Pak conflicts, the Indian media, both print and electronic, takes a nationalistic stand and when it comes to discussing the future relationship, the media has been mostly negative. As people were dependent on media for the coverage, the media had set an agenda while covering the issues. According to A.K. Tandon, Indian media is briefing oriented and nationalistic in the sense that they have no access to direct theatre of

conflict. Everything was in the government's control. And to that extent when the coverage of conflicts or relations between India and Pakistan is brief oriented then it tends to become "nationalistic".[473] Moreover, Ayesha Siddiqa wrote that "the role on both sides [India and Pakistan] is negative because of the nature of the industry. I wouldn't even call electronic media a well-trained media. It is what I would say 'Bollywoodization' of news content. Anchors all try to turn their shows into thrillers that get greater viewing. In India's case, unfortunately, Arnab Goswami has become a symbol for this. It has *Fox TV* written [*sic*] all over the content in both countries. However, Pakistan is not far behind. In Pakistan, the trick is different which is that anchors are not Arnab Goswami but they will ensure that the discussion leads to results that they get influenced to produce. The military's influence on media in Pakistan is phenomenal and so the discussion on foreign policy doesn't really stray away from the policy line."[474] According to V.P. Malik, both electronic and print media generated nationalist sentiments. [But the] electronic media was way ahead in this.[475]

Executive editor of *NDTV* Nidhi Razdan in an e-mail interview wrote that unfortunately today, the television channels in India have become jingoistic and hysterical. On asking that which news channel has done the maximum damage to the Indo-Pak relationship, Razdan added that *Times Now* started it with its jingoistic coverage.[476] Thus, this proves the first hypothesis that Indian media, both print and electronic, has played more negative rather than a positive role in influencing India's foreign policy with respect to Pakistan.

Security and Strategic Affairs' Editor of Press Trust of India (PTI), Sumir Kaul, who has covered the Kargil War, the Parliament attack and Mumbai terrorist attack for the news agency, while commenting on the electronic media in India wrote:

> "…without any shred of doubt, *DD* news, despite claiming to be an autonomous organisation, remained to be a mouth piece of the government. *Star News*, which has changed alliance partners since it landed on Indian shores, has been changing its stands according to the owners who controlled the editorial board. *NDTV* has been regarded as one of the balanced channels especially after the exit of Barkha Dutt, who glamourized terror in the Kashmir Valley, and soon attained role of mediator and

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[473] *Ibid.*

[474] *Siddiqa, Ayesha (2017), e-mail to the author, 19 March 2017.

[475] *Malik, V.P. (2017), e-mail to the author, 12 May 2017.

[476]*Razdan, Nidhi (2017), e-mail to the author, 29 June 2017.

pontificator rather than following ABCD of basic journalism. *Times Now* is a channel which has thrived on jingoism and whipping up nationalistic fervour without any rhyme and reason. The debates on the channel are sickening and do not serve any purpose other than promoting communal hatred in a country whose base is on secularism. Often, this channel was seen as a court and its anchor as judge, who, in the most shameless way, sought to extract replies from his panellists in the garb of the slogans 'the nation wants to know.'"[477]

When the Kargil War took place with the advent of electronic channels in India, there were limited news channels and hence the reach of channels was restricted. But during the Mumbai terrorist attack, apart from *DD*, *Star News, NDTV* and *Times Now,* there were many more channels. With the mushrooming of media outlets and cut-throat competition among them, there has been a massive increase in the flow of news and the coverage was so intense during the time of Mumbai attacks that it had a wide reach among people. As Amit Baruah pointed out,

> "Probably in 1999 [Kargil War], the Indian media did much better than what we are currently doing. Probably, the channels were fewer and noise levels were lower. In 1999, there was an advent of considerable jingoism on the part of some media groups and that is perhaps inevitable when media groups have certain approach and that approach has now become quite institutional in the current scenario. So, it does not fit in well with the professional mandate of the media...In India, media's role in terms of impact is difficult to measure. But there is no doubt that television has a huge effect on people especially when breaking news happens, people turn a lot to television. Today, it is a different situational because people turn to twitter, Facebook, they may or may not turn in those numbers to television anymore. During the 26/11, the impact of television media was probably at its maximum. Indian showed itself to be quite mature as we voted the next day in elections (Delhi elections)."[478]

Also, due to advancement in technology, some news channels resorted to showing the positions and movements of the security forces engaged in flushing out the terrorists just to score over rival television channels. The channels had debates on almost all the aspects of attacks, ranging from how India remains soft on terror to how the defence budget should have gone up, how the country's coastline should have been secured and even showing the gunmen as clean-shaven and dressed up in T-shirt and jeans. Thus, the impact of media (both print and electronic) was the most felt during the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks as compared to the Kargil War of 1999 and the Parliament attack in New Delhi in 2001 which proves the second hypothesis of this study.

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[477] *Kaul, Sumir (2017), e-mail to the author, 12 July 2017.

[478] *Baruah, Amit (2017), personal interview, ITO, New Delhi, 8 June 2017.

While explaining the role of Indian electronic media during the conflicts between India and Pakistan, Razdan wrote that "TV has a huge influence and every day we see hysterical debates on India-Pakistan issues, which mostly result in Pakistan bashing. It gives a distorted picture of both countries since usually only hardliners in both sides are called."[479]

On asking V.P. Malik about the coverage of conflicts between India and Pakistan, he mentioned, "The media will always carry majority sentiments of a nation and its government. It will by and large be nationalist. It cannot-should not-try to act as an arbiter. Conflicts are caused by many reasons. However, in such matters, the media must reflect greater sense of responsibility, maturity and avoid unnecessary bashing bouts during visual discussions."[480]

The war and terrorist attacks have proved to be detrimental to the progress made in the Indo-Pak peace dialogue, but the media in both the countries have acted as a facilitator in the past for providing a platform to have a people-to-people contact with each other. One such initiative was "*Aman ki Asha*". *The Times of India* and Pakistan's *Jang Group* had launched "Aman ki Asha" (AKA), a peace movement, on January 1, 2010 to promote amity between the two countries. This initiative is viewed to improve people-to-people contact, diplomatic as well as cultural ties with Pakistan. Thus, the media can play quite an influencing role. As Amit Baruah has rightly pointed out that "today it is about how much damage you can inflict on the other side. It is not just on Indian side. It is the same in Pakistan also. The Pakistani media is equally hawkish in nature. This is a zero-sum game. It is a game that has been played for many years."[481]

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[479]*Razdan, Nidhi (2017), e-mail to the author, 29 June 2017.

[480] *Malik, V.P. (2017), e-mail to the author, 12 May 2017.

[481] *Baruah, Amit (2017), personal interview, ITO, New Delhi, 8 June 2017.

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Interviews with the experts

1. **E-mail interview with Ayesha Siddiqa (Author and Political Commentator from Pakistan) on 19 March 2017.**

Question: What do you think what are the dynamics of the relationship between press, public opinion and foreign policy?

Answer: In both India and Pakistan media has generally become a tool for lobbies that broadly pressure foreign policy re-orientation or its direction. This is often done through building a hype on issues or twisting arguments in a way that it moulds public opinion. The hype created thus amounts to pressure on policymnakers.

Question: Which medium (print or electronic) do you find more powerful in generating public opinion in India?

Answer: This probably happened less with print media but with electronic media the impact is exponnetial. The ability to reach out to people is a huge deterrent against policymakers breaking through the conservative prism.

Question: My third question is: Indo-Pak relationship has been marked by mistrust, animosity and conflict ridden in the last six decades. Do you think that Indian media has played any role in furthering the tensed relationship? Can you illustrate with instances?

Answer: Of course, in both India and Pakistan media has played a major role in increasing enemity. But given that in India, the debate revolves around terrorism, media has increased pressure on its government to generate a harsh reaction without fully debating that increase in violence will result in dangerous consequences. If you watch now it is clear that in the past decade or so the Indian government is less hawkish than the media.

Question: Do you think that media in India as well as Pakistan cover conflicts with certain pre-conceived notions against each other? Is there any particular pattern or nature of media in both the countries in coverage of the conflicts between India and Pakistan?

Answer: Of course, the coverage is ridden with bias. We are two neighbours that are obsessed with each other yet know so little about each other. The Indian and Pakistani media multiply the biases. In India, the primary prism is Pakistan as a terrorist state and in Pakistan, India is viewed largely as a Hindu hegemony that ought to be resisted at all costs. The media indeed has become so powerful that it doesn't even allow the entertainment industry or the cultural connections to work in diluting misunderstandings.

Question: According to you, has Indian media played more negative role than positive in influencing India's foreign policy? How would you rate Pakistani media's role in influencing that country's foreign policy?

Answer: The role on both sides is negative because of the nature of the industry. I wouldn't even call electronic media a well trained media. It is what I would say 'bollywoodization' of news content. Anchors all try to turn their shows into thrillers that get greater viewing. In India's case, unfortunately, Arnab Goswami has become a symbol for this. Its Fox TV written all over the content in both countries. However, Pakistan is not far behind. In Pakistan the trick is different which is that anchors are not Arnab Goswami but they will ensure that the discussion leads to results that they get influenced to produce. The military's influence on media in Pakistan is phenomenal and so the discussion on foreign policy doesn't really stray away from the policy line.

Question: As per your opinion, the role of which Indian newspaper *The Hindu, The Times of India, The Indian Express, The Hindustan Times and The Telegraph (of Calcutta)* you find more balanced or critical in reporting vis a vis Indo-Pak conflicts.

Answer: *The Hindu* followed by *The Indian Express* and then the *HT*. I don't really see *The Telegraph* so my apologies for not commenting on it.

Question: Similarly, according to you, which Indian news channel *DD News, Star TV, Times Now* or *NDTV* has done more damage to the Indo-Pak relationship? What do you have to say about the electronic media of India?

Answer: I believe other than Karan Thapar or in some cases Barkha Dutt most others get very hawkish. Now you may argue that all what the anchors want to do is play to the sentiments of people but then there is a visible effort to enhance enmity rather than think it through.

Question: How have the bilateral relations between the two nuclear-armed neighbouring countries shaped post three major direct and proxy conflicts since 1999?

Answer: I believe the conflicts are just a symbol of the larger issue which is that the conflict has become more ideological in nature. This means that conflict is just the moment or the opportunity when the underlying difference or ideological bias comes out in the open.

Question: Do you think Track II diplomacy has been effective for Indo-Pak relationship?

Answer: It does help in developing some understanding of each other but largely it has zero results because track-II in both countries works closely with track-I. As a result, track-II becomes a good paid holiday for some.

Question: What do you think what kind of role Indian and Pakistani media should play in promoting peace and harmony vis-a-vis relations with Pakistan?

Answer: a more measured and balanced opinion but then the problem is with the nature of the industry.

Question: In general, what kind of backlash or pressure the media generally faces from the government about confronting India and Pakistan relationship?

Answer: Up until the past decade the military would have its pet journalists who would write and report on India that was closer to the Army's understanding of India. However, since

Raheel Sharif's tenure the pressure can be felt by all to present India in a certain way. In fact, now representatives from the ISI/ISPR also sit during meetings of the film censor board and guide the process according to their desire to 'de-indianise' the society.

Question: How much pressure the journalists or editors in Pakistan face from military or government in reporting issues related to India?

Answer: The pressure on print media has increased. In most papers military's ISPR has direct access to news rooms. They will even get stories planted or even opinion pieces.

Question: Also, which media do you find more mature as well as critical about its own government: Indian English media or Pakistani media?

Answer: Pakistan media is more critical about the political government as compared to bulk of Indian media but not against the military.

2. **E-mail interview with Hamid Mir (Pakistani Journalist) on 29 March 2017**

Question: What do you think what are the dynamics of the relationship between press, public opinion and foreign policy?

Answer: Pakistani media is struggling for its freedom since 1958 when General Ayub Khan imposed Martial Law in Pakistan.11 years of Ayub, then 2 years of General Yahya Khan, then 11 years of General Zia ul Haq and 9 years of General Pervez Musharraf were spent in fighting for media freedom. We never had much time to focus India. Yes, Pakistani media is concerned about Kashmir but most of the important newspapers gave attention to Kashmir as an unfinished agenda of the 1947.I have seen Zia era and Musharraf era as a journalist. We were more concerned about our domestic problems than India. I think our media is not important for Foreign Policy makers. Media became important in last 10 years but it is not very independent. Pakistani democracy is going through an evolution process and media is part of this process.

Question: Which medium (print or electronic) do you find more powerful in generating public opinion in India?

Answer: In India electronic media is more important in generating public opinion. Indian media is influenced by Bollywood. They use sensationalism and drama in their news stories. Few years back a very famous India TV anchor offered me big money for India bashing. He said, "You will attack India I will attack Pakistan and we will make good TV" but I refused.

Question: Indo-Pak relationship has been marked by mistrust, animosity and conflict ridden in the last six decades. Do you think that Indian media has played any role in furthering the tensed relationship? Can you illustrate with instances?

Answer: Our biggest problem is our history books taught in schools and colleges. We don't read full truth in these books we only read half truth which creates lot of misunderstandings between the two countries. Media is also showing half truth on both sides but I wonder why Indian media never played a responsible role? Indian media represents the biggest democracy of the world but Indian media never played a responsible role (except some newspapers and magazines). India media blamed Pakistan for Samjhota Express blast but it was not true.

Most of the Hindi newspapers and TV channels never distinguished between good Pakistanis and bad Pakistanis they hate Pakistan as a State.

Question: Do you find any particular pattern or nature of media in both the countries in coverage of the conflicts between India and Pakistan?

Answer: Pakistani media always respond jingoism of Indian media with jingoism. I think that non-professional attitude of Indian media always promoted non-professionalism in Pakistan.

Question: Many media theories suggest that the terrorists use media for their own publicity and media also promotes terrorist activities by doing stories in sensational way for their TRPs and readership. What are your comments on this?

Answer: Yes, I think Indian media played in the hands of terrorists after Mumbai attacks in 2008.Terrorists wanted to spread fire of hatred and media provided them lot of fuel performance of Indian media was beyond their expectations. Terrorists attack schools and universities in Pakistan to spread fear and Pakistani media creates hype after every attack. This media hype is always useful for terrorists.

Question: The impact of print and electronic media on socio-political dynamics was the most during the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks as compared to 2001 Parliament attack and Kargil War of 1999. What are your opinions on this?

Answer: Mumbai attacks of 2008 gave so much space to media for spreading hatred on both sides. Pakistani establishment encouraged media to spread hatred against India and Indian established used their media for same purpose.

Question: As per your opinion, the role of which Indian newspaper *The Hindu, The Times of India, The Indian Express, The Hindustan Times and The Telegraph (of Calcutta)* you find more balanced or critical in reporting vis a vis Indo-Pak conflicts?

Answer: I think *The Telegraph* and *The Hindu* is [are] more balanced than [the] others. *The Indian Express* is better than *The Times of India.*

Question: Similarly, according to you, which Indian news channel *DD News, Star TV, Times Now* or *NDTV* has done more damage to the Indo-Pak relationship? What do you have to say about the electronic media of India?

Answer: Unfortunately, Indian news channels are not available in Pakistan. I follow these channels on web I think *NDTV* is better than others.

Question: Do you think Track II diplomacy has been effective for Indo-Pak relationship?
Answer: No I support open and transparent diplomacy between two countries. People to people contacts must be promoted.

Question: What do you think what kind of role Indian and Pakistani media should play in promoting peace and harmony vis-a-vis relations with Pakistan?

Answer: We must speak full truth about history and politics. We must understand each other. We must highlight positive sides of each other. We should become mirror of each other not a sword in the hands of each other.

Question: Which country's media do you find more mature as well as critical about its own government: Indian English media or Pakistani media and why?

Answer: Indian English media is more responsible while Pakistani print media is more responsible than electronic media. There is no local English TV channel in Pakistan.

3. **E-mail interview with General V.P. Malik (Former Chief of Army Staff of the Indian Army) on 12 May 2017**

Question: What were the reasons that led to Kargil war?

Answer: There were many reasons, primarily:

- Pakistan wanted to highlight Indo–Pak dispute over J&K to the international community.
- Revive terrorism in J&K, which had been brought under control by India substantially by 1998.
- Pakistan Army wanted to alter alignment of the LoC east of the Zoji La (pass) and deny us the use of the Srinagar–Kargil–Leh highway.
- Pakistan Army wanted to re-capture Turtuk in Siachen Sector, which it had lost to India in 1971.
- Pervez Musharraf wanted to do prove his merit to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif who had appointed him as Chief of Pakistan Army over two seniors officers.

Question: Was the Kargil war inevitable? Could it have been avoided?

Answer: Kargil war was initiated by Pakistan Army within three months of Pakistani and Indian Prime Ministers signing Lahore Agreement in late February 1999. It appears that Pakistan Prime Minister did not have full knowledge of Pakistan Army's planning of Kargil invasion. If Pakistan Army had been under civilian Prime Minister (Nawaz Sharif's) proper control, it is possible that Nawaz Sharif may not have given permission to Pakistan Army to take this initiative.

Question: Was the Kargil war different from the earlier wars? If yes, how?

Answer: All wars have different reasons and are fought differently. The unique aspect of Kargil was that it was initiated by Pakistan within three months of Pakistani and Indian Prime Ministers agreeing and committing in the Lahore Agreement that they will find peaceful solutions to all Indo Pak problems in peaceful talks and avoid wars.

The other unique aspect was the nature of terrain on which this war was fought; high altitude, snow covered mountains with limited communications in a very remote area. The terrain has

affect on logistics, equipment, physical capability. It was probably the highest battlefield in the world.

Question: Was the Kargil conflict militarily motivated or political?

Answer: Primarily, all wars have political reasons. Military is only an instrument of political power of a state. In all democratic countries, military is controlled by the elected civil authority. In this case, as far as Pakistan is concerned, one can say that it was militarily motivated.

Question: What are your opinions about the Kargil Review Committee (KRC)?

Answer: After every war, I believe there is a need to review why the war took place, how it was fought, and what strategic, operational and tactical level lessons are to be learnt. The KRC was appointed for these very reasons. It was a good, objective report in which many good recommendations were made.

Question: Do you think that the recommendations of KRC were implemented well?

Answer: Unfortunately, not.

The Kargil Review Committee report brought out many serious deficiencies in India's security management system, particularly in the areas of intelligence, border patrolling and defence management. The report pointed out that despite far-reaching developments affecting India's national security in the past few decades, the country's higher and defence-related decision-making system had not changed. It urged a thorough and expeditious review of the national security system by an independent body of credible experts. The prime minister set up a Group of Ministers (Ministers of Home, Defence, External Affairs and Finance) to review the national security system in its entirety and formulate specific proposals for implementation. Most of the recommendations were implemented half-heartedly to suit the bureaucracy and political leaders who even now have little knowledge of the armed forces' working.

Question: How have the bilateral relations between the two nuclear-armed neighbouring countries shaped post three major direct and proxy conflicts since 1999?

Answer: There has been no improvement in their relations. Some reasons are:

- Pakistan continues to consider J & K as an unfinished agenda of territorial partition done in 1947.
- It is a country based on one religion (Islam) which has little tolerance for any other religion and thus follows a strong anti-India bias because we are a secular country.
- Pakistan Army controls Pakistani politics and defence and foreign policies related to India, Afghanistan and its nuclear weapons. Its anti-Indian attitude has become necessary for its super status in Pakistan society.

Question: How did reportage affect the Kargil operation? Do you recollect any incidents where the plan had to be changed at last minute because of certain reporting done in the media?

Answer: Kargil war is often known as India's first televised war, in which trying to 'manage' or 'conduct' the media did not work. Most ground reporters had no knowledge or experience of war reporting. Many stories that appeared in the media had little relevance to the ground situation. None of these had any impact on our operational plans or actions on the ground.

Question: How did the Army use media, print and electronic both, during the course of the Kargil conflict? Was there a media policy in place regarding dissemination of information on the conflict? Was there any deliberate selection or omission of news?

Answer: As the war went on, both the media and the army kept learning from experience. After some experience, we were able to lay down a broad media policy in place, which was:
- Expose Pakistani lies about the Pakistan Army not being involved in the operations and about the LoC in the Kargil sector not being clearly delineated. Counter any other Pakistani disinformation campaign.
- Put across the national policy of restraint, emphasize the probity of, and the justification for, our military action and support the military strategy for war.
- Make people aware of the traditional strength and the organizational capabilities of the Army. Also, highlight gallantry displayed by the troops, their high morale, the espirit de corps in and among the various units, the competent leadership and, above all, the determination to win the war.
- Convey the news from the war zone as soon as possible without compromising on security.

- Do not deviate from the truth. Give out only facts and establish trustworthiness. (Views and analysis to be given by senior officers only.)

As the war progressed, it became easy to expose Islamabad's lies and disinformation about the non-involvement of the Pakistan Army. Besides the taped telephone conversation between Pakistan's Army chief, General Pervez Musharraf, and his chief of General Staff, we made use of hundreds of Pakistan Army official documents, identity cards, demi-official letters, personal diaries, letters and photographs that were captured after every battle starting with Tololing. Some of these items were shown on the TV channels that were viewed in Pakistan also so that all doubts could be dispelled among the public there about who had initiated the war and what was happening now. Pakistan Army equipment captured during different battles was exhibited on TV from time to time. Media persons were taken to places where our soldiers buried Pakistani soldiers killed in the war with due solemnity and after performing the requisite ceremonies.

The Military Operational Directorate showed the *original copies* of the maps of the Kargil sector that had been delineated after the Simla Agreement and which carried signatures of senior Indian and Pakistani officers. Captured Survey of Pakistan maps that had the LoC marked clearly on them were also displayed.

In addition to the daily media briefings, the Army Liaison Cell organized several discussions involving senior strategic analysts including retired officers of the armed forces who wrote for the print media or participated in TV talk shows. This move helped in explaining, in broad terms, the national policy and the military strategy without going into operational details. In the field, after every battle, or after every few days, media persons were briefed at the corps, division and brigade level. I believe this policy ultimately worked well between the army and the media.

Question: Kargil War took place when the electronic media in India was at infant stage. What in your opinion was the response of Indian media in covering the Kargil conflict between two nuclear nations?

Answer: Being the first televised war, every Indian was interested to learn what was going on in Kargil and that too instantly. Every young and enthusiastic media person wanted to go the front, shoot pictures and interrogate every soldier and build stories without understanding

the context. Senior journalists too made these mistakes sometime. Media stories without an understanding of context and larger picture became our big headache. However, after some time by creating a desirable system of official briefings and ready availability of our spokespersons, there was better understanding and such stories reduced.

Question: During the Kargil war, did you see any views of the opposition being highlighted in the media or just government's side appeared in the dailies?

Answer: In any crisis situation, including when a conflict is initiated by a nation's adversary, there is a need for national consensus. There was no bar on any one commenting or speaking against the government. Opposition parties played their role but political polarisation was eveident. Some opposition parties even played up wrong stories based on a disgruntled officer till the whole truth was revealed to them. Other than that, there was very little criticism of the armed forces.

Question: Which medium of media generated more nationalist sentiments – print or electronic during Kargil war?

Answer: Both electronic and print media generated nationalist sentiments. Electronic media was way ahead in this.

Question: What are your comments on 2001 Delhi Parliament attack and 2008 Mumbai terror attacks?

Answer: Both incidents conveyed India's inability to understand the Pakistani mindset, lack of India's deterrence capability, and poor intelligence. Even in the handling of such situations, including the media, we failed to learn and practice lessons from the past. These problems continue. Our security management continues to be compartmentalised and poor.

Question: What do you think what kind of role Indian media should play in promoting peace and harmony vis-a-vis relations with Pakistan?
Answer: In the face of existing Pakistani mindset, the media alone cannot bring about peaceful relations between the two countries. Media in every country tends to be nationalist particularly in a crisis situation. The kind of India versus Pakistan debates that one sees in the

electronic media panels these days need to be avoided. These serve no purpose and tend to prejudice peoples' mind and work against any possibility of peace and harmony.

Question: Do you think that media in India and Pakistan cover conflicts with certain pre-conceived notions against each other and media have played more negative rather than positive role in influencing India's foreign policy with respect to Pakistan?

Answer: The media will always carry majority sentiments of a nation and its government. It will by and large be nationalist. It cannot-should not-try to act as an arbiter. Conflicts are caused by many reasons. However, in such matters, the media must reflect greater sense of responsibility, maturity and avoid unnecessary bashing bouts during visual discussions.

Question: As per your opinion, the role of which Indian newspaper *The Hindu, The Times of India, The Indian Express, The Hindustan Times and The Telegraph (of Calcutta)* you find more balanced or critical or nationalist in reporting vis a vis Indo-Pak conflicts?

Answer: It is difficult for me to rank their performance during Kargil war today. These are national level newspapers. By and large, their performance will always depend upon their editors and correspondents of a particular period.

Question: Similarly, according to you, which Indian news channel *DD News, Star TV, Times Now* or *NDTV* has done more damage to the Indo-Pak relationship? What do you have to say about the electronic media of India?

Answer: The biggest asset of electronic media is its visual impact and instant news. But the news and debate lacks depth which is there in the print media. The debates which tend to polarise people across borders or within the country and thus further divide our unity are not to my liking.

Question: Do you find any particular pattern or nature of media in both the countries in coverage of the conflicts between India and Pakistan?

Answer: While the coverage methodology is similar; the resources, the quantity and the quality of Indian electronic and print media (and now the social media) leaves much greater impact as compared to Pakistani media. In fact, after Kargil war, many Pakistani officers openly acknowledged that Pakistani media could not match up to the Indian media and thus lost its information war.

4. **Transcript of interview with Amit Baruah (Resident Editor of *The Hindu*). The interview was taken on 9 June 2017.**

- On role of media in 1999 Kargil War

Answer: As a reporter we should be interested in the facts. We have limitations on the facts because we don't have access. So we are dependent on what the governments tell us. A good practice is to try and check the claims being made by either sides on situation of conflict. The reporter or the news organisation's interest should be in the facts and not in opinion. Often, people peddle opinion in the name of facts. Probably in 1999, the Indian media did much better than what we are currently doing. Probably, the channels were fewer and noise levels were lower. In 1999, there was an advent of considerable jingoism on the part of some media groups and that is perhaps inevitable when media groups have certain approach and that approach has now become quite institutional in the current scenario. So, it does not fit in well with the professional mandate of the media.

- On 2001 Parliament attack and 26/11 Mumbai terror attack

Answer: The intent of terrorist is to create fear and how do you create fear? By the nature of actions. [The terrorists created fear in] the Parliament attack also but 26/11 more because it involved the killing of large number of people. The Mumbai attack went on for quite long. In UK, three terrorists were neutralised in the matter of 8 minutes. When something stretches on, when there is a siege, when hostages are taken and it took the NSG 2-3 days to clear out Taj, Oberoi and Trident Hotels, it was such a sensational attack that people have come from boat from Karachi and they have landed in Mumbai and they have struck in multiple locations so the very act is obviously when such a large number of people are killed, the media has to report it. The way BBC reports terror attacks, the decibel levels are low in BBC. But in Indian media, in television media, everyone seems to be shouting at the top of their voices. Whatever be the incident, whether it is two persons or 200 people, the same decibel levels is being used. So any sensible scholar will avoid these television channels. You are not getting any facts from them. You are only getting pre-loaded opinion that is now become the hallmark of many news channels so watch them at your own peril.

- Is there any particular pattern of covering the conflicts between India and Pakistan?

Answer: There are. Foreign policy wants you to have particular approach. [They want that] media should project the government's point of view. [But] that doesn't always happen. They would like want particular narratives, incidents should go out. There is also plurality in media. People do raise questions about government's act. We have a large number of independent websites working. There are more questions being raised but that is not enough. Government security policy, government foreign policy should be put more under the scanner. We should ask questions, hard questions about the goals and how the goals have been achieved.

- Socio-Political Impact of media

Answer: In India, we see it from the point of view that it was Pakistan's aggression. In Pakistan, it was projected in a different way as few people knew that such a war was happening. And only after a couple of months, the narratives had changed. In India, media's role in terms of impact is difficult to measure. But there is no doubt television has a huge effect on people especially when breaking news happens, people turn a lot to television. Today, it is a different situation because people turn to Twitter, Facebook and they may or may not turn in those numbers to television anymore.

During the 26/11 [Mumbai terror attacks], the impact of television media was probably at its maximum. Indian showed itself to be quite mature as we voted the next day in elections (Delhi elections). South Asia is not the only place where such terrorist activities are happening. They are happening across the global. The problem of violent extremist Islamism is a serious one which govt need how to handle.

- Which newspaper do you find more balanced in its coverage related to Indo-Pak relations?

Answer: *The Hindu* is more balanced. It is followed by *The Indian Express* and *The Telegraph.* They are often critical about the government policies.

- What do you have to say about Track II diplomacy?

Answer: It has been helpful in the past. Indians and Pakistanis do not always meet. They have all kinds of notions about each other. It is good to meet and talk. But the problem with Track II is that it has become very institutionalised. Same 20 people meet on Indian side and same 20 people on the Pakistani side meet. The idea of the genuine Track II diplomacy should be to expand. To expand to students, to university teachers to business persons and to civil societies. There is really a need for that. Track II is a good thing.

• What do you think about the relationship between press, public opinion, foreign policy?

Answer: There has always been an effort to influence foreign policy through the media. Most governments tend to defend on television to influence people. Print of course is also an important mechanism to influence but there are more critical voices in print media than there are in electronic media. Also, social media is a new ground of contest. Twitter battles are being raged by Indians and Pakistanis... Unfortunately, if you see a television channel, it is like a bull fight. You bring few Pakistanis, you bring few Indians, the most hawkish Indians and the most hawkish Pakistanis and you let them dare each other part. It is done apparently for TRPs because people want to watch them. They don't want any agreement between Indians and Pakistanis. They don't want soft and gentle voices. They don't want voices of people advocating understanding, or peace or dialogue. Today, it is about how much damage you can inflict on the other side. It is not on Indian side. It is the same in Pakistan also. The Pakistani media is equally hawkish in nature. This is a zero sum game. It is a game that we have played for many years.

• About bilateral relationship between India and Pakistan

Answer: At the end of the day, only economy and trade can bind two countries. For instance, look at relationship between China and Taiwan. There are huge trading partners. They have major differences between each other. But that has not prevented them from trading.
There have been a lot of talks. Pakistan doesn't buy a single megawatt of power from India. There is a huge power shortage in Pakistan. They don't buy any finished petroleum products from India. They would like to take the long route. Now the game has changed in Pakistan with CPEC coming in. The orientation of Pakistani economy could change quite rapidly. There is a mixed opportunity for India and Pakistan. India's own growth rate and Pakistan's

own growth rate could be helped dramatically if the two countries really and genuinely throw open trade with each other. But that doesn't look likely in the current scenario. But the actual ability to do something has been lacking. Political will has been weak. We are on parallel trajectory on the economy. Until and unless we build those stakes in each others' future, currently what is happening on the LoC which is quite tragic that is what will continue to happen. Pakistan needs to realise any support for terrorist groups like LET, JeM is not going to be appreciated and it is not appreciated by vast majority of Indians. There is a need for Pakistan also to introspect and to take actions against the perpetrators of 26/11. Everyone knows who was responsible for attacks. It could have been very helpful if people have been convicted. It would have been an example of Pakistan's goodwill and Pakistan's intent to control groups like LeT which they do not touch. There are many outstanding issues which we need to talk about. With nuclear-armed countries, I am unsure, how much one can raise the thresh hold.

5. **Transcript of interview with Ashok Tandon (Ex-Media Advisor to the Former Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee). The interview was taken on 16 June 2017.**

- **Role of media in Indo-Pak conflicts**

We have to look at the historical perspective of Indo-Pak relationship. [The] British India partition, the scars of partition is not forgotten by the first generation of media journalists since [India's] independence but gradually the hostility was coming down and things were becoming normal and from 1947 till 1965 war and then from 1965 war to 1971 war, media ['s] role was very objective reporting of the conflicts or the tensions. But, by and large, media would react only when there was an escalation of conflicts or war but in normal circumstances, there was not too much of focus on Indo-Pak relations or tensions. The whole focus got flared up in the context of the terrorist activities rather than the conflicts. The conflicts, 1947-1948, 1965, 1971, there was a different kind of media focus but it got escalated a change when the terrorism element came into the Indo-Pak relationship. That is one sector which we must analyse. The terrorist activity or infiltration started gradually since the 1971 war. The mindset of the Pakistani Army after the 1971 defeat got changed. They got into a revenge mode and they realised that we can't take directly on India in any kind of a warfare. The General Zia Ul Haq's role, perhaps the longest serving Army chief who ruled Pakistan, there were low conflicts and minimum tension on the border and he conceded that we can't do anything with India. But, the Army had in the back of the mind that somehow we had to take revenge. Surrendering at such a huge level, no army can digest it. Then later on, maybe subsequently some General or Army guy or ISI thought that let's get indulged into proxy war and that is where initially they were trying to fuel fire with the Khalistan movement that was one way of troubling India and then infiltration and then terrorist activity.

Indo-Pak relations in the context of terrorism activity, the media started giving more and more focus to the Indo-Pak relationship. But nevertheless, the Indo-Pak relations have always had high or low. No regime in India or in Pakistan would say that we are not for talks. Talks have been going on with every Prime Minister has his quota or dialogue with Pakistan. I think we should focus of media's role in Indo-Pak relations from mid 1990s onwards and Kandahar hijacking was also somehow linked with this. At that time Pakistan used to claim that now we have got strategic depth because at that time Taliban regime was pro-Pakistan. Therefore, I won't deal in Kandahar hijacking. Then Kargil and then attack on Indian Parliament and then Mumbai terrorist attack. So, all these things put together, another

element which is relevant to the subject is the advent of electronic media in India. Till the 1971 wars, it was all print media which was reporting and covering the Indo-Pak conflicts and tensions. And within the limits which the print media had got at that time wat we had was *AIR* and to some extent *DD*.

So, the advent of electronic media and increase in terrorist activities, these were the key factors which dominated the coverage of Indo-Pak relations and the conflicts and electronic media has its own advantages and limitations they can show you all the conflicts in your drawing room. Like the 1991 Gulf war, *CNN* showed live coverage of conflicts for the first time when people were sitting in the and that was carried forward by Indian media during Kargil and subsequently the Parliament an Mumbai attack. And this is one area where media itself came under attack for its coverage... Thus, media is "briefing oriented" and "nationalistic" in the sense that they have no access to access to direct theatre of conflict. Everything was government control.

Starting with the Kargil war: Electronic media wants to cover conflicts from the theatre of war because you get visuals and even till today, the armed forces would not allow media to reach the theatre of conflict on its own. They will conduct press party, take them to the area or the theatre of conflict wherever they want. The media even today is not free to visit. Without naming the journalist I want to tell that one television journalist managed to reach the theatre of conflict in Kargil and there was a code of conduct how the journalist reach Kargil... those days there was only sat phones which u can operate in the region and the journalist had a satellite phone using that satellite phone for the channel.. within few minutes there was enemy shelling in that particular bunker and there were casualties as well at our side coz of this media coverage by that channel. Later, there was a Code of enquiry.. but nothing came up. But as a result the journalist became a celebrity.

With the advent of the electronic media things have changed. Not only in terms of reporting conflicts, in overall coverage of the Indo-Pak relations, because electronic media is an event based media as they have to have visuals and whenever and wherever they get visuals they highlight it and for them Indo-Pak relations both the talks or the breakdown of talks of the conflict is evident, therefore the coverage has gone a qualitative change in this regard. When there was terrorist 26/11 attack, the same issued was raised about the media coverage. Again, media persons were doing their jobs in showing to the people sitting in their drawing room the actual terrorist attack that was going on at the Taj hotel and other areas , they were

thinking that they were doing a professional job and some of the channels were even highlighting look at our reporters they are stationed there for the last 24 hours without eating and sacrificing and risking their lives but they are showing u the real action and they wanted some kind of appreciation from society and everybody and people were also enjoying it but then there security angle again. Security issue was raised by the Indian authorities because the operation was being shown live on television and the terrorists hiding inside the hotel were watching everything on television and accordingly changes their strategy... All are well known fact, so again the media came under attack. Then government was so serious to make some kind of code for media. Electronic media said at that time said that we will have self-discipline and be careful in future.

Again, it was the second time after the Kargil event there was a conflict between the media coverage for a clean independent press and at the same the security agencies feeling that it is compromising their security so conflict between the independence of press for coverage and security issues and it was highlighted and if one refers one particular incident... during the conflict in Mumbai when all these things were being debated on television channels and in media, then Naval chief Admiral Bhagwat lost his tempered at one of the press conferences because Indian Navy was involved in the operation and narrated the Kargil episode at the press conference itself, and that was the first time that the Kargil episode came into public domain quoted by none other than Naval chief and he named the journalist also. Role of media in covering Indo-Pak conflict sometimes have come between security of armed forces and independence During the Mumbai attacks, universally it came under attack and there was hardly anyone in defence of media and that is why media became apologetic.

- Perceived as "Soft censorship" on electronic media – so much criticism of media. The Broadcasting Association said they will enforce voluntary self-restrained in covering any such event which they said they were following but unfortunately – whether it is the security of armed forces or for that matter, reporting women harassment or rape cases --- they again cross the *Lakshman rekha* for their TRPs and professionalism. The commitment of the electronic media in sticking to the rules of game invariably violated whenever there is an event. For them an event is an event whether it is sensitive to the society or women or the armed forces they invariably tend to forget the sensitivities and they go for the live coverage and they come under attack.

Thus till 1971 War, the covering was there but it was stick to the print media so it was restrained and briefing oriented. And to that extent when the coverage of conflicts or relations b/w two countries is brief oriented then it tends to become "nationalistic". But restrained was because there was no other option for the print media and radio. But when the private channels came into existence, they wanted to break this shackle of briefing oriented reporting and they wanted to do independently and that is where the word nationalistic media got broken but in the process, which people appreciated but in the process security got compromised. This is a difference between first and second phase of reporting, and the second phase of reporting still continues because of the private channels. There was a comparison with the 9/11 attacks also. Americans didn't show any dead bodies and didn't indulge in any kind of TRP competitions. Although the footage was available, the reporting was largely restrained keeping in view the sensitivity rather than getting panic or fear among the people. The media was reassuring people that they are [were] safe. A lot of articles were written, and there were debates that American media didn't go overboard on the issue whereas our media tend to go overboard even if it compromises the security.

Mumbai terror attacks and the 2001 Parliament attack were covered by the electronic media. Electronic media was inside the Parliament premises but their risk of their own life was much more than as compared to Mumbai attacks, therefore, they ran for their own shelter first and then they covered it from a distance whatever shot they could manage so nobody at that time dared to enter parliament house from the main gate where the terrorists were in operation and they were all were hiding (rightly so) but the coverage got restrained automatically because they themselves were in the position where their own lives were threatened like the MPs and security personnel so there was no controversy involved in this so the coverage was fairly good. People could see shot being fired by terrorists were getting killed.

But in the Mumbai attacks, they were covering from the point that their own lives were not threatened. Had some of them at the Taj hotel it would have been different. Electronic media showed the bullet marks but their lives were safe. Moreover, as far as print media is concerned, in print media one has to read and journalists have to write about it. It doesn't have an immediate impact. Visual media particularly has an instant impact on the viewers. Whether literate or illiterate, he/she doesn't have to apply his/her mind. He gets influenced by the visuals which are shown, and impact is instant. It gives you pleasure watching live and it is dangerous because the way it is projecting it is influencing the mind. One has to

differentiate between print and electronic media. Unfortunately, it is tit for tat for Indo-Pak relations.

6. **E-mail interview with Nidhi Razdan (Executive Editor, *NDTV*) on 29 June 2017**

Question: What kind of role the Indian electronic media plays while covering the Indo-Pak conflicts? Can you please illustrate with some instances?

Answer: TV has a huge influence and every day we see hysterical debates on India- Pakistan issues, which mostly result in Pakistan bashing. It gives a distorted picture of both countries since usually only hardliners in both sides are called.

Question: Do you think that electronic media get more nationalistic in nature while covering the issues related to Pakistan as compared to Print media?

Answer: Yes, unfortunately the TV media has become jingoistic and hysterical.

Question: Do you find any particular pattern or nature of electronic media in covering the three conflicts, namely The Kargil War, the 2001 Parliament attack and the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks?

Answer: Not really. Each was different. Mumbai was a turning point because television and the government both learned lessons in how to deal with an ongoing situation without compromising on security and giving proper information. Since then, coverage has generally been more restrained.

Question: Which Indian news channel among these: *DD*, *Star TV (Now ABP), Times Now* or *NDTV* has done more damage to the Indo-Pak relationship?

Answer: *Times Now* started it with its jingoistic coverage. Now some others follow its model

Question: What do you think what kind of role Indian electronic media should play in promoting peace and harmony vis-a-vis relations with Pakistan?

Answer: I don't think it is Indian TV's job to promote anything. We should just do our jobs and report things fairly and factually. That's all.

Question: Electronic media has been criticised for putting in danger the lives of security men while doing the coverage of the Mumbai attacks. What are your views on that?

Answers: I think that's very simplistic. You think the terrorists hadn't done their homework? Yes, the coverage was over the top in some cases, but lessons have been learned. The government at the time also handled things badly by not giving out information coherently and too many people were speaking to too many media houses. Now it's more organised.

7. **E-mail interview with Sumir Kaul (Editor, Security and Strategic Affairs,** *Press Trust of India (PTI))* **on 12 July 2017**

Question: As you have covered the Kargil War of 1999, the Parliament attack in 2001 and the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks in 2008, what do you think what kind of role the Indian media, both print and electronic media, has played in covering these issues?

Answer: All the three incidents had different degrees of media attention and reportage. The Kargil War was the first ever conflict which was covered actively on television cameras of private channels. A large contingent of print reporters was also present. It was the first war since 1971 making a completely new phenomenon for a generation of audience and readers drawing immense interest. While print media remained traditional covering every aspect of the conflict with gravity and seriousness under the watchful eyes of some editors who had covered 1971 wars, the television channels went overboard. While print reporters were giving analysis and human interests stories, byte hungry television channels were busy showing canons firing, blasts, interviews and bytes laced with a bit of jingoism and theatrics. In certain cases, the TV journalists proved to be a security hazard for the Indian Army as they never stuck to the basic principles of reporting from a war zone.

Parliament attack was a different coverage altogether. The TV media was growing. Channels mushroomed post-Kargil. The incident took place in the heart of the national capital in the presence of a contingent of media covering ongoing session of the Parliament. It was the first terror attack caught on camera. Live visuals were beamed which shook the entire country. It was unimaginable that Parliament could be attack. Following arrests and later interview of one of the accused Afzal Guru on TV, in which he confessed, proved to be a questionable is a milestone in TV history. The print media was covering in traditional way. Sticking mostly to investigative stories. Getting details weaving them and at times questioning the police on its investigation. The print media followed the traditional route to the story and once the story was a hit in the newspapers, the TV journalists twisted the same facts to whip up nationalistic feelings.

In 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, it was an electronic media spectacle altogether. It had every bit of element for electronic media audience. The prima donna of the attack, Ajmal Amir Kasab's visuals, interviews of victims, posh South Mumbai localities, Cafe Leopold, Iconic Taj Hotel every bit of eyeball grabbing shots were there. The stories were, however, being

broken by wire services and print. Right from Kasab's first interview to conversation between handlers to operational details, print media gave it a thorough coverage. The overzealous television channels repeatedly crossed line by beaming live shots of commando action which resulted in rap on their knuckles from the government and the Supreme Court. The television helped the terrorists who were informed by their handlers in Pakistan about the movement of troops on the ground. Some things never change right from the Kargil War to Mumbai attack.

Question: Do you find any particular pattern or nature of media in India in coverage of the conflicts between India and Pakistan?

Answer: It is jingoistic. Print media is balanced as it has more accountability because of printed word while it is very easy for the electronic media to run a flash and drop it after few minutes. Rabid panellists make work easy for channels. Apart from ex-army officials and nationalists, those who are jingoists make it difficult to have any sanity in the debates. It's like condensed form of a B-grade bollywood movie wherein abusing Pakistan (in India) and India (in Pakistan) fetches good TRPs with anchor playing the ring leader. Rather than having a balanced discussion, partisan anchors are taking these debates to a completely new dip. The seriousness of diplomatic issues is lost in the shrill TV debates on both sides of borders where panellists are bombarded with silly and leading questions often to create binaries.

Question: Was there any kind of backlash or pressure the Indian media had faced from the government while covering India and Pakistan relationship?

Answer: Recently *NDTV* had to face a blackout for covering Pathankot terror attack.

Question: As per your opinion, the role of which Indian newspaper *The Hindu, The Times of India, The Indian Express, The Hindustan Times and The Telegraph (of Calcutta)* you find more balanced or critical or nationalist in reporting vis a vis Indo-Pak conflicts?

Answer: They all are balanced in their narrative. While *The Hindu* continued to be a newspaper of records having a good coverage of investigating journalism as well as government's and opposition's viewpoints, *The Indian Express* continued with its romanticism of being seen as a defying newspaper. *The Hindustan Times* has always maintained of being close to the political establishment in power whereas *The Telegraph*

newspaper is always a conventional paper which enticed its readers with juicy headlines to serious stories.

Question: Similarly, according to you, which Indian news channel *DD, Star TV, Times Now* or *NDTV* has done more damage to the Indo-Pak relationship? What do you have to say about the electronic media of India?

Answer: Electronic media has been explained in my earlier replies. Without any shred of doubt, *DD* news, despite claiming to be an autonomous organisation, remained to be a mouth piece of the government. *Star TV*, which has changed alliance partners since it landed on Indian shores, has been changing its stands according to the owners who controlled the editorial board. *NDTV* has been regarded as one of the balanced channels especially after the exit of Barkha Dutt, who glamourised terror in the Kashmir Valley, and soon attained role of mediator and pontificator rather than following ABCD of basic journalism. *Times Now* is a channel which has thrived on jingoism and whipping up nationalistic fervour without any rhyme and reason. The debates on the channel are sickening and do not serve any purpose other than inflicting communal hatred in a country whose base is on secularism. Often, this channel was seen as a court and its anchor as a judge, who, in the most shameless way, sought to extract replies from his panellists in the garb of the slogans 'the nation wants to know'.

Question: What do you think what kind of role Indian media should play in promoting peace and harmony vis-a-vis relations with Pakistan?

Answer: India media should report facts. Media cannot promote peace or harmony if the government of another country keeps using non-state actors as state policy. It should report facts and avoid fiction, shrill opinion and jingoism.

8. E-mail interview with Manoj Joshi (Commentator, Analyst on National and International Politics and Distinguished Fellow at *ORF*) on 14 July 2017

Question: What do you think what are the dynamics of the relationship between press, public opinion and foreign policy in India?

Answer: As such government dominates the foreign policy discourse in the country. However, whenever the government position is ambiguous and unclear, the media tends to take the lead and push in this or that direction.

Question: Indo-Pak relationship has been marked by mistrust, animosity and conflict ridden in the last six decades. What do you think what kind of role Indian media (both print and electronic) has played during the Kargil conflict, 2001 Parliament attacks and 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks? Can you illustrate with instances?

Answer: The Indian media reported in the Kargil conflict despite the government efforts to restrict their reporting. The 2001 Parliament attack took place in front of the media cameras in the Parliament House and so the reports were factual. However, the media did not really provide us any detail as to who the attackers were. Even today we know the name of the conspirators like Afzal Guru, but we don't know who the attackers were, which outfit they were affiliated with and where they came from. In the Mumbai terror attacks, the poor handling of the situation by the government enabled the media to give a direct reportage of the attack. Subsequently, too, a lot of information on the attack became available.

Question: Do you find any particular pattern or nature of Indian media in coverage of the conflicts between India and Pakistan?

Answer: Increasingly, the two countries no longer post correspondents in each other's soil. The result is that most of the reportage is indirect. Some has to do with hostility, some with affordability. In Pakistan, Urdu papers are dominant, but they are not interested in reporting from India, while the English papers cannot afford. Even Indian papers have cut down correspondents abroad, even though they can afford them.

Question: Has Indian media played more negative role rather than positive in influencing India's foreign policy vis-a-vis Pakistan?

Answer: In recent times, the Indian media has played more of a negative role. Media reflects government policy in India. When government to government relations are good, you will find the coverage reflecting this and vice versa.

Question: Is there any kind of backlash or pressure the media generally faces from the government while covering Indo-Pak relationship?

Answer: Media does not challenge the government on coverage so there is no question of backlash.

Question: It was for the first time that Indian media in general and electronic media in particular had covered the Kargil War. What are your opinions on the media's reportage on the crises?

Answer: This was a matter of chance and the location of the scene of action. Had the action taken place in Siachen area, you may have had no coverage. But it took place on a major highway connected to two airports—Srinagar and Leh and hence the coverage. Once the government discovered that the media coverage added to the nationalist fervour, they did their best to encourage it.

Question: Do you think Track II diplomacy has been effective for Indo-Pak relationship?

Answer: To some extent, but mainly Track I is decisive.

Question: What do you think what kind of role Indian and Pakistani media should play in promoting peace and harmony vis-a-vis relations with Pakistan?

Answer: Media's role is to report, not to promote peace or war.

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