

**STATE-SOCIETY INTERACTION IN KYRGYZSTAN:
UNDERSTANDING POLITICAL DYNAMICS THROUGH
“COLOUR REVOLUTION”**

*Thesis submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
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Dedicated
to
My Amma and Babuji



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DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled **STATE-SOCIETY INTERACTION IN KYRGYZSTAN: UNDERSTANDING POLITICAL DYNAMICS THROUGH "COLOUR REVOLUTION"** submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other University.

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We recommend that this thesis be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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ABBREVIATIONS

CARs	Central Asian Republics
CADI	Central Agency for Development, Investment and Innovation
CDCS	Coalition For Democracy and Civil Society
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CPD	Congress of Peoples' Deputies
CPSU	Communist Party of Soviet Union
CSAC	Civil Society Against Corruption
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
DDK	Democratic Movement Kyrgyzstan
GONGOs	Governmental NGOs
KCHR	Kyrgyz Committee For Human Rights
ICNL	International Centre for Not-For-Profit Law
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOs	International Organizations
INGOs	International Non-Governmental Organizations
LDCS	Least Developed Countries
MSN	Moja Stolitsa Novosti
NED	National Endowment for Democracy
NEP	New Economic Policy
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
ODIHR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe
PMK	People's Movement of Kyrgyzstan
SDPK	Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Chapter I

Introduction and Research Design

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN

1.1 Introduction

Kyrgyzstan is a tiny and mountainous country of the Central Asia. It is one of the few post-Soviet states, which has attracted the attention of the world due to the enthusiastic adoption of economic and political reforms after getting independence from the disintegrated Soviet Union. In addition to that, it has raised more curiosity due to its fragile political process, which paved the way for the two popular people's movements and overthrow of incumbent presidents in 2005 and 2010. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, its first President Askar Akayev initiated the process of "triple transition (economic, political, and state and nation building)" (Cummings et al. 2013: 443). Therefore, it was very rightly praised as an "island of democracy in Central Asia" (Anderson 1999:23). Anderson says that "undoubtedly, the first few years were the era of cooperation and co-optation between state and powerful societal forces (Anderson 1999:25).

After the independence of Kyrgyzstan Askar Akayev became its first President. Though he was elected as president of the Supreme Soviet of Kyrgyzstan on 27 October 1990 but he was re-elected through popular vote on 12 October 1991 (Spector 2004: 7). After becoming the president of Kyrgyzstan Akayev faced many challenges. Kyrgyzstan was facing the uncertainty about the model of a newly democratic government as there was no clarity about the role and relationship between parliament and president. Also, the Kyrgyz economic situation has severely started deteriorating after the end of the former Soviet Union and further, many problems occurred, such as unemployment after adoption of Perestroika; rupturing of the economy because of the inflation of necessary commodities and the revival of Kyrgyz ethnic nationalism, Russian and other Slavic minorities started leaving the country. In the meantime, ethnic strife also happened between Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities over land and housing issues in the Osh region (Huskey 1995:825-826). But, Akayev struggled with

these problems to resolve them, and hence he received the full support from the people and political elites for reforming policies and programmes in the early years.

People of Kyrgyzstan were very hopeful and optimistic that their President would lead the nation to rescue and overcome the newly originated upheavals and challenges. But after few years of a good show of fair intention and statesmanship, he gradually started moving towards the authoritarian/semi-authoritarian direction. He brought the democratic institutions of the Kyrgyz political system under jeopardy. Incessantly, he tried to seize and hold the power in a highly divisive political environment; he and his associates started influencing election laws, media groups, and freedom of press (Connery 2000: 1). Therefore, his popularity rapidly shrank with more subsequent additional challenges, such as increasing poverty and corruption, faltering economic situation, murders of opposing political elites and accumulation of financial assets by his family members (Radnitz 2005:5).

It is noteworthy that just after the second round of parliamentary elections in March 2005, opposition political parties and their supporters along with various civil society groups started protesting across the country against the alleged massive irregularities in the elections. These protests in southern Kyrgyzstan were very intense, particularly in many southern cities, due to the perceived dominance of northern leader Akayev (Tucker 2007:536). Several more protests took place, and finally, on 24 March 2005, protesters stormed the government building and offices in Bishkek, and demanded the resignation of Akayev. Thus, President Askar Akayev had to leave the country. This ouster of the incumbent president through popular mass uprising is popularly known as the 'Tulip Revolution' (Marat 2012: 325).

The leader of the opposition coalition (PMK) and former Prime Minister Kurmanbek Bakiyev became the interim Prime Minister as well as the interim President. Following the presidential elections of July 2005, he was elected as a new President of Kyrgyzstan. The people hoped that the new President would

bring peace and prosperity in the country, and will strengthen the democratization process in the country which was stalled. After taking charges, Bakiyev promised the citizens for bringing radical changes in the country (Sherniazova 2013:22), and also promised substantial political and economic reforms in the republic. He assured that he would promulgate constitutional reforms to reduce the powers of the president. However, with the passage of time, it was realized that most of his policies, decisions, and actions had been just the opposite from his promises and assurances (Engvall 2011: 53). Like his predecessor Akayev, Bakiyev was also the product of Soviet era's political legacy. This legacy resulted in serving the interest of their family and clan members.

It may not be forgotten that Tulip revolution occurred because of the anger of the people towards the Akayev's corrupt and authoritarian practices as well as disenchanting political elites. Akayev neither fulfilled the hopes of people, nor of political elites. However, after some time this began to surface that those political elites who were against Akayev's corrupt regime, also did not have any clear long-term vision to take the Kyrgyzstan forward. They were united against Akayev only because of their petty narrow political interests, not because of any long-term interest of the country. This proved correct when the incumbent leaders' infighting began shortly after the Tulip revolution and the struggle for power and resources restarted. The Tulip revolution and the removal of Akayev resulted in the systemic instability, which produced changes in the prevailing power structure. But it must be remembered that most of them were product of Akayev legacy (Tursunkulova 2008:350).

Kurmanbek Bakiyev got elected with a landslide victory in the presidential election of July 2005. But again after a year, it did not show any sign of settlement between various political factions in the new government; none of the groups were able to consolidate the political power over the state apparatus. Various political groups, business elites, criminal elements formed alliances, but no one was able to succeed in this struggle of power (Radnitz 2010: 231-232). They were not able to provide stability to the Kyrgyzstan. But there were some

qualitative difference from the Akayev era. Bakiyev's era has seen political competition which was more fierce and stiff. Even the political tandem between new President Bakiyev and Prime Minister Felix Kulov did not last long due the power struggle, and Kulov had to resign during early 2007. Both of them were supportive of the two competing political factions, who were rival for the political and economic resources with the backing of clan groups. These two groups ran the Kyrgyz state as a separated and disjointed entity. Finally, Kulov was replaced by another new Prime Minister Azim Isabekov after Kulov's disapproval from parliament *Jogorku Kenesh* (Matveeva 2010:3-5).

The power struggle was going on not only inside the parliament, other state bodies and institutions, but it was also happening outside the state apparatuses. This was happening mostly because of economic interests pertaining to alcohol, tobacco, construction, and foreign import-export markets in border areas (Alkan 2009: 368). Almost all powerful political and economic magnates of the country, who were earlier loyal to Akayev, became the supporters of Bakiyev over night; but few of them did not favour Bakiyev and resisted his dominance in politics. Such aggrieved persons got united against the new president, and the dissatisfaction with the new leader was the main cause of their alliance, not the ideological conjunction. It was only mutual resentment which united them against Bakiyev. Meanwhile, Bakiyev gradually took almost full control of parliament, and opposition found it very hard to challenge the president and his associates through the legislature arena. So, the opposition parties made maximum use of demonstrations and protests against the government to put pressure for constitutional reforms (Engvall 2011:55).

The collusion between state and organized crime is also a very important factor in Kyrgyz politics (Temirulov 2008: 344). Organized criminal groups got protection from both Akayev and Bakiyev government but the support of Bakiyev's government was stronger than Akayev. The criminal groups were being used to terrorize the opposition where some opposition politicians were murdered as well. After the revolution in 2005, the political competition and scrambling for

resources got high and in such situation the influence of criminals groups became stronger. Surprisingly, during 2005-2006, political killing increased rapidly in an unprecedented way. Meanwhile, along with infighting among political groups, criminal leaders also tried to enhance their role in political theatre. They also wanted to make inroads in politics and some criminal leaders (e.g. Ryspek Akmatbaev) were very popular among people; they had the image of '*Robinhood*' and saviour for the people (Marat 2008: 15-16). They used their black money to get popularity among public and no one raised question regarding their source of such huge money. It is the situation in a society where such criminal elements compete with legal authority on equal footing to get legitimacy. This state-crime nexus demonstrates that how criminal elements in Kyrgyzstan also attempted to use state machinery for their protection and upliftment. Bakiyev's weak position existed for only two years, and the political tandem between Bakiyev and opposition remained for the first two years only. Finally, in late 2007, Bakiyev was gradually able to achieve a strong control over the state apparatus. He was able to smash the opposition solidarity, and became the most powerful person of the country by using the tactics of the former President Akayev, and established his family members as number one family in the country (Kupatadze 2008:280).

Further, Akayev family captured the state apparatus through indirect way. During the Akayev tenure, his wife had control over cadre politics, and his son, daughter and daughter-in-law had informal and indirect control over the finance ministry and law enforcement agencies. But Bakiyev and his family members did this in open and direct manner. His family members began to take control of the various state bodies and institutions straightforwardly. During Bakiyev regime, corruption, nepotism and criminals' management were done by his family members directly. In other words, state machinery became synonymous to family business. They had control over all important business and resources of the country (Sherniazova 2013:23).

Another divergent factor of Bakiyev regime from Akayev regime was the dominance of clan and regional grouping. This clan and regional groupism were

also present during Akayev era, but they were not so open and rampant like Bakiyev regime (Oraz 2006:59). They became more intensive and penetrative during Bakiyev time. Bakiyev radically removed the dominance of northern elites in the system and replaced them with southerners, especially from his native Jalal-Abad province. But, the family and clan members were the center of gravity of this regional and clan cronyism (Collins 2011:154-155). When constitutional court declared the November 2006 Constitution null and void, then he became more emboldened. Thereafter, he went for the Presidential election in 2009 which was scheduled to be in 2010. He easily got elected because opposition was divided and unprepared for the early elections. This victory bolstered him and he undertook various measures to strengthen his position under the pretext of administrative reforms. He transferred almost all important powers of government to the President and newly established government bodies. He established a new body- Central Agency for Development, Investment and Innovation (CADII) - for the supervision of economic and financial matters, and his son Maxim Bakiyev was appointed the head of this powerful body. This was made to surpass the parliament and Finance Ministry's powers in crucial matters related to economic affairs of the country. Such move was a clear violation of Kyrgyz Constitution and laws related to state services, which prohibited the head of the state to appoint the close relatives to important posts (Engval 2011:59-60).

If Maxim Bakiyev had the control over the country's economic affairs, his uncle Janish Bakiyev- had almost total control over Kyrgyz security forces. He had command over security pillars of the country. He was the chief of Kyrgyz elite forces named "Asystan (the lion)", which was established after the merger of "National Guards" and "State Protection Service." This elite force had the control over security forces of the Kyrgyzstan (Marat 2012:326). Even Bakiyev had made several important appointments of his favourite persons in state police services. Bakiyev elder son Marat Bakiyev was the head of National Security Service. Bakiyev' second brother was appointed as the Ambassador of Germany; his third brother was a special representative of China; his fourth brother was de-facto ruler of Jalal-Abad province; and the fifth brother was the local village administrator.

So, it was quite clear that Kyrgyz state affairs were made Bakiyev's family affairs through above-mentioned clever tactics. Thus, Bakiyev consolidated his position by creating a "kleptocracy" with most lucrative assets of Kyrgyzstan transferred into the hands of his family members. The nature of the Bakiyev regime cannot be understood by conventional logic of state perspective. It could be understood only through deep understanding of motive, methods, and deciphering the purposes of the political leadership of the incumbent regime (Kubicek 2011:116).

It was the Bakiyev strategy to make a vertical power structure at all levels of the state; this model was inspired by Russian President Putin's style; this model was also successful to some extent in Kyrgyzstan (Sherniazova 2013:29-30). Akayev also attempted to do this, but did not succeed; during his regime the power was decentralized and dispersed to a great extent. Bakiyev made more intensified effort to centralize the power and he gave top priority to integration of political authority in order to remove the various loci of power centers in the Kyrgyz society; which were creating hurdles for his kleptocracy. Therefore, he appointed his loyal persons over almost all important posts including ministry of defense, finance, internal affairs, justice, and others. This system was completed till the fall of 2009 through various administrative reforms. The creation of "Presidential Institute" in October 2009 was the final nail in the coffin of authoritarianism by Bakiyev (Marat 2008: 19). This initiative made parliament control over president irrelevant, and transferred almost all powers to president and his appointees; this move made all specialization of various state bodies totally impotent and dependent. But such moves backfired and many powerful political leaders of the country felt alienated and sidelined from the power structure. Instead of power balancing among political elites, Bakiyev vied for full control of the system and tried to take total control of resources and institutions of the country. Bakiyev's greed did not stop here; in addition to privatisation and criminalization of national economy and polity he and his family members also made secret deals with murky business persons from abroad (Loung 2012:1-2). They were brought and appointed in the government bodies to supervise the economy to get undue benefits in business deals; through this method Bakiyev associates and foreigners

enriched themselves. These steps of Bakiyev frustrated and radicalized large parts of the population as well as excluded many political elites of the polity. For rivaling political elites, the only alternative was to overthrow him by sheer force; which happened in April 2010 in the second Tulip Revolution.

The government, which came to power post-Tulip revolution failed to fulfil the promises, which was resulting in deep disillusionment among the people. The rapidly growing popular disaffection began to accumulate around the steep rise in fuel, water and gas charges. This provided a platform on which the fractious opposition groups could unite. Even UN secretary general Ban Ki-Moon criticized the Bakiyev government during his Kyrgyzstan visit. This event united the whole opposition which called for a national protest on 7 April 2010 and transformed into a national uprising. The demonstrators occupied official buildings and state-run TV stations all over the country, including the capital, Bishkek. The bloody clashes with the security forces took the toll of approximately 100 lives. Realizing the fervor of the protests, Bakiyev fled from Kyrgyzstan. This is called as the second Tulip Revolution, which allegedly received the support of Russia (the first was orchestrated by the US) (Radyuhin 2011). After Bakiyev leaving, Roza Utunbayeva, an influential leader from the opposition, announced that Bakiyev government had fallen and the interim authority she planned to lead would draft a new constitution and called a fresh presidential election in Kyrgyzstan.

After the ouster of Bakiyev, political instability continued to inflict Kyrgyzstan. On 10 June 2010, the southern province Osh saw the worst ever violence in Kyrgyzstan's history, allegedly provoked by the supporters of Bakiyev. Hundreds died in riots that targeted ethnic Uzbeks and tens of thousands Uzbeks fled to neighbouring Uzbekistan. The violence in June 2010 in Osh and Jalalabad 470 people was killed and over 400,000 people displaced. The military and government in Kyrgyzstan were ineffective in stopping the violence. The difference can be easily recognized between the 2005 and 2010 revolution. The second Tulip Revolution (7th April 2010) was not properly based on cooperation

among opposition leaders, because, they were imprisoned one day before. The nature of Protests was not organized, but spontaneous. Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) were the main part of these protests (Marat 2012:330).

The aforesaid summary shows how the political climate has been rapidly changing in Kyrgyzstan. The Republic started towards the ‘triple transitions’ (Cummings et al. 2013); from Soviet Communism to liberal democracy, from state-controlled socialist economy to market economy and third, “towards stateness” after independence have not completed yet. The so-called two Tulip revolutions in 2005 and 2010 look very similar in certain aspects (Huskey et al. 2013). The similarities in both revolutions involved- discontents about regimes characterized by corruption, nepotism, increasing authoritarianism, rapid and unexpected ouster of the presidents, led by actors who had earlier participated in the old regime ruling coalition, assuming a new leadership role in the new regime; mobilization of people outside Bishkek, mainly participation of countryside people, control of the government buildings. In both events, alleged role of external actors was also crucial; the USA in 2005 and Russia in 2010 (Cummings et al. 2010: 445). This study strives to analyze the political process in Kyrgyzstan through the state-in-society approach, which would be discussed in the following sections.

1.2 The State-Society Interaction Process

Human society has been under some form of political authority since the beginning. Though, its type of authority might vary. The form of authority and its decision making capacity has deep impacts on the societal development (Pierson 1996: 65). The modern state has now become the sole representative of legitimate authority in society (Cassese 1986:121); and its citizenry is supposed to follow the ‘rules of game’ - legislations and laws - made and implemented by state institutions. Kukathas Defines the ‘state’ here: “The state is a form of political association or polity that is distinguished by the fact that it is not itself incorporated into any other political associations, though it may incorporate other such associations. The state is thus a supreme corporate entity because it is not

incorporated into any other entity” (Kukthas 2004:3). On the other hand Mann defines society as “a unit with boundaries and it contains interaction that is relatively dense and stable; that is, it is internally patterned when compared to interaction that crosses its boundaries” (Mann 1986:13). Giddens elaborates the four important features of society as follows (Giddens 1995: 164-165): first, society is an identifiable clustering of institutions across time and space; second, it is an association between the social system and a given specific territory; third, in any society we find the normative and authoritative claims about the behaviour of people through a legitimate claim of occupation; and fourth, the people of a given society have the feeling of a common identity and value system. In the process of articulation, formulation, and implementation of ‘rules of the game’ for society, state institutions interact with a multitude of societal forces and subsequently, both affect as well as transform each other (Huggins1997:204-205).The relationship between the state institutions and society is one of the most obscure and controversial issues of social science’ (Hintze 1973:154).

To understand the process of state-society interaction and its impact on social, political and economic transformation is very complex and challenging. To understand the state-society interaction three mainstream approaches are important to be mentioned here; first, “Statist approach”; second is “Society-centric or Social Reductionist approach” and the third is “state-in-society approach” (Migdal 2004:3) in the context of understanding the political dynamics in the post-Soviet states. A brief of these perspectives is being mentioned in the following sections.

1.2.1. The Statist Approach

The statist approach explains about state-society interaction process through the prism of state and its institutions’ powerful role as the chief driving force of societal change and development. One of the pioneers of this statist/institutional approach, Max Weber has given prime importance to the state and its formal institutions and laws over societal forces (Redner 1990:648-649). And he argues that the state with its preponderance of resources and extraordinary means

dominates the societal forces. His definition of the state - “as a human community that successfully claims the monopoly over the use of physical force within a given territory” shows that he has so much faith in the monopoly of physical force of state machinery to initiate the changes in society (Gerth and Mills 1991: 82). Adding onto Weber’s view through his “Social System Approach”, Talcott Parsons (1951:71) elaborates that state and society are the parts of a broader entity, which he calls “social system.” He further says that state’s unified and overarching set of values take the center stage in the society in deciding the patterns of power spectrum of society. Also, he argues that the core of any social system is “patterned normative behaviour” on which the life of the population is collectively organized (Kamrava 1996:49-50). These normative behaviours internally regulate the people of the polity; and it is gradually internalized by the society. He says that “No society can maintain stability in the face of varying exigencies and strains unless interests’ constellations of its members are grounded in solidarity, loyalty, and obligations (Parsons 1967:10).” It means that political institutions i.e. state institutions are the prime center for guiding the modernization and development in the society (Migdal 2004:5). Charles Tilly also puts much emphasis on the state institutions. In his study of modernization in Europe, he argues that the origin of the modern nation state has undoubtedly been by-products of consolidation of state institution. Tilly has said: “War made the state and state made the war; making war means raising taxes (Pierson 1996:31).” He further argues that it is the coercive power of the state through which state extracts resources from society; regulates the public behaviour through the coercive power. Moreover the state’s coercive capacity is also pivotal to starting of modernization process and it paved the foundation of contemporary modern Europe (Tilly 1975: 24).

Explaining this modernization and transformation in terms of his “center and periphery model”, Edward Shils (1975:138-140) says that it is the center with its profound resources and machineries, promotes a unified, coherent, and universal value system, institutions, and practices in society. State attempts to modernize the periphery of society through its universally accepted value system; where

people feel a sense of belonging, connection, and attachment with their community and state authority. Shils says that society is given both carrot and stick by the state; so state institutions give direction to society/periphery. Moreover, he is of the view that society is periphery and passive receptor of the center's order and direction and plays only peripheral role (Migdal 2004:6-7). So, one must focus on the center in order to analyze the process of state-society interaction process as well as understanding the political process of a given country. So, it is clear that "statist approach" and its proponent scholars identify the "state or center" as the magical site to understand the domination and the change of the power equations and its transforming capability in the society. In their view, focus on a purposeful, goal oriented loci of state with its institutions, elites, and values, must be the first goal of social science students who want to analyse the societal development (Lambach 2004: 2).

1.2.2. The Society-centred Approach

Some approaches have been identified as a body of thoughts, who put emphasis on the social forces and negates the over importance of state institutions in the role of societal transformation. They argue that social forces determine the nature of the state and its overall direction in the societal development. These society-centred approaches are the Marxist approach, the Structural-Functional approach, and the Pluralist approach. The classical Marxist approach views the state as a tool of class oppression and domination in the hands of the bourgeoisie class (Wang 1999:231). The capitalist bourgeoisie class uses the state as a means to extract resources, to protect private property rights through the use of the coercive power of the state. They maintain the type of order that is conducive to the capitalist mode of production (Gill 2003: 10-11).

Pluralist conception of state-society interaction also gives importance to organized groups in society who want autonomy from the state and these groups tends to resist against the centralized state (Barkey and Parikh 1991: 524). This argument says that in an organized group, individual gives more importance to groups' interest rather than the state (Parsons 1966:72). But this concept of

pluralism prevails in developed states, not in the developing countries where people largely get organized on the basis of primordial and informal relations. The mode of social organizations on the civil norms not fully applied here like developed societies (Vincent 1987:183-186). In a pluralist conception of grouping, the prime motive would be power and resources, which seems absent in developing countries where groups vie for rule and control of government machinery. Pluralist groups struggle to maximize their own autonomous self-interests; they largely ignore the public sector institutions. Public institutions are understood only as an impartial referee among various groups competing for resources (Krasner 1984: 227). Legal and institutional constraints only play a minor role in the fight for resources. Diverse interest groups attempt to bargain and build coalitions with one another in order to gain the greatest advantage for themselves at the lowest cost. These kinds of groups are prevalent in American society where competition is decided by specific sets of American values: individualism, separation of powers, universal suffrage, two-party competition and fairly open access to decision-making processes on the part of diverse interests (Dahl 1961, 1971).

1.2.3. Neo-Statist Perspective

Since the mid-1980s, the focus on State institutions has been reemphasized against the structural-functional reductionism. So it props up the question that what this new “Bringing the State Back In” literature offer to the understanding of state-society interaction process (Mitchell 1991:81-82). This tradition was concerned with two core issues; the first was the degree of autonomy of the state from its environment, and the second important issue was related to the degree of congruity of state with its environment. The autonomy issue is seen the state as an exogenous variable and the first central question was can the state make and implement its preferences independent from society (Pierson 1996: 89-91). As mentioned earlier, many writers implicitly or explicitly have demonstrated about the growing popularity of their approaches as partly growing out of a reaction

against the recent resurgence of neo-statist or institutional approach, of which the 'bringing the state back in' literature is one subset (Skocpol 1985).

1.2.4. The State-in-Society Perspective

The state-in-society perspective attempts to understand the nature of societal development through seeing state within its social setting. The very state-in-society perspective is an attempt to know the susceptibility of the state institutions to the influences of societal forces in a particular society. This approach does this through resituating the state in their social setting (Migdal et al.1994:1).The search for the explanation for the role played by different state institutions in their respective societies has paved the way for state-in-society perspective. Arguing against the other dominant approach to study the social transformation and modernization, it argues that the struggle for rule-making for the whole society does not always takes place at the commanding heights of state institutions located in the capital of the country (Barkey and Parikh 1991: 532). It can happen anywhere in the country, even in very distant remote areas. It is not necessary that only big players participate in the tussle for domination and subordination in society, and decide the rules for the whole society; local players also do. It adopts a strategy of disaggregating the state as an object of study. It puts state, both as an end and means of analysis to get a better understanding of the state as well as socio-political changes in the society.

Migdal asserts four important interrelated claims to study the state-society interaction under state-in-society perspective (Migdal 1994: 2-4):

- **States vary in their effectiveness based on their ties to society**

It is true that the state is an important actor in the process of social change, but nevertheless, it is not the only important actor; and it has never been autonomous from social forces. So it would be a mistake to give privilege the state institutions over social forces' influences. In low-income developing countries, state is not as autonomous as in the developed world. In such a situation state disconnectedness from society results in its

weakness; this is counted as strength in developed countries. So, in developing countries, state effectiveness depends on their relationship with social forces.

- **States must be disaggregated**

This second related claim follows from the first. Any state must be analyzed in its particular social setting. One must study not only the top institutions of the state located in the capital city of the country, but also state and social institutions located in remote areas. So, one must carefully observe on various parts of state institutions- from the pinnacle of power to lower levels of state institutions- and on links between lower levels with the capital city.

- **Social forces and states, both are contingent on specific empirical conditions**

Migdal argues like the state institutions, social classes and forces also need to be looked in the context of their social circumstances. But he cautions about the predefined role of any particular social group according to their political clout. Instead, he says that any social group can be influential according to the particular context. Therefore, one should not too early predict its role and not jump to conclusion.

- **States and other social forces may be mutually empowering**

Migdal urges the scholars to eschew the state versus society dictum. State and society are not always against each other. It would be misleading to always put one against other in the analysis. We should move forward from the zero-sum game paralysis. It can be true for some social groups, but not for all. Some interaction between state components and social segments can be mutually empowering.

The post-colonial and post-Soviet societies are very complex in nature. Therefore, the state has not been able to get enough authoritative capabilities yet in these developing societies. Thus, in these societies, the state is not able to implement the rules of social control through its laws, symbols, and values across the society. Also, in these societies, the nature of social structures is very intertwined, so here

state institutions are not coherent and organized like a unit; they are very much disorganized and scattered and unable to put a unified control system. Their social organisations are not having a national character; instead, they are having a “weblike structure”, which are a conglomeration of local social organisations (Migdal 1988: 39). This local social organisation come under disparate segmented authorities or local strongmen; they can be a local former leader, local rich landlords, clan leader, community elders etc (Migdal 1988:33). These local leaders hold the authority, though not fully, in such social organisations.

The competition for social control between state and social forces takes place at the micro and macro level in the political system. On the macro level, i.e. national level, this struggle for social control occurs to make policies and programs for the whole country, in which various groups of society and various institutions of state compete for the support for their favourite programs and policies (Barkey and Parikh 1991: 525). On the national level, state wants to make rules which could make state institutions capable of implementing its authority across the whole country. But wishing powerful state organs across all levels of polity has also a danger. Making regional and local level state organs powerful will help to make these units autonomous from the national level leadership. Such autonomous islands would not be desired by national leadership. This autonomy creates fear among the top national leadership that the local administrative organs would not follow their orders in the future. This situation could lead to development centrifugal tendencies in the remote areas of the country. So, the state has to make counter-balance, though unwillingly, its own state organs through local social institutions (Migdal 1988:176).

This research would use the underpinnings proposed by Migdal (et al. (1994). Migdal (2004) says that this “state-in-society approach” is a process oriented approach and it illuminates how state authority and its power are exercised in any society, and how and when such pattern of power gets changed. This approach demonstrates that the state is a fragmented entity and it is not a unified, goal oriented cohesive organisation as proposed by Weber. A multitude of social

organisations (family, clans, MNCs, domestic and foreign business elites, criminal groups, tribes, political parties, patron-client dyads, etc.) maintain and vie for power and try to set the rules for guiding people's behaviour. The struggle between various parts of the state and society determine how society and the state create and maintain a distinct way of structuring day-to-day life, including the nature of rules that govern the people's behaviour. This undergoing process is the main focus of study in "state-in-society approach."

Migdal says that state-society interaction process should be understood within two types of boundaries. First is the 'territorial boundary' which separates one state's territory from the other; here domestic forces interact with international forces and subsequently they interact with state institutions. Second is the "social boundary", in which state institutions are demarcated from non-state, societal forces. The states-society interactions are shaped by interactions among state institutions, extraterritorial forces, and domestic societal forces. So it would be very interesting to see the interaction of these forces in and out of the territory of the states (Migdal 2004:92-93).

1.3. State-Society Interaction in Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan experienced two popular peoples' uprisings against its incumbent Presidents Askar Akayev and Kurmanbek Bakiyev in 2005 and 2010 respectively; both were forcefully removed from power. These two popular movements spark many intriguing questions; why did this 'island of democracy' face two such movements within just two decades of its existence?; how do state and social forces perceive each other?; how political leaders see the state institutions?; what do people expect from state institutions?; why do political leaders act differently after coming to power against their promises made?; why do the constitution of Kyrgyzstan become a tool for political leaders for their power aggrandisement?; which internal force did play important role in colour revolutions and why?; did external actors also have any role in these people's uprising?; why did they adopt the semi-parliamentary system after second uprising in 2010? These puzzles will be scrutinized in the subsequent review of literature available on Kyrgyz society

and politics. The present review attempts to explain the nature of political dynamics/process under the broader framework of state-society interaction in the Kyrgyz republic. It mentions about those internal and external forces which were decisive in that interaction and paved the way for the two popular people's movements in Kyrgyzstan. So the corpus of literature has been categorized under that theme of internal and external factors affecting the state-society interaction in Kyrgyzstan.

1.3.1 Internal Factors

Ahamad Rashid (1994) mentioned about the role history and geography on Kyrgyz society. He says that since long, sheep herding and the shepherds in the mountains of Tian Shan have been instrumental in a nomadic and communal life; and further this nomadic and tribal way of life engendered the norms of mutual assistance and cooperation on various local issues. John Anderson (1999) also accepts this notion of collective consciousness and a communal way of life that ensured solid and stable community bonding; in which people used to make an effort to resolve their societal problems through mutual help and cooperation; nevertheless, he cautions the exaggeration of democratic ethos of older clan based Kyrgyz society. Further, he indicates about the existence of intense inter-intra clan rivalry among various clan groups; he asserts that nomadic values did not preclude fragmentation and division on the basis of ethnic and cultural divisions. Their differences led them to fell prey to foreign rulers; and moreover this clan based society was also very hierarchical and rigid in its nature.

Reflecting on the role of Islam, Michael Kort (1999) states that Islam reached in the Central Asian region in mid of the eighth century A.D.; and it is an important factor in Kyrgyz social life; but it has no conservative traits like traditional Arabic Islam. He emphasizes that Kyrgyz people have maintained their erstwhile existing traditional syncretic belief system; a belief in spirit in the world, devotion to the supreme deity "Tengri" (heaven) and "cult of ancestors" especially strong among the nomadic herders of Kyrgyzstan. Moreover, Achylova (1995) also mentions that "Sufism" is also a very special feature of the Central Asian society. It

developed initially as an ascetic movement, establishing a clear identity for itself in the ninth century and even it retained its resilience during anti-religious Soviet rule. This role of Islam and other syncretic belief systems rejected the Communist notion of anti-religious secularism, and gave priority to “spiritual purity” and it negated the life based over wealth, money, and luxury.

Making comments about the nature of separate Kyrgyz state identity, Collins (2004) argues that before the tsarist period there was no such notion; power structure of society were defined by an intricate set of social and traditional norms developed over long period of time, which determined the behavioural and communal interaction between individuals and societal groups. Before the tsarist period, the politics was the art of family ties and loyalist occupied by upper class of society; the lower social classes were usually excluded from this dynamic process. And, Kaushik (1970) says that during the tsarist rule (from 1860s-1917), the society-state relation went through major transformations. There was greater centralisation in the political authority, because the reduced importance of powerful tribal leaders due to harsh Tsarist state. Nevertheless, many new social elites emerged due to new Tsarist rulers’ dependence on local notables and translators; this gave Tsarist state opportunity to further their penetration in the Central Asian society. The elimination of tribal chiefs also provided an opportunity for the Islamic Ulemas’ greater role in the society. On the other side, the Tsarist new economic, education and administrative policies for the first time in history transformed the Central Asian society on all dimensions.

Dzhunushaliev (1998) says that during the early years of its rule, Bolsheviks Russia attempted to resolve the task of transition to socialism by consolidating its totalitarian control in order to initiate socialist transformation from the top by means of “universal statisation.” This rigid model of state socialism blocked the democratic culture of civic consciousness and contained the seeds of totalitarian tendency in popular political culture. Lowe (2003) says that during the period of Stalinist despotism, every element of market structure, peasant economy, independent trade unions, entrepreneurial groups, and other associations were

destroyed. Stalin's "collectivisation and industrialisation" policy fuelled tension between soviet officials and Kyrgyz farmers. But this collectivisation policy did not have any spectacular impact on the traditional community structures, which was based on clan groups. The collective farms often simply restructured the existing kinship groups' solidarity networks; many traditional authority structures and agricultural practices remained intact (Anderson 1999). More space was given to indigenous Kyrgyz leaders in the Kyrgyz Communist Party since the Krushchev era, and they became slowly-slowly stronger and autonomous in relation to Moscow leadership (Huskey 1995).

Mentioning about the impacts of Gorbachev regime over Kyrgyzstan, Mohapatra (2006) says that the policy of "Glasnost' and Perestroika" had profound impact in social, cultural, political, and economic spheres in Central Asian republics. This policy resulted in the emergence of a host of dormant issues to the forefront such as corruption, environmental issues, emergence of informal groups, re-emphasis on past heritage, the changing in older political leadership in Kyrgyzstan. Analysing the relation between the elite and society in the Soviet era, Petric (2005) says that in Kyrgyz society, the political elites were never cut off from the population and the idea that state and society functioned separately is incorrect. On the contrary state elites maintained close relations with the masses through the establishment of solidarity networks. Furthermore, on the political level, even in the monopoly of one party during Soviet system, competition existed between inter and intra regional factions and antagonism between state and society existed there.

Indicating the importance of past traditions of dialogue and discussion in Kyrgyz society, Bunce (et al. 2006) observes that even during the Akaev era, his authoritarian tendency was opposed by societal forces because democratic norms were already present in Kyrgyz tribal traditions and culture. Kyrgyzstan was one of the Soviet republics where fellow communist leaders were challenged in elections in 1990 and eventually unseated Communist Party bosses and brought a physicist Askar Akaev to the presidency. After independence opposition political

parties were active in criticising the government policies either in the parliament or outside it. Adding to this idea, Juraev (2010) argues that Akaev efforts to democratize the society after the independence instilled the importance of democratic values in people's mind. The atmosphere of debate and discussion, media news, civil society groups flowering, all engendered high expectations and hopes from government, which subsequently could not be fulfilled by the Akaev regime. But still in the Kyrgyz society, political elites lacked consensus over some basic 'rules of game' among societal groups. Scholars argue that there is lack of commitment over certain basic norms, principles and long-term vision about Kyrgyzstan among the political elites of country (Cummings et al. 2013).

Showcasing the importance of personality based politics in Kyrgyzstan, Abazov (2003) emphasises the role of 'Personalism' in Kyrgyz politics and says that political competition in the country has been degenerated into competition between individuals; it is not between political ideals, ideas, and such kind of political competition leads to 'tribalization of politics' at the expense of political parties. The political leaders mobilise people on basis of patron-client network and clan based affiliation in any political gathering. McGlinchey (2010) claims that concepts like political parties, opposition groups are unfit in Kyrgyz politics. He terms Kyrgyz political dynamics as "a handful of elite going in circles". It is not a competitive democracy. Here a large number of various kinds or elite competes to grab share in the cake of state resources.

Adding another dimension to factionalism in Kyrgyz political process, Loung (2002) stresses on the importance of regionalism in factional competition. She accounts regionalism as establishment of relations between people based on their shared, locally-specific or broader territorial backgrounds shaped by the internal administrative divisions of a place or region. Her analysis proposes regionalism as a model for the emergence of post-Soviet political factions, which emphasizes on these local connections; and regional groups attempt to secure greater political control to obtain resources for their region. Ryabkov (2008) also accepts the important role of regional divide in Kyrgyz politics, but he cautions that all is not

laid in regional politics; on the opposite he demonstrates different political attitudes among north and south people about their regional political elites and politics. He, in his survey, finds that north is sceptical, aloof, pessimistic, and perhaps passively loyal to the state institutions. Northerners refuse to support political institutions and personalities, including the opposition and exhibits a high degree of alienation from politics. On the other hand south is actively loyal and optimistic, and grants support to the political system. This north-south cleavage may be a reaction to the politics of the elite, nevertheless he is of the view this regional divide is neither a replication of power struggles of regional and national elite nor a product of ethnic differences. Marat (2010) is also having the view that regional divide is used as a tactical tool for the political gain by politicians. As for instance, southern elite are positioned in both northern and southern political parties and they get united at times when their interests are threatened and they promote their own southern candidates for key government positions. She argues that north-south political divide/rivalry is a political instrument of political elite for political gains.

Signifying the role of clan networks, Collins (2004) states that ‘clan networks’ are very important in understanding the political dynamics of Kyrgyzstan. In her view clan is an important political actor and clan network is very crucial factor to explain the political process in Kyrgyzstan. She says that clan network were central in durability of Akayev regime after the dissolution of Soviet Union. Nevertheless, accepting the role of formal institutions (political parties, movements, media, NGOs) in Tulip revolution of 2005, Temirkulov (2008) says that informal institutions and actors also played an active, supportive, and complementary role in this mass movement. The informal institutions such as kurultai, aksakals, palvan were mobilised by the patronage networks based on the theory of “subversive clientelism” (Radnitz 2006), in which people are encouraged to participate in protests due to a mix of purposive, material and solidarity incentives. Radnitz further says that this situation occurs in three conditions- weak formal instructions, economic benefit prospects, and deficit of public good in society; which were/are present in Kyrgyzstan and proved as

boosting factors for peoples' movement in 2005. But on the contrary, repudiating the views of Radnitz and others, Marat (2010) argues political forces have little interest in uniting clan and kinship ties. By contrast, familial, clan and tribal identities are often viewed as an important feature of everyday life (weddings, funerals, etc.), they are not a defining feature of the political churning. Instead alliances are brokered between officials, criminals, and political elite; so that none will threaten their network's business interests.

Denoting the importance of crime in a Kyrgyz political environment, Marat (2006) comments political leaders oftentimes maintain friendly relations with criminal groups to secure leverage over rival forces in the political and business sphere. Even in the economic field, many sectors such as customs control, markets located close to inter-state borders, the drug economy, and the energy sector are sources of illegal profits directly or indirectly controlled by high-ranking state officials, whose business interests overlap with criminal groups.

Some scholars put significance to economic conditions and argue that deteriorating economic conditions cause people's anger and protests against the state institutions. Radnitz (2005) mentions that the economic plight was one of the main causes of colour revolution in Kyrgyzstan. The collapse of the Soviet Union and Kyrgyz state's rolling back from social expenditure created fertile ground for a grievance generation that exhausted in Tulip's protests against Akaev regime. Soviet system that provided universal employment, salaries sufficient to buy all necessary goods, paid vacations, and generous pensions; but since its collapse, people have been left without substantial social security schemes by government.

Cheterian (2009) shows the impact of neo-liberal policies to people's plights and their role in people's protests. In a number of post-Soviet countries, transition did not lead to the promised results. To understand this failure, the economic side of transition/mass privatisation should be contrasted with the political democratisation and political pluralism. The coloured revolutions reflected the rehabilitation of political and economic changes which were initiated after independence. Khamidov (2006) mentioned that for people's mobilization,

accounts for the privatization and decentralization processes that have occurred in Kyrgyzstan in the past 10 years. Reforms like privatisation of economy and decentralisation at local level under former President Askar Akaev produced wealthy individuals and local networks that have gained significant autonomy from central authorities. Denoting the repercussions of economic reform on society, Way (2008) remarks that ruling elite had to deal with dissent of new economic policies within its own ranks as well as people were rejecting the neo-liberal agenda. A more authoritarian and patronised networks of Akayev determined the number and type of actors, who were allowed to gain access to the principal government positions, gave way to informal practices of cronyism and nepotism, particularly of family members. As a result, already half way into the 1990s, the picture was not very optimistic because competitive authoritarianism outpaced liberalizing polity in Central Asian republics.

Perception of government in the minds of people is also a crucial one to determine state-society interaction analysis. In this direction, White (2009) argues that a sense of perception of corrupt government its unresponsiveness is closely associated with a series of irregular regime changes that had generally been precipitated by a 'stolen election'. Indicating the link of administrative and political elite corruption, Engvall (2014) argues that rather than securing access to a single favour through bribery, officials invest in political and administrative posts in order to obtain access to streams of rents associated with an office. Political and administrative corruption is organically linked in the Kyrgyz political system, where officials are required to pay a continuous 'fee' to their bosses.

1.3.2 External Factors

The process of state-society interaction in Kyrgyzstan like any other country has been influenced by disparate international norms/institutions/organisations, International NGOs, big powers' interference, and neighbourhood environment. Abazov (1999) says that after independence, Kyrgyz state has gone from being subordinate to Moscow to depend on international community, or in Petric (2005)

words, it became a “globalised protectorate”. In a bid to secure the financial support Kyrgyzstan followed the path of neo-liberal reforms advised by international institutions and burdened itself with debt as well as disengaged itself from the social security schemes as well as society (Abazov 1999). Cummings (2008) shows how the privatisation has created new economic elites. He says during the first years of independence political and economic posts were highly valued and high rank officials were able to take advantage of privatisation to secure the country’s main resources under favourable conditions. Now these economic powerful people wish to enter into politics to secure their economic interests.

Tucker (2007) and Radnitz (2006) argue how any successful example of external incidents can give direction to any country’s political dynamics. They say that the previous successful revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine were influential in inspiring the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan. Also, they emphasized that the influence of example can substitute to some extent for structural disadvantage, allowing some groups that might be less structurally advantaged to engage in successful action by riding the influence of the prior example of others. According to Bunce (et al. 2006), not only emulation, but diffusion also occurs in starting new movements wherein new ideas, institutions, policies, models or repertoires of behaviour spread geographically from a core site to other sites, whether within a given state or across states. But it is also emphasised that the necessary pre-conditions (like enough independent civil society, strong international assistance, evidence of significant democratic improvements) are also required to make this diffusion and emulation successful.

Yulia (2008) shows how funding of NGOs has been misused by local elites; she explains that after independence, foreign countries and international NGOs favoured the opening of NGOs in Kyrgyzstan with hope that they would act as surrogate for the emergence of civil society. But the result was opposite because officials and local elites took NGOs as profit making machines not the as social service provider. On the role of civil society groups and NGOs, Maija (2009)

seeks to reassess the outcome of mainstream civil society promotion policies in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan. While the author agrees with critics that the distorting effects of funding that promised ‘grassroots citizen’ empowerment has not been achieved directly through NGOs, but the author does not agree that NGOs are therefore merely vehicles of the Western ideological agenda and international aid to the Kyrgyzstan population. Further, he argues that the facilitation of international actors has opened up opportunities for individual NGO activists to pursue their own social and political development agendas. But Chaulia (2006) differs with Maija’s argument, and opines that American democracy promoting NGOs were necessary, though not sufficient, cause for colour revolutions in post-Soviet countries. These revolutions were not the cases of ‘regime type change’ but only the ‘regime change’ of incumbent presidents. By their nature, these episodes were replacements of anti-Western ruling regime with pro-Western regime not the far-reaching changes that could remodel the polity. Kyrgyzstan’s new constitution, which allows various political forces to compete in elections and stage debates inside the parliament, is mainly the result of an informal pact among multiple political figures that captured power in March 2005 and then again in April 2010 (Marat 2012).

1.4 Definition, Rationale and Scope of the Study

The above-mentioned brief introduction about the Kyrgyz political process shows how the political climate has been constantly under flux in Kyrgyzstan. The Kyrgyz republic has been facing the ‘triple transitions’ - from Soviet communism to liberal democracy; from state-controlled socialist economy to market economy; and third, towards state building and nation building (Cummings et al. 2013: 444), which has not been completed yet. The two colour revolutions of Kyrgyzstan in 2005 and 2010 are very similar in certain aspects (Huskey and Hill al. 2013). In this context, many pertinent questions arise: What is the nature of state-society relationship in the Kyrgyzstan? Did the state-society relations and its resultant perception of people about the Kyrgyz state play any kind of role in these two movements? Did Kyrgyz state attempt to fulfil the aspirations of its citizens? Did

it strive to improve its image in the eyes of the people? What is the role of informal networks (i.e. clan groups and regionalism) in Kyrgyz state-society interaction? How do political elites perceive the state institutions? Various questions regarding state-society interaction can be asked in the context of Kyrgyz political process. Given the above-mentioned background, the present research seeks to understand the nature of state-society interaction in Kyrgyzstan and its role in the “Colour Revolutions” in 2005 and 2010. How has Kyrgyzstan been struggling to create democratic institutions? How is it transforming its polity in such a way that democratic values and practices might become integral part of its political culture?

There are many important rationales behind the study of state-society interaction in Kyrgyzstan. Firstly, the erstwhile review of literature reveals that many scholars have done a good job to understand the causes of Tulip revolution, but none has attempted to study state-society interaction process in Kyrgyzstan through the approach of “state-in-society” in two Tulip revolutions and in-between political dynamics. This is the reason to investigate and to reveal the processes of state-society interactions in Kyrgyz nascent transitional democracy. So this becomes a strong case to conduct research in this direction to fill the gap in existing literature on Kyrgyzstan. Secondly, the present research will undertake a comparative study of the political dynamics between the Akayev regime, Bakiyev regime and post-Bakiyev developments, and subsequently will attempt to examine the underlying patterns of domination and change of authority and trace out some consistent and some changing patterns of formal and informal “rules of the game” in Kyrgyz politics. Thirdly, the two Tulip revolutions echoed the controversy among scholars about the internal and external factors behind it. So this present study shall strive to find out the objective and impassionate explanation of causal factors and make an independent opinion about it. Fourthly, the Kyrgyz democracy is in the nascent stage as well as in transitional gray zone. The present research would be helpful in delineating the factors which are becoming the roadblocks in its democratic deepening or consolidation. The study will analyze the political dynamics of Kyrgyzstan through understanding its state-

society interaction process using “state-in-society approach.” This will especially focus on state institutions and its interactions with external and internal forces in the context of two people’s movements in 2005 and 2010. The study will cover the period from 1991 to 2015 or Askar Akayev, Kurmanbek Bakiyev and post-Bakiyev period developments.

1.5 Research Questions

Flowing from the definition, rationale and scope of the study, the research seeks to answer some pertinent questions which are mentioned below:

- What are the basic characteristics of the state-society interaction in Kyrgyzstan?
- To what extent internal forces were responsible for fostering regime changes in Kyrgyzstan?
- Why did the external state and non-state forces take very keen interest in the politics of regime changes in Kyrgyzstan?
- Who were the dominant actors in the process of adopting a new Parliamentary system of government in 2010 and why did they do it?
- What is the prospect of Parliamentary democracy in Kyrgyzstan?

1.6 Hypotheses

Taking into consideration the above mentioned research questions, the research attempts to find two hypotheses which are as follows:

- Informal institutions (like regional groups, clan groups, etc.) obstruct the democratic process and, thus, state institutions are comparatively weaker in Kyrgyzstan.
- Failure on the part of the political elite to deepen the process of democratization has contributed towards the spurt of Colour revolutions in Kyrgyzstan.

1.7 Research Methodology

The research begins with explaining and analyzing the significant historical phenomena of the two people's movements and comparing the features and events as well as testing and refining the 'state-in-society approach'. Further, the research involves an assessment of the state institutions and its relations with societal forces (especially clan groups and regional group identity). It attempts to provide an insightful understanding of the role of societal forces in shaping and affecting the policies of state institutions. The research is descriptive, analytical and historical.

The research relies on qualitative methods by drawing informed views and opinions of the experts of Kyrgyz and Central Asian social and political experts about the political and social churning of two Colour Revolutions in Kyrgyz history. It is based on both primary and secondary data. The secondary data include books, articles from journals and newspapers. This has been substantiated by primary data which include Kyrgyz constitutions and other government reports.

1.8 Overview of Chapterization

Chapter I: Introduction and Research Design

The introductory chapter delves upon a brief introduction and underlines the research design of the thesis. It discusses the theoretical underpinnings of state-society relations and state-in-society approach.

Chapter 2: State-Society Interaction and Political Developments during the Soviet period in Kyrgyzstan

This chapter discusses on the nature of state-society interaction in the Soviet period. Further, it analyzes the political developments during the rule of the Soviet regime.

Chapter 3: Institutional Structure and Constitutional processes in Kyrgyzstan

This chapter discusses the constitutional developments after the independence of Kyrgyzstan.

Chapter 4: Political Changes and Nature of Colour Revolutions

This chapter discusses the political developments in Kyrgyzstan after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and analyses the factors which led to Colour Revolutions in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 and 2010.

Chapter 5: Process of State-Society Interaction in Kyrgyzstan

This chapter examines the tenuous social character of Kyrgyz politics in the post-1990 phase as to how the informal actors like clan and regional groups and neo-liberal civil society groups are facilitating the processes of democratic transition.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

This chapter would also attempt to provide new insights for state-society interactions in Kyrgyzstan based on the two hypotheses that will help to understand the contemporary political dynamics of Kyrgyzstan.

Chapter II

State-Society Interaction and Political
Developments During the Soviet Period in
Kyrgyzstan

CHAPTER II

STATE-SOCIETY INTERACTION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE SOVIET PERIOD IN KYRGYZSTAN

2.1 Introduction

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union five new sovereign Republics along with Kyrgyzstan came into being. Kyrgyzstan made its presence felt at the political map of the world. The modern history of Kyrgyzstan has been very dynamic and full of upheavals. Kyrgyzstan's current political dynamics is also deeply influenced by its historical legacy. It has experienced the legacies of pre-Tsarist, Tsarist and Soviet period on almost every aspect of its life including the political process. The story of Kyrgyzstan before the independence and the interaction between state and social forces is the mainstay of this chapter. The changes during the Tsarist and Soviet rule put up many important questions in the mind of political scholars. Some of the very intriguing are—how was the society before the Tsarist rule?; How was the relationship between society and authority?; What changes had been brought by the Tsarist Empire in the Central Asian region?; how and why Tsarist imperial Russia did come into this region and what were the impact of its rule on the society and polity in the region? Another question that comes to the fore is about the process of delimitation of major five Republics during the Soviet rule and the factors responsible for that? It is also important to explore the impact of the Soviet rule during the different phases of communist rule and legacies that remained after the independence of Kyrgyzstan? These questions often come into the discussion when one tries to understand the historical legacies and its impact on Kyrgyz society and politics. The political process, the nature of interaction between state and people in the Kyrgyz polity, is the subject matter of this chapter.

2.2 Kyrgyz Society during Pre-Tsarist Period

During the pre-Tsarist period, there was no concept of an independent Kyrgyz national identity. The origin of Kyrgyz ethnic identity is contested and a matter of

debate. Notwithstanding, there are some historical facts that indicate towards the origin of Kyrgyz identity and provide significant details regarding the issue. Say for example, a renowned Kyrgyz political scholar Rkhat Achylova held that the independent and separate identity of Kyrgyz people dates back to 300 BC (Achylova 1995: 318-319). She claims that the first reference to Kyrgyz and their state can be found in Chinese sources of the third millennium B.C. In that period the Kyrgyz were dependent of ancient Chinese state and later, in the first century B.C. of the Huns. On the other side, a scholar like Ahamad Rashid (1994) argues that Kyrgyz history goes back to eighth century BC. He says that the earliest recorded inhabitants of modern day Kyrgyzstan were the Sakas, whose tribal confederacy established a kingdom in the region around the eighth century B.C. The Sakas traded with China and Persia and remained defiant until they were conquered by Cyrus the Great of Persia who employed them to fight in his armies against Alexander the Great (Rashid 1994: 150). But John Anderson does not find any concrete evidence of the separate Kyrgyz until the 12th century. And he argues that “It is impossible to find more than passing reference to a people known as Kyrgyz and their origin remains the subject of controversy” (Anderson 1999: 1). It means that there is no certainty or clarity about the history of separate Kyrgyz identity till the 12th century.

Before the subjugation of Kyrgyzstan by Russian army and its inclusion into Russian Empire, the culture and political life of the region did not differ greatly from other parts of the nomadic world particularly the Islamic world. The earliest people of the region are believed to be a mixed community of Mongol, Turkic, and Kypchak descent. The society at the time of annexation was nomadic. It was based on customs and traditions and it was tribal in nature. In this period, the people lived a nomadic life, and food gathering and hunting were their main occupations. Due to its land-locked status, the country was largely cut off from the outside influence. In the thirteenth century, the Kyrgyz migrated towards south controlled by the Mongolian Empire. Different Kyrgyz tribes, that inhabited the area in fifteenth-sixteenth century, stretched from western Mongolia to eastern

Turkestan. However, the region of the central Tien-Shan, the Chui valley and the south-eastern part of the Fergana region i.e. the territory closely coinciding with the present borders of the Kyrgyz republic formed the heart of the Kyrgyz nation's territory (Wheeler 1969: 17).

In the middle of 18th century, Kyrgyz came under the Chinese rule. Chinese did not attempt to alter the life style of nomadic Kyrgyz people. At the end of this century, Kyrgyz were under the control of Khanate of Kokand. In the initial years of second half of the mid 19th century, Kyrgyz people started rebelling against the perceived weakening of Khanate of Kokand. In the meantime the Russians also started to think about controlling this particular region. When the Kyrgyz were resisting against the Kokand Khanate, they contacted the Russians for their support against Kokand and the Russians did not disappoint the Kyrgyz. Finally Kyrgyz, along with Russians, fought against Kokand Khanate and took control of Pishpek (later Frunze and then Bishkek) in 1876 and all Kyrgyz groups formally accepted the Russian rule. It means Kyrgyz came under the power of Tsarist Russia in mid 1870s and it remained under the rule of Tsar until the Soviet Revolution in 1917 (Anderson 1999: 4).

2.2.1 Kyrgyz Society before the Arab Conquest

The structure of Kyrgyz society before the Arab conquest in the seventh century throws light upon the interaction between the political authority and society. It shows that how the common people co-opted with the authority and got their demands fulfilled. The Kyrgyz had never been a unified group. They were divided, mostly at abstract level, into large kinship based networks. That was roughly related to the North and South of the country. Kyrgyz tribes were usually divided in three basic groups: the biggest grouping was the *Ong Kanat* (right wing) which included the *Tagaï* grouping in northern and central Kyrgyzstan and the *Adigine* and the *Mungush* groupings in the eastern Alai Mountains (Geiss 2005: 25). The second largest grouping was the *Sol Kanat* (left wing) in the northern part of the Ferghana valley and in the Talas district, whereas *Ichkilik* was

located in the western Alai Mountains and in the eastern Pamir. Each of these groups occupied defined territories. Each tribe had its own territory which included summer and winter pastures, and it was the *aga biř* (tribal chiefs) who decided on the allocation of pastures and migration routes in larger tribal federations. In addition he was the supreme judge who decided rival judicial claims and settled disputes among his tribesmen. The *aga biř* decided also about the external relations of the tribe. It was up to his reason to make peace, to form alliances or to start raids with or against neighbouring groups. His decisions were highly respected by his tribesmen (Golden 1998: 7-9). These tribal groups used to help mutually and provided assistance and cooperation on the village level on various issues; which could be in domestic and economic matters including other activities such as sheep-rearing, harvest assistance or the digging and maintenance of canals and wells. More often they acted as military units which occupied and defended territories or secured and coordinated routes of migration (Achylova 1995: 320).

2.2.2 Kyrgyz Society during the Arab Conquest

The relation between Arab rule and society was based on coercion and atrocities. In seventh and eighth century A.D., after establishing their control over the region, the Arab rulers forced the Sogdian people to accept Islam. Arab rulers destroyed almost all the historical and cultural memories of native Sogdians. The heritage and culture of the Sogdian people completely got lost but despite this the local people had tried hard to protect their native culture and values. So the relationship between the Arab rulers and the local Sogdians could not be said to be very interactive and positive. The relationship was based on coercion not cooperation. Islam was and is also an important factor in Kyrgyz social life but it has not conservatives like the Arabic version of Islam (Kort 1994: 150). Islam reached the Western Talas valley region following Arab conflicts with the Chinese rulers around 750 A.D. The mighty Tien Shan mountains offered an insurmountable barrier to further religious or political penetration. In subsequent years there were to be waves of Islamic expansion, but these had

little impact upon the mass of the population who retained their traditional syncretic beliefs. Especially strong among the nomadic herders of Kyrgyzstan were beliefs in the spiritual world, devotion to the supreme deity “Tengri” (heaven), the cult of ancestors, and various forces of totemism which sacralised the wolf, the horse or other animals central to their daily life (Olcott 1996:110-111). Sufi Islam is also a very special feature of the Kyrgyz society. It developed initially as an ascetic movement, establishing a clear identity for itself in the ninth century, and retained its structures in Soviet times. It nurtured priority to spiritual purity, despised luxury and wealth, and adopted a completely quietist attitude to the world around them (Achylova 1995: 134).

2.2.3 Relationship of Kyrgyz Society with Mongol Rulers

In the thirteenth century the Mongol Genghis Khan conquered the region and established his rule. During his period, the society substantially transformed. This period appears to have been significant for the consolidation of an identifiable ‘Kyrgyz’ people who developed a distinctive Turkic dialect. The beginning of a separate ethnic awareness linked to a common territory and culture appeared in Kyrgyz society under the Mongol Empire. But one must be careful that this ethnic consciousness was not at the national level. The Family and clan were still the strong and formed the basis of social organisation and authority in Kyrgyz society (Lowe 2003: 107). The Mongol united the whole agricultural region of Central Asia. Contrary to Arabs, they promoted new alphabetic system and they remained absolutely tolerant towards the religion and culture (Ibid). So we can say the rulers-ruled relations were not very antagonistic.

2.2.4 Kyrgyz Land under the Khanate Rule

Two major regional powers that established their rule in Central Asia in the sixteenth century were Khanate of Khiva and Khanate of Bukhara. But in the eighteenth century, these two Khanates saw the emergence of another ruler in the region—Khanate of Kokand. Kyrgyz region was ruled by this third ruler—Kokand Khanate—from 1710 to 1876. Like the earlier regimes, the Kokand rule

was synonymous to despotism. This was a common practice in those days because of the non-existence of a constitution that could guarantee the rights and properties (Khalid 2007: 37). They were largely passive in political administration of Kokand Khanate. But on the opposite, southern Kyrgyz were having semi-nomadic and sedentary lifestyle (Achylova : 1995: 321-322). They were properly incorporated into Kokand rule and fully administered through proper administrative machinery. They also actively participated in the local administration that's why southern Kyrgyzstan was divided into smaller districts like Aravan and Osh. Due to its strategic, economic and political interests, Tsarist Russia began to expand its influence the Central Asian region in the nineteenth century. Initially they conquered Kazakh region, then incorporated all three Khanates into their fold. In 1868 they firstly conquered Emirates of Bukhara followed by Khanate of Khiva in 1873 and finally occupied Khanate of Kokand in 1875. The Tsarist rule did not destroy Khanates, but made them their protectorates having some sort of independence in their internal affairs. Bukhara and Khiva existed until the Bolshevik Revolution; however, Kokand Khantate was demolished immediately after Russian conquest (Adle 2005: 36-37).

2.2.5 State-Society Relationship under Tsarist Rule

The Russian foray into Central Asia happened through mainly four phases (Cummings 2012:34). The first phase of the expansion took place between 1580 to 1644. In this period, the Russian Empire conquered the Siberian region which included the contemporary northern Kazakh lands. During the second phase (1680-1760), the whole Kazakh region was incorporated into the Russian empire. This happened when Kazakh tribes sought the protection of Russian Empire due to the cruel onslaught of Dzhugarian Oirat tribes. The third phase of the Russian expansion in the Central Asia was done between 1785 and early 1860s. During this period, they wanted to secure the trade routes from Asian region to the Russian and European areas. Therefore, they conquered the Caspian Sea and Amur region. During this period, they also captured the contemporary Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan region. The last phase spanned from 1864 to 1884 during which

they conquered major cities of Bukhara, Khiva, and Kokand. Russians formally annexed the whole region with the capturing of Merv city in 1884. This was the main outpost of Turkmen resistance against the Russian Empire (Cummings 2012:35).

Kyrgyzstan was under the Tsarist rule from 1876 to 1917. In this period many significant changes took place in the country. These changes had made their marks on socio-economic and cultural structures. The Tsarist Russian Government supported the thrones of their Khan and Emir with its troops and helped the despotic ruling circles of these feudal rulers. The Russians used the Kyrgyz land for two purposes; firstly this region was a good market for their produced goods, and secondly this area, especially Fergana Valley, was fertile and good source of cotton and food grains (Kaushik 1970: 65). He further explains that after its annexation, Fergana Valley was converted into a raw material supplying base for the metropolitan industries. Tsarist administration paid greedy attention to cotton cultivation and encouraged its farming at the expense of wheat and other agricultural products. But the development of cotton cultivation did not improve the material conditions of the local *dehkans* (peasants) (Olcott 1996:112).

In the Tsarist period the Central Asia were predominantly nomadic and rural. But there was a beginning of urbanization and industrialization, mainly induced and supported by the Russians. In 1913 only 19 per cent of the total population was living in towns and urban settlements. The process of capitalist development in Central Asia followed very slow and uneven progress because Tsarism and feudal regimes of Bukhara and Khiva purposely tried to preserve the feudal and patriarchal relations. Hence this region remained an extremely backward agrarian colony of Tsarist Russia until the October Revolution. The introduction of Railways in late 1880s marked the end of economic inclusion of the different regions inside Central Asia and also the end of isolation of the whole of Central Asia. Thus, the modernization process started in the region and it led to the formation of political consciousness among the people (Kaushik 1970: 78).

In the Tsarist colonial period, Central Asia also experienced a significant progress in the cultural sphere of the society. First, the opening of secular schools and other institutions were encouraged. Secondly, newspapers and magazines, books started to be printed and sold in the whole area. Thirdly, new intellectuals and cultural movements by *Jadidism* started as progressive movements in the traditional society. *Jadidism* propagated the idea of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism. But it should be clear that *Jadidist* united against the people in Soviet Revolution of 1916 (Wheeler 1964: 80). Despite many changes such as the rise of new towns, construction of railways, cotton agriculture and a general intellectual understanding occurred in the region. But in spite of this, the region reeled under the pawns of cultural backwardness and ignorance and of Islamic dominance. The society was under the control of feudal leaders, mullahs and other local elders. And this became apparent in 1905-07 workers' movements and reached its peak in the Revolution of 1917 (Wheeler 1964: 67).

2.2.6 Impact of Tsarist Rule on Kyrgyz Society

According to Shirin Akiner, three major changes occurred during the Tsarist rule in Kyrgyzstan. Firstly, Tsarist rule demolished the traditional rule of Khans in the region; they were shattered now; Russian governor general and Tsar was now tier of political authority in Kyrgyzstan as well as in Central Asia. Secondly, Tsarist rule tried to abolish the old primitive model of feudal economy; Kyrgyz economy was now incorporated into Russian economy and it became the source of raw material and market for the Russian industries. And thirdly, the impact of Russian rule resulted in socio-cultural changes in the region; the introductions of rail, roads, hospitals, education, banking system, trading houses were done by Tsarist rule. The westernisation was introduced by Russians (Akiner 1998:9-10).

Initially, Tsarist administration did not attempt to intervene in traditional social structure, but later on two significant revamps occurred during the tsarist regime. The first was the emerging new centers of urban areas. Secondly, the settled farming was initiated. Both these changes had overtly led to conflicts of interests between Russians and Kyrgyz people related to latter's culture and livelihood.

From 1860s onwards Slavs and Ukrainians started coming in the Central Asian regions and made their homes in the cities like Osh, Pisphek and other cities. Due to this new change in the settlement structure, the cultural differences created a sense of 'us and them' in the Kyrgyz society (Wheeler 1964:183). During the Tsarist period the society-state relation had gone a major realignment. There was greater centralisation in the political authority because of the disappearing of tribal chief due to hard Russian state which consequently led to the emergence of many new social elites. The new ruler's dependence on local notables and translators had given them opportunity to further penetration in the society. Due to the elimination of tribal chiefs gave the *Ulemas* a greater role in the society. On the other side, the Tsarist new economic, education and administrative policies for the first time in the history transformed the Central Asian society on all fronts (Kaushik 1970:72).

Another modification initiated by Tsarist rule was the promotion of settled farming through disbursing cheap lands to new immigrants. The land was not the private property until now and it was seemed to belong to the whole community as a collective property (Anderson 1999: 5). On the one hand, settled Russian farmers needed land for cultivation and on the other Kyrgyz nomadic people required unfarmed vast free land for grazing their cattle. So the conflict started to take shape. In 1890s more than eighty percent population of the Kyrgyz were nomadic or semi-nomadic. Though there were apprehensions and misconceptions between Russian settlers and Kyrgyz, but it did not cause any major revolt or uprising except few small incidents such as Andizhan incident (1898). But in June 1916 a mass rebellion swept across the Central Asia. The people were deeply dissatisfied with the government due to growing tax burdens, forceful incorporation of young men into the army and war against the holy Ottoman Empire—Turkey— were the main causes of rebellion. In August 1917, they revolted against the Russian government and 10,000 slavs people had been killed in the riots. The revolt was soon suppressed by the army, but not before close to one lakh of deaths (Anderson 1999: 7). Finally we can say that peasants' movement in 1860s, opposition of immigrant slavs, tension on cultural, religious

or economic issues led to this mass rebellion. The participation of people in 1916 uprising reflect that the people Kyrgyzstan were becoming aware of their indigenous welfare, culture, economy, etc., and they were demanding their rightful dues from the Tsarist state.

2.3 Kyrgyzstan under the Soviet Union

In April 1918, the Kyrgyz region was made part of the new Turkestan Autonomous region. The old Turkistan governor-general rule of Central Asia was replaced by Communist planners; they created a new administrative division naming “Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (March 1918-October 1924).” In the early 1920s the struggle for making national republics were started in Central Asian region which created ripples in northern Kyrgyzstan; though at that time southern part was under the turmoil of civil war. Therefore, an executive committee was set up by Communist government in 1922 to decide the fate of Kyrgyz land. A Kara-Kyrgyz autonomous *Oblast* was made and incorporated under the Russian federation in October 1924 which later renamed Kyrgyz autonomous *Oblast* in May 1925. In 1926 status of *Oblast* was upgraded and it was renamed as “Kyrgyz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.” Finally, it was again renamed as “Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic” on 5 December 1936. It was a full-fledged union republic of the Soviet Union. Pishpek was named its capital in 1926 after the commander-in-chief of the Turkistan Front, Mikhail Frunze which was later changed as Bishkek in 1990 (Ade et al. 2005: 271-272).

This Soviet nationality policy had two important repercussions. First, it prepared the background of national consciousness which later resulted into the independent Kyrgyz Republic after the Soviet dissolution. Secondly, it had also a negative consequence which culminated into ethnic strife in the Fergana Valley region among ethnic Uzbek and Kyrgyz communities (Anderson 1999:7). Lenin initiated the policy called ‘Decree of Peace’ as a basic principle of the Soviet Union. The first and second Congress of Soviets also mentioned the right to self-determination as such-Equality and sovereignty of the people of Russia, right to self-determination up to secession and the establishment of independent states,

annulment of all national and religious privileges and restrictions, free development of national and religious minorities and ethnographic groups inhabiting the territory of Russia. After the October Revolution, the people of Central Asia got a new life in their political, social and cultural advancement (Kaushik 1970:8). Under conditions of the Soviet Socialist system, the social and national oppression was abolished. The standards of living, public health, education, technical knowledge and the productivity in Soviet Central Asia were much higher than other African and Asian countries. A very remarkable socio-cultural transformation has been effected in the lives of the peoples of Central Asia by Soviet rule during a short span of time. This was the first switch over to Socialism without the pains of capitalist development. The victory of Socialism had turned the Central Asia into an advanced industrial agrarian region (Kaushik 1970:9).

2.3.1 Institutional Structure under the Soviet Union

Soviet society was a “totalitarian-administered” society. It was very difficult to understand its nature because of the lack of proper information. Although, totalitarian model and its variants depicted a relatively unified set of the party and state bureaucracy, which was guided by discernible policy and programs. Nevertheless, scholars accept the existence of divergent interests within the polity. These interest groups were associated with disparate sectoral, institutional and regional actors. From center to periphery rival social and political institutions existed in the Soviet polity from the center to local bodies (Willerton 1989:70-71).

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was the most powerful and dominant institution in the Soviet Union. There were various participants who used to actively participate in the political process; these were followed by almost all party members, policy making bodies, both at central and state level, and members of scientific bodies. But, if we see on the actual functional basis, the cabinet of the Soviet political system was Communist Party Politburo; its real parliament was a party Central Committee, and the real prime minister was the

party General Secretary. Nevertheless, it would also be misleading to assume that other non-Party organs i.e. government bodies were just a rubber stamp of the Communist Party. The responsibilities were many times overlapped among party and government; many Politburo members were used to be from the council of ministers. In the following sections, we would discuss the main institutional actors of the Soviet Union.

2.3.1.1 The Supreme Soviet: The Deputies

In the constitution of the Soviet Union, the highest organ of the state authority was the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. The Supreme Soviet was divided into two chambers—the “Council of Soviet Union” and the “Council of Nationalities.” The “Council of Union” was the body of geographical representation in which an equal number of inhabitants did elect the 750 members (Article 10 of the 1977 constitution). On the other hand “Council of Nationalities” was designed to provide the explicit representation to ethnic nationalities; its total numbers were also 750 deputies. Though the numbers were made equal since the constitution of 1977 came into force, they were not equal before. The term of the both the houses was five years. But the actual sessions of Supreme Soviet used to short in length and infrequent. The constitutional rules stipulated two sessions of the Supreme Soviet but it was not followed especially after Khrushchev years. It means that it played lesser roles than other major institutions.

2.3.1.2 The Presidium of Supreme the Soviet

The Presidium played the role of highest state organ during the gap between sessions of the Supreme Soviet. Perhaps this was promulgated by the constitution due to the infrequency and brevity of the Supreme Soviet. Presidium was a quite powerful body. It was capable of taking any decision that did not contravene the Constitution or change it. It could issue the laws, form and abolish ministries, ratify border changes between Union Republics, and appoint and remove the council of ministers. Even it can also make some decisions which did not require the ratification of the Supreme Soviet. The 1977 Constitution specified that

presidium should have 39 members. It convened the meeting once in every two months (Hough and Fainsod 1979).

2.3.1.3 Standing Committees of the Supreme Soviet

These committees were the special committees made by deputies of both houses of the Supreme Soviet. They were four/five before the Khrushchev era, but it was increased drastically thereafter. After 1978 they were increased to fifteen for each house of the Supreme Soviet.

2.3.1.4 The Council of Ministers

According to legal terms, the council of ministers is a very important institution in the Soviet political system. It was the highest executive and administrative organ of the state power. Its decision and orders were binding across the whole union. Since the Supreme Soviet did pass a very few number of laws, a very large number of laws were passed by the council. It contained more than a hundred members. There was also a Presidium of the council of ministers, which ran as a working organ of the council of ministers. This Presidium was delegated the task of dealing with urgent questions and it did speak in the name of the government of the USSR (Hough and Faisond 1979: 381).

2.3.1.5 Ministries and State Committees

The ministries belonged to their special departments with the full bureaucrats and experts. Ministries were responsible for their departments' works. There were sixty-two ministries by 1978. There were also standing committees whose role overlapped across the various ministries. Examples of the ministries were the ministry of agriculture, the ministry of defense etc. and examples of state committees were state committees for prices, state committees for labour and social questions. These ministries and state committees were highly qualified and specialists in their competence.

2.3.1.6 State Planning Committee (Gosplan)

Of course, this is the committee that had all encompassing planning and coordinating task for all the ministries. The primary function of the Gosplan is to reconcile the various ministerial requests within the framework of available resources and regime priorities. They had the responsibility of making plans for all departments and ministries for next five years.

2.3.1.7 Trade Unions

In 1978 there were 121 million members of the total around 31 trade unions in the Soviet Union (Hough and Fansod 1979:399). It means virtually whole population was having the membership of these trade unions. They were classified along branch lines on the basis of various specific ministries and departments. They did participate in the decision-making process at all levels in their respective departments. Their participation was documented, but their impact on the Communist regime is very difficult to ascertain. It is reported that their demands were attentively examined by the Party's Central Committee, USSR council of ministers, and Gosplan.

2.3.1.8 Komsomol

The Komsomol was the youth wing of the Communist Party. Its full name was All-Union Leninist Communist Union of Youth. This wing was established to mobilize the youth for the promotion and popularize the party ideologies and goals. This was also made to inculcate the values of the Communist Party into youth. The Komsomol structure was very similar to the Communist Party. The Komsomol was given right to appoint its representatives across the departments (Hough and Fansod 1979: 407). The personnel with these institutions were very specialized. So they were transferred across the ministries. Their interests were similar and did not match with the internal bureaucracy. Perhaps, the Soviet politics could be characterized as a conflict among "complexes." These complexes were transportation complex, agriculture complex, heavy industrial-military complex, and so forth (Hough and Fansod 1979: 408).

2.3.2 State- Society Relation under Lenin Period

During the Bolshevik revolution in Russian, Lenin had given the most important role to the Communist Party and its organization. This conception was also not theorized in the original thesis of Karl Marx. In the Marx' conception, there was no role of the political party in the socialist revolution. He has given the leadership role in the trade unions to steer the movement of trade unions and workers' associations. On the opposite of Marx, Lenin had planned out the leadership role of the Communist Party. It would lead to revolutionary struggle, make strategies to move on the revolution and the peasantry and workers would follow the instructions from the Communist Party. The reason of not giving the lead role to labour unions and workers' association is that Lenin believed that common naïve workers would not be able to comprehend the clever tactics of a capitalist class. Thus, to understand properly the situation of struggle and requisite strategies to overthrow the capitalist government would need a full time dedicated cadre based party to lead the revolution and implement the socialist policies in the transitional phase. Nevertheless, he had a fear of maintaining discipline in the party so he devised the theory of "democratic centralism." The "democratic centralism" implies a hierarchical or pyramid structured organization in which any decision would be taken through a democratic process, but once the decision would be finalized by central authority, nobody would go against that, and it would be fully implemented across the society, and if needed it would be applied by the force of communist government. None would have right to renounce and reject this final decision taken by the Communist Party (Wheeler 1964: 137-138).

Due to the impact of "Democratic Centralism" and Communists' efforts to penetrate into Central Asian society the early years of Kyrgyzstan have seen the interesting developments in the context of state relations with the social forces (Haugen 2003: 26-30). The communists had four major tasks to be completed; first, they were to demarcate the nationalities and properly territorialise them. It was done in 1936 nationality policy. As mentioned earlier, after many attempts of delimitations Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic was finally established in 1936.

The second task was creating a popular support base for the Communist Party in the Kyrgyz Republic which could further revolutionise the society. Due to the suspicion of the native Kyrgyz people, the initial years saw the domination of Russians, Tatars, Ukrainians, and Jews in the Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan. The party was indigenised in early 1930s. The Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan had to face the influence of groupism, cronyism, and clientelism by the Kyrgyz people during the grounding of the party organisation in Kyrgyzstan. The third major task was aimed to modernise the society and remnants of old primordial structures. Therefore, the Communist Party focused on establishing the modern education system, promoting secular values, supporting the women's education for their equal status with men, reducing the role of religion in public life, discouraging the clan groupings etc. the fourth major task was to complete the land reforms in Kyrgyzstan especially the in the Fergana Valley. The land reform faced the resistance of farmers but was completed with the help of brute force. Moreover, the nomadic people were also forced for the settled farming. But the major reforms in agriculture were to come in the late 1930s via collectivisation drive (Anderson 1999: 10-11).

A new initiative by communist regime marked the beginning of radical transformation in the Kyrgyzstan and Central Asian region. The "New Economic Policy" (NEP) was on the programme mode during 1921 to 1928 (Kenez 2006:41-42). This was implemented between the period of "war communism (1918-1921)" and "Stalinism" that began in late 1920s. This NEP was adopted in March 1921 at 10th party congress of Communist Party. It was a programme of mixed economy. The policy had effects in various sectors; private property, business, and trade was promoted and legalised in the economic field; the semi-militarisation of labour was abandoned; trade unions got the protection from working class; the literature and cultural field was also liberalised to a great extent but not fully. Overall we can say that the NEP period was an era of some liberalisation, pluralism, cooperation, tolerance, consensus, and compromise as well as importance of local influence across Kyrgyzstan and all over Central Asia (Acton 2001: 160-162).

2.3.3 Kyrgyz Society Relationship with State during Stalin Era

Stalin became the leader of the Communist Party in 1924 after the death of Lenin. Thereafter, the ideological and the factional fight started between Stalin and Trotsky factions. In this power struggle finally, Stalin's group got the victory in late 1920s (Roudik 2007: 133-134). The economic planning was inaugurated in 1928 by Stalin to fortify the culture of socialism in Russia. In 1933 Stalin declared the victory of socialism in Soviet USSR in the event of new announcing the new constitution of 1933. He warned the people about remnants of capitalism in the Soviet society and called for a rigorous fight against it. So this question was raised that why this situation was still prevailing in Russia? And he answered that the societal-cultural development lags its economic development. It means that society's economic prosperity does not easily penetrate the cultural milieu of the people. Cultural transformation takes more time than expected. Economic modernisation does not easily translate into cultural modernisation. He demanded a very strong, repressive state in order to destroy all leftovers of capitalism. In the garb of destroying the remnants, he started targeting his opponents and critics in the party, government, and society including Trotsky and supporters. This program of elimination of capitalist's residues from the society was just a ploy to misguide the Soviet people (Wheeler 1964:179-180).

Under the Stalin regime, Kyrgyz Society faced the impact of Stalin and Communist Party on many fronts. The initial current was the great purge of Kyrgyz people in the allegation of being Trotsky supporter or anti-Soviet. This drive was directed to strengthen Stalin's position in the party and remove his opponents (Reshetar 1960: 213-215). Though, in early 1920s, the local nationalities (like Kyrgyz) were given representation in the Supreme Soviet showing the inclusive nature. But Stalin did just the opposite; firstly, he removed, imprisoned, and murdered the so-called enemy of socialism in late 1920s. Stalin alleged that they were counter-revolutionary cells. Another renewed purge started in late 1933 for two years, which drastically reduced the membership of the Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan from 19,932 to 6,385. Many eminent members of

Kyrgyz intelligentsia were removed from their positions and shot dead in the allegation of conspiring against the Communism. Some of the important figures were prominent economist Andulkerim Sydykov, former chairman of Kyrgyz people's Commissar Yusun Abdrakhmanov, noted educationist Kasym Tunsatnov, and Torkul Aitmatov were shot dead on the false allegations (Anderson 1999:12-13).

During Stalin period, massive industrialisation was initiated in the economic sector. New industries started working, especially in the northern region. In the mountainous regions, hydroelectric power stations were beginning to develop. By the late 1930s, over 200 new industries were established in various sectors like mining, sugar refining, textiles, and meat packing. These industries were further witnessed a boom during the Second World War when more than two dozen factories relocated to Kyrgyzstan from the western part of the Soviet Union due to the attack of Nazi forces. In the rural sector collectivisation of agricultural lands started during the Stalin era. This plan was taken up to transform the nomadic life into settled farming. This collectivisation drive compelled around more than 95% of private farmers into collective farms. Though, the benefits of collectivisation drive are the debatable issues. The number of livestock declined rapidly due to some resistance by farmers because they did not want their cattle confiscated by the authorities (Roudik 2007:7-8).

Since 1929 the Communist Party had started a campaign against religion. This campaign forced people to close their mosques, prohibition of religious education and religious activists witnessed the suppression of the state. But this was done to minimise the impact of religion on daily life. But its impact was not similar throughout Kyrgyzstan. In the northern part, the campaign against religion was more successful because this region was more Russified and more urbanised. But on the southern part, particularly in Fergana valley this had limited effects. The impacts of the campaign of religion have short-lived. Even people cleverly found some alternative to doze the communist regime; for example, people of southern part intensified the pilgrimage to the throne of Suleiman near the Osh city as an

alternative of the Haj pilgrimage (Anderson 1999:13). The traditional customs and lifestyle also came under attack. The “khudzhum (advance)” campaign launched in 1927 in Central Asia. This mass campaign was launched to make women liberated and empowered. Local authorities encouraged the people to participate in public veil-burning (Shahrani 1993:130-131).

During the Stalin era the Kyrgyz society faced the totalitarian rule which ruptured the state-society relationship. The party membership declined considerably due to fear of state and Communist Party (Mohapatra 2006: 64). But the main interesting point is that even during the totalitarian Stalin’s regime the Kyrgyz people maintained their clannish structure and religious identity. They did it with the clever adoption of the loopholes of the system. During the collectivisation drive, they helped their clan members to get the job. They organised most of the religious festivals in private, but on public forums kept quite due to fear of official suppression. It means that Kyrgyz people very tactfully handled the suppressive Stalin regime.

2.3.4 Kyrgyzstan under Khrushchev and Brezhnev Regime

After the death of Stalin in 1953, leadership infighting started among the Communist Party factions; and in this infighting Nikita Khrushchev emerged victorious and became the president of the CPSU. He finally became the President of the USSR in late 1955. Khrushchev proposed the thesis of “wither whither.” He criticised the Stalin concept of communism i.e. “socialism in one country.” Khrushchev’s idea of communist state was such that it would wither away only internally not externally. Only external affairs would be managed by the state institutions, and internal affairs would be managed by people’s committees. Withering of the external front would disappear only after the establishment of a circle of the socialist state along with the Soviet state. Khrushchev attempted to follow classical ideas of Lenin to improve the Communist Party organisation and its leadership with the people and government bureaucracy. Khrushchev attempted to revitalise the Communist Party, which was weakened due to Stalin’s excessive authoritarian control onto the party organisation. He tried to change the

old party leaders of Stalin age and adopted measures to reignite the party organisation, as well as, included his loyal persons in the party. He divided the work of party leaders in agriculture and industrial segments, but this segmentation annoyed the party leaders and paved the way for his fall in October 1964 (Kenez 2006: 186-187).

Khrushchev initiated the “virgin land program” and made a heavy investment in the agriculture. This new initiative bolstered the agricultural production, but it also created a new challenge over-bureaucratisation. It was time when Soviet economy was suffering from too much industrialisation; Industries were lacking innovation and new technical input. Due to heavy investment in agriculture, industries were facing financial crunches. Rather than doing something new in industrial management, managerial boards were producing the exaggerated data of over production pleasing the government. So these paradoxes prevailed during Khrushchev and Brezhnev period. On the one side, economic sector yielded dismal performance but on the other living standard of the people were in the positive direction due to social sector spending. Due to this very reason, the Soviet state was overburdened by social sector spending (Roudik 2007: 130-132)

Though the Soviet state was doing well, everything was actually not that good and the ground realities were quite opposite. The growing corruption resulting in dissatisfaction from the party and state were on the rise. But because of the fear of the party and state, no one was able to raise the voice. Even though party membership was growing and people were rallying behind the party because of hope of getting resources and benefits from the state. Status-quoist party leadership did not want to change with the time and circumstances. The party leaderships was simply trying to maintain the hegemony over society, and moribund to the harsh realities. Seeing the fate of Khrushchev, Brezhnev neither attempted to touch the party apparatus nor introduced any move to reform the functioning style of the party. Andropov and Cherenkov also made little attempt to improve the situation but did not succeed (Anderson 1999:14-15). Unlike Stalin, Khrushchev eased the tight authoritarian control of the state and the

Communist Party on the society. The New leader gradually started reversing the policies of Stalin era. He tried to rehabilitate those people who were put into jail and thrown into exile. He also attempted to increase the membership with the Kyrgyz people. He appointed them to the top positions in the Kyrgyz Communist Party. However, despite that only one third of top leadership was from Kyrgyz nationality and the rest were the Russians. This was the time when Kyrgyz people found some space and started asserting themselves in the socio-political issues. And despite the criticism of the Communist Party of Kyrgyz traditions, customs, religious practices, women's situation in society in a decree of the Communist Party, the Kyrgyz people's patronage system, clan networks, religious practices remained constant, though in some mild form (Kenez 2006:189-190).

The new leader of Kyrgyz Communist Party Turdakum Usubaliev now took the position in 1961. He remained the First Secretary of Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan from 1961 to 1985, almost two and a half decades. Usubaliev belonged to a group of leaders loyal to Khrushchev and was also able to preserve his post even in the Brezhnev leadership. His political longevity on the top post of the Communist Party was depended on extreme loyalty shown to the Moscow. He adopted the two-pronged leadership to deal with Moscow. On the one hand, he paid absolute subservience to Moscow leaders, and on the other demanded as much possible assistance from them. Usubaliev enthusiastically implemented and legitimated central directives, most notably in the politically sensitive areas such as nationality policy. In the party apparatus and government, he increased the posts almost 150 percent and then filled these posts of the administrative apparatus with titular nationality. This move paved the way for strengthening of informal networks of the regional and clan groups. The Usubaliev's personnel policy favoring the Kyrgyz people was continuity with change according to new circumstances. Patronage networks based on region and clan identity remained powerful. But the Communist Party balanced it with the inclusion of other groups such as Slavs and Europeans. It was a policy of striking the balance between rival factions (Anderson 1999:15).

Usubaliev was not, however, merely a servant of the center. He had interests of his own, especially in increasing his Republic's share of centrally allocated goods and in maximising autonomy in local political decision making. Kyrgyzstan's dependent and peripheral economy forced its leaders into the role of *tolkachi*, constantly petitioning Moscow for investment, supplies and the right to retain a larger share of the wealth generated in the Republic. Although the local leader's plea to the center for scarce resources is a constant in politics, it assumed a particular urgency in Kyrgyzstan because of the Republic's geographical isolation, its low level of development and its unfavorable terms of trade with the center. Usubaliev used every public platform, whether in Moscow or Frunze, to remind the Moscow about the of Kyrgyzstan's faithful delivery of goods to the country and the Republic's reciprocal need for new projects and scarce supplies. For example, in a speech at the XXVI CPSU Congress in 1981, Usubaliev petitioned the USSR Minister of Power and Electricity to build a hydroelectric station on the Naryn River in Kyrgyzstan, a Republic whose electric power usage was only one-third of the national average. Usubaliev achieved notoriety in the 1980s for the avalanche of telegrams he directed to central ministries. In Beissinger's phrase, Usubaliev was a resource-hungry politician who viewed economic problems largely in terms of the allocation and reallocation of resources. He was less interested in economic reforms designed to enhance innovation and efficiency (Beissinger 1986: 312-13).

Though Usubaliev attempted to get more and more resources from the Moscow through integration of Kyrgyz economy with Soviet economy; he tried to Russified the Kyrgyz economy and agriculture. But on the other side, he did not like the Moscow interference in regional policy making process and personnel recruitment decisions. Although, Moscow always interfered within local Kyrgyz Communist Party officials' recruitment process, but Usubaliev tried to make this process under his own control, especially since post-Brezhnev period. He made the Kyrgyz Communist Party his pet party through patronage distribution networking; he mostly appointed Kyrgyz nationals on most of the party positions. He also tried to Russify the indigenous Kyrgyz culture and literature; therefore he

was harshly criticised by the local nationalist politicians. They alleged that he was abolishing the indigenous culture and customs through Russification (Anderson 1999:16).

Two developments at the end of the Brezhnev era reduced the Centre's ability to influence politics in the Republic. The first was the appointment in June 1981 of V. A. Makarenko as Second Secretary. Makarenko had close ties to Usabaliev, having served in Kyrgyzstan since 1955. The second was the recruitment of leading Slavic officials into existing networks of corruption in Kyrgyzstan. This co-optation of Slavs is part of which allowed indigenisation of political rule, whose roots in Central Asia go back to the early years of the Russian colonial experience (Huskey 1995:816). By exploiting opportunities for personal gain, Slavic officials became political insiders rather than outsiders, thereby enhancing the autonomy of indigenous political elites. Although the scale of corruption among indigenous and Slavic leaders in Kyrgyzstan, apparently never achieved the heights reached in neighboring Uzbekistan, there were several scandals linking politicians, law enforcement officials, and black marketers. The most publicised of these were in the Russified industrial center of Tokmak, where the illegal sale of goods from meat and wool processing plant involved local and Republic officials and led to the execution of the deputy procurator of Kyrgyzstan (Huskey 1995:816).

2.3.5 State-Society Relation during Gorbachev Period

After the fall of Andropov, Mikhail Gorbachev was elected as the president of CPSU in March 1985. It is true that the Soviet Union has changed the life of its people enormously, but it is also true that in many areas it was far from fulfilling the needs of its citizens. So Gorbachev realised the growing disenchantment and dissatisfaction of people with the Soviet state. So reform of this mammoth state machine was inevitable. Therefore, Gorbachev had the vision of the radical reforms of the system in the political and economic sphere. He also felt that the contemporary model of liberal democracy was able, at least, to make the political leaders responsible and accountable to their people. Despite many lacunas in the

model, it was able to make many scientific and technological progress in the society. So through the famous programs “Glasnost and Perestroika” he initiated the reforms in the Communist Party, State as well as Social institutions. But his reforms were over enthusiastic and he tried to imitate the Western model within a very limited time period. The Soviet Union could not cope up with this radically new situation and fatally dissolved into fifteen newly independent Republics (Roudik 2007:140-141).

This happened due to many important reasons. The first reason was the gap between West and the Soviet Union was widening in many sectors such as living standards, social welfare procurement, quality and quantity of industrial production, life expectancy, infant mortality, access to modern technology, environmental conditions etc. Soviet Union rank was somewhere among 50-60 in the least developed countries (LDCs). Its per capita income was half of the US. The growth rate of the economy was dismal during the last decade. The second reason for initiating the reforms was that he was deeply dissatisfied with the unresponsive party and state institutions towards the people. He wanted to make the party workers responsive to the rising needs of the people. They had become merely issuer of the order from the above (White 1999:1). This attitude of inertia and stagnation forced Gorbachev to launch an ambitious programme of restructuring of the authoritarian system. He said that “This administrative-bureaucratic system, this totalitarian system, could not respond adequately to the problems that had built up. Not only did it fail to contribute to their solution; it deepened and intensified them. As a result, by the 1980s country had entered a stage of the severe crisis. It was in order to overcome this crisis that Perestroika was begun. The third important factor was the hostile external environment. The new cold war had been started after the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and the subsequent arms race. The Soviet Union was unable to face this new challenge due to its weak economic condition, lagging of technological development, unable to modernise its weaponry, and the most important its huge social sector expenditure. So Gorbachev wanted to boost communist society from all fronts (White 1999:2).

Gorbachev did not begin his reforms haphazardly, he did it very methodically. First, in April 1985, he initiated a policy of “acceleration.” It was a programme of fast-paced technological up-gradation and modernisation in industrial and agriculture sector of the economy. He also tried to improve the quality of goods through establishing the quality control institute and initiating anti-alcohol campaign. It was Gorbachev’s idea at that time the economic revival could be done through largely traditional methods. But very soon Gorbachev realised that the revival of economic system would need a more fundamental overhauling. Therefore, on the occasion of 27th Communist Party Congress in February-March 1986 he announced his most controversial signature policy of perestroika or restructuring. This was a policy of limited market reforms; it introduced the operation of small business enterprises, cooperatives and decentralisation and autonomy in decision making at the factory level (Robinson 1992: 425).

But again Gorbachev got the impression, observing the slow progress in economic reform, that the economic overhauling would not be possible without changes in political and ideological mindset. So in order to put pressure on the conservative elements of Communist Party, Gorbachev introduced the “glasnost policy or openness.” This was a policy of open debate-discussion, freedom of speech, relaxation on media censorship. Due to effect of this glasnost policy, political prisoners/critics were released from jails; the rehabilitation of Stalin’ purges was started; the environment of freedom of expression was spread; many previously banned books were allowed to be re-printed. Gorbachev wanted a change in point of view of Russian society and party officials especially.

Another third most radical and consequential reform was done in summer of 1988 when Gorbachev launched a programme of his whole government apparatus. He announced for the establishment of a new legislative body, the Congress of Peoples’ Deputies (CPD); a major part of the CPD was to be elected through competitive elections. Moreover, he also instituted the post of executive president, which was to be elected by the new legislature (Robinson 1992: 425). Even though Gorbachev brought various institutional and economic measures, but they

did not prove effective to rejuvenate the faltering economy. The problem was at the implementation level because most of the reforms remained on paper due to well-entrenched interests. Political institutions were the biggest hurdle in the path of the reforms. Most of the party leaders were against these reforms because of their vested interests; these leaders did not want to be challenged in their privileged status and powerful positions (Hisrt 1991: 228).

Gorbachev leadership wanted to reassert the central control on the Central Asia, and to remove the corruption, nepotism, cronyism, networking in party organisation and the state apparatus, which was permeated into political life of Kyrgyz Republic. So in his first move, he replaced the party secretaries of the Communist Party. During the continuance the Turdakun Usabaliev, the first secretary of the Kyrgyz Communist Party was sacked, but officially it was announced that he had retired from his position in January 1986 in the Congress of the Kyrgyz Communist Party. At the Congress almost every speaker spoke against their former party boss. Absamat Massaliev was made the new first secretary of the Kyrgyz Communist Party. Around two third of the party officials were removed from their offices. New younger officials were brought to party offices and party officials' size was reduced by 20 percent. But despite the purges, old guards and bureaucrats of the central committees, and powerful regional officials continued to dominate the political life of Kyrgyz Republic. The new leader Massaliev was suspicious of Glasnost and Perestroika because he saw these programs as a tool to weaken his position in the polity. He began to link with conservative leaders of Moscow; he had assumed that Moscow was diverting its own problems to Republic's shoulders which were not responsible for this problem. Consequently, he resisted all efforts of the reforms of Glasnost and Perestroika and did not enthusiastically implement it (Anderson 1999:18).

The simultaneous introduction of perestroika and glasnost contributed to potential ethnic strife between Kyrgyz majority and Uzbek minority. Particularly in southern Kyrgyzstan, the different lifestyle between sedentary Uzbek and nomadic Kyrgyz paved the tension due to twin reform policies. Historically

nomadic Kyrgyz were living in rural areas and Uzbek were city dwellers. So perestroika benefited urban Uzbek people, who were economically powerful and purchased the private enterprises due to privatisation of industries. The Kyrgyz were benefitted through glasnost; since they were numerically in a majority, so they were put in position to capture the state power. Therefore, since independence the use of political power to grab economic resources was started in Kyrgyzstan by Kyrgyz politicians and their supporters (Mullerson 2013: 95-96).

Due to the result of 'Glasnost' and 'Perestroika' unemployment had been exacerbated in the countryside and people started protesting in capital Frunze (Bishkek). In summer 1989 they created the first significant social organization 'Ashar' (meaning mutual help) and under these auspices they began to seize land and build shanty towns on the outskirts of the city. Fearing for their future, the Russian speaking people started to emigrate from Kyrgyzstan and until 1993 the Russian population had been reduced by 20 percent. This situation got worsened due to inter-ethnic clashes between Uzbek minority and Kyrgyz over the land issue in the Osh region in summer 1990. People started to protest in the capital, but Masaliev did not try hard to solve this issue. Then in October 1990 Kyrgyz parliament refused to elect him to the new executive presidency (Yaccov 1991: 40-41). The parliament chose Askar Akayev as the new president who was then the chairman Republican academy of science. Though Akayev had no popular base within the Republic, but somehow he managed the situation because he had the confidence of the Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan (DDK) and he adopted a more nuanced policy and promised that Kyrgyzstan would be the safest place for all groups. In August 1991 military coup Akaev resigned from the party and de-partyised the state and administrative organs. Though Akaev supported the Soviet Union's unity, but at the end of August 1991 the Kyrgyz parliament voted for independence from the USSR. Akayev called for election and in October he won by a thumping majority. Gorbachev programme of perestroika and glasnost were supported by mostly Russian population of Kyrgyz republic; local Central Asians were not very aware of it. It is true that after the launching, perestroika was misused by chaotic masses, who tried to achieve various goals during the

time of chaos such as unlawful grab of land (Ashar), creation of politically (Zamandash, Koz Karash, Ayikat) and ethnically centered (Osh aimagi, Adolat) organisations. Even political leaders of Kyrgyzstan also utilised this time to make their position strong in the Kyrgyzstan using patronage networking. These programmes exacerbated tension between Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities and subsequently created a ruptured Kyrgyz society; people become overwhelmed by their socio-economic problems (Dadabaev 2017: 108-109).

2.4 Conclusion

Any country has deeper impacts of historical legacies, so also has Kyrgyzstan. Its history has strong imprints on its state-society interaction process. Its current upheavals also have imprints of historical legacy. Kyrgyz historical legacy could be categorized under three broad categories: pre-Tsarist period, Tsarist period, and Soviet period. All three periods have impacted its societal forces as well as their interaction with political authority. During the antiquity, before the invasion of Islam Kyrgyz tribes were known as Sogadians. It is very interesting to know that event at that time *Ong Kanat*, *Sol Kanat* and *Ichklik* were present. The society was divided into various tribal groups; *Aga Bii* would be their chief. He was sole representative of their internal and external issues. This period was era of cooperation and mutual help between people and their tribal chief. During the 7-8th century the Kyrgyz land came under the Arab rule; in this period Islam was expanded in this region. This period was characterized by oppression and coercion of Islamic rule over Sogadian (older Kyrgyz). During the mogul rule the relationship between political authority and people were not so antagonistic like Arab rule. In this period separate Turkic dialects were developed and separate Kyrgyz identity at local level also got imprinted. During the Khanate rule since 18th to mid 19th century the rule of the Kokand Khanate were coercive and authoritarian. Khanate rulers were Uzbeks, so since then the animosity and mistrust are found between Uzbek and Kyrgyz communities. Due to its economic, political and strategic interests the Tsarist rulers came invaded into Central Asian region; modernization, urbanization was done during Tsarist rule. During the

Tsarist rule the political authority was very centralized; various new powerful actors also emerged after the weakening of old tribal chiefs and Ulemmas. Though some sections of Kyrgyz society were dissatisfied with Tsarist regime but they could do nothing against the very powerful Tsarist regime.

After the Communist Revolution in Russia, Communist regime came to power. During the Lenin period Kyrgyz nationalist were given considerable autonomy and right to self determination, albeit in principle. Stalin period was a nightmare for the Kyrgyz people because many people were killed during the purge drive; though this period is also marked with industrialization and collectivization of Kyrgyzstan. In 1936 Kyrgyzstan became the separate autonomous republic during the Stalin regime. Brezhnev and Khrushchev period gave some space of local and regional leaders of the Kyrgyzstan. The interaction between Soviet state and Kyrgyz society restarted. Regional leaderships were given space to manage their some affairs. During the Gorbachev era Glasnost and Perestroika were started in Kyrgyzstan; they were launched to improve the relation between state and society; that were ruptured due to corruption, authoritarianism, nepotism of Soviet rule. During Gorbachev period Kyrgyz civil society also found some space to flourish; new democratic politics began to take shape. But the Kyrgyz society was not apprehensive like other Soviet republics; instead they wanted to remain with Soviet Union under a confederation like structure.

Chapter III

Institutional Structure and Constitutional
Processes in Kyrgyzstan

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3.1 Introduction

Since the beginning of the 1990s, various new political and economic initiatives have taken place in the all former Soviet Union Republics. Many post-Soviet states have chosen the path of liberal democracy for the development of their societies. This concept was totally different and alien from what existed in the erstwhile Soviet Union; which was a follower of the socialist model. The majority of the population was largely not experienced about the concept of liberal democracy and its modes opernadi. Nevertheless, the political elites were hopeful that once the liberal model would be adopted, the consequent flow of political and economic liberty would usher a new dynamics those societies. After the journey of almost two and half decades of liberal democracy in post-Soviet states, now it would be very interesting to gauge the preliminary results of important transformations. One should attempt to make some concrete conclusion about their present situation. That would give new insights about the current politico-economic dynamics of the Kyrgyzstan. One should remember that the dissolution of the USSR was propagated as a victory of Western liberal democracy across the globe, and they also discredited the Soviet model of development. Even Francis Fukuyama predicted the demise of the USSR as an “end of history” and the “triumph of the liberal market economy (Fukuyama 1989).” But this view was/is not appreciated by political elites and population of Kyrgyzstan. They did not take the dissolution of the USSR as a victory. In fact, there was/is a strong nostalgia for the Soviet period, and this feeling still prevails among the masses. The people often express their disappointment about the USSR dissolution; it was a disaster for them in terms facilities provided by Communist regime of USSR (Petric 2005: 322-323).

Kyrgyzstan was the also one of the Central Asian Republics under the Soviet Union, who declared its independence after the demise of the Soviet Union in

1991. Kyrgyzstan, under the leadership of the President Askar Akayev, got an international reputation because of implementing the systemic liberal reforms. It can be said that the framework for the establishment of a democratic state based on the rule of law marked its beginning. In the initial stage there were definitely positive indications towards achieving these grand goals. A number of new political parties, civil society groups, non-governmental organizations, and independent media outlets mushroomed during early 1990s. Therefore, Kyrgyzstan was called as a 'Central Asia's Island of Democracy' (Anderson 1999: 23). However, this rejoice did not last long, and soon it stumbled onto autocratic path. In other words, the first President of independent Kyrgyzstan, Askar Akayev changed his role of democratic crusader and moved towards towards autocracy. Subsequently, he after fifteen years of rule was overthrown by the people's uprising in 2005 though Tulip revolution. The new President of Kyrgyzstan, Kurmanbek Bakiyev also followed the Akayev's pattern and he was also thrown away in 2010 within just five years after Tulip Revolution. Another new constitution was adopted in 2010; which has adopted a semi-parliamentary model of government (Roy 2011:199-200).

In this chapter, we would focus on the constitutional development in Kyrgyzstan since the adoption of first constitution in 1993. This country has a very short history of the democratic process. Until the establishment of the Soviet Union in 1917, this Kyrgyz land had not any experience of written constitutions. Even during the Soviet period, the region played largely a passive role and it only followed through the constitution of the Soviet Union. Only in 1993, Kyrgyzstan got its first indigenous constitution made up by its own people through deliberate discussions and debates. The aim of this chapter is to analyze the constitutional debates; various important provisions of the first constitution; and numerous referendums regarding the constitutional changes as well as scrub down the hidden motives behind the subsequent politics of referendums by Askar Akayev and Kurmanbek Bakiyev. This chapter also attempts to scoop up the various factors behind the politics, which led to constitutional developments and subsequent newly arisen institutional structures. It will also to analyze that

whether the formal constitutional structures are guiding the contours of political processes and what kind of political system emerging through this formal and informal interaction.

Since the state-in-society approach applied in this thesis work focuses on the “rules of the game” of the society, i.e. legal-constitutional provisions about the role of executive, judiciary, legislature, rules about the political parties, rules for the electoral process, rules about the relation among executive, judiciary, and legislature etc.. These rules decide the political process of any state and creates favourable potential loser or winner in the political system. These rules of the game are very much deciding especially in the context of post-Soviet states, who have sailed around their polity on the very new uncertain path of liberal democracy. It is very interesting to follow through the constitutional developments and subsequent many new referdums of Kyrgyzstan. Because the Kyrgyzstan is plagued with problems of lack of state capacity, lack of enough natural resources, ridden with clan competition and regional rivalry between north and south, personalistic politics; so it would be very interesting to analyze the constitutional development in the Kyrgyzstan.

3.2 Institutional Structure under Akayev Regime

The constitution of any polity describes the distribution of power among the political institutions. It also demarcates the boundaries under which these powers would be exercised. It means that constitution is a “map of power distribution” of society (Anderson 1997:301); but we should remember that it is only the formal map. In the society, there is also an informal, invisible power map that deviates from the formal power map, which decides the course of the political process of the country. Formally, the constitution decides the power distribution among various political institutions and also interrelationships among them and their relationships with the citizenry. The case of Kyrgyzstan is quite intriguing, because it was the part of Communist Soviet Union, in which state played the role of guardian in the development of society; and state heavily screwed up into daily affairs of its citizens. But the new constitution of 1993 adopted the liberal

democratic model, which does guarantee the political rights but not the socio-economic rights of its citizenry, and let them free to choose their own path of development; in other words state does not screw up in their daily life (Duchacek 1973:10-11).

3.2.1 New Constitution of 1993

The independent Kyrgyzstan's new constitution, which replaced the Soviet-era constitution of 1978, was passed by the parliament of Kyrgyzstan in May 1993. The new constitution provided a legislative framework to establish the required institutions of liberal democracy in Kyrgyz republic.¹ According to the new constitution, the Kyrgyz Republic defined as a sovereign, unitary, and democratic republic founded on the principle of rule of law. It also recognized numerous civil and political rights and provisions for its citizens. Kyrgyzstan's 1993 constitution established separation of powers between legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government. It is very interesting to make an analysis of constitutional debate about different issues that emerged at the time of adopting the constitution. In Kyrgyzstan, during the time of the debates on various provisions related to the constitution, newspaper columns very lively discussed the each and every article of the constitution. Correspondents touched upon almost every broad theme, and they used to make a very deep and nuanced analysis about the future of the constitution. The ambiguity in the articles of constitution was the common concern for almost all the columnists of news papers; they were also apprehensive about the total disappearance of the socialist vision in the new document, and too much appearance of the Western liberal principles. A noted historian D. Malabiev criticized the disappearance of socialist vision and suggested that article 1 should be as follows:

“The Kyrgyz Republic is a sovereign, unitary, democratic republic, built upon the beginnings of a law-based, secular state which emerged as a result of the victories of the October revolution, and developed in the period of the construction of socialism (Anderson 1997:4).”

¹Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic (Bishkek, 1996), Articles 3, 4.

The basis of independent Kyrgyzstan and its own constitution emerged during the 1990 when the demand for separate nationhood emerged across the republics of the Soviet Union. In the meantime, Kyrgyz republic was also experiencing some feeling of nationalism. Though, it wanted a confederal structure, not complete independence, like Switzerland. On 27 October 1990, Supreme Council of Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic decided to establish a commission for making a draft of the new constitution for the Kyrgyzstan. It was also the day when the Supreme Council elected Askar Akayev as the President of the Kyrgyzstan. Another major development took place on the 15 December 1990, when the Kyrgyz Supreme Soviet adopted the resolution of “Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan.” It was stressed that sovereignty meant supreme command of Kyrgyz state over domestic and foreign affairs. It was also a declaration of the journey towards liberal democracy; in which it was stated that the new republic would be based on the principles of the rule of law, separation of powers, and pluralism. It was also declared the Kyrgyz Parliament had the sole authority to ratify the laws of the Soviet Union. Finally, when the Soviet Union was disintegrated on 8 August 1991, then it became very necessary to make some legal status of Kyrgyzstan. Therefore on 31 August 1991 Kyrgyz Supreme Soviet declared the independence of Kyrgyzstan. It was the dawn of a new state on international stage. On 12 October 1991, Askar Akyev was elected by popular vote; he had got 95.3% support of the popular cast vote (Spector 2004: 9-10).

As mentioned in previous section that the Kyrgyz Supreme Soviet, on 27 October 1990, formed a commission to draft a new constitution for the new Kyrgyz Republic. The commission headed by Justice Usup Mukambaev started working in May 1991; the commission submitted its draft on 1 November 1991 to Kyrgyz Supreme Soviet. After several months of discussion and opened for the public purview, review and revisions; the first constitution of independent Kyrgyz republic was adopted on 5 May 1993. However, this document-constitution- has been changed seven times through referendums held on

1994,1996,1998,2003,2007,2010,2016. It is the aim of this chapter to understand the dynamics of these changes and the politics behind it.

3.2.1.1 Distribution of Powers

The new constitution of the Kyrgyzstan stated that the people of Kyrgyzstan are the holders of sovereignty of the republic, and they are the final source of authority in the republic. The people of Kyrgyzstan would exercise their power directly through different state and local government bodies; this exercise of power would be grounded on the Kyrgyz constitution and laws. Only the president and parliament have the right to act on the behalf of people, because they are elected by the people of Kyrgyzstan. Article 7 (2) of the Kyrgyz constitution laid the foundation of balance of power between the legislature, executive, and judiciary. It stated:

The state power of Kyrgyzstan would be exercised by the legislature-Jogorku Kenesh, executive power by government and local self government bodies, and the judiciary- by the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, the Supreme Economic Court, and other courts and judges of the system of justice. All three bodies would function independently and in cooperation with each other. They shall have to right to exceed their power established by the constitution of the Kyrgyzstan.

In the constitution, the role of president was very crucial. He would be the head of the state; he would be the guarantor of the Kyrgyz constitution, laws, and also of rights and freedom of citizens; he would be responsible for the making coordination among other governmental bodies (Article 42). Article 43 tells that one could be elected to the President post only for two terms; he had to be the citizen of Kyrgyzstan; no younger than 35 years and not older that 65; he must have a good knowledge and fluency over Kyrgyz language; before nomination he/she had to consistently reside in the country for not less the 15 years. He would be elected by the second ballot system in which, if no candidate get the absolute majority (above 50% of valid votes) then another round of voting would be conducted between top two voted candidates (Article 44).

Though the constitution, in principle, mentioned about the separation of powers, but in practice the president was very powerful in comparison to legislature and judiciary. He had considerable leeway over the legislature and the judiciary and it reflected the dominance of president in the political system; despite that there was not any provision of president rule in constitution. The constitution provided enormous power over other bodies; he would appoint the prime minister and other ministers, various key figures of the government, such as head of national bank, regional administrative head. The right to appoint of regional heads was misused on various occasions by the incumbent presidents. The Kyrgyz president had also broad powers regarding legislation. He could initiate his own bill in the Jogorku Kenesh; he would give final permission on the bills made by the Jogorku Kenesh; he could return any bill for reconsideration, but he would have to sign for it, if again send by the parliament to the president. He could also dissolve parliament before time following a referendum to this effect (Article 46). If he breaches the law, then he could be impeached with the two third majority of the parliament (Article 52). Most controversial was the debate over whether the presidency would be limited to members of the titular nationality. Eventually this ethnic requirement was not incorporated in the constitution and the presidency was to be open to any citizen who met certain presidency requirements and knew the state language.

Therefore, there was a common concern among law experts that president's powers could be misused, and their fear proved right when they faced such scenarios during Akayev and Bakiyev regime. As we know that Askar Akayev and Kurmanbek Bakiyev misused the powers of president for their own benefit; both did not use these for the democratic development of the country; especially Akayev misused dominant position of president in the constitution to bypass the parliamentary approval. He misused the power of calling of referendum to maximize the power vis-a-vis parliament. Even within one year of adoption of new constitution, its first President Akayev dissolved the parliament and organised a referendum to enhance his power in name of reform inducement powers. As we know that with the October 1994 and February 1996 referendums,

President Akayev made the parliament impotent; through October 1994 referendum the parliament was made bicameral, which would not be able to unite against the power misuse of president; through February 1996 referendum the powers of parliament were reduced heavily, the parliament could only criticize the government, it could not dismiss the cabinet, only president could have done it. This 1996 referendum made the parliament toothless and useless.

According to 1993 Kyrgyz constitution, the laws would be made by legislature-Jogorku Kenesh; the constitutional provisions related to the powers of the legislature were mentioned in article 63-68 in the constitution. The Jogorku Kenesh would have three more functions: to make laws about the country, to put control on the executive and the judiciary. In the constitution, the right to make legislation was vested in the Jogorku Kenesh, the president, the government, the supreme court, the supreme economic court, and the people- if they initiate any proposal to make laws by the signature of 30,000 electors. The Jogorku Kenesh would have 105 deputies; they would be elected by universal adult franchise; all voters would take part in the election and cast their vote for the deputies of the Jogorku Kenesh. The parliament could initiate amendment in the constitution only with the support of not less than 2/3 votes of deputies. The referendum on any issue could be held only with the support of 1/3 deputies with 300,000 of the electorate. Though Kyrgyz Parliament had also sufficient powers; it could initiate legislation, make amendments in the constitution, approve budgets, and appoint certain key officials. But there was less clarity in the relationships between powers of the parliament and the prime minister; though the Prime minister would get passed the budget from the Jogorku Kenesh, but there was no clear statement about the making the prime minister accountable to parliament.

As the post-independent history of Kyrgyzstan has demonstrated, the Kyrgyz Parliament was very active and powerful during initial first two-three years. The initial activism did not last long and this law making body got engulfed into inter-deputies fighting for their sheer narrow interests. Askar Akayev took advantage of this infighting and played the politics of divide and rule. He through various

referendums weakened the powerful position of president and became himself more powerful. Through the October 1994 referendum Akayev heavily reduced the powers of parliament; this referendum made the Jogorku Kenesh bicameral; this bicameral had to unite to pass against the will of president, which was nearly impossible because there were bakiyev supporters in the Jogorku Kenesh who would not support any such move against the Akeyev. This October 1994 referendum also abolished the power of parliament to call for referendum. so it is quite obvious that how president prerogatives were misused by the incumbent president to weaken the democratic institutions. He even used the powers of law enforcement agencies to threaten the deputies to force them to get favour of them. Through various crooked tactics he force the parliament to become a subservient body of president.

In Kyrgyzstan, the executive consists of the prime minister, the vice-prime minister, other ministers of the cabinet, and chairman of the state committees. It is noteworthy that the president is not included into executive bodies. As mentioned earlier, the president would appoint the prime minister and other ministers of the government from the political party, who would get majority in the parliamentary election; the cabinet would be approved by the Jogorku Kenesh. According to the 1993 constitution, the prime minister with the cooperation of his ministers would form and abolish the different ministries and department, appoint the chief of various departments, appoint the head of state administrations, appoint the administration of city Bishkek, appoint the head of the district and town state administrations. The appointments by the prime minister would be effective only with the consent of the president (Article 71); so this article 71 makes President very powerful vis-a-vis executive. The executive issue decrees about the all bodies under the territory of Kyrgyzstan. Though executive has a broad range of powers; nevertheless it was under the supervision of the president and the parliament. The Kyrgyzstan had inherited a weak executive against the president. President Akayev often used to threaten the government to dissolve through his prerogatives; through this means he put the government and ministers under his grip. Even within just one year after the adoption of new constitution in he

dissolved the government and appointed new Prime Minister Apas Jumaglov as a new prime minister and allowed him to form a new cabinet; moreover he went for two referendums in January and October 1994 to make his position stonger. Meanwhile their internal competition and rivalry also wakened their positions vis-a-vis president. They the frequent changes in ministers created disturbance in government and administration and subsequently in Kyrgyz society. Even it is also true the during early years after 1993, the political leaders were struggling to get powerful position in the ministry and other departments to grab resources of the state; and the more irony is that local constituency of leaders support those corrupt leaders, because these leaders provide the share of that resource grabbing through patron-client networks.

In the Kyrgyz constitution article 79-85 states about the judiciary branch of the Kyrgyz state. Article 79 (2) says that in the Kyrgyz Republic there shall be the following courts: the constitutional court of the Kyrgyz Republic, the supreme court of the Kyrgyz Republic, the supreme economic court of the Kyrgyz Republic and local courts (courts, courts of the city of Bishkek, district and municipal courts, regional economic courts, military tribunals as well as courts of elders and courts of arbitration). The Constitutional Court shall be the highest body of judicial power that protects the constitution of the Kyrgyzstan [Article 82 (1)]; it would have total nine judges consists of the chairman and deputy chairman. This court decides the legality-constitutionality of the laws and rules made by state executive. The Supreme Court of the Kyrgyzstan decides about the civil, criminal, and administrative issues of the country (Article 83). Article 84 (1) mentions about the supreme economic court of the Kyrgyz Republic and regional economic courts shall form a single system of economic courts of the Kyrgyz Republic. There was also provision under the Article 85 (1) Courts of the elders and courts of arbitration; which might be established on the territory of ails, settlements, cities by the decision of citizens' meetings from among the older people and other citizens held in respect and authority. The judiciary of Kyrgyzstan is also plagued by Soviet inheritance; it the appointments are made by the president on the recommendation of executive; so judiciary often give

decisions in the favour of him. Powerful politicians involved in corruption do not punished by courts; it creates distrust among public towards judiciary. The constitutional court adjudged the new constitution of 2006 null and void shows the influence of president on judiciary.

3.2.1.2 Civil Liberty Issues

The new constitution had the provisions about a strong president, independent parliament, and independent judiciary. Article 7 of the Kyrgyz constitution organized the Kyrgyz state power on these principles. The constitution also provided some provisions related to democracy and civic virtues for the nurturing of a liberal democratic society. Article 8 of the constitution allowed the establishment of political parties, trade unions and other public associations. Article 16 provided the right to freedom of expression, freedom of the press, right to form associations, and to assemble peacefully without any weapon. Article 21 gave the people right to engage in any activity for the livelihood, except those prohibited or restricted by the present constitution and laws of the Kyrgyz Republic. As a result, we can say that independent Kyrgyzstan's new constitution was the most liberal space, and it provided better conditions than its Central Asian neighbours. Introduction of the Kyrgyz currency in May 1993 was also proof of the commitment of the Askar Akayev to establish a liberal market economy. In addition, as we have mentioned above that Askar Akayev did his best in terms of establishing a market-based economy and developing a liberal democracy based on civil society. All of these were positive signs that Kyrgyzstan, with the leadership of Askar Akayev, was determined in transforming to liberal democracy. So, it was called the 'democratic island of Central Asia' by John Anderson. But Kyrgyzstan's limited economic resources, trade dependence on the former the Soviet Union and other neighbouring countries had constrained its real progress (Abazov 1999:197-199). Nevertheless Kyrgyz constitution had all required provisions of a liberal democracy, but the implementation of these provisions on the real ground proved very difficult for Akayev and Bakiyev; in fact both did lead the country in the wrong direction. It is also true that the

Kyrgyz state lacked enough capacities to perform its duties properly; the country is also resource constrained state with a large mountainous terrain, which inhibits its development; but on the other hand its leadership also have not shown long term vision of progress about the country.

3.2.1.3 The Titular Language Question

The status of the titular language (Kyrgyz) and non-titular language (Russian and others) emerged as a major controversial issue during the constitutional debates. The post of presidential candidate had also become aligned with this dispute; this dispute was related to whether a president could be such person who doesn't know the Kyrgyz language properly. The language issue was very sensitive because it was related to a larger number of Russian people residing in Kyrgyzstan since Tsarist and Soviet period; it could also have a major impact on the Kyrgyz-Russian relations. Since Russian, the largely skilled people, were leaving Central Asia after the nationalist upsurge in the republic; so it was a burning issue because the Kyrgyz state could not cope up the instantly migration of 62,000 skilled people (OSCE 1995:4-5). There were three main groups related to language issue; one was nationalists, who were favouring the titular native Kyrgyz language as state language; second were Europeanizers, who were fully supporting the Russian language; third was moderates, who were supporting the both languages for communication and national development. Finally, after a lot of discussions of Article 5 of the Kyrgyz Constitution declared that Kyrgyz language would be the official language of the state. It also stressed the equal functioning of Russian and all languages; it also prohibited any discrimination on the grounds of not having the knowledge of it. It guaranteed the other languages with full ecosystem for the preservation, development, and functioning (Anderson 1997: 307-309). The language issue had exacerbated tension between titular Kyrgyz people and other Russian and Uzbek minorities. This language issue was used by Akayev regime as barrier for the opposition politicians; the famous northern leader Felix Kulov was once victim of this language law requirement for the president post election.

3.2.1.4 Welfare Rights

During the constitutional debate three major issues emerged regarding the socio-economic rights of the people in Kyrgyzstan. Akayev believed that without the private property rights, the liberal democracy could not be developed. The Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan opposed the right to private property; because they think that it would benefit only big corporations of foreign countries. These issues further became complex when another issue erupted; it was the issue of privatization of public enterprises; it was alleged that this policy would benefit the non-indigenous population such Slavs, Uzbeks or Russians. Another issue, which also sparked the debate, was the provision of social safety net for the poor population. The second important issue that sparked debate was various rights such as: right to work, health care, housing and social protection. It was demand of many Soviet era leaders that there was ambiguity in mentioning these rights; they must find a place in the new constitution categorically and clearly. But Kyrgyz officials did not accept it and argued that it was impractical to incorporate these socio-economic rights in the transition period of the Kyrgyz economy; because the Kyrgyz economy is facing the economic decline and in the process of restructuring. The position of women was another pertinent issue in the Kyrgyz constitutional debate. Sh. Khudabaeva, chairperson of the Kyrgyz Women's Committee, said that there was not almost disappearance of women in the constituent assembly. She argued for better conditions and rights of equality and laws against discriminations in the current age of reawakening of old traditions during the nationalist upsurge. She said that Article 80 did mention about the role traditional elders (Aksakals), but did not mention about the elderly women. At last the socio-economic rights were included in Article 21-41 of constitutional text. Since the Kyrgyz state has adopted the market economy, so it was envisioned that social sector would be supplemented by private sectors, for example, through many insurance schemes. But it was unclear that how the impoverished state would fulfil the needs of citizens (Anderson 1997: 310-311). The we have mentioned earlier that Kyrgyzstan is resource starved country; it could not fulfil the needs of its population on its own; the welfare needs was not fulfilled by both

leaders. Though the Tulip revolution of 2005 was started with protests against unfair results of parliamentary elections, but that was only immediate cause; the real genuine cause was people's disenchantment and deep frustration with the government; the 2005 parliamentary elections only catapulted people to protests but the underlying causes were their bad socio-economic conditions, endemic corruptions, nepotism, regionalism etc..

During the first tenure of Akayev, Kyrgyzstan was called the 'island of democracy' in Central Asian countries; it adopted the policies of social and political pluralism. In this period the president adhered to constitutional provisions in pursuing the domestic and foreign policy; he discussed about the multi-party system and adopted the laws freely, the government publicly adopted the political and economic reforming policies, and regularly reported to the parliament. It means that first constitutions neither created strong presidentialism nor strong parliament (Anderson 1997: 313-314). But it made a balance a between these two institutions.² Akayev reforms created hopes in the world and among its own countries' citizens. However, since 1993 he began to change his tactics and started seizing up the power to make his position stronger than parliament and other opposition parties. In September 1994, he very cleverly disbanded the parliament and forced the government to resign, cowed the Judiciary, shut down the press, set up a new electoral commission, and announced the new parliamentary election. With the referendum of October 1994 he positioned himself as more powerful. So, he was reverting to the Central Asian leaders' type of a more talk on democratic rhetoric, but practiced a more authoritarian type of rule (Spector 2004: 4).

As mentioned in the above sections that constitution of 1993 created semi-presidential system in which president, parliament and judiciary were in position to check and balance each other through their special prerogatives. But it is

² "Murat Ukushov about the Parliamentary regime in Kyrgyzstan", [Online: web] accessed on 16 June 2015 URL: <http://ipp.kg/en/news/2262/>.

noteworthy that the president was in very powerful position and in the subsequent years Akayev devised new tactics to strengthen his position in the political system. We will see in further sections that how Akayev, through the various referendums, tried to curtail the powers of Jogorku Kenesh and other institution of the state to enhance the powers of the president.

3.2.2 Referendums of January 1994

In the constitutional debate there were apprehensions about the dispute over the jurisdiction between the president and parliament. It was argued by experts that there was ambiguity over the distribution of powers among these two institutions of state. Since 1993 in all party meetings President Akayev warned the political leaders over the issue of encroachment of power between parliament and president like Russian case. The adoption of the new constitution in May 1993 was not able to soothe tension between parliament and the president over the issue of power sharing. Two issues emerged as a bone of contention between the two institutions of the state; the first issue was ongoing economic decline due market reforms, which scrunched up the people's livelihood and threw them out into poverty; and the second issue was many corruption scandals in the process of awarding contracts to private investors as well as the Kumtur gold mine issue (Andersson 1997:313-314). In mid December 1993 parliament pushed a motion of no-confidence against the government; though it could not be passed by the required two third majorities in order to bring the government down. But it led the Akayev to dissolve the government and appoint Apas Jumaglov as the head of the new government. Meanwhile, other parliamentarians were busy in making profit from different sources rather than passing necessary laws; they had not shown the maturity and long term vision about their country. That was also a reason for the ire of Akayev against parliament. On the other side parliament speaker Medetkhan Sherimkulov was a strong critic of Akayev policies over Kumtor gold contracts issue. Therefore, to bolster his legitimacy Akayev went for Referendum in the January 1994. In the January 1994 referendum, Akayev asked the people to give mandate on two issues; first, the continuation of his economic policies, and

second, he wanted to remain in his office until the scheduled term till October 1996. The turnout in the referendum was 96%. Total 95% voters supported the Akayev' policies and the continuance of his tenure till October 1996 (Murzaeva 2011: 7-72). This first referendum was the first sign of Akayev intention of turning towards being semi-authoritarianism.

3.2.3 Referendum of October 1994

After getting the popular approval through January 1994 referendum, Akayev with prime-minister Apas Jumugalov now started harshly criticizing the parliament over making undue delay in passing laws. But when this plan did not work, he utilized the divisions among parliamentarians and instigated one group, which had around 150 deputies, to call for dissolution of Soviet era parliament and conduct a new parliamentary election. The fragmented government was unable to function and it was compelled to resign. After which Akayev dissolved the parliament and proposed for second referendum on 22 October 1994. In the second referendum Akayev wanted two major amendments. First was the mandate to amendment in the constitution by referendum, and the second was to make the parliament (Jogorku Kenesh) bicameral. Successfully, he got the 86% of the support of the Kyrgyz population (Anderson 1999:315). The 22 October 1994 referendum had far reaching implications for the transformation of the independent Kyrgyzstan towards the liberal democracy. First of all, the constitutional changes were to be made by referendum rather than parliament. This amendment had diminished the power and privileges of the parliament. At the new bicameral parliament, which was to be elected in February 1995, the power of the two houses was not separated; this ambiguity weakened the parliamentary position.³ So if both houses wanted to stand up against the executive, both had to make consensus first; then they could equalize the power against the president; and certainly this was impossible because there were Akayev's supporters too in the parliament. As the result of this, the newly elected parliament, which convened its session on March

³ "Murat Ukushov about the Parliamentary regime in Kyrgyzstan" 14 October 2011 [Online: web] accessed on 16 June 2015 URL: <http://ipp.kg/en/news/2262/>.

1995, spent its first year on disputing the relative powers and jurisdiction of each chamber. Starting with these two amendments to the constitution Akayev started to strengthen president's power and weakening legislative simultaneously (Jyldyzbek 2008: 14-15).

3.2.4 Referendum of 1996

Askar Akyev was elected again as the President of Kyrgyzstan on 24 December 1995. He proposed for another referendum (total third from starting) to extend his power in order to pursue the reforms measures. In an interview with a newspaper he justified his demands; he argued that due to multi-holders of power, he needed more powers in the transition period to make reforms possible; he said that he was accountable to people of Kyrgyzstan and parliamentarians were creating hurdles in the development of the country as well as democratic institutions. Again, he blamed on them that instead of creating the legislative basis for market reforms, they were busy in extending their own privileges and wealth. The two chambers of parliament were disputing over the jurisdiction of their work. This dispute forced Akayev to call for another referendum to settle down this dispute (Murzaeva 2011:73).

This referendum was held on 10 February 1996; the voting turnout was 96.53 percent; in which 94.50 voters supported the Akayev's proposal of constitutional amendments to extend the power of the president. Akayev got support in the name of promoting democracy and development. This referendum further enriched the powers of the president. He acquired the power to formulate the domestic and foreign policy. He could directly appoint and dismiss the cabinet members, ambassadors, and judges without the consultation of parliament; the president could dissolve the parliament if it failed to approve the nominee for president for the three times. However the parliament still had the power to approve the choices the president for the posts of the prime minister, justices of supreme courts, constitutional courts, and supreme arbitration courts, prosecutor general, and the head of the national bank. With these changes president had enhanced his power immensely; now he can choose his own cabinet without taking the consent of

parliament, he can appoint head of local administration; the referendum had cut the two chambers of the parliament heavily (Spetov 2004: 21).

As we know that October 1994 referendum made Jogorku Kenesh bicameral. The first upper house was “Legislative Assembly” composed of full time legislators responsible for the daily workloads, and the second house was “ Assembly of People’s Representatives”- lower house. The functions of the two houses were so cleverly distributed the most of functions were to be performed by both houses. For example, both houses can introduce amendments and supplements to the constitution; both had the power to interpret the constitution and laws; both would take part in the appointment of the judges of the constitutional court, supreme courts, supreme economic courts; both were responsible for the election of one-third members of accounting members and chief election commission. These overlapping powers had made the both houses of the Jogorku Kenesh immovable. The new laws made the both houses’ work so intertwined that both needed the consent of another in order to get pass a law. After this it would go to the president for the final approval to become a law. Both houses had to reach consensus to stand up against the president, which was impossible in house of short sighted deputies. The Jogorku Kenesh had also lost its power to hold the executive accountable; because both houses had the power to launch an investigation against the members of the cabinet, but they could not dismiss the ministers and officials (article 57). Only the president could do such thing. Moreover, the president could dismiss the government at any time on their personal prerogative. So it was quite clear that the new amendments made both houses redundant and useless; it made the parliament impotent and dependent to the President. This referendum made the Akayev even more authoritarian (Murzaeva 2011:76).

3.2.5 Referendum of 1998

The 1998 referendum was another step towards making the president more powerful vis-a-vis parliament. In fact, Akayev wanted to make land reforms speedy to benefit the private sector. He knew that deputies could stall his move to

expedite the land reforms, so he went for another fourth referendum. He argued that land reform is very quintessential for the “free economy”. To this end he wanted changes in the Article 4 of the 1993 constitution; therefore he adopted his older technique of criticizing and attacking on the parliament for not properly doing its duties; they are screwing up the economic reforms. With the criticism of Akayev, government supported media houses were also playing an active role against the parliament. This referendum of 1998 was held on 17 October, in which people were asked to give their opinion on four issues related to land reforms. The first issues were allowing the ownership of the private land; the second was reconfiguring of both houses of the parliament; the third was the amendment in the government’s power of fiscal decision making; and the fourth was more freedom of media and limiting the immunity of deputies of Parliament. The turnout was 96.26 percent and 92.92 percent voters supported his proposals (Jyldyzbek 2008 17-18). The changes through referendum were following:

- The right to private property were introduced in the constitution.
- The seats of the upper house (legislative assembly) were increased from 35 to 60; and 25% (total 15) of them would be elected by partly list; and seats of the lower house (assembly of people’s representatives) were decreased from 70 to 45.
- Deputies of the parliament now could not make changes in the budget without the approval of government. Only with the consent of the president, deputies could now pass the law on increased/decreased state expenditure.
- With this new referendum the immunity and prerogatives of deputies were scaled down; and permanent residence requirement was introduced for the election in the lower house.
- The only positive side of the referendum was freedom of the media was scaled up in the constitution. Now no law could be made to curtail the freedom of the media in the Kyrgyzstan.

- Other major changes occurred through this referendum in Article 65 (6). This says that any amendment in the constitution could not be done without the two readings of the proposal and two-third majority of the both houses separately. This was made redundant and said the in the referendum that now president can go to the people directly for such amendment if parliament is not approving the amendment.

Now the president of Kyrgyzstan was turning into super president like Russia; he could now control on the formation and all activities of the government. The powers of the parliament were reduced considerably; deputies' prerogatives were reduced so much that they could not make any change without the government approval. The powers of legislature to check on the powers of the executive and president were comprehensively cut down. Even their position was now under threat because of the reduced immunities; so much so they would be now under terror of the prosecutor general on the pretext of false charges (Dukenbaev and Hansen 2003:31-32).

3.2.6 Referendum of 2003

Due to growing atrocities and misuse of power, the opposition now started uniting against the Akayev. They were demanding his resignation; they were posing a threat to the Akayev regime' stability. The deputies who could not win the 2002 parliamentary election are now criticizing the over-centralization of power under the authority of president. The opposition had been vocal and they were organizing protests against the government failures. To douse the fire of opposition, Akayev invited the opposition parties in July 2002 in a national round table meeting. In September 2002, a commission for the revision of the constitution was constituted, and it gave its report; which was put on for public discussion in October 2002. After the suggestion from the public, this revised draft of the constitution was to go to referendum. With the beginning of 2003, the situation was not favourable for Akayev; the tension was surmounting due Aksy event of 2002; which caused the Prime Minister Kurmanbek resignation. In this tough situation Akayev co-opted many opposition leaders, and he now decided to

go for referendum on 2 February 2003 (Spector 2004:24). Since this referendum was being held on very short notice, so the people were not exactly aware of the proposed changes in the constitution. There were two separate ballots; which asked two different questions; first, should the new version of the constitution be adopted? Second, should Akayev remain on the post of president till the December 2005? Though, these two questions looked very simple in first sight, but the matter was not so simple; instead they were having other complicated attached questions, which had wider implications for the political system of Kyrgyzstan. The voting in the referendum was 86.68 percent; first question was endorsed by 76.61 percent of the population; and the second question was supported by 78.74 percent of people. The main changes which were introduced by the referendum were as follows:⁴

- The 2003 referendum made the parliament unicameral again, as it was in the original constitution of 1993; it would consist of only 75 members for the five year term through single member districts [Article 54(2)].
- Jogorku Kenesh regained some of its powers; for example, now new cabinet could not be formed without the approval of parliament; it could vote for no confidence on the annual report of the government. Though the president had still many powers, which were decisive; he could still dismiss the parliament; he could still go to referendum in order to surpass the parliament.
- Another important change was done through the referendum within article 66, which said that if any law returned for reconsideration by the president, it would not be signed by not less than 4/5 majority of the Jogorku Kenesh (60 of total 75 members); then it would be further signed by the president. Since such huge number (60 out of 75) was almost

⁴ “Akayev Administration Claims Victory in Kyrgyzstan Constitutional Referendum” [Online: web] accessed on 4 November 2016 URI: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/rights/articles/eav020303a.shtml>

impossible to gather in the parliament to support; therefore it made the parliament attenuated and powerless.

- It gave immunity to the president about works and responsibilities served up during the office by amending article 53. He could not be prosecuted criminally or administratively for the activity and inactivity during his tenure of president; he could not be arrested, searched, interrogate or personally inspected for his works done during his tenure. The same article 53 gave him and his family members' protection and maintenance at the expenses of state.
- Other amendments also were done to make the president more powerful; for example, he could veto any legislation; he could make amendments in the laws passed by parliament and sign them without the consent of the parliament. And we should not forget that the office of prosecutor general was still the most important tool in the hands of the president to terrorize the opposition. The president was still enough powerful; the power structure was vertically organized in the system; still all the important appointments were being done by the president; *Akims* (head of districts), governors of oblasts, ministers and prime minister, prosecutor general were still in his hand; they could not do anything against their boss president.
- The change in article 63 gave most important power through a referendum. It stated that the president could dissolve Jogorku Kenesh on the three conditions, first if any referendum for this purpose passed by the people; if the disagreement in the parliament would be too surmountable; and third, if the parliament would three times reject the approval of the prime minister, then president would dissolve the parliament.
- Another major change was made in the constitution through the referendum; it was amended that parliament would delegate its power to make laws for one year, when it was dissolved. So this provision made the president more powerful, and now he could discharge even the legislative powers without any restrictions (Murzaeva 2011:81-85).

3.3 Institutional Structure under Bakiyev Regime

After the ouster of Akaev, the Kyrgyz Parliament appointed Kurmanbek Bakiyev as interim prime minister and acting president of the country. Bakiyev appealed to public to trust him while addressing Parliament- “Now, if you trust me, and as far as I understand you do, give me the opportunity to form an executive body (government) urgently. It will not stay in power forever, it won’t stay for several years; I will only stay until the next elections, only for about three months.”⁵ Bakiyev might have a hard time gaining support for other popular reasons. During and after the movement of Tulip Revolution, Bakyiev expressed his vision through a number of public speeches. At the same time, Bakiyev, in a televised address April 30, 2005 expressed hope that the presidential election would help unite the whole country again for their better future. He also said he would attempt to make Kyrgyz republic responsible and capable of answering for its promises (Marat 2008:231-232). In addition, Bakiyev vowed during his address to build a new architecture of power; therefore he would work to end corruption and take measures to prevent the revival of autocracy. He went on to pledge that he would pursue genuine market reforms and bring young leaders in the government.⁶ With such high lofting promises Bakiyev came to power after the 2005 people’ uprising against the incumbent regime of Akayev. But his high promises again proved nightmare for the Kyrgyz people; they were cheated again for their naive hopes. Bakiyev also behave more like erstwhile Akevev regime; even he and his coterie proved more disasterous and ruthless than Akayev; they became more disrespectful of democratic institutions than Akayev.

3.3.1 Failed November 2006 Constitution

⁵ “Kyrgyzstan: ‘New’ Leadership Drawn From Old Guard”[Online: web] accessed on 7 November 2016 URI: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp032505a.shtml>

⁶ “Kyrgyzstan’s Presidential Campaign: Mud Already Flying”[Online: web] accessed on 7 November 2016 URI: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav050405.shtml>

After coming to power new President Bakiyev did not show positive intention towards the political parties' demand and kept himself aloof from them. Now obviously people started protesting intermittently against the new government for constitutional reforms; and first two years were full of protests and demonstrations. When Bakiyev did pay heed towards the demand of parties, then opposition parties, media groups, and business groups all joined their hands and formed an umbrella organization- "*For Reforms*"- in January 2006 to pressurize the Bakiyev for constitutional-legal reforms. "*For Reforms*" sponsored some large rallies in April and May in demand of a new constitution and limiting the powers of the president. When the deadline passed and the president gave no attention, then "*For Reforms*" announced that new protests would be held in November. Meanwhile, due to fear of opposition parties and NGOs, Bakiyev started the deliberations over a new constitutional amendment; which proved a very contentious; Bakiyev sought to protect numerous presidential prerogatives, but many legislators and others wanted to curtail those rights. Because of growing criticism, Bakiyev in March 2006 appointed one of his critical legislators, Azimbek Beknazarov as the head of a working group to draft three alternative constitutions: one with strong presidential powers; other with strong legislative powers; and third with a mixed system. In September 2006 these drafts were released for public discussion (Murzaeva 2008:232-233).

The new wave of protests started on 2 November 2006 outside the Kyrgyz Parliament under the banner of "*For Reforms*". During their protests, opposition was unable to attract their supporters in larger numbers, and they were able to manage only around one thousand protesters before the Parliament house (Sinnot 2007:429). With other demands, they were demanding the resignation of President Kurmanbek Bakiyev and Prime Minister Felix Kulov, because both had not been able to push forward the process of constitutional reforms. On November 6, Bakiyev submitted a draft constitution to the legislature that retained substantial powers of the President. But the "*For Reforms*" members vowed to enact their own version of constitution. Bakiyev and Kulov publicly denounced this as a "coup attempt." Later, on November 7, demonstrators outside the legislature

supporting Bakiyev violently clashed with “*For Reforms*” supporters; which resulted in some injuries of protesters of both sides. This violence was denounced by both Bakiyev and the “*For Reforms*” leaders; they formed a small team to quickly work on a compromise draft. Eventually, due to the heavy pressure of “*For Reforms*” the President Bakiyev compelled to agree on the “*For Reforms*” demands and assured them for further constitutional reforms. It is very intriguing that on 9 November, Parliament very quickly passed a new constitution. In this new constitution, various changes were done to weaken the powers of the President; for example, the President would appoint the head of the Central Bank, the Central Election Commission, and the Prosecutor-general only after the Parliament’s approval; the National Security Service (NSS) would be placed under the purview of the Prime minister rather than the President. November 2006 constitution also established a mixed voting system for a new legislature to be elected in 2010, with one-half of the members elected by party lists and one-half in single-member constituencies. The legislature would be increased from 75 to 90 seats, and the body would have more influence over budget legislation. The party who would win more than 50% of total seats in the legislature would nominate the Prime minister and cabinet. It meant that the new constitution of 2006 had changed the power balance in the favour of Parliament (Marat 2008:229-230).

But in the November 2006 constitution, some more some changes were occurred through the parliament. They were following: the party who wins 50% of seats would form the government; if it did not happen then the president would choose one of the two largest parties of parliament to form government; national security service would be under the control of government; now parliament would appoint the judges of local courts; the impeachment of president would be difficult now because it would require support of 3/4th deputies of the parliament. This new constitution was signed on 15 January 2007. Now these two versions of constitutions, November 2006 and January 2007 tell the complex political dynamics of the Kyrgyz politics. It was also mentioned the new constitution would come into force on 21 October 2007. But, meanwhile in case filed against

these two new constitutions, the constitutional court declared null and void both November 2006 and January 2007 constitutions and said that the 2003 constitution was the only valid constitution; and court had restored the 2003 constitution of Kyrgyz Republic. Now the president, who was on the back foot due to protests of opposition, parties under the aegis of “*For Reforms*”, got strengthened by this judgement. He found an excuse and decided to go for a referendum. He announced the referendum would be held on 21 October 2007.⁷

3.3.2 Referendum of October 2007

In the referendum of October 2007 two simple questions were asked to people: first, would the people of Kyrgyzstan accept the new version of the constitution? And would they accept the new electoral code? The chief election commissioner reported that total turnout was 80.64 percent; the 75.40 percent people voted in the favour of the new constitution and 75.45 percent people supported to the new election code. So because of this new referendum many new changes incorporated into the constitution and into new election rules. Second change was that the Parliament would select the chairman of national bank upon the proposed name of the president. Third, now the main party would form the government on the invitation of the president. Fourth, some major alterations were made in the election codes; now in the new election code, each political party was to secure 5 percent threshold in each oblast; the political parties were to secure 30% percent of seats for the women candidates; 15% of candidates would be lower than 35 years age; the political parties would select 15 percent of candidates from ethnic minorities. We must remember no any substantive changes were done to reduce the powers of the president, which was on the agenda since the 2005 uprising. It is very unfortunate and surprising the opposition political parties of Kyrgyzstan, who were united against the President Kurmanbek Bakiyev under the umbrella front “*For Reforms*”, remained surprisingly silent about the October 2007 referendum. No powerful alterations were done in this referendum against the

⁷ “Kyrgyzstan: Conflict Over Constitution Continues”, [Online: web] accessed on on 30 November 2016 URL: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav122206.shtml>

president powers (Marat 2008:228). Rather, his powers remained intact. Those can be analyzed as follows:

- The President of Kyrgyzstan would be the most important figure in deciding the domestic and external affairs (Article 42). It means he would be the main lever of the political system.
- The Kyrgyz President would appoint the prime minister and other cabinet ministers. He could dismiss them without giving any proper reason to parliament or people.
- He was still holding power to appoint the chairman and members of almost all important bodies, such as national security council, prosecutor general were some most important of them.
- He could still nominate the Judges of the constitutional court and other important bodies.
- He could call for a referendum on his own; though it could also be done through the approval of 300,000 citizens or majorities of deputies of parliament.

Again, this referendum was done through asking two simple questions with simple answers 'yes' or 'no'. There were no options given for the each separate question for the every issue. Again, like former President Askar Akyev, Bakiyev also did not give enough time to properly deliberate and discuss on the provisions of the referendum. It was almost one month given for the discussion on proposals in the referendum. Moreover, this referendum was alleged about over exaggerated of voter turnout, false voting, misuse of official machinery, which was just like earlier regime. He and his family members followed the same path as was shown by Akaev. They even took them to a further level at which was the extreme model of kleptocracy (Engvall 2011:57). Kyrgyzstan's downward slide accelerated rapidly under the Bakiyev regime. The deteriorating socio-economic situation, coupled with falling living standards, rampant corruption and ethnic problems within the country led to the anti-government protests that led to the overthrow of the Bakiyev government on 7 April 2010. A few weeks prior to the overthrow of

the Bakiyev government, a group of opposition leaders had formed the Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the People's Kurultay (assembly) to coordinate the protest. On April 7, 2010 the CEC assumed power with Roza Otunbayeva as acting president declared that the CEC would stay in power for six months to oversee a new constitution and the Parliamentary and Presidential elections (Kubicek 2011:115).

3.4 Institutional Structure after the Revolution of 2010

The provisional government went ahead with the referendum for a newly and more democratic constitution on June 27, 2010. The voters approved the new document. The government claimed that a turnout was 72.2 per cent; of which 90.5 percent voted in the favour of the new constitution. Despite some skepticism about the figures, the referendum was viewed as a crucial validation of the interim government's legitimacy.⁸ There were many significant amendments were done through the June 2010 referendum. The major articles of the 2010 Constitution are as follows:

- In the preamble the Kyrgyz constitution avow the goal of constitution to build a free and democratic state,who would be based on the principle of respect and protection of human rights.
- The Kyrgyz Republic is a sovereign, democratic, secular, unitary state governed by the rule of law [Article 1(1)].
- It is people of the Kyrgyzstan, who are the bearer of sovereignty and the sole source of state power in the Kyrgyz Republic [Article 2(1)].
- Any law or other matter which is of national significance may be submitted to a referendum to know the views of people [Article 2(3)].

⁸ Recknagel, Charles (2010), "Can Kyrgyzstan Become a Democracy in Russia's Backyard?", [Online: web] accessed on 17 October 2016 URL: <http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/07/23/can-kyrgyzstan-become-a-democracy-in-russias-backyard/>

- The Kyrgyz state would be based on the principle of separation of state power [Article 3(2)]. No branch would interfere within the ambit of other.
- Kyrgyz President shall be head of the state. He would be selected for the six years only; any person could not be selected twice for the post of the President [Article 60]. He can be dismissed by the Jogorku Kenesh by not less than two third majorities [Article 64 (3)].
- The President has lost certain politically important executive functions, including the power to nominate, appoint, and dismiss the heads of local governments; and he would not have any decisive role in ministerial appointments. These powers now belong to the Parliament.
- The President shall appoint the prosecutor general with the consent of Jogorku Kenesh [Article 64(2)].
- The Kyrgyz Parliament (Jogorku Kenesh) shall consist of 120 deputies elected for a five year term on the basis of proportional representation; no party would get more than mandated 65 seats of Jogorku Kenesh [Article 70 (2)].
- All party lists would be required to fill up their party list of contesting candidates with 33.5 percent women and 15 per cent national minority candidates.
- According to the constitution, political parties are required to pass the five per cent threshold and win 0.5 percent of the vote in all nine oblasts.
- The President has the right to veto or refuse to sign any laws, except for laws related to budget and fiscal policy. This measure ensures greater parliamentary control and is aimed at preventing any future leader from ruling by decrees and referendums, which is quite normal in other Central Asian states.
- The constitution also provides space to opposition factions. They would control two very important committees-the budget committee and the security, law and order committee.

The new constitution of June 2010 makes an attempt to establish a semi-parliamentary system in Kyrgyzstan. It is not a full parliamentary system of rule; because the president is still elected through popular vote; he still uses a good amount of powerful prerogatives. But despite that, the new document tries to weaken some of his important powers through some crucial changes. This new constitution also has made some provisions to prevent any political party to monopolize the Jogorku Kenesh. No president could monopolize the parliament through making his own political party as did by two former Presidents Akiyev and Bakiyev. But, given the history of last two decades of Kyrgyzstan, still we cannot be certain about the future political upheavals. We cannot be certain about its sustainability. Yes we can say that this new model suits to political fragmented Kyrgyz politics. It also empowers the parliament against the president. It tries to give representation to the all sections of Kyrgyz society. It also attempts to prevent the monopolization of power in the favour of any organ of state. This system tries to create a kind of balance of power among competing elites for resources of society; then to this would reduce their temptation for the radical changes through referendums. This new constitution provides equal opportunities to all political parties competing for parliamentary representation. In Marat words- “ Kyrgyzstan today is an example of how formal rules can transform and regulate neopatrimonial politics: although fierce political struggle often revolves around business interests, the new constitution both facilitates and restricts competition among power holders (Marat 2012:326-327).” The new political document provides space for a regulated and restricted political competition, which would not give such leverage to any leader to become authoritarian.

3.5 Institutional Changes and State-Society Interaction in Kyrgyzstan

Now in the preceding sections we have mentioned about the institutional developments and changes in the Kyrgyz constitution. We must take a look that how these changes have affected the state-society relations as well as political process of the country. It is very important to know that in which direction the

Kyrgyz democracy is sailing? We must say that the intention and its reflection of the proposed changes by both Akayev and Bakiyev were not towards democratic deepening. As it seemed that Akayev's initial proposals seemed positive at the beginning but it resulted into disappointment. But Bakiyev's intention was very much clear since beginning that he did not want to reduce the powers of the president as well as he wanted to strengthen it further. Both presidents could not curb their hunger for power. The 1993 constitution of the Kyrgyzstan attempted to make the political system semi-Presidential like Russia; in which the president and the parliament would be elected by popular vote; but the government would be accountable to parliament only. Here a mistake was done that a clear demarcation of powers was established in the constitution; since both bodies (the president and the parliament) were to be elected by popular vote, so both considered themselves true representative of the people's mandate; and this dichotomy created tension between them; since the people were not fully aware of such conditions so they could not decide who is wrong and who is right. Both bodies interfered into the domain of others. Moreover most of the leaders were of the Soviet era, so they also had style of soviet era dictatorship ruling. It is also the irony of the Kyrgyz constitution that even some provisions of the original constitution gave more power to the president; the amendments through referendums, as above mentioned, made the president more powerful in the political system. The referendums in fact misbalanced the power map distribution between the government, the legislature, and the president; it tilted towards the president.

There is no doubt that even in the 1993 constitution, there were certain provisions that were against the principles of any democratic constitution; those articles could not be deemed democratic in any sense. Some articles are worth mentioning; for example, Article 46 (2) gives the president such power that he could dismiss the government, ministries, state committees, and other administrative bodies without the consent of anyone if they act against the laws and the constitution of Kyrgyz state. One must remember that this is the prerogative of the judiciary to dismiss any law not of the president. Article 48 was

also controversial; and it gives extra power to the president vis-a-vis the parliament. It was related to issuing decree by the president; but it was not stated clearly that whether the president would issue decree on his own accord; he did not need government consent. This was the gray area of president's rights when he could dictate a very broad range of issues through presidential decrees. Two other provisions also gave immense power in 1993 constitution; first, the parliament could not initiate the process of the constitutional amendments, only President could do it; second, Article 46 (5) specifies that if any referendum supports the dissolution of the parliament, the president would do the same even before the completion of the five year term (Curtis 1996: 18). One could easily observe that both presidents had misused these provisions of the constitution.

It is interesting as well as disgusting that Akayev did not stop here; he even tried to increase his power further against other branches of government in the name of fighting against the old elements of the Soviet era. He always criticized those invisible elements and said that those elements did not want reforms to move forward. It was a clever abstruse tactic by him to disguise his hidden intention to become super-president of Kyrgyzstan. He also staunchly renounced them for not passing necessary laws required for the expedite reform process; he alleged that they were busy in their own profit making. He justified his accruing of power via referendums to build the democratic institutions in Kyrgyz polity; he argued that the country like Kyrgyzstan was in transition and it needed strong leadership to face the challenges of the transition period. He said that strong leadership was necessary because Kyrgyz society was not like Western society; here was an instable socio-economic structure, hierarchical society, the absence of civil society groups; so, Kyrgyzstan needed extra time to cope up these challenges, and extra powerful leader to set forward the process the development of a transitional society (Anderson 1997:314). This was also done by next President Bakiyev, who also in the name of reform in the system did the same.

The referendum was the most important tool through which both presidents, especially Akayev, enhanced their powers vis-a-vis other branches of government.

The referendums were organized in name of people's opinion about president's proposal to bypass the genuine process of law making in democratic society. It is also worth noting that the questions in the referendum were asked in the one or two simple sentences with many-many added clauses; which were done to misguide the people. For example, in 1996 referendum 52 amendments were proposed in 97 clauses; which was impossible for a common man to understand and decide about them; even if one would comprehend all clauses, he would not be able to cast their desired vote because the question was asked as- "would you support this referendum or not?" how can one answer about 52 amendments proposals with only answer yes or no. Therefore, these referendums were just facade referendums (Anderson 1997:312). Any proposal for referendum needs enough time to analyze about the proposed changes in the constitution. But the presidents never gave enough time to electorate for proper understanding of the texts and meaning of proposals. Therefore, these could not be said as proper referendum. In a 2003 referendum, though discussion started almost one year before, but the final draft, which put before the public was not that same, that was recommended by the constitutional council and the opposition parties (Dukenbaev and Hansen 2003:28).

Several cases of irregularities were also reported during the referendums which cast doubt on the credential of the process. The state authorities used to threaten the opposition leaders if they would speak against the referendums. The authorities negated the allegations of the malpractices and irregularities. The true reporting of the referendums was almost impossible because the election commission, regional akims, local administration officials were not in the position to speak against the government. The presenting of voter turnout percentage was also debated. It was alleged that the voting percentage and voter participation were falsified by the authorities. According to local observers only 40% of the population participated in the 2003 referendum, they could not be legitimized as true representation of people's opinion. The people of Kyrgyzstan had become fed up with such kind of tactics of incumbent regimes of both presidents. Several other cases were also reported about bogus voting by without IDs persons as well;

in which voters were given multiple ballots to vote for the entire family. This was done to legitimize the victory of the presidents through as much as possible voting percentage. The Respublica newspaper reported that in the 1994 election the officials were working hard to manage the voting more than 75% of the total voters. Such kind of irregularities were reported in other referendums also (Anderson 2000:80).

Another common feature of these referendums were misuse of the mass media in the favour of regime; these were media houses were called as government supported media houses; who were constantly reported positively about the government. In his interaction with the media both presidents always masked himself as staunch democrats; they always argued that they was organizing these referendums in the favour of democracy, human rights, economic reforms, progress; for example 2003 referendum was said as “constitution of human rights” by Akayev. But the result of the referendums told just the opposite story; they increasingly became tools for bypassing the constitutional process and avoiding the parliamentary scrutiny.

The constitution was made on the basis of liberal democratic principles; it had a vision for making a liberal democratic society. It also mentions about the fundamental rights and the freedom of speech as well as freedom of press. Generally, it is thought that greater participation of the people would set forth the process of democratization more robustly; but this did not happen in Kyrgyzstan. Here the president misused the people’s faith in order to strengthen his position; he presented the high turnout in referendums as their legitimacy and symbol of unity of Kyrgyz people. Moreover the voting percentage and the voting method in the election were also unreliable; because it was depended on soviet era election commission, and its old dated redundant method. Even in most of the referendums the observers were also not present in those referendums, and in few referendums if they were present they reported that they had no access to all required places to judge the fairness of the proceedings (Dukenbaev and Hansen 2003:30).

The people of Kyrgyzstan started on a new unknown path in the leadership of Akayev in the high hopes that he would ensure their developmental needs and rescue the abominable condition of misery and poverty. But having high hopes were not their fault; instead it was the fault of Akayev, who promises a lot of from the liberal democracy. Meanwhile Akayev became too much autocratic; and then opposition united against him under after the rigged parliamentary election of February-March 2005. Akayev was ousted from the power in a popular people's uprising named as "Tulip Revolution". The adoption of initial constitutional structure failed to stabilize and democratize the polity of Kyrgyzstan. Moreover after the ouster of Akayev, next President Bakiyev came to power with almost same promises and slogans, but he proved even more disasterous for the people's hopes as well as with the democratic institutions. The problems of society became more worsened during his regime; corrupton, nepotism, grabing of state resources, high electric and gas prices became the common phenomena during his regime; resultantly he was also overthrown by a mass people' movement in April 2010. After the ouster of Bakiyev new provisional government throuogh another referdum made some crucial changes in the constitution to reduce make it semi-parliamentary system. This was done by political elites in the hope the next president would not usurp powers; the new constitution has raised hopes again about the deepening of democracy in the country.

After observing the institutional development it is perplexing question that why promises made in beginning was gradually faded away in Kyrgyzstan. Numerous studies have tried to reflect upon the Kyrgyz institutional trajectory and have given their explanation about the reversal from earlier positive developments. Steven Fish has argued, regarding the post-Soviet states' political trajectory, that in those states reversal of liberal democratic institutional developments happened due to following reasons: over centralisation of power in the post of executive president (super-presidentialism) during the adoption of new constitution, weakness of opposition in their inability to communicate with population and mobilize resources and people, powerful external patronage of a big powerful state (Fish 2001: 66). Another group of scholars have stated that geographical

distance from the Western democracies has resulted in the degradation of democratic institutions in some countries. They argue that location matters because they could not get proper help from the Western states (Kopstein and Reilly 2000: 24). Paulin Jones Loung has given importance to “perception in the shift of relative power position” in declining the democratic institutions during Akeyev era (Loung 2002: 28). She says the during early years incumbent president’s relative position vis-a-vis political elites was not strong enough, so at that time they had the desire of political openness and commitment for deepening democracy; but with the passage time they concentrated their position in relation to other powerful leaders of the country; then they backed off their support of democracy because they had perception that now balance of power has shifted in their favour. But some authors indicate the role of clan structure in derailed the process of democratic deepening since second half of 1990s; Collins argue that initially both the presidents got full support from their clan for democratic deepening initiatives, but after some years over reliance with each other resulted in exclusion of other clan leaders; which culminated in more authoritarian policies (Collins 2002: 148-149). So despite the differences among scholars in deciphering reasons behind the fading up of initial democratic efforts, one thing is clear that despite all hurdles and challenges if Akayev and Bakiyev would have committed to democratic principles then the political trajectory would have different. So despite being strong positioned in the polity they did not utilise the opportunity; and they did not wholeheartedly make efforts to consolidate democratic intuitions in the new established democratic country. One thing also clear that sowing the seeds of democratic institutions had not wasted; the people with despite civil society groups still have high hopes about the democracy; that is the reason the after second uprising the political elites of Kyrgyzstan have created a balanced distribution of power in the 2010 constitution to take the country forward on the path of liberal democracy and progress.

3.6 Conclusion

Present chapter has dealt with institutional developments in Kyrgyzstan after its independence. The constitution of Kyrgyzstan in 1993 provided liberal democratic provisions for the state-society interaction. This chapter argues that political elites, especially Askar Akayev and Kurmanbek Bakiyev, manipulated their citizens in the name of democracy and good governance; both organized referendums in the name of democratic development for make them more powerful. Kyrgyzstan's 1993 constitution established separation of powers between legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government. In the constitution, the role of president was very crucial and important. He would be the head of the state; he would be the guarantor of the Kyrgyz constitution, laws, and also of rights and freedom of citizens.

This provisions of powerful a powerful president in Kyrgyz constitution was misused by political elites, i.e Akayev and Bakiyev. Both misused the powers for their own benefit; both did not use these for the democratic development of the country; that can be illustrated through some examples: the October 1994 referendum the parliament was made bicameral, which would not be able to unite against the president; through 1996 referendum the president could dissolve the parliament if it failed to approve the nominee for president for the three times. This referendum of 1998 was related to land reforms and privatization of public properties, through this referendum Akayev made inroads for grabbing state resources for his family and loyal clan groups, who largely hailed from northern part of the county. Through October 2007 Bakiyev could dismiss Kyrgyz government cabinet without giving any proper reason to parliament or people. He was still holding power to appoint the chairman and members of almost all important bodies, such as national security council, prosecutor general were some most important of them.

Deputies of the parliament also failed to provide qualitative environment for debate and discussion. The has not been able to provide the role of visionary politicians. Though Kyrgyz Parliament was very active during initial years. The

initial activism did not last long and this law making body got engulfed into inter-deputies fighting for their sheer narrow interests. Askar Akayev took advantage of this infighting and played the politics of divide and rule. Even it is also true the during early years after 1993, the political leaders were struggling to get powerful position in the ministry and other departments to grab resources of the state; local constituency of leaders support those corrupt leaders, because these leaders provide the share of that resource grabbed through patron-client networks.

In the Kyrgyz constitution also provides the provisions of independent judiciary. The Constitutional Court shall be the highest body of judicial power that protects the constitution of the Kyrgyzstan. The judiciary of Kyrgyzstan is also plagued by Soviet inheritance; it the appointments are made by the president on the recommendation of executive; so judiciary often gives decisions in the favour of him. Powerful politicians in involved in corruption do not punished by courts; it creates distrust among public towards judiciary. The constitutional court adjudged the new constitution of 2006 null and void shows the influence of president on judiciary. So judiciary which is the protector and guarantor of the constitution also failed show good examples through its independent and fair process, it also failed in the institutionalization democracy.

The new constitution of June 2010 makes an attempt to establish a semi-parliamentary system in Kyrgyzstan. The new document tries to weaken some of his important powers of the President. For example, Kyrgyz President would be selected for the six years only, he could not be selected twice for the post of the President. The Kyrgyz Parliament (Jogorku Kenesh) shall consist of 120 deputies elected for a five year term on the basis of proportional representation; no party would get more than mandated 65 seats of Jogorku Kenesh. No President could make hegemony in parliament though making his own party, like Askar Akayev and Bakiyev, who made up political partries “Alga Kyrgyzstan”, and “Ak Jhol” respectively.

Nevertheless Kyrgyz constitution had all required provisions of a liberal democracy, the political elites President, Parliamentary deputies, or Judiciary, all

failed to deepen the process of democratization in Kyrgyzstan. They failed the consolidation of democratic institutions in the newly established liberal democracy. It is also true that the Kyrgyz state lacked enough capacities to perform its duties properly; the country is also resource constrained state with a large mountainous terrain, which inhibits its development; but on the other hand its leadership also has not shown long term vision of progress about the country. Therefore two incumbent Presidents were ousted from power through mass peoples' uprising in 2005 and 2010. But the new constitution of June 2010 makes an attempt to establish a semi-parliamentary system in Kyrgyzstan. It provides some hope for the democracy in Kyrgyzstan. It seems the political leaders and people of the country getting mature day by day towards the functioning of democratic institutions.

Chapter IV

POLITICAL CHANGES AND NATURE OF
COLOUR REVOLUTIONS

CHAPTER IV

POLITICAL CHANGES AND NATURE OF COLOUR REVOLUTIONS

4.1 Introduction

Kyrgyzstan was catapulted to be an independent state from the Soviet Union on 31 August 1991 (Olcott 1992: 108-130). Soon it embraced the development model of liberal democracy and free market economy. It was praised as “Island of Democracy” (Anderson 1999: 23) under the leadership of its first President Askar Akyev because of its vigorous implementation of systemic reforms; various new political and economic initiatives took place in the republic. At the beginning definitely there were positive signs in achieving these grand goals. A number of new political parties, civil society organizations, non-governmental organizations, and independent media groups mushroomed during the initial years. But these positive developments did not last long; first President of independent Kyrgyzstan, Askar Akayev changed his path towards becoming authoritarian just within few years of adopting the constitution in 1993. In 2005 the international community was surprised by the Kyrgyz mass mobilization against the regime of President Askar Akaev. President Akaev was overthrown and he fled from the Kyrgyzstan. This event is known as the “Tulip Revolution.” The Tulip revolution of March 2005 again raised the hopes of people for the consolidation of democratic institutions in Kyrgyzstan. The ouster of former President Askar Akayev appeared to be a return of democratization in Kyrgyzstan. New incumbent President Kurmanbek Bakiyev fostered positive expectations about the development and prosperity in the country. The July 2005 Presidential election, which Kurmanbek Bakiyev elected, received the warmest feedback from western observers; it was most free and fair among all previous elections held in independent Kyrgyzstan. Bakiyev promised the people to initiate constitutional reforms but after getting elected he showed his indifference towards those promises. Therefore public protest began taking place on a regular basis, with demands ranging from calls for constitutional reform to the replacement of a local

hospital chief in the most remote villages in the country. Meanwhile, opposition leaders were being regularly harassed and persecuted by the state agencies. The rapidly growing popular disaffection began to accumulate around the steep rise in fuel and water and gas charges. This provided a platform on which the fractious opposition groups got united. These events in early April united the whole opposition which called for a national protest on 7 April 2010 and transformed it into a national uprising. The demonstrators occupied official buildings and state-run TV stations all over the country, including the capital, Bishkek. The bloody clash with the security forces took the toll of approximately 100 lives. Realizing the fervour of the protests, Bakiyev fled from Kyrgyzstan to Belarus in April 2010. So in order to understand the political dynamics through colour revolution the present chapter would dwell upon the political developments as well as internal and external factors which led to first and second mass uprising in 2005 and 2010.

4.2 Askar Akayev Regime: 1991-1994

Kyrgyzstan declared its independence from the Soviet Union on 31 August 1991. Soon after this its incumbent President Askar Akayev was re-elected on 12 October 1991. This was done to prove the legitimacy of Akayev in and out of Kyrgyzstan. He secured 95.3 percent of the total cast vote. Akayev promised his populace that he would transform Kyrgyzstan into a true liberal democracy through a spate of reforms. Newly independent Kyrgyzstan was praised as the 'Island of Democracy' or "Switzerland of Central Asia" (Anderson 1999: 23). It was not over-exaggeration. Despite Kyrgyzstan was not fulfilling all the parameters of a democratic state, When we would compare it with its post-Soviet neighbours, we find that Kyrgyzstan really was a democratic island in the sea of authoritarian Central Asian States. When Akayev started his first tenure, his goal was very clear about how he would lead his nation. He avowed for a embracing a liberal market economy; ensuring the civil-political rights; initiating the process of democratization; maintaining amicable ethnic relations between various ethnic groups (Marat 2008: 31); and finally he wanted to establish a state based on rule

of law and separation of powers. Separation power was a very important feature of the Kyrgyz political system to protect it from authoritarian tendencies; but unfortunately the republic experienced just opposite (Spector 2004: 5).

The independent Kyrgyzstan's new constitution, which replaced the Soviet-era constitution of 1978, was adopted by the Parliament in May 1993 (Anderson 1997: 34). According to the new constitution, the Kyrgyz Republic defined as a sovereign, unitary, and democratic republic founded on the principle of liberal democracy and the secular state. It also recognized numerous civil and political rights for its citizens. New constitution provided a legislative framework for further democratic transition.¹ The new constitution had the provisions about a strong President, independent Parliament, and independent Judiciary. The constitution also provided provisions related to democratic and civic virtues for the growth of a liberal democratic society. As a result, we can say that independent Kyrgyzstan's new constitution was the most liberal space and provided better conditions for the formation of a democratic society than its Central Asian neighbours. Introduction of the Kyrgyz currency in May 1993 was also proof of the aspiration of the Askar Akayev to integrate into the global economy. In addition, as we mentioned above Askar Akayev did his best in terms of establishing a market-based economy and developing a liberal democracy based on civil society. All of these were indicators that Kyrgyzstan, with the leadership of Askar Akayev, was determined in transforming to liberal democracy.

As we know that Kyrgyzstan was one of the poorest states of the Soviet Union. Kyrgyzstan's limited economic resources, trade dependence on the former Soviet Union and other neighbouring countries had constrained its real progress (Gleason 2003). During the Soviet period, Kyrgyzstan used to provide primary commodities for industries located in the European parts of the Soviet Union. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan lost its soviet era customers of

¹ Articles 3& 4 in the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic (1996),

raw materials and suppliers of daily usage commodities. As a result, Kyrgyzstan's most industrial enterprises quickly became non-functional and some had to be closed entirely. This situation made it really difficult for Kyrgyzstan in terms of transition to an open market economy (Abazov 1999: 197-199). On the other hand, in the way of building the new democratic political order, Askar Akayev had to work with a constitution and a parliament, which were created and elected under the authority of the old Soviet regime. Many of old deputies voted for Akayev in October 1990, but it did not mean that they were giving their full support to market reforms, which was constantly advocated by Akayev. Many Parliamentarians were fearful that such reforms would threaten their political influence and economic well-being (Anderson 1999: 24). Such factors hampered down the pace of democratization. As a result, the President Akayev realized the need for a new constitution, which would create a smaller, but more operative parliament, and would decisively promulgate required legislations for economic and political reforms during the transition period. Therefore, he went for referendum just one year after the adoption of new constitution in 1993 (Niazaliev 2004: 94).

So with the unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union, small and resource crunched state became helpless. The government unfortunately assumed that it can resolve all the socio-political challenges only through introducing reforms. But, the much needed state capacity to face those challenges was not available there. Kyrgyzstan needed a significant economic assistance and international support to pursue its development goals. The followed path of openness, economic restructuring and liberal democracy were aiming to get financial aid from wealthy Western states. Of course, this was not the only reason which explains Kyrgyzstan's goals. But, it is the reality that Kyrgyzstan got support from international financial institutions, only because of its intention of transformation to the market based economy. Such policies satisfied the expectations of major Western donor states. Therefore, Kyrgyzstan became the favourite child of international donors. It managed to get funds from international institutions and developed countries. So, Kyrgyzstan

became one of the leading states for liberal political and economic reforms not just in Central Asia, but also in the entire CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) region (Abazov 1999: 197-198).

During the first five years of Akayev regime, two referendums were held in Kyrgyzstan. The First was held in January 1994, and the second was in October 1994. In first referendum, Akayev asked people to give their opinion about the continuation of economic reforms, because the opposition was vociferously against the new economic policies. And in this referendum, he got the support of 95% of the population. In the second referendum (October 1991) Akayev sought the opinion of people about the two major issues. First was the mandate to initiate amendments in the constitution of the country through the referendum, and the second was to make the parliament (Jogorku Kenesh) a bicameral body from the unicameral one. He again got the support of eighty six percent of the population (Niazaliev 2004: 97).

The second referendum of October 1994 had far reaching negative implications for liberal democratic institutions of Kyrgyzstan. First of all, the constitutional amendments would be done by referendum rather than through the parliament, thereby it would diminish the power and privileges of the Parliament. At the new bicameral Parliament, which was to be elected in February 1995, the power of the two houses was not separated. This non-separability had a huge negative effect on the Parliament functioning.² So, to stand up against the president's abuse of power, both houses were needed to make consensus on the disputed issues. Certainly, it was impossible because Akayev supporters too would be present in the Parliament to oppose any such move. As a consequence of this, the newly elected Parliament, which convened its first session in March 1995, wasted its one year over disputing over the relative powers and jurisdictions of each chamber. These developments revealed the hidden agenda of the October 1994 referendum.

² "Murat Ukushov about the Parliamentary regime in Kyrgyzstan" [Online: web] accessed on 16 June 2014 URL: <http://ipp.kg/en/news/2262/>.

Through these cunning tactics, Akayev started to avert the pressure of the legislature and strengthened his power and weakened the legislature simultaneously (Anderson1997: 45).

There is no denying that Akayev was the first Central Asian leader who made genuine efforts to establish multi-party system in the region, which was based on the adult franchise and transparent election process. This was the one of the most important pillars in establishing liberal democracy in the country. He was personally enthusiastic about the new development model and encouraged others to participate in political party formation. The law on social organization promulgated in 1991 provided the basis for the establishment of political parties without any unwarranted state interference. By 1993, there were fifteen registered political parties and social movement organizations. Most of the political parties were earlier constituents of DMK (Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan); but later on, they gradually got separated from DMK (Koldys 1997: 357-354).

The first Parliamentary election was held in February 1995, in which many political parties (Asaba, Ashar, Erkin Kyrgyzstan, Ata Maken, Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan etc.) contested and many of them sent their winning representatives to Jogorku Kenesh (Parliament of Kyrgyzstan). In the Parliamentary election of 9th February 1995, twelve political parties fielded more than one thousand candidates in the fray for the 105 seats of Jogorku Kenesh. But in the first multiparty Parliamentary elections in the Kyrgyz history, only 37 candidates could win, who belonged to 11 political parties. It was very surprising that 67 winning candidates were unaffiliated with any political party. These political leaders were local well known figures in their respective regions. They attracted their constituencies more effectively than the organized political parties. The well known local leaders got benefited from the single member constituency based on the majoritarian electoral system. The local elites got the edge over national leaders because they assured people solve their local problems. So, lower chamber 'People's assembly was full of regional Akims and business-oriented people. It was alleged that there were some implicit pacts between Akayev and

regional akims that if Akayev would give lift constitutional ban on regional and local Akims holding office in the People's assembly; then local and regional leaders (Akims) would support Akayev on important issues and to state machinery in implementing government programmes and policies(Luong 2004: 161-163).

In this election Akayev did not make any misuse of the state machinery for his own favour; instead he facilitated and cooperated with other political parties for the development of stable multi party system. Even on many policy issues, he solicited advice from many political leaders and social groups. So it can be said that during his first tenure Akayev was very helpful to political parties and social groups on the matters related to public interests. Thus, Kyrgyzstan acquired a good momentum in creating a multi-party system, the prerequisite of democracy (Spector 2004: 5). It shows that the first few years were very good in terms of state-society interaction. It means that the first constitution of 1993 neither created strong presidentialism nor strong Parliament. But, it made a balance a between these two most important institutions of the Kyrgyz state.³ Both state institutions and social forces did not vie with each other. Instead, they cooperated and supported each other in the hope to fulfil the goals of new Kyrgyz nation (Huskey 1995: 553).

4.3 Askar Akayev Regime: 1995-2005

During the first tenure of Akayev, Kyrgyzstan was called the 'island of democracy' in Central Asian countries. Akayev adopted the principles and programmes of political pluralism and market reforms; he tried to dismantle the Soviet era political institutions. At that time Kyrgyzstan had the most liberal environment than all other Central Asian countries. However, by 1994 he began to change his path to make his position stronger. In September 1994, he tried to weaken the parliament and forced the government to resign, cowed the Judiciary,

³ "Murat Ukushov about the Parliamentary regime in Kyrgyzstan" [Online: web] accessed on 16 June 2012 URL: <http://ipp.kg/en/news/2262/>.

shut down the press, set up a new electoral commission, and announced a new parliamentary election (Spector 2004:4). A mere big talk on democratic rhetoric, but the practice was more authoritarian had become his ruling formula. Democratic reform measures were being diluted. The symptoms of authoritarian state were started to emerge within Akayev policies and actions; in other words “democratic island of Central Asia” was becoming more authoritarian, albeit semi-authoritarian. According to Gregory Gleason, the meeting between the heads of states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan that took place in Almaty in July 1994, was the beginning of the Akayev’s turn toward authoritarianism. At this meeting, leaders of neighbouring states persuaded Akayev to follow ‘Asian development model’. That meant thereafter he would abandon his erstwhile efforts to reach national consensus democratically (Gleason 1999: 99).

In December 1995, Askar Akayev was elected for the second term. Thereafter, he started to weaken the democratic principles through the referendums. These referendums were held in 1996, 1998, and 2003. These referendums were used as tools to avoid the due procedure of parliament and constitutional provisions (Huskey and Hill 2013: 254). These referendums were not the result of people’s demands, but the results of the Akayev’s own needs and greed of power. Through the referendum of February 1996, he strengthened the power of the president. Two years later, he again introduced another surprise referendum. Through this second (third times since independence) referendum, he wanted five changes regarding the issues of private land ownership, reduction in size, structure and power of Parliament, immunity and privileges of the Parliamentarians etc. So, these amendments were not related to the common people. These attempts were made to make the Parliament puppet. The referendum of February 2003 was related to two main issues; First, whether the new version of the constitution should be adopted? And, the second was about whether Akayev should remain in office till the end of his official term in October 2005. With more than 70% of vote favoured the Akayev. In the political development of post-communist Kyrgyzstan, the role of elections and referendums have been very interesting, because political leaders have misused these festivals of democracy for their

personal power aggrandizement, not for the genuine democratization of the polity.⁴ They have tried to get the manipulated results in their favour. They have not utilized it for the true political representation of the citizens. They have used to for affirming their political position, recruiting their supportive elites and make the people misconceive that everything is alright in their country. This is a kind of political anaesthesia for the population regarding their political awareness. The Kyrgyz President Akayev had done the same (Anderson 1997: 56).

4.4 Tulip Revolution 2005

Before the analyzing the Kyrgyz ‘Tulip Revolution’ one should not forget to mention the 2005 parliamentary elections. The 2005 parliamentary elections, which were the third parliamentary elections in the independent Kyrgyz republic’s history, were very important because of several reasons. First of all, 2005 elections were the first parliamentary elections held since the 2003 amendment of the constitution; this amendment made the parliament Jogorku Kenesh unicameral again with 75 seats. Furthermore, the main factor which doubled the importance of 2005 parliamentary elections was the next presidential election, which was scheduled for October 2005; in which there was conundrum in the political circle that whether Akayev would contest in it or not. Third reason was the continued deterioration of the socio-economic situation in the country. The expectations of the elite and politically active part of the population after the “colourful revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine increased the importance of the 2005 parliamentary elections, even though Askar Akayev stated that he will not contest again for the post of the president, the opposition groups were suspicious that Akayev would use the 2005 parliamentary elections in order to push as many supporters as possible into the parliament.⁵ Moreover, the opposition groups had

⁴ “New Constitution Runs Risk of Deepening North-South Divide in Kyrgyzstan ”, [Online: web] accessed on 14 February 2014 URI: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav021103a.shtml>

⁵“Kyrgyzstan's Akayev: The Revolution Stops Here” [Online: web] accessed on 14 December 2014 URI: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/civilsociety/articles/eav122204.shtml>

all the genuine reasons after the looking the history of Akayev to be cautious about his intentions. The parliamentary and presidential elections in 2000 had shown that Akayev's team was able to manipulate the electoral process and the results easily. That's why the 2005 parliamentary elections had a unique importance both for the ruling elite and the opposition and consequently for the whole politics. All of these factors showed that having a control over the majority of the new parliament would be crucial goal for the political elites in order to retain the power (Henningsson 2006: 16).

The 2005 Kyrgyz parliamentary elections consisted of two rounds, the first round of elections was held on 27 February 2005, and the second round was held on 13 March 2005. As it was mentioned above, the 2005 elections were the first parliamentary elections held since the amendment of the Constitution in 2003. After the new amendments to the Constitution, Jogorku Kenesh regained its unicameral form after 1994 amendments; and, it consists of 75 deputies elected in single member constituencies for five year terms. The candidate who would get more than 50% of the total popular votes participated in the voting would be elected. If, any candidate could not succeed to get more than 50% of the votes, the two leading candidates would contest in a second round. The second round would be held within two weeks; and the winning candidate in the second poll would be elected for the parliament (Marat 2006: 9-10).

Even though, most of the scholars agreed that these elections were most democratic and competitive than previous elections, the 2005 parliamentary elections fell short of OSCE (Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe) standards and also other international standards for democratic elections. 473 candidates have submitted their documents for registration and only 427 of them were registered. But the first round of the elections was contested by 389 candidates. In other words somehow 38 candidates were eliminated by denying registration of opposition candidates and excluded them from elections. One of the popular disqualified candidates was former diplomat Roza Otunbaeva, who was perceived as one of the most powerful candidate from the opposition for the October 2005 presidential election. In other words, the denying registration was

politically motivated in order to suppress the opposition groups, and as was mentioned above, and suppressing the opposition by administrative methods is one of the easiest way to rule out the opposition leaders from the Parliament. The first round of the parliamentary elections was held on 27 February 2005. These were the conspicuous characteristics of the first round. As a result of the first round 33 candidates won their seats in the parliament, in other words 42 seats left to be decided in the second round on 13 March. After the end of the first round, many public demonstrations across the several parts of the country had been started. The reasons of these demonstrations were the allegations of electoral fraud, violations of rules in the first round. The supporters of the candidates, which were disqualified on the basis of electoral rules or defeated in the election because of the unfair election process, started to protest and demanding the annulment of the parliamentary election results and the dismissal of the president (Engvall 2011: 51-52).

The second round of the elections was the competition between the top two candidates from the first round who could not succeed to poll more than 50% of the votes. The second round of parliamentary election was held on the 13 of March 2005. The result was an unambiguous victory for the President and his allies. The president's daughter, Bermet Akayev, won a seat in the second round which meant that both his children held seats in the parliament (Marat 2005: 10). Public protests against the allegations of fraudulent election were escalating day by day, especially, in the south of Kyrgyzstan. However Askar Akayev and his team did not take it seriously and the second round of the elections was also full of rigging. As a result of the two rounds only six seats were taken by the opposition candidates. The remaining seats were divided between pro-president candidates, who were the representatives of the governing clan, including Askar Akayev's daughter, son, and relatives. After the announcement of the results, on 22 March the central election Commission issued a decision to register the newly elected deputies to the parliament (Radnitz 2006: 137).

As was mentioned above, besides blackmailing campaigns, ruling elites actively applied pressure by administrative methods too. In other words, the preparation period for the elections was used as the period of eliminating candidates who might challenge Askar Akayev, as it happened in the year 2000 Parliamentary elections. A number of leading opposition politicians were prevented from standing as candidates by official disqualification in registration in elections. 473 candidates have submitted their documents for registration and only 427 of them were registered. But the first round of the elections was contested by 389 candidates. In other words a lot of candidates, including Roza Otunbaeva, were disqualified from elections by the decisions of courts and the district commissions.⁶ On 6th of January 2005, Roza Otunbaeva by submitting her documents on the constituency Number one received a registration certificate. But, at the same day, the district election commission convened at the emergency meeting and Otunbaeva was barred from contesting in the election.⁷ One of the realities of Kyrgyzstan is that the family ties are very strong in Kyrgyzstan. Injustice against the person means not only his indignation, but also his numerous relatives and fellow countrymen. That's why the supporters of the candidates, which were excluded from the elections unfairly, started protesting, spontaneous meetings, blocking the roads, captures of buildings of administrations. As a result, on polling day, even international observers could not reach in many districts (Marat 2006: 15).

Within this atmosphere of an official crackdown on opposition, first round of the elections held on 27th of February 2005. By the end of the first round of the elections, it was announced that 33 candidates won their seats in the Parliament and 42 seats left to be decided in the second round, held on 13 March 2005. The most important thing was that, as a result of the first round in the Parliament have

⁶“Kyrgyzstan: Opposition Leader Claims Political Motivation Behind Rejection Of Her Election Registration”, [Online: web] accessed on 1 March 2014 URL: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp010804.shtml>

⁷ “Kyrgyzstan Protests: Rehearsal for Revolution?”, [Online: web] accessed on 6 July 2016 URL: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/civilsociety/articles/eav011305.shtml>.

been elected only two candidates from the opposition. These results led to a series of demonstrations across the several parts of the country.⁸ The reasons of these demonstrations were the allegations of electoral violations in the first round. The supporters of the candidates, which were deregistered or lost the election because of the unfair election process, started to protest, and demanding the annulment of the Parliamentary election results and the dismissal of the President (Temirkulov 2008 : 320).

On the 3rd of March at a village in the southern province of Jalal-Abad, another protest had begun. The demonstrators were close associates of the candidates. These candidates were eliminated in the first round of voting. On the same day on March 3 2005 opposition leader Kurmanbek Bakiyev demanded urgently to hold an extraordinary session of the Jogorku Kenesh. Thus, despite being successful in the first round of the Parliamentary elections, it was clear that the President and his team gradually lost the control over the situation. Under these conditions, many previously neutral local clans have become increasingly cautious and think about the expediency of supporting the President. The displeasure of the opposition and its supporters was growing continuously and dramatically because of the injustice led by Akayev. In spite of that, the authorities did not reduce misuse of machinery against the opposition. Moreover, at the second round of the elections more efforts were put on into defeating opposition candidates than the previous round. This experienced even greater alleged violations of rules than the first round. Prior to the second round of the election, two candidates in Chui and Naryn were discharged from ban by a local court on contesting elections. And also, other election irregularities such as electoral fraud and pressure from government officials were also heard in the second round too. With the announcement of election results, protests rapidly escalated, especially in the southern part of the country. As a result of the all two rounds of elections, the

⁸ “Preliminary Election Results in Kyrgyzstan Heighten Uncertainty Surrounding President’s Future” [Online: web] accessed on 6 July 2016 URL: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav022805.shtml>.

opposition won only six seats. The remaining opposition candidates, including Kurmanbek Bakiyev, were defeated. Especially, Kurmanbek Bakiyev's defeat in his own district was really a big scandal. Kurmanbek Bakiyev, who had strong support from the South, faced defeat in his own stronghold, expected to be easily elected (Olcott 2005: 4).

Immediately after the announcement of the results a mass protests began in Jalalabad. This saw participating thousands of protestors on the streets. At this mass meeting, on the 15th of March 2005, Kurmanbek Bakiyev had addressed the protesters. Opposition groups blamed Akayev's government for manipulating the elections. After the speech of Bakiyev, it was decided to establish a coordinating council of People's Unity of Kyrgyzstan. Zhusupbek Zheenbekov, who was the ex-candidate for deputies, was elected as a chairman of this Council. As was mentioned above, with the escalation of the protests, the protestors have managed to take over the regional administration buildings. By occupying the building of regional administration, actually the opposition has declared the capture of authority in Jalal-Abad province. Despite the fact that, government on 20th of March made an attempt to take control over the situation, the opposition reoccupied the administration building. The opposition leaders in Jalal-Abad after this development began sending out emissaries to 'export the revolution' to other towns (Radnitz 2006:137). Obviously the next town was Osh, which is close to Jalal-Abad and the second largest city in Kyrgyzstan. On March 21st the opposition, facing weak official resistance, captured the authority in government offices of Osh province easily. In other words, hereafter, the entire South of Kyrgyzstan was under the control of the opposition (Yandas 2011: 53).

After the capture of regional government building of Osh oblast (province), a heap of demonstrators moved to Bishkek. Only after the taking control over the South of Kyrgyzstan leaders of PMK (People's Movement of Kyrgyzstan), other opposition groups and NGO activists started to organize a joint protest in Bishkek. The first demonstration organized by these diverse elements took place on March 23. Despite the fact that, police broke up this gathering, the opposition

had prepared the massive demonstration for the next day. By the beginning of the demonstrations on March 24, the situation in the country was clearly out of the government's control. After the small strife with police, demonstrators stormed the President's office. In the mean time, Askar Akayev fled the country. In other words the Kyrgyz "Tulip Revolution" had been over (Radnitz 2006: 146).

4.5 Analysis of Mobilization against Akayev

In the following sections we would analyze the modes operandi of protests during the Tulip Revolution; It would be mentioned that were the strategies of mobilization against the regime?; How did opposition parties attract to masses against the government?; how did NGOs play their role in this protests?; what was the role of media houses?; it would also be mentioned that did international environment provide any conducive environment for the mass protests in Kyrgyzstan? All the factors and actors would be analyzed in the subsequent sections. Since both internal and external factors triggered the Tulip Revolution of 2005. Internally, the changes brought by Akayev contrary to what he promised in his initial years led to discontentment among the people of Kyrgyzstan. Externally, the changing dynamics of international environment and the growing dependence of civil society on external donors influenced the mobilization of people against Akayev's authoritarian regime during the protests of Tulip Revolution.

4.5.1 Economic Downturn of the Kyrgyzstan

Some scholars put significance to economic conditions and argue that deteriorating economic conditions cause people's anger and protests against the state institutions. The collapse of Soviet Union and Kyrgyz state's rolling back from social expenditure created fertile ground for grievance generation that exhausted in Tulip's protests against Akaev regime. Soviet system that provided universal employment, salaries sufficient to buy all necessary goods, paid vacations, and generous pensions; but since its collapse, people have been left without substantial social security schemes by government. So Radnitz (2005:

415) mentions that the economic plight was one of the main causes of colour revolution in Kyrgyzstan. After the shock therapy model of privatization the impact of neo-liberal policies to people's plights and their role in people's protests was also the one the main reason for the people uniting against the Akayev. In the Kyrgyzstan the transition period did not lead to the promised results. Reforms like privatisation of economy and decentralisation at local level under former President Askar Akaev produced wealthy individuals and local networks that have gained significant autonomy from central authorities. Denoting the repercussions of economic reform on society, Way (2008) remarks that ruling elite had to deal with dissent of new economic policies within its own ranks as well as people were rejecting the neo-liberal agenda. A more authoritarian and patronised networks of Akayev determined the number and type of actors, who were allowed to gain access to the principal government positions, gave way to informal practices of cronyism and nepotism, particularly of family members. As a result, already half way into the 1990s, the picture was not very optimistic because competitive authoritarianism outpaced liberalizing polity in Central Asian republics. Khamidov (2006), for people's mobilization, accounts for the privatization and decentralization processes that have occurred in Kyrgyzstan in the past 10 years.

4.5.2 Role of Opposition Political Parties

Before the elections, Kyrgyzstan witnessed the formation of some opposition blocks by opposing leaders. One of the most important opposition block, which got emerged was "People's Movement of Kyrgyzstan" (PMK). PMK was formed by nine smaller parties in September 2004. This coalition group was formed in order to check the unfair election process and abuse of state machinery; this PMK block also aimed to oppose any such move of Akayev to contest in the next presidential election; which was to scheduled in October 2005; opposition had suspicion that Akayev could contest again, despite the end of two terms of office, for the presidential election. By the end of the December 2004, five opposition parties signed a memorandum of cooperation with PMK for joint move against misuse of administrative resources by Akayev against opposition parties, civil

society groups, and media. This opposition alliance was composed of PMK, which was led by Kurmanbek Bakiyev, Ata-Jurt party (Fatherland) headed by Roza Otunbaeva, Jany-Bagyt party (New Course), Civic Union for Fair Elections, the People's Congress of Kyrgyzstan which included Felix Kulov's party Ar Namys (Dignity). However, this opposition unity was in some sense conditional or showpiece; everyone fought for their own political survival and interests. In common, they had been making only lofted general statements and appeals (Radnitz 2006: 134). Despite the differences among the opposition PMK group, this front provided a common platform to them where they could mobilize people against the regime. This opposition front proved the decisive in streamlining the protests which were happening in different parts of country after the results of first round of elections of February 2005.

4.5.3 North-South Rivalry

Adding another dimension to factionalism in Kyrgyz political process, Loung (2002) stresses the importance of regionalism in factional competition. She accounts regionalism as establishment of relations between people based on their shared, locally-specific or broader territorial backgrounds shaped by the internal administrative divisions of a place or region. Her analysis proposes regionalism as a model for the emergence of post-Soviet political factions; which emphasizes on these local connections; and regional groups attempt to secure greater political control to obtain resources for their region. Kyrgyz politics since Soviet era is defined in terms of this regional division. Ever since Soviet period the political elites of northern part have been dominating in the power structure of the Kyrgyzstan. The post soviet era under Akayev was also a show that dominance. Yes there was northern bias in elite representation in high post in state institutions. This extended to distribution of economic rents besides important political and economic posts of provincial governors or akims. As Collins argues that during the early 1990s, the oblast akims (governor of province) were members of powerful clans; but since mid 1990s Akayev started to appoint their northern clan leaders in order to counter the southern politicians and clans

(Collins 2007). This cleavage led to a political division in the north-south lines and determined the relationship between centre and provinces. So this regional rivalry between north and southern clan was one of the most important factors in the mobilization of people against the Akayev regime. It is obvious that majority of the protests started on southern Kyrgyzstan. Two southern provinces Osh and Jal-abad were the epicentre of the protests against Akayev, which toppled him ultimately. Akayev's continued policy to concentrate political power in his family's hands at the expense of the south after the election in 2000 led to a united southern opposition. This included such prominent politicians as Azimbek Beknazarov, Adakhan Madumarov, Omurbek Tekebaev and Doronbek Sadyrbaev. The mobilization that led to the Tulip Revolution on 24 March 2005 also took place primarily in the south. The fact that the revolution brought Kurmanbek Bakiev to power, a former prime minister and Jalal-Abad akim after Akayev ouster proves that regional dimension also impinged on the Tulip Revolution. Kurmanbek Bakiev was seen as a southerner who would restore the balance of power tilted in favour of the north under Akayev (Ryabkov 2008: 302). This regional rivalry was used by opposition to mobilize people against the Akayev in the protests and demonstrations.

4.5.4 Role of Clan Groups in Mobilization

Signifying the role of clan networks, Collins (2004) states that 'clan networks' are very important in understanding the political dynamics of Kyrgyzstan. In her view clan is an important political actor and clan network is very crucial factor to explain the political process in Kyrgyzstan. She says that clan network were central in durability of Akayev regime after the dissolution of Soviet Union. Nevertheless, accepting the role of formal institutions (political parties, movements, media, NGOs) in Tulip revolution of 2005, Temirkulov (2008) says that informal institutions and actors also played an active, supportive, and complementary role in this mass movement. The informal institutions such as Kurultai, aksakals, palvan were mobilised by the patronage networks based on the theory of "subversive clientelism" coined by Radnitz (2006), in which people are

encouraged to participate in protests due to a mix of purposive, material and solidarity incentives. Radnitz further says that this situation occurs in three conditions- weak formal instructions, economic benefit prospects, and deficit of public good in society; which were/are present in Kyrgyzstan and proved as boosting factors for peoples' movement in 2005. But on the contrary, repudiating the views of Radnitz and others, Marat (2010) argues political forces have little interest in uniting clan and kinship ties. By contrast, familial, clan and tribal identities are often viewed as an important feature of everyday life (weddings, funerals, etc.); they are not a defining feature of the political churning. Instead alliances are brokered between officials, criminals, and political elite; so that none will threaten their network's business interests. In the 2005 revolution political leaders of opposition organized protests through calling upon their clan members in protests.

4.5.5 Role of Media in Mobilization

The financial resources of opposition essentially were relatively weak as compared to that of the ruling elite Akayev. The majority of the control on economic resources and media houses was under control of the Akayev's favoured people. The main instruments for the voices of opposition were the newspaper "Moja Stolitsa Novosti" (MSN) and a Kyrgyz branch of radio "Radio Liberty" (Azattyk).⁹ As the mechanism of propaganda the opposition actively used speeches, brochures and internet. The newspaper MSN was publishing its paper in the printing house of Freedom House Press. This newspaper, at the beginning of February, published an article "The House Which Has Constructed Akayev", with the detailed listing of illegitimate business dealings of Akayev and his family. Following these days as MSN was printed with Freedom House Support.

⁹ "Interview with Silenced Kyrgyz Moya Stolitsa Editor Alexander Kim", [Online: web] accessed on 1 March 2016 URI: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/qanda/articles/eav061803a.shtml>

On the other hand, ruling elite had a control over all remaining media houses in order to run a media campaign against the opposition. Akayev's team, by the central television and official newspapers, ran a massive blackmailing campaign, claiming that the opposition leaders were the extremists., and they were working on the basis of given money from the West, and they were connected with the international terrorism (Lane 2009:121-122). On the 22 February the electricity of the Freedom House was cut off. Two days later, the state controlled Kyrgyz Telecom stopped broadcasting nationwide "Azattyk radio" which was oppositions' one of the most important voices. There were only three days until the elections, which meant that, it was the last days of the election campaign, in addition there were significant public protests in rural areas of the country. Because of this stopping broadcasting of Azattyk, restricted voter access to an independent information source at a critical time of the campaign (Kartawich 2005: 12).

4.5.6 Public Anger against Misuse of the State Machinery

Akayev's misuse of the administrative resource machinery was apparent to everybody. For example, he refused to allow the opposition to use schools or public buildings for political meetings despite the extremely cold conditions. These moves displeased many people who were already dissatisfied with the excesses of power of the government. The opposition's suspicions of Akayev's nepotistic tactics were strengthened when a list of election candidates was published on the 20th of January. The list included Akayev's son and daughter as well as the son of the Prime Minister Nikolai Tanayev (Henningsson 2006: 16).

As was mentioned above, besides blackmailing campaigns, ruling elites actively applied pressure by administrative methods too. In other words, the preparation period for the elections was used as the period of eliminating candidates who might challenge Askar Akayev, as it happened in the year 2000 Parliamentary elections. A number of leading opposition politicians were prevented from standing as candidates by official disqualification in registration in elections. In other words a lot of candidates, including Roza Otunbaeva, were disqualified

from elections by the decisions of courts and the district commissions.¹⁰ On 6th of January 2005, Roza Otunbaeva by submitting her documents on the constituency No: 1, received a registration certificate. But, at the same day, the district election commission convened at the emergency meeting and Otunbaeva was barred from contesting in the election.¹¹ One of the realities of Kyrgyzstan is that the family ties are very strong in Kyrgyzstan. Injustice against the person means not only his indignation, but also his numerous relatives and fellow countrymen. That's why the supporters of the candidates, which were excluded from the elections unfairly, started protesting, spontaneous meetings, blocking the roads, capturing of buildings of administration.

4.5.7 Personalistic Politics and the Patron-Client Networks

Showcasing the importance of personality based politics in Kyrgyzstan, Abazov (2003) emphasises the role of 'Personalism' in Kyrgyz politics and says that political competition in the country has been degenerated into competition between individuals; it is not between political ideals, ideas, and such kind of political competition leads to 'tribalization of politics' at the expense of political parties. The political leaders mobilise people on basis of patron-client network and clan based affiliation in any political gathering. How the scarcity of resources can be apple of discord among populace has been elaborated by Engvall (2014); which results in factionalism in Kyrgyz society. He argues that Kyrgyz state is considered as investment market by political elite in which public offices can be bought and sold; the state has severely limited resources and a large number of diverse elite groups, who have tasted power in the past, contest for state resources and try to subvert the state institutions in this struggle. Citing the role of elite in transitional polities McGlinchey (2010) claims that concepts like political parties,

¹⁰“Kyrgyzstan: Opposition Leader Claims Political Motivation Behind Rejection Of Her Election Registration”, [Online: web] accessed on 1 March 2016 URI: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp010804.shtml>

¹¹ “Kyrgyzstan Protests: Rehearsal for Revolution?”, [Online: web] accessed on 6 July 2016 URI: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/civilsociety/articles/eav011305.shtml>

opposition are unfit in Kyrgyz politics. He terms Kyrgyz political dynamics as “a handful of elite going in circles”. It is not a competitive democracy. Here a large number of various kind or elite compete to grab share in the cake of state resources.

Mass mobilization is the by-product of institutional incentives endemic to nondemocratic political systems whereby self-interested actors adopt the strategy of *subversive clientelism* (Rdnitz 2010: 3-4). It is the strategy of using a framework of incentives, by which people are encouraged to protest through a mix of purposive, material and solidarity incentives, and also purposive incentives. Material incentives include material rewards such as salaries, jobs, government posts, government contracts and other support through state machinery, and material punishments such as threats of physical and economic retaliation and solidarity incentives include rewards as socializing, congeniality, sense of group membership and identification, status resulting from membership, fun and conviviality, maintenance of social distinctions, and so on. Purposive incentives are derived from the stated ends of the association, rather than from the simple act of associating (Terminkulov 2008). A mobilization through subversive clientelism is likely to occur under the three situations working together. First, formal institutions are weak and rational individuals do not believe on politicized and personalized institutions. Second, there must be economic opportunities that allow oppositions actors to earn and dispose of wealth. Third, there must be a deficit of public good in the society (Rdnitz 2010: 4-5). All these factors were present in Kyrgyzstan that provided the fertile ground for mass mobilization for a regime change.

4.5.8 Regional and International Environment

Tucker (2007) and Radnitz (2006) argue how any successful example of external incidents can give direction to any country’s political dynamics. They say that previous successful revolutions in Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004) were influential in inspiring the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan. The inspiration for the protesters has also come from the success of recent peaceful resistance in Georgia

and Ukraine. They say that influence of example can substitute to some extent for structural disadvantage, allowing some groups that might be less structurally advantaged to engage in successful action by riding the influence of the prior example of others. According to Bunce (et al. 2006) not only emulation but diffusion also occurs in starting new movements wherein new ideas, institutions, policies, models or repertoires of behaviour spread geographically from a core site to other sites, whether within a given state or across states. But they also say that necessary pre-conditions (like enough independent civil society, strong international assistance, evidence of significant democratic improvements) are also required to make this diffusion and emulation successful. The role of global big powers is also crucial in the Tulip revolution, because it was alleged the after the invasion in Afghanistan, America allegedly started favouring such coloured revolutions in the name of democratic promotion; this was done due to get favour from the incumbent regime in the Afghanistan and Iraq war (Chaulia 2006).

4.5.9 Role of Civil Society and INGOs

Various strategies were adopted by the INGOs (International Non-governmental Organizations) in the name of democratisation to bring about a regime change in Kyrgyzstan. They sought to win over local elites to Western ideas and models. They organised conferences, seminars, ‘technical assistance’ and exchange programmes with Kyrgyz elites, believing that domestic political change comes from exposure to Western ideas. This tactic was successful; it was evident by the trend among the Kyrgyz business and political elites to endorse closer security and economic relationships with the US. Kurmanbak Bakiyev of the PMK, the man who replaced Akayev as Prime Minister after the Tulip Revolution, was himself sent to the US on an exchange programme. Felix Kulov, the new head of security, and Omurbek Tekebayev, the new Speaker of the Parliament after the Tulip Revolution, were also beneficiaries of State Department-sponsored visitors programmes (Guterman 2005).

It is evident that during the Tulip Revolution of 2005 both NGOs and INGOs played a prominent role, despite the fact that Akayev accused them of being used

as a tool to destabilize the region and creating unrest in the country. But the authorities underestimated the role of civil society groups' involvement in the demonstrations and their firm commitment to democracy. The CSOs played the role of election observer, monitoring, and educating the people. They even played the role of a mediator in Jalalabad, the first area of mass protests. The INGOs funded projects for publishing anti-government newspapers, training youth "infected" with the democracy virus through US-financed trips to Kiev for a glimpse of the Orange Revolution, and mobilising fairly large crowds in Bishkek who stormed Akayev's Presidential palace and in the southern towns of Osh and Jalalabad. USAID "invested at least \$2 million prior to the elections" (Escobar 2005). The Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society (CDCS) and Civil Society Against Corruption (CSAC), key local NGO partners of the NED(National Endowment for Democracy), played very active role with anti-Akayev parties without any impartiality. The US Embassy in Bishkek, continuing the murky tradition of interventionist behaviour in crises, worked closely with INGOs like Freedom House and the Soros Foundation, supplying generators, printing presses and money to keep the protests boiling until Akayev fled. Information about where protesters should gather and what they should bring spread through State Department funded radio and TV stations, especially in the southern region of Osh. Thus, it becomes apparent that US influence provided the impetus for the anti-government demonstrations. CDCS head, Edil Baisolov, admitted that the uprising would have been "absolutely impossible" without this coordinated American effort.¹²

4.6 Regime of Kurmanbek Bakiyev: 2005-2008

Kurmanbek Bakiyev was named as acting president and interim prime minister of Kyrgyzstan after the overthrow of Akayev regime on 24 March 2005. The new president appealed to Kyrgyz people to remain calm and maintain order and peace

¹² Smith, C. (2005), "US Helped to Prepare the Way for Kyrgyzstan's Uprising", [Online:web] accessed on 3 March 2014, URL:

http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/30/international/asia/30kyrgyzstan.html?_r=0

in the country. While addressing the Jogorku Kenesh he assured to the people- “Now, if you trust me and as far as I understand you do so, give me the opportunity to form an executive body (government) urgently. It will not stay in power forever, it won’t stay for several years; it will only stay until the next elections, only for about three months.”¹³ During an interview with a TV channel Bakiyev mentioned his four priorities; first, to amend the constitution to prevent future authoritarianism, second, to remove corruption from the political system, third, economic growth of the country, and fourth, to create a conducive environment for democratization in society.¹⁴ These were very large and overenthusiastic goals to achieve. Altogether the mood of the country was very positive that something better would happen in the upcoming years regarding the overall situations in Kyrgyzstan; but who knew that this was going to be a nightmare for the people of Kyrgyzstan (Marat 2008: 230).

4.6.1 Political Confusion after Tulip Revolution

After the revolution a very different kind of political confusion exacerbated in the Kyrgyz politics. The newly elected deputies of Jogorku Kenesh vowed their support to Bakiyev. This new unicameral body supported the interim prime minister Kurmanbek Bakiyev and attempted to resolve the uncertainty around the issue of executive body in the country. On the other side old parliament had confirmed the date of presidential election on 26 June 2005. But in an unusual development, the newly elected unicameral parliament had repealed this resolution; they argued that the new date would be announced after the reviewing the resignation letter send by Akayev on 4 April 2005.¹⁵ So in this situation both- old and new deputies- were claiming their legitimacy as the real parliament of the

¹³ “Kyrgyzstan: 'New' Leadership Drawn From Old Guard”[Online: web] accessed on 15 July 2015 URI: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp032505a.shtml>

¹⁴ Kyrgyzstan’s Presidential Campaign: Mud Already Flying”[Online: web] accessed on 15 July 2015 URI: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav050405.shtml>

¹⁵ “Kyrgyzstan’s New Parliament Annuls June 26 Presidential Election Date” [Online: web] accessed on 20 July 2015 URI:

<http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/recaps/articles/eav040705.shtml>

country. Both were claiming that they were true representor of the people's mandate. The new political and social upheavals swept across the country. The early announcement of election date was also criticized by many foreign observers.¹⁶

4.6.2 Capturing State Properties and Institutions

Another important unique development was happening in Kyrgyzstan due to the situation of lawlessness. The government lands, in and around the capital, was being captured by the some protesters. Most of them were from the southern region, i.e. Bakiyev supporters; they flooded in the city during the March protests. They tried to capture the lands on the outskirts of Bishkek. It was reported the 17 places of unoccupied lands were captured by around 30,000 people. Some on them started to build houses and selling these lands. It was alleged the "People's Hope Movement" and "Revolution Committee" were spearheading these occupation; remember these groups were actively participated in the 24 March revolution.¹⁷ Another developments show the nature of peoples' attitude towards the state bodies. One deputies of Jogoku Kenesh alleged that in Kyrgyzstan provincial regions the post of regional heads, city mayors, and other bureaucratic posts were rapidly being distributed. Even interim president Bakiyev had acknowledged this issue and warned that those found in such anti-constitutional activities would not be spared. There were also reports that Akayev supporters properties- lands, bazaars- were also captured by the Bakiyev supporters. Some of the Akayev allies were even murdered in the resource competition.¹⁸

¹⁶ "Provisional Government Strives to Bring Order to Kyrgyzstan's Political Mess" [Online: web] accessed on 20 July 2015 URI:

<http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav032805.shtml>

¹⁷ "Kyrgyz Revolution: Taking a Turn in an Unpredictable Direction", [Online: web] accessed on 24 August 2015 URI: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav040805a.shtml>

¹⁸ "Kyrgyz Revolution: Taking a Turn in an Unpredictable Direction", [Online: web] accessed on 24 August 2016 URI: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav040805a.shtml>

4.6.3 Presidential Elections of July 2005

After the March revolution, the first democratic festival-Presidential election- was held on 10 July 2005; in which Bakiyev got 88.71 per cent of the total vote (Marat 2008:231). Total six candidates were contesting for the presidential post, but Bakiyev was the frontrunner among them. Earlier other prominent contestant of Bakiyev, Felix Kulov withdrew from contest just two weeks before the election. This was a surprising move for political observers because he was ferociously campaigning. This was again looking as regional rivalry - north and south-between Bakiyev and Kulov. Later it was confirmed by Kulov that he withdrew from contest because Bakiyev had assured him to appoint as prime minister; and moreover, his withdrawal also would decrease some rivalry between north and south; this election was again exacerbating the tension between the north and south. A widening north-south gap could create space for counter-revolution.¹⁹ He promised to appoint honest persons on key posts in order to ensure the transparency in governance. He also promised to take initiatives to limit the power of the president. But none of aforementioned promises was realized on the ground (Juraev 2008: 257).

4.6.4 Rift among Opposition Leaders

After the overthrow of Akyev regime, the opposition leader of PMK (People's Movement of Kyrgyzstan) convened a constitutional council to initiate the constitutional reforms to make balance between the three branches of government. This council had 114 members from different sections of society including political parties and civil society groups. After becoming president of the country, Bakiyev became the president of this constitutional council also and he demanded some changes in the membership of the council. Now he started using the rhetoric- poverty, corruption, etc. - to divert attention from the real core issues of constitutional reforms. Further two more developments showed the

¹⁹ "Bakiyev Wins Landslide in Kyrgyzstan, Courts Controversy with United States", [Online: web] accessed on 14 November 2016 URL: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav071105.shtml>

glimpse of intention of Bakiyev. First was he dismissed on 19 September the Prosecutor General Azimbek Beknazarov; who was aggressively following the corruption charges against the Akayev family members and his other political and business associates. The reasons were given by the presidential office was quite ridiculous; it gave two reasons for that action; one was his alleged role in the murder of prominent businessman Abdalim Junusov and second was his involvement in the shooting at a hotel in Osh city.²⁰

Now many leaders of anti-Akayev coalition were deliberately being sidelined by Bakiyev and also he was making himself stronger through incorporating the loyal leaders into government; first victim was Azimbek Beknazarov, leader of *Asaba* (Banner) *Party*, who was forced to resign for the alleged false allegations. Prominent leader Roza Otunbaeva became the next victim of Bakiyev deliberate exclusion; she was the acting foreign minister in the interim government and leader of *Ata Zhurt* Party. Parliament did not endorse her post of foreign minister, and finally she resigned and formed a movement “*For Reforms*” in 2006. Omurbek Tekebayev of *Ata Maken* also resigned from the post of speaker of Jogorku Kenesh on a personal brawl with Bakiyev (Engvall 2011: 55).

4.6.5 ‘*For Reforms*’ Movement

As earlier mentioned the “*For Reforms*” movement was established in January 2006 to put pressure on Bakiyev for the constitutional reforms. *For Reforms* coalition comprised around 20 political parties and non-governmental organizations that are dissatisfied with the Bakiyev administration’s reform course. This movement, ‘*For Reforms*’, included the main Parliament leaders, former members of Bakiyev administration, important civil society leaders and wealthy business men. Omurbek Tekbaev, Alamzbek Atambaev, Melis Eshimkanov, Roz Otunbaeva, and Edil Baislov were prominent figures of “*For*

²⁰ “Kyrgyzstan’s Revolution at Risk?”, [Online: web] accessed on 24 November 2016 URL: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav092605.shtml>

Reforms".²¹ The tension between Bakiyev and "*For Reforms*" leaders began growing on the issue of constitutional reform issue. They demanded reforms in the political system due to make a check and balance in the system against the encroaching Presidential power. It sponsored large rallies in April and May to demand a new constitution limiting the powers of President. After this deadline passed, "*For Reforms*" announced that new protests would be held and thousands of supporters of "*For Reforms*" and others launched daily rallies outside the Kyrgyz legislature and Presidential buildings on November 2, 2006. The deliberations were proved contentious and it was because of Bakiyev's resistance to constitutional reforms. Basically, he did not want to be curtailed by constitutional barriers on Presidential powers. But he had to succumb to pressure of opposition pressure and formed a working group under the Azimbek Baknazarov to make draft for the three constitutions; first with a strong Presidential power; second with strong legislative powers; third with mixed constitutions. This working group released its three documents in September 2006 (Sinnot 2007: 429-430).

Bakiyev also submitted its own version of constitution to Jogorku Kenesh in November 2006; in this constitution the Presidential powers were maintained; but "*For Reforms*" members supported their version. This situation created confrontational situation and Bakiyev and Kulov criticized the "For Reform" move and denounced this "coup attempt." On the 7 November 2006 the Bakiyev supporters and "*For Reforms*" supporter clashed with each other in violent manner. This clash was denounced by both group's leaders and both quickly made and compromise and come with compromise draft of constitution. Both side had to accept a draft constitution on November 8. In the anti-Bakiyev group the leaders were mostly from the northern region and they were very influential in their region. They use to gather their supporters on the basis of clan and regional identity networks. The Osh and Jalalabad oblasts were the centre of southern

²¹ "Low Protest Turnout Hampers Reformers in Kyrgyzstan "[Online: web] accessed on 24 November 2016 URI: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav053006.shtml>

group and Chuy and Talas were epicentre of northern groups. But it could not also be denied that many southern leaders, who were dissatisfied with Bakiyev, also joined hand with northern leaders (Khamidov 2006:40).

4.6.6 November 2006 Constitution

The new constitution of 2006 significantly curtailed the powers of the president. The most important of them was the National Security Service would come under the Prime Minister. The new Parliament would be more control on budget. The new constitutional provisions had increased the members of parliament-Jogorku Kenesh- from 75 to 90. The members of the new parliament under new constitution would be elected through a mixed voting system; half of the members of would be elected by party list system and the other half by single membership first past the post system. It was categorically mentioned that this new constitution would be implemented since 2010. The top winner party would be able to nominate the Prime Minister and cabinet. The new constitution was the mark of a political defeat for Bakiyev, who was in competition for the power with his Parliamentary foes since 2005.²²

Bakiyev was adamant to these new changes and he demanded new Parliamentary elections. But the deputies of Jogorku Kenesh were not in the favour of a new election before 2010, therefore he threatened to dissolve Parliament. He demanded to restore his erstwhile Presidential powers. Finally deputies were forced to accept his demands and retained his most prerogatives the amendments of the November 2006 constitution.²³ On April 19 Felix Kulow's "United Front" and "*For Reforms*" organized a joint protest in Bishkek against Bakiyev. This movement was scattered down by the brutal use of police by the Bakiyev administration. But in this movement the supporters of Bakiyev had gone violent

²² "New Constitution Comes into Force in Kyrgyzstan", [Online: web] accessed on 26 November 2016 URI: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav110906.shtml>

²³ "Kyrgyzstan: Conflict Over Constitution Continues", [Online: web] accessed on 30 November 2016 URI: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav122206.shtml>

and hurled stones on government officials and buildings. So police chased them down from the Alla Too square. Seeing the violence “*For Reforms*” group criticized the violent protests and quit from movement.²⁴

4.6.7 Referendum of October 2007

During the second half of the year 2007, Bakiyev very tactfully initiated two moves to fortify his rule through reshaping the institutional structure. These two prominent ‘*For Reforms*’ members Melis Eshimkanov and Kabay Karabekov had filed a petition in the constitutional court against the both rounds of constitutional changes in November-December 2006. The constitutional court declared both changes null and void; the honourable court reaffirmed the validity of the 2003 constitution. Bakiyev reacted sharply to this new development and call for a referendum on 21st October 2007. This referendum offered a new method of electoral law based on the party list. This referendum got the 76 percent support of the voters. But it created uproar among international observers due massive irregularities (Marat 2008: 232). International observers said that this constitutional change would strengthen the president power over regional administration. The opposition was having mixed opinions about the referendum. On the one hand, they were appreciated the new electoral law of party system voting, but on the other hand they were against the increase of executive power vis-à-vis regional administration. This difference of view deprived the unifying cause of opposition and promoted the division of opposition front ‘*For Reforms*’. After the adoption of the new constitution, President Bakiyev dissolved the parliament and called for early parliamentary elections on 16 December 2007. This election would be held on the basis of new electoral laws of Proportional representation system first time in the country since independence.²⁵

²⁴ “Kyrgyzstan: A New Bout of Constitutional Wrangling Begins”, [Online: web] accessed on 30 November 2016 URI: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav122206.shtml>

²⁵ “Kyrgyzstan: A New Bout of Constitutional Wrangling Begins”, [Online: web] accessed on 27 November 2016 URI: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav092607.shtml>

4.6.8 Parliamentary Election of December 2007

With the new amended constitution Bakiyev had also another plan to strengthen his position. Before going for the Parliamentary election, he specified the need of a strong power structure that would help the country out from political instability and economic hardships. According to him this new power structure would work from top to bottom as a single entity. In pursuance this powerful entity he announced the formation of a new political party on 15th October 2007. During the announcement of this new pro-Presidential party *Ak Zhol* Party, he criticized other political parties of Kyrgyzstan that they are not participative, constructive, responsible, and action-oriented. With this new party *Ak Zhol* Bakiyev was planning to constitute a single party dominated parliament which would rubber-stamp his decisions. He planned to swallow up many his supportive political parties and politicians and get an outright majority in the parliament. Through this way he would be successful to get his all policy decisions accepted by the parliament (Luong 2012: 5).

Ak Zhol party attracted many pro-President political parties and figures. They created a single bloc; they became a united force in the election and won the majority of seats. Those who joined the *Ak Zhol* were- Ata Zhurt party created by Roza Otunbaeva and Adahan Madumarov against former President Askar Akaev, Maya Strana, a liberal party founded by Medet Sadyrkulov, and a number of other more obscure groups. They were united not through any ideological similarity; they were united by their pro-Presidential stand. When the result was announced on 20 December 2007 only three political parties were managed to enter into Kyrgyz Parliament (Jogorku Kenesh). Out of total 90 seats, *Ak Zhol* acquired 71 seats, Communist party of Kyrgyzstan 11 seats and Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan got 8 seats. The communist party and SDPK were already having pro-President stand. It meant that Bakiyev had, now, centralized the whole political system into his hand till the end of 2007.

The creation of the pro-presidential party had two effects; one the one hand it centralized all the channels to access the state-resources for political elites; on the

other hand it blocked the opposition channels to communicate with the regime by producing the sufficient number of seats in parliament. Since the opposition had no seats in parliament; this had weakened the chain of linking with local leaders; because they had no incentive to offer due to not having access to state-resources. On the other side Ak-Zhol had established a system in which individual deputies were given responsibility to reach out to local notables. Now all the deputies of parliament were well known to Bakiyev, so they could not defect easily. The other two parties, i.e. Communist Party and SDPK were largely friendly because of their close relationship with the president Bakiyev. So through these tactics he not only created a loyal party, but also friendly opposition in the new Parliament (Marat 2008: 232). After the oath taking ceremony on January 10, 2008 Bakiyev addressed the Parliament and said the constitutional transition process is over and now the era of economic growth, prosperity and stability had been started.

4.6.9 Puppet Parliament

The new parliament was called just a “shadow Parliament” by Kyrgyz scholar Erica Marat (Marat 2008: 262); in which Bakiyev’s all assistants and aids began control almost all most all important lucrative posts. The legislature Jogorku Kenesh became a compliant parliament by the president. Bakiyev had full control on the all powerful posts. So this situation was one clan replaced by another one; this was not said as revolution. The powerful people, those were in the Akayev circle, were also got place in the Bakiyev coterie. With the government comprised of wealthy businessmen, the Kyrgyz Parliament was populated by people with comparatively weak economic backgrounds. Unlike Akayev, Bakiyev allowed only weak candidates from his political party Ak Jhol to be elected in the parliament in December 2007.

The government introduced further limitations to the Parliament. Starting from January 2008 Parliamentarians were being allowed to speak up only if they initiate a question, represent a parliamentary committee or a fraction. This new regalement curbed the ability of a majority of Parliamentarians to take an active part in Parliamentary debates. To neutralize his powerful opponents in the

government Bakiyev resorted to strategies previously used by Akayev. Bakiyev appointed Suvanaliyev who previously represented the opposition as an oblast governor, allowing him to occupy a political position detached from law enforcement agencies. The President also increased in ranks some opposition members serving in the foreign service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the pursuance to co-opt them (Murzayeva 2011: 171).

4.6.10 Informal Control of Economy

Kyrgyzstan's most important sectors of the economy were/are banking sector, customs control, markets located close to interstate borders, the drug economy, and the energy sector. These sectors were also a source of illegal profits directly or indirectly controlled by high-ranking state officials whose business interests' overlapped. The Bakiyev circle's tight controls in these lucrative sectors were visible in the privatization policies that the Bakiyev regime had enforced. Among these, the privatizations of the Manas international airport; the main phone provider, Kyrgyz Telecom; hydro-energy sites, Kyrgyz Gaz and a series of other public utilities had taken the lead. During these privatizations, in the absence of real reform of governance and the rule of law, the patronage system played a clear role (Nichol 2007: 6)

The important market places were also on the target of Bakiyev's embezzlement of state resources. There were two important market places-Dordoi and Kara-Suu- in Kyrgyzstan. Dordoi was situated near the Bishkek. This is/was very important transit zone for supply of market from China, Turkey, and United Arab Emirates. Other market Kara-Suu is located in the Ferghana valley. These two markets were very attractive places for the politicians and business groups. So Bakiyev group tried to control these two markets. In this fight to control, 'Kara-Suu's main owner and former MP Bayaman Erkinbayev, was shot dead in September 2005 amid competition over the market (Marat 2008: 18).

The county's energy sector was another source of large-scale corruption. Bakiyev gave good positions to the former officials of Energy sector; which indicates the

level of corruption in the one of the most important sectors of the country. It is very important for Kyrgyzstan to have sufficient electricity for the winter season. But since 2007 the problem of erratic blackouts had become the norm and the impatience had been upping in the citizens. Ignoring these facts, Bakiyev appointed the former energy minister Igor Chudinov as Prime Minister in December 2007; and former head of electricity board-Saparbek Balkibekov- of the country was made an energy minister. During the regime of Balkibekov, the electricity board had the loss of \$40 million; it was alleged that these losses were due to the embezzlement of board officials and Bakiyev family members. This energy and heating problems were making people restless and they were being annoyed with Bakiyev government.²⁶ The overall economic condition of the country was also very bad. The bleak economic situation was resulted into new taxes and fee by the government, electricity blackouts, rising inflation, increasing food and fuel prices, declining public services, etc... were just a few examples of a deteriorating economy of the country. This situation was aggravating the anger of the Kyrgyz people; Bakiyev regime was indifferent towards the plights of people and popular anger were growing in the country, which would burst at the right time (Engvall 2011: 84).

4.6.11 Criminalization of Politics and Economy

Though it is true that the Akayev regime also had links with criminals, but it was as close as with Bakiyev regime had (Kupadatze, 2008: 292). The Kyrgyz state was becoming a criminal state, where political murders were started being routine. After the fall of Akayev, the fight over control of Akayev business assets started among leader; in which some politicians and businessmen were killed by criminal groups. Even politicians did not believe in police protection and started

²⁶ “Kyrgyzstan: Energy Crisis Threatens Country's Stability”, [Online: web] accessed on 30 November 2016 URI: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav111808.shtml>

using of protection of martial arts sportsmen.²⁷ Bakiyev and his rival Felix Kulov who then held Prime Minister's office were supported by competing criminal groups as well. National criminal kingpin Rysbek Akmatbayev was acquitted of all charges during the Bakiyev regime. Meanwhile Rysbek brother Tynychbeks was killed during the inspection drive of prison in October 2005. Rysbek in April 2006 organized a protest in central Bishkek demanding that prosecution of the culprits. Bakiyev had to meet with Rysbek at central square and he assured Rysbek to take action against culprits. Though Bakiyev argued that he met with a citizen to fulfil his demands, but it was understood that he succumb to pressure of criminal leader. This episode showed his dependence and relationship with criminal gangs. It was another issue that Rysbek also killed a few months later by unknown killers (Marat 2008: 16).

Rysbek murder paved a different relationship between state and criminals. Now regime had total control of criminals and they began to use them for their own benefits under the regime's direction. Now the Bakiyev regime had full control in political and criminal circle and regime started to behave as a mafia structure in itself. State authorities and criminals were cooperating to control to the economic and political system.²⁸ Their intimacy started to embed into the system; this was conversion of power into money. They were closely related to each other. One was controlling the formal ground and another was informal sector of the economy. Nevertheless, this link between state and criminal groups was also present during the Akayev period; but it gained speedily momentum during the Bakiyev regime (Kupadatze 2008: 280). During the Akayev era the link was with some leaders and criminals; but the Bakiyev regime was institutionalized with

²⁷ "Kyrgyz Ngos Call On Government To Fight Organized Crime", [Online: web] accessed on 1 January 2016 URI: <https://jamestown.org/program/kyrgyz-ngos-call-on-government-to-fight-organized-crime/>

²⁸ "Bakiyev-Kulov Political Union Endangered By Criminals", [Online: web] accessed on 2 January 2017 URI: <https://jamestown.org/program/bakiyev-kulov-political-union-endangered-by-criminals/>

regime-crime nexus.²⁹ It means scale and depth both were increased in state-crime nexus during the Bakiyev era. In Kupatadze argues, “it is widely accepted that the volume and extent of bribery, that is the money, goods or services given quid pro quo for an illicit advantage, is greater than before the Tulip Revolution” (Kupadatze, 2008: 287).

4.6.12 Manas Air Base Issue

When the economic situation of the country was not getting better, Bakiyev desperately needed money to improve the economic condition and make the opposition quite. At that time he tried to reach the money of international players. He used the bargaining tool to get the money. During his visit to Moscow in February 2009 Bakiyev indicated his intention of closing down of Manas air base which was given to America on lease. Russia welcomed Bakiyev move and announced the financial assistance of 150 million dollars in grants and 300 million dollars in loans. Russia also promised to delete its some old loans and assured Bakiyev to invest its cash ridden energy sector.³⁰ This help by Russia gave some respite to Bakiyev against protesting opposition. But surprisingly, he took a u-turn in June 2009; on 25 June 2009 he renewed the lease of Manas air base and his puppet Parliament approved this move.³¹ Bakiyev betrayal to Russia, allegedly, angered Russians. It was alleged that the Russian government was instrumental in the overthrowing of Bakiyev in April 2010 because of his cheating.

²⁹ “Kyrgyzstan’s Weakness And Central Asia’s Insecurity”, [online: web] accessed on 2 January 2017 url: <https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/11187-analytical-articles-caci-analyst-2006-11-1-art-11187.html>

³⁰ “Kyrgyzstan: Prime Minister And Gazprom To Increase Cooperation”, [online: web] accessed on 4 January 2017 url: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/news/articles/eav060909c.shtml>

³¹ “Kyrgyzstan: Us Air Hub At Manas Busier Now Than Before”, [online: web] accessed on 4 January 2017 url: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav081209a.shtml>

4.6.13 Presidential Election of 2009

The Presidential election was held on 23 July 2009. Bakiyev had enough resource-some \$ 800,000- to use for his campaign. Total 6 candidates were contesting. Almazbek Atamabayev was the main opponent against Bakiyev. The opposition could not put a consensual candidate against Bakiyev because of fragmentation. Bakiyev got 76 percent of total valid votes in the election and Atambaev got only 8 percent votes.³² One could imagine the condition of opposition parties against the Bakiyev. Atambaev alleged of official fraud in the elections. This victory of Bakiyev was also a victory mode of formal and informal ties. It was alleged that Bakiyev used the government employees-university and school teachers- as the vote enhancer. State machinery was also helping the Bakiyev victory. Government television channel and radio channel were favouring the Bakiyev and tarnishing the image of opposition leaders, especially main opposition contestant Almazbek Atamabaev. But OSCE committee alleged that the election was failed to come up on democratic standards, specifically clear separation between state and party. After the victory in the election Bakiyev control on the state apparatus became rampant; his scope to capture the domain of politics and economics got more widened.

4.7 Bakiyev Nepotistic Rule since July 2009

After the July 2009 Presidential election victory, Bakiyev appointed his son Maxim Bakiyev as chief of newly established body CADII (Central Agency for Development Investment and Innovation). This body-CADII- was made due to monitoring the investment and economic activities of the country; but basically it was made to surpass the Parliamentary discussion related to important lucrative financial matters. Now Bakiyev other brothers were given important posts such as Jannish Bakiyev was made head of State Protection Service; one was made ambassador to Germany and China; another was made special representative to

³² “Dispute Dogs Kyrgyz Poll Ahead Of Results Announcement”, [Online: web] accessed on 4 January 2017 URI: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp072609.shtml>

China. After the appointing his close aids at all important decision making posts, Bakiyev cliques went for further privatizations. The privatization of Severlektro company and later Kyrgyz telekom were the examples of these privatization in February 2010. Maxim sold many government companies to himself at very low prices. These activities were widening the gap between rich and poor more (Alkan, 2010: 25).

President Bakiyev control on the State security apparatus also began to strengthen. As mentioned earlier the his brother Jannish Bakiyev was made the chief of State Security Service and law enforcement agency and intelligence services to tam the opposition movements. The national guards had been combined with Presidential guards and was given a new name “The Lion” in February 2010. These arrangements were made to make firm control of the security forces in order to quell any further protests against Bakiyev government. Bakiyev did not want to remain indecisive like Akyev. He had made up his mind to use brutal force to disperse any further protests against him. Now the use of government machinery against opposition leaders, media houses, NGOs, human rights activists, and journalists were increased by Bakiyev government was increased.³³ It was alleged that Janish Bakiyev was behind the attacks on opponents of Bakiyev.³⁴ Since the end of 2007 Bakiyev government was enhancing its coercive capacity. The Kyrgyz President was following the other Central Asian republics and Russian political system; where strong Presidents exist as ‘super Presidentialism’ (Alkan, 2009: 372). But his wish did not fulfil because the April 2010 uprising against his regime had shown that it is very difficult for any ruler in Kyrgyzstan to have total control of the whole Kyrgyz

³³ “Kyrgyzstan Relegated To The Back Of The Freedom Class”, [Online: web] accessed on 7 January 2017 URI:

https://www.rferl.org/a/Kyrgyzstan_Relegated_To_The_Back_Of_The_Freedom_Class/1927741.html

³⁴ “More Rights Activists Attacked in Kyrgyzstan”, [Online: web] accessed on 7 January 2017 URI: <https://jamestown.org/program/more-rights-activists-attacked-in-kyrgyzstan/>

political system. This uprising had shown the true nature of decentralization of power in Kyrgyz society.

4.8 April 2010 Revolution

The continuous rocketing prices were the catalyst which led the opposition political parties to organize protests against Bakiyev government. The first protest march took place in the northern Naryn district in February 2010. After that in March various traditional Kurultai were organized by opposition politicians in Bishkek city, Talas and Naryn provinces. Meanwhile Naryn oblast was experiencing the high energy prices during the very cold season; so people were protesting against the high energy prices. Naryn is a mountainous region and poor province; winter season lasts for over six months here. The high rate of electricity and heating made to people life miserable here, because poor people would not be able to afford high energy prices (Wooden 2014: 466). This was the main immediate cause of anger and protests. Contrastingly most social benefit schemes were launched by the government had been diverted to southern region; this was done to make satisfy their southern people. On 17th March 2010, a Kurultai was organized to celebrate the 8th anniversary of Aksy events; in this meeting opposition leader Roza Otunbaeva was chosen as leader of the opposition bloc. This group had put a list of demands to President Bakiyev. The main demands were: issue of Maxim Bakiyev succession, rising energy prices, rising inflation, rising taxes, political repression by Bakiyev government. The opposition camp also threatened to organize a demonstration on 24 March 2010 to commemorate the fifth anniversary of the Tulip Revolution, if their demands had not been fulfilled (Alkan, 2010: 26). On the other hand Bakiyev also organized a counter Kurultai of Harmony on 23-24 March to celebrate the 5th anniversary of the March 2005 revolution. He said in his speech- “Many parts of the world have the idea of ‘consultative democracy’; which includes the opinion of view of various groups of society to process and make the state policies and its implementation. This idea of democracy has already been incorporated in the Kyrgyz democratic

model. Many people think that this Kurultai is not a forum of discussion of ideas; instead it is only a rubber stamp to support its leaders. This is not true.”

The opposition bloc planned a protest to organize on 6 April 2010 in Talas city. But in the morning of 6th April vice President of Ata Maken party Bolot Sherniyazov was detained by police. His arrest infuriated protesters and they began protesting on the front of the provincial building of Talas and demanded the release of Vice President Sherniyazov. The Governor of Talas oblast Beishenbek Bolotobekov came out of his office and tried to calm down the protesters; but protesters took Bolotobekov as hostage. Till the afternoon of 6th April, protesters named Koison Kurmanaliev as the new Governor of Talas Oblast; and the also attempted to take full control of Talas administration building. The situation was going out of control, so Bakiyev sent interior minister Modomusa Kongantiyev to Talas city to restore law and order in the oblast; but he was captured by protesters and savagely beaten by the mob. Finally till the midnight, protesters won and took control the building of the provincial administration of Talas.³⁵ Meanwhile, the government tried to control the spread of news of Talas protests. Government became active and on 7 April 2010 arrested all important leaders of opposition to undermine and weaken the opposition protest march; which was scheduled in Bishkek. But unfortunately this move by Bakiyev government only went into opposite direction and further angered the protesters.³⁶

In the early morning of 7th April, protesters gathered at the office of the Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan (SDPK) to decide the further direction of their protests. The government officials came to SDPK office and told the protesters that their protests were illegal and they could protest only at the Governor’s office

³⁵ “Kyrgyzstan: Protesters Storm Government Building in Talas”, [Online: web] accessed on 4 November 2016 URI:

<http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/civilsociety/articles/eav040610.shtml>

³⁶ “Kyrgyzstan: Government Headquarters Under Attack”, [Online: web] accessed on 4 November 2016 URI: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav040710c.shtml>

not their designated place. They would have to leave the place otherwise they would be arrested. The police actually moved in and tried to disperse the mob. This police action quickly spread through social media and internet and more people started to gather in support of protesters. Seeing the situation going out of control, police used tear gas and tried to disperse the crowd; the protesters were in large numbers and they outnumbered the police personnel. Police personnel were beaten and their arms had been snatched by the mob.

Now protesters started moving towards the Ala-Too Square. The numbers were rapidly growing and they quickly overpowered the special forces of government. Then they flooded into Ala-Too Square. The Bakiyev government had erected heavy police security of government building and Parliament. The crowd attempted to break the gates of government building and clash with the security forces started after that. Police used too much force to disperse them and more shockingly the snipers deployed on the White House shot fire at protesters. Another fighting started in nearby areas to set free the opposition leader from jail of National Security Headquarters. The fighting lasted throughout the day and eventually stopped in the evening. The incidents of looting and small gun battle also occurred throughout the night. 86 people were killed due to police firing and the use of heavy force; 1600 people were got injured. Protester tried to loot the Maxim Bakiyev's shopping stores. And finally mob took control of the government building of Bishkek on 7th April.

4.9 Developments after Bakiyev's Overthrown

The new interim government was formed after the second Tulip revolution, and Rosa Otunbayeva became the interim Prime Minister. A constitutional referendum was held on 27th June 2010 just two weeks after the Osh ethnic riots. In this referendum appealed to citizens to participate and make the country possible to switch over from the abusive prone Presidential system to a more European style Parliament democracy. This was done because the power Presidential system was rather misused by two successive Presidents for their own

narrow political and economic interests. The more powerful President was instituted due to strengthen the President to lead the nation towards the glorious democratic path, but on the contrary the carried it towards autocracy and personal fiefdoms. Kyrgyzstan's transition from a Presidential to a Parliamentary republic that began with the election of a new Parliament in October 2010 completed in December 2010, when interim President Otunbayeva stepped down and made room for Mr. Almazbek Atambaev. It was a milestone for the Kyrgyz democracy (Marat 2011) because this country saw for the first time, power change in a peaceful manner without any violence, contested elections rather than turmoil. Kyrgyzstan today is not only the only democracy in Central Asia but has a more democratic political system than Russia and many other former Soviet states (Radyuhin 2011).

Kyrgyzstan's new constitution, which allows various political forces to compete in free elections and stage debates in the Parliament, is mainly the result of an informal pact among multiple political figures who captured power in March 2005 and then again in April 2010. This consensus among the key political players does not directly contribute to state building and good governance, but the highly competitive Parliamentary and Presidential elections in 2010 and 2011, respectively, allowed these players to continue their political struggle as legitimate actors. The new constitution presumes that Kyrgyz political actors are driven by neopatrimonial links and therefore seeks to regulate them to the extent that no one political network captures too much power (Marat 2012:326).

4.10 A Comparison between Uprisings of 2005 and 2010

It is quite interesting that a country of Central Asia faced two people's uprisings against its two incumbent presidents in just five years of gaps. The international community was surprised by 2005 Tulip revolution; but it got more surprised when second colour revolution happened in 2010. So it would be intriguing to do a comparative study of two people' movements. If we observe the two

movements, we find the causes were almost similar; but it the mode of organizing protests that differed one from another.

The main causes of the two protests are almost similar in nature. First, both came to power with high lofting slogans about the democracy and development, but took u-turn from their promises; second, both presidents ruled the Kyrgyzstan through their neo-patrimonial methods; third, both tried to monopolize the state resources of state for the benefits of their family, clan and regional compatriots, but we must remember that the monopolization of state resources were more intensive in Bakiyev regime than the Askar Akayev rule; fourth, both presidents oppressed the opposition political parties, media groups, but again this oppression was more severe during Bakiyev government; fifth, both alleged the foreign states were intervening in the domestic affairs of Kyrgyzstan; sixth, both used all legal-illegal means, such as election, media usage, misuse of state machinery, murders of opposition politicians for establishing their control on the political system; seventh, both tried to sell state resources and properties to private hands in order to embezzle it; eight, economic situation was very bad during the regime of both presidents, the disparity between rich and poor was becoming high during both regime; though it was more severe during Bakiyev government. So these were some similarities which we find between the two regimes of Akayev and Bakiyev almost similar.

The differences we can find are followings: first, the immediate causal factor for the Tulip Revolution of 2005 were parliamentary elections, the fraudulent elections were the main immediate cause of Tulip Revolution. But in 2010 the rising gas prices and electricity tariffs were the chief igniting causes. Second, during the 2005 protests opposition political parties, media, civil society groups played active part, but in 2010 the main opposition leaders were arrested just a day before the protest started. It means 2010 uprising was total people's movement. Third, foreign funded NGOs played heavy role during first colour revolution, but they were not so active during second uprising. Fourth, first uprising completed within two months, but second was finished within just two

days. Fifth, fist movement was less violent than second revolution; almost 200 people were killed during 2010 revolution. Sixth, the main difference is very important to mention here; first revolution involved all three- material, solidarity, and purposive- interests were igniting factors for the revolution, but such was not case with second uprising. In the 2010 revolution the purposive interests were more important than other two; people became furious after listening the news of killing of protesters by police and thousands of people were gathered suddenly after spread of this news of killing (Temirkulov 2010: 598-599).

4.11 Conclusion

The chapter has dealt with the political developments that led to two people's movements in Kyrgyzstan. It has mentioned the internal and external factors that led to colour revolutions in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 and 2010. It also deals with the strategy of mobilization during the political mobilizations against the presidents by people and political leaders. These two people's uprisings culminated in the ouster of the duo incumbent Presidents Askar Akayev and Kumanbek Bakiyev respectively. The new constitution of 1993 incorporated all those provisions which are fundamental for liberal democracy. He avowed for a embracing a liberal market economy; ensure the civil-political rights; initiate the process of democratization; maintain amicable ethnic relations between various ethnic groups, state based on the rule of law, liberal political competition. However, since 1995 he began to change his path to make his position stronger. Through various tactics he began the reverse the democratization process in the country. those tactics were: using the referendums to dilute the parliamentary procedures, reducing the power of the Prime Minister and cabinet, concentrating all important powers in hand of president, misusing the powers of appointing various government posts, appointing his favourite judges, setting up a weak election commissions, appointing his family, clan members on important posts, threatening and pressurizing media, opposition and civil society groups. It means that Akayev failed in consolidation of democratic institutions in Kyrgyzstan. Next president Kurmanbek Bakiyev applied almost same tools; the only difference was

the Akayev was milder than Bakiyev. Bakiyev regime was more ruthless than Akayev. His regime was more oppressive more than Bakiyev. During Akayev regime his family members' controlled on the state institutions were largely informal, but Bakiyev controlled the state institutions more formally and appointed his family members on different important government positions. Bakiyev made the state his family business. The main internal-external factors that led to Colour revolutions in Kyrgyzstan were: public anger due to economic downturn and deteriorating living conditions, capture of state resources and offices, criminalization of politics, united front of opposition parties (PMK), rivalry between northern and southern clan groups, constant pressure for media, role of civil society groups (especially western funded NGOs and INGOs), patron client networks, regional and internal environment (especially during Tulip revolution 2005), support of western countries (especially during 2005 revolution).

A comparative look at both revolutions explains the nature of state society interaction in Kyrgyzstan. It shows that how is the relationship between state and social forces. There are few similarities between the both revolutions: both presidents took u-turn from their aforesaid promises, both presidents ruled the Kyrgyzstan using their clan-regional and neo-patrimonial networks, both tried to provide undue benefits to political elites of their family, clan and region, both tried to capture the state resources, both terrorized the opposition parties, media groups, and civil society groups, both alleged the role of foreign hands in the domestic affairs, both misused machinery for personal benefits, both embezzled the public resources in the private hands, the disparity between rich and poor grew in both regimes. But these two colour revolutions also have some differences: first, the immediate causal factor for the Tulip Revolution of 2005 were parliamentary elections, the fraudulent elections were the main immediate cause of Tulip Revolution. But in 2010 the rising gas prices and electricity tariffs were the chief igniting causes. Second, during the 2005 protests opposition political parties, media, civil society groups played active part, but in 2010 the main

opposition leaders were arrested just a day before the protest started. It means 2010 uprising was total people's movement. Third, foreign funded NGOs played important role during first colour revolution, but they were not so active during second uprising. Fourth, first uprising completed within two months, but second was finished within just two days. Fifth, first movement was less violent than second revolution; almost 200 people were killed during 2010 revolution. Sixth, the main difference is very important to mention here; first revolution involved all three- material, solidarity, and purposive- interests were igniting factors for the revolution, but such was not case with second uprising. In the 2010 revolution the purposive interests were more important than other two; people became furious after listening the news of killing of protesters by police and thousands of people were gathered suddenly after spread of this news of killing (Temirkulov 2010: 598-599).

The state-society interaction is all about making and implementing the “rules of game” over society. The state-in-society perspective attempts to understand this process through analyze this rules making and implementing process locating the state institutions in its internal and external social settings. This perspective proposes that state institutions are susceptible to their societal forces and both mutually affect and transform each other. The abovementioned similarities and differences interval demonstrates the only minor qualitative and majorly qualitative differences were there between the nature of two regimes and their interaction with social forces. Therefore the first and second presidents of new liberal democracy of Kyrgyzstan faced the same fate. As we have mentioned earlier that Kyrgyzstan was forced to born as a new state after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The resource poor Kyrgyzstan was also compelled to adopt the liberal market economy to in order to sustain its statehood, therefore it was eulogized as so-called island of democracy by mostly Western states; who prefer to impose market economy on the newly born states. After that its first President Kyrgyzstan started journey on the liberal democratic path, but after few years he became succumb to demands of demands of society. He changed the style of his

rule and authoritarianism, corruption, nepotism, favouritism clannism, regionalism became the normal course of the government. But since the basic of democratic institutions were established during the early years in name of civil society, media and press, political parties. So these political institutions started protesting against Askar Akeyev after 2001-02. Which increased further and finally during parliamentary election of 2005 these forces ousted Akayev. After the Tulip revolution Kurmanbek Bakiyev came to power with new hopes but he proved worse than Akayev and followed the same strategies of Akyev with high degree of intensity of flour. Bakiyev's high degree of authoritarianism produced the results within just five years, and he was also overthrown in 2010. We must be careful about the strategy of mobilization during both revolutions. Though formal political institutions i.e. political parties, media, civil society played their role, but it was the solid support of informal institutions of clan groups and region-based networking who played the decisive role during both revolutions. So both presidents failed to deepen the democratization process in Kyrgyzstan after independence. The new constitution of 2010 attempts to make such "rule of the game" that would put control on the short sighted tendencies of political elites. Through adopting semi-parliamentary system it tries to make check and balance between state institutions to regulate their power seeking whims.

Chapter V

The Process of State-Society Interaction in
Kyrgyzstan

CHAPTER V

THE PROCESS OF STATE-SOCIETY INTERACTION IN KYRGYZSTAN

5.1 Introduction

The clan groups and regional identity-based politics have become one of the important tools for the political mobilizations in the newly started democratic politics of Kyrgyzstan. The political culture of Kyrgyzstan has been very much influenced by clan groups in the society and regional competition between northern and southern part. These two factors (i.e. clan grouping and regional division) have not only shaped the political dynamics, but also a larger value system of the country (Mohapatra, 2002:180). The study of informal actors-clan and regional grouping- is important here, because after the disintegration of USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) these two informal institutions acquired a significant role in the political scene during the transition period; they began to play a decisive role and has been crucial in charting out the political trajectory of Kyrgyzstan. Political leaders started mobilizing people on the basis of clan and regional identity.

It is a very pertinent question that why political leaders had started mobilizing people through this clan and regional identities. It is also important to analyze the role regional and clan groups in the Colour Revolutions in the Kyrgyzstan. In the transition period of Kyrgyzstan, the present chapter strives to analyze the role of clan groups and regional division in the Kyrgyzstan, especially in the context of state-society interaction. It will observe and analyze the nature of clan-based society and its interaction with state institutions vis-a-vis whole political process. It would seek the role of clan groups in the political dynamics and its repercussions. It will analyze the cleavage between north and south regions in the country; this chapter would try to seek the paradox of north and south regional politics because the political elites had played different roles during different situations. It is a very important question that regional division is how much

important for the political elites. It would analyze that why there is a difference of perception among the people of two regions towards the political system. It would also seek to find answers that why regional and clan-based grouping use to become only a political tool for political leaders.

After the independence, Kyrgyzstan had started its new model of societal development on the liberalism and individualism. As we know that one of the important pillars of liberal society is civil society, so the Kyrgyz state promoted the development of civil society organizations after independence. Resultantly, civil society started playing an important role in the political process of the country; which finally paved the way for people's uprisings in Kyrgyzstan. So, here we would analyze the role of civil society in politics of Kyrgyzstan. Civil society is considered as a third space between state and people. It plays a vital role on the one hand, educates, aware and organize the people about the government and its policies. On the other side, it tries to check the authoritarian nature of government. If the state has capability for carrying out 'legitimate violence' over its citizens, here a big question comes into the picture that who will keep checking upon this legitimate violence? Here comes the role of civil society organizations. It is a collective entity that springs from the society. It involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, passions, ideas, exchange information, achieve mutual goals, make demands from the state, and to hold state officials accountable. As Diamond stated, "Civil society is an intermediary entity, standing between the private sphere and the state (Diamond 1994: 15)." Though there are varied conceptions about purpose, limit, and scope of civil society. There is also a very complex, complicated and mysterious type of relations between civil society and state.

In the whole Central Asia as well as in Kyrgyzstan the modern civil society organizations are in the nascent stage. While many valuable works have been done on post-Communist political transformation, economic transition, and the other conflicted issues of Kyrgyzstan; but less attention has been paid to the strength, influence, and opportunities for civil society. But the role of these civil

society organizations in tulip revolution is a much disputed issue among social scientists. Therefore, it becomes a very pertinent to study the role of newly emerged civil society groups in context of Colour Revolution in Kyrgyzstan. This chapter would analyze the relationship between state and civil society organizations in Kyrgyzstan.

In the context of the state-society interaction in Kyrgyzstan, the present chapter would seek to study two important variables; first, the role of regionalism and clan groups which drags the politics and society towards traditional primordial values; second, the role of civil society groups (NGOs, Media Houses etc.), which push forward the politics and society towards modernity. So it would be very intriguing to analyze the role these two very important factors in the state-society interaction process of Kyrgyzstan within the context of Tulip Revolutions.

5.2 Clan Networks and Kyrgyz Politics

There are various social fault lines which can be counted as informal institutions, which play important role in the political process, but we would select only two of them. The first is clan groups, and the second is region based grouping. Both factors play very important role in the Kyrgyz politics. The issue is who gives importance to whom on the basis of their perspective. For example, Kathleen Collins (2002, 2006), gives importance to the kinship based clan grouping in the society. She argues that these clan groups strive to control political power as well as resources in the Central Asian Society. On the one hand, Pauline Jones Luong (2002) focuses on regional affiliations as the main element causing the fragmentation in societies in Central Asian context. But Sherbek Jurev gives importance to both and says they play their role, according to the situation (Juraev, 2008: 259). It will be helpful to discuss these perspectives briefly in order to enrich these views with various other key elements of informal dynamics as well.

Then what is a clan? Collins defines the clan as: “an informal social institution in which actual or notional kinship based on blood or marriage forms the central

bond among members. These identity networks consist of an extensive web of horizontal and vertical kin-based relations (Collins, 2002: 142).” She further explains that clan groups are an important factor in determining the nature of political regime as well as the political dynamics, since political power structure is determined by pacts among different clan groups. Any clan group claims to have common ancestry, and it may comprise several lineages. Clan members share an organizational identity and network. There will be certain unwritten norms, which would be applicable to all clan members, i.e. loyalty to their clan, inclusion of members, exclusion of outsiders, and support of the other members during the time of need. These norms actually create certain narrow, exclusivist character in any particular clan (Jacquesson 2012: 277-278).

There are some 40 different tribal unions in Kyrgyzstan, which are based on kinship relations. These tribal unions are called ‘*uruk*’. Each tribal union is subdivided into other small groups. These tribal groups are united under three common big confederations: *Ong kanat* (Right wing), *Sol kanat* (Left wing), and *Ichklik* (Neither). These three grouping creates a strong pull for the political mobilization. Moreover, this horizontal division is intersected with vertical division of the power at the legislative, executive and judiciary level the patronage networking. These clan based patronage networking pervades at all three levels of government branches, but with the difference of their degree of penetration. The Kyrgyz Republic is divided into seven *oblasts* (Province) and 39 *rayon* (districts). The first line of competition occurs between north and south region. The northern region consists of four oblasts-Chui, Issikkul, Talas, and Naryn oblast and southern part includes Osh, Jalalabad and Batken *oblast*. It should not be wise to do an all encompassing generalization because the competition between intra-oblast peoples also occurs. This case is particularly true for the northern region. Each oblast consists of several *rayons*, which determine competition between the *rayons* at the oblast level. Each rayon includes several *uruks* (tribes or clans), which compete with each other at the local level. Thus we can find three levels of completion for influence and resources; they exist at local, regional and national levels (Oraz 2006: 87-88).

In order to have an understanding the dynamics of informal networks in post-Soviet Kyrgyz politics, it is necessary to briefly dwell upon the main traits of its historical context. This would enable us to see that despite the several tsunamis that the Kyrgyzstan (in the context of Central Asia) experienced for centuries, the informal features of society largely remained intact despite some moderations from time to time. The region has adapted to these influences and retained its traditional tone of self-governance to a certain extent (Gleason, 1997). It is accepted by most scholars that, the Kyrgyz people since its early known history in the 11th century have been remained nomadic in nature (Abazov, 2004: 8). And he further argues that Kyrgyz politics mostly depended on loose tribal and regional confederations. The political authority was very fragmented and there was no central authority that could make an all-encompassing political authority. In Abazov's words, there was "not a single Sultan or Khan, a leader whose authority is recognized by all tribes: each tribe was ruled by its own tribal leader, i.e. Manaps (Abazov, 2004: 9)." Interestingly, even the literal meaning of Kyrgyz word is 'forty tribes' indicates its fragmented nature.

The socio-political structure, described above that depended on loose confederations of tribes with no overarching central authority to oversee them, did not change much under the rule of the Kokand Khanate between 1762 and 1831. The Khanate of Kokand did not make any wholehearted effort to modernize the population due to his inability in controlling of the whole region, especially over the rural and nomadic population of steppe and mountains. Kokand Khanate gained only limited control and authority with the help of already existing traditional pacts with northern regional tribal elites, which were largely nomadic in nature in comparison to sedentary southern Kyrgyzstan. This was the initial seed, which further grew and culminated in political competition between the north and south regions (Anderson 1999: 41)

After gradual weakening of the Kokand Khanate during the mid 19th century, Russian Empire got influential sway onto the region. In the process of acquiring authoritative control in Central Asia (Kyrgyzstan in the context) it took the help

of local elites of northern region; which further accentuated the political distrust between the north-south. The Tsarist Russian expansion in the region was occurred to gain mainly three reasons; first was to get strategic leverage against British Empire; the second was generating tax revenue, and the third was extracting natural resources from the region. Tsarist rule did make substantial effort to transform the region on a larger scale, but it also resulted in only minimal changes in the social characteristics. The interesting point is that even the Tsarist rule could not alter tight grip of local notables onto society and notables played mediating role between Tsarist rulers and masses ((Kaushik 1970: 78-79).

Subsequently, after the Tsarist rule, Central Asia came under the control of the Communist rule of the USSR. Moscow immediately provided recognition to disparate Central Asian communities based on ethnic, language, culture and region. The Soviet rule further initiated indigenization, national delimitation, elite purges drive, industrialization, collectivization of agriculture, and Sovietisation or Russification of the regions (Roy 2000). It is Soviet economic, social and political programmes which heavily influenced the Central Asian region as well as Kyrgyzstan. It is quite interesting to say that in spite their various efforts and policies Moscow rule had not been able to exert its full control onto the region. This happened due to traditional groupings and institutions that remained quintessentially powerful in the region adapting various strategies and tactics from time to time according to circumstances. Even this strong Soviet state could not be able to eliminate the influence of these informal networks (Gullette, 2006: 183-184).

Finally, an overall analysis of historical accounts shows that despite the reorganization of socio-political organizations in the Kyrgyzstan, one can argue that despite disparate influences in the history, traditional informal networks still remain determining influential in the politics and society in Kyrgyzstan. It is a stupendous ability of Kyrgyz society and its powerful elites that they have adapted themselves according the changing circumstances; moreover, they have left traces on its socio-political fabric that give us hints on the origin and bases of

informal dynamics of politics that we come across today. The sustenance of the clan is based on give and take relationship. The elites of any clan member need support of their non-elite member in the political arena. So they provide economic resources and other benefits such as finding a job, dealing with bureaucracy, accessing education, getting loans, etc. The non-elite members provide political support and solidarity during election and political mobilization of the people against any party or government. This mutual support happens due scarcity of resources in the Kyrgyz society. Berdikееva puts emphasis on clan groups' role in the politics of the central Asian region. She argues that clan groups are very crucial in deciding the tune of the political process in Central Asian society or in Kyrgyzstan as well. She explains the continuance of clan networks due to many factors; influence of the Soviet regime, very late state formation, and the formation of national identity after the liberalized economy are some of the important factors which are responsible for clan influence in the politics of Kyrgyzstan (Berdikееva 2006: 5-6)

The rivalry and the tussle for greater share in resources, harms the cohesion of society. This would not be healthy for new Kyrgyz democracy. This rivalry can derail the process of democratization and weaken the newly established democratic institutions, who needs more time to be mature in Kyrgyz traditional society. That is what exactly happening in Kyrgyz democracy. It is becoming the source of internal conflict and regional competition. The competing groups do not think that what is good for their broader national interests. They only follow their petty, narrow, personal, and clan interests. This problem pervades into all spheres of life in Kyrgyz polity. This clan-based rivalry puts roadblocks in state building and nation building process and complicating the development path of the country. As Collins (2006: 249) argues that "key democratic institutions - elections, the separation of powers, parties, and civil society - have been steadily undermined, penetrated, or, one might say, crowded out of business by clan politics." So it can be said that clan groups are one of determining factors, which shapes the course of politics of Kyrgyzstan decisively. This presence of the clan might be felt and seen not only within various government institutions at all

levels, but it also exists within parties and non-governmental structures. Further this clan-based structure make a kin-based patronage networks, strip state resources, crowding out formal government institutions, start mobilization during protests, and recruiting cadre for political parties. So because of the influence of clan politics, we observe personalistic, particularistic and exclusivist rule in not only in Central Asia but also in Kyrgyzstan. We also observe that this clan-based networking hinders the political and economic reform processes as well as they weakens the already weak formal institutions (Alkan 2009: 356-357).

The most severe fight between clan networks occurs at legislative branch of the power. For instance, the political parties do not have a clear ideological basis for their political organization, and at the same time, they do not have certain core vote bank in their region. So they rely on clan like social structures to attract them to win in the elections. This is one of the reasons for reform of the electoral process and cancellation of election by party list in 2003. We can see this clan-based political faction in the appointment of deputies of oblasts and other government official positions (Djunushaliev and Ploskih 2000: 148-149). One can find this clan rivalry at the local level administration and self-government bodies, where people vote for the candidates who belong to their kinship or clan groups. They consider them as their fellow brother. They feel that he would help them better than any other clan's candidate. So it can be concluded that the legislature branches are most affected from this clan-based groupings; whether it is national, regional or local level, all suffering from the same malady. This clanist structures also exist at the executive level. The President Akaev and Bakiyev had appointed most of the important ministries and government positions among their regional clan members. But nevertheless we can say that the Judiciary was least affected by this clan grouping (Oraz 2006: 87-88).

The Kyrgyz social structure is based on many norms and customs which regulate the individual behaviour and prohibits him/her to not to override them. One of such custom is called '*adat*'. It acts as a system of control of behavior before the elders. In this custom people respect their parents and elders, and they do not

disobey them. If they do not follow their suggestion, it is considered as disregard to them. Another custom which is related to clan groups is '*tooganchilik*'. It is a kind of obligation to be as a soldier of their clan, and the norm to help their fellow clan members in time of warfare, and avenge for their community members. Since war does not happen in the present days, so they help each other in time of need. These norms make a strong bonding among the clan members, which sustains this clan authority in society. During the time of protests organized by any political leader, their clan member use to participate due to this allegiance of clan's norms. These norms have become internalized, and they play very important role in the political process. The custom *tooganchilik* finds expression during the meeting of elders of the clan- *Kurultai*. The meeting of *Kurultai* paves the way for common agenda and implementation plan; in which clan leaders which are called *aksakals* decide the plan of action on any particular issue (Temirkulov 2004: 94-95).

The perfect example of this process is Aksy events of 2002. Even the in the two people's protests of 2005 and 2010 we can see the role played by these informal institutions. Obviously, one can understand that such community groups can be used by political leaders during their difficult time. Even who is in power they can easily influence them due to factors of incentive which they can provide with the help of government institutions. They can provide perks and benefits to clan leaders in return of support on important policy issues as well as in organizing protests against the opposition parties. So these clan networks have been transformed into a patron-client relationship in which one support other in the hope of securing benefits. Often government leaders call the *Aksakals* into their office and persuade them to support the government on any particular issue.¹

There is another form of clan-based relationship, which is found in the bureaucratic structure. In the bureaucracy, many officials their clan background to

¹ "Kyrgyzstan: Kinship and Patronage Networks Emerge as a Potent Political Force", [Online: web] accessed on 28 November 2016 URI: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav112106a.shtml>

find a higher position in their office. In this process, they persuade their clan leaders for help. On the other hand, during the time of difficulty, these officers help these leaders. On the other side, the clan leaders use these officials to find a job for their party cadres. Even at the time of corruption charges on any government officials the political leaders try to protect their clan members who are in charge. So again, one can argue that this clan structure has become a reciprocal relationship. The give and take is the normal course of this relationship. Even there are many posts in the government offices, which are very lucrative such as customs office. On these posts, incumbent party leaders appoint their clan member official which benefits both in making money (Oraz 2006:90).

So the above-mentioned explanation shows the clan working style. It shows that how clan groups fight each-other for resources in Kyrgyz society and that is the main reason behind the inter-clan competition. This conflict can be found from top to bottom, on each layer of the state institutions. All branches of government are affected by this in Kyrgyzstan. This rivalry very profoundly manifests itself into the Parliament. Where government leaders do not tolerate any challenge from the opposition, and they try to subdue them through authoritarian practices like Akaev and Bakiyev did during their regime. This happens due to the rapid changes in the economic and political domain. When people find it difficult to cope up with new circumstances, then they turn towards their social networks for the help. It also happened during the Soviet repressive regime, where the state machinery created a kind of fear among the common people. Then their clan members' official provided them safety and security from the government oppression. The traditional social institutions like clans are double edge sword. This social networking can be utilized to deepen the democratic institutions. But if misused, they can be a very dangerous weapon in undermining the same. During the both peoples' movement of 2005 and 2010 clan groups played important roles in the uprising against the corrupt authoritarian regime which has been mentioned in the previous chapter.

5.3 Politics of Regional Division

Another source of informal networking in the Kyrgyz political process is the regional division between north and south parts of the country. This regional divide has political, cultural, and economic dimensions. The northern part of Kyrgyzstan consists of the Chui valley with capital Bishkek, Talas, Issyk-Kul and Naryn Oblasts; while Osh, Batken and Jalal-Abad provinces come under the southern part. The geography of both regions is also different and so their life style. Northern part is mountainous area, so here the population is larger nomadic. On the other side southern region is settled and sedentary due plain and fertile Fergana valley. It means nomadic tribes dominate in the northern side. So these high mountains divide the Kyrgyzstan and make the communication difficult between the two regions. Pauline Jones Luong (2002) gives emphasis on the regional division in the deciding factor in the Kyrgyz politics than clan grouping. Luong analysis of the impact of Soviet policies on clans/tribes is quite different from the Collins' argument. She argues that the policies of the Soviet regime weakened the clan and religion based affiliations. Religion was against the Communist principles, and clan based identity was considered an institution against the modernity; therefore both were discouraged by government (Jones Luong, 2002: 52). She says-this was done through three pronged strategies adopted by Soviet regime- territorial demarcation of autonomous republics, industrialization and economic specialization of work, and finally, the creation and expansion of national cadres of the Communist Party (Gullette, 2006: 40). This regional grouping was remained intact or even got more prominence in the aftermath of sudden independence and economic reforms policies. The continuance of regional political identities after independence simultaneously ensured that the very same actors, interests, and the basis which were responsible for power asymmetries would continue to dominate the decision making process in the post-Soviet period (Luong, 2002: 53).

In the north part of Kyrgyzstan, 22% population is Russian people. This northern region is more Russified than the southern part. Most industrial complexes of the

country are located there. In other words, this region is more urbanized than the southern part. In the northern part, there is a good relationship between Russian minority and Kyrgyz majority people. Even the first President Akayev was from the north. On the other hand, relations with the Russian minority had always been peaceful in nature. In fact, many Kyrgyz attribute the relative economic and social progress of the country to the greater Russian influence (Gullette 2006: 45).

This positive perception of the Russian influence and the simultaneous negative portrayal of the Uzbek minorities is another point of divergence between the north and the south. Uzbek minorities in southern part support mostly to northern leaders. So it creates animosity between the southern Kyrgyz majority and Uzbek minorities. On the other hand, southern part consists of 13 percent of Uzbek population. The relation between Uzbek minority and Kyrgyz majority is not harmonious. Uzbeks are not treated as proper citizens by southern Kyrgyz. Even, on the eve of 1990, a bloody ethnic clash occurred between Uzbek and Kyrgyz people, which led to death of hundreds of people from both sides. In June 2010, another ethnic riot happened in Osh again and as estimated 200 people were killed in this riot; most of them were Uzbek minorities. Another feature of this ethnic divide is that Uzbeks are considered as a supporter of northern political leaders. So, this support makes them against southern political elites.² Due to plain land, most of the southern people live a settled life; agriculture is their primary source of income. On the other hand, northern highland people prefer moving around the mountains with their cattle and live a nomadic pastoral life. So this different way of economic activity also begets superiority-inferiority feeling between the north and south. Northern people are considered as traitors, because they helped Tsarist Russians during the Russian invasion. Both regions' people see themselves with mutual suspicion (Radnitz 2006: 139-140).

² "Provisional Government Grappling with Simmering Ethnic Tension in Kyrgyzstan", [Online: web] accessed on 25 December 2016 URI: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav112106a.shtml>

The presence of this economic disparity and different levels of development in the two regions reinforced the rivalry between the clans of both the regions (Berdikeeva 2006: 6). The economic disparity between the north and south has been growing since the Tsarist period. This is continuing even in Soviet rule and after independence. This further leads to mutual distrust between them. During the Soviet rule the northern part experienced the heavy industrialization and this led to economic prosperity in the northern part. While the southern part largely remained agrarian. This economic disparity between the two regions reinforces the rivalry between the clans of both regions. They, therefore, vie for resources, which led to further accentuated conflicts between northern and southern people (Graubner 2005: 6). This north-south rivalry is also reflected in the politics of the country. The economic disparity has a direct link with politics of the Kyrgyzstan. Because, it is very obvious that political leaders always catch such kind of issue to politicize them for their political ambitions. This leads to a political tussle between the two regions. When one group came to power, it always tries to exclude other from major crucial positions in the government. During the Akayev regime, the political and economic power was concentrated in the hands of northern political elites. Northerners were the first choice for political and economic appointments. In the Akayev era Bishkek became the epicenter of politics and business, and southern regions were grossly ignored. Therefore southerners followed the policy of confrontation with uncompromising stand with Akayev government due to their negative perception against government (Lewis 2010: 46).

This regional competition is used for political gain during the political crisis. Just like clan networks, this regional grouping can be leveraged to get support in the election campaign, protests against the government, and on many other political occasions. Even, both Akayev and Bakiyev did this to make a firm grip on the government. Both appointed their supporters on important political and administrative positions. This kind of regional favoritism creates again patron-client relationship. During the regime of Akayev, southerners felt marginalized and northerners during the Bakiyev regime. Akayev secured 97 percent of the

votes from Narin district. This trend can be found in almost each and every election. So this pattern of voting shows strongly biased voting behavior along regional lines. Political parties do this to gain foothold in the politics (Berdikeyeva 2006: 8). When Jones Luong's perspective is projected onto Kyrgyz politics, it results as if the political contestation in Kyrgyzstan primarily occurs between the northern and southern regions, which got politicized under Tsarist and Soviet rules (Jones Luong, 2002: 74). According to her view, it is very pertinent to understand the nature of political contestation and competition choreographed through northern and southern affiliation perspective. And it has very important implications in the context of two revolutions (so-called) happened in the country in 2005 and 2010.

5.4 Localism in Kyrgyz Politics

Scott Radnitz places another explanation of informal networks. He gives importance to local grouping behind any public figure. This local is not only a conglomeration of clan members, but contrarily, they are the group of local business groups, clan group, and patronage ties. All these are intertwined and make themselves into a collective front. Arguing through the example of Aksy event of 2002, he says these local networks operate on two levels- first, on the vertical front, people were organized for the protests through local leaders and respected men of the society, who were having legitimacy in society; second, on the horizontal front local level officials collaborated and cooperated with protesters (Radnitz 2005: 422). Local people were organized to protests through the help of classmates, colleagues, and neighbours through this horizontal networking. So Radnitz puts a prominence to more nearer local networks rather than on any 'pan regional and clan identity' because it was quite easy for the local populace to get attached with local issues that immediately affect them. He explains the Tulip revolution of 2005 through this local network thesis. He says that Kyrgyz protests were the result of local elites who organized the protests for their political leaders, who had been disqualified for various reasons from contesting elections. So this was a middle-down protest not top-down. People

were protesting for their local leaders not for their whole region or clan. In this process all local protests were channeled by national political leaders into pan-national protests against Akayev (Radnitz 2006: 133-135). The bundling of local protests into an umbrella protest shows the importance of localism or local networks which is based on patron-client relationship.

5.5 Multi layered Informal Networks

Temirkulov also acknowledges the many fault lines in Kyrgyz society, but he disagrees with other scholars, because they have generalized this phenomena. He argues that clans are informal, but they are considered as hierarchical and stable structure, but it is not so in reality (Temirkulov, 2008: 317-318). This is a fluctuating network of family members, relatives, criminals and business connections. He says the informal networks are multi-layered political competition networks, which cannot be simplified into only clan and regional level. Same like Temirkulov but on different grounds, Gullette argues that factionalism is very common in Kyrgyz society; this factionalism very strategically uses the fault lines of prevailing in society, according to situational demand in order to get resources from state (Gullette, 2006: 46). Gullette has termed this opportunistic grouping as ‘tribalism’ in the context of Kyrgyzstan. Under the light of above-mentioned key elements of informal networks, that are the baseline of political competition in Kyrgyz society; we do not confine to any of the above-mentioned elements but considers this term informal networks as an umbrella term.

5.6 Criminal Groups in Kyrgyz Politics

Criminal groups are also intermingled with the clan networks. State law enforcement agencies are very weak and ill equipped, so politicians and common people take help of them solve their disputed issues; which must be done by formal agencies. Due to this co-option the relations between criminals and politicians and clan leaders get stronger (Kupatadze 2008). Though criminal elements were active in Akaev era, but they became very powerful due to support

of Bakiyev government. Bakiyev used the criminal groups to intimidate and eliminate the opposition leaders. There was a very strong relationship between informal networks and criminal elements. In this context, above-mentioned evidences indicate the formal institutions had remained weak and fragile, and its process was postponed due to impacts of progressively growing informal networks. Even informal networks tried to play a substitute role in the political system in Kyrgyzstan (Dukenbaev & Hansen, 2003: 35).

5.7 Implications of Informal Networks

It is the irony that after the implementation of economic reforms, the state institutions got weakened in the subsequent years. In this situation, informal networks emerged as a savior of the people in their hardship days. Through the process of horizontal and vertical networking they penetrated into state structures by the strategies of clientelism, favouritism, nepotism and corruption. This informal network creates a big problem here for state institutions because through corrupt practices, the process of democratization and institution building got hampered. And this creates instability further. This informal network exists through the matrix of mutual benefits. These mutual benefits are reaped by political leaders and clan members both. Politicians get benefits because they get access to political and economic resources, and their clan and regional people also get many more advantages such as finding jobs, dealing at the bazaar, education and so on. It means these informal institutions get a strong foothold due to weakness of formal institutions (Collins 2006: 30).

To understand impacts of informal networks which shape the very nature and course of Kyrgyz politics, there are many worth mentioning points which can be explained here. Any kind of solidarity network does not create any problem, if it is not mixed up with state structures. In other words, if formal and informal structures of society get mixed then it becomes a challenge for state and nation building process. Otherwise it can be helpful in strengthening the democratic institutions (Temirkulov 2007: 7). There is no harm if informal structures are outside the formal aspects of politics. But this ideal condition does not happen on

the real ground. When people get organized through these informal institutions, they get narrowed down in thinking and world view. They mostly benefit to their fellow group members; they do not think beyond that. They do not view the whole picture of the nation and national interests. This kind of thinking generates a new kind of political culture which is based on narrow interests of their respective clan or region. This kind of clan based society would neither benefit the community nor the society.

Nevertheless Temirkulov indicates the positive side of these informal groups also. During the time of crises, these informal groups become very helpful to tackle the challenge, i.e. any natural calamity, disaster, etc. these clan groups help a number of people during the retreating of state benefits after the implementation of neo-liberal economic reforms (Temirkulov 2007: 7). These informal networks were very helpful, when they saved people from the social trauma which emerged after economic reforms and joblessness after sudden unwanted independence from the Soviet Union. These social networks provided a social safety net as well as social protection to the common man at the dreadful time of state absentia from its social responsibilities. This social safety net which was provided by solidarity groups had stabilizing effects in society; otherwise the chaos after liberalization would have been bigger (Ryabkov 2008: 310)

The aforementioned benefits of informal networks would not be possible if they were not present in a society like Kyrgyzstan, because the Kyrgyz state was not in a position to provide the social security benefits after the independence. But it is very unfortunate that these informal institutions have basically delayed the process of state and nation building. So far as the informal institutions will remain strong, the state institutions would remain weak and less effective. Because they subvert the formal institutions and their ideal working style. The loyalty to the state is more important than informal bonding. If the leader cheats their clients after winning election, then they will not support him again. But in most of the cases this does not happen, because he has to come again for election. That is the

reason that Dittmer admits that the glue that hold informal networks together and function in harmony is ‘personal loyalty’ (Dittmer, 2000: 300).

Looking at the state-society relationship from the angle of informal networks is very important in the Kyrgyz context. Because of informal networks the already very thin border get more blurred. It would be largely impossible to make any difference between legal and illegal here. It creates fluidity between state and society, both gets intermingled. They are not very strict and tight roped as expected; instead they are basically interest based and they transform themselves according to the new situation and demand. They are continually evolving and they form, dissolve and join the other networks, according to contextual demand.

5.8 Civil Society in Kyrgyzstan

At the dawn of the last decade of the 20th century, many new socio-political and economic developments have occurred in all newly independent states from former USSR. Most of them adopted the liberal democratic model of development and abandoned the erstwhile socialist model. Since the communist regime of the USSR had put a total control on society; it forcefully prohibited the political freedom of their citizens for several decades. Therefore, the people very eagerly and enthusiastically embraced the path of the liberal model, in which they started to enjoy the political freedom first time since the Soviet revolution in 1917. However, a majority of the population did not fully aware about the concept of liberal democracy; what this concept is and how it works. So it was already expected by scholars that once the liberal democratic model would be rolling out, it would flare up many new dynamics in politics of newly independent states, which were habituated into the authoritarian style of functioning (Loung 2002: 11). Now, after the journey of two and half decade under the liberal model, it would be very intriguing to analyze the preliminary outputs and experiences in order to reach out some concrete conclusions about their success or failure. This analysis would provide new insights into the contemporary politico-economic development of the Kyrgyzstan and the role played by civil society groups.

The USSR did not have free, open, vocal, autonomous civil society groups like Western liberal society, due to its Communist regime. The people were even deprived of basic political rights (Buxton and Konovalova 2007: 23). This was so because people were unaware of the liberal democratic model and its basic features; the Communist model of modernization was powerfully guided by the utmost authority of the Communist party. This was a top-bottom model of development, which alienated the people from important government's decision-making process. So in this communist political system, people were devoid of their political rights, i.e. the right to discussion, debate, and criticism. Therefore, due to lack of experience, expertise, and capacities, newly acquired political freedom after the collapse of the USSR had merely translated into electioneering and voting for a majority of the populations. The people were habituated in believing and relying on non-elected Communist officials for decades, so electing their own representative were quite a new experience for them. Thus, these new democracies are mixed up of the characteristics of Western liberal democracy and the Communist system. Consequently, the functioning style of this newly independent post-Soviet state is quite distinct and unique (Babajanian 2005:209).

The study of civil society in the context of Kyrgyzstan is very crucial, because it has adopted the path of liberal democracy after independence; in which civil society is considered a very important vehicle for democratization. The civil society has attracted the attention of scholars, because the Kyrgyz society operates in the largely primordial mode, where communal life is very strong as well as Kyrgyz society lacks the experience of civil society organizations. Moreover, these civil society organizations have been under criticism, because they have been understood as an instrument of neo-liberal market forces for the ideology promotion of neo-liberalism around the world. The ideal role of civil society is its separation from the state, but in the context of Central Asian society, it would be inappropriate to draw a watertight demarcation between state and civil society (Howell 2005: 207).

5.8.1 Civil Society under Akayev Regime

Civil society in Kyrgyzstan started functioning mainly after the independence of Kyrgyzstan. President Akayev facilitated the development of civil society organizations to attract the foreign funding. Since social conditions have always been difficult in Kyrgyzstan, it was one of the poorest Soviet republics. Unlike its neighbours, this country has no natural energy resources that would assist it for self-reliance economically and politically. So the Kyrgyz society had to become the subordinate to international donors in order to get financial assistance; same as it was erstwhile relied on Moscow's help for subsistence. That is why independent Kyrgyzstan has been called as a 'globalized protectorate' by a scholar (Petric 2005: 319) of international donors. To secure the support of Western countries, it has pursued the advices of liberal international economic advisers and implemented economic 'shock therapy' measures; and subsequently, it trapped into international debt (Pomfret 2003: 3). With the help of international donors (mostly Western countries) many new civil society organizations (namely NGOs) sprang up; nevertheless mostly in capital Bishkek. Yet, Kyrgyzstan deeply lacked necessary culture to strengthen civil society because of Soviet history of community life, and the people did not have self-organizing traits like as of self-help groups. Hence the civil society groups' emergence and democratization process have started concomitantly in the country. So the future of both was to be determined by the political elites' ambitious direction and roles played by civil society groups (Anderson 2000: 78). By adopting the myriad of reforms measures, this country in the early 1990s was hailed as an 'island of democracy' within which a vibrant space for social organizations and civil society groups did exist (Anderson 1999: 23). The aim of democratic process and civil society was to put a control on erstwhile traits of authoritarian rule and provide the way for development of democratic society.

It was expected civil society was going to be the foundation bricks of the Kyrgyz democracy. That notion of civil society, based on the non-governmental organizations (NGOs), was to work with the Kyrgyz authority to start the

democratization process in the country. In particular, it had been believed that NGOs as would promote democratic reforms and make the authority responsive by raising public awareness, monitoring national and international laws on human rights and democratic governance and targeting government institutions' repression and corruption events (Starr 1999: 165). That time the relationship between state and government was ad-hoc in nature, since both were in the phase of budding. In this period of mutual non-recognition, each sector was concerned with its own agenda. In those days non-recognition was explained by the absence of the prior experience of cooperation; the immaturity of state institutions and NGOs. The issue of the relationship between the state and non-commercial sector (NGOs) was not quite satisfactory. Despite the rapid development of civil society groups, their impact was limited to the state institutions and as well as on society. The major reason for such limited impact is the lack of cooperation between state authorities and NGOs. Problems of legislation, lack of clear and transparent financial policies in NGOs, weak organizational development, and lack of perception and necessity in interaction with regard to representatives of both NGOs and state bodies.

In the early 1990s, when NGOs were in nascent stage in Kyrgyzstan, the state led by President Akaev was very supportive of civil society groups. His, this enthusiasm for civil society seemingly stemmed from his aim to get support, especially financial, from the international community (Anderson, 1997: 316). Consequently, a legislative framework favourable to the emergence and operation of civil society was established. The Kyrgyz constitution of 1993 was a key document guaranteeing civic independent activities and freedoms; according to its Article 8, freedoms of all social organizations ought to be protected by the state. Though Akayev was initially seen as an incompetent and weak leader, but surprisingly and unexpectedly, he gave an impression of powerful and competent leader, when he spoke about his programmes of neo-liberal reforms, and he vowed for commitment to Gorbachevian vision. He met with various social groups in order to assure them, providing the ecosystem and environment to make

them nurture. So political environment was very pleasant and stress-free initially. Media outlets instantly began to open and operate in the country; many new social organizations and civil society groups got blossomed and very few of them faced any kind of legal hurdles obtaining legal sanction. He made commitments to provide the conducive environment, providing a foundation for democratization in the country (Spector 2004: 14). During first tenure of his regime, he used to meet civil society groups and leaders of political parties as well as media groups at regular interval. But some sceptics argue that it was largely an attempt to co-opt social organizations and blunt their criticisms against the government (Anderson 2000: 79). Even some critics argue that old communist elites of the Soviet system, in the new political and economic order, were playing a double role in the country's complex situation. On the one hand, they were claiming to full support for democracy and democratic values, and on the other they were trying to strengthen their position in the newly environment through patron-client networks. Nevertheless, we can say that during the early 1990s Kyrgyzstan remained the most open of the Central Asian states, and showed a relatively high degree of social pluralism (Babjanian et al. 2010).

Since mid-1990s Akayev began to lose his enthusiasm for democracy; he opposed the mindlessly following for a Western model of democracy for Kyrgyz society. Addressing a constitutional convention in December 1994, the President seemed to step back from his earlier commitment to political, economic and social reforms. Speaking of Western political forms, he argued that they were based upon a strong economy, so they had a clear and defined property relations helped to shape distinctive class and social interests, therefore in western countries we find a mature and vibrant civil society that is supported by a favourable democratic political culture and well institutionalized political parties (Pryde 1995:117). Though he argued that without these necessary preconditions it would be illogical to expect immediate results in the process democratic transformation. He said that his country was in a transitional phase so it would follow the path of evolutionary process of democratization based on the foundation of specific

traditional societal features of Kyrgyzstan. But at the official level, there were not any significant policy roadblocks against the NGOs, and response of the state was liberal enough, so that they can be autonomous enough for healthy functioning. During this period he justified his growing power, stating that it would be necessary to strengthen the capacity of the central state and grant the executive more power to forward the process of reform(Schulte 2008: 8).

Moreover, from mid-1990s, Kyrgyzstan's experiment with liberal democratic politics was becoming a little bit cumbersome task. Akayev was now becoming intolerant towards his critics. Several journalists critical to the regime were subjected to harassment as well as criminal prosecution from state agencies. Parliamentary elections in February 1995 were characterized by considerable manipulation. There were also some degree of electoral irregularity, which was evident in the Presidential election in December that year (Anderson1996: 530). In December 1995, Askar Akayev became the President for the second term. He started to weaken the democratic norms and institutions by using the tool of referenda; he extended his power through referendums in 1996, 1998 and 2003 in the next ten years till the 'Tulip Revolution' in March 2005. He had far greater personal power than the erstwhile communist leaders of Kyrgyzstan. But the formal extension of his power entailed no guaranteed increase in the actual penetration in society. Moreover, another consequence of these developments was a harm of Kyrgyzstan's image as an 'island of democracy', and the creation of a more suffocating political atmosphere in the country. Though the state still permitted a considerable degree of social pluralism, evident in the rise of registered social organizations to well over a thousand by 1997, an informal distinction was increasingly made between the 'harmless or useful' and the 'critical' categories of NGOs (Anderson 1996: 531). Thus, while some got flourished in the mid-1990s, others-notably some of the human rights groups and the settlers' movement, such as Yntymak-were subject to increasing pressures from the authorities.

At the same time, many parliamentarians came to the forefront as the defenders of their constitutionally granted privileges; they wanted to safeguard the right to criticize and social activism by civil society. Though laws were made to restrict the rights of the press and rights to hold meetings near the official building. These developments suggest that what we have seen in Kyrgyzstan since the late 1980s should be seen in terms of ‘liberalization’ of economy rather than ‘democratization’ of political system (Anderson 2000: 80). So the formation of a ‘public space’ by political elites, that has not been fully institutionalized, and that can be restricted or removed with very little difficulty. In such circumstances social organizations may flourish, but they were located mainly in capital Bishkek, and the political context was only partially supportive of civil society, despite the extensive and seemingly liberal regulatory framework.

5.8.2 State-NGOs Relations during Akayev Era

Kyrgyz NGOs functioned within a law on public associations introduced in 1990. The law was adopted during the last years of the Soviet Union; it governs the not-for-profit organisations, which included trade unions, political parties, cultural associations, and charitable organisations. According to the law, a not-for-profit organisation was supposed to emerge on a voluntary basis. Upon registration they could own their property, establish mass media, publish, and act as a juridical entity. In 1999, a law on non-commercial organisations was adopted for NGOs in Kyrgyzstan. It separated NGOs from political parties, trade unions, and religious organisations; it also eased NGO registration required rules. The law also introduced a tax exemption for NGOs receiving grants. It was recognised by the ‘International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law’ (ICNL) as one of the most liberal in the former Soviet Union (Jailobaeva, 2011: 164). In other words, the attitude of the Kyrgyz government towards NGOs throughout the 1990s was relatively positive and favourable.

In 1998, the Forum of NGOs was established with the aim to observe elections and promote civic education. Its first activity was training 150 independent

observers to monitor a referendum in several regions of Kyrgyzstan. A year later the forum was registered as the “Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society (CDCS).” It held a large campaign on election observation for local councils in 1999. The campaign involved 130 NGOs and 2000 citizens. This was an unprecedented activity in Kyrgyzstan; as a result of the campaign, 1849 people were accredited as independent election observers. Building upon such activities and gained experience, the coalition was engaged in different activities related to elections, such as reforming the election code). Further, it also moved to offering vigorous and critical assessments of the government's actions and public affairs generally (Marat 2008: 238).

These types of activities gave a new twist to the attitude of the state towards NGOs and its perception of them. From the standpoint of the Kyrgyz officials, all disagreement with the state is political dissent. Consequently, NGOs such as the CDCS started to be seen as part of the opposition. This meant that the nominal state promotion of civil society came to an end, since it realised that civil society institutions could criticise it. On the whole, in the mid 1990s, Akaev opted to change his governance strategy in the direction of centralisation of power by initiating referenda to amend the constitution in 1994 and 1996 (Huskey, 1997b; Anderson, 1997).

There were a number of issues with the referendum. For example, Gleason asserted (1997: 100) that Akaev's referendum in 1994 to change the structure of the parliament was clearly illegal because “Kyrgyzstan's constitution empowered only the parliament, not the president, to call referendum.” These types of activities gave a new twist to the attitude of the state towards NGOs and its perception of them. Furthermore, according to the reports of international organisations from 2000 to 2005, a few NGO leaders, who criticised the state publicly, were either attacked or threatened. For example, the 2002 HRW Report stated that the head of the Coalition had been attacked outside of her house after criticising the state at a round table. In 2004, the head of a Civil Society Support NGO received threatening calls regarding her criticism of a government plan on a

constitutional reform at a UNDP meeting. In the same year, state-owned and pro-government media outlets began publishing articles critical of local and foreign NGOs. One of the criticisms was that NGOs intended to destabilise the situation in Kyrgyzstan (Jailobaeva, 2011: 45).

However, according to different reports, Akayev's government had better relations with NGOs dealing with social issues. For example, NGOs working on education enjoyed much more freedom and state support (Abazov 2003). The Assembly of the People of Kyrgyzstan, which brought together several large public associations and cultural centers, was chosen by the Akayev government as a focal point of state interaction with civil society. The organisation was given the status of a "consultative and advisory organ under the President of the Kyrgyz Republic" (Abazov 2003). Furthermore, the government created so called 'governmental NGOs' (GONGOs). For example, in 2000 an Association of NGOs was established. Local NGOs were encouraged to join it. The Association of NGOs was reported to have been inactive during the first year following its establishment. It has not been mentioned in the reports since the mid 2000s. In 2004, Akayev's government created an agency for relations with society to monitor and co-opt local NGOs. In general, the reports suggest that, under the rule of Akayev, NGOs enjoyed much more freedom than the media and political opposition and were relatively better protected by legislation. The state interfered little in NGO activities, except for the cases of large human rights NGOs. Even in their cases, state actions against them were not severe and did not involve heavy violence, but rather they were restricted to detentions, short-term imprisonments, fines, and refusals of permission to hold a protest event. This suggests that Akayev's government still remained relatively liberal towards NGOs, particularly in comparison with other states in the region (Marat 2008: 240).

5.8.3 Civil Society under Bakiyev Regime

Just like Akayev, Bakiyev regime was also afraid of criticism coming from any source. It attempted to curb the criticism came from various NGOs through

making new tougher laws. Demonstration against the State was a major source of instrument to show their anger against the government. Therefore, the government under Bakiev limited the freedom of demonstration through decrees on protests and demonstrations. The new law stated made the any public demonstration tougher. The decree served as a basis for the introduction of the amendments to the law on the rights of citizens which narrates about the right of citizens to assemble and to freely hold meetings and demonstrations without weapons in August 2008. The revised law also requires citizens to inform the state authorities about their perspective demonstration in advance and wait for their permission. Otherwise, the demonstrations can be regarded as illegal.³

It had become risky to citizens to hold the meeting because of afraid of being targeted by the regime. People had to pay fine or face trial by the government; so this paved the way for limited protests. It means government deprived the citizen to voice their concern in the name of national security. So Bakiyev governments cheated the people and denied to fulfill its erstwhile made comments. Even, in fact, the 2007 constitution of Kyrgyz Republic did not mention anything about Kyrgyz people striving for democratic civil society. Moreover, Bakiyev criticized the Western model of democracy based on elections and human rights would not be appropriate for Kyrgyzstan in March 2010. He proposed a new ‘consultative model of democracy’ for Kyrgyzstan. This new type of democracy would be based on consultations among powerful and influential societal groups with deep roots in Kyrgyz traditions and culture. He advised that this model would be more suitable for Kyrgyz society (Marat 2008:229-230).

So, the above-mentioned developments demonstrate that Kyrgyz second President Kurmanbek Bakiyev adopted two-pronged strategy in relation to non-governmental organizations (NGOs). On the one hand, his government was open

³ “Bakiyev Regime Suppresses Young Civil Society Activists”[Online: Web] Accessed On 15 July 2015 Url: <https://www.Cacianalyst.Org/Publications/Field-Reports/Item/11554-Field-Reports-Caci-Analyst-2008-1-23-Art-11554.Html>

to cooperate and collaborate with those NGOs whose activities did not involve any kind of criticism of government. Government shared their agenda, provided information and took consultations regarding many policy related issues. On the other hand, however, it took harsh measures against those NGOs who were critical of government policies and actions. So it took a number of initiatives to limit their activities through legislative and executive orders. So Bakiyev attitudes were more or less similar to Akaev regime. Both were provided support to NGOs who put support to a regime and came down heavily on critical NGOs on government. Both attempted to concentrate power in their hands and then powerfully curtailed on regime's opposing NGOs. Though the Bakiev government' approach was tougher than Akaev, but it did not reach at the level of Russia and Uzbekistan in respect of controlling NGOs activities and funding sources. As earlier stated that its approach was dual and for some NGOs it was facilitating; and for others it was autocratic. For pro-government its attitude was positive and for critical NGOs it adopted the harsh measures. Since the government did not provide any funding to NGOs, so its harsh measures cannot affect as much as it was in Russia and Uzbekistan. Even the politicized NGOs enjoy relatively much freedom against their counterparts in Central Asia. Yes, it is true that crack down on media and religious groups was more harsh than because they faced considerable legislative oppression, physical attacks, imprisonment and even murderous attacks (Juraev 2008:256).

5.8.4 Role of Civil Society Groups in Colour Revolution

The Tulip Revolution was the first Kyrgyz Revolution, which overthrew President Askar Akaev regime after the parliamentary elections of 27 February and 13 March 2005. The main rationale of the revolution was to end the increasingly corrupt and authoritarian rule imposed by Akayev regime particularly during his second tenure. It was a showcase of accumulated grievances against the high handed measures of the government. Following the first round of elections, concerned by the development of 20 January 2002, the NGO "Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society" announced that they would begin to educate 120

observers for the election. The government responded by proclaiming that the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) would send 100 observers to monitor the polls. The INGOs also played a vital role in promoting anti-government demonstrations. As has been elaborated, the donor-centric nature of civil society led to absolute control of the Kyrgyz society by the INGOs. Fiona Adamson's finds;

“Local NGOs receive almost 100 percent of their funds from international actors and can easily become almost 100 percent donor driven. International donors implicitly or explicitly expect local NGOs to administer programmes that do not necessarily match local needs.”

Various strategies were adopted by the INGOs in the name of democratisation to bring about a regime change in Kyrgyzstan. They sought to win over local elites to Western ideas and models. They organised conferences, seminars, ‘technical assistance’ and exchange programmes with Kyrgyz elites, believing that domestic political change comes from exposure to Western ideas. That this tactic worked was evident by the trend among the Kyrgyz business and political elites to endorse closer security and economic relationships with the US. Kurmanbak Bakiyev of the National Movement of Kyrgyzstan, the man who replaced Akayev as Prime Minister after the Tulip Revolution, was himself sent to the US on an exchange programme. Felix Kulov, the new head of security, and Omurbek Tekebayev, the new Speaker of the Parliament after the Tulip Revolution, were also beneficiaries of State Department-sponsored visitors’ programmes (Chaulia 2005).

The INGOs funded projects for publishing anti-government newspapers, training youth “infected” with the democracy virus through US-financed trips to Kiev for a glimpse of the Orange Revolution, and mobilising fairly large crowds in Bishkek who stormed Akaev’s presidential palace and in the southern towns of Osh and Jalalabad. USAID “invested at least \$2 million prior to the elections” (Escobar 2005). The Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society (CDCS) and Civil Society against Corruption (CSAC), key local NGO partners of the NED, played a very active role with anti-Akaev parties without any impartiality. The US

Embassy in Bishkek, continuing the murky tradition of interventionist behaviour in crises, worked closely with INGOs like Freedom House and the Soros Foundation, supplying generators, printing presses and money to keep the protests boiling until Akaev fled. Information about where protesters should gather and what they should bring spread through State Department funded radio and TV stations, especially in the southern region of Osh. Thus, it becomes apparent that US influence provided the impetus for the anti-government demonstrations. CDCS head, Edil Baisolov, admitted that the uprising would have been “absolutely impossible” without this coordinated American effort. On the utility of the INGOs to the entire exercise of the Tulip Revolution, it is evident that during the Tulip Revolution of 2005 both NGOs and INGOs played a prominent role, despite the fact that Akaev accused them of being used as a tool to destabilize the region and creating unrest in the country. But the authorities underestimated the role of civil society groups involvement in demonstrations and their firm commitment to democracy. The CSOs played the role of election observer, monitoring and educating the people. They even played the role of a mediator in Jalalabad, the first area of mass protests (Paasiaro 2009: 59).

So one can argue that state-CSOs relationships had many features in the context of Kyrgyzstan. There were/are CSOs who have collaborated with the government on various issues and supported the government with their fund raising capacity, training capacity, and other roles. But on the contrary, there are others whose relationship with state institutions is grounded on suspicions and mistrust. If someone criticize government on any issue, he/she are threatened in retaliation. In fact, we can easily assess that NGOs, who negotiate with government their agenda with government, they also pressurize the government to make them agree by lobbying, demonstrating, criticizing. So they have counterbalanced the government through above-mentioned means and have been able to put at least minimum check and balance on the state agencies. So it is not that civil society, especially NGOs are not active as proclaimed by some scholars (Roy 2002:145). Even some of them are involved as playing the catalyst role in political activism.

The most noticeable example of civil society and NGOs activism would be mentioning the retaliatory protest by a watchdog NGO against the criminal Rysbek's protest against Prime Minister Felix Kulov in 2006. This task was a courageous one, in spite of life threats from many criminals. In other words, NGOs do not shy themselves from politically conflicted as well as pressing issues. Conversely, they have drawn the attention of people and government through various methods and mechanisms to deal with those issues. This stand becomes more important in the context of weak political parties. Even NGOs have produced a many competent politicians in Kyrgyzstan. For example, the former chief of staff to the interim government was from the NGO sector. One scholar also claims that NGOs have been very effective in affecting the state-society relations against the argument posed by Oliver Roy (2002: 144) and capacity building of societal forces (Paasiaro 2009:71). So we can see that civil society organizations have been able to produce leaders who together with personal goals have promoted the wider public interests as well.

So it is pertinent question that to what extent state-building agenda of government have been successful in making state accountable and responsible to its citizen? The answer is yes, despite the curtailment efforts by the Bakiyev government through various measures such as law amendments, turning more authoritarian, asserting a Kyrgyz style of liberal democratic government the NGOs became progressively empowered and vocal enough to protest against the government to make them responsive to its people (Reeves, 2010: 77)). In the context of role of major powers aftermath of 9/11 attacks, it is obvious that they did not care about the common people who were suffering the negligence and atrocities of Bakiev, instead they (namely America and Russia) pursued their own interests and ignored the common interests of the people. That paved the way for another second people's uprising and subsequent ouster of Bakiyev from power. So it can be argued that in pursuance of their own geopolitical interests the powerful players did not care about socio-political and economic conditions of Kyrgyzstan. In the name of 'war on terror' United States of America wittingly ignored the plight of common Kyrgyz people and more than that, it neglected the democratic

norms and principles of which it claims to be guardian in the world and fought wars in the name of democracy's defender. For this reason, it has been asserted that the case of Kyrgyzstan is not only the failure of the state, but also of *realpolitik*. Finally, above account of state-civil society relations has demonstrated that state in Kyrgyzstan is still weak in the context of its capacity. Its weakness is related to its Soviet past. Local and regional governments are weaker and they have an urge to please the central government in order to get funding and other supports from central government of Kyrgyzstan. In other words, one can argue that the Kyrgyz state is still functioning in the Soviet style, where state officials use to get more concerned about their power positions rather than technical efficiency of their actions which can produce better output in policies (Reeves:80).

5.9 Conclusion

In the context of the state-society interaction in Kyrgyzstan, the present chapter has dealt with the role of two important variables- informal institutions and civil society. In the informal institutions we have selected the role of clan groups, regional division regarding the Kyrgyz politics. There are some forty larger clan groups in Kyrgyzstan, which are also divided into small kinship groups based on blood relations. There are be certain unwritten norms, which would be applicable to all clan members, i.e. loyalty to their clan, inclusion of members, exclusion of outsiders, and support of the other members during the time of need. The members of any clan and kinship share an organizational identity and network. Another source of informal networking in the Kyrgyz political process is the regional division between north and south parts of the country. The historical, political, cultural, and economic dimensions accentuate the rivalry between north and south part of Kyrgyzstan.

The new constitution of Kyrgyz incorporated the "rules of game" of liberal democratic politics after independence. It is the irony that after the independence and implementation of neo-liberal economic reforms, the Kyrgyz state institutions were unable to fulfill the demands of people due to lack of resources and resultant

weak capacity of state intuitions. In this situation, informal networks (clan and regional based networks among people) emerged as a savior of the people in their hardship days. Meanwhile after the adopting the multi-party democracy, the social elites also started competing in the electoral process. And the long historical legacies of pre-Tsarist, Tsarist, the Soviet period also provided base for the continuance of these informal institutions. Through the process of horizontal and vertical networking they penetrate into state structures through the strategies of clientelism, favouritism, nepotism and corruption. So these informal networks create a big problem here for state institutions and the process of democratization and institution building get hampered. And this creates instability further in the political system. during the protests of first colour revolutions the southern people were instrumental, they came to support the southern clan and regional political leaders. On the other hand in the second people' uprising in 2010 northern regional and clan groups played important role.

This informal institution exists through the matrix of mutual benefits. These mutual benefits are reaped by political leaders and clan members both. Politicians get benefits because they get access to political and economic resources, and their clan and regional people also get many more advantages such as finding jobs, dealing at the bazaar, education and so on. It means these informal institutions get a strong foothold due to weakness of formal institutions. But it is very unfortunate that these informal institutions have basically delayed the process of state and nation building. Informal institutions make the state institutions weaker and less effective. Because, they subvert the formal institutions and their ideal working style and we know the loyalty to the state is more important than informal bonding in a modern democracy state. So through their vertical and horizontal networking web-like structure, and penetration into state institutions at all levels, informal institutions (especially clan groups and regional groups) obstruct the democratic process of the country. Further the state institutions do not function properly due to heavy influence of informal institutions, and subsequently they capacity get becomes weaker to fulfill the needs of society. So this proves my hypothesis that informal institutions (like regional groups, clan groups, etc.) obstruct the

democratic process and, thus, state institutions are comparatively weaker in Kyrgyzstan.

Since Kyrgyz constitution adopted the liberal democracy in 1993. Kyrgyz President Asakar Akayev initially very enthusiastic about the democratic consolidation in the country. He provided all necessary ecosystems for the development of civil society groups. The civil society groups got its initial footprints as NGOs supported and funded by Western countries. These NGOs started helping the people in their various social, economic and political activities. But civil society groups started being pressurized from the government agencies after mid-1990s when President Akayev began to behave in authoritarian manner. He alleged that Western civil society groups are creating hurdles in the development of country. When slowly-slowly he became more corrupt, nepotistic and authoritarian, then opposition parties and leaders became wary about his rule and started organizing people against him. Finally after the fraudulent parliamentary election of 2005 political leaders with their supporters organized mass movements across the country and ultimately he was toppled by the protesters. The next President Bakiyev also almost copied his steps; he also came to power with promising for democratic reforms and ended with authoritarian government. He was also ousted by people in 2010. The roles of civil society groups in these two movements were quite important, especially in the first movement of 2005. Many INGOs organized and educated protesters about the methods of protesting. Since the second uprising was so spontaneous that civil society could not take part in it, though they were organizing various demonstrations against the Bakiyev government for last five years. So we can say that civil society groups are one of the most important elements of Kyrgyz democracy.

Chapter VI

Conclusion

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The “state-in-society” perspective attempts to understand the nature of societal development by placing the state within its social setting. The very state-in-society perspective is an attempt to know the susceptibility of the state institutions to the influences of societal forces in a particular society. This approach does this through re-situating the state in their social setting (Migdal 1994:1). The search for the explanation for different state institutions in their respective societies has paved the way for “state-in-society” perspective. Migdal says that this “state-in-society approach” is a process oriented approach and it illuminates how state authority and power is exercised in any state and how and when such pattern of power gets changed. This approach demonstrates that the state is a fragmented entity and it is not a unified, goal oriented cohesive organization as proposed by Weber. A multitude of social organizations (family, clans, MNCs, domestic and foreign business elites, criminal groups, tribes, political parties, patron-client dyads, etc.) maintain and vie for power and try to set the rules for guiding people’s behaviour. The struggle between various institutions of the state and society determine how society and the state create and maintain a distinct way of structuring day-to-day life, including the nature of rules that govern the people’s behaviour. This undergoing process is the main focus of study in “state-in-society approach” (Migdal 2004).

The post-Soviet societies are very complex in nature; therefore the state has not been able to get enough authoritative capabilities in these developing societies. Therefore, in the such societies, the state is not able to implement the rules of social control through its laws, symbols, and values across the society. In these societies, the nature of social structures is very intertwined, and hence state institutions are not coherent, organized unit; they are very much disorganized and scattered and unable to put a unified control system. Their social organizations are

not having a national character; instead, they are having a “weblike structure”, which are a conglomeration of local social organisations (Migdal 1988: 39). These local social organisations come under disparate segmented authorities such as local strongmen, local former leader, local rich landlords, clan leader, community elders etc. (Migdal 1988:33). These local leaders hold the authority in their respective domain; though such authority could be characterized as partially segmented authority.

The study underscores the State-Society Interaction and Political Development during the Soviet period in Kyrgyzstan. The history of Kyrgyzstan has strong imprints on its state-society interaction process. It is found that the current upheavals in Kyrgyzstan also have imprints of historical legacy. Its historical legacy could be categorized under three broad categories: pre-Tsarist Period, Tsarist Period, and the Soviet Period. All three periods have impacted the societal forces as well as the interaction with political authority.

During the antiquity, before the invasion of Islam Kyrgyz tribes were known as Sogadians. It is very interesting to know that even at that time contemporary existing larger tribal confederations - *Ong Kanat, Sol Kanat and Ichklik* - were present in Kyrgyz land. The society was divided into various tribal groups where *Aga Bii* is called as their chief/master, and known as the sole representative of their internal and external issues. This period was the era of cooperation and mutual help between people and their tribal chief. During the 7-8th century Kyrgyz land came under the Arab rule and expanded accordingly. This period was characterized by oppression and coercion of Islamic rule over Sogadian people. During the Mongol rule the relationship between political authority and people were not so antagonistic like under Arab rule. In this period, separate Turkic dialect was developed, and separate Kyrgyz identity at the local level also got sprouted. During the Khanate rule since 18th to mid 19th century the rule of the Kokand Khanate was coercive and authoritarian. Khanate rulers were Uzbeks and since then the animosity and mistrust are found between Uzbek and Kyrgyz

communities. Due to its economic, political and strategic interests, the Tsarist rulers invaded the Central Asian region, and the modernization and urbanization started during the Tsarist rule. During the Tsarist rule the political authority was very centralized where various new powerful actors also emerged after the weakening of old tribal chiefs and Ulemmas. Though some sections of Kyrgyz society were dissatisfied with Tsarist regime, but they could do nothing against the very powerful Tsarist regime. The above history shows that informal institutions have deeper roots in Kyrgyz society, which affect the interaction of society with state institutions. The tribal nature of society creates the base for fragmentation in Kyrgyz society.

After the Communist Revolution in Russia, Communist regime came to power. During the Lenin period, Kyrgyz nationalists were given considerable autonomy and right to self determination, albeit in principle. Stalin period was the worst period for the Kyrgyz people because many people were killed during the purge drive; though this period is also marked with industrialization and collectivization in the Kyrgyzstan. In 1936, Kyrgyzstan became the separate autonomous republic during the Stalin regime. Brezhnev and Khrushchev period gave some space to local and regional leaders of the Kyrgyzstan. The interaction between the Soviet state and Kyrgyz society restarted. Regional leaderships were given space to manage some domestic affairs. During the Gorbachev era, Kyrgyzstan has experienced Glasnost and Perestroika. It was launched to improve the relation between the state and society which was ruptured due to corruption, authoritarianism and nepotism under Soviet regime. During the Gorbachev period Kyrgyz civil society also flourished to some extent, and new democratic politics began to take shape. But the Kyrgyz society was not apprehensive like other Soviet republics, instead they wanted to remain with the Soviet Union under a confederation like structure.

Further, the study focusses on the Institutional Structure and Constitutional processes of Kyrgyzstan where it brings out that institutional structures developed

gradually over the years. The Constitution of Kyrgyzstan in 1993 provided liberal democratic provisions for the state-society interaction. The political elites especially Askar Akayev and Kurmanbek Bakiyev manipulated the citizens in the name of democracy and good governance. Both of them organized referendums in the name of democratic development to make them more powerful. Kyrgyzstan's 1993 Constitution explained the separation of powers between legislative, executive and judicial branches of the government, where the role of president was very crucial and important. The President would be the head of the state, and also the guarantor of the Kyrgyz Constitution, laws and the rights and freedom of citizens.

These provisions make the President more powerful in the Kyrgyz Constitution, and which was misused by political elites, including Akayev and Bakiyev. Both of them misused power for their own benefit. They did not use power for the sake of the democratic development of the country which is reflected in some instances, such as the October 1994 referendum which made the parliament bicameral so as to confirm that no one would be able to unite against the President; through 1996 referendum the president could dissolve the parliament, if it failed to approve the nominee for President for three times; and the referendum of 1998 was related to land reforms and privatization of public properties, through which Akayev made inroads for grabbing state resources for his family and loyal clan groups, who largely hailed from northern part of the country. Through October 2007 referendum Bakiyev dismissed the Kyrgyz government cabinet without giving any proper reasons to either the parliament or the people. He held power to appoint the chairman and members of almost all important bodies, such as national security council, prosecutor general.

Deputies of the parliament also failed to provide qualitative environment for debate and discussion. They have not been able to provide the role of visionary politicians. Kyrgyz Parliament was very active during initial years. The initial activism did not last long and this law making body got engulfed into inter-

deputies fighting for their sheer narrow interests. Askar Akayev took advantage of this infighting and played the politics of 'divide and rule'. Even it is also true that during early years after 1993, the political leaders were struggling to get powerful positions in the ministry and other departments to grab resources of the state. Local constituency of leaders supported some of the corrupt leaders so that these leaders may provide the share of the resources grabbed through patron-client networks.

The Kyrgyz constitution also provides provisions for an independent judiciary. The Constitutional Court shall be the highest body of judicial power that will protect the Constitution of Kyrgyzstan. The judiciary of Kyrgyzstan is also plagued by Soviet inheritance where the appointments were made by the President on the recommendation of the executive and judiciary, which often gives decisions in the favour of the President. Powerful politicians are involved in corruption but are not punished by the courts, which creates distrust among public towards judiciary. The Constitutional court adjudged the new constitution of 2006 null and void which shows the influence of President on judiciary both directly or indirectly. Thus, the judiciary which is the protector and guarantor of the constitution also failed to provide good examples, and therefore failed to push forward the institutionalization of democracy in the country.

It is also true that the Kyrgyz state lacked enough capacities to perform its duties properly. It is also resource constrained state with a large mountainous terrain, which inhibits its development; but on the other hand its leadership also has not shown long term vision for the country's progress. Therefore, the peoples' uprising in 2005 and 2010 (popularly known as Colour revolutions) played pivotal role for overthrowing the two incumbent Presidents from power. Though Kyrgyz Constitution had all required provisions of a liberal democracy but the political elites – earlier Presidents, Party leaders and Parliamentary deputies failed to deepen the process of democratization of Kyrgyzstan. Therefore, they failed to strengthen the democratic institutions in the newly established liberal democracy

which proves the second hypothesis that “*Failure on the part of the political elite to deepen the process of democratization has contributed towards the spurt of Colour revolutions in Kyrgyzstan*”. The reason for not being able to deepen the democratization process in the country is the lack of long term vision of the political elites.

However, the new Constitution of June 2010 makes an attempt to establish a semi-parliamentary system in Kyrgyzstan. It provides some hope for democracy in Kyrgyzstan. It seems that the political leaders and people of the country are becoming gradually aware about the functioning of democratic institutions. Though the new constitution of June 2010 makes an attempt to establish a semi-parliamentary system in Kyrgyzstan, but at the same time the new document tries to weaken some of the important powers of the President. For instance, Kyrgyz President would be selected for six years only, and would not be selected twice for the post of the President. The Kyrgyz Parliament (Jogorku Kenesh) shall consist of 120 deputies elected for a five year term on the basis of proportional representation; no party would get more than mandated 65 seats of Jogorku Kenesh. Also, no President could create hegemony in the parliament through ones’ own party, like earlier Askar Akayev and Bakiyev made their political parties i.e. “Alga Kyrgyzstan”, and “Ak Jhol” respectively.

Further, the study underlines the *political changes and nature of the Colour Revolutions and* has dealt with the political developments that led to the two people’s movements in Kyrgyzstan. It has underlined the internal as well as the external factors that led to the colour revolutions in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 and 2010. Moreover, it also explores the strategy of mobilization during the movements against the presidents by people and political leaders. These two people’s uprisings culminated in the ouster of the duo incumbent Presidents Askar Akayev and Kumanbek Bakiyev respectively. The new constitution of 1993 incorporated all those provisions which are fundamental for liberal democracy.

Askar Akayev avowed for embracing a liberal market economy; ensure the civil-political rights; initiate the process of democratization; maintain amicable ethnic relations between various ethnic groups, state based on the rule of law, liberal political competition. However, since 1995 Askar Akayev began to change his path to make his position stronger. Through various tactics he began to reverse the democratization process in the country. Those tactics were: using the referendums to dilute the parliamentary procedures, reducing the power of the Prime Minister and cabinet, concentrating all important powers in the hands of the president, misusing the powers of appointing various government posts, appointing his favourite judges, setting up a weak election commissions, appointing his family, clan members on important posts, threatening and pressurizing media, opposition and civil society groups. It means that Akayev failed to consolidate the democratic institutions.

Next President Kurmanbek Bakiyev applied almost the same tools, but the only difference was the Akayev was liberal than Bakiyev to some extent. Bakiyev regime was more oppressive than Akayev. However, during the Akayev regime, his family members controlled the state institutions informally, but Bakiyev controlled the state institutions more formally and appointed his family members on different important government positions. Bakiyev's family members were hugely involved in the business. The main internal-external factors that led to Colour revolutions in Kyrgyzstan were public anger due to economic downturn and deteriorating living conditions, capturing of state resources and offices, criminalization of politics, united front (PMK) of opposition parties, rivalry between northern and southern clan groups, constant pressure for media, important role of civil society groups (especially western funded NGOs and INGOs), patron client networks, regional and internal environment (especially during Tulip revolution 2005), and support of western countries (especially during 2005 revolution).

A comparative analysis of both the revolutions revealed the nature of state society interaction in Kyrgyzstan. It shows the relationship between state and social forces. There are few similarities between both the revolutions, such as both the Presidents did not fulfil their promises, and ruled the country by using their clan-regional and neo-patrimonial networks. Both tried to provide undue benefits to political elites of their family, clan and region, and also tried to capture the state resources. They also terrorized the opposition parties, media groups and civil society groups, misused the machinery for personal benefits, and alleged the role of foreign hands in the domestic affairs. These all led to the disparity between rich and poor during both the regimes.

So far as the differences between the two colour revolutions are concerned, there are many differences. First, the immediate causal factor for the Tulip Revolution of 2005 was parliamentary elections i.e. the fraudulent elections were the main immediate cause of Tulip Revolution. But in 2010 the rising gas prices and electricity tariffs were the chief igniting causes. Second, during the 2005 protest opposition political parties, media, civil society groups played an active role, but in 2010 the main opposition leaders could not participate as they were arrested just a day before the protest started. This suggests that the revolution of 2010 was totally driven by the masses, making it a people's movement in the true sense. Third, foreign funded NGOs played an important role during the first colour revolution, but they were not so active during second revolution. Fourth, first uprising was protracted and was over within two months, but second one ended within just two days. Fifth, the first movement was less violent than second revolution. Almost 200 people were killed during 2010 revolution. Sixth, the main difference which is very pertinent to mention here that the first revolution involved three interests i.e.- material, solidarity and purposive, and these were igniting factors for the revolution of 2005, but in 2010 revolution, the purposive interest was the prime one compared to the other two (Temirkulov 2010: 598-599).

The state-society interaction is all about making and implementing the “rules of the game” over society, and for understanding this, the state-in-society perspective attempts to analyze this process through locating the state institutions in its internal and external social settings. This perspective proposes that the state institutions are susceptible to their societal forces, and both mutually affect and transform each other. The above-mentioned similarities and differences demonstrate that only minor qualitative and majorly quantitative differences existed between the nature of two regimes and their interaction with social forces. Therefore, the first and second Presidents of new liberal democracy of Kyrgyzstan faced the same fate. As it is mentioned earlier that Kyrgyzstan was forced to be born as a new state after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The inadequate resources of Kyrgyzstan compelled to adopt the liberal market economy in order to sustain its statehood. Therefore, it was eulogized as so-called island of democracy by mostly Western states, who preferred to impose market economy on the newly born states. After that its first President started experiencing the journey of the liberal democratic path, but after few years he succumbed to the demands of the society. Akayev changed the style of his rule, and authoritarianism, corruption, nepotism, favoritism clannism, regionalism became the normal course of the government. But since the basis of democratic institutions were established during the early years in the name of civil society, media and press, political parties, so these institutions started protesting against Askar Akeyev (Akayev, consistency) after 2001-02, which paved the way for parliamentary election of 2005, and finally, these forces ousted Akayev. After the Tulip revolution (2005) Kurmanbek Bakiyev came to power with new hopes, but his regime was more ruthless than the Akayev’s regime. He followed the same strategies of Akyev but in an intensified manner. Due to the Bakiyev’s high degree of authoritarianism, he was overthrown in 2010.

One must be careful about the strategy of mobilizations during both the revolutions. Though formal political institutions, i.e. political parties, media, civil society played their role, but there was the solid support of informal institutions of

clan groups and region-based networking who played the decisive role during both the revolutions. Thus, both the Presidents failed to deepen the democratization process of Kyrgyzstan. However, the new Constitution of 2010 attempts to make such “rule of the game” that put control on the short sighted tendencies of political elites. By adopting semi-parliamentary system it tries to maintain checks and balances between state institutions to regulate their power seeking whims.

The study explains the process of State-Society Interaction in Kyrgyzstan and emphasizes on the role of two important variables- informal institutions and civil society. In the informal institutions, the study has selected the role of clan groups and regional division affecting the Kyrgyz politics. There are some forty larger clan groups in Kyrgyzstan, which are also divided into small kinship groups based on blood relations. There are certain unwritten norms, which would be applicable to all clan members, i.e. loyalty to their clan, inclusion of members, exclusion of outsiders, and support of the other members during the time of need. The members of any clan and kinship share an organizational identity and network. Another source of informal networking in the Kyrgyz political process is the regional division between north and south parts of the country. The historical, political, cultural, and economic dimensions accentuate the rivalry between north and south parts of Kyrgyzstan.

The new constitution of Kyrgyz incorporated the “rules of game” of liberal democratic politics after independence. It is an irony that after the independence and implementation of neo-liberal economic reforms, the Kyrgyz state institutions were unable to fulfill the demands of people due to lack of resources and resultant weak capacity of state institutions. In this situation, informal networks (clan and regional based networks among people) emerged as a savior of the people in their hardship days. Meanwhile after adopting the multi-party democracy, the social elites also started competing in the electoral process. And the long historical legacies of pre-Tsarist, Tsarist, the Soviet period also provided base for the

continuance of these informal institutions. Through the process of horizontal and vertical networking they penetrate into state structures through the strategies of clientelism, favouritism, nepotism and corruption. So these informal networks create a big problem for state institutions and the process of democratization and institution building get hampered. This creates further instability in the political system. During the protests of first colour revolutions the southern people were instrumental, they came to support the southern clan and regional political leaders. On the other hand in the second people' uprising in 2010 northern regional and clan groups played important role.

This informal institution exists through the matrix of mutual benefits. These mutual benefits are reaped by political leaders and clan members both. Politicians get benefits because they get access to political and economic resources, and their clan and regional people also get more advantages such as finding jobs, dealing at the bazaar, education and so on. It means these informal institutions get a strong foothold due to weakness of formal institutions. But it is very unfortunate that these informal institutions have basically delayed the process of state and nation building. Informal institutions make the state institutions weaker and less effective. They subvert the formal institutions and their ideal working style. More so, the loyalty to the state is more important than informal bonding in a modern democracy state. So through their vertical and horizontal networking web-like structure, and penetration into state institutions at all levels, informal institutions (especially clan groups and regional groups) obstruct the democratic process of the country. Further, the state institutions do not function properly due to heavy influence of informal institutions, and subsequently their capacity gets weaker to fulfill the needs of society, which proves the first hypothesis of the study that *“informal institutions (like regional groups, clan groups, etc.) obstruct the democratic process and, thus, state institutions are comparatively weaker in Kyrgyzstan”*.

While Kyrgyz Constitution adopted the liberal democracy in 1993 the President Asakar Akayev was very enthusiastic initially about the democratic consolidation in the country. He provided all necessary eco-systems for the development of civil society groups. The civil society groups got its initial footprints as NGOs supported and funded by Western countries. These NGOs started helping the people in their various social, economic and political activities. But civil society groups were being pressurized by the government agencies after mid-1990s when President Akayev began to behave in an authoritarian manner. He alleged that Western civil society groups are creating hurdles in the development of country. When gradually he became more corrupt, nepotistic and authoritarian, then opposition parties and leaders became wary about his rule and started organizing people against him. Finally after the fraudulent parliamentary election of 2005 political leaders with their supporters organized mass movements across the country and ultimately he was toppled by the protesters. The next President Bakiyev also almost copied his steps; he also came to power promising democratic reforms and ended with authoritarian government. He was also ousted by people in 2010. The roles of civil society groups in these two movements were quite important, especially in the first movement of 2005. Many INGOs organized and educated protesters about the methods of protesting. Since the second uprising was so spontaneous that civil society could not take part in it, though they were organizing various demonstrations against the Bakiyev government for last five years. So we can say that civil society groups are one of the most important elements of Kyrgyz democracy.

In current situation, the political institutions of the Kyrgyzstan needs to be strengthened. In this process, the political elites should play a constructive role and come forward with a development agenda and collaborate with the clan groups and civil society members for the democratization process of Kyrgyzstan. A broader space should be created for the clan groups and civil society groups. Lastly, they all have to come together into a common platform for the broader dialogue on the socio-economic and political development of the country.

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