


**China-Africa Relations: Political, Defence and Security Aspects, 1996-2013**

Thesis submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the award of the degree of

**DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

**ABHISHEK KUMAR DARBEY**



**CHINESE STUDIES DIVISION  
CENTRE FOR EAST ASIAN STUDIES  
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES  
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY  
NEW DELHI-110067  
2017**

जवाहरलाल नेहरू विश्वविद्यालय  
CENTRE FOR EAST ASIAN STUDIES

SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES  
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY  
NEW DELHI- 110 067 (INDIA)



Phone : 91-11-2670 4346  
FAX : 91-11-2670 4346

Date: 2017

DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled “China-Africa Relations: Political, Defence and Security Aspects, 1996-2013” submitted by me for the award of the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

*Abhishek*

ABHISHEK KUMAR DARBEY

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this thesis be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

  
Chairperson  
Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli  
(Chairperson, CEAS)  
Centre for East Asian Studies  
Jawaharlal Nehru University  
New Delhi-110067

  
Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli  
(Supervisor)  
Supervisor  
Centre for East Asian Studies  
School of International Studies  
Jawaharlal Nehru University  
New Delhi-110067

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**Abhishek Kumar Darbey**  
**New Delhi**

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## **ABBREVIATION**

UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
BASIC	Brazil, South Africa, India and China
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROC	Republic of China
ANC	African National Congress
UNSC	United Nation Security Council
FDI	Foreign Direct Investments
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
NRA	National Resistance Army
FOCAC	Forum on China Africa Relations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
CNP	Comprehensive National Power
PLA	Peoples' Liberations Army
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNPKO	United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
AU	African Union
TAZARA	Tanzania and Zambia Railways
SWAPO	South West Africa People's Organization
WTO	World Trade Organisation
SACP	South Africa Communist Party
OAU	Organisation of African Union
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
AUC	African Union Commission
NPC	National People's Congress
SNC	Sudanese National Congress
CAR	Central Africa Republic
SADC	Southern African Development Community
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Accord
PF	Patriotic Front
CPPCC	Chinese Political Party for Consultative Conference
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa

SNA	Sudanese National Assembly
HRC	Human Rights Council
FASLG	Foreign Affairs Small Leading Group
PBSC	Chinese Politburo Standing Committee
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOFCOM	Ministry of Commerce
MoD	Ministry of Defense
MoSS	Ministry of State Security
AHRDF	African Human Resource Development Funds
UNFAO	United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
LDC	Least Developed Countries
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Country
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
TAITRA	Taiwan External Trade Development
GCCI	Ghana Chamber of Commerce and Industry
NLF	National Liberation Front
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
SU	Soviet Union
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
FRELIMO	<i>Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique</i>
MPLA	Movement for the Liberation of Angola
CPCCC	Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
CMC	Central Military Commission
RDF	Rwandan Defense Forces
NDU	National Defense University
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
SATAWU	South African Transport and Allied Workers Union
AAA	Anti-Aircraft Artillery
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front
ADD	Africa Aerospace and Defence
CSOC	China Shipbuilding & Offshore International Co., Ltd.
CSIC	China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation



COSDIC	China Overseas Space Development and Investment Co. Ltd.
NORINCO	North China Industry Corporation China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation
CATIC	China National Aero-Technology Import & Export Corporation
CEIEC	China National Electronics Import-Export Corporation
C4ISR	Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
PGMM	Precision Guided Mortar Munitions
MANPADS	Man-Portable Air Defense System
SACCPCC	South Africa Chinese Community and Police Cooperation Center
AQIM	Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb
NEO	Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation
UNMISS	United Nation Mission in South Sudan
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
KDF	Kenya Defense Forces
PSO	Peace Support Operation
NIGCOMSAT-1R	Nigerian communication satellite
UNTAG	UN Namibia Transitional Period Aid Group
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
MINUSMA	UN Stabilization Mission in Mali
GWDC	Greatwall Drilling Company
CNPC	China National Petroleum Corporation
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
PLAN	People's Liberation Army's Navy
GNPOC	Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
ACFTU	All-China Federation of Trade Union
GFSWTU	General Federation of the Sudanese Workers Trade Unions
ILO	International Labour Organisation
NIF	National Islamic Front
UNAMID	AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur

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# CHAPTER I

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Background

China-Africa relations have evolved in stages over the last six decades and has included ideological, economic, political and security interests. The significance of Africa for China also evolved in its nature and grew constantly from ideological to pragmatic. In the given time frame economic aspects is the most prominent in China-Africa relations but political, defence and security aspects is the primary or basic for China-Africa relations including the economic engagements. Historically, there were friendly exchanges between China and Africa, and the first official contact between the two dates back to the 15th Century. Zheng He (1371-1433) was a mariner, diplomat, explorer, and fleet admiral during China's early Ming dynasty. Zheng He made seven expeditionary voyages from 1405 to 1433, and during his fourth voyage from 1413-1415, he reached the East Africa coast for the first time. After the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949, the major initiative to establish diplomatic relations was seen on April 18-24, 1955 during the first Afro-Asian Conference, Bandung in Indonesia. Premier Zhou Enlai led the delegation at the Bandung Conference and met with the representative leaders of African countries participated in the conference, i.e. Egypt, Ethiopia, Gold Coast (today part of Ghana), Liberia, Libya and Sudan (*Baidu*: 2012). Thereafter, from 1955 to 2013, the China-Africa relations experiences various forms of political and economic challenges before it established as one of most stable international relation in the contemporary period. Therefore, the China-Africa relations from 1955 to 2013 can be broadly classified into three different phases.

#### 1.1a *China-Africa Relations, 1955-1977*

In the early 1950s, the PRC was isolated in the international system and the Republic of China (ROC) was recognised as the sole legal authority of China by United Nations. In May 1956, Egypt became the first African country to establish diplomatic relations with

the PRC. The main foreign policy objective at that time was to overcome the international isolation and consolidating the efforts of the African countries in the war of liberation, which was supported through increased diplomatic ties and economic, technical and military support. It was also aimed at to support the revolution as part of international third front against both superpowers. There were also some strong political aims such as, national sovereignty and unification of Taiwan took the center stage in a government effort. So, in this phase China policy in Africa were focused to win new friends and establish diplomatic relations with the newly independent countries.

In the early 1950s, China had close ties with the African political groups such as, anti-apartheid, liberation movement, and African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa. In the 1950s China signed its first bilateral trade agreement with Algeria, Egypt, Guinea, Somalia, Morocco and Sudan which further consolidated the newly established relations. Therefore, by the early 1960s, China establishes diplomatic relations with 10 African countries. China's diplomatic moves were positive in taking forward the China-Africa relation, from December 1963 to January 1964, former Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai made a ten countries tour to Africa. Thereafter, Zhou Enlai in order to further harmonize the relations makes another two rounds of Africa tour visiting four nations until 1965. After a decade in 1960, there were 27 independent African states and now, they were nearly one-third of the United Nations members. On 25 October 1971, UN recognises the PRC as the sole legal authority of China largely with the vote of support from the African states. The PRC takes over the ROC's chartered membership of the United Nations and its permanent seat of the United Nation Security Council (UNSC). There was a gradual deepening of China-Africa relations and by the end of 1970s, China establishes diplomatic relations with 44 out 50 independent African countries.

### **1.1b *China-Africa Relations, 1978-1995***

This was the post Mao era and the PRC undergoes a major economic reform in 1978, began to give top priority to economic aspects. Ian Taylor (2013) suggests China from 1978 to 1989 was focused on 'socialist modernisation' and called for massive Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) inflows. There was a decline in Sino-African ties as China realised that Africa cannot help in China's economic development. In December 1982,

shortly after the close of twelfth congress, former Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang made eleven nations tour to Africa. This was followed by establishment of new diplomatic ties with Angola in 1983 and increase in aid for Ethiopia in 1985. But, soon after the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, China faced the challenges of international pressure for its inhumane suppress of the movement which resulted in the killing of thousands people. This incident strained China's relations with the West but the African countries were still supportive. Therefore, China undertook re-evaluation of its foreign policy and increases its aid to Africa drastically, and reasserted policy of non-interference in state sovereignty. The high-level diplomatic visits by the Chinese leaders in Africa increased substantially. These visits are both symbolic as well as a real gesture of China's respect for Africa. Thereafter, from 1991 onwards, every newly appointed Chinese Foreign Minister must make their first state visit to Africa. In the early 1990s, China increases its economic engagement with Africa and therefore, the diplomatic visits also increased suddenly, as now the significance of visits was beyond symbolic or gesture of respect and the visits were driven by well-defined economic as well as political interests of China. By the early 1990s, China began to understand and realise the significance of Africa in context to economic development as well as political aspects for greater influence in the international system.

### **1.2 China-Africa Relations: Political Aspects, 1996-2013**

A new horizon was seen in the China –Africa relations after the former Chinese President Jiang Zemin state visits to six African nations, namely, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mali and Namibia from 8 to 22 May 1996. Vice Premier of the State Council and the Foreign Minister Qian Qichen also accompanied President Jiang Zemin on his Africa tour. Contextualizing, the further development of China-Africa relation this visit was of great significance, largely because China came with a new package of Africa policies and a five point proposal introduced by Jiang Zemin. These policies and proposals reflected a pragmatic move to further integrate and deepen the China –Africa relations across the various areas under new international circumstances (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2000). Thereafter, the visits were more frequent from the African side as well and in 1997 alone, 4 Presidents, 1 Vice-President,

3 Prime Ministers, 3 Deputy Prime Ministers and about 20 Ministers from Africa visited China. Chinese Vice-Premier Qian Qichen made a successive ten visits to African nations and by the end of his tenure he covered almost every region of the continent. According to Kong Minghui (2003) there has been a close political contact between China and Africa since the establishment of the PRC, and there were almost 150 visits to China from 49 heads of the African countries and 40 heads of the governments of Africa. The China-Africa relations are guided by four major principles as part of its policy to Africa:

- Sincerity, friendship and equality
- Mutual benefits, reciprocity and common prosperity
- Mutual support and close co-ordination
- Learning from each other and seeking common development

China's political engagement in Africa is often commended by the African political leaders but the African civil society actors as well as the opposition leaders criticize the role of China in Africa. The inter-state political competition is also becoming a big challenge for Beijing. Another factor which has emerged with the rise of China as second largest economy that China seems to be no more a 'south' or 'developing' state so the notion of political equality between China and Africa does not exist. It is said that China "has quickly realized that Africa will become an important stage where its image as a responsible global actor is forged." (Qin Hao 2010).

In June 2003, a new package of China's foreign policies to Africa was introduced by the former Chinese President Hu Jintao as a major initiative of the Chinese government to shape a new China-Africa partnership based on long term stability, equality and mutual benefit. The diplomatic and political contacts further deepened and the visits also increased substantially. After 2006 the Chinese government adopted new foreign policies towards Africa they are: sincerity, equality and friendship; mutual benefit, reciprocity and common prosperity; mutual support and close coordination; and learning from each other and seek common development (Baumann, Christian 2010).

From 2007- 2011, political leaders from 30 African states and 20 parliamentary speakers visited China (Gregusova, Veronika 2010). In the last decade, former President Hu Jintao

visited 18 African countries in his four tours to Africa. Former Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, former Vice-President Xi Jinping, cabinet ministers, and officials of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) also visited the continent regularly (Mancheri 2012; Embassy of the PRC 2012; Jianzhong 2012). By 2010 there were only four African states, namely, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe, and Swaziland. In November 2013, Gambia was the last to sever diplomatic relations with the ROC and established with the PRC.

### **1.3 China-Africa Defence and Security Aspects**

The China-Africa defence ties are historically significant and there was regular arms supply or military support for the African national movement in their fight against colonial and imperial powers from early 1950s to mid-1990. The President of Uganda, Yoweri Kaguta Museveni while addressing to the governors and mayors of the PRC and the East African Community on November 2013, said, the Chinese leaders actively supported the National Resistance Army (NRA) guerilla group led by him in 1986 against the military junta. He acknowledges China will continue to support the liberation struggle in Africa until the whole of Africa was liberated, the last one being South Africa in 1994 (Chimp Corps Report 2013). The Chinese government “tries its best to support and promote peace and stability in Africa” and they go as far as to argue that “peace-orientation is the first and foremost characteristic of China-Africa relations. It sets China-Africa relations apart from others.” (Yu and Wang 2008). China- Africa military cooperation is mainly to strengthen political ties with the African governments. It includes high level political delegations, military exchanges, defence attaches based in embassy, financial assistance to military infrastructure, training for African armed forces but there is no permanent military presence by the Chinese government in Africa. In the new century there have been Chinese military leaders visit to Algeria, Nigeria, Egypt, South Africa, Tanzania, and other African countries. From more than ten African countries senior military delegations have visited China. China has also committed to support the African army to improve and develop their peace keeping capabilities and give financial assistance to de-mining operations. Chinese peacekeepers are deployed in

Western Sahara, Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo as part of UN peacekeeping missions.

Zhang Chun (2012) suggested after the FOCAC meeting in 2012 that the declaration of "China and Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security" signifies China will give more importance to security of its overseas rights and properties. Zhang comes out with a conclusion that China should make a concrete contribution to peace and security in Africa. China has maintained close communication and coordination with the African countries at the UN Security Council. The major initiatives by the Chinese government in this regard, such as, increase in the number of the Chinese peacekeepers to Africa, escort mission of the Chinese troops in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia, a special representative of the Chinese government was appointed for the African affairs, and actively engaged in the mediation of African hotspot issues. China has steadily increased its participation in Africa's peace and security issues. In 2006, China played a significant role in securing Khartoum's acceptance of deployment of peacekeepers in Darfur. In 2009 FOCAC meeting an agreement stated that the Chinese government will continue to participate in the UN peace keeping operations for Africa. In late 2008 there was a conflict between Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda, where Rwanda was supporting the rebel groups. China actively pushed the governments of the DRC and Rwanda to resolve conflict in eastern DRC. In 2009 the Chinese trained commandos in Guinea were involved in killings of 150 protestors, and the DRC forces trained by China were also found of violating human rights. Chinese scholars and officials believes that underdevelopment in Africa is the root cause of conflict and the Chinese aid and investment in the continent will help to improve the economy that will promote peace and security in Africa.

There is still a regular transfer of arms from China to African countries, but now, the purpose of arms transfer is different, which can be solely economic. China is Sudan's chief arms suppliers and in the 1998-2000 Ethiopia and Eritrea conflict China supplied arms to both sides worth US\$1 billion. China also supplies arms regularly to the African countries such as, Zimbabwe, Angola, Mali, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.



It is suggested that selling arms to some African leaders helps in improving bilateral relations and can enhance China's access to raw materials. China is now selling military equipment worldwide and Africa is a potential market for military hardware. The military exchanges between China and Africa also indicate China's involvement in African politics. According to the Congressional Research Service, in between 1996 to 2003, 10 percent of China's total arm sales were transferred to Africa. With the dramatic growth of the defense industry, China now controls the 25 percent of the African arms market and is the biggest trader from outside the continent and sales arms to almost 16 African countries.

#### **1.4 Literature Review**

In the introductory section it indicates that there are various schools of thought and international relation theory that explains the various aspects of China-Africa relations. In the last two decades the engagement between China and Africa has become more complex and expanded across various areas under the changing international scenario. If dealing with this subject in the relatively smaller span of time than a general trend of a particular theory may be seen or possibly a major part of a theory is prevalent. So, in order to study and understand the subject thoroughly every possible theory should be applied to look into the subject. The international theories or concepts given below will be applied to study the subject.

##### **1.4 a Theories**

1. Soft Power
2. New Strategic Partnership
3. Neocolonialism
4. Realism

##### ***Soft Power***

The concept of soft power was developed by Joseph Nye, and the broad definition is, the ability to attract and co-opt rather than coerce, use force or give money as a means of persuasion. The term was first coined in 1990 by Nye in his work *Bound to Lead: The*

*Changing Nature of American Power*, thereafter, in 2004 authored a book, *The Soft Power: The means to success in World Politics*. Although in other disciplines such as Gramsci's hegemony, Bourdieu's symbolic power, Weber's authority, Foucault's disciplinary power, and Habermas' communicative power similar concepts had already been introduced (Lee 2008). The introduction of soft power by Nye were different from the other and his study highlights some of the hidden aspects of international relations, such as non-violent and non-coercive ways of influencing others, earlier the concept lacked a well-developed theoretical framework. According to Geon Lee (2008: 9), the most cost-effective way of influencing through soft power is by creating "social habits" in the recipients, which will produce a long term co-optive power. But Frank Vibert (2008: 6) the cultural or ideological means of obtaining an objective is considered to be narrow or limited. He believes, the broader definition of soft power, includes payments (foreign assistance) or trade concession as part of the non-coercion activity.

Contextualising, China's soft power, in 2007 former General Secretary of CPC, Hu Jintao explicitly stated in the 17<sup>th</sup> CPC Central Committee meeting that China needs to improve and enhance its soft power influence. He emphasised on enhancing China's National cultural soft power, CPC Central Committee under the new situation of transformations and changes that the contemporary China and the World has experienced, should promote this new concept. To promote "Socialist Cultural Development and Prosperity" was an important policy that was implemented with immediate effect. It was stated that "Enhancement of National Cultural Soft Power" is to meet the goal of creating an overall well-off society, to realise the dream of better livelihood for the people, and a significant step to build a new relationship between China and the world. It also aimed at to strengthen Comprehensive National Power (CNP) through National rejuvenation; to strengthen the international competitiveness by improving the National competitiveness.

The concept of soft power in China-Africa relations is an old trend in China's foreign policy in Africa, but in the recent few years, this policy has been defined by a well-formulated theoretical framework. The birth of China's soft power dates back to the democratisation setbacks of the Tiananmen Movement in 1989, and China struggled against the pressure of international isolations. The Chinese political intellectuals began

to look for or shift to a more liberal “universalistic values” held by the mainstream international society, which is other than the China’s traditional “particularism” or “socialism with Chinese characteristics”. In 1993, Wang Huning, one of the major think tanks of former President Jiang Zemin, in his seminal article, “Soft Power: Culture as a Form of National Power”. Wang suggested the Chinese government for a strategic plan of China’s soft power in accordance with the international trends and propensities. The intellectual quest by the Chinese academia drew up a conclusion, that in order to contend the ‘China Threat Theory’, the Chinese soft power should be compatible with Chinese interpretation of the Marxist socialist theory and China’s peaceful rise (Shubo Li & Helge Reunion 2013).

In 2005, the Chinese government scholar, Zheng Bijian, published an essay, “China’s Peaceful Rise to Great Power Status” in *Foreign Affairs*. The essay emphasized on the significance of soft power to influence the world along with the “military strength” as hard power. In the contemporary China’s leadership, soft power directs the foreign policy for the most part of it. In the contemporary period major goal of soft power in its foreign policy is to affirm the world that China’s rise is peaceful. The Chinese scholars began to define the cultural aspect as an important part of China’s power and finds cultural competition as an increasingly vital part of international competition (Lu & Wang 2008). According to Chinese scholar Shen Dingli (2014), China’s traditional culture and philosophy should be behind its soft power, and believes China still has a long way to go before it builds robust domestic institutions for larger contributions to international public good and truly establish its global soft power. Sylvester Tabe Arrey (2013), believes that although China has established itself as a global power, but its soft power in Africa is still vague, controversial and its reason is yet to be understood. China has used Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) to build political influence in African countries. China’s use of soft power in Africa has a shorter history than the continent’s traditional partners but today, China has become an important player in African countries’ political and economic landscapes.

According to He Qingliang (2009), the “Soft Power Diplomacy” is designed by an utterly unprincipled government that operates opportunistically and it is well marked by

“Chinese characteristics” in number of times indeed. He further adds, China’s soft power in Africa is natural resource diplomacy, along with conditional economic aid. He strongly suggests that the ‘interest’ led soft power of China will result into ‘spiritual pollution’ of the world. Kenneth King (2013), finds Africans learn Chinese language to do business with China, this helped to increase the Chinese soft power through Confucius Institute. Today there are more than 30 Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms in about 26 African countries, which have taken up the task of teaching Chinese language and culture. The greater influence of Chinese language and culture will strengthen the political ties of China with the African governments. The Chinese presence in Africa will enhance their security of interest in Africa.

### ***New Strategic Partnership***

In 2006 the Chinese government declared that China will ‘unswervingly carry forward the tradition of China-Africa friendship, and, proceeding from both the Chinese and African people, establish and develop a new type of strategic partnership with Africa. China-Africa new type of strategic partnership includes three main connotations, on political aspects equality and mutual trust, on economic aspects win-win cooperation, on cultural aspects exchanges and mutual learning. In the new strategic partnership, China claims that in their cooperation program with Africa emphasises on improving self-development capacity of the African states.

In 2006, the Chinese government issued the African policy paper which expounds China’s goals of carrying forward China-Africa traditional friendship and building of a new form of a strategic partnership. The goals include, strengthening of political mutual trust; expand win-win cooperation; increase cultural interactions; strengthening security cooperation; maintain close coordination in international affairs. It is suggested that the establishment and development of new strategic partnership will not only lead to economic development and National rejuvenation of African countries, but will also strengthen “South-South Cooperation” that will have great significance for the developing countries. The strengthening of China-Africa consultation and collaboration on International affairs will improve the international influence on the developing countries, and accelerate the establishment of a just and rational political as well as

economic international order (Ban Yuetan 2006). The Peoples' Liberations Army (PLA) attaches great importance to its relations with African countries' armed forces, and seeks to build military co-operations based on five principles of peaceful existence. China claims it does not seek a military alliance or confrontation or target any other country through its co-operation with African armed forces. The new strategic partnership between China-Africa is well recognised by the international community will help to push forward these military ties.

China-Africa explores new forms of cooperation, and emphasise on training and capacity building, to provide a new impetus for sustainable development in Africa. This will open a new path for the "South-South Cooperation". In this regard it has been argued without the peace and development in the developing countries human society cannot be at harmony and progress, because they account for the majority of the world population (Zhao Ligen 2006). Hu Mei (2010) suggests the possible background, other reasons behind the establishment of the new form of a strategic partnership. Firstly, there was deepening of China-Africa mutual interdependence in economic and political aspects. Mainly the expansions of economic cooperation lead to the deepening of mutual interdependence in strategic as well as security aspects. It created a requirement for a stable and strong China-Africa relation, and so they defined it in the form of the new strategic partnership. Secondly, after the cold war, the strategic value of Africa declined, Africa was increasingly marginalised by the Western world, but China shared a common strategic demands and emotional attachment with Africa. Therefore, it still treated Africa keeping in mind the historical perspectives and faith. Thirdly, the new strategic partnership is the direct outcome of the gradual strengthening mechanism of China-Africa relations.

Former Chinese ambassador to Tunisia and the present ambassador to the Republic of Benin, Li Beifen (2012) said, a new era of China-Africa relations is not all about China-Africa trade, it emphasises on the self-developing capacity of the African states. He cites the old Chinese saying, "Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day, teach a man to fish and you feed him for a lifetime" while contextualising China-Africa new strategic partnership. In this regard Zhang Hongming (2012) suggests in the contemporary period

China-Africa economic and trade relation is colorful and China-Africa relations in every other aspect are still not balanced largely due to lack of interoperability. Cooperation with China-Africa security, cultural, and other aspects are still lagging behind. China should increase its investment in the African peace and security issues, and not only the financial investment, but it also requires the Chinese participation and attention. It is only the peace and stability in Africa can guarantee China's interest in Africa. It is also believed that China-Africa military ties will strengthen the new strategic partnership, which will create a favourable environment for their development and helped to build harmonious world marked by long lasting peace and sustainable development.

Zhang Chun (2012) suggested after the FOCAC meeting in 2012 that the declaration of "China and Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security" signifies China will give more importance to security to protect its overseas rights and properties. Zhang comes out with a conclusion that China should make a concrete contribution to peace and security in Africa. Although China now has the blueprint for peace and security between the two sides, but it does not reveal a detailed summary or plan. Zhang suggests such cooperation for peace and security poses a risk of violating China's traditional principles of non-interference. Therefore, in this regard China needs a strategic plan for such an initiative, with multilateral institutions as the main platform.

China has intensified cooperation, security and peace in Africa after the 5<sup>th</sup> Ministerial Meetings of FOCAC. China has maintained close communication and coordination with the African countries at the UN Security Council. The major initiatives by the Chinese government in this regard, such as, increase in the number of the Chinese peacekeepers to Africa, escort mission of the Chinese troops in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia, a special representative of the Chinese government was appointed for the African affairs, and actively engaged in the mediation of African hotspot issues. China has steadily increased its participation in Africa's peace and security issues.

### ***Realism***

According to John Mearsheimer (2001), a leading proponent of offensive realism, which maintains that states are not satisfied with the given amount of power, but seek hegemony

for security because the anarchic makeup of the international system creates strong incentives for states to seek opportunities to gain power at the expense of competitors.

Realism centered upon four propositions.

- The international system is anarchic. It means that there is no actor above states capable of regulating their interactions; states must arrive at relations with other states on their own, rather than it being dictated by some other higher controlling entity. Secondly, the international system exists in a state of constant antagonism.
- States are the most important actors.
- All states within the system are unitary, rational actor. It also means states tend to pursue self-interest and groups strive to attain as many resources as possible.
- The primary concern of the state is survival. States build up military to survive, which may lead to a security dilemma.

Some Chinese scholars support the use of idealist paradigm over the realist paradigm in international relations. Chinese scholar Yan Xuetong (2001) proposes that the shift to the Chinese idealist world order, based on Confucius thinking will “make international society more civilized” by placing the focus on international efforts on cooperation and morality over power politics. Allen Carlson (2006: 235) believes that China’s foreign policy has inclinations on both the side idealist as well as realist. China employs a cost-benefit analysis based on its own national interests and the conception of the Chinese national interests is formed by deep seated beliefs of cooperation. According Alastair Iain Johnston (1995), China’s desire to rise peacefully seeks to change the realist nature of great power relations and the world system. He suggests that China’s increased engagement with Africa is the idealist grand strategy and the framework of development in Africa is different from the context provided by realist theory. In accordance with the western realist theory, China’s foreign policy goal of restructuring the world order can only be achieved if China has a predominance of power and influence. China must evince some form of power either in the form of traditional realist power or in the form of neoliberal soft power.

George Madelski (1987a: 98) views in this context differ from the above scholarships that suggests, it is a call for “new network of solidarity” to overcome the rituals of macro conflict that corresponds to the rise of great power, China’s Idealist path has been rendered a necessity by the salient realist interpretation of state behavior. According to the realpolitik and realist theory, it is expected that China will continue to maximize its power in the international system at the expense of other powers, until it becomes single hegemony in the new world order (Mearsheimer and Brzezinski 2005; Li 1999: 446). Jonathan Fenby (2014), a veteran China commentator, “we have now come to a period of great realism and this appears to coincide with the Xi Jinping’s administration’s acceptance of the need for slower and more sustainable growth.” He suggests the argument of China’s domination in the 21<sup>st</sup> century strike a note of realism and takes back to the debate of middle kingdom taking over the world as referred in the Chinese classical books. Yan Xuetong (2011) strongly opposes the realist theory in China’s rise and argues, “Firstly, the Chinese regard their rise as regaining China’s lost international status rather than obtaining something new. Secondly, the Chinese consider the rise of the China as a restoration of fairness rather than as gaining advantages over others”.

### ***Neo-Colonialism***

Neo-Colonialism is the practice of using capitalism, globalisation, and cultural forces to control the country in lieu of direct political or military control. The term neo-colonialism was coined by Kwame Nkrumah, former President of Ghana to describe the socio-economic and political control that can be exercised economically, linguistically, culturally, whereby promotion of the culture of the neo-colonist country facilitates the cultural assimilation of the colonised people and thus opens the National economy to the multilateral corporation of the neo-colonial country. Kwame Nkrumah writes in his book, *Neo-Colonialism- the Last Stage of Imperialism* (1965), which is theoretically developed and extended form of socio-economic and political argument presented by Lenin in the pamphlet *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*.

In the place of colonialism, as the main instrument of imperialism, we have today's neo-colonialism.... [which] like colonialism, is an attempt to export social conflicts of the capitalist countries....



The result of neo-colonialism is that foreign capital is used for the exploitation rather than for the development of the less developed parts of the world. Investment under neo-colonialism increases, rather than decreases, the gap between the rich and the poor countries of the world. The struggle against neo-colonialism is not aimed at excluding the capital of the developed world from operating in less developed countries. It is aimed at preventing the financial power of the developed countries being used in such a way as to impoverish the less developed.

Contextualizing neo-colonialism in China-Africa relations the available scholarships suggests different views and so, it is hard to clarify the prevalence of neo-colonialism in China-Africa relations. Robert I. Rotberg (2008) in his book, *China into Africa Trade, Aid & Influence* writes, in fact, the term neo-colonialism is usually used to describe the relations between China and Africa. Some international observers' views are often entertained in the academic and media analysis which suggests the relationship between China-Africa is neo-colonial in nature. They argue that China is a new colonial power in Africa. They also believe that international efforts to increase transparency and good governance among the African countries are undermined by the Chinese foreign policies. In the 1960s, Kwame Nkrumah criticized at the western powers for practicing neo-colonialism as a new form of colonialism, and in the modern times the expansion of China in Africa economically as well as politically had led to similar accusations of "fresh neo-colonialism distinguished as south-south development" (Servant 2005). Ogunrotifa Ayodeji Bayo (2011) suggests the exponential growth of economic and political activities in African countries of the emerging powers has given weight to intense debate among the academic circles about the term 'new scramble' (Frynas & Paulo 2007) and 'neocolonialism' (Taylor 2006; Michael & Daniel 2006). There are other scholars as well supports the argument that China's policies in Africa is to deepen the China-Africa relations are well documented, with the effort often labeled as neo-colonialism (Zweig and Bi 2005; Frynas and Paulo 2006; Taylor 2006a; Melber 2007; Herman 2007; Norberg 2006). Similarly, Alden and Hughes (2009: 569) believe, the problem is that "when the non-interference principle is used to justify opacity in dealings with elites, from aid disbursement to business practices, the view becomes more widespread that China is just another power out to exploit the continent."

Corkin (2011) suggests a new variant in China-Africa relations, he finds in the case of Angola, which is currently the main source of oil for China, the government's continued diversification of its political and economic relationship with Angola is a 'marriage of convenience' between elites rather than an explicit form of neo-colonial exploitation. The Thabo Mvuyelwa Mbeki former South African President supported the argument contextualising China's quest for mineral resources in Africa and called it as a "new form of neo-colonialist adventure". There are Africans who believe that the continent would take advantage of this 'scramble' to leverage its position so as to derive its substantial benefits from the Africa's engagement internationally. It is to note that even though there were large scale infrastructure investment in Africa by China, but the technology transfer aspect is still poor. The Chinese enterprises in Africa employ Chinese workers and so even though the investment increased there is no job created for the native Africans (Pan 2006).

Some scholars do not support China's engagement in Africa as a new form of colonialism rather they suggest it is mutually beneficial win-win cooperation. Sautman & Yan (2009) finds that despite its various manifestations, China-Africa relations appear to be broadly popular in its own right and in comparison to the west and they firmly reject the notion of neo-colonialism in China-Africa relations. They justify their argument by referring to the African survey response to the explicit question of whether China is practicing any form of neo-colonialism and the Africans rejected it overwhelmingly. In this context, Beuret and Michel estimated about the number of Chinese living in Africa to be around 750,000 and Huang Zequan, a reporter for the *People's Daily (Renmin Ribao)* suggest the number to be 500,000. So, in this regard, Martyn Davies argues it will be unfair to say Chinese presence in Africa is neo-colonialism.

### **1.5 Definition, Rationale & Scope of Study**

The study "China-Africa Relations: Political, Defence and Security Aspects, 1996-2013" is focused to understand the political, defence and security engagement of China and Africa. Specifically, the research is aimed to identify, understand, interpret and define the PRC's political, defence and security objectives in Africa and to understand the growth and development of African countries diplomatically as well as militarily through China-

Africa engagement. Other aspect of the study is focused to understand the China's policy in Africa to enhance diplomatic influence and building national image globally. The time frame of the study 1996-2013 is the third phase of China-Africa relations where Africa has been featured in China's rise to a great power status. At the same time there was deepening and strengthening of China-Africa relations based on equality and mutual interests. In this period of China-Africa relations, Africa defined a new international status for itself with the support of China.

The political aspects of China-Africa relations include bilateral and multilateral interactions. One of the major objectives is to get political support from as many as possible from Africa's fifty-four countries, which now constitutes well over one-quarter of UN's 193 members. There is a mutual understanding between China and the African countries at the international forums. China often uses its veto power in the UNSC to support the African countries against the UN sanctions, on the other hand African countries stands in favour of China whenever it is required. Another major interest is to restrict the Taiwan's diplomatic presence in Africa. The Gambia was the last African country to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan in November 2013 and now, there are only three African countries maintains diplomatic relations with Taiwan. So, in order to safeguard political interests in Africa, China needs to maintain stable relations with African countries.

The defence and security aspects of China-Africa relations include United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO), military cooperation, military aid, joint military exercises, arms transfer and military exchanges. China attaches importance to its relations with African countries armed forces because military ties play a significant role in diplomatic relations. It is believed that China-Africa military relations will strengthen new strategic partnership. There are about 1500 non-combat peacekeepers assigned in six UN missions in African countries. So far China has not deployed its PLA troops or police personnel in African countries, but it is suggested China will develop its defence and security in Africa to safeguard or secure its interests in African countries.

The study is confined to political, defence and security aspects of China-Africa relations and will also include the political aspects of economic engagements. The study will look

into China's political and defence engagements with fifty two African countries to highlight the larger picture of the engagement with some case studies.

## **1.6 Limitations of Research**

The research subject "China-Africa Relations: Political, Defence and Security Aspects, 1996-2013" is based on the available Chinese, western as well as African sources of information. The study lacks field research and interviews of officials relevant to the subject. The study is based on research materials available in libraries available at Delhi and internet sources and we were unable to consult firms or other materials.

## **1.7 Research Questions**

The thesis intends to reflect on a number of queries. As the subject includes foreign and security policies, a number of related aspects have to be studied and analysed. Based on the requirement of the research these questions are framed and the answers of these questions will help in testing the research hypothesis.

1. What are China's national interests in Africa?
2. What are the changes in China's foreign policy to Africa with the changing international environment?
3. What is the nature of diplomatic interactions between China and the African countries?
4. What is the extent of the international cooperation between China and the African countries?
5. How China's defence ties with African Countries cause human rights violations in Africa?
6. Does Africa have been featured in China's grand strategic calculations to be a great power?
7. How does China's soft power in Africa helps in building national image?
8. What is the significance and role of China's non-interference policy in Africa contextualizing western global hegemony?
9. How the FOCAC frame work helped China to promote the position and proposals of the African Union (AU)?

## 10. What are the strategic objectives of China-Africa Defence Relations?

### **1.8 Research Hypotheses**

The two research hypotheses is aimed to study the subject “China-Africa Relations: Political, Defence and Security Aspects, 1996-2013”. The first hypothesis is to understand China’s political, defence and security objectives in Africa. It is to understand the roles of bilateral political, defence and security engagements in China’s rise in the international system. The second hypothesis is aimed at to study the impacts of China’s Africa policy on its maximalist interests in Africa i.e. ‘one China policy’, and also its maximalist interests in Africa i.e. Chinese expansion in Africa.

1. China’s political, defence and security objectives in Africa serve China’s rise in the international system.
2. China’s policies in Africa are intended to promote China’s minimalist & maximalist interest.

### **1.9 Research Methodology**

Inductive method of research will be applied to study “China-Africa Relations: Political, Defence and Security Aspects, 1996-2013”. Primary as well as secondary sources will be used for the necessary and relevant information and data about the subject. Qualitative as well as quantitative methods will be applied in the research. China will be dependent variable, Africa as independent variable, and International system as intervening variable. The study will be focused on to understand and discuss the significance of Africa for China. This will test the above mentioned hypotheses.

### **1.9 Chapterisations**

1. Introduction

This chapter describes the background of the study and developments in the given timeframe to highlight the broad context of the research problem. The international relations theories or concepts applied for the study will be discussed. It also deals with the methodology of research applied in the study.

2. China-Africa Relations: Political Aspects, 1996-2013

This chapter deals with China-Africa political relations in the time frame 1996 to 2013. It narrates the historical background of China-Africa relations to understand their bilateral ties in present context. The study also includes Chinese leaders' perceptions on Africa to understand China's Africa policy over the period of six decades. China's Africa policy is also studied based on the Chinese government's White Paper released in 2006. The chapter includes Chinese foreign policy institutional structure for Africa. Bilateral exchanges and visits are considered a major tool to understand the deepening of political relations between China and Africa. FOCAC is looked at as a major platform for China-Africa interactions. The study of Taiwan in context of China-Africa relations brings out China's minimalist policy in Africa i.e. the 'one China policy'. The chapter has focused on FOCAC and AU to test the hypothesis of China's rise in the international system.

### 3. China-Africa Relations: Defence and Security Aspects, 1996-2013

The chapters looks at China-Africa defense and security relations in the time frame 1996 to 2013. Historical background of China-Africa defense relations is covered to understand their traditional ties in the present context. Bilateral military exchanges and arms deals are the major theme of the study to understand the defence cooperation between China and Africa. China's participation in the UN peacekeeping operations and anti-piracy missions in the African region is studied to analyze China-Africa security relations in the given time frame. The study focuses on the roles of bilateral defence and security ties in pushing China's rise in the international system. It's role in achieving China's maximalist interests in Africa.

### 4. Case Study: China-Sudan Relations: Political, Defence and Security Aspects, 1996-2013

Chapter IV is the case study of China-Sudan relations in the time frame 1996 to 2013. The chapter covers the historical background of the bilateral ties to understand Sino-Sudan relations in the present context. The states' ruling party interactions, and China's participation in resolving Darfur crisis are major themes relevant in the study of the subject in the given time frame. The study also covers

China's participation in resolving crisis between Sudan and souther Sudan to understand the Chinese government political influence in the region. China's arms trade with Sudan, security of Chinese investments and nationals, and Chinese peacekeeping operation in Sudan are the significant themes covered to understand the bilateral defence and security relations. The chapter tests the role of Sudan in China's rise in the international system. It also tests the role of China's Sudan policy in achieving China's maximalist interests in the continent.

#### 5. Conclusion

Chapter V summarises the chapters on bilateral political, defence and security relations in the time frame 1996 to 2013. The chapter also looks at the relevance of four international theories, namely soft power, realism, new strategic partnership and neocolonialism in China-Africa relations, 1996-2013. The chapter tests the role of Africa in China's rise in the international system, and impacts of China's Africa policy in meeting the goals of it's maximalist interests in the continent.

## CHAPTER II

### China-Africa Political Relations, 1996-2013

#### 2.1 Introduction

The political relations between China-Africa under the present situation helps to maintain good cooperation between China and the African countries. After the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. One of the primary objectives of its foreign policy is to win international recognition and support for its position as the sole legal authority of China, including Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, the Senkaku/ Diaoyu island and islands in the South China Sea. The 'one China Policy' fulfils China's minimalist interests in Africa. The nature and objectives of the China's political relations changed over time according to the Chinese government interests with the ever growing international status of the PRC. Similarly, in the case of Africa, China's political relation in its earlier phase of establishment emphasised on the objectives or support for anti-colonial, anti-imperial and pro-independence struggle to create a third world solidarity against the contemporary ruling powers. Today, China's political interests serve varied interests which are different from the past. Now the Chinese interests in Africa are more pragmatic, and its policy serves the purpose of economic and trade expansion, and ever expanding Chinese business in Africa has raised their security concern in the last few years. The Chinese government, to overcome the security of its investment and trade in Africa, began to encourage the Chinese people in Africa in the form of people in business, worker, employee. A large number of the Chinese citizens in Africa will create a secure environment for their investment, stakes, and business. The other method is through UN peacekeeping mission China sends the highest number of peacekeepers to Africa. Thirdly, China is building a military base in Djibouti on the pirate infested Horn of Africa, which is due for completion in 2017, is expected to feature weapons stores, ships and helicopter maintenance facilities and possibly special forces.



## 2.2 Historical Background

Though not well documented, China-Africa relations date back to the 13th century Ming Dynasty period in China. Jan Julius Lodewijk Duyvendak, the late eminent Dutch sinologist in his book titled, *China's Discovery of Africa* mentioned that the Yongle emperor (永乐: 23 January 1403 – 19 January 1425) of the Ming Dynasty commissioned expeditions as he was influenced by "the real need of overseas products felt particularly at court, and the desire to increase his prestige, and to reestablish the overseas renown of the Chinese empire." Zheng He, a Hui-Chinese mariner, explorer, diplomat, and fleet admiral of Ming Dynasty carried out maritime travel from 1405 to 1433, and in 1418 he led a vast fleet of 62 ships and 37000 soldiers across the Indian Ocean. In 1414 Zheng He in his 4th expedition visited Malindi, a town on Malindi Bay at the mouth of the Galana River, lying on the Indian Ocean coast of Kenya. He met with the Sultan of Malindi, the most powerful coastal ruler of that time. The ruler presented a giraffe to the Chinese ruler and sent a personal envoy to visit China. According to Teobaldo Filesi (1972), the Chinese fleets visited African countries, and it is testified that the Chinese were not invaders, as many African envoys have also visited China. Harman Kiriamu, a senior archaeologist at the National Museum of Kenya, commented on the Zheng He visit to Sultan of Malindi and said, "we are discovering that the Chinese had a very different approach from the European to East Africa."

On October 2014, an international seminar titled "Exploring China's Ancient links to Africa World Conference" was conducted in Addis Ababa, the capital city of Ethiopia. In the seminar, researchers shared the common view that archaeological and historical evidence of cultural and economic relations between China and Africa might date back to hundreds of year earlier than Zheng He visit to the continent. Some books from the Tang Dynasty (618-907) namely, *经行记* *Jingxingji* (Records of Travel), Assorted Dishes from Yu Yang and the Song Dynasty (960-1279) namely, *Gazetteer of Foreigners*, Information from beyond the mountain records the earliest Chinese knowledge about the East Africa. But, LI Anshan (李安山), Director of Institute of Afro-Asian Studies and Center for African Studies, School of International Studies, Peking University in his book titled, *History of Overseas Chinese in Africa* suggests the starting point of Sino-Africa

relations is in the period between 138-126 BC, which is prior to the Qin Dynasty (221-206 BC). According to a Taiwanese scholar Fang Hao's authored book *History of East and West Traffic*, during the Han Dynasty the cultural and commodity exchanges between China and Egypt was prevalent. He believed "Chinese learned about Alexandria of Egypt (Li Xuan) and dispatched an envoy there." During the Ming Dynasty, the Chinese merchants and diplomats frequently visited Egypt and Ethiopia. In the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) there were no official contacts but the private contacts endured and the direct trade gave way to indirect trade between China and Africa.

However, the formal political relations were established during the early years of the founding of the PRC in 1949, and Egypt was the first Arab and African country to recognise and established diplomatic relations with the PRC on 30 May 1956. The consensus reached between the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser to lay the foundation for the relationship at the Bandung Conference in 1955. Egypt has always been a special partner of China in Africa. In November 1956, China provided military support to Egypt against British and French military interference to restore Cairo's sovereignty over the Suez Canal. China and Egypt are friends in need, the Chinese government provided strong support to Egypt fighting the domestic political turbulence of Arab Spring. Notwithstanding, the Egypt's poor economy China maintained a growing bilateral trade and regularly increased its direct investment in Egypt.

## ***2.2 a Bandung Conference & Sino-Africa relations***

The Bandung Conference also known as the Asian-African Conference was held in Indonesia from 18 to 24 April 1955. The representative leaders from 29 Asian and African countries participated in the conference, and there were six from African countries namely, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, and Sudan. The conference was convened to determine the role of the third world in cold war, economic development and decolonization. The core principles the conference were political self-determination, mutual respect for sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, and equality. The conference was supported by the Chinese government and sent a delegation led by then-Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai. The other members included in the Chinese delegation were Vice-Premier Chen Yi, Vice-Foreign

Minister Zhang Hanfu, Minister of Foreign Trade Ye Jizhuang and the Chinese Ambassador to Indonesia Huang Zhen. China's major interests for attending the conference was to create conditions for the enhancement and establishment of relations between China and the countries of Asia and Africa, promotion of national independence movement and expansion of united front for peace. On 19 April 1956, Zhou Enlai delivered a speech at the Plenary Session of the Asian-African Conference, in which he said, the Asian and African countries have assembled to solve their common problems, and he emphasised on the existing issues of colonial plunder and oppression in most of the countries of Asia and Africa. He explained and highlighted the losses, atrocities, and grievances faced by a colony under a colonial power. His intention was to share solidarity of the third world and consolidate and unite them against the imperial powers. He encouraged them and said, more and more countries are independent or fighting for their independence, and the colonial powers can no more continue their plunder and oppression. He said the conference is a profound historical change and suggested to eliminate the state of backwardness caused by the colonial rule, safeguard world peace and to win and preserve national independence. He reminded that now, the countries of Asia and Africa are the master of their destiny. He cautioned about the dangers of war and said, China seek for peace and oppose a war. He spoke about the establishment of military bases in Asia by the countries of other regions and asked the countries to oppose colonialism and defend national independence. He proposed that the governments, parliaments, and people of Asian and African countries increase bilateral exchanges for consolidating mutual understanding and cooperation among them. He also recommended maintaining non-antagonistic relations with countries of other regions.

Not only in the context of China-Africa relations but also in the context of China and the world, the Bandung Conference provided a diplomatically significant opportunity to China express and identified itself as part of the third world. China to a certain extent mitigated the confusion and misunderstanding about its image before the world. It was a first major step for China to fight against its international isolation, which was created by the west and the Chinese language barrier can be the other possible reason. After that, the Non-Aligned Movement became an important basis for China's foreign policy and its relations with Africa and Asia.

## ***2.2b African countries support for China's representation at UNSC in 1971***

Somalia was the first country to object the credentials of the Republic of China (ROC) as China's representation in the Security Council meeting on 9 February 1971. This question was responded by ROC and the US saying that China's representation should not be dealt with in the UNSC. On 15 July 1971, at the 26th session of the UN General Assembly, seventeen UN members proposed to include "Restoration of the lawful rights of the PRC in the UN" on the provisional agenda. Later, on 25 September 1971, twenty-three member states submitted a draft resolution to "restore all rights of the PRC and expel the representation of the ROC". According to Alaba Ogunsanwo, the Foreign Minister of Taiwan visited 22 African countries and claimed that 19 of them supported Beijing's exclusion. A monumental diplomatic offensive policy was practised by the US to get support for the dual representation of China. Then US President Richard Nixon personally asked for support, the US Secretary of State talked to more than 90 Foreign Ministers and representative leaders to the UN and it is also alleged that the US diplomats even threatened aid-receiving countries to cut off aid.

On 25 October 1971, the US proposed a motion that would have allowed the PRC's representation in the UN while allowing retention of the ROC UN membership. On this proposal, only one out of 24 African countries voted in favour. This motion was rejected, and members of majority supported the withdrawal of the ROC's membership in the UN. According to the article 8 of the UN charter, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 2758, and this resolution was supported by 76 member countries including 26 countries from Africa. The resolution was passed by the General Assembly at a Security Council meeting on November 23, 1971, the PRC was welcomed as the legal representative of China. On the other hand, the ROC lost its UNSC seat as well as its membership at UN.

From 1949 to 1971, the PRC has worked hard on its Africa policy to get their key support for restoring its rights at UN by replacing the ROC. China's Africa policy was motivated primarily by its desire to rally African votes in the UN. In the early 1950s, the African countries were facing the dilemma that which Chinese government is right to represent China in the UN, and secondly, most of them were hesitated about the condition to

recognise one also means to exclude the other. In 1955, only three African countries namely, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Liberia had the representation in the UN, and later their number of representation increased, and after 1958 the other African countries, such as Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia and Sudan took a pro-Beijing position in UN. In the early 1950s and 1960s, the PRC's strong support for Africa against the colonialism and racism was manifested in the case of Algeria and Cameroon influenced the other African countries seeking for the revolution to get freedom from colonial and imperial powers. The development of revolutionary war of Algerian conforms with China's advocacy of armed struggle which spread to other colonies in Africa. With the Zhou Enlai's tireless diplomatic effort for 22 years and his policy to seek the friendship of the new African states successfully countered the US effort to isolate China. In the 1960s, the other prominent force acting against the PRC was Nikita Khrushchev, who joined the US to isolate China diplomatically. Sometimes, China has also extended its support to Africa's capitalist factions against USSR backed ones such as Angola (UNITA) and South Africa (Apartheid). China's policy in this period was to unite the "third world" to fight against the western countries. On 3 September 1965, Lin Biao, then Minister of Defense of the PRC stated this principle as,

"Around the globe, if North America and Western Europe can be called 'the cities of the world,' then Asia, Africa and Latin America constitute 'the rural areas of the world.'...The socialist countries should regard it as their international duty to support the people's revolutionary struggles in Asia, Africa, and Latin America."

Deborah Brautigam (2009) has pointed out: "In the 1970's, strategic diplomacy remained the chief motivation behind China's aid: wresting diplomatic recognition away from Taiwan [in the United Nations] and countering the influences of both the West and, in particular, the Soviet Union."

After the Cultural Revolution, the PRC government emphasised on their foreign aid & assistance to Africa and in 1970, announced budgetary and military assistance to Guinea of worth US\$20 million. The most celebrated Chinese development assistance project in Africa was the Tazara railway. Tanganyika (Tanzania) and Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) had an ambition as far back as 1947 to develop their vast agricultural land through rail

links, which will connect the Central and Southern African states. Their dependence on white minority owned railways endangered their political freedom, and since Zambia was a landlocked state, the Northeastern rail link was the only way for Zambia to maintain its economic and political independence. The Chinese proposed its offer for the project as early as 1963, but Nyerere and Kaunda were willing to get this offer from the western countries and the Soviet Union because of their experience and technological advancement. Both the African leaders approached West to finance the project which was rejected by them as they found it was economically not viable and this view was supported by the World Bank. The Soviet Union rejected to fund the project without even evaluating it through research. Finally, Mao Zedong readily accepted to provide the required assistance for the project. On 5 September 1967, an agreement was signed for the construction of TAZARA among the governments of China, Tanzania, and Zambia. In July 1970, China agreed to provide an interest-free loan of amount 988 million Yuan for a term of 30 years. China financed for the construction of the project and also provided required experts and equipment, and it is said about 13,500 Chinese technical and engineering personnel were engaged and nearly 64 Chinese workers died during the construction. Yu Donghai (2015) in his research paper while dealing with the question why the Chinese sponsored the TAZARA argues that in this phase, China's foreign policy was to unite the 'third world' to fight against the western countries and to minimise the impact of the US and the Soviet Union. On 3rd September 1965, Lin Biao then Minister of Defense said, "Around the globe, if North America and Western Europe can be called 'the cities of the world', then Asia, Africa, and Latin America constitutes the rural areas of the world.' For China TAZARA was an ambitious project to re-engage into Africa. The Chinese government and the Tanzanian government shared a similar objective in supporting the revolution. Kurt Hirschler & Rolf Hofmeier (2004) mentions in African Year Book, "Tanzania's foreign policy continues to be guided by its commitment to the national liberation struggle in Southern Africa." Under the leadership of Julius Nyerere, Dar es Salaam became the headquarters of other African revolutionary movements. With the growing understanding between the leaders of both sides, China and Tanzania signed Treaty of Friendship in 1965 during the Nyerere's first visit to China. Yu also suggests, China proposed an offer to sponsor TAZARA as early as 1963. Secondly, Nyerere was an

enthusiast of socialism and also endeavoured to support liberation movement in Southern and East Africa. Later, during his visit to China, Nyerere was impressed by China's achievement in industry and agriculture. The iconic TAZARA railway of railroad 1860 km was completed in 1976. Ma Xinghua, Ex-diplomat and now a professor of Foreign Relations in Beijing termed this era as the "golden age" of China-Africa relations.

After the death of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai in 1976, the ideology based China's Africa policy was gradually overtaken by the Deng Xiaoping's pragmatic approach in favour of national interests. In this context, late sinologist Philip Snow described this transition as, "a continual attempt to sustain a rhetorical unity which has sometimes disguised the pursuit of profoundly different goals". Zhang Qingmin and Songwei (2012) suggests, through opening up and reform in 1979, China created a favourable international environment for its domestic construction. By this time, most of the African countries gained their independence and were facing the similar challenges of developing their economies. In 1985, China developed cooperative relations with Africa based on the principles of "equality and mutual benefit, stress on practical results, diversity in form, and attainment of common progress." China expanded its foreign aid to Africa in the forms of preferential loans and joint venture. China's economic engagement with Africa increased substantially only after the mid-1990s. Throughout this changing phase, Africa always supported China's domestic and foreign policy.

In the 1980s, the cold war nations were pulling out of Africa and development aid from the west reduced to half (Servant 2005). Meine Pieter Van Dijk (2009) China's policy to Africa shifted from the ideological and political approach to more pragmatic and economic oriented. China re-engaged with Africa in search of raw materials and consumer market of its manufactured goods.

Li Anshan (2006) suggests, China first adopted the one-sided policy of pro-Soviet Union and the anti-United States in the 1950s; then shifted to double attack policy of anti-imperialism and anti-revisionism in the 1960s; and finally, the policy of alliance with the US and opposition to SU in the 1970s. In the 1970s, an Eritrean leader remarked, 'when the Chinese stand up to speak on the floor of the UN, Africa listens. By the late 1970s, the Chinese developed an ability to maintain military presence worldwide, which raised

concerns of some of the Africa rulers, who expressed their views saying, Africa's relations with China could become increasingly awkward.

Thomas W. Robinson and David L. Shambough (1995) suggests that in the early 1980s, the PRC strikingly emphasised on its Third World role. In September 1981, the Chinese Communist Party Chief Hu Yaobang said at the 12th Communist Party Congress, "Socialist China belongs to the Third World. China has experienced suffering similar to most of the Third World countries, and they are facing common problem and tasks. China regarded it as her international duty to strengthen resolutely against imperialism, hegemonism, and colonialism together with the other Third World countries."

### ***2.2c Zhao Ziyang Tour to Africa 1982-1983***

From December 1982-January 1983, then Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang visited 11 African countries namely, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Guinea, Zaire, Congo, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Kenya, and Gabon. The Africa tour was part of China's campaign to strengthen its image as a champion of the Third World. In the early 1980s, China began to follow an independent foreign policy and Zhao's Africa tour aimed at enhancing China's influence particularly in Southern Africa to create a new image of its own in the eyes of the world" (Chang 1983:8). During his tour, Zhao met with the leaders of African National Congress (ANC) & South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) to project China as a concerned party in Southern Africa. His visit was also focused on enabling China to pursue its independent foreign policy, in this context, Chang (1983) suggests "The African nation forms the majority of the Third World countries...Communist China has a sharp conflict of interest with Asian countries, and Latin America is the backyard of the US making it difficult for Peiping to infiltrate. Africa is the only area where there is no conflict of interests (Chang 1983;11). Ian Taylor (2006) commented on Zhao's Africa tour that, in the framework of reinvigorated foreign policy the tour is an attempt to secure and cement relations with Africa and promotes economic cooperation to develop a link with Third World. He highlighted three major goals of Zhao's Africa tour. Namely, it was to overcome the strained relations with Africa caused due to the Chinese foreign policy shifted towards the west in the late 1970s, and a perception developed that Beijing somehow abandoned Africa; As part of China's



economic modernization program China began to set groundwork to strengthen trade and economic cooperation with Africa; China began to consolidate its anti-hegemonic policy in Africa and encouraged resistance against the expansion of superpower in the continent (Kwan 1991; 156). In December 1982, the New China News quoted Zhao's statement two weeks before his Africa tour that, his coming trip "shows that China attaches great importance to developing its friendship and cooperation with African and the Third World countries." Zhao also said to the visiting African envoy before his tour that the Chinese side will emphasise on exchanging views on economic cooperation. The Chinese government officials said, Zhao's Africa tour aimed at two principles, namely, to strengthen political unity with the Third World; and to enhance trade and economic engagements with the Third World countries. The Chinese Assistant Manager in charge of African Affairs Gong Dafei was interviewed in Beijing by an African writer Colin Legum on Zhao's Africa tour. At the press meet, he said, China is focusing on to unite with African countries to play a larger role internationally. At present China is facing national economic difficulties and so it has curtailed the bigger aid projects in Africa; China is planning to provide small aid projects to Africa with quicker results.

With the implementation of China's independent foreign policy, it became easier for China establish and maintain diplomatic relations with a country of different ideology and political system. In Southern Africa on 27 September 1982, the People's Republic of Angola agreed to establish relations with the PRC and realised it on 12 January 1983 (Xinhua 12 January 1983). The other significant aspect of China's Africa policy was to resist the influence of superpower in Africa specifically the United States. For instance, on 4 October 1982, the Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua attacked the US at the UN General Assembly blaming for their support to South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia and making a military incursion into neighboring countries thereby posing a direct threat to the security and stability of the region (Beijing Review 1982). Still the overall China-Africa relations in the 1980s declined, and in mid-1980s, China effectively lost interests in Africa. It is said that Africa was marginalised by the Chinese government because of its interest on modernisation. China was preoccupied with its domestic problems specifically the issues related to economic progress. In 1985, Deng Xiaoping met with the visiting Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere and said, "Socialism did not

mean poverty. Without developing the productive forces and improving people's living standard, you cannot say that you are building socialism (Xinhua 1985).

In 1981, China was the only major power to support a Third World candidate Salim Salim from Tanzania for the post of the United Nations General Secretary. The Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang during his Africa tour in 1982-83 declared that 'China is a socialist country and part of the Third World.' But regarding aid & development assistance to Africa, the PRC failed to keep the commitment of their previous leadership. In 1981, Deng Xiaoping bluntly informed Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe that no further large-scale aid could be anticipated from China. Later, Zhao Ziyang tour was the reversal of the Chinese retreat from the continent. Soon after the Africa tour, from 1983 onwards, the Chinese export to Africa was promoted along with development aid of US\$200 million/year.

### **2.3 China-Africa relations after the Tiananmen Square Incident**

As Gu (1995) explains the post-Tiananmen Incident China-Africa relations that, 'the event of June 1989 did not affect the PRC's relations with the Third World as it did with the Western world.....what changed was the PRC's attitude towards the Third World countries, which turned from one of benign neglect to one of renewed emphasis.' Cheng Ming (1989) suggests that "In the past, China's relations with Western countries have been overheated, giving cold-shoulder to the Third World countries and old friends (means Africa). Judging from the events in this turmoil, it seems that at a central moment it was still those third world countries and old friends who gave China the necessary sympathy and support. Therefore, from now on China will put more efforts in resuming and developing relations with these old friends." Yu (1991) says the PRC's foreign policy orientations and its interaction with the world changed after the June 1989 Tiananmen unrest. Lowell Dittmer (1998), the Chinese politburo directives announced, "from now on China will put more effort into resuming and developing relations with old friends (in Africa) and Third World countries." "In the past several years we have concentrated too much on one part of the world and neglected the other". In 1990, Deng Xiaoping at the Beidaihe said, "The USA and other Western nations invoke sanctions against us, but

those who are truly sympathetic and supported us are some old friends in the developing countries...and so this course may not be altered for the next 20 years."

Beijing turned towards African countries in garnering potential political support to resist Western 'hegemonism', and then Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen visited 14 African countries from June 1989 to June 1992. The Chinese government sent Qian to a prolonged tour to Southern Africa, and his tour consolidated ties with Botswana, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Angola, Zambia, and Mozambique. The Chinese government found that the Southern African countries are significant and integral part of China's anti-hegemonic policy. The Beijing Review (1989) writes, Qian Qichen during his tour to Southern Africa explained the Africa leaders 'about the situation in China following the putting down of the counter-revolutionary rebellion', and the African countries in their response expressed support and understanding for China's action. Later, Qian proudly proclaimed that the PRC has diplomatic relations with 137 countries in the world, but only 22 reacted adversely to China's action to suppress the pro-democratic student protest at Tiananmen Square. The African understanding of the PRC government's position was a major theme of Qian's Africa tour. Qian asserted that the Southern African countries had agreed that the event in June 1989 does not permit any foreign interference and China supported the African countries against hegemonism, colonialism, and revisionism, and continue to cooperate in African economic development. The Xinhua (1989) writes that as a reward for Beijing's effort Africa supports China against the US hegemonism, and the Secretary General of the African Union said, China is the pillar of strength of the third world. The China Daily (1989) writes, China found Africa to be an integral part of its foreign policy and after June 1989 event it pledged to expand its economic cooperation with Africa as part of its opening up and reform policy. In November 1989, China hosted a seminar on "China-Africa Seminar on Economic Reforms and Adjustment", and the delegations from Zambia and Zimbabwe participated. China doubled its efforts to support Southern Africa development process and pursued 'anti-hegemonic' policy. Frank H. Columbus (2000), from June 5, 1989, to June 5, 1992, 38 African leaders visited China.

Nearly all the African countries never criticised China for the June 1989 incident, most of them were silent while only a few supported Beijing. After the incident, the 1st Head of

states and Foreign Minister visited China was from Africa (Yun Sun 2014). China also rewarded those African countries have supported China during the Tiananmen event, for instance, in early, 1990s China rewarded Ghana by constructing its national theatre. Zhang Chun (2014), suggests that the political unrest in China provided an opportunity for Zimbabwe to consolidate its diplomatic ties with Beijing. He quotes Robert Mugabe, then Zimbabwean President saying in support of the Chinese government as, "any reform in China can only take place by its tradition and its Chinese characteristics." The Zimbabwean government refused to join the anti-China campaign and issued an official statement saying, it was Beijing's right to stabilise the domestic situation. John W. Graver (2016) writes, in 1990 leaders of 7 African countries visited China.

In the early 1990s, Qian Qichen paid an unofficial visit to South Africa and met with senior government ministers and inspected possible embassy sights. In October 1991, Pik Botha Foreign Minister of South Africa met Qian in Beijing.

Xinhua (1991) writes that Hage Geingob, President of Namibia concurred with Li Peng's assertion that 'one country should never interfere in the internal affairs of another country, under any pretext'. Xinhua (1992) writes, Qian Qichen in his visit to Namibia in January 1992 said that 'in the post-cold war era, a small number of powers may wish to see the imposition of certain values or a particular economic model in disregard of diverse circumstances.' He further emphasised that 'independence of states' should be paramount and all countries should refrain from interference in others internal affairs. Deborah Brautigam (1998) writes, in 1990s Qian Qichen reassured the African countries that, 'China will continue to take unity and cooperation with Third World countries, including Africa countries, as the fundamental foothold of its foreign policy. Zhao Jinjun & Chen Zhirui (2014) quotes Qian Qichen to suggest that African response after the June 1989 unrest, "What they did indicated the reason why they visited China at that very moment. It was exactly to show that Africa was a real friend of China, even though China was going through its toughest situation. They remembered China used to help them in the past, and therefore, they should try their best to support China."

Deborah Brautigam (2007) suggests, from 1990 to 1998, Qian Qichen visited 36 African countries. In July 1992, then Chinese President Yang Shangkun along with Foreign

Minister Qian Qichen and a Chinese trade delegation visited Morocco, and during the visit, Yang reaffirmed that cooperation with Africa is the basic tenet of the Chinese foreign policy.

After 1989, China embraced the south-south cooperation and the Chinese officials explicitly pronounced about the respect for each other internal affairs and non-interference must be the basis of emerging new international order. The theme of non-interference in each other's internal affairs became the theme of the Chinese official visits to Africa. Ben Willis (2014) suggests that the Chinese foreign policy gravitated towards the developing world. The Chinese leaders closely aligned with the African elite and started working together to create a more hospitable multi-polar world order. The policy emphasised on state sovereignty and non-interference. He also believes that there was an elevation of communitarian socio-economic rights above purportedly 'western' individual human rights and the African countries promoted China as an authentic voice of developing the world within multilateral bodies and international forums. MH Ingiriis (2014) the diplomatic isolation China faced internationally after the Tiananmen unrest in 1989 also ended its honeymoon with the west. FM Mwege (2006) suggests that the consequences of the unrest induced China to seek closer ties with non-western states. African countries played an important role in criticism of China by the west.

Ian Taylor (2013) China reasserted the policy of non-interference in state sovereignty and took a prudent attitude towards commercial links with Africa. Hanson (2005), believes that China's non-interference policy largely please Sudan. On the Darfur crisis, French (2004) quoted the Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Zhou Wenzhong said in 2004, "We try to separate politics from business. Secondly, I think the internal situation in the Sudan is an internal affair; we are not in a position to impose upon them." Serge Michel, Michel Beuret (2009), believes that 'Great Leap Forward' was seen in China-Africa relations after the June 1989 Tiananmen incident, and later in 1995, then Chinese President Jiang Zemin asked its business community to "Go abroad! Become world players".

China began to delegitimize Taiwan which reflected in their new Africa policy; it began to provide more generous aid to Africa than Taipei. As result of its aid policy in Africa, the number of ROC's diplomatic partner in the continent reduced from 13 in 1994 to 4 in

2010, and most of the African countries opposed to Taiwan effort of joining World Trade Organisation (WTO) (Brookes 2006). John F. Copper (2016) writes, due to the fall of the Soviet Union, its aid program almost disappeared in Africa, and it became easier for China to increase its aid & assistance in the continent.

## **2.4 Understanding the Chinese leaders' perceptions of Africa**

### ***2.4a Mao Zedong and Africa***

In the early 1960s, Mao Zedong felt that a tide of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism was sweeping through Africa. He believed that revolution is the means to achieve the victory for independence. He called for workers, peasants, revolutionary intellectuals and all revolutionary people to fight for the victory of the revolution. He wanted the people of the world to unite against racial discrimination by the US imperialism. On 8 August 1963, he received visitors from Africa and had a very cordial, friendly talk with them. He condemned the racial discrimination practised by the US imperialism and the colonial authorities of South Africa. He stated, "Racial discrimination is found in Africa, in Asia, and in other parts of the world. The racial question is, in essence, a class question. Our unity is not of one race; it is the unity of comrades and friends. We should strengthen our unity and wage a common struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and the running dogs, to attain complete and thorough national independence and liberation." Though Mao Zedong's expressed concern and solidarity of the Chinese people for Africa against the colonial and imperial powers, such a move helped the PRC's recognitions, international support and later on, most of the African countries after their independence established diplomatic relations with the PRC. Mao Zedong's Africa policy targeted the US imperialism because at that time the US was the strongest rival of the newly established PRC. His policy influenced not only the African people but also in Asia and other parts of the world. This policy successfully established a platform for the PRC increase the number of its diplomatic partners in Africa and other parts of the world. The significance of this policy was manifested on 27 October 1971 with the restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations. The United Nations General Resolution 2758 was supported and voted in favour of China by 76 member countries, which transferred the seat of China from the Republic of China (ROC) to the

PRC as the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations. It can be considered to be one of the most significant outcomes of the Chinese diplomacy in the next two decades of its establishment. In 1971, 42 African countries were the UN member states and over a one-third of the Beijing's total votes in favour of the PRC were from Africa, including four who still had diplomatic relations with Taipei (Ian Taylor 2007).

In February 1974, Mao Zedong in a talk with Zambian President Kenneth David Kaunda put forward his view on differentiating the "three worlds". He said, "I hope the Third World unity. In Asia, all countries except for Japan belong to the Third World. The whole of Africa belongs to the Third World, and Latin America also belongs to the Third World."

#### **2.4b *Zhou Enlai and Africa***

Zhou Enlai, first Premier of the PRC was responsible for implementing the Mao Zedong's Africa policy in the 1950s and 1960s. In 1954 he said: "It isn't necessary for the Asian countries to fight with others, the thing we need is peace and cooperation. The Asian countries must agree and use beneficial ways, try to keep the social cooperation and protect the safety and peace in Asia using the joined force. Our society has a connection to the other countries located far from Asia." He attended the Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia in April 1955. In this conference, leaders from 29 states participated, and Zhou Enlai realised that it was a great diplomatic success for the PRC. Zhou Enlai believed that the PRC should increase its engagements in Africa and after that, he put forward 8-principles to guide China's relations to the African countries. Zhou Enlai's speech at the Plenary Session of Asia-Africa Conference on 19 April 1955 was based on two themes, first, to put a common struggle against colonialism, imperialism, and neo-colonialism, second, to struggle against poverty and for development. He said the countries of Asia and Africa had been the subject of suppression and oppression by the colonial powers and which has resulted in a stagnant state of poverty and backwardness. He said the people of Asia and Africa are deprived of human rights and are subject of racial discriminations. He suggested as newly independent states we must seek for and safeguard world peace, preserve our national independence. We must also seek for our

political and economic independence, enjoy equal rights in international relations. We must support the national self-determination of the dependent countries as part of their fundamental human rights. During his speech, he also presented the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, namely, mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence. Zhou Enlai in his speech carried the message that China's main aim was cooperation with Asia-Africa. He explained the need to protect peace among the Asian and African population. He said the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence and the ten principles accepted in the conference are written with the aim of cooperation of all the countries, and these principles are the main principles of China.

In the 1960s, China's foreign policy was focused to the "Third World", and so, it was necessary to develop relations with Asian, African and Latin American countries and to support fights for social and economic rights. China foreign policy to Africa since its establishment was marked by three constants: the export of the Chinese model'; the struggle against the superpowers and China's third world (Yu 1977:98). From 13 December 1963 to 5 February 1964, Zhou Enlai made 72 days Africa trip to visit 10 African states namely, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Mali, Guinea, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia. This trip was significant not only as a diplomatic symbol, but it was an opportunity for Zhou Enlai to understand and develop an idea about the Africa, which included its people, socio-economic and political situations. Later, these ideas helped Zhou Enlai to formulate China's Africa policy. He found that the Chinese and the Africans have similar experiences of oppression of colonialism, they have common tasks of independence and development and they will have to work together to strengthen solidarity and cooperation. Zhou Enlai was pursuing an African policy featured in pragmatism, diversity, seeking common ground while shelving differences. Until December 1963, there were 34 African countries, and they followed a varied political system of governance such as Republic system, monarchy, military dictatorship, etc. Zhou Enlai believed that the ideological differences could be an issue before China to strengthen its relations with African countries. He instructed the Chinese diplomats, "we should make friends with African countries", and "shall not take a hostile attitude to push them into the camp of the enemies." He emphasised on "seeking big common ground



while shelving small differences." For instance, during his Africa tour, then-Tunisian President Bourguiba raised challenges over China-US relations, but he dealt it intelligently and finally, on January 10, 1964, Tunisia establishes diplomatic relations with the PRC. His meeting with the Ethiopian King Haik Selassie was also a diplomatic success as later on December 1, 1970, the two sides agreed to established diplomatic relations. Zhou Enlai maintained "One China Policy" as the fundamental component of China's foreign policy, for instance, Senegal already had ties with the Taipei, and it was also enjoying the cultural and trade relations with the PRC. Though Senegal always emphasised on to establish relations also with the PRC it was possible only when it severed diplomatic ties with Taipei. On December 7, 1971, Senegal and the PRC established diplomatic relations.

During the Africa tour, Zhou Enlai along with the African leaders formulated the "eight principles guiding China's external economic and technological assistance." The Chinese idea was, "In offering assistance to Africa, we should aim at the global landscape and future development and pursue pragmatism and mutual benefits". Zhou Enlai believed that the assistance should be based on equality and mutual benefits. Therefore, the Principle One provides, "the Chinese government always provides external assistance based on the principles of equality and mutual benefit, never views this kind of assistance as largesse by one side, and believes the assistance is mutual". He believed that after the World War II, the big power such as the US and the USSR were practising neocolonialism in the 'Third World' and maintained their control over the economic lifeline and resources of the newly independent countries through the engagement of external aid and assistances. Zhou Enlai ensured that the PRC's assistance would be different from neocolonialism and the recipient countries' sovereignty will be the main feature of its aid. Thirdly, the Chinese assistance should suit the conditions and realities of the recipient countries; it should be efficient enough to increase the income and accumulate wealth for the government of the recipient countries. For instance, China assisted Tanzania and Zambia to construct Tanzam Railway. Zhou Enlai played a key and responsible role from the Chinese side in the construction of Tanzam railway. In December 1964 Abdulrahman Babu then Minister of Commerce, Tanzania conveyed the message of the Tanzanian President Nyerere to the Chinese Ambassador He Ying and

said Nyerere wanted to build a railway to free Zambia from geopolitical blockade made by three white colonial ruling countries namely, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. The railway will help Zambia to export its copper to foreign markets through Tanzania. In this regard, Zhou Nan, former Vice Foreign Minister of the PRC recalls Chairman Mao Zedong's words to President Nyerere; 'You have difficulties, so do we. But your difficulties are different from ours. We will still help you build this railway even if that means we won't be able to build railways on our land.' Premier Zhou Enlai said, 'what the Western imperialists refuse to do, we will help you do. And as long as we decide to do it, we will do it well.' Zhou Enlai came up with 5 points of suggestions:

- First, Tanzam railway was urgently needed by Tanzania and Zambia, and the President of Tanzania Nyerere himself came for the help, and so, China should grant his request.
- Second, China is capable enough financially and technologically to take up this large project.
- The effect and influence of this single large project will be beyond Africa.
- We should dispatch the Chinese expert team for the project.
- This project will certainly panic the west, and after that, Nyerere will negotiate better with the west.

The Tanzam railway project officially began in October 1970, and it took about five years and eight months to complete.

According to Ian Taylor, Zhou Enlai's 10 African nation tour in 1963-1964 had three main goals:

- Rationalise PRC's policies in Africa
- Promote a planned 2nd Bandung Conference
- Position China as distinct from Moscow.

The other aspects which make the Zhou Enlai's Africa tour significant are the Sino-Soviet split which began 1960 and the Sino-Indian border conflict in 1962. The PRC already damaged relations with its two important diplomatic partners and its recovery could only

be made in Africa as a large number of countries became independent in the early 1960s. In 1960, 15 African countries became independent and established as new states. Soon after the visit by early 1970s, almost 20 African countries established diplomatic relations with the PRC.

**Table No. 2.1 : List of African countries established diplomatic relations with the PRC (Year of establishment of diplomatic relations)**

Sr.No	African Country	Established Diplomatic Relations with the PRC (Year)	Severed Diplomatic Relations with the PRC (Year)	Reestablished Diplomatic Relations with the PRC (Year)
1	Egypt	May 30, 1956		
2	Morocco	November 1958		
3	Algeria	December 20, 1958		
4	Sudan	January 4, 1959		
5	Guinea	October 14, 1959		
6	Ghana	1960		
7	Mali	October 25, 1960		
8	Somalia	December 14, 1960		
9	Tanganyika	December 9, 1961		
10	Uganda	1962		
11	Zanzibar	December 11, 1963		
12	Kenya	December 14, 1963		
13	Burundi	December 28, 1963		
14	Tunisia	1964		
15	Congo	February 22, 1964		
16	Central Africa Republic	September 29, 1964		
17	Benin	November 1964	January 1966	1972
18	Mauritania	July 19, 1965		

19	Ethiopia	1970		
20	Equatorial Guinea	October 15, 1970		
21	Lebanon	1971		
22	The Democratic Republic of Congo	1971		
23	Gambia	1971	1995	March 17, 2016
24	Nigeria	February 10, 1971		
25	Cameroon	March 26, 1971		
26	Sierra Leone	July 29, 1971		
27	Rwanda	November 12, 1971		
28	Chad	1972		
29	Mauritius	April 15, 1972		
30	Togo	September 19, 1972		
31	Madagascar	November 6, 1972		
32	Gabon	April 20, 1974		
33	Niger	July 20, 1974		
34	Guinea Bissau	March 1974		
35	Botswana	January 6, 1975		
36	Sao, Tome and Principe	July 12, 1975	May 6, 1997	
37	Comoros	November 13, 1975		
38	Cape Verde	April 1976		
39	Seychelles	June 30, 1976		
40	Liberia	1977		
41	Libya	August 1978		
42	Zimbabwe	January 1979		
43	Djibouti	January 8, 1979		

44	Lesotho	1983		
45	Angola	1983		
46	Ivory Coast	March 2, 1983		
47	Namibia	March 22, 1990		
48	Eritrea	May 24, 1993		
49	South Africa	January 1998		
50	Senegal	2005		
51	Malawi	2008		
52	South Sudan	July 19, 2011		

*Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PRC*

Zhou Enlai was in office as the Premier of the PRC from October 1, 1949- January 8, 1976, and during his tenure 30 African countries established diplomatic relations with the PRC. He also served as the 1st Foreign Minister of the PRC from 1949-1958. Zhou Enlai suggested the idea study Africa and learn from Africa. He said to the Chinese cultural team visiting Africa, when visiting the countries, "you should not only present our culture but also learn from their culture" and "you can gain more by seeing a country yourself."

#### **2.4c Deng Xiaoping and Africa**

Deng Xiaoping while meeting with the visiting Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, said, "We are closely following Africa's development and progress towards prosperity. We are pleased to see that many African countries have become independent since the Second World War, creating the best conditions for development. After years of struggle, the international situation is becoming more relaxed, and a world war can be avoided. The African countries should take advantage of this favourable peaceful environment to develop. They should work out strategies and policies for development by actual conditions in each country, and they should unite so that all their people can work together to promote economic development." Deng Xiaoping on April 10, 1974, spoke at the special session of the U.N. General Assembly about the people of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. He said the people of Asia, Africa, and Latin America has a greater role in international affairs. He said the US and the Soviet Union vainly seeking world

hegemony and wants to bring the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America under its control. He said, on the other hand, the people of Asia, Africa, and Latin America is winning their struggle against colonialism. The African people's struggle against imperialism, colonialism and racial discrimination is expanding. He pointed out the old economic structure has not changed fundamentally, and economic lifelines are still controlled by colonialism and imperialism.

During the tenure of Deng Xiaoping, China under the influence of reforms and opening up changed its foreign policy. Deng pointed out that, China's policy should focus on economic development, and its foreign policy should serve the central economic task. The implications were also seen in China's relations with the African countries, and now, the relations must serve China's domestic economic development agenda through the "mutual complementarities of their economics". In the late 1970s, during the tenure of Deng Xiaoping's leadership, China committed up to 700 combat troops to South Sudan to restore peace in the region, and it is said this decision is mainly aimed to preserve China's energy interest. From the late 1970s to mid-1989, China followed the Deng Xiaoping's 'opening up' and modernization drive and the significance of Africa to China declined which was reflected China-Africa relations. Though Deng Xiaoping mentioned about the 'Third World' in his selected works, he proposed three points:

- We oppose hegemony.
- We safeguard world peace.
- Union and cooperation with third world countries

He laid special emphasis to the third world, and he believed that opposing hegemony and safeguarding world peace are of special significance to the third world.

#### ***2.4d Jiang Zemin and Africa***

From 8-22 May 1996, then Chinese President Jiang Zemin along with the Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen visited six African countries, namely, Kenya, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mali, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. Head of states from both sides exchanged views on Africa and international situation, bilateral relations, economic cooperation, trade and other issues, and they reached a broad consensus on these issues. On behalf of the

Chinese government, Jiang Zemin systematically expounded China's Africa policy in the contemporary time. It was said that the China's new Africa policy mainly aimed at strengthening solidarity and cooperation with African countries and work together to contribute to world peace and development. The guiding principle of China's new Africa policy is "to treat each other as equals, develop a sincere friendship, strengthen solidarity and cooperation, and seek common development." The main elements of the China's Africa policy are as follows:

- to respect the choices of the road to development made by African people themselves;
- to abide by the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence and non-interference in the internal affairs of African countries;
- to respect all countries and treat them as equals, irrespective of their size, strength, and wealth;
- to support African countries in their just struggle to maintain national independence, state sovereignty, and territorial integrity and oppose foreign interference;
- to promote unity among African countries and advocate settlement of disputes among them, if any, through peaceful negotiation;
- to uphold justice and help safeguard the rights and interests of African countries in international affairs;
- to continue to provide economic aid to African countries without attaching any political strings;
- to stick to the principle of equality and mutual benefit in its economic cooperation and trade with African countries.

During his visit to Ethiopia, he delivered a keynote speech at the Headquarters of the African Union, which was entitled, "Towards a New Historical Milestone of Sino-African Friendship" and in his speech he put forward five-point proposals for long-term stable China-Africa relationships of all-round cooperation. These are as follows:

- to foster a sincere friendship between the two sides and become each other's reliable "all-weather friends";
- to treat each other as equals and respect each other's sovereignty and refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs;
- to seek common development by mutual benefit;
- to enhance consultation and cooperation in international affairs; and
- to look into the future and create a more splendid world.

In 1998, Blade Nzimande, General Secretary of the South Africa Communist Party (SACP) met with President Jiang Zemin, who described Nzimande as an "old friend of the Chinese people and thanked SACP for its contribution to the establishment of diplomatic relations with South Africa. In April 2000, Jiang Zemin visited South Africa, and he was accompanied by Vice Premier Qian Qichen, Chinese State Councilor Wu Yi, seven other ministers and his wife, Wang Yeping. The Pretoria Declaration is in the partnership between the PRC, and the Republic of South Africa was signed. He said, "The Chinese people and the South African people enjoy an age old traditional friendship" and "we are convinced that our joint efforts, the friendly cooperation between China and South Africa will serve more achievements and better benefits to people." He further said, "I am confident that my visit to South Africa will further enhance mutual understanding and facilitate the constant and steady growth of China-South Africa friendship in the new century."

From 10-12 October 2000, the First Ministerial of Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was held in Beijing. Then-Chinese President Jiang Zemin addressed the opening ceremony of the meeting which was based on two themes, namely, "How to promote the establishment of a new international political and economic order in the 21st century" and "How to further strengthen Sino-African economic cooperation and trade under the new circumstances". In the speech he said, China and Africa faced with historical opportunities for greater development and unprecedented challenges. He called for closer south-south cooperation and establishment of an equitable and just new international political and economic order. He believed the international order should be based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence; purposes and principles of the UN



Charter; principles and spirit enshrined in the Organisation of African Union (OAU) Charter and other universally recognised norms. According to him, the paramount importances to the world peace are sovereign equality and non-interference. He said the friendship between China and Africa is based on the solid foundation of the five decades of relations. We have experienced frequent high-level exchanges and the growing friendship between the Chinese and the African people. In his speech, he made the following recommendations:

- Strengthen solidarity and promote south-south cooperation.
- Enhance dialogue and improve north-south relations.
- Take part in international affairs by equality and in an enterprising spirit.
- Establishing a new long-term stable partnership of equality and mutual benefits.

Jiang Zemin proposed China's three tasks for the new century and identified national reunification as one of the major tasks along with the modernization of the Chinese economy and safeguarding peace. During his tenure, Taiwan remained isolated in Africa and in 1998 South Africa established relations with the PRC whereas, Sao Tome and Principe severed relations with the PRC on May 6, 1997, to established diplomatic ties with Taiwan.

In April 2002, during his visit to Libya, he said the two sides supported each other in international issue. He believed that both countries have the common aspirations of peace, cooperation, and development. He expressed his willingness and said, all countries should have equal rights international forums and their active participations in international affairs. He said, the Chinese government opposes any form of terrorism and expresses its support for the efforts to eliminate terrorism. The governments of both sides signed agreements on investment cooperation, oil and railways cooperation.

After the state visit of Libya, Jiang Zemin made three days visit to Nigeria in April 2002, and this was his fourth visit to Africa as the Chinese President. During the visit, he met and held talks with Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo at the latter's Presidential Palace. He reiterated the Chinese government attaches great importance to Africa and they want to strengthen further and develop friendly relations with the African countries.

He said on the principles of sincerity, friendship, equal treatment, unity cooperation, common development and facing the future establish a relation of long-term stability and all-round cooperation with the African countries. Jiang Zemin expressed his support for the African leaders' initiative of New Partnership for Africa's Development. He also emphasised on the expansion of bilateral economic and trade cooperation and decided to offer assistance to Nigeria to aid projects. He expressed his views on Africa and said, the general situations in Africa tend to ease and to seek peace, stability and development are the common aspirations of the African countries. On July 3, 2002, the Nigerian Vice-President Atiku Abubakar met with the Jiang Zemin in Beijing. Jiang Zemin said during the talks with visiting Nigerian leader that Nigeria is an important country and the most important trading partner in Africa. Jiang Zemin also expressed his appreciation for Nigeria's long-term position of adhering to one China policy.

After Nigeria, Jiang Zemin visited Tunisia in April 2002, he met with Tunisian President Fouad Mebazaa and spoke about the China-Tunisia friendly cooperation in the political, economic, scientific and cultural sectors. He suggested opening up a new area of bilateral economic and trade cooperation to enrich bilateral relations. He also suggested that both sides should strengthen consultations and coordination on international areas. He reiterated that in the last 38 years of diplomatic ties both sides have always respected and supported each other.

Jiang Zemin during his tenure as Chinese President made four diplomatic trips to Africa in the year 1996, 1999, 2000 and 2002, and visited 12 African countries, namely, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Mali, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. In his leadership, China's Africa policy emphasised on the expansion of economic cooperation and explored new areas of engagement while maintaining and strengthening stable political relations. The Chinese government focused on to promote peace and development in the African countries and strengthening cooperation in international affairs as the new areas in their political relations.

#### ***2.4e Hu Jintao and Africa***

The Chinese President Hu Jintao carried forward Jiang Zemin's Africa Policy and further deepen and strengthen the all-round cooperation between China and Africa. The bilateral exchanges and engagements were encouraged in various areas, and he has used all the possible platforms of contact with the African leaders. He has also encouraged people to people exchanges between the Chinese and the Africans. In August 2004, he sent a message to the participants of the first China-Africa Youth Festival. In September 2004, he met with the visiting Gabonese President El Hadj Omar Bongo Ondimba and emphasised on enhancing China-Gabon relationships. He suggested for the Chinese investment in oil, mining, and reforestations. He stressed for new areas of cooperation and exchanges in education, culture, public health. He pointed out that both sides should strengthen cooperation in the human resource development through China-Africa Forum. He supported the idea to establish political consultation mechanism for the regular contact between foreign ministers of both sides. During the meeting, Hu Jintao reiterated that China firmly supports the development and revitalization of Africa. He also expressed his appreciation for Gabonese government continuous support to China on reunification and international affairs. In 10-12, October 2000, Hu Jintao as the Vice-President of the PRC participated in 1st Ministerial Conference of FOCAC held in Beijing. During the conference, he met with the visiting leaders and government representatives from 44 African countries. This may be the first major platform for Hu Jintao to interact with the African leaders.

On September 28, 2004, he met with the visiting South African President Jacob Zuma and said the cooperation between China and South Africa is significant to world peace and common prosperity. He suggested that both sides work hard to substantiate bilateral strategic partnership. He reiterated that since the 1950s, the Chinese government and the people had supported the South African people in their fight against apartheid and in realising their national liberation. In November 2004, Hu Jintao welcomed the visiting Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi in the Great Hall of the People, Beijing and held talks with him. He expressed his willingness to expand cooperation, strengthen exchanges and enhance friendship with Ethiopia. He suggested that China and Ethiopia

should cooperate in the areas of politics, trade, economy, culture, education, public health, international and regional affairs. Hu appreciated and praised the Ethiopian government for their support and adherence to a one-China policy against Taiwan, and human rights issues. The top Chinese legislator Wu Bangguo visited Zambia and delivered a speech at the Zambian National Assembly on 5 November 2004 entitled "Enhancing mutual trust and promoting common development." He read out the 3-point initiatives of Hu Jintao to upgrade Sino-African relations, which are as follows:

- To Build on the traditional friendship and push for new progress in China-Africa relations.
- To persists in mutual assistance and mutual benefit and promote common prosperity of China-Africa relations.
- To cooperate even more closely to safeguard the rights and interests of the developing countries.

On 15 November 2004, Liu Guijin the Chinese ambassador to South Africa also spoke about the Hu Jintao's 3-point initiatives at a seminar on China-Africa relations organised by Institute of Security Studies of South Africa. On 25 January 2005, Hu Jintao met with the visiting Mauritian Prime Minister Paul Raymond Berenger and acknowledged about the deepening of traditional friendship between China and Mauritius since the establishment of diplomatic relations. He said the bilateral exchanges from both sides have increased in the recent few years and has resulted in the deepening of mutual trust. He appreciated that both sides have consulted and supported each other in the international and regional affairs. He spoke highly of Mauritian government adherence to one-China policy. On 22 March 2005, Hu Jintao in his talks with visiting DRC President Josef Kabila, said China supports Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) peace process and economic reconstruction. He emphasised on improving the bilateral exchanges between the two sides to further deepen the political relations. He said the diplomatic relations between the two developed with increasing mutual trust in politics. He acknowledged the mutual understanding and support in international affairs and expressed his appreciations to the DRC government's consistent adherence to one-China policy. On 21 April 2005, Hu Jintao held talks with the visiting Nigerian President

Olusegun Obasanjo and jointly issued a communiqué saying, "Nigeria supports China's efforts to reunify the nation, including the formulation of the Anti-Secession Law." The communiqué also suggested for the close cooperation between China and Nigeria for the attainment of global security and reforms of the United Nations (UN). The Nigerian President clarified the Africa's position for the reforms of the UN and the realisation of Nigeria's permanent seat at the UN. Hu Jintao said China supports the development of the African Union and the implementation of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). He further suggested the focus on four aspects of the China-Nigeria Strategic Partnership, namely, enhancing political negotiation through high-level official and other personnel exchanges, increasing bilateral trade and two-way investment, strengthening cooperation in key fields and reinforcing negotiations in international affairs to protect the interests of developing countries.

During the Asia-Africa Summit 2005 in Jakarta, Hu Jintao said the people of Asia and Africa must seize opportunities, strengthen cooperation to cope with challenges in a globalised world and seek common development. He believed in the current international order there are rare opportunities and severe challenges for Asia and Africa. He suggested the Asian and African countries open one's market for the other, exchange and share one's respective experiences, actively work for the free trade arrangements, raise fund for development, deepen industrial cooperation and guard against financial crisis. On the further improvement of South-South cooperation, Hu said the contacts and exchanges should be increased between regional organisations in Asia and Africa. He emphasised on to create an international development environment featuring win-win cooperation and a rational new international economic order featuring mutual benefits. On 20 July 2016, China and Mauritania celebrated the 40th anniversary of their diplomatic relations, and the heads of both states exchanged letters of congratulations. On this occasion, Hu Jintao said China and Mauritania enjoy profound traditional friendship and the 40 years of bilateral relations have developed with the concerted efforts of both sides. He appreciated the support and cooperation for each other in international affairs.

In July 2005, the Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe visited China and held talks with Hu Jintao at the Great Hall of the People. Hu Jintao spoke about the China-

Zimbabwe relations and said the 25 years of friendship between two sides developed steadily. Hu admired Zimbabwean government consistent adherence to one-China policy and said China-Zimbabwe are sincere friends and reliable partners. He suggested four aspects of developing long-term stable relations and all-round cooperation between China and Zimbabwe.

- Firstly, enhance high-level exchanges between the governments, parliament and political parties to lay a solid foundation of China-Zimbabwe relations.
- Secondly, further expansion of trade and economic cooperation.
- Thirdly, strengthen cooperation in human resources development and expanding cooperation in the fields of education, health and culture.
- Fourthly, strengthen bilateral coordination and cooperation in international and regional affairs.

He appreciated the effective mechanism of China-Africa collective dialogue and pragmatic cooperation through FOCAC and expected a new type of partnership between China and Africa with long-term stability, equality, mutual benefit and all-round cooperation. Hu Jintao along with his wife Liu Yongqing and other senior Chinese leaders held a welcome ceremony for Robert Mugabe at North Hall of the Great Hall of the People.

The written statement by President Hu Jintao at the High-Level Meeting on Financing for Development titled "Promote Universal Development to Achieve Common Prosperity" was presented at the 60th Session of the United Nations on 14 September 2005. In his statement, he asked to build a fair, rational and effective Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) evaluation framework and take concrete measures on critical issues such as poverty eradication, financial assistance and debt forgiveness to developing countries and African countries in particular. He announced that China in the next three years will increase assistance to developing countries and Africa in particular. At the session, Hu Jintao met with the Zambian President Levy Mwanawasa and said in the last two years, many new achievements are made in bilateral friendly cooperation in various areas between China and Zambia. He said both sides enjoys frequent high-level exchanges, expanded trade and economic cooperation a closer bilateral consultations and cooperation

in international affairs. He assured that China will continue to follow unswerving policy to boost political mutual trust and mutually beneficial cooperation to take the bilateral relations to a new height. He reiterated that FOCAC has strengthened bilateral dialogue and enforced pragmatic cooperation between China and Africa. During his speech at the UN, Hu pointed out that China understands concerns of the African countries regarding the UN reforms. On 26 September 2005, Hu Jintao held talks with the visiting Congolese President Sassau at the Great Hall of People. Hu pointed out that though there are profound changes in the international situation and respective conditions but the China-Republic of Congo relations is developing steadily since 41 years. He said both sides have enjoyed increased high-level exchanges and sound cooperation in major international and regional issues. Hu Jintao appreciated and thanked the Congolese government for their resolute pursuit of one China policy, and he expressed China's support to safeguard Congo's state stability and national rehabilitation. He expressed China's willingness to strengthen unity and cooperation with African countries. A welcome ceremony was held at the square outside the East Gate of the Great Hall of the People for Sassau at the presence of Hu Jintao, his wife Liu Yongxiang and other Chinese leaders. On 20 October 2005, President of Equatorial Guinea Teodor Obiang Nguema Mbasogo met with Hu Jintao in Beijing. Hu Jintao acknowledges that China-Equatorial Guinea enjoys sound progress in the relationship in last 35 years and fruitful cooperation is seen in the areas of education, culture, and health. Hu appreciated Equatorial Guinea's position on one China policy and their support for the reunification. On 2 December 2005, Hu Jintao met with the visiting Lesotho Prime Minister Pakalithe Mosisili and said the Chinese government appreciates Lesotho's support for one China policy. He suggested working on the common task of developing both sides economies, improving people's living standard and maintaining long-term stable relations through expansion of communication and cooperation. On 19 December 2005, the visiting Namibian President Pohamba met with Hu Jintao at the Great Hall of the People, Beijing. Both sides agreed and exchanged views on bilateral friendly cooperation relations in the new century. Hu Jintao said both sides enjoyed long-term friendly exchanges and the bilateral relations has steadily consolidated and developed in the last 15 years of established diplomatic relations. He expressed that China-Namibia has experienced remarkable achievements in

politics, economics, culture, education, health, and judicature. Hu Jintao highly appreciated and thanked the Namibian government for their resolute adoption of one China policy and support for reunification. The Chinese government carried out a welcome ceremony for Pohamba in the North Hall of the Great Hall of the People in the presence of Hu Jintao, his wife Liu Yongqing and other Chinese leaders. On 13 February 2006, Hu Jintao met with the visiting Togolese President Faure Essozimna Gnassingbe and said both sides in the last 35 years of established diplomatic relations have shown sincerity and mutual reliance, shared weal and woe to establish a profound friendship. He expressed that remarkable achievements are seen in their relations in the aspects of politics, economy & trade, culture, education, and health. Hu said both sides have experienced mutual understanding and cooperation in international affairs and he acknowledges that China appreciated and thanked the Togolese government for their resolute position on one China policy and their support for reunification. Hu Jintao expressed the Chinese government willingness to expand friendly exchanges between their governments, legislatures and political parties, and deepen cooperation in culture, education, health and human resource development (FOCAC 2006). On 19 July 2006, during the leader's meeting of six developing countries namely, India, Mexico, South Africa, Brazil, Republic of Congo and China, Hu Jintao said the international community should pay more attention to Africa's stability and development. He is quoted as "without stability in Africa, there will be no world peace. Without development in Africa, there will be no world prosperity." He urged the developing countries to implement New Partnership for Africa's development (FOCAC Archives 2006). On 16 July 2006 Hu Jintao met with Denis Sassou Nguesso, President of Republic of Congo and Thabo Mvuyelwa Mbeki, President of South Africa at the G8 St. Petersburg Summit. Hu Jintao said to Sassou that Congo is a trustworthy friend of China and extended the Chinese government appreciation for one China policy. Hu suggested that both sides should vow to strengthen strategic cooperation. Hu Jintao during the talk with Mbeki said, Chinese government attaches great importance to ties with South Africa and both sides should work to strengthen the bilateral strategic partnership to next level.

On 21 April 2005, Hu Jintao delivered a speech titled, "Seize the opportunity for all-round cooperation and common development" at the Asian-African Business Summit



2005, Jakarta. Hu Jintao urged to establish a new type of strategic partnership for closer cooperation between Asian and African countries. He pointed out that in the current economic globalisation there are rare opportunities and severe challenges for the countries in Asia and Africa. He said the developing countries must seize opportunities and create an international development environment featuring win-win cooperation and mutually beneficial cooperation. Hu Jintao reiterated that China's foreign policy attaches great importance to economic & trade cooperation with Asia and Africa. He extended China's support to strengthen Asia-Africa friendship and solidarity and urged to carry on Bandung spirit for the continuous progress in Asia and Africa.

On 1 November 2006, before FOCAC Beijing Summit, Hu Jintao met with Alpha Oumar Konare, Chairman of the African Union Commission (AUC) at the Great Hall of the People, Beijing. During the meeting, Hu Jintao said, in the six years of establishment of FOCAC, we have experienced an important arena for dialogue and cooperation. He said, "FOCAC summit demonstrates common aspirations of Chinese and African people, and conform to world trend of peace, development, and cooperation." On the other hand, Konare acknowledged that China-Africa friendship is based on equal treatment and mutual trust. Hu Jintao expressed appreciation for AU's effort for safeguarding regional stability, promoting African unity and pushing for economic integration. He accepted that China-AU relation an important component of Sino-Africa relations. Hu Jintao also met with the Gabonese President El Hadj Omar Bongo Ondimba and said both sides should deepen Economic & Trade cooperation and enhance consultations in the international affairs. Bongo reiterated that Gabonese government supports China's unifications. In the same meeting, Hu Jintao met with President of Comoros Ahmed Abdullah Mohammed Sambi and pointed out that "Sino-Comoros relation is a good example of equal treatment between big and small countries and cooperation" (FOCAC Archives 2006).

On 4 November 2006, at the FOCAC Summit Beijing, Hu Jintao announced \$3 billion preferential loans, \$2 billion preferential buyer's credit for the next three years and a special fund of \$5 billion for the Chinese investment projects in Africa. Hu Jintao in his speech said, China-Africa commonly pursuit friendship, peace, cooperation, and development. He expressed that China-Africa enjoys close unity and coordinate and trust

each other in international affairs. He said China supported African countries in their struggle for winning liberation and in their development process. He accepted that China would not forget Africa's support for restoring lawful rights of the PRC in United Nations. He appreciated and thanked African countries support for one China policy and peaceful reunification of Taiwan and mainland. He pointed out that China will strengthen cooperation with Africa in the following fields.

- Deepen political relations of equality and mutual trust.
- Broaden win-win economic cooperation.
- Promote balanced and harmonious global development.
- Strengthen Cooperation and mutual support in international affairs.

To forge a new type of China-Africa strategic partnership and strengthen our cooperation in more areas and at a higher level, the Chinese Government will take the following eight steps:

- Double its 2006 assistance to Africa by 2009.
- Provide US\$3 billion of preferential loans and US\$2 billion of preferential buyer's credits to Africa in the next three years.
- Set up a China-Africa development fund which will reach US\$5 billion to encourage Chinese companies to invest in Africa and provide support to them.
- Build a conference centre for the African Union to support African countries in their efforts to strengthen themselves through unity and support the process of African integration.
- Cancel debt in the form of all the interest-free government loans that matured at the end of 2005 owed by the heavily indebted developing countries and the least developed countries in Africa that have diplomatic relations with China.
- Further, open up China's market to Africa by increasing from 190 to over 440 the number of export items to China receiving zero-tariff treatment from the least developed countries in Africa having diplomatic ties with China.
- Establish three to five trade and economic cooperation zones in Africa in the next three years.

- Over the next three years, train 15,000 African professionals; send 100 senior agricultural experts to Africa; set up 10 special agricultural technology demonstration centres in Africa; build 30 hospitals in Africa and provide RMB 300 million of grant for providing artemisinin and building 30 malaria prevention and treatment centres to fight malaria in Africa; dispatch 300 youth volunteers to Africa; build 100 rural schools in Africa; and increase the number of Chinese government scholarships to African students from the current 2000 per year to 4000 per year by 2009.

In his speech, he expressed that strengthening unity and cooperation with Africa is the key principle guiding China's foreign policy, and affirms China's support in the implementation of New Partnership for Africa's development.

During Hu Jintao's tenure, the Sudanese President Omer Hassan Ahmed El-Bashir visited China in November 2006. He said, China-Sudan relations is exemplary in South-South Cooperation and also spoke about the progress made in the people to people cooperation. Earlier, Hu Jintao met with El Bashir in 2005 on the sidelines of Asia-Africa Summit and after that, the Chinese investment in Sudan increased substantially to reach at \$4 billion in 2006. Similarly, on 4 November 2006, the visiting President Denis Sassou-Nguesso of the Republic of the Congo commented on the two documents of the Beijing Summit of the FOCAC, namely, the Beijing Declaration and an action plan for the year 2007-2009 and said, it will further enhance the China-Africa Strategic Partnership to a new level. He said, "The Chinese government has, as always, fulfilled its commitment and the African people have benefitted a lot China's generosity." He also hoped that the Chinese government would address the severe issues of desertification and droughts. He appreciated the tasks of the Chinese peacekeeping operation in African countries. On the Beijing Summit of FOCAC, Djibouti President Ismail Omar Guelleh said, it is a successful event, and the eight measures proposed by Hu Jintao are inspiring and "in the common interests and aspirations" of the African and the Chinese people. He commented on the China-Africa relations and said, China has not only provided aid and assistance to the African countries, but it has also offered experience and strength. Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki commended China-Africa Summit and said, it is a milestone in defining the

future China-Africa Cooperation. He further said, "I am glad to inform Kenyans that the Beijing summit was a major milestone not only in defining the future of China-Africa cooperation but also in securing crucial commitments by the Chinese government to support development projects in Kenya and on the African continent."

On 29 March 2007, the top Chinese legislator Wu Bangguo met with the visiting Deputy President of the Sudanese National Congress Nafi'a Ali. Wu said, the party to party exchanges and cooperation has upgraded the mutual understanding and friendship, and he proposed for the further deepening and expansion of the exchanges and cooperation between the National People's Congress (NPC) and the Sudanese National Congress (SNC). He also said, "Strengthening this relationship is in the interests of the two peoples and will help promote cooperation between China and Africa and contribute to peace and stability in the region and the world at large". Wu Bangguo visited Egypt in May 2007 and delivers a speech in Cairo, the capital city of Egypt at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. He said China-Africa political relations are growing stronger and strengthening unity and cooperation is the cornerstone of the China's foreign policy. He said China would give priority to public and cultural projects to help the Africa's development and well being of its people. China is willing to cooperate in the fields of human resources, education, public health, agriculture and social development.

Hu Jintao met with the Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade in Berlin on 7 June 2007 on the sidelines of G8 Summit and said, Senegal is an important partner of China in Africa and expecting more cooperation for the implementations of the plan formulated at the Beijing Summit of FOCAC. He acknowledges that since the resumption of the diplomatic ties in October 2005, both sides had shared stronger coordination and cooperation in global affairs. He appreciated Senegal's firm adherence to one China policy. Hu also met with South African President Thabo Mbeki on the sidelines of G8 Summit and expected to use the upcoming occasion of the 10th anniversary of China-South Africa relation in January 2008 to boost their relations further. He supported and encouraged more Chinese large scale projects and investment in South Africa. He hoped to address the bilateral trade imbalance issue through joint effort and expected to seek more coordination and cooperation of South Africa at the UN, WTO and other

multilateral institutions for regional peace and stability. In the sidelines of G8 Summit, Hu met with the Nigerian President Umaru Yar'Adua and commented on the China-Nigeria relations that since the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1971, both sides had experienced a smooth development and new momentum in relations. He said the political mutual trust, economic mutual benefit and cooperation in global affairs has helped to establish a strategic partnership. He expected South Africa's cooperation in global issues such as terrorism, human rights, south-south cooperation and north-south dialogue to protect the legitimate rights of the developing countries. He said China is willing to expand cooperation in the fields of education, public health, telecommunication, infrastructure development, aviation and outer space, etc. He hoped that the Nigerian government would provide effective protection of the lives and property of the Chinese citizens in Nigeria.

In February 2009, Hu Jintao during the state visit to Mali met with his counterpart Amadou Toumany Toure and held a talk on further deepening friendship and cooperation. He said, China-Africa relation is going through an important stage of development, and China will increase aid to Africa and its pragmatic cooperation with Africa. During his five nations tour in Africa, he visited Senegal and held talks with the Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade further promoting the bilateral friendly ties and cooperation. He pointed out that the cooperation must seek tangible benefits for the two peoples and expected high-level exchanges and visits at the government, legislature, ruling parties, local authorities and non-government organisation to build a solid foundation of bilateral relations. Hu said China values the positive role played by Senegal in African and international issues and hope for the more Senegalese cooperation at the UN, WTO and other international organisations. He expected Senegalese support in promoting the south-south cooperation, north-south cooperation and in increasing the African representations in the international financial system. In his state visit to Tanzania, Hu said the Chinese government vows to enhance mutual trust and political ties with Africa. In his keynote speech, he said China will maintain closer high level exchanges and strategic dialogue with Africa and always support the African countries, AU and regional organisation in safeguarding the regional sovereignty and in resolving the African issues. He seeks to jointly address the international issues such as climate change, food security,

poverty alleviation and development. On 16 February 2009, Hu Jintao met and held talks with the Mauritian Prime Minister Navi Ramgoolan, and both sides exchanged views on bilateral ties and international as well as regional issues of common concern. Hu said China-Mauritius bilateral relation is a model of solidarity and cooperation between developing countries. On the five African nations tour conducted by Hu Jintao between February 10-17, 2009, the Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi said, it was a successful journey of friendship and cooperation as it fulfilled the goals of consolidating friendship, reinforcing will to face challenges and deepening cooperation. To boost ties with developing countries, it was significant diplomatic move taken by China. During the visits, a consensus was reached to meet the challenges of the international financial crisis.

From September 9th to 15th 2009, Francois Bozize Yangouvonda then President of Central Africa Republic (CAR) paid a state visit to China. Hu Jintao met with him and expressed his willingness of the Chinese government to work with CAR to further consolidate the political foundation of bilateral ties, expand bilateral trade and enhance the people to people exchanges and cooperation. Bozize reaffirmed the CAR government adherence to one China policy and their support for China on the issue of Tibet and Xinjiang.

In Brasilia, Hu Jintao met with the South Africa President Jacob Zuma on 15 April 2010. Hu Jintao reiterates China attached importance to the development of bilateral ties, and willing to work together to deepen the strategic partnership further. He proposed to intensify bilateral high-level contacts to enhance the political mutual trust further and expand the bilateral trade to explore new areas of cooperation. He acknowledged about the close cooperation the two sides have maintained at the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference. On 27 April 2010, Hu Jintao met with the visiting Gabonese President Ali Bongo Ondimba during the 2010 World Expo in Shanghai. During the Expo, on 1 May 2010, Hu also met with the participating Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki and said, China and Kenya have experienced the smooth development of friendships, frequent high-level visits and both sides have worked hard to deepen friendly cooperation. Hu suggested maintaining high-level exchanges in international affairs, deepen trade and economic cooperation and enhance people to people cooperation. On the other hand, Kibaki

appreciated China's selfless assistance to his country. On 3 March 2010, Hu met with the President of Seychelles James Alex Michel, who came to attend the 2010 World Expo in Shanghai and commented, China and Seychelles are experiencing an excellent model of ties between countries with different social systems and territorial sizes. He suggested to comprehensively deepen the friendship and cooperation between two sides and expressed his willingness to increase the financial aid to Seychelles further. He further proposed to increase the educational and cultural exchanges between the two sides. His counterpart James Alex Michel affirmed Seychelles support for the national reunification of China and Taiwan. Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo President of Equatorial Guinea paid a state visit to China in August 2010 and held talks with Hu Jintao. Hu said, Odiang is an old and good friend, and expressed China's support in safeguarding Equatorial Guinea sovereignty and Security. He suggested that both sides should maintain high-level cooperation and coordination on regional and global affairs. On 24 August 2010, the South African President Jacob Zuma visited China and met with Hu Jintao at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. During the meeting, Hu acknowledged and appreciated the South Africa support on Taiwan and other major issues. Hu said the Chinese and South African are good brothers, good friends and good partners. He suggested making use of bi-national commission, strategic dialogue and another cooperative mechanism, and increase mutual efforts in the areas of culture, education, media, health and tourism. He proposed to improve the mutual consultation and coordination with the international organisations, namely, the UN, WTO, G20 and BASIC. He pointed out that after the establishment of FOCAC the growth in bilateral relation is unprecedented. His counterpart Zuma commented that African countries enjoy equality in trade relation with Beijing. He further added, "China is there discussing with the brothers and sisters in Africa to create mutually beneficial kind of relationship" which is "different from former western colonialists (simply) taking things by force."

On 20 September 2010, Hu Jintao met with the visiting Ghanaian President John Evans Atta Mills at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. Hu spoke highly of the bilateral relations and appreciated Ghanaian government's adherence to one-China policy. On the other hand, Mills expressed his satisfaction on smooth development of Ghana-China relations. On 22 October 2010, Max Vuyisile Sisulu, Speaker of the National Assembly

of South Africa visited China and met with Hu Jintao at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. During the meeting, Hu suggested maintaining a regular exchange mechanism to meet the demand for the development of bilateral ties. He proposed to enhance dialogue and exchanges between special committee further. The Malian President Amadou Toumani Toure visited Beijing in October 2010, and during his talks with Hu Jintao said, "For past 50 years, Sino-Malian relations have experienced constant growth and continued consultations on political, regional and international issues." Hu Jintao also commented on the bilateral relations that, "Mali was one of the first countries in sub-Saharan Africa to establish diplomatic relations with new China. For half a century, the Chinese and Malian peoples have shared both good and bad times. This has been made possible by the sincere and deep friendship that both countries have shared with each other. Cooperation in all areas has brought almost fruitful and abundant results for both nations.

On 24 November 2010, China and Ethiopia celebrates the 40th anniversary of diplomatic ties, and on this occasion, Hu Jintao said, both sides have experienced all-round cooperative partnership based on the principles of equality and mutual trust. A breakthrough was seen in the China-South Africa relations as then Chinese President Hu Jintao in January 2010 invited Jacob Zuma to attend the 3rd BRIC leader's meeting to be held in Beijing in 2011. On 23rd February 2011, Liu Youfa, Vice-President of China Institute of International Studies said that Hu Jintao attaches high importance to China-Africa relations. On 13 April 2011, Hu Jintao congratulates Jacob Zuma for the South African membership in BRICS. Zuma commented that South Africa's membership in BRICS would be conducive to the whole of Africa. Hu also supported his argument and said, it will deepen pragmatic cooperation and people to people exchanges. On 23 May 2011, then Chinese legislator Wu Bangguo made an official goodwill visit to South Africa. In South Africa he said, the bilateral relations have advanced in an all-round way, and there is fast developing trajectory, further deepening of political mutual trust and are important partners of regional and global affairs.

In June 2011, Hifikepunye Pohamba, Chairman of Southern African Development Community (SADC) visited China and held a meeting with Hu Jintao on stronger ties



between China and SADC. During the meeting, Hu applauded SADC's effort in safeguarding peace and stability of Southern African countries, successfully promoting regional prosperity and tackling the regional issue. He also proposed for the establishment of cooperative mechanism between China and SADC and cooperation in areas such as energy and water conservations. He affirmed the Chinese government support to SADC in regional and international issue.

During the political crisis in Sudan in 2011, Hu Jintao held talks with the Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing and said, China is determined to resolve the Sudan issue through the peace process. He further said, "The Chinese side has always respected the will and choice of the Sudanese people." He hoped for peaceful national reconciliation and urged to implement Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) signed in 2005. He ensured that China is always ready for close cooperation and coordination on Darfur crisis resolution. Soon after the independence of South Sudan on 9 July 2011, Hu Jintao sends Jiang Weixin as a special envoy to attend the independence ceremony and sign to joint communiqué to establish diplomatic relations with South Sudan. During the Libya crisis in 2011, Hu Jintao called for the immediate ceasefire of the related parties and urged to resolve the crisis peacefully. He cleared his position and said, its people should decide Libya's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. He expressed China's close cooperation with South Africa and AU on Libyan issue.

In August 2011, Hu Jintao expressed China's commitment to the operation of the China-Africa Forum and deepening the strategic partnership between China and Africa before the Mozambican President Armando Emilio Guebuza, who was on a state visit to China. Hu said the Chinese government attaches importance to African countries' concerns and interests and supports economic and social development in the continent. On the bilateral issues, Hu proposed for strengthening political trust, expanding the areas of cooperation, increasing cultural and people to people exchanges and cooperation in international affairs. In December 2011, a delegation of Patriotic Front (PF) of Zambia visited China, and it was welcomed by Zhou Yongkang, a member of the State Council of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. Zhou Youkang said, it is the first official contact

between two political parties and hoped to enhance the exchanges between the CPC and PF on the issues of reducing poverty, increasing employment and strengthening the development of party units at the grass root level.

At the 18th Summit of the AU in January 2012, Jia Qinglin, Chairman of the National Committee of the CPPCC represented the PRC. Jia read the congratulatory message on behalf of the Chinese President Hu Jintao and said, China-Africa relations have further boosted political exchanges and cooperation in the fields of politics, economic, trade, and culture. Both sides have experienced stronger political trust, closer shared interests with ever deepening people to people friendship. He read out the message and said, Africa is a good friend, good partner and good brother of China, and further consolidation and strengthening of unity and cooperation between China and Africa is the cornerstone of the China's foreign policy to Africa. Jia Qinglin in his speech said, China will energetically promote China-Africa traditional friendship; further intensify cooperation and coordination at regional and international affairs; further expand the economic cooperation; vigorously expand people to people exchanges, and work together on building FOCAC.

On 24 April 2012, Hu Jintao held talks with the visiting South Sudanese President Salva Kiir Mayardit and proposed three points to deepen the bilateral ties further. He suggested that the both sides should beef up political relations, strengthen dialogue at all level; expand pragmatic cooperation, and enhance people to people, cultural and educational exchanges. Hu said, "China sincerely hopes that South Sudan and Sudan will become good neighbours and partners that can live in harmony and realise common development." On 17 June 2012, on the sidelines of G20 Summit, Hu met with the Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and suggested for expansion of all-round cooperation between China and Ethiopia.

On 19 July 2012, Hu Jintao while addressing the opening ceremony of the 5th Ministerial Conference of the FOCAC at the Great Hall of the People proposes measures on five priority areas to strengthen China-Africa relations.

- Expansion of the Chinese investment to support sustainable development in Africa.
- China's economic and technical assistance for the development of the African people.
- Chinese government support for the African integration process.
- Jointly work to deepen people to people friendship further.
- China will promote peace and stability in Africa.

During his speech, he spoke highly of China-Africa ties, and said the relationship had experienced an enhancement of all round friendly political relations with mutual respect and mutual trust. China formed strategic partnership and launched strategic dialogue mechanism with many African countries. China deepened economic cooperation with African countries based on the principle of mutual benefits. It has expanded Chinese trade and investment in Africa. China has increased people to people and cultural exchanges featuring mutual learning. Both sides have extended solidarity and coordination in international affairs. Hu announced credit loans worth US\$20 billion to African countries for the development of infrastructure, agriculture, manufacturing, and small and medium size enterprises.

Hu Jintao in his ten years of tenure as the Chinese President successfully carried forward the Africa policy left over to him by his predecessor Jiang Zemin. During Hu's tenure, the deepening and expansion of China-Africa relations were unprecedented. A gradual development of political mutual trust emerged between the two sides, and China's relations with a large number of African countries reached to the level of strategic partnership, and with some, it maintains the comprehensive strategic partnership. Most of the African countries began to reiterate about their adherence to one-China policy and support for reunification and anti-cession law. The establishment of FOCAC in 2000 gave a broader platform for China to interact with the African countries and helped to expand China politically, economically and culturally. In his tenure, China began to see as a major leader of Asia and Africa and persists on south-south cooperation. The substantial rise of China in Hu's tenure provided a special status in many international fora, and after that, China began to speak about African issues more confidently that

reflected the political trust between the two. On 27 June 2007, China-Africa Development Fund was established, and the Chinese investment grew substantially in Africa. Investment projects were have played a key role in motivating the African countries, and the African leaders began to work on attracting Chinese investment. The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) established in 2001, and with the Chinese investment, the development drive grew rapidly in Africa. The ties grew under the basic policy of strengthening unity and cooperation with Africa.

#### ***2.4f Xi Jinping and Africa***

Xi Jinping was vice president of the PRC from March 2008- March 2013, and in five years, he got a big platform to observe, participate and understand the significance and development process of China-Africa relations. Soon after, Xi was elected President of the PRC on 14 March 2013, and he began his four-nation tour namely, Russia, Tanzania, South Africa and the Republic of Congo from 22-30 March 2013. Xi's first African state visit as President was Tanzania, and during a press conference, he said, "No matter how international landscape may change. China will continue to support and promote Africa's efforts to achieve peace, stability, prosperity and development, seek strength through unity and participate in international affairs based on the principle of equality." He met with the Tanzanian President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete and signed an agreement on Comprehensive Cooperative Partnership. Xi was quoted as,

"We shall light a candle on the top of the highest mountain in Africa to draw together people from all walks in the continent through the path of south-south cooperation as dreamt by Mwalimu Nyerere for the mutual benefit of the people of Africa and China," and " we each view the other's development as our opportunity, and we each seek to promote the other's development and prosperity through closer cooperation."

He said Africa is full of hope despite challenges and difficulties and China's policy is to ensure peace and development in Africa. He pointed out that African people are committed to African dream. He acknowledged that China is always grateful to African countries and peoples for the firm support and selfless help given to China over the years." He was quoted as, "Greater China-Africa cooperation represents the trend of the

times and the will of the people," and "let me assure you that China will intensify, not weaken its efforts to expand relations with Africa." On 27 March 2013, Xi visited South Africa and met with the President Jacob Zuma, and spoke highly about the bilateral relations and said, the relation is conducive to the solidarity and cooperation among the developing countries and to the peace and development of the world.

On 27 March 2013, Xi Jinping attended the 5th BRICS Summit opened in Durban, South Africa, and during his speech, he commented that China is ready to elevate and broaden its ties with Africa, and was quoted as saying, "we are calling on the international community to work together to play a constructive role in Africa's pursuit of peace and development." In the BRICS Summit, on 28 March 2013, Xi met with the leaders of Uganda, Mozambique, and Ethiopia. He called Ugandan President Museveni Yoweri a witness of China-Africa friendship and a trustworthy old friend of China. Xi expressed that China is ready to boost cooperation with Uganda and proposed a partnership in cross-border and trans-regional infrastructure construction on the continent. During his meeting with the Mozambican President Guebuza, Xi pointed out that both countries have supported each other in their struggle for independence, peace, and development. Xi assured the Chinese enterprise's investment in Mozambique and worked together with the Southern African Development Community to promote socio-economic development and regional interconnectivity. Guebuza pointed out that the Chinese enterprises have earned good reputations in Mozambique and welcomes more Chinese investments in agriculture, electricity, energy and infrastructure. He also met with the Ethiopian counterpart Hailemariam, Xi commented that both countries follow similar development concepts and have a similar opinion on many international and regional issues. Xi suggested further deepening the bilateral ties and consolidating practical cooperation to safeguard common interests of the developing countries. Hailemariam said Ethiopia is ready to cooperate with China on international and African affairs and increase political party level exchanges to learn from the Chinese experience in governance. He hoped for the Chinese investment and economic cooperation to improve Ethiopia's infrastructure and socioeconomic situations. While meeting with the Zambian President Michael Chilufya Sata, Xi assured that China would continue to provide aid and hope favourable business conditions in Zambia for the Chinese enterprises. He guaranteed for the social

responsibilities undertaken by the Chinese enterprises and hoped for an independent development of Zambia.

On 29 March 2013, Xi Jinping paid a state visit to the Republic of Congo and met with President Denis Sassou Nguesso. Xi said China would facilitate major bilateral cooperation project and a joint communiqué signed on the arguments reached by the two nations. The Joint Communiqué read as, "The two heads of state agree to build, based on the principle of traditional friendship between the two sides, a China-Republic of Congo comprehensive cooperative partnership of solidarity and mutual assistance." Xi said China is willing to encourage the Chinese medical volunteers and contribute to improving local health care services. He was quoted as saying, "China's medical aid for Africa is a demanding but honourable undertaking." He encourages Congolese students to learn Chinese. Xi Jinping in his Africa tour said the "Chinese Dream" of national rejuvenation is intensively combined with the "African Dream" of self-reliance and development. Asha-Rose Migiro, former UN deputy secretary general, said, "Chinese dream" proposed by Xi Jinping resonates with African dream, and it is a method of common development through common effort.

In June 2013, Xi Jinping sent his envoy Wu Sike to Egypt on Palestine and Syria issue. Wu read out Xi's four-point plan as, "The new Chinese leadership stressed to President Mahmoud Abbas that China's position remains unchanged, supporting the Palestinian people and the Arab countries. China will stand on the side of the Palestinian people and Arab citizens forever." In July 2013, China sent Zhang Dejian, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) for more parliamentary talks with Nigeria. Zhang said NPC is ready to deepen exchanges with the National Assembly of Nigeria and deepen strategic partnership. In the same month, Asha-Rose Migiro, former UN deputy secretary-general commented on the "Chinese Dream" and said, it resonates with the African Dream of common development through common effort. The Kenyan President Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta met with Xi Jinping during his state visit to China in August 2013 said, China is a strong and true friend play a bigger role in promoting Africa's peace and prosperity. In November 2013, Kenyatta lauded Chinese leaders for supporting railway project in Kenya. He said, "Let me at this juncture express my deep

gratitude to the President of the PRC Mr Xi Jinping, for his great personal interest in this project, and his government immense support."

Hua Chunying, the Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson at a regular press conference on October 21, 2013, expressed the Chinese government views on China-Africa relations and commented that both sides are experiencing ever increasing political mutual trust, fruitful cooperation, close coordination and communication on regional and international affairs. At the demise of the South Africa leader Nelson Mandela, Xi expressed his deep grief and said, he was 'world-renowned statesman' and one of the founders of China-South Africa relations. The Chinese Vice-President Li Yuanchao as a special representative of Xi attended the memorial service for Nelson Mandela in December 2013.

In January 2014, Xi Jinping reiterated that China would be a trustworthy friend and sincere partner of Africa forever and Africa will remain an important pillar of China's diplomacy. In the last week of February 2014, Xi met with the visiting Senegalese President Macky Sall and based on the important consensus reached between the two leaders blueprint was formulated for the future growth of bilateral relations. Macky also met with the Chinese legislator Zhang Dejiang, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC, and Zhang expressed his views and said, NPC is ready to work and develop long-term friendly cooperation partnership with the National Assembly of Senegal. A positive development was seen in Sino-Africa relations in February 2014, as the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson announced the establishment of China-Algeria Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. China-Algeria established diplomatic ties in 1958, and in 2004 it was upgraded to strategic and cooperative relations. In April 2014, Xi sent Zhong Jianhua, special representative of the Chinese government on African Affairs to meet and commend the Sudanese President for their government's assistance to the Chinese oil workers in South Sudan during the armed conflict. In the same month, Xi Jinping met with the visiting Sudanese National Assembly (SNA) Speaker Dr Al-Fatih Izz Al-Deen and said, China and Sudan are "good friends, good brothers and good partners", and he expected more exchanges and cooperation between NPC and SNA. On 8 April 2014, Xi met with the Namibian Prime Minister Hage Geingob in Beijing. He

said Nigeria is "all weather friend" of China in Africa and affirmed to carry forward the undertaking of the predecessor and will open up a new road for the future. He promised to promote China's foreign policy to unite with African countries and help them in strengthening their capacity in self-drive development. In May 2014, two days forum opened in Sudan to strengthen Sino-Africa people cooperation. More than 200 delegates from 27 African countries and China participated in the program and decisions were taken on deepening cooperation in poverty relief to boost Sino-African friendship well-being of people.

Hu Jintao set a strong platform of China-Africa relations and his successor Xi Jinping in the last one year since November 2012 has diligently followed the routine of his predecessor. The ever-expanding bilateral ties have increased the visits and exchanges from both sides and Xi meets most of the African leaders visiting the PRC. Xi is more vocal than his processor and speaks more openly for African countries at the regional and international forum. As mentioned above, many African leaders praise the leadership of Xi Jinping.

## **2.5 China-Africa Political Relations, 1996-2013**

A major shift in China's Africa policy was seen after the Jiang Zemin visit to six African countries namely, Kenya, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mali, Namibia and Zambia from 8-22 May 1996. In his visit to Africa, he was accompanied by then Vice Premier & State Councilor Qian Qichen, leaders of both sides discussed African and International situations, bilateral issues, economic cooperation, and trade. Jiang Zemin systematically expounded China's Africa policy in the new period and suggested to strengthen solidarity and cooperation with African countries. He outlined the guiding principles of Sino-Africa relations as, "to treat each other as equals, develop a sincere friendship, strengthen solidarity and cooperation and seek common development", the policy also contained the following elements:

- to respect the choices of the road to development made by African people themselves;



- to abide by the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence and non-interference in the internal affairs of African countries;
- to respect all countries and treat them as equals, irrespective of their size, strength, and wealth;
- to support African countries in their just struggle to maintain national independence, state sovereignty, and territorial integrity and oppose foreign interference;
- to promote unity among African countries and advocate settlement of disputes among them, if any, through peaceful negotiation;
- to uphold justice and help safeguard the rights and interests of African countries in international affairs;
- to continue to provide economic aid to African countries without attaching any political strings; and
- to stick to the principle of equality and mutual benefit in its economic cooperation and trade with African countries.

Jiang in his keynote speech at the Headquarters of Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which titled, "Towards a New Historical Milestone of Sino-Africa Friendship" proposed five points proposals for the development of all-round cooperation between China and Africa in the 21st Century. The proposals were focused on developing a long-term and stable Sino-Africa relations based on comprehensive cooperation and interaction (Peigeng 1996).

- To foster a sincere friendship between the two sides and become each other's reliable "all-weather friends";
- to treat each other as equals and respect each other's sovereignty and refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs;
- to seek common development based on the policy of mutual benefit;
- to enhance consultation and cooperation in international affairs; and
- to look into the future and create a more splendid world.

Some of the African leaders commented on Jiang's speech, for instance, Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe said, African people, are pleased to hear China's new Africa policy. He further added that China advocating for the mutual noninterference in the internal affair is a principle already established by the UN charter, which is must to safeguard our state sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Namibian President Sam Nujoma expressed his appreciation for China's Africa policy. Shelton (2005) suggests that Jiang Zemin laid the foundation of new Africa policy, which strengthened and consolidated the China-Africa relations and it was further advanced through FOCAC. His visit in 1996 was significant in setting a framework for the establishment of diplomatic relation with South Africa (Tingen 2007). This visit also set the ground for the establishment of FOCAC in 2000 (Wekesa 2014). Two days before his Africa tour in May 1996, in Beijing Jiang announces economic and military support for Mozambique. The Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian discussed military relations with his Mozambican counterpart and provided new weapons to Mozambique. Jiang's visit to Mozambique was to repair the damage emerged in China-Mozambique relations, as former refused to build new parliament building for Mozambican government in 1996. Another concern was to get the Mozambique's vote in China's favour at the Human Rights Council (HRC). The other visited African countries such as Zimbabwe, Mali and Ethiopia voted for 'no-action motion' in favour of China at the HRC. After China lost a no-action motion and nearly lost a resolution at HRC in Geneva in 1995, it has worked out consistently and embarked on a concerted diplomatic campaign to get the support of African countries. For instance, Li Peng, then Chinese Premier met with the visiting Gabonese President Omar Bongo in August 1996 in Beijing and emphasised the importance of relationship and their support to defend the common rights of developing countries in the international organisation. Earlier, in 1992, Gabon abstained on 'no-action motion' on China at HRC, but in 1996, it voted in favour of China. In 1996, Guinea was a new member of the HRC, and it voted in favour of China. Later, the Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Tian Zengpu met with the Guinean Foreign Minister and thanked him for their support. In 1995, Benin abstained on 'no-action motion', but later, Bu He, Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC visited Benin and convinced them successfully to gain a vote at HRC in their favour in 1996. According to

Congressional Record (1998), Jiang Zemin during the meeting of the OAU in 1996 said, China is an ally of Africa's drive to developments. During his visit, 23 agreements and protocols on Sino-Africa cooperation were signed. Ian Taylor (2010) suggests Jiang's proposals at the OAU meeting were seen as laying the foundation for strengthening Sino-Africa relations. Maghan Keita (2002) writes, Jiang at the OAU Headquarters at Addis Ababa spoke about China's cooperation with Africa and narrated the shared experiences of struggle against colonial powers and foreign aggression by the Chinese and African people. His objective was to strengthen friendship and mutual understanding between the African and the Chinese people (Jiang Zemin 1996). Tom McGivan (2014) believes that Jiang's visit to Africa was also motivated by the objective of China's economic expansion, it is said that Jiang asked the Chinese enterprises to explore the overseas market and establish themselves globally. He noted that, soon after his return from Africa tour, Jiang for the first time spoke about China's "Go Out" policy. Julia C. Strauss (2009) commented on Jiang's visit to Africa and said, he spends more time in each of the African countries and successfully secured a number of the bilateral trade agreement. In his speech titled, "Towards a new historical milestone in Sino-African friendship?" spoke about the commonalities between China and Africa, for instance, he said "the Chinese and African people have suffered under colonial foreign aggression" and both China and Africa "are renowned cradles of the earliest human civilization, who began to reach out to each other some 2000 years ago". He said both sides left with an unjust and inequitable economic order from the past". He added, "The world needs peace, nations desire stability, economies must grow, and societies must progress". He ensured that to strengthen Sino-Africa friendship and cooperation, China would provide a more favourable condition and open up broader prospects. Lewis Machipise (1996) believes Jiang's visit was aimed at 'defection' to Taiwan by former allies in Africa. Soon after Jiang's visit to Africa, then Chinese Foreign Minister claimed that all the six visited African countries have reaffirmed their position on 'one China policy' and did not intend to establish diplomatic relation with Taipei. Mary Burdman (1997) quoted Jiang Zemin, "China ensures to establish at an early date a just and equitable new international political and economic order". He suggested that China and Africa must become "all weather friends", and committed that, "China steadfastly supports African countries in their effort

for economic development and will continue to provide, within its means, government assistance to them with no string attached." He believed that China and Africa would create a more splendid world. He said, with Africa's economic development and political stability, a peaceful and prosperous world will be an "illusion". He finds, the weak economic base caused by colonial exploitation in Africa for hundreds of years and inequitable international economic order is the reasons for Africa's hindrance in economic development. On 21 April 1996, two weeks before Jiang's visit to Africa, then-Chinese Premier Li Peng also supported the Africa's development, and he was quoted as saying, "The peace and prosperity of the world require the stability and development of Africa and any opinion or action to neglect Africa is wrong".

## **2.6 China's Africa Policy**

The Department of West Asian and North Africa Affairs and the Department of African Affairs are working under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. These two departments are given the responsibilities to implement China's Africa principles and policies and related laws and regulations. The departments runs African diplomatic affairs on behalf of the state and the government, and handle diplomatic activities between leaders of the CPC and Africa. The departments study and analyse major issues concerning Africa in the areas such as, politics, economy, culture and security. The department advises the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on adopting diplomatic strategies, principles and policies. According to the overall diplomatic planning the departments coordinate with the relevant African government's departments. The departments reports and works on China's bilateral relations with countries and regions concerned, manages diplomatic with and makes representations to relevant countries and regions. It guides the operation of China's African diplomatic missions and its regional jurisdiction. China maintains fifty-two Chinese embassies and nine Chinese Consulate General offices in Africa. The Mission of the PRC to the African Union is a diplomatic channel that influences China's Africa policy

The PRC announced its first White Paper on China's Africa Policy on 12 January 2006. The policy suggests Beijing's intention to pursue an 'independent foreign policy of peace', and here 'independence' means China does not align with any major powers of the world. The Chinese government also means that they seek for peace, and so they concentrate on development. The policy document suggests that China will develop relations with all the African countries based on Five Principles of Peaceful Cooperation. The white paper released is based on China's previous Africa policies, such as its Africa policy document released in 2000, FOCAC's 'Beijing Declaration', Program of China-Africa cooperation in economic and social development, and 'Addis Ababa Action Plan' of December 2003, etc. The key elements in the white paper mentioned are, ongoing economic development in Africa; emphasis on historical experiences of China-Africa relations; the future bilateral ties will be based on 'sincerity, equality, mutual benefits, solidarity and common development'. The key principles of the policy mentioned in the document are, 'win-win' exchanges; sincerity, friendship and equality; mutual benefits; mutual support and close coordination; learning from each other and common development; and adhere to "one China policy". The white paper suggests strengthening six areas of China-Africa relations namely, high-level visits; exchanges between legislative bodies; exchanges between political parties; to establish consultation mechanism; cooperation in internal affairs; and exchanges between local governments.

The policy also emphasised on the areas of education, science, health and culture, which are seen as new forms of engagements in China-Africa relations. It will include, training of African students in China; increasing cultural exchanges; administrative cooperation; consular cooperation to ensure the safety of citizens; environmental cooperation; cooperation in disaster management; strengthening people-to-people exchanges, especially the youth; cooperation of media; and expansion of cooperation in science & technology. In the areas of peace & security, the white paper mentioned the following forms of engagements: Chinese participation in the UN Peace Keeping Operation (UNPKO) in Africa; enhancing cooperation in intelligence exchanges on terrorism; military cooperation, including the training of African armed forces; and exchanges between judiciary and law enforcement agencies.

Peace and development remained the main theme of the white paper and emphasised on African role in world peace and development. China will support Africa conscientiously exploring its road to development suited to their national condition and will seek for peace, stability, and development by joint efforts. It suggests China is eager to support African rejuvenation and development. The major components mentioned in China's Africa policy are: carry forward the tradition of friendship; fundamental interests of the Chinese and African people; a new type of strategic partnership featuring political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchanges. The general principles of the policy are as follows.

- sincerity, friendship and equality; adhere to five principles of peaceful coexistence;
- respect the independent choice of the road of development of African countries;
- support African countries effort of development;
- mutual benefit, reciprocity and common prosperity;
- mutual support and close coordination at the UN and other multilateral forums;
- negotiation for peace and development in Africa at the international forums;
- learning from each other and seeking common development;
- cooperation in education, science, culture and health; and enhance capacity building of African countries.

The white paper also specifies that one China principle is the political foundation for China diplomatic relations with African countries and regional organisation. The African bilateral partner must refuse to have diplomatic relations with Taiwan and support China's national reunification. The white paper also suggests the policy measures enhance all-round cooperation between China and Africa. In the political aspects, it recommends for high-level visits to facilitates communication, deepen friendship and promote mutual understanding and trust; exchanges between legislative bodies, for instance, multi-level and multi-channel friendly exchanges between National People's Congress and parliaments of African countries which will deepen understanding and cooperation; exchanges between the political parties, for example, the Communist Party of China (CPC) in order to seek understanding and trust will maintain exchanges with

friendly political parties based on the principles of independence, equality, mutual respect and non-interference in internal affairs; establishment of consultation mechanism such as, National Bilateral Committee for the political consultation between foreign ministers, joint committee on trade and economic cooperation, committee on science & technology, and the dialogues and consultation will be flexible and pragmatic in approach; cooperation in international affairs, it means China will extend its coordination and cooperation with African on international and regional issues, support for state sovereignty, territorial integrity, national dignity and human rights, and support each other to achieve the common goal of a new international political and economic order featuring justice, rationality, equality and mutual benefit, and promote democratization of international relation implementing rule of law in international affairs to safeguard rights and interests of developing countries; increasing the exchanges between local government to facilitate bilateral exchanges and cooperation in local level development and administration.

The white paper also announced a new initiative to boost cooperation in the areas of education, science, culture, health and social aspects. Both sides will engage and cooperate with each other in human resources development and education; China will train African personnel under the program "African Human Resource Development Foundation". There will be regular exchanges of students between the two sides. The cooperation in the field of science & technology will include, bio-agriculture, solar energy, utilisation, geological surveying, mining and research & development of new medicines. As part of cultural exchanges initiative, both sides will maintain a regular contact between their cultural departments and exchanges of artists and athletes. China and Africa will facilitate amicable discussion on urgent problems through consular cooperation. Cooperation in the environmental issues will include, climate change, water resource conservation, anti-desertification, and bio-diversity. The other components included in this part are namely, medical and health cooperation, administrative cooperation, people-to-people exchanges, and disaster reduction, relief, and humanitarian assistance, etc.

The white paper also defined the various new aspects of engagements in the field of science & technology. Under the military cooperation initiative, China and Africa will promote high-level military exchanges, carry out military technology exchanges and cooperation, and train the African military personnel to support their effort of army building for defence. China will always support the African Union (AU) and other African regional organisation to settle regional conflict and participate in UNPKO in Africa. In the Judicial and Police Cooperation initiative, the Chinese and the African judicial & law enforcement departments will maintain regular contacts to strengthen their understanding. Both sides will work together to combat transnational organised crimes and corruption, and illegal migration. China has also committed to strengthening its cooperation in non-traditional security areas, such as enhancing intelligence exchanges, combat terrorism, arms struggling, drugs trafficking and transnational crimes, etc.

FOCAC and its follow-up action were a major component of China's white paper on its Africa policy. It suggests one of the primary goals of FOCAC is strengthening political consultation and pragmatic cooperation between China and Africa. And explore new ways to enhance mutual political trust, comprehensive development of pragmatic cooperation. China also emphasised on its relation with African regional organisation to maintain political stability, boost economic development and integration of the African continent.

If we look at the Chinese foreign policy in Hu Jintao's era, China emphasised on balanced diplomacy and developed ties with all important powers of the world. China's foreign policy priorities can broadly be defined as, 大国是关键，周边是首要，发展中国家是基础，多边是重要舞台， this means that "big powers are the key; China's peripheries are the priorities; developing countries are the foundation; multilateral platforms are the stage." But if we compare with Xi Jinping's era, here we see, Lu Shaye, Director of the African Department at the Ministry of External Affairs said, prior to Xi Jinping's Africa visit that, "the strengthening of solidarity and cooperation with developing countries including African countries reflects a consistent principle of China's foreign policy, and this is the foundation of China's foreign policy." Yun Sun (2014) suggests that China has smoother relations and more policy success on the African continent, and in the case



of Africa, it does not pose any direct threat to China's national security. He supported his argument and said that Africa does not support Taiwan, Tibet or Xinjiang in their pursuit of independence. Africa is also least interested in promoting democracy in China. It has always been relatively easier for China to secure African support which is most of the time crucial for the Chinese domestic as well as international agendas. Sun added that, despite the impressive growth of the Chinese economy, China's economic interest in the continent is relatively low. He quotes a Chinese analysts comment, "In absolute terms, China's investment and trade with Africa have grown significantly compared with the past. However, China's total global investment and trade have also grown exponentially, since reforms and opening up. The whole pie is bigger, so is the African piece. But this does not mean that Africa is occupying a larger share of the pie. In relative terms, compared with the China's investment and trade with other areas, Africa still falls far behind." He quotes another prominent Chinese Africa scholar based in Beijing saying, "Africa does not rank the lowest in China's foreign policy, but probably the second lowest, as it is slightly higher than Latin America." He is the view that China will always rely on Africa for 'long-term and strategic issues', while the key and primary issues of China's foreign policy are temporary and ephemeral." He suggests, the Chinese leaders emphasised on 'prestige diplomacy', and it has facilitated China's entry into the erstwhile forgotten continent. He believes that, Africa is not China's priority, but China is important for Africa. He supports his argument by saying, the Chinese economic ties with Africa is a smaller fraction of China's overall foreign trade. On the other hand, African government attaches importance to China's investment, and in 2009, China became the largest trading partner of Africa. In 2012, China Development Bank granted the loan to Ghana worth US\$3 billion, which is equal to 10 percent of Ghana's annual GDP. At this event, a Ghanaian analyst quoted saying as, "we do not know who is China Development Bank is, but just that we owe them a lot of money." In 2008, China provided a loan to Democratic Republic of Congo worth US\$6 billion, which is also almost equal to its annual GDP.

Yun Sun (2014) suggests, developing countries are of lower priority in China's foreign policy. It is not in the strategically important category and in most of the cases its policy is not decided by the highest level of the Chinese government decision making. In the

case of Africa, the policy is formulated, coordinated and managed at the government ministries. In some African cases, the Chinese government high-level decision-making bodies participate, for instance, in 2007, just before the 2008 Beijing Olympic China's controversial relations with Khartoum at the backdrop of Darfur crisis was highly criticised internationally, and there was the possibility of implications on the forthcoming Beijing Olympic. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China set up as Foreign Affairs Small Leading Group (FASLG), and the Chinese Foreign Affairs Office invited the relevant members of the FASLG to organise a discussion on the issue mentioned above. In the discussion, the position of special representative for African affairs in May 2007, was created.

Similarly, the growing threat of Somali pirates for the Chinese ship in 2008, compelled the Chinese Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) to take the decision of sending PLA naval escort mission after consultations with the line agencies namely, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), Ministry of Defense (MoD), Ministry of State Security (MoSS), Ministry of Overseas Chinese Affairs etc. In 2011, during the Libyan civil war, nearly 30,000 Chinese citizens were in Libya and the Chinese government top decision-making bodies have to engage themselves to evacuate them. It is said the FALSG organised an emergency discussion among MFA, MoSS, PLA, Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs. The Chinese government through a massive bureaucratic resources mobilisation successfully evacuated its 30,000 Chinese people trapped in Libya.

In general, the political relationship with Africa is managed by the MFA without any involvement of the Chinese high decision-making bodies. At the ministry level, the African region is divided into two sub-regions and is categorised under two respective departments of the ministry namely, Department of West Asia and Department of Africa Affairs (Sub-Saharan region). The Department of African Affairs, which includes 44 African countries, is responsible for implementing China's foreign policy and principles. Its major functions includes, reports and works on China's bilateral relations with countries and regions concerned, manages diplomatic contacts with and makes representations to relevant countries and regions, oversees and coordinates policies on

and cooperation and exchanges with relevant countries and regions and guides the operation of China's overseas diplomatic missions within its regional jurisdiction. Other functions also include translation and interpretation for important diplomatic functions, documents, and instruments in relevant languages.

The Chinese embassies in Africa function as a field office within the bureaucratic system of MFA, which is the primary source of information for the Chinese government. In each of the Chinese embassies in Africa, there are four offices responsible for various tasks in relations to the respective countries namely, Political Section, Administrative Section, Information and Public Affairs Section and Economic and Commercial Counselor Office. The embassy sends the first-hand information to Beijing, which is reviewed and incorporated into the research report for policy recommendation by managing division called 主管处 (zhuguanchu) . The Department of African Affairs initially worked on the idea for the establishment of FOCAC. It convened a plenary meeting to discuss the feasibility of the idea and finally, proposed to MFA and State Council.

David Zewig and Bi Jianhai (2005) suggest that China's Africa policy has little room for morality and they have enumerated four aspects of the policy. They are:

- General indifference to the human rights situation in the continent.
- China de-facto support for the brutal dictators.
- The Chinese government direct and indirect influence in unilateral and multilateral human resource initiative.
- China's perceived insensitivity to human rights linkages.

Kenneth Roth (2006) Executive Director of the Human Rights Watch commented on China's foreign policy and said, "when it comes to human rights, China's foreign policy is deliberately antagonistic" and "perceived indifference is rooted in China's policy of non-interference in internal affairs." During the Darfur crisis, the Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Zhou Wenzhong said in 2005, 'Business is a business we try to separate politics from business [...] the internal situation in the Sudan is an internal affair'. Roth further added, "when the western government tries to use economic pressure to secure human rights improvements, China's no string rule give dictators the means to resist." China is

accused of propping up repressive regimes in Africa, and its possible reason is China's greed for oil supply. For instance, China always backs repressive governments of Angola, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo because these are the top three oil suppliers for China. Yitzhak Shichor (2007) said China's total imports from Sudan increased ten folds, from US\$1.47 in 1998 to US\$1.71 in 2004. Nicholas D. Kristof (2008) commented on the Darfur crisis and said, "Abetting genocide in Darfur and effect undermining the UN military deployment there" and "in exchange for access to Sudanese oil, Beijing is financing, diplomatically protecting and supplying the arms for the first genocide of the 21st century." According to Roth, "China's policies have not only propped up some of the continent's worst human rights abuses but also weakened the leverage of others trying to promote greater respect for human rights". In most of the cases, China has either blocked or abstained from voting on UN Resolution or sanction against Sudan. For instance, in July 2004, China abstained from voting on Resolution 1556 that demanded disarmament of Janjaweed militia in Darfur. On 31 August 2006 China abstained from voting on Resolution 1706 for expanding the mandate of UN mission in Sudan. On questioning China's non-interference policy, Sophie Richardson, Deputy Director of Human Rights Watch, Asia Division commented, "China insists that it will not interfere in other countries 'domestic affairs', but it also claimed to be a great friend of the African people and a responsible major power. But that does not square with China being silent while mass killing goes on in Darfur." Donald L. Spinks (2011) China's policy of non-interference with Africa can be traced since the Jiang Zemin's initiative of re-engagement with Africa in 1996. Sun Yun (2014) is quoted saying, " On the technical level China views development and foreign aid as practical policy instruments to promote political friendship and economic cooperation. Ian Taylor has commented on China's non-interference policy in Africa and said, "In short, by advancing the theme of non-interference in domestic affairs and promoting a cultural relativist notion of human rights, China has been able to appeal to numerous African leaders." Non-interference policy has freed up China to sell weapons to rogue states like Sudan and Zimbabwe. Taylor suggests, since there is no political string attached to African affairs, it opens a window for the Chinese to deal quite profitably with controversial regimes."

Michal Meidan (2006) says that China has not neglected its ideological component in its Africa policy and other elements added are south-south cooperation and the concept of new-world order. He suggests, the Chinese and the African leaders aim at "collective consultation and dialogue and a cooperation mechanism between the developing countries, which falls into the category of south-south cooperation." He believes that, China calls for a permanent seat for Africa at the UN. He has summed up China's Africa Policy as, it aimed at massive Chinese investments in natural resources in Africa, improving the trade balance, emphasised on development aid and the Chinese exports to the continent. He says the policy is also aimed to isolate Taiwan from the international scene, setting up a new international world order based on the five principles of peaceful existence. He is of view that, China's non-interference policy and its anti-colonial nature is "working towards the establishment of a new international political and economic order in the 21st century." He finds a shift in China's Africa policy, its current level of development and increases appetite for energy calls for a more pragmatic as well as opportunistic policy.

Chris Alden (2008) summarises the development of the Chinese Africa policy, he suggests, China's New Independent Policy was followed by the Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang visit to 11 African countries from 20 December 1982 to 17 January 1983. The policy aimed at introducing China's new Africa policy which included China's new development priorities and global interests. The policy supported the African liberation struggles, consolidation of the African continent, political independence of African countries, south-south cooperation and the Third World unity. He was of the view that, the policy not only incorporated region-specific concerns but also had wider international aims such as the Sino-Soviet rift and the cold war. Wu Chenchen in his research paper titled, China's Foreign Policy towards Africa emphasises that China's Africa policy also has the component of the strategic importance of the African continent rather than merely the interests of oil and natural resources imports. He summarizes the evolution of China's Africa policy as, in the late 1950s, China followed the Five Principles of Peaceful Cooperation announced at the Bandung Conference in 1955, which covered mutual respect for state sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-

existence. In 1963, then Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai announced 'Eight Principles' to guide China's engagement in Africa. In 1970, China expanded its aid program in Africa, and it had both political and ideological objectives. The ideological objective was to support the revolutionary movement against imperialism, and the political objectives included competing with Taiwan, to get African support for internal recognition and also to compete with the Soviet Union in Africa. In 1982, during the 12th Communist Party Committee National Assembly an implication on China's Africa policy was seen as after that, the 'Four Principles of Sino-Africa economic and technical cooperation' was announced by then Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang in Africa. The policy emphasised on equality and mutual benefits, practical results, diversity in forms and common results. In 2006, China followed the policy of New Strategic Partnership; a white paper was released on China's Africa policy. The white paper clarifies Africa's strategic importance to China and embodies China's long-term plan of enhancing all-round cooperation with Africa. It aimed to achieve strategic goals through pragmatic pursuits, including political cooperation, economic interaction, and cultural exchanges, etc. This policy is part of China's political interests to promote the political environment for China's strategic goals. It also aimed to seek a common goal of equality and justice in the contemporary world order and resisting hegemony. For instance, during the 1st Ministerial Conference of FOCAC in 2000, China called for the construction of international political and economic order. In 2003, then Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao was quoted saying, "the hegemony is raising its ugly head, and there is a need to secure the individual interest in international affairs. In 2006, then Chinese President Hu Jintao said in 3rd Ministerial Conference of FOCAC, "China will cooperate with Africa to promote balanced and harmonious global developments to strengthen cooperation in international affairs.

## **2.7 Bilateral Visits & Exchanges**

The bilateral visits and exchanges increased substantially soon after the Tiananmen Square incident of June 1989. After that, we see every newly appointed Chinese foreign minister's first visit is Africa and also his new year's first visit is Africa. The other significant change in this regard is the Chinese President Yang Shangkun's visit to Africa in 1992, which was never seen in the past, and then followed by regular and frequent

visits to the continent by Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping. We also see the Chinese Premiers' regular visits to the African countries. The bilateral visits & exchanges have been increased to expand the bilateral engagements. For instance, we see the visits to Africa by the official or leaders from People's Liberation Army (PLA), Communist Party of China (CPC), National People's Congress (NPC), Communist Party Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). The other regular high-level Chinese visits to Africa is made by Vice-President, Vice-Premier, Deputy-Foreign Ministers, Assistant Foreign Minister and the State Councilor. China also invites and host substantial numbers of African leaders every year. Apart from the high-level political visits, China also maintains regular exchanges in the fields of economy and culture.

**Table No. 2.2: Chinese Foreign Ministers' visits to African countries, 1989-2013**

Name of the Foreign Minister	Year of visit	Visited African countries
Qian Qichen	July-August, 1989	Botswana, Zimbabwe, Angola, Zambia, Mozambique, Lesotho
	January 1991	Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania
	January 1992	Mali, Geneva, Saineijjaer, Ghana and Namibia
	January 1993	Cameroon, Gabon, Burundi and Rwanda
	January 1994	Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Madagascar, Mauritius
	January 1995	Zaire, Congo, Togo, Benin and Niger
	January 1996	Chad, Djibouti & Seychelles

	January 1997	Niger, Equatoria Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivory
	December 1997	South Africa
Tang Jiakuan	June 1998	Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo and Benin
	January 1999	Keneya, Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia
	January 2000	Nigeria, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Seychelles
	January 2001	Central African Republic; Gabon, Cameroon, Angola
	January 2002	Eritrea, South Africa
Li Zhaoxing	January 2004	Comoros, Djibouti, Sudan, Uganda,
	September 2004	Libya, Egypt
	January 2006	Cape Verde, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone,.
	January 2007	Benin, Botswana, Central Africa Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Mali,
Yang Jiechi	September 2007	Mauritania,
	January 2008	South Africa, Congo, Burundi, Ethiopia.



	January 2009	South Africa
	January 2010	Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria,
	February 2011	Chad, Egypt, Gabon, Guinea, Togo, Zimbabwe
	August 2011	South Sudan
	January 2012	Core d'Ivory, Namibia,
	February 2013	South Africa
Wang Yi	December 2013	Algeria, Morocco,

*Sources:* China's Foreign Affairs, Department of Policy Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PRC

**Table No. 2.3: Chinese President's visits to the African countries, 1989-2013**

Name of the President	Year of visit	Visited Country
Yang Shangkun	July 1992	Cote d'Ivoire
Jiang Zemin	May 1996	Kenya, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mali, Namibia, Zimbabwe
	April 2000	South Africa
	April 2002	Libya, Nigeria
Hu Jintao	February 2004	Gabon
	May 2006	Kenya, Nigeria, Morocco
	January 2007	Cameroon, Liberia, Sudan, Zambia, Namibia, South Africa, Mozambique and Seychelles.
Xi Jinping	March 2013	South Africa, Tanzania, Republic of Congo
	June 2013	Trinidad and Tobago

*Sources:* China's Foreign Affairs, Department of Policy Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PRC

## **2.8 FOCAC and Sino-Africa Relations**

The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) is an official forum between the PRC and the African countries, which was established in October 2006 in Beijing. The establishment of FOCAC is a joint initiative by China and Africa to strengthen friendly cooperation between China and African countries further and it was also an effort to jointly facing the challenges of economic globalisation and seeks common development. At the time of its establishment, the members included were China, 51 African countries having diplomatic relations with China and the African Union (AU). The objectives enumerated are promoting cooperation, strengthening friendship, expanding consensus, enhancing understanding and equal consultation. So far there have been six summits held to date. It is said, FOCAC is part of China's foreign policy of 'soft power', and Jiang Zemin's Africa visit in 1996 opened the way for the establishment of FOCAC. For the further development of China-Africa relations in the new situation, and to face new challenges and opportunities, China and African countries, on the one hand, seize the opportunity to accelerate the economic development and on the other hand strengthen their solidarity and cooperation in various fields. It was also aimed to improve the status of North-South dialogue. In this context, the objectives for the establishment of FOCAC has a far-reaching influence and practical significance for strengthening the China-Africa relations. On October 1999, Chinese President Jiang Zemin personally wrote letters to all the Heads of State having diplomatic relations with China and also to the General Secretary of African Union to convene the FOCAC Beijing Summit. African heads of state gave an enthusiastic response and expressed support for the China's initiative (Lu Miaogeng and Huang Shejiao 2006:44-45).

### ***2.8a First Ministerial Conference of FOCAC Beijing Summit 2000***

After a year of hard work from both sides, finally the first FOCAC Beijing Summit was held on October 10-12, 2000. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation was a major initiative to promote South-South cooperation in a new circumstance and strengthen cooperation to seek common development. Jiang Zemin called it a "pioneering work in the history of China-Africa relation" (People's Daily, Renmin Ribao 2000). The conference was attended by eighty ministers from China and 44 African countries as well

as representatives from 17 regional and international organisation also participated. Then-Chinese President Jiang Zemin and the Premier Zhu Rongji attended the opening as well as the closing ceremony of the conference. The major themes of the ministerial conference included 'the establishment of a new international political and economic order in the 21st century' and 'strengthening Sino-African economic cooperation and trade under the new circumstances'. At the FOCAC opening ceremony, President Jiang Zemin said that FOCAC is a concerted effort to establish a new international political and economic order. The major initiatives pointed out such as, strengthening solidarity and actively promoting south-south cooperation; enhancing dialogue and improving north-south relations; taking part in the international affairs based on the principle of equality and establishment of a long-term stable partnership of equality and mutual benefit. Garth Shelton and Farhana Paruk (2008) has quoted then Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa (1995-2005) saying at the conference that, FOCAC 'captures not only the spirit of the long established and cherished bond of friendship, but also consolidates the already existing cooperation in political, social, economic, technological and cultural fields.' He further added, it is a framework to construct a new Sino-Africa partnership which will contribute to the struggle against poverty, disease, indebtedness and globalisation. It will provide an important opportunity to consolidate the political consultation between the two sides. They have also quoted Zhang Qiyue, a representative of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs saying, "strengthening unity and cooperation with African countries constituted a major component of China's foreign policy". He added, "with the goal of fostering equal consultation, furthering understanding, expanding consensus, strengthening friendship and promoting cooperation, China, and Africa jointly explore the establishment of just and fair international political and economic order and strengthening Sino-Africa economic and trade cooperation under the new situation."

In the 1st Ministerial Conference, FOCAC follows up mechanism was also adopted to inspect the development process and results of FOCAC undertakings. It was adopted to ensure that FOCAC should produce some concrete result and will not be for other platforms of dialogues. This mechanism has transformed FOCAC into a positive and constructive force in Africa. In the conference, Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary-General of the Organisation of African Union spoke highly about the FOCAC and also

complimented the establishment of a specific mechanism to follow up FOCAC undertakings and implement promises. FOCAC has maintained three levels of dialogue and consultation mechanism:

- Ministerial Conference to be held in every three years.
- Senior official follows up meeting and senior official preparatory meeting to be held before the ministerial conference.
- Chinese Follow-up Committee- It was established in November 2000, which is composed of 28 member departments or agencies. The committee is consists of a Secretariat, Director General officials from Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Chinese, as well as the African diplomats, participate in its meetings.

Sithara Fernando (2014) believes that FOCAC is an effective multilateral forum for collective dialogue as well as a platform forging a partnership comprising long-term stability, equality, and mutual benefit. The Beijing Declaration of the FOCAC's 1st Ministerial Conference stated that "the establishment of a joint and equitable new international political and economic order is indispensable for the democratisation of international relations and the effective participation of developing countries in the international process of decision making (FOCAC 2000). The major initiatives taken by China in the 1st Ministerial Conference were as follows:

- China cancelled debts of 31 heavily indebted poor African countries worth RMB 10.9 billion.
- It established an Africa Human Resource Development Fund.
- It announced to conduct 500 training courses.
- It announced to train 7,000 African professionals in the fields of diplomacy, economy, national defence, agriculture, education, science & technology, culture, and health.

### **2.8b *Second Ministerial Conference of FOCAC Addis Ababa Summit 2003***

On December 15-16, 2003, the Second Session of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation was held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The Conference was attended by seventy ministers from China and 44 African countries, and the representatives from regional & international organisations also participated. After the cooperation and coordination from both sides the theme of the conference was decided as: Consolidate and develop China-Africa friendship, deepen mutually beneficial cooperation; and it aimed at pragmatic cooperation and action oriented (Xinhua News Agency 2003). Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in his speech proposed four points to deepening the Sino-Africa relations. In his third point, he called to face the challenges of globalisation jointly and called on to the international community to assist African and other developing countries to improve their independent development capacity (China News 2003). In the meeting, the issues related to bilateral cooperation in various fields for 2004-2006 were discussed and a master plan was formulated for the next three years which was called as "Forum on China-Africa Cooperation- Addis Ababa Action Plan 2004-2006" (Lu Miaogeng and Huang Saga 2006:13). The Addis Ababa Action Plan 2004-2006 included the components such as, Science & Technology; Chinese participation in Peace Keeping Operation (PKO); Natural Resources and Energy Development; Medical Assistance; Non-traditional security issues of drugs trafficking and illegal migration; concluded 60 cultural exchanges agreements; China committed to combating terrorism; enhancement of consultation mechanism to expand China-Africa engagements; development assistance; debt relief; agriculture; support for AU which is considered as the key element of Sino-Africa relations; struggle against poverty; and restructuring of World Trade Organisation (WTO), the UN and other similar organization.

The major initiatives from the Chinese sites were as follows:

- China signed 382 agreements on financial assistance with Africa countries.
- China trained 12,600 professionals for African countries.
- It provided zero-tariff treatment on 198 items to 28 least developed countries.

- China announced the names of new Africa countries for the Approved Destination Status namely, Zambia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritius, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, and Zimbabwe.

The Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in his speech said, China is committed to helping Africa in leveraging the benefit from globalization; Based on common interests and objectives China and Africa will build a new positive long-term relationship; China has long-term interests in Africa such as, Africa's raw material, its markets for Chinese goods, investment opportunities, African support in the UN, Africa's support for China's anti-hegemonism; African support for non-interference in international affairs; Promoting the equality in international relations; and promoting 'one China policy'. In 2004, then Chinese President Hu Jintao followed up FOCAC agenda and paid nine days visit to Africa. In Gabon, he was quoted saying, "strengthen the Sino-Africa cooperation which should be free from any political conditionality and serve the interests of both China and Africa." He also urged to enhance the interaction between legislatures, political parties, Non-government organisations and youth organisations and also suggested to establish and maintain party level contacts.

### ***2.8c Third Ministerial Conference of FOCAC Beijing Summit 2006***

The Third Ministerial Conference of FOCAC Beijing Summit was held on November 3-5, 2006. This meeting was aimed at "Friendship, Peace, Cooperation, and Development", In the Summit 48 heads of African states, including heads of government, foreign ministers, heads of delegation and ministers responsible for economic cooperation (Lu Miaogeng and Huang Saga 2006:16). The representatives from 24 regional as well as international organisations also participated in the conference. Then-Chinese President Hu Jintao and President of the Commission of African Union Alpha Oumar Konare were also present. This ministerial meeting concluded with 16 commercial agreements for the cooperation various fields including natural resources sector, communication, infrastructure, the technology which was worth \$1.9 billion. In the speech of President Hu Jintao, there were major commitments for development assistance:

- To double the 2006 aid commitments to the continent by 2009;

- To provide the \$3billion preferential loans and \$2 billion export buyer's credit over the next three years;
- To set up China-Africa development fund of \$5 billion, this will encourage and support to the Chinese investor in the African countries;
- To cancel the debts arising from interest-free government loans that matured at the end of 2005 for the highly indebted developing countries and least developed countries in Africa having diplomatic relations with China;
- To increase the number of zero-tariff treatment export products from 190 to 440 for the least developed poor countries from Africa having diplomatic relations with China, to open China's market for the African products;
- To build a conference centre for the African Union to support the African countries to strengthen themselves through unity and to support the process of African integration (Sanusha Naidu 2007: 288).

Moreover, to complement the commitment of African Human Resource Development Funds (AHRDF), President Hu Jintao made the further commitment in this regard:

- To train 15000 African professionals;
- To send 100 agricultural professionals in the African countries;
- To set up ten specific agricultural technology demonstration centres in the continent;
- Build thirty hospitals in the continent;
- To provide Yuan 300 million grant for artemisinin and the construction of thirty malaria prevention and treatment centres to fight malaria in African countries;
- To dispatch 300 youth volunteers to African countries;
- To build 100 rural schools in the continent;
- To increase the Chinese Government scholarships to African students from current 2000 to 4000 in 2009 (ibid).

The Summit ended with the declaration of China's "New Strategic Partnership" with African countries, would be based on, 'shared desire of independent choice of China and Africa', which serves our common interest, and will help enhance solidarity and mutual

support, assistance and unity of the developing countries and contribute to durable peace and harmonious development in the world' (Beijing Declaration 2006). It also adopted the Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009).

The Follow-up action of Beijing Summit was to strengthen political relation and regional peace & security. It resulted in regular high-level visits, which established greater mutual political trust. Many senior Chinese leaders including Hu Jintao, Wu Bangguo, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC, then Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, Chairman of the CPPCC Jia Qinglin and others visited most parts of African continent. On the other hand, some African leaders also visited China. A mechanism of the regular China-Africa political dialogue was established between the foreign ministers. As a result, it strengthens the collective political dialogue and coordination on major issues. As part of the Beijing Summit agenda, 20 NPC delegations visited different African countries, and 21 African parliamentary delegations visited China. In this process, the Chinese NPC established a bilateral parliamentary friendship with 18 African countries. Finally, on May 2008, under the framework of FOCAC, China-Africa multi-lateral parliamentary exchange was conducted. Soon after the Summit, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) started exchanges of delegations with the Africa political parties. It was based on the principles of independence, equality, and integrity of each nation, together with mutual respect and non-interference in internal affairs.

#### ***2.8d Fourth Ministerial Conference of FOCAC Sharm El Sheikh Summit 2009***

The fourth ministerial conference of FOCAC was held in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt on 8-9 November 2009. The ministers in charge of foreign affairs and economic cooperation from China and 49 African countries participated in the meeting. In the meeting the Chinese government committed to send 50 agricultural teams to African countries and help train 20000 agricultural technicians from the African countries over the next three years; implement the decision to contribute \$30 million to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (UNFAO) to set up trust fund and actively use the trust fund to promote South-South Cooperation between China and African Countries under the framework of UNFAO Special Program for Food Security (FOCAC 2009). The conference adopted 'Declaration of Sharm el-Sheikh and Sharm el-Sheikh Action Plan



(2010-2012), and it was a 3-year plan for China-Africa cooperation in political, economic, cultural and social fields.

The Chinese government regarding the cooperation in the field of development assistance made a new commitment to assistance and debt relief:

- China committed further scaling up assistance to African countries and prioritising the area of concern for cooperation is public well-being, including, agriculture, infrastructure, public health, education, human resource development, clean energy and environmental protection;
- To cancel the due debts of interest-free government loans that will mature by 2009 for the highly indebted developing countries and least developed countries from Africa (FOCAC 2009).
- In the field of Human Resource Development and Education, Chinese government committed to:
  - To train 20000 African professionals from different sectors over the next three years;
  - To contribute \$1.5 million to support NEPAD's projects to train nurses and maternity assistant in African countries;
  - To help African countries to build 50 China-Africa friendship schools in the next three years;
  - To propose implementation of 20+20 Cooperation Plan for Chinese and African Institutes of Higher Education, to establish a new type of one to one inter-institutional cooperation model between 20 Chinese Universities (or Vocational colleges) and 20 African Universities (or Vocational colleges);
  - To admit 200 middle and higher level African personnel to MPA programs in China in the next three years;
  - To raise the number of Chinese government scholarships and increase the number of scholarships offered to Africans students to 5500 by 2012;
  - To promote the further development of Confucius institutes, to increase the number of scholarships for Chinese language teacher to teach in African countries

and double efforts to increase the number of local African teachers to teach Chinese language (FOCAC 2009).

In the summit Chinese government in the science and technology assistance made the following commitments:

- The Chinese side will carry out 100 joint research and demonstration projects in the next three years;
- The Chinese side will invite 100 Africans post doctors to conduct scientific research in China (Ibid).

In the field of medical and health care, the Chinese government promised:

- To provide Yuan 500 million worth of medical equipment and malaria-fighting materials to 30 hospitals and 30 malaria prevention and treatment centres;
- To train 3000 African doctors and nurses and administrative personnel over the next three years (FOCAC 2009).

### ***2.8e Fifth Ministerial Conference of FOCAC Beijing Summit 2012***

The fifth ministerial conference of FOCAC was held in Beijing on July 10-20 2012, and the ministers in charge of foreign affairs and economic cooperation from China and 50 African countries along with the Chairperson of African Union Commission attended the conference. The theme of the conference was ‘open up new prospects for a new type of China-Africa strategic partnership. The keynote speech was given by Hu Jintao, in which he announced a series of new measures to support Africa's peaceful development in the next three years. He said to strengthen China-Africa cooperation in five major areas namely, investment and financing, assistance, African integration, non-government exchanges and peace & security.

Some of the commitments of the Chinese government for the assistance and cooperation of the African countries are:

- Chinese side will continue to make use of China-Africa Development Fund and gradually scale up the development fund to \$5 million;

- To provide Yuan 600 million free assistance to the African Union within three months starting from 2012;
- Chinese side will actively support aid for trade to African countries and continue to provide technical support for the processing of agro-products and raw materials;
- Chinese side promised to further open its market to African products under the framework of South-South cooperation and will follow zero tariff treatment to products under the 97 percent of all tariff items from the least developed countries in Africa having diplomatic relations with China;
- Chinese side agreed to assist the African countries in the project of digging 100 small sized wells;
- The Chinese government will provide a credit line of \$20 billion to the African countries for the development of infrastructure, agriculture, manufacturing, small and medium size enterprises in Africa;
- The Chinese government will encourage and support the Chinese financial institutions to provide loans in Yuan to African side;
- The Chinese government pledges to scale up its assistance to African countries and introduce new ways of assistance and make the assistance more effective;
- To make active use grants, interest-free loans and concessional loans for the assistance of African countries' development;
- The Chinese government promised to implement "African Talents Program" under this program 30000 African professional will be trained in various sectors and 18000 Chinese government scholarships will be offered to African students and special measures will be taken to improve the quality of training programs;
- China's "Brightness Action Plan" will be launched to provide free treatment of cataract for the African;
- China promised to send medical teams to African countries, and in the next three years 1500 medical workers will be sent to different African countries;
- China committed to provide \$2 million annually to support education development in Africa in particular higher education under the framework of UNESCO trust fund (FOCAC Beijing Action Plan 2012-2015).

Apart from the agendas mentioned above the other initiatives to deepen the political relations were:

- Chin-Africa people-to-people friendship action;
- Setting up of China-Africa press exchange centre in China;
- Implement China-Africa joint research and exchange program;
- To set up China-Africa cooperative partnership for peace and security.
- It was decided in the meeting that the next follow-up sixth ministerial conference of FOCAC will be held in Johannesburg, South Africa in 2015.

### ***2.8f Significance of FOCAC***

Munetsi Madakufamba (2015) suggests that FOCAC has further strengthened since its inception. He believes, FOCAC serves two major functions:

- It is a platform to "strengthen consultation and expand cooperation within the pragmatic framework".
- It facilitates to "promote political dialogue and economic cooperation that seeks mutual reinforcement and cooperation."

Garth Shelton and Farhana Paruk (2008) are of the view that FOCAC is a central pillar in promoting China-Africa relations and it is a foundation for building long-term 'win-win' China-Africa relationship. They suggest that it is a unique diplomatic mechanism that promotes dialogues between China and Africa. It has provided an opportunity to develop common political and economic agenda. It helps to build Sino-Africa relations with a well-formulated policy framework. In 2006, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, President of Algeria expressed his views on FOCAC and said, 'It is an effective platform for enhancing mutual understanding' between China and the African countries. He added it would strengthen south-south cooperation and advancing Sino-African understanding, and serve a basis for common development which will contribute significantly to the world peace. In 2006, the Chinese Vice-Premier Wu Yi proposed that FOCAC should be the leading organisation in advancing China-Africa relations. She urged that both sides should exploit cooperation with full potential and suggested the diplomats strengthen

coordination at bilateral as well as multilateral levels. She commented on FOCAC that "the two sides give full play to the role of the forum as a mechanism of collective dialogue, by keeping close consultation, developing a new consensus, closely studying new trends in cooperation, expanding common interests and appropriately addressing new problems arising during the course of interaction, in order to transform the forum into an effective platform for safeguarding the common interests of both China and Africa.

In all the major declaration of FOCAC, the call for the greater representation of Africa in the UNSC is prominently mentioned. Li Anshan has written about FOCAC that it will strengthen China-Africa strategic cooperation and will help to achieve stable and sustainable bilateral relations. He was quoted saying, "At present, the role of FOCAC in African integration is limited. African integration is primarily a task for African countries themselves. Only African countries can authorise a role for FOCAC to play in this area."

## **2.9 China-Africa relations and Taiwan**

Since 1949, Africa has been a major battlefield for the rivalry between China and Taiwan from the issue of UN representation of China to Taiwan independence. So far, China has successfully managed to get the crucial support from African countries in their favour to defeat Taiwan diplomatically in major international forums. The Chinese government's 'one China policy' makes Taiwan an important factor in Sino-Africa relations. In the past, it has been tough for most of the African countries to choose 'one China policy' as the policy strictly demands to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Some of the African countries were of opinion to establish diplomatic relations with both China as well as Taiwan. Before the economic rise of China, it was easier for the African countries to shift their diplomatic ties from China to Taiwan or vice-versa largely based on the economic benefit available at that time. In the late 1980s, Taiwan used 'dollar diplomacy' prominently to win African diplomatic partners. Today, 'one China policy' is the minimalist interests of the PRC and therefore, adherence to 'one China policy' is the precondition to establish diplomatic relations with China.

### **2.9a *Dollar Diplomacy***

In the late 1980s, Taiwan was concerned about its international space and was ready to practice "Dollar Diplomacy" to raise its international profile, Taiwan had a substantial amount of foreign exchange reserve to practice "Dollar Diplomacy", there was possibility that Taiwan induced few small and poor countries to establish formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan (Anon., 1997; Taylor, 1998). It was in 1988 when Taiwan for first time practised "Dollar Diplomacy" and also accepted the dual recognition of Beijing and Taipei. In 1992, Taipei successfully established diplomatic relations with Niger by providing a foreign aid package of \$50 million. In 1996, through the "Dollar Diplomacy," it was able to induce three Caribbean countries, one in Central America and eight countries in Africa to establish diplomatic relations with Taipei. In 1997, Taipei successfully convinced and established diplomatic relations with Chad by supplying \$125 million, and Chad was tired of waiting for the aid commitment by China of \$238.3 million. Similarly, Taipei supplied aid package of \$30 million to Sao Tome and Principe in 1997 (Joseph YS Cheng 2009). Later on, between 1994 and 1998, four of these eight African countries re-shifted their diplomatic ties to China and this reflected in the diplomatic contestation in Africa (Cheng 1992; Liu 2001; Taylor 2002). From 1993 to 1997, Liberia maintained a dual recognition of China, as well as Taiwan and both the governments, maintained their embassy in Liberia's capital Monrovia but this did not work out as China refused to accept the dual recognition and stressed on "One China Policy". After that, China increased its foreign aid substantially to counter Taiwan's "Dollar Diplomacy". Li Peng then chairman of standing committee of NPC, during his visit to Africa in 2001, announced a free grant and an interest-free loan of \$24million to Tanzania and a free grant of \$3.6 million to Zambia (Taylor 2002). At the same time, China applied "One China Policy" in its diplomatic relations as well as in providing foreign aid. After that, China does not favour any aid and assistance to the countries without diplomatic relations. This was mentioned by China's then-President Hu Jintao, during the announcement of China's commitment of assistance measures for the developing countries in UN Summit 2005.

By 2005, China has already established itself a powerful economy and diplomatic influence of China is far stronger than Taiwan. Most of the developing countries also willing to be with China as there is a great opportunity for economic cooperation and China has proved itself as a reliable partner or friends to the countries having diplomatic relations with China. So, a large number of developing countries still rely on China's foreign aid and economic cooperation.

**Table No.2.4: “Dollar Diplomacy”- Diplomatic Rivalry between Beijing-Taipei in Africa.**

Countries that broke with Beijing to establish relationships with Taipei	Countries that broke with Taipei to establish with Beijing
1989 Liberia (second)*	1993 Liberia (Second)
1990 Guinea-Bissau	1994 Lesotho (Second)
1990 Lesotho (Second)*	1996 Niger (Second)
1991 Central African Republic (Third)*	1998 Central African Republic (Third)
1992 Niger (Second)	1998 Guinea Bissau
1994 Burkina Faso	1998 South Africa
1996 Gambia	2003 Liberia (Third)
1996 Senegal (Second)	2005 Senegal (Second)
1997 Chad (Second)	2006 Chad (Second)
1997 Liberia (Third)	2008 Malawi
1997 Sao Tome and Principe	Swaziland never established diplomatic relation with China.

\*These countries previously had diplomatic relation with Taipei severe diplomatic ties to establish diplomatic relations with Taipei.

*Source:* The table is based on Deborah Brautigam Research and Chung Lianjiang, “Beijing and Taipei, the African challenges <http://www.african-geopolitics.org/show>.

This was the phase where China's foreign aid was completely focused on economic development, but it successfully used foreign aid as a tool to counter Taiwan and

successfully attained a high position in the international system. China's participation in the UN Conference on Millennium Development Goal in September 2005 and the Hu Jintao announcement of assistance measures helped China to enhance its soft power, and the world began to realise it as a responsible power. The assistance measures announced was substantial, they are as follows:

- Zero tariff treatment for imports from the 39 Least Developed Countries (LDC), only the countries having diplomatic relations with China.
- Writing off or forgiving, within two years, all the over dues as of the end of 2004 of all the interest-free loan and low-interest government loans owned by Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) and LDCs with which China has diplomatic relations.
- Providing \$10 billion in the form of concessional loans and export buyer's credit to the developing countries within the next three years to improve the infrastructure.
- Increasing medical assistance to the developing countries, particularly African countries, in the next three years and help them in setting up and improve medical facilities and training medical staff.
- For the human resource development in the next three years, China will provide training to 30,000 personnel from the developing countries.

### ***2.9b Understanding "Anti-Secession Law, 2005."***

On March 14, 2005, the Chinese government adopted Anti-Secession Law at the Third Session of the Tenth National People's Congress is a step to strengthen their interest of reunification of China. The Article 1 says it is to oppose and checking Taiwan's secession from China by secessionists in the name of "Taiwan independence. It also states the PRC shall never allow the "Taiwan independence" secessionist forces to make Taiwan secede from China under any name or by any means. It claims Taiwan is China's internal affair, which subjects to no interference by any outside forces. The Anti-Secession Law upholds the principle of one China is the basis of peaceful reunification of the country. The Article 6 of the law emphasised on the measures to maintain peace and stability in the



Taiwan Straits and promote cross-straits relations. The Article 6 enforces far deeper engagement in economic, cultural and security aspects which may provide the PRC government with an opportunity to influence the Taiwan government directly. The Article 7 says that the PRC stands for the achievement of peaceful reunification and to consult on the political status of the Taiwan. The Article 8 suggests the PRC government shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to resist "Taiwan independence". The Article 9 ensures that while executing non-peaceful means against Taiwan, the PRC government shall exert its utmost to protect the lives, property and other legitimate rights and interests of Taiwan civilian. The Article 9 of the Anti-Secessionist Law tries to justify the non-peaceful means of the PRC government by suggesting that the action will be on state or government or military but not on the Taiwanese. Here, the PRC government should not undermine the fact that the "Taiwan independence" is the aspiration of the Taiwan citizens who have already understood the significance of a democratic state. In this situation, the non-peaceful means of the PRC government against Taiwan will not be easy and possible it may face the strongest resistant from the Taiwanese people. It is possible that the African allies may support such action of the PRC but it may fail to get the African populist support.

### ***2.9c African Response on Anti-Secession Law, 2005***

On March 20, 2005, President of Nigeria Olusegun Obasanjo stated that Nigeria supported China's Anti-Secession Law and further added that the Anti-Secession Law enacted would serve as deterrence to the pro-independence forces in Taiwan. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs PRC 2005) According to a Nigerian newspaper Leadership reporting, in June 2015, the Taiwanese Trade Mission in Nigeria called for effective collaboration with the Nigerian Government to avoid double taxation on Taiwanese investments in Nigeria. It also demanded to ensure the protection of Taiwanese investments in Nigeria and boost bilateral economic ties. It is estimated that the Taiwanese investment in Nigeria is about \$91.3 million which includes 20 companies employing 2,000 Nigerian. The Taiwanese Trade Mission also stated, "Taiwan's edge in innovation and development in high technological electronics, machinery, petrochemical industries, highly value-added agriculture should offset the disadvantage the primary industries in Nigeria are suffering.

Nigerian conglomerates like Dangote Group, D-Link Nigeria and other high-tech companies in Nigeria are currently benefiting from cooperative ventures with Taiwanese industries. Taiwan shares its industrial know-how with interested, friendly countries and their entrepreneurs including Nigeria." The deepening of economic ties between Taiwan and Nigeria will certainly strengthen Taiwan's pro-independence movement. The above information indicates Nigeria is dependent on both the PRC and Taiwan, and it certainly makes a difficult situation for the Chinese government in their goal of achieving national reunification. It also indicates that possibly the Nigerian government acts and negotiates on Taiwan Strait issue primarily keeping in mind their interests.

On 18 March 2005, the Ghana Chinese Chamber of Commerce on the Anti-Secession Law expressed their support and stated the law is an expression of the maximum goodwill and sincerity of the Chinese Government to safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial integrity. There is no specific statement from the Ghanaian government on the Anti-Secession Law. According to Taiwan News report, in October 2015 a memorandum of understanding (MoU) was signed between the Taiwan External Trade Development (TAITRA) and the Ghana Chamber of Commerce and Industry (GCCCI). The President of GCCCI Seth Adjei Baah stated, "Not only can we help Taiwan businesses gain access to the Ghanaian market, but also pave the way for additional opportunities in Africa's Sub-Saharan regions." It was assumed that the Taiwan's product supply chains would gain easier access to the West African markets, while counterparts in Ghana could look to export their precious industrial minerals, cocoa, petroleum, and non-traditional items to the island. Peter W.J. Huang, President, and CEO of TAITRA said that in February 2016 TAITRA would be leading a delegation of Taiwanese business people to Accra, Ghana's capital to bridge closer bilateral trade ties. It was reported on 24 February 2016 that TAITRA is leading a business delegation of 32 Taiwanese enterprises to visit Ghana, Burkina Faso, Nigeria and South Africa from 20 February- 5 March 2016. Therefore, there is a positive sign for the Taiwan-Ghana economic ties which probably complicate China's national reunification process.

According to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on March 15, 2005, Terence Sinunguruza, Minister of External Relations and Cooperation of Burundi indicated to the

Chinese ambassador to Burundi Feng Zhijun that the government and people of Burundi understand and supports China's Anti-Secession Law. On March 15, 2005, Ndongou, Foreign Minister- Level Representative of Gabon said to China's Ambassador to Gabon Xie Jinwei that Gabon fully understands and supports the adoption of Anti-Secession Law and the Chinese goal to achieve national reunification. On March 16, 2005, on behalf of the Federal Council of the Ethiopian Parliament Speaker Mulatu expressed support to the PRC for the adoption of the Anti-Secession Law. He sent messages to Chairman Wu Bangguo of the standing committee of the National People's Congress and Chairman Jia Qinglin of the Chinese People's Political and Consultative Conference which said the Anti-Secession Law is aimed at peaceful resolution of Taiwan issue and peaceful reunification of China. He also added this law would contribute to the peace and stability across Taiwan Straits and world at large.

According to a Taipei-based newspaper Business Wire reported on December 2, 2009, the TAITRA will lead a trade delegation of 30 Taiwanese companies to visit Algeria, Morocco, and Ethiopia in December 2009. Similar Taiwan trade mission to Ethiopia was carried out by TAITRA in 2011 and 2013, but we do not see any significant trade exchanges between Taiwan and Ethiopia.

On March 16, 2005, the Parliament and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Namibia issued their separate statement to extend support for the Anti-Secession Law. The statement said Namibia understands and supports NPC passed Anti-Secession Law which demonstrates the resolute determination of the Chinese government and people to realise peaceful reunification. Similarly, on March 17, 2005, the government of Niger expressed their support to China's Anti-Secession Law. It is also seen that on August 15, 2011, the Government of Taiwan and the Government of the Republic of Niger signed a trade agreement at Niamey. According to the agreement the two governments shall grant mutual favourable treatment for the export and import license, custom duties and other taxes on the basis of reciprocity; and to encourage and promote the visits of their manufacturers and merchants to each other's country; and shall organize permanent or temporary expositions in each other's territory.

According to the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), there are 21 African countries and the African Union have extended their support of the Anti-Secession Law passed by the NPC of the PRC. They are namely, Comoros, Zambia, Lesotho, Niger, Nigeria, Mauritania, Libya, Egypt, Eritrea, Mali, Gabon, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Rwanda, Guinea-Bissau, Uganda, Namibia, Burundi, Central African Republic, South Africa and the African Union. In Africa there are altogether 54 countries and 32 of them has not extended their support for China's Anti-Secession Law, 2005. Among the 21 African states which have stated support of China's Anti-Secession Law, there are ten countries namely, Zambia, Niger, Nigeria, Libya, Egypt, Eritrea, Gabon, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Uganda and South Africa having trade engagement with Taiwan. The above data also suggests that Taiwan is still a factor in China-Africa relations. There are two concerns for the PRC, one the expansion of Taiwan's economic engagements with African states and a significant number of African states do not extend their support for the Anti-Secession Law and Reunification of China. It also means some African countries possibly willing to follow dual recognition but 'one China policy' compels them to do so.

The Chinese government policy towards Taiwan issue in the Hu Jintao leadership was a policy of containment when Chen Shui-bian was the President of Taiwan. After 2008, in Ma Ying-jeou's leadership, China shifted to a policy of rapprochement with Taiwan. Hu Jintao's leadership believed in economic determinism while dealing with Taiwan. A large number of economic and trade pacts were signed in the last Chinese leadership as part of their Taiwan policy. Agreements were signed on tourism sector basically to promote social and cultural exchange across the Taiwan Strait. Though, this policy was successful in relieving the tension and bringing the people close enough to understand each other's state, citizen, governance, etc. but it did not work for the aim it was adopted. The policy did not succeed in influencing the Taiwanese nationals or the Taiwan Government through the ever-rising Chinese economic and political might. Taiwan enjoys a living standard higher than the Mainland Chinese, and perhaps the reunification can affect their lifestyle.

On March 5, 2016, Xi Jinping said to the Shanghai NPC delegation, China's policy towards Taiwan is correct and consistent, will not change because of a change in the Taiwan authorities. He continues to insist upon the political foundation of the "1992 consensus," and the cross-Strait dialogue and cooperation in various fields, deepen cross-Strait economic, social, and financial development. He also clarifies that China will resolutely contain the separatist path of any form of Taiwan independence, protect state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and not allow a repetition of the historical tragedy of national separation. Xi Jinping's policy to Taiwan is more assertive about the goal of national reunification, and it asserts on cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation across various fields, but on the other hand, it works effectively to undermine Taiwan's international status and China's extraterritoriality rights over Taiwan.

The Chinese Government policy to Africa has successfully marginalised Taiwan diplomatically and reduced the Taiwan's African allies to only three, which is the lowest figure of all times. The policy also ensures that no African state can practice dual recognition of China. Specifically 'one China policy' has played a significant role in discouraging dual recognition which has directly influenced Taiwan's pro-independence drive. Though Taiwan enjoys economic and cultural relations with some states in Africa, but such engagements will not challenge the 'one China policy'. These forms of relations probably will not work for Taiwan's independence unless and until it is a diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. The trade between Taiwan and the African states do provide a platform of negotiation and a possible scope for more African allies to Taiwan. Most of the African states follow 'one China policy' which is the basic principle for the establishment of the PRC's diplomatic ties, but many of them have never stated about the 'Reunification of China' and 'Anti-Secession Law, 2005'.

Now, the African states believe in pragmatic approach in their practice of diplomacy rather than ideological, and their negotiation is often based on the interest of the nation. The Taiwan Strait issue has always provided African states with a platform to negotiate profitably with the PRC and the ROC. Therefore, the early settlement of Taiwan Strait issue or the reunification of China is not in favour of the African states. Rather, the African dealings with the PRC will always be tough after the reunification of China.

Under the above scenario, the Chinese government will have to strictly maintain its Africa policy at any cost and any form of economic turmoil in China will be an advantage for Taiwan. The contemporary situation is also critical for the Taiwan as any form of pro-independence movement such as self-determinism referendum will certainly be suppressed by the Chinese military and Taiwan may not get even reasonable support from the African states. Taiwan's act of self-determinism may provide the PRC with an opportunity to reunify China by military force. Still, the self-determination for independence is the best possible method for Taiwan to resolve Taiwan Strait issue. The process of nation building in Taiwan is an encouraging for many and is considered as mini economic superpower around the world. Most of the African states are known to Taiwan's nation building process in the last 69 years and the 'one China policy' is a discouraging factor for the African states in establishing diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

#### **2.10 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) & Sino-Africa relations**

The Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU) was formally established on May 25, 1963, with the common agreements of thirty-one independent Africa countries on <the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity> with its Headquarters and General Secretariat in Addis Ababa. Today, it has fifty-three African member states. The purpose of OAU is to defend sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the African states; eradication of all forms of colonialism from the continent; promotion of unity and solidarity of the African countries; to intensify their cooperation in politics, foreign affairs, economics, culture, military affairs and security; and to promote international cooperation.

China has always maintained friendly exchanges and good cooperation with the AU and its predecessor and has assisted it. Since the establishment of the OAU, the Chinese Premier has sent a congratulatory message to all the OAU Summits conducted so far, except the period 1966-1969.

China claims, its government attaches great importance to consultation and cooperation with the OAU, and to establish a long-term stable, friendly and cooperative China-Africa relations in the 21st Century, China is willing to continue its cooperation with the OAU.

On the issue of regional peace and stability, the Chinese government appreciates the efforts by the OAU to solve the problem. The Chinese government has also mediated in the wars and conflicts in Liberia and Somalia.

The Chinese government's major initiatives towards OAU began in the early 1990s, and the closer association of the Chinese Foreign Minister and the Secretary General of OAU Salim Ahmed Salim can be one of the major factor contributing to strengthening China-OAU relations. In January 1991, the Chinese Foreign Minister & State Councilor Qian Qichen met with Salim Ahmed Salim, the Secretary General of OAU in Addis Ababa, the capital city of Ethiopia. In July 1993, Salim Ahmed Salim was reelected as the Secretary-General of OAU, on this occasion he was congratulated by Qian Qichen. In September 1996, Qian Qichen met Salim Ahmed Salim, who visited Beijing for the 4th World Conference on Women. In May 1996, Jiang Zemin during his Africa tour delivered an important speech on China's policy to Africa at the OAU Headquarters, where he put forward the Five-Point Proposals to develop a long-term and stable China-Africa relation with all-round cooperation in the 21st century. In June 1997, Salim Ahmed Salim was once again re-elected as Secretary General of OAU, and Qian Qichen sent a congratulatory message to him. In June 1998, for the first time, China was invited to attend the 34th OAU Summit. In October 2000, Qian Qichen met with Salim Ahmed Salim was also invited to attend the FOCAC Ministerial Conference Beijing 2000. Salim in his speech at the conference said that the OAU and other African regional organisations will expand cooperation with China to cope with the challenges of economic globalisation and Africa's integration. On May 25, 2001, Qian Qichen was invited to attend the 38th anniversary of OAU (i.e. the African Liberation Day), where he spoke highly about the outstanding contribution of OAU in the national independence and liberation of Africa countries, and its valuable support to promote peace and development in Africa in the past 38 years. He pointed out that the establishment of FOCAC will provide a good framework for strengthening cooperation between China and Africa in the new century and is conducive to promote a new long-term stable, equal and mutually beneficial partnership between China and Africa. In July 2001, the Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan and Vice Premier Qian Qichen successively called to congratulate Amara Essy on his election as the new Secretary-General of OAU. On July

10-11, the Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Yang Wenchang, as the special envoy of the Chinese government attended the 37th Summit of the OAU held in Lusaka, Zambia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC 2001).

### **2.10a *Establishment of African Union (AU)***

On July 9, 2002, the OAU was disbanded and replaced by the African Union (AU). Since the establishment of the AU in 2002, China has repeatedly sent its delegation to attend its Summit. For instance, in 2005, China became the first foreign country to send a delegation to the AU, and in 2014, China once again sent its delegation. In March 2015, Kuang Weilin was appointed as China's first ambassador to the AU. In recent years, China-AU relations have been developing in an all-round way. In November 2003, Wen Jiabao met with the Chairman of the AU Commission Alpha Oumar Konaré during the second ministerial meeting of the Central African Cooperation Forum in Ethiopia. In August 2005, Konaré visited China. In November 2006, Konaré attended the Beijing Summit and the 3rd Ministerial Conference of FOCAC. In August 2008, Jean Ping, the new Chairman of AU Committee was invited to attend the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympic Games. In the same year in November, Chairman Wu Bangguo visited the AU Headquarters. In the same month, the first China-Africa strategic dialogue was conducted at the AU Headquarters. In September 2009, Jean Ping co-chaired the second China-Africa strategic dialogue along with the Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi in China. He also met with Wen Jiabao and State Councilor Dai Bingguo separately. In September 2010, Deputy Chairman of the AU Commission visited China. In October same year, Yang Jiechi co-chaired the third China-Africa strategic dialogues along with Jean Ping in China. In January 2011, China and the AU held consultations on foreign policy, and the Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister co-chaired the fourth China-AU Strategic Dialogue along with Jean Ping in Addis Ababa. In September same year, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi met with Jean Ping on the sidelines of 66th session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York to discuss on Africa's New Partnership for Planning and Development (NEPAD). In October, at the Eighth Senior Officials' Meeting of the FOCAC, the AU Commission was accepted as full member of the forum. In January 2012, the AU inaugurated its newly built Headquarters in Addis Ababa, and



the Chinese government funded it. China began this project in 2009, and it cost around US\$200 million. Jia Qinglin, Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), attended the opening ceremony where he said, "The towering complex speaks volumes about our friendship to the African people, and testifies to our strong resolve to support African development" (BBC 2012). He also attended the eighteenth summit of the AU, where he read out the congratulatory message of Hu Jintao and also delivered his speech. Jia also met with Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, the Chairman of the African Union and Jean Ping, Chairman of the AU Commission. In the same year July, the AU Committee for the first time attended the Fifth Ministerial Meeting of FOCAC as a full member.

Georg Lammich (2014) believes that in the recent few years, China has begun emphasising on supporting regional cooperation in Africa. He finds, China, to safeguard and protect its investment and economic development in Africa, has already working to create a more stable environment. China began to consider the regional organisation as another option for managing its ties with Africa. China's "Africa Policy" formulated in 2006 stresses on the use of regional and multilateral channels to deal with Africa. Since 2007, FOCAC is used as a formal strategic dialogue mechanism between China and the AU. Chinese inclination to the regional organisation is also reflected by the increased high-level exchanges between China and the AU in the recent few years.

In February 2013, AU Chairman Jacob Zuma visited China and co-chaired the Fifth China-Africa Strategic Dialogue with Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, and he met with General Secretary Xi Jinping and Dai Bingguo separately. During his stay in China, Jacob Zuma also met with Zhang Xiaoqiang, Deputy Director of the Development and Reform Commission, and Li Jinzao, Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Commerce, Meng Xiaosi, Vice-Chairman of the All-China Women's Federation. In March 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping met with Hailemariam Desalegn, Chairperson of the AU & President of Ethiopia during the BRICS leaders meet hosted by South Africa. In May 2013, President Xi Jinping sent a congratulatory letter to the AU Special Summit conducted to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the OAU. The Chinese Vice-Premier Wang Yang, as the Special Representative of the President,

attended the African Union Special Summit and read out the congratulatory message of Xi Jinping. Wang Yang also met with Hailemariam Desalegn, Chairperson of the AU and the South African President Jacob Zuma. In October 2013, Erastus J.O. Mwencha, Deputy Chairperson of the African Union Commission visited China. In the same month, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi spoke with South Africa President Jacob Zuma, the Chairman of the AU and the Deputy Chairman of the AU. In May 2014, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang visited the AU Headquarters met with the AU Chairman Jacob Zuma and delivered a speech on "Creating a better future for China-Africa cooperation" at the AU Conference Center. The PRC and the AU jointly issued "An outline of China and the African Union cooperation for China-Africa poverty reduction". In June 2014, President Xi Jinping sent a congratulatory message to the 23rd Summit of AU. In October 2014, the first round of the China-AU Strategic Dialogue Peace and Security Group was held in Beijing. The PRC's participation in the AU affairs reflects that Africa has begun to serve China's maximalist interests and contributes to China's rise in the international system.

## **2.11 Conclusions**

After 1996, the Chinese diplomacy succeeded in convincing to the African countries that we belong to the third world with common struggles, challenges, and goals. In this process, China at times compromised by its domestic development and provided much needed economic assistance to Africa. The interesting as well as significant is China succeeded diplomatically, politically as well as economically in Africa without compromising with 'one China Policy'. The June 1989 Tiananmen incident was a breakthrough that reminded China the significance of Africa for it to survive in the contemporary world order. In the aftermath of the incident, the immediate response from the African leaders in favour of China was largely an outcome or influences of the earlier generations' Chinese leaders' sincere efforts in establishing a solid foundation for the Sino-Africa relations. For instance, in 1964 Zhou Enlai visited 10 African countries to develop an idea about its people, socio-economic and political situation, and accordingly laid a foundation of Sino-Africa relations. The non-interference policy and south-south cooperation were a new lesson for the Chinese leaders in formulating their foreign policy.

Jiang Zemin played a key role in shaping the contemporary Sino-African relations. He outlined new policies to establish a long term, more reliable and interdependent relations to seek common interests at national as well as international level. His idea was to an emphasis on creating a new political and economic order. He was probably the first Chinese leader to come up with the notion of Africa's economic development and political stability. China has been successfully set up a platform for a long-term strategic engagement with Africa in the fields of economic, politics and culture. Later on, Hu Jintao and now, Xi Jinping have been working on Jiang's outlined Africa policy, but some new additions are made whenever it is required.

After 2006, China began to further deepen its political relation with Africa by increasing its channels of engagement such as exchanges between legislative bodies; exchanges between political parties; to establish consultation mechanism; cooperation in internal affairs; and exchanges between local governments. These forms of engagements helped China in gaining more confidence upon African sides in securing its interests and stakes in the continent. For many, it may sound the engagements are interdependent between China and the African countries but actually in many ways or forms of engagement Africa is highly dependent on Africa. China's major or key interests in Africa are oil, export market and political support at multilateral forums. The African dependence on Chinese is explicitly projected in their engagements largely because the Chinese negotiate better. Although, China's economy and international political status to a great extent are dependent on Africa still China can negotiate and deal with the African countries in their terms and conditions. The possible reasons can be the Africa's economic dependence and secondly, the Chinese high-level visits and exchanges with African countries, which is prominently frequent at any possible opportunity. Most of the African countries are newly established states and so, China is possible one of the major countries that successfully manage relations and gives high priorities to its African partners. This makes China significant to Africa. Most of the time, the gestures of the Chinese leaders towards an African state makes them feel special, which is highly appreciated by the Africans leaders and the people.

The establishment of FOCAC facilitated China to deal with Africa uniformly as a single unit, and on the African sides, it helps in integrating the continent. China declares its Africa development plans or financial assistance projects through FOCAC forum, and the funds allocated will be equally distributed across the continent for development. For instances, in the field of human resource development, China will invite personnel from all the African countries to train them in their country. The existence of such forum does not give much scope to the Africa countries to negotiate with China at the bilateral level to get more financial assistance, and so there is also not much scope of China favouring some states and ignoring the others. Thus, it helps China to maintain balanced and uniform bilateral relations with all its African partners.

The soft power policy began to be more prevalent in China-Africa political relations (1996-2013) after 2007, and the reason was in 2007 former General Secretary of CPC, Hu Jintao explicitly stated in the 17<sup>th</sup> CPC Central Committee meeting that China needs to improve and enhance its soft power influence. He emphasised on enhancing China's National cultural soft power, CPC Central Committee under the new situation of transformations and changes that the contemporary China and the World has experienced, should promote this new concept. Secondly, China's security challenges in the continent increased due to the expansion of Chinese investment, enterprises and its nationals in Africa. Earlier, China supported the ruling government or regime economically, politically and militarily to ensure its security of stakes in Africa, but larger expansion of Chinese business and increasing numbers of Chinese nationals throughout the continent also became major security challenges. The host African government had limitations in providing security of Chinese interests and national largely because the constant instability and crisis within most of the resource rich African states. China began to take part in the development of peace and stability in the continent. Hu Jintao called for the 'Harmonious World' and the Chinese government began to pursue soft power policy in Africa. In the late 2000s, the Chinese government began to persuade the African governments to resolve their internal crisis through peace talks and negotiations, and attracted the ruling governments through its lucrative Chinese company's infrastructure investments.

Since 2006, China's began to follow its 'New Strategic Partnership' policy in Africa, an its objective of formulation was that China will 'unswervingly carry forward the tradition of China-Africa friendship, and, proceeding from both the Chinese and African people, establish and develop a new type of strategic partnership with Africa. China in its political relations with Africa in the given period followed the three main connotations of new strategic partnership.

- First, on political aspects China practiced mutual trust in its relations with Africa, and from 1996 onwards there was gradual increase in political understanding and mutual trust between the governments of both sides. The significant reasons behind it can be the increasing visits and exchanges at all levels of their ties. The strengthening of cooperation at the regional and international forums also manifests deepening of mutual trust between the two sides. As far as, equality in China-Africa relations in the given period is concerned, China always maintained an advantageous side for itself and was the main actor, who manipulated the process of their engagements with Africa in their own terms and conditions.
- Secondly, positive impacts of China-Africa political relations in the given period are seen in the overall economic growth of the continent, but in most cases, the ruling regime or political party have enjoyed the larger share of economic benefit of the bilateral ties. In some cases, the African ruling party used the Chinese money to suppress the anti-government voices and forces to remain in power.
- Thirdly, the bilateral ties between China-Africa in the given period have seen the positive developments in cultural exchanges and mutual learning. The student exchange program expanded significantly and new areas of cultural engagements also initiated.

The policy of realism was also prevalent in China-Africa political relations in the given period. China gains power in Africa to ensure greater security of its core interests in the continent, and it creates strong incentives for the states to seek opportunities to gain power at the expense of competitors.

China's political engagement with Africa do have the components of capitalism, globalization and Chinese cultural influences in the continent, but so far China has not

established a direct political or military control over the African region, and therefore, it is too early to speculate that China is practicing neo-colonialism in Africa.

The independent variables Chinese economic interests, political trust, security, and Africa have been affecting the dependable variable China. The intervening variable Chinese policy to Africa has been changing and had causal impact on dependent as well as independent variables of the research. China's core interests in Africa are economic expansion, strengthening mutual political trust, security of the Chinese investments, enterprises and its nationals in the continent, and finally, since 1996, so far, there are many positive impacts of China-Africa political relations on African as well as Africa. China-Africa political relations have enhanced and deepened the political trust between the Chinese government and many African country's governments. The deepening of political understanding and mutual trust has enabled a suitable condition in securing China's economic expansion in the continent. China-Africa political relations have enhanced and deepened the political trust between the Chinese government and many African country's governments. The deepening of political understanding and mutual trust has enabled a suitable condition in securing China's economic expansion in the continent. China-Africa political relations have positive outcomes on China's security concerns in the continent, and the Chinese government repeated attempt to provide security and safety of Chinese investment and its national by pressurizing the respective African country's government had reduced the instability and political crisis or disputes in Africa. China's political engagements with Africa have certainly improved the scenario of peace and stability in the continent, for which the African people have been longing since decades due to frequent and perpetual political conflicts in the region. The China-Africa political relations have positive outcomes in the continent, as China has always voiced for Africa's development at the international forums. Since 2008, China is major diplomatic partner of Africa that participated in the UN led peace process and stability in the continent.

China-Africa political relations (1996-2013) have helped China's rise in the international system. Since 1995, Africa's oil supply had been a prime reason for China's manufacturing led development. From 1996 to 2013, is a significant phase for the

Chinese economy, and it achieved an unprecedented growth and expansion largely due to uninterrupted oil supply from the continent. The development of political understanding and mutual trust with several regimes in Africa helped the Chinese leaders to secure oil fields projects in the continent. China's economic rise made it a major global player in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century and also a major participant in the international institutions. China's involvement in the Africa's peace and stability process in particular during the Darfur crisis in order to address its own security challenges in the continent, provides the Chinese government and its leaders a major platform to interact and work with the United Nations as a responsible global power.

In the political sphere, African countries support has always been a key factor in making China a major global power. China managed to create space in the international system was largely due to African countries' support in the the first two decades of its establishment. China's gradual rise as a major power in the regional as well as global institutions is possible only because of Arican countries support. Till 1980s, China struggled to attain its minimalist interests in Africa i.e. the 'one China policy'. In 2013, there are fifty-two African countries acknowledges and adheres to 'one China policy'. Taiwan is recognised in Africa only by two countries, and therefore, China's Africa policy has been able to serve China's minimalist interests. Since the late 1990s, China's Africa policy has also been to serve China's political expansion in the continent. The Chinese government's relationship with many Africa ruling political party has been growing since the implementation of party or government level exchanges. The political party level engagements helps build common consensus on bilateral, regional as well as international issues. The bilateral high-level exchanges provides China a significant platform to propose and push forward its major political ambitions at the regional as well as global level. The deepening bilateral ties gives large scope to the Chinese government it expand its political and economic influence further. Therefore, so far China's Africa policy has also been serving China's maximalist interests i.e. expansion of China's political and economic influence.

## CHAPTER III

### China-Africa Relations: Defense & Security Aspects, 1996-2013

#### 3.1 Introduction

China-Africa Defence & Security relations (1996-2013) includes various components such as military visits and exchanges, arms deals, peacekeeping operations, participation in anti-piracy operations, security of Chinese enterprises and its nationals in Africa. The China-Africa defence relations began to deepen in the late 1990s, primarily because China began to import oil from Africa in mid-1990, and this was also the new phase of China-Africa economic engagement. In the late 1990s, China-Africa defence relations was primarily focused on arms sales to Africa, in particular, Sudan and Zimbabwe. The oil import from Africa was significant for the Chinese economic ambitions, but at the same time, China was also looking for African market for Chinese manufactured goods. In the late 1990s, China found weapons and arms to be the suitable export goods for African markets; this is because throughout the 1960s and 1970s in many parts of Africa civil wars were perpetual and conflicts were frequent. The permanent situation of instability and political crisis in Africa raised the demands of weapons and arms among the rival groups. Initially, in the late 1990s, China began to sell arms to the government of Sudan under Omar Al-Bashir. And later on in the 2000s onwards, Chinese arms market expanded to several African countries namely, Sudan, Gabon, Zimbabwe, Niger, Tanzania, Namibia, Congo, Chad, Ghana, Rwanda, Nigeria, and Kenya. China's arms sales helped to balance the trade between China and Africa, as the China's oil import volume from Africa was growing continuously. The governments of few African countries often required military weapons and arms to suppress the internal insurgencies created by the anti-government rebel forces in the respective country. So, the demand of Chinese weapons was high among these African countries government, who often face the threat of a coup by the rebel groups. Few African countries faced the UN arms embargo such as Zimbabwe, Sudan and so they were dependent on the Chinese arms and weapon supplies. This was also one of the reasons for the deepening of defence cooperation between China and Africa.



The China-Africa Security relations began to initiate with the expansion of the Chinese investment, enterprises and its nationals in the continent. From the late 1990s to mid-2000s, China without any humanitarian consideration took advantage of the political crisis in Africa and sold Chinese weapons and arms purposefully, to maintain its balance of trade with Africa and also to expand Chinese defence industry. In the early 2000s, China began to face serious security challenges of Chinese investment, enterprises and nationals in Africa. Thus, China began to participate in UN and AU led peace process in the continent and the anti-piracy operations in Somali waters in 2008. In several African countries, the rebel groups often targeted the Chinese national, and it's invested projects as they see the Chinese government as the main economic and political support of the respective country's regime. The Chinese government began to pressurise the respective African country government to provide a peaceful and stable environment for the Chinese investment, enterprises and its nationals. The expansion of Sino-Africa security relations has worked positively in the development of peace and stability in the continent.

### **3.2 Historical Background**

China's military relations with Africa dates back to the early 1950s, the Chinese government provided its unconditional support to revolutionary and independence movements in Africa. A gradual trend of the Chinese military involvement was seen in the continent. During the Angola's struggle against the French colonial power in the late 1950s, China supplied arms to the Algeria's National Liberation Front, FLN (Chuke Euka). During the Suez Canal Crisis in the late 1950s, China sent 280,000 volunteers to support Egypt (Taylor 2006). In the early 1960s, China provided unconditional support to Zimbabwe in their fight against colonial power (Zhang Chen 2014). Robert Mugabe led Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) turned towards the PRC for military support as he failed to get the support of the erstwhile Soviet Union (SU). The ZANU's military wing, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) was provided with the guerrilla war training by the Chinese military. Under the guidance of the Chinese military, the ZANLA underwent fundamental changes in their military tactics from conventional to the Maoist model, which established the mass mobilisation of the population (Zhang Chen 2014). In 1964, Chinese military instructors provided guerilla training in Ghana,

and the Rhodesian freedom fighters were trained in China (Chuke Enuka 2016). Even Taylor (2006) suggests ZANU fighters from Rhodesia were sent to China for military training. His statement can be supported by evidence, in the Battle of Sinoia, a pocket book was found with a killed guerilla fighter which revealed that he was trained at Nanjing Military College in 1965. China supplied weapons to the Eduardo Mondlane's Mozambique Liberation Front, *Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique* (FRELIMO), fighters and they were trained for the Chinese tactics of guerilla warfare. Shinn (2008) finds that since the early 1960s, FRELIMO began sending delegations to China. Within the framework of Organisation of African Unity (OAU), Chinese military cooperated in the training of African liberation groups against the colonial subjugation.

In Angola, initially China provided military assistance and support to the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)-a political party. But in the late 1960s China shifted its assistance to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) because MPLA strengthened ties with the then Soviet Union (SU). Rotberg (2008) writes, Jonas Savimbi, leader of the UNITA received his military training in China. Later, China shifted its support to National Front for the Liberation of Angola, FNLA and its leader, Holden Roberto. In the early 1970s, China sent 112 military instructors to Zaire to train the FNLA soldiers.

Shen Zhixiong (2001) divides the history of Chinese military diplomacy into six phases.

- The first phase was from 1949 to the end of the 1950s, based on the Chinese government's policy of 'lean to one side', its military cooperation and communication were only with the socialist countries. In this phase, China provided military assistance to socialist countries in Africa such as Algeria and Guinea.
- From 1960 to the beginning of the 1970s was the second phase in which China provided military assistance and support to the newly independent countries and movements in the continent. It is said the active provision of military assistance was the main form of its military diplomacy in Africa. In this phase, the Premier Zhou Enlai's "Eight Principles" for providing economic and technological assistance to foreign countries, also served as the guiding principles for military

assistance. Among the major recipients of the Chinese military assistance in Africa were Algeria and Tanzania.

- The Third phase was from the beginning of the 1970s to 1978. It witnessed the setbacks in China's policy of military assistance because in this phase China's military assistance to Algeria reached climax and soon it was also disrupted. China increased its military assistance to Tanzania soon after it began the construction of Tanzania-Zambia Railways.
- The Fourth phase i.e. from 1979 to 1989, China's foreign policy was gradually adjusted to being the independent foreign policy of peace. China adjusted its scope, objectives, scale, and means of military assistance to the continent. Also, there was a change in the forms and ways of military training of African students in China. As a result of this policy, there was a decline in China's military assistance to the liberation movements in Africa.
- The Fifth phase (from 1990 to 1999) began with the end of cold war, and it opened broader space for China's military diplomacy. Since 1996, China's high-level military visits and exchanges increased with greater emphasis on expansion of its military diplomacy. Besides, in the 1990s China began to change its position on United Nations Peacekeeping operations from unwilling participation to responsible contribution.
- The Sixth phase i.e. from 2000 onwards, witnessed the further development of China's military diplomacy in Africa with closer cooperation in security affairs and more diversified exchanges.

Tanzania is one among several African countries that share traditional military relations with China. China-Tanzania military cooperation date back to 1960s, and in 1965 Sino-Tanzania Friendship Treaty was signed with a secret clause of military cooperation (Yu 1970:62-65). Before 1965, Tanzania's military support came from Canada, which was stopped immediately. China became the major arms supplier to Tanzania. China supplied tanks, gunboats and Mig-17 aircraft fighters to Tanzania. China helped Tanzania in building a naval base in Dar es Salaam and an airbase in Ngerengere. Tanzania became a logistic base for the Chinese military, which was deployed to support rebel or

independence movements in Mozambique, Burundi, Rwanda and Congo (Kamata 2014). The Chinese military cooperation with the African countries was mainly in three forms namely, military visits & exchanges, personnel training, and arms supply. Since 1964, Tanzania's TPDF commanders or high officials visit China regularly, but the Chinese first PLA delegations headed by Deputy Chief of Staff visited Tanzania in 1974. In 1994, Chi Haotian was the first Chinese Minister of Defense to visit Tanzania.

### **3.3 China-Africa Defense Cooperation, 1996-2013**

Since the China's Reforms and Opening up policy, its military diplomacy has ushered in a new era of all-round, multi channel development and especially after the convocation of the Fourth Plenum of the 13th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) (Wendell 2005). In the past, the military relations between China and the African countries were based on arms trade which at present extended to personnel exchanges and training. In the field of the military also, China has maintained and developed traditional friendly relations with most of the African countries (Wendell 2009). The shared experiences of postcolonial military history are still used to enhance their current military relations, for instance, strong military cooperation between the PLA and the Sudan's armed forces (2016). In the 1st decade of the 21st Century, China's military engagement with Africa came down to the selling of light arms to various countries (Igor Pejic 2016).

China's Africa Policy 2006 states, "China will promote high-level military exchanges between the two sides and actively carry out military related technological exchanges and cooperation." The policy further states that China will support the defence and army building of African countries and help train African military personnel to strengthen their security. China's Defense White Paper 2008 says,

"The PLA develops cooperative military relations with other countries that are non-aligned, non-confrontational and not directed against any third party, and engages in various forms of military exchanges and cooperation to create a military security environment featuring mutual trust and mutual benefits."

As of 2007, China has military attaché in 14 African countries, and it maintains 18 African countries military attaché in Beijing. In 2013, a military section was added to the Chinese embassy in Cameroon, which further promotes the in-depth development of military cooperation between the two countries (China's Foreign Policy 2013). According to David Shinn (2009), China seems to provide at least small level of military assistance to all the countries having diplomatic relations with it. In particular, China maintains strong military ties with several African countries such as Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. China's military ties are often developed through high-level political delegations. In the case of African countries, the military ties are marked by the components of foreign aid and transfer of conventional weapons and military technologies. Besides, financial aid and arms supply, China also provides military training and assistance program to African militaries. For instance, China gives annual scholarships to Sierra Leone's soldiers to receive military education and training in China.

Chuke Euka (2016) believes that China's arms sale and military relations help to gain important African allies in the United Nations (UN). For instance, Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Nigeria are important China supporter at the UN, which helps China preventing Taiwanese independence and diverting attention from its human rights issues. When Zimbabwe was under Western sanctions, then President Robert Mugabe turned to China for military assistance. Chuke Euka (2016) identifies three forms of Chinese military engagement in Africa and they are as follows: The Chinese arms sales; the Chinese participation in United Nation Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO); and the Chinese responses to the case of kidnapping of Chinese nationals or attacks on Chinese facilities. The other aspects of the relations also include constructions of the small arms factory in some African countries, defence of Chinese oil investments and Chinese personnel often attacked in the Africa's conflict zone. Zimbabwe under the leadership of Robert Mugabe sustained an oppressive rule largely due to the military support of China. Brautigam (2009) and Dijk (2009) also support the above argument and said, Robert Mugabe and ZANU PF inflicted brutality in Zimbabwe with the assured weapon and military supply from China.

China under the leadership of Jiang Zemin (1993-2003) made notable progress in its military diplomacy (Wendell . M 2009). Shen Zhixiong (2015) believes in the early 1990s, the Chinese government began to focus its attention on military diplomacy. Shen suggests that the term 'military diplomacy' first appeared in the China's National Defense document in 1998, which stated as "Chinese armed forces have been active in participating in multilateral military-diplomatic activities. China has been active in developing Omni-directional and multi-level forms of military diplomacy." Shen pointed out that although the Defense White Paper stated the significance, objective and principles of military diplomacy. But the White Paper does not give a definition of China's military diplomacy. Shen Zhixiong defines the Chinese military diplomacy with reference of various definitions and the present Chinese military diplomacy in practice. China's military diplomacy is the exchanges, negotiation, and activities with relevant departments of other states, group of states or organisations. It is conducted by the defense ministries and armed forces of a sovereign state, organization or individual authorized by the government, with the aim to promote and achieve national interests and national security. Shen further added that the ultimate goal of military diplomacy is to safeguard and promote national interests, especially national security interests. Shen finds that military diplomacy is the peaceful use of military strength. It consists of soft as well as hard power and plays relevant roles of both military and diplomacy in practice. Shen suggests military diplomacy plays six major roles:

- It shapes a favourable international environment through international exchanges and cooperation.
- It avoids misunderstanding and misjudgement by enhancing trust and reducing suspicion.
- It expresses good will and projects a favourable international image by participating in peacekeeping or humanitarian relief operations.
- It promotes the development of the army and national defence by learning the advanced military thought, military technology and tactics through bilateral exchanges.

- It expands influence by enhancing recipient's trust in and reliance on the national defence structure, military command system and weapon and equipment.
- It is also a method to deter the potential adversary through the show of strength during bilateral military exchanges and joint military exercises.

Shen Zhixiong (2001) explains China's military diplomacy in Africa and says its nature is defined by its Africa Policy and Defense Policy. Shen generalises China's military diplomacy in Africa as follows:

- It aimed at to establish a favourable regional and international environment for peaceful development. For instance, the West propagated 'China Threat' influenced many African countries and began to look upon China with suspicious and were uncertain about the peaceful development of China. Besides, with the rapid economic rise of China, some African countries began to set very high expectations from China.
- It aimed at safeguarding the Chinese national interests in Africa. With the deepening of China-Africa relations, there is an expansion of China's interests in Africa in the fields of political, economic and security. The military assistance and cooperation will certainly strengthen their bilateral ties. Stronger bilateral relations will ensure the safeguard of the Chinese interests in the continent.
- It aimed at portraying China as a responsible power that shoulders the duties of regional peace and harmony in Africa. For China's participation in UNPKO and anti-pirate escort mission will enhance its cooperation with the other countries in the fields of non-traditional security.

Shen finds the Chinese military diplomacy in Africa is focused mainly on the following areas:

- Military Exchanges and Communications
- Military Attaches
- Defense Dialogue
- Warships Visits & Exchanges

- Functional Exchanges: It covers the military education, training, communication, logistics, equipment, and technologies.

Shen concludes that China's military diplomacy in Africa has the following characteristics:

- It is peaceful. "The underlining idea of China's military diplomacy is peace and harmony". It is manifested in Chinese government ideas of "New Security Concept" and "Harmonious World".
- It is co-operative. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) attaches great importance to not only its cooperation with African countries but also the international and regional organisations such as the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU).
- It is equal. China attaches no political conditions while providing military assistance to African countries.
- It is subordinate. China never seeks to play a dominant role in resolving African security issues.
- It is modest. China does not seek to establish a large scale military presence in Africa.

On 25 May 2006, China's Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan said to the visiting Eritrean Defense Minister Sebhat Ephrem that the Chinese armed forces values the friendship with Eritrean armed forces and will further promote exchanges and cooperation between the two militaries (FOCAC 2006). On 19 October 2006, the Chinese Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan in a meeting with the Chadian counterpart Bichara Issa Djadallah said, "the relationship between the armed forces of China and Chad constitute an important part of overall bilateral relations." As Shen Zhixiong's argument suggests, Cao Gangchuan stated that strengthening of military relations plays a significant role in deepening mutual trust, friendship, and cooperation. As part of China's defence and security relations, it has ratified extradition treaty with few African countries. For instance, on 27 April 2007, an extradition treaty with Angola was ratified with the vote of China's national legislature and the Standing Committee of the NPC (FOCAC 2007). The treaty was signed earlier in June 2006 in Luanda, the capital city of Angola. Chinese vice



Foreign Minister Wu Dawei said: "Ratification of the treaty will help cement bilateral ties, and also contribute to a framework for bilateral judicial cooperation". The treaty signed covers issues such as the types of criminals that can and should be extradited, the procedures and costs of extradition, rules for the exception, resolution of disputes. Similarly, China's national legislature and the Standing Committee of the NPC also adopted extradition treaty with Namibia.

Few African countries leaders openly claim about their beneficial defence relations with China. For example, on 28 March 2010, Ombeni Y. Sefue, the Tanzanian Ambassador to the United States, said that China helped Tanzania to build their self-defense and supported its freedom fighters. China has helped Tanzania to sustain its independence and has also supported for the freedom movements of the rest of the Southern Africa (FOCAC 2010). In 2010, the foundation for the Natitingou Women Military Academy was laid down in Benin with the Chinese assistance, and it was one of the eight measures announced at the Beijing Summit of the FOCAC (China's Foreign Policy 2011) . Zhang Yan, a military expert at the National Defense University, argues that the development in Sino-African military relations will strengthen their new strategic partnership, make the international environment favourable for their development and help build a harmonious world marked by long-lasting peace and sustainable development (China Daily 2010).

In December 2011, the Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie visited Seychelles. During his meeting with the Seychelles President James Michel said, Chinese army will work with the Seychelles armed forces to promote cooperation and exchanges in army building and military staff training and work vigorously for the further all-round growth of the China-Seychelles relations (FOCAC 2011). Seychelles Minister of Home Affairs Environment, Transport, and Energy Joel Morgan responded by saying that his country appreciates China's support for Seychelles on army building and personnel training. On 24 May 2012, the Chinese Defense Minister met with South African Military Chief Solly Shoke, and both sides have pledged for closer cooperation between the two militaries. Liang stated, "The Chinese side attaches importance to the relationship between the two militaries as well as the two nations" (FOCAC 2012). On 1 May 2012, a Malawian military delegation headed by Patrick V. Kachimera, permanent secretary of the Malawi

Ministry of Defense met with the Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie. Liang stated that bilateral military relations had made satisfactory progress and China will work with Malawi to make new achievements (FOCAC 2012). Kachimera thanked Liang for China's help, and support and further added that Malawi hopes to strengthen military relations with China and further promote the military cooperation between the two sides. On 6 June 2012, Guo Boxiong, Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) met with Jean-Frances Bozize, Defense Minister of the Central Africa Republic (CAR) to discuss the expansion of their military ties (FOCAC 2012). Guo commented on the China-CAR military ties and said that in the recent years the bilateral military ties have been smooth and have experienced fruitful cooperation, concerning exchanges of equipment, technology, and personnel training. On 31 July 2012, during the celebration of the 85th Anniversary of the founding of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) at the Chinese Embassy in Kigali, China and Rwanda pledges to strengthen defence cooperation (FOCAC 2012). Rwandan Defense Minister James Kabarebe spoke at the event that the cooperation framework in defence between China and Rwanda has been conducted through agreements and visits of officials from both sides, and pointed out that it is important to consider widening the scope of cooperation framework. He further added that "It is important to consider widening the scope of cooperation further. On defence, we have enjoyed a cordial relationship with the Chinese military quite a long time particularly in training and logistic support in different areas." He acknowledges that since 2008, 125 Rwandan officers and soldiers have been trained in China. This initiative has been fundamental in the process of professionalising Rwandan Defense Forces (RDF) in the post-war era, something that was highly needed (FOCAC 2012). In 2012, China delivered a Xinzhou-60 aircraft as a gift to Cameroon (China's Foreign Policy 2013).

Zhang Yan, a military expert at the National Defense University (NDU), expressed his views on China Daily that the PLA attaches importance to its relations with African countries' armed forces because military ties play a significant role in international relations. He says China seeks to build military cooperation, based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence (China Daily 2010). He explicitly mentions that China does not seek a military alliance or confrontation or to target any other country through its cooperation with African armed forces. On 13 June 2010 in Beijing, the Chinese Defense

Minister Liang Guanglie while meeting with the visiting Zimbabwean Commander of Defence Forces Constantine Guveya Chiwenga said, China values the traditional friendship with Zimbabwe and hopes to push forward the diplomatic as well as the military relations between the two countries (Xinhua 2010). On 1 July 2010, Fikile April Mbalula is the Minister of Police in the Cabinet of South Africa signed an agreement with the Chinese counterpart Chen Zhimin on police cooperation. Mbalula said, "we are going to have very important discussions about public safety and security in the two countries" he added, "this will provide assistance in case investigations and handing over of criminal suspects subject to the laws relating to mutual legal assistance in criminal matters and extradition" (FOCAC 2010). Similarly, on 30 May 2011, South Africa Deputy Police Minister Maggie Sotyu met with China's Vice-Minister of Public Safety, Zhang Xinfeng and both sides agreed to share experiences and work together to combat crime.

On some occasions, China has supported the African countries at the UN on the issues of defence and security. For instance, in December 2011, Li Baodong, Chinese permanent representative to the UN made a remark after the Security Council adopted resolution 2023 that condemned Eritrea's alleged provision of support to armed opposition groups in the Horn of Africa region. He said, "We stand for solidarity among African countries and appropriate settlement of their dispute through dialogue and negotiation. We hope that the AU and other regional organisation play a positive role in this regard. We will firmly support the constructive efforts made by the relevant countries and regional organisation to maintain peace in the region, and will continue to offer our assistance."

In April 2005, the Chinese government announced \$600,000 to assist the Liberian army in capacity building. It was confirmed by the Second Secretary of the Embassy He Ming that the money would be given in the form of material and logistics. In this regard, an agreement was signed by the Liberian Defense Minister Daniel Chea with the Chinese counterpart in Beijing. The military assistance is significant for the Liberian military because in their 14 years long civil war its army was split into factions. The amount will jump start the restructuring exercise of the Liberian armed forces (FOCAC 2005). On 25 May 2006 in Beijing, the Chinese Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan met with the visiting

Eritrean Defense Minister Sebbat Ephren and called for enhancing military relations with Eritrea by further promoting exchanges and cooperation with the Eritrean armed forces (FOCAC 2006). On 22 June 2006, China and South Africa signed 13 cooperation agreements which also included national defence. Chuka Enuka (2011) finds that three arms factories were set up by the Chinese in Sudan which produces light weapons for use in the region as well as in Uganda. Meidan (2006) finds China has also built a weapon factory in Zimbabwe. China provided \$1 million military assistance to Nigeria to upgrade its military facilities. In 2007, China gave \$1.7 million military assistance to Ghana to upgrade its defence and military equipment. The Nigerian Navy Captain Omatseye O'Weyinmi identifies that the military cooperation between China and Nigeria has played a significant role in the Nigerian workforce development and technical assistance. Broad spectrums of Nigerian technical professionals have been trained in different military fields. He also points out that China on the basis of Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence conducts the military exchanges and develops cooperative military relations that are non-aligned, non-confrontational and not directed against any third party. He describes the Chinese approaches and principle towards defense and security. He says that China adheres to the concept of openness, pragmatism, and cooperation, expands its participation in international security cooperation, strengthen strategic coordination and consultation with major powers and neighbouring countries, enhances military exchanges and cooperation with developing countries, and take part in UNPKO, maritime escort, international counter-terrorism cooperation, and disaster relief operations. In July 2012, Deputy Chief of General Staff Ma Xiaotian led a delegation to South Africa and co-chaired the 5th Defense Commission Meeting between China and South Africa with Chief of the South African Defense Force General Solly Shoke (China's Foreign Policy 2013). Andrew Scobell (2003) has suggested that strategic culture is an important concept in understanding the security policies of different states. He explains, in the case of China for many scholars, the Chinese preferences for defence over offences, positional warfare over mobile warfare and maintenance over expansion. He says, the Great Wall of China is not merely a symbol of the ancient Chinese civilisation but is held up as the prime example of a Chinese strategic tradition that is different from Western countries.

### **3.3a *China-Africa Military Visits & Exchanges***

China's Africa Policy-2006 specifically mentions that "China will promote high-level military exchanges between the two sides and actively carry out military related technological exchanges and cooperation." And "it will continue to help train African military personnel and support defence and army building of African countries for their security."

Jean-Pierre Cabestan (2016) suggests since 1964 the Tanzanian People's Defense Forces commander or high officials have visited China regularly, and the first PLA delegation headed by the Deputy Chief of Staff visited Tanzania in 1974. As of 1978, more than 1000 military personnel from Tanzania were trained in China (Shinn and Eisenman 2012). In 1994, Chi Haotian was the first Chinese Minister of Defense to visit Tanzania, and in 2005, Cao Gangchuan was the second. Since 1997, the military exchanges between China and Tanzania intensified. In 2000, China sent its first naval formations to Africa. According to Wendell .M (2000), China sent military delegations to 18 African countries in 2000. Shen Zhixiong (2015) points out that high-level military exchange is a significant part of China's Africa policy. Shen quotes, "The frequency of high-level military delegation visits between China and Africa increased at the end of the 1990s, but has largely remained constant over the past decades." Shen added that "Bilateral military exchanges between China and African countries have remained stable at an annual average of 26". Shen estimates that there is about 20 Chinese military attaché office in Africa, and the African countries military attaché offices had increased in number from 13 in 1998 to 18 in 2007.

The PLA Navy paid its first visit to Africa in July 2000, when its Navy fleet visited Tanzania and South Africa. South African Navy sent its frigate to Shanghai in October 2008, which was the first visit of its warship to China. The military personnel from many African countries such as Guinea-Bissau, Chad, Burundi, Mozambique, Angola, Sudan and South Sudan are sent China for demining training. In August 2006, a Chinese military delegation visited Benin (中国外交 2007 年版) . In March 2006, China dispatched a peacekeeping engineer battalion of 182 soldiers to Lebanon within the UN framework. In September 2006, China trained 25 Lebanese military officials in mine

sweeping (中国外交 2007 年版) . In June 2007, Major General Zhu Chenghu, dean of the Defense Affairs Institute for China's National Defense University headed a Chinese military training and study group to Guinea. And in September sameyear, Major General Liu Weiping, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Headquarters of the General Logistics Department headed a Chinese military Logistics delegation to Guinea (中国外交 2007 年版) . In April 2009, the South African Naval Forces sent a delegation to the commemorative activities for the 60th anniversary of the founding of the PLA Navy. Chinese President Hu Jintao met with Vice Admiral Johannes Mudimu, Chief of the South African Navy and head of the delegation. The visiting military leader Johannes Mudimu also met with PLA Navy Commander General Wu Shengli (China's Foreign Policy 2010). From 21 to 27 June, the "Peace Angel-2009", military exercises for humanitarian medical rescue carried out jointly by China and Gabon was held in Ogooue-Ivindo Province of Gabon. The participating troops of the two countries simulated joint mine accident rescue and other operations and provided free medical services to the local residents (China's Foreign Policy 2010). In August 2009, a Chinese Military Delegation visited Equatorial Guinea (China's Foreign Policy 2010).

In May 2010, the PLA Chief of General Staff Chen Bingde visited Tanzania and met with the Tanzanian Minister of Defense Hussein Ali Mwinyi and praised "brotherhood friendship" between both militaries and both countries. In May 2010, during his Africa tour Chen Bingde also visited Angola and Namibia, the Chinese government officials stated that, since 2003, this was the first visit by the PLA's Chief of Staff to Africa and the first ever to Namibia and Angola. It was said that high-level visits have increased in this century with frequent visits by the Chinese military leaders to Tanzania, South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria, Algeria and other African countries. So far, nearly 10 African countries have sent their senior military delegations to China. Now, the China-Africa military cooperation and exchanges have extended to military education, training, communications, logistics, and technology. In April 2010, Minister of Internal Security and Civil Protection General Sadio Gassama led a delegation of regional governors of Mali to China to promote exchanges and cooperation at the sub-national level (China's Foreign Policy 2011) .

In June 2010, Zimbabwean Commander of Defense Force Constantine Guveya Chiwenga visited China, during his visit the Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanlie stated, "China values its traditional friendship with Zimbabwe and hopes to push forward relations between the two countries as well as the two armed forces" (Xinhua 2010). In August 2010, a delegation of the Equatorial Guinea Defense Ministry visited China (China's Foreign Policy 2011). The visiting Defense Minister Chiwenga also met with the Chief of General Staff of the PLA Chen Bingde. In October 2010, Chinese Navy hospital ship "Peace Ark" visited Seychelles and Tanzania where it provided medical services to the general public on humanitarian basis (China's Foreign Policy 2011). In November, 2010, State Councillor and Minister of Defense General Liang Guanlie met with South African Secretary for Defense Mpumi Mpofu and Commander of the South Africa National Defense Force God Frey Ngwenya who were in China for the fourth meeting of the CSABC Defense Committee Deputy Chief of the General Staff of PLA General Ma Xiaotian and Secretary Mpofu held the fourth meeting of the China-South Africa Defense Committee (China's Foreign Policy 2011). In 2010, China and Djibouti enhanced military exchanges. The eight vessels of the Chinese navy escort fleet called at Djibouti successively for replenishment or emergency maintenance. In September, Chinese Navy hospital ship "Peace Ark" visited Djibouti and provided medical services to the general public as well as government staff and military personnel of Djibouti (China's Foreign Policy 2011). In 2011, the 7th, 8th, and 9th Escort fleet of the Chinese navy called at the Port of Djibouti for replenishment and presented the Djiboutian navy with office supplies. Colonel Abdourahman Aden Cher, Commander of the Navy Djibouti, led a delegation to China. He toured Chinese naval institutes and had talks with leaders of the Chinese navy (China's Foreign Policy 2012). In April 2011, FFG Zhoushan and FFG Xuzhou, two Chinese frigates on escort missions, visited the Victoria Port, Seychelles (China's Foreign Policy 2012). In April 2011, FFG Zhoushan and FFG Xuzhou, two Chinese frigates on escort missions paid an official goodwill visit to South Africa (China's Foreign Policy 2012). In 2013, a delegation from the honour guard of the PLA visited Botswana to help train the honour guard of the Botswana's national defence force (China's Foreign Policy 2014). In 2013, 13th, 14th, and 15th Chinese escort fleet

called at the Port of Djibouti for replenishment (China's Foreign Policy 2013) . In June 2013, an escort fleet of the Chinese navy called at the Port of Victoria, Seychelles for replenishment and paid a formal visit to Seychelles. The fleet hosted a reception on deck and a public open day. It sent an infantry square formation to join the Seychelles National Day parade (China's Foreign Policy 2013) .

### ***3.3b Arms Deals-A component of China-Africa Defense Cooperation***

Arms deals have been on the aspects of Sino-Africa Defense Cooperation. Etienne Girouard (2008), China's military equipment and weapon supply to the African governments are linked to its oil stakes in the respective state. For instance, the PRC has provided military assistance in the form of arms and weapons to the Nigerian government to suppress the militant rebel groups in the Niger Delta. In fact, these rebellion groups are demanding a fair share of oil revenue generated in the Niger Delta. The African authoritarian regimes like Zimbabwe and Sudan also buys weapons from the PRC. Chuka Enuke (2011) suggests, China gains significant African allies in the UN through arms sales and military relationship for its political goals, for example, Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Nigeria. Chuka finds that the Chinese arms are relatively cheaper and so gains faster inroads in the African market. The arms deals are conducted through illegal smuggling by the Chinese firms. Andrew Hull and David Markov (2013) describes the Chinese arms sale in Africa, they suggest its arms sale to Africa is based on three factors namely, non-interference, price structure, and financing options. China's policy of non-interference is applied to potential arms buyers, and it means that China will sell weapons and security equipment to a state without regard to its internal political situation or the repressiveness of the regime. The Chinese arms are relatively cheaper than its global competitors in Africa. Dempsey (2010) has found Zimbabwe had financed the purchase of Chinese FC-1 fighters with zinc and aluminium mining concessions.

In 1995, the Tanzanian authority refused permission to unload a Chinese ship carrying 152 tonnes of ammunition and light weapons. In some cases, it is seen that the Chinese weapon suppliers mislabeled the destination and the weapons are disguised as agricultural equipment (ODI 1998). Ian Taylor (2005) in between 1998 to 2000, while the



Ethiopia and Eritrea were at war, China sold weapons to both countries worth US\$1 billion. In fact, David H. Shinn (2009) contends that during the war China sold a lot of weapons to both the rival states. He suggests Ethiopia purchased ammunition from China was equivalent to one-third of the cost its Russian-supplied weapons, which included light mortars, military vehicles, and AK-47s. The Chinese weapons have an advantage over American counterparts regarding weight and cost. It is lighter as well as inexpensive. The Chinese made lighter weapons are more appropriate, and it can be easily deployed by two soldiers even in rugged terrain. The BBC reported in December 1999, when the war was at its peak, for the supply of new equipment Ethiopia may have bartered coffee with China. Jordi Calvo Rufanges and Josep Maria Royo Aspa (2016) in 1998 China supplied 83 percent of the DRC's total small and light weapons imported.

David H. Shinn (2009) observes that China has actively sold small arms and light weapons (SALW) to African governments. He noted that some African governments had supplied these weapons to the rebel groups to serve their interests, for instance, the Sudanese government supplied weapons to the Janjaweed militia group in Darfur. He points out that the Chinese weapons were sold in some of the African conflict zones in the open market by organisations active in conflict zones. He observes that it is hard to track the Chinese supplied small arms and light weapons and most of the time statistics are understated. According to his estimation, from 2000 to 2003, China supplied 13 percent of all arms to Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and it increased to 18 percent between 2004 and 2007. As of 2009, he noted that from 2000 onwards, China had supplied SALW to at least 27 of the 53 African countries. Sudan, Cote d'Ivoire, and Nigeria are the three biggest buyers of the Chinese SALW in Africa, and all three countries have experienced serious internal conflicts.

Chinese arms have frequently appeared in the eastern Congo and Rwanda. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the Rwandan army, Hutu militias and the opposition, Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) used Chinese weapons, among others. The Rwandan government reportedly purchased them from independent arms dealers. Those used by the RPF came from Ugandan government stocks. The Hutu militias obtained them from stocks sold initially to the DRC and Seychelles. Two rebel

groups in the DRC also used Chinese weapons. SIPRI reported that the *Mai-Mai* organisation obtained them from several neighbouring countries while Rwanda provided those used by one faction of the Congolese Rally for Democracy. In one analysis of weapons collected in Ituri District of the DRC, 17 percent were of Chinese origin. China was Zimbabwe's primary supplier of arms when it sent troops to the DRC in 1998 in support of Laurent Kabila. The China National Aero-Technology, Import and Export Corporation, sold numerous arms to the Taylor regime in Liberia between 2001 and 2003.

China's most controversial military sales concern Sudan where there have been two major conflicts—the North-South civil war and the crisis in Darfur. China provided up to 90 percent of the SALW delivered to Sudan between 2004 and 2006. It also delivered more sophisticated equipment. Regarding all armament deliveries to Sudan, however, China said it is providing only 8 percent of the total. The government of Sudan reportedly transferred some of these weapons to the Janjaweed militia in contravention of the UN arms embargo. China also joined other countries in helping Sudan to develop its weapons manufacturing capacity. Sudan or China manufacture most ammunition used by all parties in Darfur. Shinn (2009) notes that arms from several countries are being used in the Africa conflict zones and China is not the leading arms trader in Africa regarding total dollar value. He believes that China may be the largest provider of SALW to Africa.

During the civil wars in the African countries such as Sierra Leone, Liberia and Ivory Coast, Chinese-made weapons seen are machine guns, Chinese AK-47, and rocket-propelled grenade launchers. After the UN arms embargo launched in Sudan, China sold about US\$55 million worth of arms to the country (Shinn 2008). During the Sierra Leone Civil War (1991-2002), China was the main arms supplier to the country which damaged the country's aspiration for peace and development.

In 2004, Robert Mugabe government in Zimbabwe faced with the US and EU embargo bought Chinese fighter aircraft and military vehicles. In April 2008, the Robert Mugabe regime received secret delivery of weapons shipment from China ahead of the presidential election. The Chinese ship AN Yue Jiang reached the Angolan port of Lobito, which carried 77-tonne load including rocket-propelled grenades, mortar bombs and about three million bullets (*The Guardians* 2008). Since Zimbabwe is a landlocked

country, so three weeks before the arrival of the Chinese ship, two Zimbabwean ministers and senior army officials visited Luanda, the capital city of Angola to negotiate the docking and unloading of the ship. A spokesperson for Robert Mugabe, George Chiramba said the state newspaper, *The Herald* that "the arms will be delivered to Zimbabwe, one way or the other". Later, the cargo ship was docked in the South African port of Durban for the transportation of weapons to Zimbabwe. The permit for the transshipment of the cargo from Durban to Harare was issued by the South Africa's national conventional arms control committee. In fact, this incident of China's arms sale to Harare was exposed because of the disagreement between the South African government and the South African Transport and Allied Workers Union (SATAWU), a trade union in South Africa. The Dockers in Durban, members of the SATAWU refused to unload the weapons from the ship. The document for the shipment of the Chinese ship, *An Yue Jiang* revealed that the arms were sent by the Chinese government to the Ministry of Defense, Zimbabwe. Themba James Maseko, the former CEO of the Government Communication and Information Systems and spokesperson for the government of South Africa said, "We are not in a position to act unilaterally and interfere in a trade deal between two countries." South Africa had to "tread very carefully", given the complexity of the situation in Zimbabwe (The Guardian 2008). On the other hand, SATAWU General Secretary, Randall Howard, said: "Satawu does not agree with the position of the government not to intervene with this shipment of weapons. Our members will not unload this cargo, neither will any of our members in the truck-driving sector move this cargo by road." The incident led to an international criticism of the Chinese government, but still, Beijing did not change its position and continued to support the Mugabe's authoritarian regime. Deborah Brautigam (2009) suggests, four of the total 36 containers were loaded with ammunition and propelled grenade intended for transshipment to Zimbabwe. China's weapon supplies to ZANU and military training provided are the basis of the China-Zimbabwe military relations. Zhang Chun (2014) suggests that one major component of Zimbabwe's Look East Policy was its military relations with China. China has sold sizeable amount of weapons to Zimbabwe which includes, 12 fighter aircraft and military vehicles worth US\$240 million in 2004; six trainer and combat aircraft in 2005; six additional trainer combat aircraft in 2006; and

20,000 AK-47 rifles, 21,000 pairs of handcuffs and 12-15 military trucks in 2011 (Zhang 2014).

According to Igor Pejic (2016) in the 1st decade of the 21st Century, China sold small and light arms to many countries in Africa. Igor writes that the Chinese made AK-47 is used in Africa with various military groups including, the African national military, Paramilitary groups and also the rebel groups. Igor identifies some of the major African customers of Chinese weapons are Chad, Sudan, Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda. Igor estimates that in 2003, Chinese generated revenue of more than US\$1.3 billion from African market. Between 2006 and 2007, China subsequently expanded its weapons markets in Africa. The range of weapons sold by China included armoured vehicles, artillery, combat vehicles and supersonic jets. Igor finds that China has also helped some of the African countries to set up weapon factories such as, in Zimbabwe, Sudan, and Rwanda. By the end of 2010, several African countries militaries were equipped with the Chinese made aircraft fighters. For instance, the Nigerian government purchased 3 FT-7N1 dual seat fighter trainer aircraft and 12 F-7M air guard multi-purpose combat aircraft worth US\$251 million. The other African buyers of the Chinese fighters are Morocco, Botswana, Kenya and Algeria and these countries have purchased light strike aircraft such as the K-8 and the JF-17 multi-role combat aircraft. Igor Pejic (2016) concludes that the nature of weapons trade between China and the African countries suggests that it is just for the money "without any deeper military or political plans for the continent".

Diego Cordano (2014) writes that China has supplied weapons to Nigeria, Namibia, Gabon, Ethiopia, and Chad. Diego has quoted Peter Wezeman, author of the SIPRI report, "Africa is quite an important market for the Chinese arms industry because it is a stepping stone to becoming a first tier arms exporter". Diego gives an argument which will completely disagree with Igor's argument mentioned above, "China is now selling weapons to African countries as a component of the general strategy of consolidating political ties and economic relations". Diego believes that arms sale to Africa will help China's access to the natural resources reserves on the continent. Judith Van de Looy (2006) says, "Selling arms to some African countries leaders improves the bilateral relationship and can enhance Chinese access to oil and natural resources". The report of

the Congressional Research Service suggests, from 1996 to 2003, China sold 10 percent of all arms transferred to African countries. Judith writes, in 2000, the Chinese government bartered a shipment of small arms with eight tonnes of Zimbabwean ivory. In 2004, Zimbabwean military purchased 12 fighter aircraft and 100 trucks from China worth US\$200 million.

In May 2007, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu said, "China also required the weapon importing countries to identify the final intended use of the weapons, and requested them not to transfer imported weapons to third parties". She maintains in her statement that, "China strictly abide by the UN resolution and never exported weapons to countries and regions on which the UN imposed arms embargos" (FOCAC 2007). Alden (2007) has noted that arms sale is a component of China's relations with the African government, especially those African regimes which are under threat owing to the civil war, insurgency or even domestic opposition and also facing arms embargo by the Western countries. Alden (2007) suggests, in 2003 China sold arms to African government of worth US\$ 1.3 billion. Chuka Enuke (2011) estimates that in between 2000 to 2003, China was the second biggest arms supplier to Africa after Russia and accounted for 13 percent of all arms supplied in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The Chinese-made AK-47 assault rifles are the common weapon used by the African countries national military as well as the independent militant groups. Grimmell (2008) estimates from 2004 to 2007, the Chinese arms supply to Africa increased to account 18 percent of all arms supplied in Africa and the supplied equipment included were supersonic combat aircraft, surface combatant, armoured cars, artillery pieces and other fighter aircraft. SIPRI (2015) estimates in between 2005 to 2007, under the situation Zimbabwe's dangerous turmoil and instability, China supplied arms to the country of worth US\$ 28 million. Apart from arms sale, the Chinese government has also assisted the Mugabe's regime in setting up an arms factory (Meidan 2008). Brown & Sriram (2008) writes, in 2005, China supplied six jets for the Zimbabwean Air Force, and in the same year, next arms deal featured twelve jet fighter and hundred military vehicles. Eisenman (2008) notes that China's arms supply to Africa features a host of equipment namely, radio jamming equipment, riot control gear, anti-aircraft batteries, artillery, tanks and armoured

vehicles. In 2007, it was reported that China has sold 10 Type-69 tanks, 30 Type-59 tanks, 9 Chengdu J-7 fighter aircraft and 6 Karakorum-8 (K-8) to Zimbabwe.

According to the report published by the Frontline Fellowship Magazine in November 2007, the major African buyers of Chinese arms are Zimbabwe, Sudan, Mauritania, Ethiopia, the Congo, Algeria, and Angola. The report says, in 2005 Angola purchased the Sukhoi Su-27, a twin-engine super manoeuvrable fighter aircraft from China. It suggests, China is a primary military supplier of Sudan, and most of its military vehicles, aircraft, and tanks are Chinese made. The report has quoted the Kamwa Defence Review that suggests, the Sudanese Air Force is equipped with the Chinese equipment such as, the Shenyang J-6, the Chengdu J-7, Shaanxi Y-8 or Yunshuji-8 aircraft-medium range transport aircraft, and the Sudanese military is equipped with Chinese-made weapons including, Type-59 57mm anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) gun system, Chinese 130mm Type 59-1 field gun, Type 54-122 mm Howitzers and T62 tanks, as well as the mortars. The reports suggest the Congo is a traditional buyer of the Chinese arms, and as of 2007, the Congo military is equipped with 130mm Type 59-1 field gun, Type 60-122mm Howitzers, Type 63-107mm rocket guns and about 30 Type-59 main tanks. In September 2005, the Defense Industry Daily reported that Nigeria signed a US\$251 million weapon sale contract with China and as per the deal China will supply 12 F-7 N1 and 3 FT-7 NI fighters to the Nigerian military. The report contends that Egypt has more Chinese-manufactured weapons than any other country in the continent. Egypt has purchased 12 K-8 trainer aircraft from China, and its Air Force is already equipped with 53 J-7 Chinese fighter aircraft. The report points out that China's arms sale is mostly to those African countries having a high volume of oil or natural reserves. The Chinese arms proliferation in Africa either provokes conflicts or exacerbates the existing ones (Alden 2005 & Taylor 2009). Chinese weapons are also smuggled illegally by the Chinese firms. In the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s, the African countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast were experiencing civil wars and, the rebels and mercenaries used the Chinese AK-47, rocket-propelled grenade launchers and machine guns. Stéphanie Giry (2004) writes, "Unmoved by concerns and without fear of political consequences, the Chinese government seems willing to fuel a small arms race in Sub-Saharan Africa to generate additional revenue for the PLA." Deborah Brautigam (2009) suggests that in

Zimbabwe the assured and abundant supply of weapons was a factor in the brutality inflicted by the supporters of Robert Mugabe and the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). Minnick (2010) cites from the annual reports by the US Department of Defense on Chinese military modernization that from 2005 to 2009, Africa imported 11 percent of its total arms from China. From 2001 to 2008, China transferred 70 military aircraft (mostly transport), 20 supersonic combat aircraft, 440 armoured personnel carriers and armoured cars, 390 artillery pieces to sub-Saharan Africa (Minnick 2010).

Andrew Hull and David Markov (2013) claims that in November 2010, a Chinese exhibitor at the Airshow China told them Africa is one of three primary marketing targets for the state-sponsored Chinese arms trading companies. They suggest to promote Chinese arms market in the continent, in May 2010, the Chief of General Staff of the PLA along with a team of senior Generals visited Tanzania, Angola, and Namibia. During the Africa Aerospace and Defence (ADD) 2010 exhibition due to the huge Chinese presence made it much bigger than its 2008 edition. The Chinese companies participated in the ADD 2010 exhibition were China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation; China National Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation; State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry of National Defence; and China National Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation (Pakistan Defense 2010). But Andrew Hull and David Markov (2013) suggest there were about 10 Chinese arms export-import corporations participated in the ADD 2010. They are: The Poly Technologies Inc. a subsidiary of China Poly Group Corporation; China Shipbuilding & Offshore International Co., Ltd. (CSOC) is the trading arm of China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC); China XinXing Import- Export Corporation; China Overseas Space Development and Investment Co. Ltd. (COSDIC); North China Industry Corporation (NORINCO GROUP); China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation; China National Aero-Technology Import & Export Corporation (CATIC); China Aviation Industrial Base Group; The China Electronics Technology Group Corporation; and China National Electronics Import-Export Corporation (CEIEC). At the ADD 2010 exhibition the Chinese exhibitor's brochures included the equipment were as follows: Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and

Reconnaissance (C4ISR); Precision Guided Mortar Munitions (PGMM); Chinese Aircraft Fighter such as JF-17 and FC-1; very short-range tactical ballistic missiles such as, S4-400, BP-12A and B11M; Naval Ships; Tactical Air Defense weapons such as, QW-2 and QW-18, cruise missiles such as, C-704, C-705, and C-801 anti-ship missile, man-portable air defense system (MANPADS); small arms; armed vehicles such as, the WZ-551 (AKA the ZSL92), VN-1 8X8 armoured vehicles.

Andrew Hull and David Markov (2013) concludes that taking into the account of cost and pricing, China can potentially grow as a significant arms exporter to Africa. The arms sale also provides an opportunity for the Chinese to access African people and its resources. The Chinese equipment such as MANPADS and short-range tactical ballistic missiles sold to Africa could destabilize the military balance in the continent and trigger conflicts between the states in the region. China's non-interference policy allows pariah African regimes access to arms and internal security equipment, which could prolong their hold on power. There is a possibility that some Chinese equipment may reach to the non-state actors.

**Table No 3.1: Chinese Weapons Transfer to African countries from 1992-2009**

Recipient Country	Year of Delivery of Weapon	Equipment Type/Quantity
Sudan	1992	18 Artillery
Gabon	2004	4 122mm LRM
	2004	4 HM2 105 mm Howitzer
	2004	Ten 103mm Guns
	2004	16 107mm MRL
	2006	6 Armoured Fighting Vehicle (AFV)
Zimbabwe	2006	6 Warplanes
Niger	2006	6 Artillery
Tanzania	2006	2 AFV
	2007	2 AFV



	2009	2 Aircraft
Namibia	2006	6 warplanes
	2009	21 Armored Vehicles
Congo	2006	4 AFV
	2009	9 Armored Vehicles
Chad	2007	10 AFV
Ghana	2007	4 Helicopters
	2009	21 Armored Vehicles
Rwanda	2007	6 Artillery
	2008	20 AFV
Nigeria	2009	15 Aircraft
Kenya	2007	32 AFV

*Sources:* The UN Arms Registry

### **3.4 China-Africa Security Cooperation, 1996-2013**

In the Follow-up Actions of the Second Ministerial Conference of the FOCAC, it was reported that by the end of July 2004, China and Africa have further enhanced their cooperation in the fields of peace and security (FOCAC 2004). In December 2004, Xu Jinghu, Director-General of the Department of African Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the meeting with the visiting African diplomatic envoy reported that China participated in the UN organised meeting on the issues of Sudan and Somalia held in Kenya, and the International Conference on Peace, Security, Democracy and Development in the Great Lake Region held in Tanzania. Hu reiterated that China and Africa have further enhanced their cooperation in the fields of peace and security (FOCAC 2004).

In the FOCAC Summit-Addis Ababa Action Plan (2004-2006), it was mentioned that the non-traditional security issues such as terrorism, drugs trafficking, small arms smuggling, transnational economic crimes, illegal migration and natural disasters had become new variables affecting international and regional security (FOCAC 2004). The concerns were raised at the complexity and profound background of the Non-traditional security

issues, and it was suggested that such issues should be addressed with an integrated approach of political, economic, legal scientific and technological means and through extensive and effective international cooperation. The document proposed to intensify dialogue for cooperation and joint actions against the non-traditional security issues. On the issues of peace and security in Africa, the action plan says that China and Africa should further deepen its cooperation in resolving regional conflict and other problems on the continent. It also acknowledged China's Peacekeeping Operation in Africa. The action plan also included that China should intensify its Peacekeeping Keeping Operations (PKO) in Africa and to enhance the capacity of African countries to undertake PKO, China should help them in the field of logistics (FOCAC 2004). The action plan to counter terrorism was also included. It said, China supports Africa's adoption of a counter-terrorism convention and is an effort to prevent and counter terrorism. China also supported the establishment of a centre for studies and research on terrorism in Algeria. Under the framework of the UN and other international forums, China and Africa should strengthen cooperation to combat terrorism. On the issue of international disputes, the action plan suggests the disputes should be resolved through negotiation, consultations and peaceful means, rather than through force. It has suggested the nuclear power states follow no first use position and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state. The action plan supported the efforts to create nuclear weapon free zone. China and Africa have agreed to work together to stop the illicit proliferation, circulation, and trafficking of small arms and light weapons.

In the document of China's Africa Policy 2006, the Chinese Government has added the component of 'peace and security'. The various aspects of this component are military cooperation; conflict settlement and peacekeeping operation; judicial and police cooperation; and non-traditional security areas. In its initiative of China-Africa military cooperation, China will promote high-level military exchanges from both sides and actively conduct technological exchanges and cooperation in the field of the military. The document says, China will assist to train the African military personnel and support defence and army building of the African countries for their security. Within its capacity, China will assist the AU and other African regional organisations and African countries to settle regional conflicts. It will continue to support and participate in the UNPKO in

Africa. Under the framework of judicial and police cooperation, the Chinese and African judicial and law enforcement departments will carry out exchanges and cooperation between them. China will cooperate with the African countries to combat transnational organised crimes and corruption and intensify cooperation on judicial assistance, extraditions, and repatriation of criminal suspects. China will cooperate with Africa in setting up an efficient channel for intelligence and information exchanges and work closely with immigration departments of African countries in tackling the problem of illegal migration. China proposes in the document that China and Africa should increase intelligence exchanges, apply effective methods in combating terrorism, small arms smuggling, drugs trafficking, transnational economic crimes. Liu Hongwu (2009) has pointed out that although China will not interfere in the internal affairs of the African countries, it has always been concerned and focused on African issues and its peace, development, and security problems. Liu finds that China always follows the basic principles of international relations and based on the principle of equality participates in the Africa's peace and security issue within the UN framework. Here we see China follows the policy of non-interference in internal affairs, but it has begun to sign agreements with the African states to ensure their security and stable environment in the continent. For example, In June 2011, China and South Africa agree to deal with crime syndicates between two countries (*Xinhua* 2011). The immediate cause for such an agreement was killings of 32 Chinese nationals in robberies, trafficking and other mishaps in South Africa in 2011. As stated by the South Africa Chinese Community and Police Cooperation Center (SACCPCC) to *Xinhua*, 13 of them were killed in robberies. It may not be a target oriented incidents against the Chinese but may be due to the security problem of the country. For example, on 23 July 2011, a Chinese businesswoman was shot dead when her shop was being looted by five armed robbers in the Eastern provinces of Gauteng, South Africa. It is estimated that about 300,000 Chinese are living in South African, and 100,000 of them in Johannesburg (*Xinhua* 2012). An agreement was signed between the two governments to ensure that the two countries will not be "hideouts" for criminals. It said the two sides would reinforce cooperation on security matters. During the meeting between the South African Deputy Minister of Police Maggie Sotyu and the visiting Vice-Minister of the Chinese Ministry of Public Security discussed a host of

security issues, including organised crime, drug and human trafficking, cyber crime, terrorism, money laundering, arms smuggling. Both sides agreed to cooperate in police training and exchange knowledge in this field. Maggie Sotyu said, "If criminal contemplates committing a crime in South Africa with a hope of escaping to China as hide out and vice versa, they have been strongly warned." Zweli Mnisi, spokesperson at the South Africa Ministry of Police, said, "Both ministries have committed themselves to strengthening cooperation in combating transnational crimes. To this end, they committed to ensuring the safety of institution and persons from both sides." Sotyu also said, "The Ministry of Police remains committed to providing China with any assistance in case of an investigation and hand over of criminal suspects." Mnisi added, China has cooperated with South Africa and made a great effort in "combating transnational crimes and maintaining social order, jointly ensuring the security and stability of their respective countries and positively contributing to the development of friendly relationships." In March 2012, Maggie Sotyu said to a reporter of Xinhua that she put her best effort to crack down on criminal activities for the safety of all Chinese in South Africa, and in this regard, she expects the cooperation of SACCPC and the Chinese communities in the country. She also added that in the coming years South Africa police officers were being sent to China for training, and exchanges of experiences in cracking down crimes activities of all forms (Xinhua 2012).

The Chinese ambassador to Rwanda Shu Zhan spoke on a theme, "A Few Points on Peace and Security in Africa" and said, China supports the international intervention of peacekeeping operation with UN authorization under the condition that the host country government should grants consent for it. China upholds the principle of respect for sovereignty through non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries (FOCAC 2010). In August 2012, the Chinese Ambassador Shu Zhan met with the Rwandan Defense Minister James Kabarebe at the celebration of the 85th Anniversary of the PLA. He said "PLA and Rwandan Defense Forces (RDF) are important forces for the security of our countries and peace of the region, on the world peacekeeping stage, the two armies have many experiences that they can share and learn from each other" (FOCAC 2012).

For instance, after the UNSC adopted a resolution which authorised a no-fly zone over Libya, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu stated, "We oppose the use of force in international relations and have some reservations with part of the resolution." She further added, "Considering the concern and stance of Arab countries and the AU, as well as the special situation in Libya, China, and some countries, abstained from voting on the draft resolution." She said, "We support the commitment of the UN Secretary General's Special Envoy for Libya, the AU and Arab League to deal with the current crisis in Libya in a peaceful way."

In June 2010, then Vice-Foreign Minister He Yafei gave a keynote speech titled "Strengthening Partnership, Promoting Peace, Security and Sustainable Development in Africa" at Second African Forum for Dialogue. He said, "The peace, security, and development of Africa are not only relevant to a sustainable and stable Africa, but also to the common development and prosperity of the world as well." He Yafei put forward his proposal for the international community to support peace, security, and development in Africa. To safeguard peace and security, He urged all the concerned parties to settle disputes through consultations and negotiations, help and support African countries in developing their economy, eradicate poverty, improve the environment and advance social progress in the continent. Yang Guang (2010) has commented on the visit of Chen Bingde, then Chief of General Staff of the PLA to Namibia, Angola, and Tanzania that it has yielded positive results (*China Daily* 2010). Yang writes China gives priority of security in its military ties with Africa and pushes forward its development process, which can be reflected in three ways.

- China supports African countries in building a stronger military so that they could defend their territory and sovereignty. China is assisting African countries to increase their military capabilities by training its commanding, and technical personnel provides them equipment and modernise their armed forces.
- China gives humanitarian assistance to the African countries and helps them counter non-traditional security threats. The assistance also includes the PLA offered medical equipment and dispatch of medical teams in different parts of Africa.

- The PLA participates actively in the UNPKO in Africa.

In 2012, security was declared as a significant area of China-Africa cooperation. Although China had bilateral military relations with most African countries, security was not officially part of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) process. A major initiative was taken in 2012, China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security was established under FOCAC, and it was designed to provide financial assistance, capacity building and other forms of institutional support. Under this framework, the range of security engagement is wider. It includes traditional and non-traditional threats, evolving beyond purely military concerns and state based engagement to involve diverse actors. In fact, China needs security measures in Africa to protect its citizens and investments. For China, the problem lies in its foreign policy principles and the practicalities of protecting its interests.

Igor Pejic (2016) suggests the economic growth of Chinese enterprises in the continent drives China's security interest in the region. Igor believes that Beijing's major interest lies in the promotion and protection of its investment and citizen in Africa. It is estimated that there are more than 2000 Chinese enterprises in Africa, and about more than one million Chinese are living and working in the region. Igor suggests China is struggling to handle the rising issues of kidnapping, terrorism, and piracy in the continent. China focuses most of its naval operation in the Horn of Africa to fight against piracy. China is facing problems from some non-state actors such as Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Boko Haram in Nigeria as they targeted their attacks at the Chinese companies and citizens in Africa. Igor identifies issues that restrict China's security engagements in Africa.

- Limitations in the PLA's power projection in a foreign land.
- Chinese government strictly follows its foreign policy of non-interference in internal affairs of any other country.

Igor also believes that the increasing presence of the Chinese PLA soldiers in the UNPKO tends to operate and provide security even outside the UN framework. In the recent past, the role of the PLA in Libya, Mali, and South Sudan suggests the evolving

role of the Chinese military in Africa. In February 2011 during the Libyan Civil War, the PLA carried out a Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) and transported more than 35,860 Chinese citizens. Recently in 2012-2013, the Chinese soldiers were deployed in South Sudan and Mali. As part of the United Nation Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), China deployed 50 troops from the 162nd Motorised Infantry Division. In Mali, 400 Chinese soldiers were deployed were not only charged with protecting the UN mission in the country but also the overall infrastructure.

China is combining its security interests with its African partner countries and trying to portray this engagement as a win-win approach. China's security interest is linked with the stability of the region responsible for its energy supply. China contributes to the security and stability of Africa through its military training to the African military personnel and its participation the UNPKO. China has successfully persuaded some of the African authoritarian regimes to agree for the UNPKO in their country. Bahauddin Foizee (2016) on China's security concerns in Africa has commented that the increasing Chinese investment has forced China to adopt new diplomatic and military initiatives and particularly in countries like South Sudan and Mali. China to boost their capacity to counter threats to their economic interests it began to provide security assistance to the AU and the national militaries of the African states. For instance, China deployed about 400 soldiers in civilian outfits soon after the attack on its oil installations in Kordofan, Sudan, to protect its economic investment against the assault of the rebels (Gertz and Rowan 2004, Dijk 2005, Shinn 2008). It was China's first direct military involvement in Africa's domestic affairs. Similarly, in April 2007, a Chinese-run oil field in eastern Ethiopia was attacked by the Ogaden National Liberation, an ethnic Somali group that killed 74 workers. According to the statement of Xu Shuang, general manager of the Chinese oil company, nine of its Chinese oil workers killed, seven Chinese workers were kidnapped, and 65 Ethiopians were killed (Anita Powell 2007). Soon after this incident, the Chinese government decision came to start defending and protecting its workers with armed guards (Pushe 2008). In May 2006, the Nigerian militants claimed the responsibility of a car bomb attack and warned Chinese companies to "stay away" of the oil-producing Niger delta or risk facing attack (Dino Mahtani 2006). The incident took place soon after the Chinese companies and employees came to Niger Delta to implement

China's \$4 billion infrastructure investment deal with Nigeria. Chinese government stated that such events make it difficult for China to maintain its non-interference position (Dijik 2009).

Shen Zhixiong (2001) finds that non-traditional security threats such as terrorism and piracy are rampant in Africa. China's enterprises, investments, citizens, and ships are exposed to the rampant non-traditional security threats. Shen believes that China considers the relative weakness of military strength of some African countries and provides them assistance to enhance their security and military capabilities. China claims that "it will continue to help train African military personnel and support defence and army building of African countries for their security." Shen suggests that one of the objectives of China's military diplomacy is to promote the building of harmonious world by taking up the responsibilities and duties of international security. In November 2011, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni met with the Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie and said that his country is willing to work with China to promote regional peace and stability and to build a harmonious world (Xinhua 2011).

For instance, in June 2011, the Chinese Deputy Defense Foreign Minister Zhai Jun made a remark while addressing a UNSC meeting in the situation in Libya, initiated by the AU. He calls on the international community to work together to find a political solution to the Libyan Crisis. He said, military forces cannot solve the Libyan issue, and the UN resolution should be implemented earnestly. He added that China supports the diplomatic mediation efforts of the AU in solving the crisis (Xinhua 2011). During the Northern Mali Conflict in January 2012, the PRC's Ministry of Commerce issued a statement that warned Chinese firms in Mali about the security risks as the country's military turmoil escalated (Xinhua 2012). The ministry said in a statement, "Chinese companies should closely monitor change in the country's security situation and take stronger precautions to ensure the safety of lives and property. The ministry asked the Chinese businessmen and traveller delay their visits to Mali and suggested its citizens in Mali to leave the country temporarily. At the same time, in April 2012, the Chinese government urged the Mali military junta and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to explore ways to end the ongoing crisis in Mali (Xinhua 2012). The Chinese Foreign



Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei said in a press conference. "China supports ECOWAS in leading mediation for peace in Mali." He urged all the relevant parties in the Mali crisis to establish a channel with ECOWAS to resolve the crisis. Later on, China sends security forces for the peacekeeping mission in Mali (Xinhua 2013). It was for the first time that China had dispatched 135 security forces for the peacekeeping mission. Similarly, during the April 2012 Guinea-Bissau coup d'état, the Chinese spokesperson Liu Weimin said at the press briefing that China "was worried about the impact" brought by the coup on the West African country's political and security situation (Xinhua 2012). In May 2013, Li Baodong, China's permanent representative to the United Nations, made the statement while addressing a Security Council meeting on the situation in the Central African region. He said, "Central Africa is still faced with many challenges in peace and security." "This is especially true that situation in the Central Africa Republic (CAR) and the Eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) remain still turbulent." Li also pointed about the rising non-traditional security issues such as piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, arms smuggling and transnational organised crimes.

In 2013, as Nigeria's Boko Haram crisis escalates, the Chinese Ambassador to Nigeria Dang Boqing made a remark in Abuja at the "International Conference on Traditional Methods of Conflict Resolution: Chinese and Nigerian Perspective". He urged its government not to rely on military solution alone in the fight against insurgency (Premium Times 2013). He suggested Nigeria's homegrown methods of conflict resolution for its internal insecurity problems. He emphasised on to achieve peace and stability in the country and suggested the Nigerian government must work on poverty and under development which is the cause of insecurity in the country. The Chinese Government also began to take initiatives to check its Chinese citizens' involvement in criminal activities in Africa. In November 2013, the Chinese embassy in Tanzania issued a statement that the Chinese nationals should strictly abide by the Chinese and Tanzanian laws, and never involve in ivory or other smugglings (FOCAC 2013).

The security issues often challenge the Chinese enterprises to carry on their task forward. In December 2013, a Chinese road construction firm, Wu Yi was forced to suspend its work on the Isolo-Moyale road that connects Kenya and Ethiopia as its workers, security

team vehicles and machinery came under heavy attack by armed militia. The Chinese firm said, their 14 workers had to flee from the site when they were conducting the hydro-geological survey as there was a sudden fire exchange between the two rival communities namely, Borana and Gabra. It is said that the rival groups during the fire exchanges used grenades and mortars. The clash left several people killed and vehicle burnt. After two weeks, the government deployed Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) to restore the normal situation, Marsabit County Commissioner Isaiah Nakoru said, "The road construction has resumed. The joint security operation had successfully flushed out militia out of the area, and they have now embarked on patrols." He also said the Kenyan government would continue to provide security to the Chinese company until they complete their work, and it will not accept a big project to stop due to the communal conflict (*Xinhua* 2013).

As Humprey (2013) observes, "If China is going to play a large investment role in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), it must be willing to play a security role, too." Chuka Enuke (2011) believes that the Chinese government is also expected to concern about their responsibility of global power, but its strategic and material interests are often entangled with African concerns. Chuka concludes that Beijing will be compelled to consider its national interests and protect its growing interests in Africa. Here, African peace and security become a greater concern to China.

The Nigerian Navy Captain Omatseye O'Weyinmi identifies prospects in China-Nigeria security cooperation. He suggested it can be expanded through enhancement of naval diplomacy and joint exercises, military personnel exchanges, sharing of expertise in Peace Support Operation (PSO), the establishment of partnership in the aviation, ordinance, shipbuilding/ maintenance industry and jointly establishing a satellite launching site in Nigeria. He suggests, both sides need to actualize the desired win-win relationship because the security cooperation between China-Nigeria is not yet developed. He appreciated the assistance of China to Nigeria in successfully launching of NIGCOMSAT-1R, a Nigerian communication satellite on 24 December 2011. David H. Shinn (2005) observes that China is supporting the Africa effort to prevent and combat

terrorism. It helped Africa in the adoption of a counter-terrorism convention and establishment of an anti-terrorism research centre.

#### ***3.4a Peacekeeping Operation (PKO): A tool for China-Africa Security Cooperation***

Lieutenant Colonel Philippe D. Rogers, U.S. Marine Corps (2007) observes that China policy documents such as China's Africa Policy and its Defense White paper mentions that the UN peacekeeping as one of its security cooperation tools. He quotes, "China will urge the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to pay attention to and help resolve regional conflicts in Africa" and "will continue its support to and participate in the UNPKO in Africa" as part of "Enhancing All-Round Cooperation between China and Africa." Juliette Genevag suggests that China claims that its participation in the UNPKO is part of the policy of South-South international aid.

Yasuhiro Matsuda finds, China opposed to the UNPKO in the 1950s and 1960s and called it as "the docile special detachments of the international gendarmerie of US imperialism." One of the reasons was during the Korean War, China supported the North Korea, and so it was in a state of war against the US and the other members of the UN forces. China before acquiring the rights of representation in the UN, it opposed all forms of the UNPKO and denouncing them as "invasion" by the UN or as "tools of UN neo-colonialism". Yasuhiro observes that the Chinese government's overall attitude began to change after China gets the representations in the UN replacing the Republic of China (ROC) in 1971. In the 1970s, China has maintained a softer protest against the UNPKO and continued to insist on respect for the principles of state sovereignty during the each of the three UN peacekeeping mission that took place in that period. Yasuhiro finds that China shifted towards support for the UN peacekeeping operation in the 1980s. Other reason can be China undergone a strategic adjustment in its foreign policy in the period from the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th CPCCC in December 1978 to the 12th National Congress of the CCP in September 1982. The major change was a greater openness to the outside world and began to join the international system and international forums at a faster rate. In November 1981, China adopted a more flexible position on United Nations Peacekeeping. In December that year, China requested the UN to accept payment of its share of Peacekeeping Operations as part of financial support to the UN Peacekeeping,

and it paid all amounts that were due since it joined the UN in 1971. In 1984, China proposed seven principles on the peacekeeping operation. In fact, the proposal of seven principles was a preparatory step for China to participate in the UN peacekeeping mission. Since China adhere to the principle of state sovereignty and non-interference, so it was difficult for China to join the UN peacekeeping operations. The recommendations of proposals will help China justify its participation in the UN peacekeeping mission, which it claimed earlier as the direct intervention of the state. In September 1988, China communicated the UN Special Committee of Peacekeeping operation its intention to contribute to UN peacekeeping and was accepted as the member of the committee. China's stand on the UN peacekeeping can be described as "firm ardent opposition in the 1970s to avid support in 2000s" (Wang 2013). Later on, China on the UN peacekeeping operation began to argue that any intervention can be legitimate on with the authorization of the UNSC, at the same time the host country's consent should be obtained for such intervention and also state sovereignty should be respected. The Chinese government describes its involvement in the peacekeeping operation in Africa as a relevant effort to help the continent obtain peace and security.

Theo Neethling suggests that with the beginning of the 21st Century there was a dramatic surge in China's peacekeeping participation which reinforced Beijing as a major global player in general and UN peacekeeping in particular. Theo observes that in early 2000, Beijing's increased participation in peacekeeping also coincided with its expansion of economic and diplomatic influence globally through its trade and diplomatic links. Theo Neethling suggests that China has emerged as a major contributor to UN peacekeeping operation in general and in Africa in particular, and it has direct relations with China's growing engagement and influence globally as well as to the fact that China is the largest trade partner of Africa. It will yield diplomatic benefits for China. Its participation in peacekeeping is an instrument of its public diplomacy which is aimed at depicting China's image as a responsible global power. The peacekeeping mission also helps China in confidence building measures with African governments and the AU. He finds that China's foreign policies have evolved from outright rejection of UN peacekeeping operation in the 1970s, to reluctant participation in the 1980s and at present to a prolonged involvement in peacekeeping operations.

China for the first time participated in the UN peacekeeping mission in 1989 in Namibia. It sent 20 non-military observers to join the UN Namibia Transitional Period Aid Group (UNTAG) overseeing a general election. After that, in the early 1990s, China sent a small number of peacekeepers in Africa such as Mozambique from 1993 to 1994, Liberia from 1993 to 1997, and Sierra Leone from 1998 to 1999. In 1998, the Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs put forward the "《建议选派民警参加联合国维和行动的请示》 / Opinion on the Selection of Civilian Police to Participate in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations", and after the approval of the senior leaders, the Ministry of Public Security has set up the "China Peacekeeping Civil Affairs Small Leading Group" i.e. the Foreign Affairs Department Peacekeeping Office. On 8 August 2000, approved by the Ministry of Public Security, China Peace and Civil Police Training Center was set up in the Armed Police Academy. On 14 March 2001, the Ministry of Public Security formally approved the establishment of the Department of Peacekeeping Training Department, also known as "China peacekeeping police training centre." It was responsible for the training of China's peacekeeping and civilian police before it was sent for the peacekeeping mission and also for the task of international peacekeeping police exchange training (Xinhua 2005). The Peacekeeping Police Training Center is responsible for the training of peacekeepers, peacekeeping police anti-riots team, police liaison officers, and foreign peacekeeping police. Before 1999, China's majority of military personnel in the UN peacekeeping mission were in the form of engineering, transport, and medical teams, but thereafter, it began to deploy civilian police. For instance, in the case of East Timor followed by Haiti, Liberia, South Sudan and Timor-Leste (Theo Neethling ).

In 2000, the PRC provided ten military observers to the UN peacekeeping mission along the Ethiopia-Eritrea border (Shinn: 2007). In 2001, for the first time, Bam Ki-moon appointed a Chinese General as the Commanding Officer of the peacekeeping operation in Western Sahara. In 2003, China significantly increased its contribution to the UN peacekeeping mission in Africa, and it provided 175 personnel engineering unit and 43 members medical unit to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In 2004, a small group of Chinese military observer was sent to Burundi and Cote d'Ivoire (Edgar

Agubamah 2014). In 2004, China contributed 837 peacekeepers participating in 7 UN peacekeeping missions in Africa (FOCAC 2004). In 2004, in Liberia alone, China sent 558 peacekeepers which included its engineering, transportation and medical teams as part of the UN peacekeeping mission. This team also includes 25 Chinese civilian police officers. In the same years, China provided three military observers to the UN peacekeeping mission in Burundi and Cote d'Ivoire (FOCAC 2004). In May 2005, the Chinese peacekeepers' teams within the UN peacekeeping mission in Liberia were awarded UN medals for their tasks in restoring peace and stability in Liberia (FOCAC 2005). On this occasion, He Meng, the 1st Secretary of the Chinese Embassy in Liberia stated that Abou Moussawas, the UN Secretary General Chief Representative in Liberia satisfied with the Chinese peacekeepers' tasks in Liberia. Lin Songtian, Chinese ambassador to Liberia, stated that "The Chinese government attaches great importance to the UN in maintaining world peace and is willing to participate actively in the peacekeeping operations of the UN with unremitting efforts" (FOCAC 2005). In April 2005, China replaced its 218 peacekeepers from the DRC. By April 2005, China had deployed 843 military personnel in eight different UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, and among them are 776 peacekeepers and 67 military observers (FOCAC 2005). David H. Shinn (2005) by the end of 2004, about 840 Chinese peacekeepers were deployed in seven UN missions in Africa. After that till 2005, the PLA has increased its participation in peacekeeping missions, and it has sent more than 6,500 peacekeepers to 13 UN peacekeeping missions in Burundi, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Haiti, Lebanon, Liberia, Kosovo, Cambodia, East Timor, Georgia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan. In March 2006, the Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing after his Africa visit said in a press meet that the Chinese peacekeeping troops had developed a harmonious relationship with the local citizens in Liberia and they played a positive role in maintaining the local peace and stability (FOCAC 2006). On 10 December 2006, the officials with Chinese Defense Ministry in charge of peacekeeping issue said, "The strict discipline, high quality and remarkable contribution of Chinese military officers and soldiers in their peacekeeping mission have left a deep impression on the international community and the local government and people" (FOCAC 2006). The official also said that the Chinese peacekeepers during their three years and four months of deployment in

Africa they have repaired 3,600 km of roads and 130 bridges, levelled 300,000 square meters of land, taken over and destroyed 80 guns and 5000 bullets and treated 1500 kilogrammes of explosives. In May 2007, Ambassador Liu Guijin, a special representative on Africa Affairs was appointed by the Chinese government, and he has worked vigorously and effectively for resolving the Darfur issue.

In 2006, China provided over 1600 personnel to the UN peacekeeping operation in Africa, and it was 70 percent of China's total peacekeepers (Scobell 2003). In 2006, during the FOCAC Summit and also at the UNSC meetings, the PRC pledged to increase its support for the peacekeeping operations and provided additional training and equipment to African peacekeeping forces (Scobell 2003). Later, China's support to the UN peacekeeping operation began to reflect in its policy document. For instance, China in its Defense White Paper 2008 stated that "It has consistently supported and actively participated in the peacekeeping operation with the spirit of the UN Charter (China National 2008). At the 4th Ministerial Conference of FOCAC in Egypt, China declared that it would continue to support and participate in the UN peacekeeping in Africa and it will cooperate with the African countries in research related to peacekeeping, peacekeeping training and exchanges, and assist in the building of peacekeeping capacity in Africa (FOCAC 2012).

In August 2008, a UN peacekeeping operation Civilian Police Training Center was established by the Chinese government that began to provide training for civilian police of various other Asian countries as well as China (Yasuhiro Matsuda). Yasuhiro concludes that following its suppression of the Tiananmen Square Protest China faced an international isolation and the UN peacekeeping was a good opportunity to use it as a tool to break that isolation. He suggests the national interests considerations were also the factors behind China began to participate in the UN peacekeeping operations. It helped the PLA boosting its capabilities, increased China's international influences, securing natural resources and other economic benefits in Africa. Edgar Agubamah (2014) has quoted from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) that said: "China peacekeepers are consistently rated among the most professional, well trained, effective and disciplined in the UN peacekeeping operation." In 2008, then UN Secretary

Ban Ki-Moon remarks before the students at the Beijing Foreign Affairs University, "Peacekeeping was an area where China stands tall". In 2007, before the visit of then Chinese President Hu Jintao to Liberia, its President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf appreciated and praised the works of the Chinese peacekeepers. He said "Liberia will never forget the friendship of Chinese peacekeeping soldiers (The Star: 2007).

**Table No 3.2: China's Participation in the UN Peacekeeping Mission in Africa**

Name of the UN Peacekeeping Mission	China's contribution
MNURSO-UN Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara sent in 1991	14 military observers
MONUC-UN Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) sent in April 2003	218 troops and 12 military observers
UNIFIL-UN International Forces in Lebanon sent in March 2006	392 soldiers
UNIOSIL-UN Integrated Officers in Sierra Leone (2006)	1 military observer
UNMEE-UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (July 2000)	Seven military observers
UNMIL-UN Mission in Liberia sent in November 2003	565 troops, 18 civilian police, 5 military observers (total-588)
UNMIS-UN Mission in Sudan (October 2005).	446 troops, 9 civilian police, 14 military observers (total-469)
UNOCI-UN Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (April 2004)	7 military observers.
African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in Sudan Darfur region (November 2007)	700 Chinese personnel
MINUSMA - The United Nations	China's fourth instalment of 395 troops



Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in Mali ( July 2013)	Integrated	of peacekeeping force to Mali, including a 155-member engineering unit, a 170-member security unit and a 70-member medical unit
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*Source:* UN Peacekeeping

Philippe D. Rogers (2007) suggests the UNPKO provides Chinese military to gain distant operational experience. The deployment of Chinese personnel helps them to gain share and learn the operational practices and methods of foreign military forces. He observes the Chinese soldiers also benefits in the areas of operational logistics, multilateral operations, combat and civil engineering. He emphasised that the experiences of deployment in foreign territory for an extended period are more useful and practical than conducting a joint military exercise in a foreign country. He points out that a Chinese Unit is being deployed multiple times to Africa means that a ready force of Africa is being built. The Chinese forces will get invaluable knowledge about logistics, ports, lines of operations, operational intelligence, lines of communication, local atmosphere and modus operandi, and means of sustaining forces in Africa over prolonged period. The UN mission in Africa will add to the tactical value to China, and it will enable the PLA to build an extensive knowledge base. Murray (2013) also believes that China's UN peacekeeping participation will provide important practical benefits for the PLA. The peacekeeping mission will help the PLA gain first-hand experiences in addressing unconventional threats in potentially hostile environments, and enable China to integrate itself into multi-lateral international operations. Rogers (2007) had earlier predicted that China will most probably send its soldier to UN mission globally, but would do so specifically with a keen eye on regions that “corresponds to its strategic vision”. He believes that the Chinese government will continue to regard peacekeeping as a valuable security instrument in Africa. China also provides funds as peacekeeping assistance to the AU's peacekeeping mission, for instance, it gave US\$ 300,000 to AU peacekeeping mission in Somalia in 2007 and another US\$400,000 in 2009 (China Monitor 2010).

In June 2009, China's Defense Ministry Thursday opened its first peacekeeping training centre in suburban Beijing. The Ministry's statement said, it is 16,000 square-meter

facilities built at the cost of 200 million Yuan (US\$29 million), and it will also serve as a venue for international exchanges in peacekeeping, including international conferences and training peacekeepers for other countries. There are 20 classrooms which include simulation rooms for shooting and driving, the centre will provide professional courses in peacekeeping missions and English language. It also offers training facilities for peacekeeping skills, including simulated UN peacekeeping camps and de-mining training grounds, as well as swimming and driving venues (China Daily 2009). According to the UN Department of Peacekeeping operation (2009), China increased its number of blue berets in the UN peacekeeping mission from less than 100 in 2000 to about 2000 in 2008. In 2010, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Affairs said, "We are extremely pleased with China's participation in the UN peacekeeping operation." From 1990 to 2010, China has contributed more than 16,000 personnel for the 12 UN peacekeeping missions in Africa (FOCAC 2010). In May 2010, He Yafei China's Ambassador to the UN Office in Geneva, stated that the Chinese government supports the conflict resolution efforts in the African countries. So far, it has been actively participated in mediating activities in various conflicts such as, Darfur, Sudan and other parts of the continent (FOCAC 2010). On 16 July 2010, Lieutenant General Babacar Gaye, Armed Force Commander of the UN Mission in the DRC has commented on the China's 11th peacekeeping engineering unit successful completion of the mission. He said, "Your team is one of the best and quickest in completing its tasks among all the troops deployed here" (FOCAC 2010). It is to be noted that China's 11th peacekeeping engineering unit is composed of 175 soldiers and officials from the Lanzhou Military Area Command.

By mid-2011, China provided 1,632 personnel which included 1,550 troops, 40 police, and 42 military experts to the six UN peacekeeping operations in Africa (Edgar Agubamah 2014). So far, among the China's larger number of peacekeepers in Africa are 564 troops, 18 police, two military experts in Liberia; 444 troops, 22 police, 12 military experts in South Sudan; 324 troops in Darfur; and 218 troops, 15 military experts in the DRC. Relatively smaller contributions are three military experts in Cote d'Ivoire and ten personnel in the Western Sahara. Edgar Agubaha (2014) observes that it is coincidental that China's peacekeeping participation is larger on the three Africa countries where it has or once had significant interests in natural resources such as oil in South Sudan and

Sudan; minerals in the DRC; and in the earlier period, hardwood timber in Liberia. By April 2013, China was named among the 15 top troop contributing nation in the world, and it has the highest number of troops contribution in the UN peacekeeping among the five permanent members of the UNSC (Theo Neethling ). Chuka Euka (2011) finds that China's peacekeepers in the UN peacekeeping operation are proportionately striking in Africa. During the first nine months of 2008, 77 percent of the total Chinese peacekeepers were in Africa. Qiang and Tian (2009) finds among the permanent members of the UNSC, China is the largest contributor of peacekeepers in the UN peacekeeping mission in Africa, and it accounts for 63 percent of the total UNSC permanent member's peacekeepers deployed in Africa. Among the total Chinese peacekeepers deployed in various UN peacekeeping missions around the world, 5 percent are military observers, 14 percent are police, and 81 percent are troops (Parenti 2009). The UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon visited Chinese peacekeeping troops in Lebanon in 2007 and 2009, and later he was quoted as saying, "I have seen the bravery of Chinese blue helmets in helping struggling communities around the world". David H. Shinn (2009) has summed up the story of China's peacekeeping mission in Africa as follows. In the early 1990s, China provided a small number of personnel to the UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, and in 2001, the number of Chinese military personnel increased significantly when it sent more than 200 troops to the DRC. By the end of April 2007, there were about more than 1,600 Chinese troops participating in six of the seven UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. As of 2009, he estimates that about 75 percent of the Chinese peacekeepers are in the African countries, and the larger units of the Chinese peacekeepers are in the DRC, Darfur, southern Sudan and Liberia. He finds three explanations for China's involvement in peacekeeping.

- It contributes to the peace and security and projects China's image as the promoter of a "harmonious society" to balance western influence.
- It helps the PLA to gain experience in non-combat mission in the foreign country.
- It will help the Chinese security forces and the PLA in improving their responsiveness, riot-control capabilities, non-combat abilities, coordination of military emergency command system.

In the case of the UN peacekeeping mission in Africa, the troop component is about 91 percent. Shen Zhixiong (2015) suggests that China contributes the highest number of troops and police in the UN peacekeeping among all the UNSC permanent members. Shen also notes, among all 115 contributing countries in the UN peacekeeping operations, China provides the highest number of peacekeepers for the engineering, transportation, and medical support. Shen Zhixiong (2015) quotes, "Chinese peacekeepers are consistently rated among the most professional, well-trained, effective and disciplined contingents in UN peacekeeping operations". Shen writes as "Chinese peacekeepers are well accepted and have participated in improving local populations in Africa". And "over the past 22 years, Chinese peacekeepers have built and repaired over 10,000 km of roads and 284 bridges, cleared over 9,000 mines and various types of unexploded ordnance (UXO), transported over one million tons of cargo across a total distance of 11 million km and treated 120,000 patients", majority of the China's peacekeeping works are accomplished in Africa.

According to the Department of Peacekeeping Operation (2013), in December 2013, China contributed 2078 military personnel in nine peacekeeping missions in Northern Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and Cyprus. China for the first time deployed its combat troops in the UN Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) following the collapse of the state in the north as the radical Islamic armed forces initiated a series of attacks against the government forces. A team of 135 members of the Chinese peacekeeping force left for Mali, which was composed of 35 engineers, 65 medical workers and 35 soldiers (FOCAC 2013). At that time, the Chinese Defense Ministry Spokesman said, "The Chinese peacekeepers will abide by the UN peacekeeping regulations and play a constructive role in safeguarding peace and stability in Mali and the region as a whole."

On 17 December 2013, 105 members squad which was composed of engineers, guards and medical staff from the PLA Jinan Military Area Command was sent to Sudan as the first squad of the 9th peacekeeping contingent assigned for eight months UN peacekeeping operations (FOCAC 2013). All the 105 members of the squad were conducted drills and exercises at a Beijing training centre in June before their departure.

A statement from the Ministry of Defense (MoD) of the PRC said, "On the other hand, it is also a great opportunity to stay in touch with other armies, and to gain good experiences from other troops." In 2013, the UN Peacekeeping Chief Herve Ladsous said, "I am very happy to see China contribute to the peacekeeping mission in Mali. Besides the engineering and medical crew, the troops to Mali also include security forces. It is also a big step for China in UN peacekeeping mission." It is to be noted that the Chinese troops deployed in Mali are equipped with Chinese designed and manufactured military equipment which is unlike the previous mission. The Defense Ministry also said that in the next year's probably more Chinese service personnel are expected to be deployed in Mali which will increase their numbers to 400 (FOCAC 2013). The Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi admitted that this marked a shift in Beijing's foreign policy and China had to align its foreign policy with its expanding global interests when it decided to commit combat troops to the UN peacekeeping in Mali (Hille 2013; Murray 2013). But before this, since 2011 elite Chinese combat troops were also spotted in South Sudan. Chen Jian, Head of the UN Association of China, a China-based think tank, stated that "This is a breakthrough in our participation in the UN peacekeeping, and with this, our participation will be complete. We will have policemen, medical forces, engineering troops and combat troops" (Hille 2013). In 2013, the number of the Chinese peacekeepers in the UN peacekeeping operation was 15 times that of its number in 2000 (Murray 2013). By December 2013, there were about 2,078 Chinese peacekeepers in nine different UN peacekeeping missions, which included 174 police officers, 39 military experts, and 1805 military troops. By 2013, China became the sixth largest contributor to the UN peacekeeping budget. The major portion of China's peacekeepers are deployed in Africa, and specifically in Darfur, Mali, Western Sahara, South Sudan, Cote d'Ivoire, the DRC, and Liberia. Albert Gerard "Bert" Koenders, the UN Special Representative for Mali remarks on China's role in the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali in August 2013. He said, "The UN Secretary General said that China and its peacekeeping role in Mali were very important, but now I would have to say, China's important work has exceeded expectations."

China's participation in the UN peacekeeping operations in Africa serves its national interest which is linked to China's rise. We have seen there are many aspects of the UN

peacekeeping operations in Africa including the political, economic and military. The China's participation in the UN peacekeeping mission as part of its soft power policy. Chinese troops deployed in African countries promote China's people to people diplomacy and that factor in their diplomatic relations. China's economic interests in Africa are increasing rapidly which certainly requires security. In 2012, China's accumulative direct investment in Africa increased from US\$9.33 billion to US\$21.23 billion, 2.3 times the 2009 figure. The UN peacekeeping mission provided an opportunity to China in 2013 to deploy its combat troops in Mali. Though most of the Chinese peacekeepers sent for peacekeeping operations are trained soldiers belonging to its military regions. The presence of the Chinese troops in Africa for a long duration will provide a first-hand experience for them. One aspect is the Chinese military personnel in the UN peacekeeping operation deployed in Africa are given the tasks of establishing peace and stability in the region, which is significant for the Chinese government for the security of its business stakes as well as its citizens living there. Secondly, the Chinese Units deployed in the continent repeatedly for longer durations will help the PLA in collecting first-hand information related to defence and security, which can certainly be useful in the future. For instance, in the case of any forms of insurgency that can challenge its security in Africa, the Chinese government can intervene through the UN peacekeeping operation to secure its stakes. China's regular participation in large numbers of military personnel will help the PLA to build a stronger team of force having expertise in the African continent. China's major interests i.e. the trade and citizens can be given security only through its defence channel. In future, China will have to strengthen its defense cooperation with the African countries further to ensure its security. The peacekeeping operations give an opportunity for the Chinese soldiers or officers to interact with the African military, which helps in confidence building measures.

China's participation in the UN peacekeeping mission in Africa helps in China's maximalist interests and its rise in the international system. China's participation in peacekeeping mission serves its soft power policy as well as military hard power policy. Chinese peacekeepers are acknowledged as one of the most professional and disciplined peacekeepers participating in the UNPKO. Chinese peacekeepers contribution in Africa improves China's image and status regionally as well as globally. Secondly, it also

projects China's military might to a lesser extent. Chinese troops in Africa gains valuable information and experiences of geopolitical and military strategy in Africa.

### **3.4b *Security of Chinese Citizens in Africa***

During the Mao era, an estimated 150,000 Chinese workers and technicians were sent to Africa for the agriculture, technology and infrastructure projects, which was part of the Chinese government to foster diplomatic relations with newly independent African countries (Park 2009). Since the establishment of the PRC, the Chinese people have been going to Africa for various government level cooperation projects (Amanar & Chichava 2016). The trend of the Chinese moving to Africa independently only began with the start of the 21st Century (Fielding 2015). In the recent years, the Chinese migration to Ethiopia and Ghana increased significantly. The Chinese enterprises have begun to invest heavily in these two states in the fields of mining, construction, hydropower, electricity, railroad, telecommunication, manufacturing and other sectors. In the case of Ghana, originally in the 1940s, the Chinese people began its migration to the African state, but they were generally from Hong Kong. In the 1980s, the Chinese from the mainland began to migrate to Ghana. In the 1960s, the Chinese government used to send an official contingent for a shorter duration, for instance in 1964 a team of military advisors were sent to Ghana. In the 1966 coup, the Nkrumah's government was overthrown, and the new government expelled 430 Chinese citizens including three intelligence officers and thirteen guerrilla warfare experts. In the 1990s, the number of independent businessman increased and most of them was import-export businesses or restaurants. After the Chinese government promulgated the going out strategy in 1999, the outward flow of its companies, as well as people, increased drastically. The business communities of Ghana are often seen protesting against the influx of Chinese traders selling imported good, for instance, in late 2007, in Accra the local traders protested against Chinese as they were not qualified for trading.

In Ghana several cases have been met, where it is seen that the Chinese people complain about arbitrary treatment by the local police in Ghana. For example in February 2009, about hundred Chinese citizens were arrested in a day by the Ghanaian Immigration Department, and allegedly without any pretext. In the recent years, the number of cases

of Chinese people involved in illegal gold mining in Ghana has significantly increased. In 2013, the Ghanaian government claimed that more than 4500 Chinese were repatriated allegedly for their involvement in illegal gold mining (The Guardian 2013).

At this incident, Alhaji Inusah Fuseini, Ghana's minister of lands and mines stated "Of late we have seen a tightening of the visa regime at the Chinese embassy for Ghanaians. We don't know whether this is a manifestation of our actions to deport illegal Chinese gold miners. It is a matter of concern. Relations between China and Ghana go back a long way, and they had been on the rise until we started the expulsion of foreigners from our illegal mining sites. We didn't think China would take it to this extent." The Ghanaian government has also claimed that following this incident China in retaliation has delayed Ghana's access to a \$3 Billion loan facility previously agreed with China. But the Chinese government quickly refuted such allegations. Fuseini, Ghana's Mines Minister, stated that "This illegal gold mining was compromising the environment. It was compromising the security of this country. It had a lot of social consequences, and the government was losing a lot of resource revenue. The Chinese were just plundering the resources. So what we have done is take action to stop the plunder and ensure that the resource needs of this country are not any way depleted in ways that break resource revenue of the state."

According to the Ethiopian Embassy in Beijing, there are about 35,000-40,000 Chinese citizens living in Ethiopia. In Ghana, it is estimated that there are about 7,000-20,000 Chinese migrants (Mohal et.al 2014). Etienne Girouard (2008) writes that in 2007 the Chinese oil companies were attacked by the rebel groups in Africa, and an anti-Chinese xenophobia is emerging in the African countries like Zambia, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. The case of violence against the Chinese people makes difficult for the Chinese government to maintain its non-interference policy, such claim was made by China during the attack on Chinese employee of Chinese oil companies set up in the Niger Delta in Nigeria (Dijk 2009). David H. Shinn (2009) has commented on the issue of criminal attacks on the Chinese nationals in Africa. He noticed that in the recent past several years the Chinese nationals and installations presence is growing in or near African conflict zones. He observes the Chinese in recent years are willing to take greater risks than western companies to pursue their commercial interests in the continent.



He has described an incident which occurred in 2007 in the Somali-inhabited Ogaden region in southeastern Ethiopia. A Chinese base camp which was set up for gas exploration was attacked by rebel forces and killed nine Chinese citizens and kidnapped some others. The Greatwall Drilling Company (GWDC), a subsidiary of China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) set up an oil exploration facility near Darfur region in Sudan in 2007, but after several months it was attacked by a rebel group. In Sudan in 2008, the China National Petroleum Corporation oil exploration facility was attacked by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), a Darfur rebel group resulting in the kidnapping of nine Chinese citizens. It was reported that four of them were killed, four were rescued, and one remained missing. Shinn (2009) suggests that China usually paid a ransom to the rebel groups for the release of its kidnapped citizens. Similarly, in 2007, Tuareg rebel in Niger kidnapped a Chinese uranium executive and later on released him as a warning to China for signing an unacceptable agreement with the Niger government.

According to Yoon Jung Park (2016), suggests that there are about one million or so Chinese in Africa, and one-third or more of them are temporary labour migrants. These labours are working mostly under the Chinese companies on fixed term contract of about 1-3 years. For instance, 95 percent of the Chinese migrants in Zambia are labours (Postel 2015). Park finds that among the one million Chinese in Africa one-half to two-thirds are independent and typically unskilled migrants. The majority of the Chinese migrants in Africa are male and includes educated, uneducated, peasants, professionals.

With the increasing number of Chinese migrants in Africa, the responsibility of the Chinese government is becoming even tougher to safeguard their security in the continent. For instance, a large number of Chinese people were living in Libya, but soon after the escalation of Libyan Civil War in 2011, the Chinese government took the responsibility of ensuring their security and evacuated 35,860 Chinese citizens from Libya by March 2011 (Xinhua 2011). Song Tao, then Chinese vice Foreign Minister declared that among the total Chinese people evacuated from Libya, 20,745 are already returned to China. He added that since 1949, it was China's largest and the most complicated evacuation. The PLA Navy and Air Force were engaged by the Chinese government in their unprecedented evacuation process in Libya. The evacuations were carried out using

airways, roadways, railways and waterways transportation which involved chartered planes, hired ocean liners and coaches. In the evacuation process, China also helped 12 countries to evacuate their 2,100 citizens.

It is to be noted that during the evacuation process in Libya 1,700 Chinese citizens were temporarily stationed in Khartoum of Sudan. It reflects the Chinese government progress in its efforts to ensure security in Africa for its national interests. The other countries that assisted China in transportation and providing temporary shelter in the evacuation process were Jordan, Egypt, Malta, Turkey, and Greece. Ananth Krishnan (2011) writes in the Indian newspaper *The Hindu* that the evacuation in Libya reflects China's growing comprehensive national strength and rising naval capabilities. He highlights the key role played by the People's Liberation Army's Navy (PLAN) in directing the rescue effort. He noted that the Chinese ships sent for the evacuation mission were accompanied by the PLAN missile frigate, Xuzhou to safeguard their protection. He points out that this is the first instance that PLAN has deployed a combat vessel in noncombatant evacuation operations. The *China Daily* stated that "The Chinese government was among the first group of nations to evacuate its nationals from Libya". It is worth noting what the *China Daily* stated, "This is the first time the Chinese navy has participated in such a mission. It once again proves the People's Liberation Army is a reliable force safeguarding the safety of all Chinese people, be they at home or overseas. The country's growing comprehensive national strength has provided a strong backing to such a massive operation overseas."

On 6 December 2011, Lu Shaye, Secretary General of Chinese Follow-up Committee of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and Director-General of the Department of African Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in a press meet speaks about China's defence and security relationship with Africa. Lu said a large number of Chinese commercial projects were going on in Libya before the war, but after the outbreak of the war, the Chinese government initiated the evacuation mission for its citizens in Libya. Lu claimed that the evacuation mission evacuated more than 30,000 Chinese citizens. Lu added that the PRC is willing to contribute to China's peace and security. Lu also highlights that China will respect the leading roles of the Africa countries and regional organisation whenever China is invited in any regional conflicts in

the continent. From 24 to 27 April 2012, Angola's Minister of Interior Sebastiao Martins visited China and met and held talks with State Councilor and Minister of Public Security Meng Jianzhu and Vice Minister of Public Security Meng Hongwei respectively. The two sides signed a cooperation agreement on safeguarding public security and social order between the Ministry of Public Security of the PRC and the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Angola (China's Foreign Policy 2013) .

### **3.4c *China's anti-piracy operations in Africa***

In December 2008, the UNSC adopted resolutions calling on the international community to fight against the Somali pirates. Niu Song (2016) writes Chinese, and the other naval fleets are authorised by the UN and the Somali transitional government to combat Somali piracy. On 23 December 2008, the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei said at the Ministerial Meeting of the UNSC on Somali piracy that China "seriously considering" naval escorting operations in Somali waters shortly to fight against rampant piracy there (FOCAC 2008). He stated, "China welcomes international cooperation in the fight against piracy off the coast of Somalia and supports the efforts of relevant countries to send warships to the region to crack down on pirates by international law and Security Council resolution." On behalf of the Chinese government, he read out the four-point proposals on fighting Somali piracy.

- It is crucial to allow the UN, especially the Security Council, to play its core role in maintaining world peace and security and effectively coordinates responses and actions from all the countries concerned.
- In its fight against piracy, the international community should strictly abide by international law and Security Council resolutions.
- Formulate and integrate its strategy and working towards a comprehensive resolution to the Somali issue by making concerted efforts in the political, military, economic, diplomatic and judicial fields.
- Help Somalia strengthen its capacity by building and carry out regional cooperation (FOCAC 2008).

The Chinese government has sent five rounds of escort warship fleets to Somali waters. Niu quotes The Guardian, "a deployment to join international force in biggest naval operation by China in more than 600 years," and said, "the move marks a major shift in naval policy and would be China's first active deployment outside the Pacific region," because China's "growing wealth and economic interests around the world have led to argument inside and outside China that it should play a greater role on the world stage." Niu finds that the Somali pirate poses security threats to China's and other countries ships passing through the Somali waters, and the threat is most direct motivation for the Chinese cross-border attacks against Somali pirates. The waterways along the Somali waters are significant for China's export to Europe and the Middle East, which are China's overseas and strategic interests.

On 18 December 2008, Liu Jianchao Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said, every day about 3-4 ships passes through this route and this year, from January to November, a total of about 1,265 ships have passed, and about 20 percent of them have faced the attacks of the Somali pirates. Liu pointed out, in 2008, seven hijacking cases took place in this route involving China. In two separate incidents, two Chinese ships were hijacked along with 42 crew members. In other five incidents, there was Chinese crew along with cargo in foreign ships were hijacked. A fishing boat and eight crew members have not yet released by the pirates. Liu suggests, the Chinese escort fleets focus only on the peaceful convoy and the expulsion of pirate involving only the defensive strikes. It actions includes only the air and maritime attacks, and the escort fleets involve helicopters and guided missile destroyers. Liu finds, China has not given any indication of using the ground attack against the Somali pirates due to its consideration of geopolitics and national strength. Liu identifies two main features of the Chinese escort fleets in Somali waters:

- China's military escort activities are limited only to the Somali exclusive economic zone and its airspace. In the Somali Constitution, this area is considered its territorial waters and airspace.
- China does not take the initiative to attack but undertakes defensive attacks against Somali pirates with the use of light weaponry.

The other major issue of the Chinese military escort in Somali waters is the limitation in its capabilities of landing operations and logistics supports. In 2009 a Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia was set up, China took an active part in the meetings of the group and enhanced anti-piracy cooperation with other countries, including neighbouring countries of Somalia (China's Foreign Policy 2010) . On 19 October 2009, the cargo ship Dexinhai owned by Qingdao Ocean Shipping Company and 25 Chinese crew members abroad were hijacked by Somali pirates off the east coast of the Seychelles. With the efforts of various sides, the cargo ship Dexinhai and 25 member Chinese crew were rescued on 28 December 2009 (China's Foreign Policy 2010) . On 31 December 2009, the Chinese Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo said that "by the end of 2010, it is necessary to find some logistics supply stations in nearby places to provide logistics support, such as drinking water, diet, and even the maintenance of warships, for Chinese naval escorts. The neighbouring countries have welcomed it because it will bring opportunities for local consumption and promote the exchange of peace." On 4 March 2010, regarding the issue of China's logistic support, he stated that China is thinking of logistic supply bases are "Aden in Yemen and Djibouti are the main consideration; Pakistan is too far away." On 18 March 2010, Professor Liu Zhongmin, an expert on the Middle East and marine studies said in an interview with *The Global Times*, "Planning overseas bases has become China's current problems that cannot be avoided. China should articulate its plans on overseas bases and actively carry out public diplomacy to address the concerns of the world and neighbouring countries. China should make the international community understand that the establishment of overseas bases is based on China's interests and needs of the international commitment." David H. Shinn (2009) observed that as of 2008, about 20 percent of the total 1,265 Chinese ships came under the threat from Somali pirates while passing through the Gulf of Aden. He finds that in 2009, China deployed two destroyers and a supply ship in the Gulf of Aden. The escort fleet consists of about 800 crew members and seventy special operations troops. He concludes that the Chinese naval contingent has performed well and coordinated effectively with other navies in the region. The escort mission in the Gulf of Aden gives significant experiences to the PLA Navy and projects China's power in an area that is important to its trade. By the end of 2011, China has dispatched ten escort fleets and had successfully escorted 4,383 Chinese

and foreign vessels (China's Foreign Policy 2013) . By the end of 2012, China had sent 13 fleets which escorted over 5,000 Chinese and foreign vessels (China's Foreign Policy 2013) . According to Shen Zhixiong (2015) as of December 2012, the Chinese escort fleet has protected 2,455 foreign ships which account for 49 percent of the total ships escorted in the Gulf of Aden.

On 9 May 2011, China's 7th naval escort fleet consists of two missile frigates returned to China accomplishing escort mission in Somali waters. On 2 November 2010, this escort fleet was sent to the Gulf of Aden for anti-piracy operations. The fleet also visited Tanzania, South Africa, and Seychelles. The two Chinese frigates namely, Zhoushan and Xuzhou in the 189 days long mission escorted 578 vessels and protected them from pirates in the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters. This fleet also escorted the ships involved in the evacuation operation in Libya. During its mission, the team rescued one ship from on board pirate attack and another nine from pirate pursuits. Soon after its return, the Chinese government order the 8th naval escort fleet along with the supply ship, the Qingdaohu, which was previously with the 7th fleet for the escort mission in the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters (FOCAC 2011). On 1 December 2011, the Chinese Defense Ministry Spokesperson Geng Yansheng stated in the regular press meet, "China will continue to dispatch naval escort squads to the Gulf of Aden and Somali water. China will further boost cooperation with international escort mission by the spirit of UNSC." He said, China in the last three years since December 2008 has made a great contribution in maintaining national interests and world peace by dispatching its convoy fleet to the Gulf of Aden and the Somali waters. He said, "China has sent 25 fleets, 22 helicopters, 700 special operators, and more than 8000 officers and soldiers to this area, and has escorted more than 4,300 domestic and foreign vessels to date." He added that the Chinese fleet had escorted 50 vessels of the United Nations World Food Programme in four different occasions. He said, "China has complied with its international duties and contributed to stability in the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters, effectively protecting the security of domestic and foreign vessels and sailors" (FOCAC 2011).

China's participation in anti-piracy missions in Somali waters will be beneficial for the PLA Navy in many aspects. Secondly, it will add to increase China's political and

military influence in the African region. China's participation in antipiracy operations enables the Chinese government to ensure security of commercial interests. The strengthening of China's security adds to China's rise in the international system, and also in attaining its maximalist interests.

### **3.5 Conclusions**

Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949, a gradual trend of the Chinese military engagement was seen in Africa. China's military involvement was generally in the form of its unconditional support for revolutionary and independence movements in Africa against the imperial and colonial powers. The major shift in China-Africa defence engagement was seen after China's *Reforms & Opening Up* policy in 1978. Now, China adjusted its scope, objectives, scale, and means of military assistance to the continent, and there was a decline in China's military assistance to liberation movements in Africa. Under the leadership of Jiang Zemin, there was a major change in China's overall military diplomacy. Since 1996, China's high-level military visits and exchanges increased with greater emphasis on expansion of its military diplomacy. Besides, in the 1990s China began to change its position on United Nations Peacekeeping operations from unwilling participation to responsible contribution. From 2000 onwards, witnessed the further development of China's military diplomacy in Africa with closer cooperation in security affairs and more diversified exchanges. China-Africa Defense engagement became more prominent with the declaration that "China will promote high-level military exchanges between the two sides and actively carry out military related technological exchanges and cooperation," in its China's Africa Policy-2006. It also said that China would support the defence and army building of African countries and help train African military personnel to strengthen their security. Later it became more clear with the release of China's Defense White Paper 2008 which said,

"The PLA develops cooperative military relations with other countries that are non-aligned, non-confrontational and not directed against any third party, and engages in various forms of military exchanges and cooperation to create a military security environment featuring mutual trust and mutual benefits."

China-Africa Defense Cooperation is in the forms of military visits & exchanges, military training, and warships visits. Arms deals have been on the aspects of Sino-Africa Defense Cooperation. China gains significant African allies in the UN through arms sales and military relationship for its political goals, for example, Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Nigeria. Chinese made arms are cheaper compared to the competitors in the continent, and it is a big market which is highly profitable and helps in the growth of the Chinese defence industry. The regular demand of arms in Africa is largely because of frequent and perpetual unrest or turmoil in the region. Igor Pejic (2016) estimates that in 2003, Chinese generated revenue of more than US\$1.3 billion from African market. Judith Van de Looy (2006) says, "Selling arms to some African countries leaders improves the bilateral relationship and can enhance Chinese access to oil and natural resources". Military visits & exchanges have become an important component of China-Africa defence relations. Since the late 1990s, the frequency of military leaders visit begun to increase, and from 2000 onwards the high-level military visits from the Chinese side began to increase gradually till 2010, and from 2011 to 2013, the high-level visits from the Chinese side declined drastically to merely one in 2013. Similarly, even from the African side, the high-level military visits from 2000 increased gradually and remained in similar pattern till 2010, and then there was a slight decline in the number of high-level visits till 2013. In 2007, the high-level military visits were highest from African as well as the Chinese side. Apart from the visits, the significant development worth noting is that since the late 2000s, the Chinese frigates sent for the anti-piracy or escort mission in the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters usually visits the Port of Djibouti for replenishment or emergency maintenance. These two Chinese frigates had also paid good-will visits to South Africa and Seychelles in 2011. There are very rare joint military exercises between China and Africa. Djibouti is significant for Chinese PLA Navy because of its geopolitical significance in the region, so the engagements between the two navies are frequent.

China-Africa Security relations became prominent only with the expansion China's economic engagement in Africa. For the first time China officially proposes for security in China-Africa relations, in the Follow-up Actions of the Second Ministerial Conference of the FOCAC, when it was reported that by the end of July 2004, China and Africa have



further enhanced their cooperation in the fields of peace and security (FOCAC 2004). The FOCAC Summits became a major platform for China to push forward its security interests in the continent. In the FOCAC Summit-Addis Ababa Action Plan (2004-2006), it was mentioned that the non-traditional security issues such as terrorism, drugs trafficking, small arms smuggling, transnational economic crimes, illegal migration and natural disasters had become new variables affecting international and regional security (FOCAC 2004).

Later, the Chinese Government has added the component of 'peace and security' in the China's Africa Policy -2006. The various aspects of this component are military cooperation; conflict settlement and peacekeeping operation; judicial and police cooperation; and non-traditional security areas. The document says, China will assist to train the African military personnel and support defence and army building of the African countries for their security. The basic forms of China's security engagement in the continent are the UNPKO, anti-piracy mission and security of its citizen in Africa. China's participation in the UNPKO is part of its public diplomacy or soft power. The UNPKO provide opportunities for the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) to boost its capabilities in many aspects of military other than combat. The Chinese PLA can project its strength and power in the region which will certainly enhance China's political and military influence. Undoubtedly, China peacekeepers are consistently rated among the most professional, well trained, effective and disciplined in the UN peacekeeping operation. Chinese soldiers also benefit in the areas of operational logistics, multilateral operations and civil engineering. The Chinese forces will get invaluable knowledge about logistics, ports, lines of operations, operational intelligence, lines of communication, local atmosphere and modus operandi, and means of sustaining forces in Africa over prolonged period. The UN mission in Africa will add to the tactical value to China, and it will enable the PLA to build an extensive knowledge base.

Security of the Chinese citizens in Africa is a major concern of the Chinese government. The number of Chinese nationals on the continent is increasing significantly with the expansion of trade between China and Africa. The security issues related to citizens are ill-treatment and attack by the local; burglary by local petty thieves; kidnapping or

killings by militia or rebel groups; Chinese citizens involved in criminal activities such as gold mining, illegal ivory smuggling, etc. One of the reasons for the attacks on Chinese by the local Africans is that in the recent few years, the Chinese businessman or employee residing in Africa has become a major competitor to the local African. An anti-Chinese xenophobia is emerging in the African countries like Zambia, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe and South Africa.

China began to participate in anti-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali waters to provide security of its ships against the rampant rise of attacks by the Somalia pirates in the region. China's participation in the UN led anti-piracy operations provides an opportunity to the Chinese PLA Navy to enhance its military capabilities as well as political influences through its military strength and power projection.

China intervenes in the conflict or crisis, whenever its investment and citizens are at risk. In the recent past several years, China's role as a mediator has significantly increased in any political turmoil or conflict in any region of Africa. It has been seen that now the Chinese Government do take a position on any forms of crisis in Africa, and at the same time, it also give its suggestions or acts as a mediator in resolving the crisis. We have seen China often raises its concerns over the Africa's peace and security situation at the UN. With the growing Chinese interests in the Continent, the Chinese government obvious concern for Africa's security has also been raised.

China supports the country's ruling government in any forms of turmoil escalates in that country. At the same time, the Chinese government is very cautious to check its citizens' involvement in criminal activities in Africa, and usually, the Chinese embassy of the respective country is responsible for this task. Whenever any Chinese led economic project or enterprises or employee is under attack by militia or the rebel group of the African country, the Chinese government negotiates directly with the respective government of that country and most of the time creates pressure on the government to resolve the crisis as soon as possible to resume the project. The government mobilises its national military to stabilise the crisis to bring normalcy.

China began to follow the policy of soft power in China-Africa Defence and Security relations after the mid-2000s, and it began to participate actively in the US led peace process in Africa without considering its previous ardent policy of non-interference. Previously, China overlooked the humanitarian crisis in Africa and often supported the African regimes responsible for the crisis. The gradual rising of China's security concerns in Africa compelled its government to adopt soft power policy towards the continent. China began to motivate the ruling African regimes to resolve the internal political crisis with the rebel groups through peace talks and negotiation and at the same time enticed and attracted the respective Africa country's government towards the Chinese infrastructure investment projects.

Reflections of New Strategic Partnership were seen in the China-Africa Defense and Security relations (1996-2013). The three main connotations of China-Africa new type of strategic partnership were prevalent in the ties from 1996 to 2013.

- First, on political aspects, the mutual trust between China and Africa strengthened unprecedentedly, but on equality aspects, African countries have compromised in their defence and security relations with China in the given period. China often has greater priorities in its security relations with the African counterpart, and most of the time the Chinese government had pressurised the African side in their terms against any forms of security challenges emerged in that respective country.
- Second, China-Africa defence and security relations in the given period have followed the economic win-win cooperation, and no doubt, the Africa and its people have benefitted economically because of large scale Chinese investment in African infrastructure. China's security in Africa was prerequisite conditions for major economic cooperation between the two sides. The strengthening of mutual trust between the Chinese and the African leaders due to their military cooperation often led to economic benefits limited largely to the respective African leaders and their regime.
- Third, the China-Africa Defence and Security relations provided a platform for both sides for cultural exchanges and mutual learning through China's participation in UN peacekeeping operations.

China did follow a Realist approach in its defence and security engagements with Africa in the given period. China gains power in Africa to ensure greater security of its core interests in the continent, and it creates strong incentives for the states to seek opportunities to gain power at the expense of competitors.

China's defence and security engagements with Africa do have the components of capitalism, globalisation and Chinese cultural influences in the continent, but so far China has not established a direct political or military control over the African region, and therefore, it is too early to speculate that China is practising neocolonialism in Africa.

The independent variables Chinese economic interests, political trust, security, and Africa have been affecting the dependable variable China. The intervening variable Chinese policy to Africa has been changing and had a causal impact on dependent as well as independent variables of the research. China's core interests in Africa are an economic expansion, strengthening mutual political trust, security of the Chinese investments, enterprises and its nationals in the continent, and finally, since 1996, so far, there are many positive impacts of China-Africa Defence & Security relations on African as well as Africa. China-Africa Defence relations have enhanced and deepened the political trust between the Chinese government and many African country's governments. The deepening of political understanding and mutual trust has enabled a suitable condition in securing China's economic expansion in the continent. China-Africa security relations have positive outcomes on China's security concerns in the continent, and the Chinese government repeated attempt to provide security and safety of Chinese investment and its national by pressurising the respective African country's government had reduced the instability and political crisis or disputes in Africa. China's Defence and Security engagements with Africa has certainly improved the scenario of peace and stability in the continent, for which the African people have been longing since decades due to frequent and perpetual political conflicts in the region.

China-Africa Defence and Security relations (1996-2013) have helped China's rise in the international system. Since 1995, Africa's oil supply had been a prime reason for China's manufacturing led development. From 1996 to 2013, is a significant phase for the Chinese economy, and it achieved an unprecedented growth and expansion largely due to

uninterrupted oil supply from the continent. China's military cooperation and assistance to several regimes in Africa helped the Chinese leaders to secure oil fields projects in the continent. China's economic rise made it a major global player in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century and also a major participant in the international institutions. China's involvement in the Africa's peace and stability process in particular during the Darfur crisis to address its security challenges in the continent provides the Chinese government and its leaders a major platform to interact and work with the United Nations as a responsible global power.

China's participation in the UNPKO and anti-piracy missions has strengthen its security in Africa. The security of the Chinese interests in Africa is the precondition for its political and economic expansion in the continent. An enhanced security of China in Africa will lead to its rise in the international system and, it will also set the ground for China's maximalists interests in the continent. Strengthening of security also suggests rise in the Chinese political influences in the region. Rising political influences may serve Chinese interests in various ways. It may pave a path for China to be a dominant power in the continent.

## CHAPTER IV

### Case Study-China-Sudan Relations: Political, Defense & Security Aspects, 1996-2013

#### 4.1 Introduction

In the last five decades, the China-Sudan relations have evolved in many aspects, in particular, the economic aspect. The political relations are the prerequisite condition for their ever deepening bilateral economic co-operation. So the Sino-Sudan political relations have evolved according to Chinese economic interest, specifically the oil supply. Later on, with the expansion of Chinese investment and enterprises in Sudan, its security became a major concern for the Chinese government. Therefore, Sino-Sudan security relations emerged as a relatively new area in their bilateral relations. The defence cooperation is largely limited to arms sales, which fulfils the economic development of the Chinese defence industry. Sudan is one of the major African trade partners of China, and there has been a deep political understanding between the leaders of both sides. In the case of Sino-Sudan relations, one can observe that the Chinese foreign policy has been transformed to adapt to the changing situation in Sudan and its implication globally. General trends of Sino-Sudan relations in the last five decades can be summarised as follows. A Strong political relation developed in the early years of their establishment in the late 1950s and 1960s. It was largely due to the ideological affinity promoted their bilateral relation which was pro liberation struggle against the imperial and colonial powers of the West. In the late 1970s, China began to focus on its domestic economic development and there were less engagement and subsequent reduction in aid and assistance to Africa. After 1989, Sudan and China emerged as global partners because both were alienated and isolated in the international system. After the mid-1990s, China began oil imports from Sudan and subsequently became a major trade partner. In the early 2000s, with the rising political unrest and crisis in Sudan, primarily Darfur, Chinese security challenges for its investment, business contracts, enterprises and its nationals in Sudan also became prominent. Not nly this, China as a rising global economic and

political power was made to realise its responsibilities and duties to participate in the global efforts to stop humanitarian crisis in Darfur. In the late 2000s, despite Khartoum's political and military support China faced serious serious security challenges in southern Sudan. Consequently, China readjusted and reformulated its policy of non-interference and began to participate in the UN peacekeeping operations in Darfur with the consent of the Sudanese government.

The Chinese government supported the independence of South Sudan through referendum and strongly persuaded the Khartoum for it. In 2011, South Sudan was established as a new independent state and China was among the first states to recognise and establish diplomatic relations. China's foreign policy in Sudan was readjusted time and again to maintain and safeguard its economic interests in the country. Initially, China supported strongly to Sudanese regime against the rebel groups in southern Sudan, later it's government realised the crisis is acknowledged and condemned worldwide and the resolution of the crisis by force was beyond the scope of the Sudanese government. Secondly, all the major oil blocks are located in southern Sudan, where China has large investment stake as well as energy security concerns. Subsequently, China began to befriend with the southern Sudan leaders and acted as a mediator in resolving the crisis. At the same time, China supported the Khartoum regime against the sanctions imposed by the United Nations and trial against Omar Al Bashir by the International Criminal Court (ICC). Although, there were a strong resentment and anger against the Chinese government among the southern Sudan leaders and people later, China managed to overcome it and have successfully developed friendly and cooperative relations with South Sudan.

## **4.2 Historical Background**

China Sudan relations have glorious past, and their people had been sharing traditional friendship since ancient times. It is said that since the Han Dynasty in China from 206 B.C up to 24 A.D, the Chinese and the Sudanese were able to be regular contact despite the vast geographical distance between the two regions which is about 12140 nautical miles by sea route. According to the Western, Arab and Chinese sources, it is said as early as 2<sup>nd</sup> Century the eastern sea port of Sudan was linked with the Far East and to

China. The ancient Chinese history suggests that the governors and people of the Han Dynasty were in contact with the Kush Kingdom of northern Sudan. The Chinese sailors also visited the Royal Kushite court by sailing through India to the east coast of Sudan. According to Chinese sources, the eastern coast of Sudan was linked to China even a century before Christ era. The ancient Chinese Silk Route to Africa extends from Iran to Iraq up to Syria via the Red Sea. Brunika seaport was one among the several important seaports of the Red Sea, and according to Sudanese historical researchers, the name Brunika is the ancient Roman name for Aizan seaport on the eastern coast of Sudan. During the Meroitic Period (about 300 BC - 400 AD) Sudanese goods such as the tortoise's shell, the rhinoceros horns, and gold and ivory have reached to the China. It is said as early as 166 AD the Egyptian and the Omani traders took these commodities to China. Li Anshan (2007) suggests that Chinese relations with Sudan have a long history of the country to country contact may have been as early as AD 441.

During the Tang Dynasty (618-907) the seaport of Aizab on the eastern coast of Sudan became a popular centre for the distribution of the Chinese potteries imported from China to the trading centres in Sudan and even to Egypt and West Africa. The remnants of Chinese potteries were discovered in various parts of Sudan namely Haza Bent, the trade centre in Sinkat area in Eastern Sudan, in Soba near Khartoum, in El-Fashir in western Sudan. It is said that there were regular trade contacts between Chinese and Sudanese from Han Dynasty to the 15<sup>th</sup> Century. The Suaking and Badi were also the important seaports of Sudan that facilitated trade with China and eastern Asia in general. Al Masoodi, an ancient Arab writer in his book *Muruj al Zahab*, has said that China was linked with the eastern seaports of Sudan, and has pointed out that China used to buy semi-precious stones such as aquamarines produced in Aizab region of Sudan. The historical sources suggest that it used to take about two years of the voyage for the traders of the Sultanate of Sinnar (1504-1821) for a trade trip to China.



### **4.3 China-Sudan Political Relations, 1996-2013**

#### **4.3a *Introduction***

During the Bandung Conference in 1955, Sudan was also one among the five participating Arab countries, and then Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai persuaded each of the Arab countries leaders to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC. Zhou Enlai also had a friendly meeting with the Sudan's interim Prime Minister, Ismail al-Azhari. This meeting was said to be important in Sino-Sudan relations, as after that, China began to support Sudan's independence (Wang Meng 2010). On December 19, 1955, the Sudanese parliament, under Azhari's leadership, unanimously adopted a declaration of independence that became effective on January 1, 1956. In 1956, Sudan-China Friendship Association was established, and it became a major cultural platform for the rapprochement between the two countries and people. Shortly after three years of the establishment of Sudan, the official bilateral relations between Sudan and China was established on 4 January 1959 and have since become strongly close global allies. The first student exchange programme between China-Sudan began in 1962. Zhang Chun (2015) suggests the Sino-Sudan relations in the period from 1959 to 1995, China's contacts with Sudan were similar to those between China and other African countries. These African countries have similar colonial and liberation movements, and China has sympathised with these countries politically and ideologically but has not given much practical support. However, the economic and social exchanges between the two countries were relatively weak during this period.

During the visit of Premier Zhou Enlai in January 1964, President Ibrahim Abboud praised the Chinese revolution and believed that the glorious struggle of the Chinese people and the victory achieved had created the honour of modern history and hoped that China would play its role in consolidating the cause of world peace. The visiting President Abboud also met with then Chinese Vice-Premier Chen Yi. In 1969 new Sudanese government was formed under Col. Gaafar Nimeiry, after the coup that overthrews the government of Prime Minister Ismail al-Azhari. The coup signalled the end of Sudan's second democratic era and saw the beginning of Nimeiry's 16-year rule. The new Sudanese government, which came to power in 1969, attached great importance

to cooperation with China and the first full-time ambassador to China was sent in April 1970 since the establishment of diplomatic relations. China was keen to polarise and secure the Sudanese government support to get its membership at the UN. Since 1970 China began to provide a certain amount of economic assistance to the Sudan, and China began to send medical teams and agricultural experts to the south of Sudan namely in Juba, Wau and Malakal to help the local people improve their agricultural and medical conditions. In 1970 China promised a total of US\$ 138.9 million to the Sudan in the period from 1970 to 1983, but it provided about US\$ 80 million (Zhang Chun 2015).

In 1976, China assisted in building Friendship Hall, and this project is highly appreciated by the Sudanese government and people, and since then it has become a symbol of China-Sudan friendship. David H. Shinn suggests that until the beginning of the 1970s the ties remained limited to ‘cordial’ diplomatic relations and minor economic engagements. In 1971, China benefited politically by supporting the Khartoum regime to fight the coup attempt by the Sudanese Communist Party, which Khartoum believed had the support of the Soviet Union. It was the phase when China and the Soviet Union were competing for their political influence in the continent. This incident helped China to assume some of the influence previously held by Moscow. In 1984, Premier Li Peng paid a state visit to Sudan. In 1989, Omar Al Bashir a brigadier in the Sudanese Army, he led a group of officers in a military coup that ousted the democratically elected government of prime minister Sadiq al-Mahdi after it began negotiations with rebels in the south. Consequently, Sudan’s relations with the United States and the West began to deteriorate. In the early 1980s, the Chevron Corporation of the US discovered oil in Sudan and began to exploit it. Under the Omar Al Bashir’s regime the Second Sudanese civil war (1983-2005) escalated, and as a result, the Chevron had to shut down its oil exploration operation in Sudan. Secondly, in 1993 the US put Sudan on its list of state sponsors of terrorism and imposed a sanction on Sudan. In 1989, the Bashir-Turabi coup in Sudan and the Tiananmen Square crackdown in China increasingly alienated both Khartoum and Beijing from Western powers, and Sudan began to look east (Giorgio Cafiero 2013). In 1990 Omar Al Bashir visited Beijing and met with the Chinese President Jiang Zemin. The purpose of this visit was Bashir was looking to build stronger ties with China and saw China as an alternative to develop Sudan’s oil industry (Luke Anthony Patey 2014).

In 1994, Omar Al Bashir invited Chinese oil company to take to oil exploration operation left by the Chevron. Subsequently, the bilateral engagements between the two sides became more and more dynamic. China began to provide the Omar Al Bashir led National Islamic Front with low-interest loans and weapons transfer. In 1995, the two countries began to cooperate in the exploitation of oil projects. In September 1995, President of Sudan Omar Al Bashir visited China, and during his visit, the Sudanese Chinese friendship society was established. In the same visit, a twinship between the Chinese town of Wahnan and Khartoum was woven with the two countries signing accord on the exemption from diplomatic and work visa prerequisites. In 1997, the two countries' foreign ministries established a regular political consultation mechanism. In 1997, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) took a 40 percent in Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC), which consists of a consortium of oil production companies to build the infrastructure for exploiting oil from three blocks in southern Sudan. In the early 1990s, the China-Sudan relations began to develop largely due to China's involvement in developing Sudan's oil industry, and at that time, Deng Xiaoping commented, China as a 'new actor' in Sudanese politics (Large 2008). In 1998, the Chinese government asked China Petroleum & Construction (Group) Corporation (CPECC) to participate in the construction of the 1,500 km long GNPOC pipeline linking oil Blocks 1 and 2 with the Red Sea. The CPPECC built a 2.5 million tons of processing capacity oil refinery near Khartoum. There are eight Chinese investment projects in the Sudan, including, the block 1/2/4 project (now mostly in South Sudan), block 3/7 project (now located in South Sudan), block 6 project, the Red Sea block 15 exploration project, the block 13 project, the Khartoum refinery project, the Khartoum chemical plant project, the refined oil sales project. In 1999, Sudan began oil export to China.

Sudanese government on the issue of Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang and other issues provided the firm support to China. During the United Nations Millennium Summit in 2000, President Jiang Zemin held a meeting with President Bashir. During the Asian-African summit in April 2005, President Hu Jintao held a meeting with President Bashir. In November 2006, President Bashir came to China to attend the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, and Chairman Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao

met with him respectively. In February 2007, President Hu Jintao paid a state visit to the Sudan.

On 8 December 2010, the visiting Sudanese Foreign Minister Ahmed Ali Karti had a meeting with the Chinese counterpart Yang Jiechi in Beijing. During the meeting, Yang expressed the Chinese government's willingness for the comprehensive and in-depth development of Sino-Sudan relations. He claimed about the Chinese government commitment to resolving the political crisis in Sudan and its support for a peace process and emphasised on establishing peace, stability and development in Sudan. Yang stated, "The concerned parties should resolve disputes through dialogue and consultation and work together to promote a smooth referendum in southern Sudan" (FOCAC 2010). He said, "The referendum should be conducted in a "fair, free and transparent" way to reflect the true aspirations and choice of the Sudanese people. Realising long-term peaceful coexistence between the north and south of Sudan and promoting their common development served the fundamental interests of the two sides and would also contribute to peace and stability in the region" (FOCAC 2010). Karti responded by saying,

"Sudan highly values its friendly and cooperative ties with China in various fields, pledging that the Sudanese government would adhere to its commitment to promoting peace and national reconciliation and earnestly implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in a bid to achieve long-term, stability and development of Sudan" (FOCAC).

In December 2010, a delegation of All-China Federation of Trade Union (ACFTU) visited Sudan and had a meeting with Prof. Ibrahim Ghandour, Executive Head of the General Federation of the Sudanese Workers Trade Unions (GFSWTU). Ibrahim said, "China hosts the largest trade union centres in the world and has a significant role in the development of Sudan, renewing the readiness of the GFSWTU to activate its relations and protocols with China in all fields" (*AllAfrica* 2010). He also ensured on the support of the trade union organisations of Arab and Africa for the nominating China for the management of the International Labour Organisation (ILO). On the other hand, Wang Yupu, the Vice-Chairman and First Secretary of All-China Federation of Trade unions said, "Promoting relations of trade Unions would accelerate development in order to

overcome the challenges and the economic crisis, stressing the need to focus on investment in reference to the high rate of economic growth”(AllAfrica 2010). He emphasised on more mutual visits and symposiums between the Chinese and Sudanese Trade Unions to establish a strong relationship.

#### **4.3b Political Party level interactions**

On 6 July 2010, a visiting delegation of the Sudanese National Congress Party to Beijing led by Nafie Ali Nafie, Sudanese Vice Chairman met with Jia Qingling, Chairman of the Chinese Political Party Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and a member of the CPC Central Committee Political Bureau Standing Committee. Jia said, China and Sudan have experienced a long-lasting friendship, and China has regarded this friendship from a strategic point of view. He said, “Both sides had always been adherent to mutual respect, equality, and had achieved constant development on friendly and cooperative relations in political and economic fields, and sought the well-being of the two peoples” (FOCAC 2010). He expressed the Chinese government’s willingness to deepen the political mutual trust further and expand the areas of cooperation with the Sudan. Jia pointed out that the deepening of inter-party exchanges is significant as it has become the main engine to drive the bilateral relations. Jia said, to better serve the interests of bilateral relations the Communist Party of China is willing to expand cooperation with the Sudanese National Congress Party. He said the deepening of exchanges and cooperation between the CPPCC and the Sudanese counterpart would set and expand the social foundation of Sino-Sudan friendship which will impact the bilateral relations positively.

On 20 October 2011, Pagan Amun, Secretary General of South Sudan’s ruling party SPLM visited China at the invitation of the CPC, and he met with the Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Zhai Jun. Zhai said, “China attaches importance to developing friendly relations with South Sudan and would like to strengthen exchanges and cooperation with South Sudan in the political, economic, cultural, educational, health and international affairs.”

On 13 January 2012, Li Yuanchao, a senior official of the CPC visited South Sudan along with a high-level CPC delegation and met with President Salva Kiir Mayardit. At the meeting Li said,

“The CPC is willing to enhance the exchanges and cooperation with South Sudan’s ruling party, Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), by the four principles guiding inter-party relations, and playing a positive role in developing the ties between the two countries” (*Xinhua* 2012).

Kiir said, “I renewed the SPLM’s willingness to develop cooperative relations with the CPC, particularly about the exchanges of experiences in fields of ruling and policy-making.” Pagan Amum, the SPLM Secretary General, also had a talk with the visiting Chinese leader Li Yuanchao, and both sides signed agreements on various issues.

On 15 January 2012, Li Yuanchao, visited Khartoum also along with the same CPC delegation. During his meeting with Omar Al-Bashir, Li said, “The CPC attaches great importance to the friendly cooperative relations with Sudan’s ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and is willing to develop the exchanges and cooperation between the two parties and boost the ties between the two countries” (*Xinhua* 2012). Al-Bashir responded by saying, “The NCP is willing to consolidate and develop the friendship with the CPC and learn from the successful experiences of the CPC.” The ruling party level exchanges between the CPC and NCP is significant in ensuring China’s support for Bashir to be in power in the future Sudanese government.

On 24 April 2012, Wang Gang, Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference met and discussed party-to party ties with the visiting delegation of Sudan’s ruling National Congress Party. On 6 March 2013, Ibrahim Ghandour, an official in charge of external relations of Sudan’s ruling National Congress Party (NCP) said in an interview with *Xinhua*, Sudan’s NCP is keen to expand its relations with the Chinese CPC.

### **4.3c *Darfur Crisis & China***

In April 2003, Arabs and Africans in the Darfur region of the Sudan suffered a violent ethnic conflict competing for water and pastures and triggered a massive humanitarian crisis (Steven Kuo 2012). In November the same year, the US Human Rights Organization reported that China is also a stakeholder in the crisis in Darfur. Since then, European and American governments have been criticising China for favouring the Sudanese government because China and the Sudanese government have maintained a special friendly relationship for a long time. In 2004, the Chinese government gradually began to intervene in Darfur crisis. David H. Shinn quotes Mirghani Mohamed Salih, Sudan's ambassador to China, "The cause of the problem in Darfur is the lack of development, as in the other parts of Sudan". Shinn believes that the mishandling of severe famine in Darfur in 1984 by the Khartoum regime set the stage for rebellion. He finds the Omar Al Bashir government gave more emphasis on the differences between the Arabs and the Africans in southern Sudan rather than development. He finds that religion was not the cause of conflict in Sudan.

Earlier there were only two competing rebel groups in southern Sudan namely the Sudan Liberation Movement/ Army (SPLM/A) supported by Fur community and the Justice and Equality Movement of the Zaghawa people, later additional rebel groups also joined the crisis. It was difficult for Omar Al Bashir regime to crush the insurrection because a larger number of soldiers in Sudan's national army belonged to Darfur. Finally, the government tried to crush the rebellion by arming and mobilising indigenous Janjaweed militia in Darfur. According to David H. Shinn, Bashir regime used the Sudanese Air Force against the rebellions, which indiscriminately bombed both rebel and civilian targets. He estimates, in Darfur crisis by the end of 2004 about 80,000 people were dead, nearly 100,000 had taken refuge in Chad, and about millions of people were internally displaced. The Darfur crisis was referred by the US government on 9 September 2004 'genocide' where as the United Nations, AU and most governments have referred it as "crime against humanity" or "war crimes" but not genocide.

In 2000, the peace process between north and south began. By 2003, the southern Sudan based Sudan People's Liberation Movement/ Army (SPLM/A) realised that they would

be able to achieve major concession from Khartoum on the condition of ending this costly war. In August 2003, the Sudanese government under the pressure of the international community and some countries of the continent began to negotiate over the issues of power, wealth and security with the anti-government rebels in Abuja, the capital city of Nigeria. In 2005, Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed between the government in Khartoum and SPLM/A that formally ended the civil war. Since August 2004, the AU began to deploy its peacekeepers in Darfur without any obvious achievements. Finally in November 2006, then Secretary-General Kofi Annan during a high-level meeting conducted at Addis Ababa proposed for the three-stage solution of the crisis and which also involved the deployment of AU-UN hybrid mission in Darfur and the provision of financial, technological and logistics support by the UN and the AU. It was called the 'Annan Plan', which began to be implemented in the same month. After that, on July 2007, the Resolution 1769 was passed by the UN Security Council after the consensus was reached among the UN, the AU and the Sudanese government on the implementation of the second and third stages of Annan Plan. The Resolution authorised the deployment of UN-AU hybrid peacekeeping mission in Darfur. The deployment of hybrid peacekeepers was gradual but effective, and about 70 percent of its troops were deployed by the end of September 2009. In June 2007, all the appointed envoys of the AU and the UN for Darfur crisis demanded a road map of the political process in the crisis. In July same year, the UN and the AU were given the dominant role in the political process in Darfur at the second international conference on Darfur held in Libya. In August same year, the opposition forces in Darfur with the efforts of the AU and the UN reached a consensus to implement the roadmap and negotiation with the Sudanese government at the meeting held in Arusha of Tanzania. In October same year, the Sudanese government failed to convince the seven major opposition factions for the resumption of talks. In March and June 2008, for the political process in Darfur two international conferences were conducted by the envoys of the AU and the UN for Darfur. In May 2008, Khartoum was attacked by the JEM militia resulted in civilian casualties, and it was suppressed by the Sudan's national army. This attack was condemned by the UN Security Council. On 30 June the same year, Foreign Minister of Burkina Faso Bassolet was appointed as the AU-UN Chief Coordinator for Darfur by the UN General



Secretary and the Chairman of African Union Commission (AUC). In September 2008, “Qatar Initiative” was proposed to promote political process in Darfur by the foreign ministers of Arab League during its 130<sup>th</sup> meeting. A breakthrough was achieved in the efforts of Darfur crisis peace process in February 2009 in Doha during a meeting between the Sudanese government and JEM a consensus was reached to establish a mutual trust to solve the Darfur issue.

In February 2005, Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Lu Guozeng visited Khartoum as a Special Envoy of the Chinese government and held talks with Omar Al Bashir on bilateral relations and Darfur issue. He said, the Chinese government is concerned about Darfur crisis and urges all sides concerned to exert their best possible effort to resolve the crisis as fast as possible. On the other hand, Bashir reiterated that his government commits to finding a political solution to it (*Xinhua* 2004). On 7 March 2005, Li Zhaoxing, the Chinese Foreign Minister had a phone conversation with Mustafa Othman Ismail, the Sudanese Foreign Minister to discuss and exchange views on properly resolving the Darfur issue (*Xinhua* 2005). In May 2005, Mustafa Othman Ismail made a four-day official visit to Beijing, and had a meeting with the Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing. Li said, “China will make joint efforts with the international community for an early settlement of the Darfur issue” and “China attaches great importance to relations with Sudan and supports the peace process between the north and south of Sudan.” While the Ismail said, “Sudan will further expand friendly cooperation with China in various fields.”

In June 2007, a closed-door consultative meeting was conducted among UN, AU and Sudan in Addis Ababa to discuss the deployment of a hybrid force of about 17,000-19,000 troops in Darfur. Omar Al Bashir government accepted the deployment of the hybrid AU-UN forces for Darfur. On 18 June 2007, China welcomes a joint statement on Sudan’s approval of deploying a hybrid AU-UN force in Darfur, and it was issued jointly by the UN, the AU and Sudan. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Qin Gang said, “China welcomes the joint statement. The facts have shown that dialogue and equal negotiation is an effective approach to the political solution of the Darfur issue, and the consultation between AU, UN and Sudan is an effective mechanism.” He said, “The

international community should strive to maintain the current good momentum in resolving the Darfur issue, promote comprehensive implementation of the Annan plan and political process of Darfur in a balanced way, help Sudan improve the humanitarian and security situation in Darfur and promote proper settlement of the Darfur issue as soon as possible. He said, “China is ready to play an active and constructive role in settlement of the Darfur issue, and will work together with the international community to promote the early realisation of peace, stability and development in Darfur (FOCAC 2007).

The Chinese government has earlier announced to provide humanitarian aid to Darfur in five batches. In August 2007, the fourth batch of humanitarian aid was sent to Sudan, which included vehicles, generators, pumps and board houses for 120 schools worth 40 million Yuan. The Chinese officer in charge of foreign aid with the Ministry of Commerce said, “The Chinese government’s basic standpoint is the early realisation of peace, stability and economic reconstruction via negotiations in the Darfur region.” In October 2007, during the meeting of the “Implementation of Follow-up Actions of the Beijing Summit of Forum on China-Africa Cooperation” China claimed that the Chinese government to resolve the issue of Darfur had worked vigorously and effectively. The Chinese government official also announced about sending a multi-functional engineering unit to Darfur for a peacekeeping operation. The fourth batch of Chinese aid package to Sudan reached on 28 October 2007, and Li Chengwen, the Chinese Ambassador to Sudan, delivered the aid package to the local government. Li said, “As the fundamental way out for Darfur lies in the development, the delivery of aid is conducive to the regional development of the conflict-torn region. The aid not only embodies the China-Sudan friendship but represents the sincere hope of the Chinese government for the early realisation of peace in Darfur.” Awad Ahmed al-Jaz remarked, “China’s aid will play an important role in the regional construction and development of Darfur and help the displaced people in the war-torn region return to their homes at an early date.”

In October 2007, Liu Guijin, Special Envoy of the Chinese Government for Darfur visited Sudan and had a series of talks on the situation of western Sudanese region of Darfur with Sudanese officials. He discussed and exchanged views on the deployment of hybrid peacekeeping forces of the UN-AU in Darfur. He also met with Minister of State

for Foreign Affairs Ali Ahmed Kerti and Sudanese Presidential Assistant Nafie Ali Nafie and talked about the political process for realising peace in the region. Liu commented, “The Darfur issue was generally developing towards a positive direction in spite of some difficulties, and hoped the upcoming negotiation between the Sudanese government and the Darfur anti-government movements in Libya would achieve positive results and make the political process to realise tangible progress.” Since his appointment as Chinese Special Envoy for Darfur, this was his third visit to Sudan. Liu Guijin also attended the inaugural session of the peace negotiations between the Sudanese government and anti-government movements in Darfur held on 27 October 2007 in Libya under the co-sponsorship of the AU and the UN.

In 2008, China hosted the ‘Beijing Olympic Games-2008’, and many Darfur crisis activists took this opportunity to protest against China for its alleged role in the crisis. On 15 February 2008, the Chinese government responded that “Linking Olympic with Darfur issue is against the Olympic spirit.” China claimed that its government is putting vigorous efforts to resolve this crisis, and linking the issue to the Olympic Games will not help and is against the Olympic spirit that separates sports from politics. Liu Jianchao, Chinese government spokesperson defended very strongly, he said, “We noticed recent discussion and acted on China’s stances on Darfur issue. According to my knowledge, some are out of the concerns over the situation there, but others tried to link the issue with China’s policy on Sudan and Olympic Games.” Liu said, the protest against China is politically motivated, and we will not accept. Liu also claimed that China had provided military assistance to improve the situation in Darfur, for example, so far it has given US\$500,000 to the UN fund, US\$1.8 million to the AU, and material assistance worth US\$11 million to Darfur. He said China has sent a 140 member advanced troops to Darfur. He also said, the Chinese companies have worked in Darfur to resolve the water supply crisis, they helped in digging 46 wells, and in setting up 20 small scale power plants in Darfur. He called for objective and just treatment on China’s stance. In November 2009, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao during the press conference in FOCAC meeting of Sharm el-Sheikh commented on the issue of Sudan and Darfur He said, China worked on the efforts of reconciliation between the South and North of Sudan, it sent Chinese peacekeepers to Darfur and was the first non-African country to do so, and China has provided material

assistance for the people living in Darfur. Wen claimed that China has a selfless interest in Darfur and it is not competing in any other country in the region. In May 2010, Qatar announced the resumption of Doha Peace Talk-a mediating talk between the Sudanese government and two main Darfur rebel groups namely the JEM and the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) to be held in June in the same year. On 26 May 2010, Ma Zhaoxu, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said at a regular press conference that, “We appreciate the active efforts made by the Qatari government and African Union-United Nations Chief Mediator Djibril Bassole in this” (*Xinhua* 2010). Ma added that “China hoped all parties and the international community would make further efforts to promote the political process in Darfur to achieve substantial progress as early as possible and promote a comprehensive and proper resolution of the issues” (*Xinhua* 2010).

On 11 September 2011, Liu Guijin, the Chinese government’s Special Representative on Darfur attended the inaugural conference of Darfur Peace Agreement Implementation Follow-up Commission in Doha. The signing parties of the peace agreement were Amin Hassan Omar, Minister in charge of the Darfur issue in the Sudanese Presidential Office and El-Tijani El-Sissi, Chairman of the Sudanese Liberation and Justice Movement. Liu met with representatives of the signing parties. The conference was organised to launch the Darfur Peace Agreement Implementation Follow-up Commission. It was attended by five permanent members of the UNSC and several others regional and international organisation including the AU, the EU, the Islamic Cooperation Organisation, and Arab League.

In June 2013, Zhong Jianhua, Chinese government’s representative on African Affairs visited Khartoum to participate in the unofficial meetings of the 5<sup>th</sup> session of the international envoy’s mechanism on Darfur crisis held on June 16-17 in El Fasher, the capital of Sudan’s North Darfur state. At the meeting, Zhong said, “The Darfur issue is complicated and concerns the security and stability in the region. China actively supports the peace process in Darfur and wants to contribute to the realisation of peace and stability in the region.”

#### **4.3d *China-Sudan relations after the partition of Sudan***

In January 2011, Li Chengwen, the Chinese ambassador to Sudan said in an interview with *Xinhua*, regardless of the results of the referendum in southern Sudan, China will continue to support the North and the Southern regions of Sudan to seek mutual benefits. He hoped that the referendum process to be conducted in a just, free, transparent and peaceful way (*Xinhua* 2011). He said, “China’s concern over the referendum conforms to the interest of the international community. We sincerely hope permanent peace can be achieved in Sudan. No one would benefit from the chaos of Sudan. Maintaining peace and stability of the Africa’s largest country should be a consensus and common goal of both sides of Sudan and the international community.” It is to be noted that Li said, “Whatever outcome the referendum turns out, China will continue its cooperation with Sudan’s south.” He also said, “China is confident in the peaceful prospects of Sudan. No matter how complicated Sudan’s situation is, the Sino-Sudanese cooperation will go on, because it benefits the people.” Li in his two statements conveyed the message of the Chinese government that China will continue to maintain its traditional friendship with Khartoum and it will also establish friendly bilateral relations with the newly carved out state of South Sudan.

The Chinese government knew that its major oil stakes are in southern Sudan, but still it has managed to maintain good relations with Khartoum. On 26 January 2011, Salah Siral-Khatim, Acting Governor of the Red Sea State told *Xinhua*, “We in the Red Sea State are picking the fruits of the great progress in the Sino-Sudan relations where Chinese companies have implemented many development projects in the state.” He added, “The Sino-Sudan relations have witnessed great development due to the will and wisdom of the two countries’ leadership.” It was at the time when referendum debate was going on Sudan, Hao Hongshe, economic and commercial counsellor of the Chinese embassy in Khartoum, said, “CNPC focus more on Sudan’s agricultural development. When Sudan splits into two, about 80 percent of the oil will be in the south. The north will feel the pinch, so agriculture should be the focus of CNPC’s efforts in public welfare.” He claimed that according to CNPC’s corporate social responsibility report, by the end of 2009, the company has donated about US\$50 million to charities in Sudan. That includes

about 35 schools near the oil fields in Sudan, four hospitals and 109 health clinics. It has helped Sudan in building the Merowe dam which is 9.2 kilometres long and 65 meters high, and it has the power production capacity of 1250 megawatts.

On 28 June 2011, Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir visited China and met with Chinese President Hu Jintao in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. Hu said, “The Chinese side has always respected the will and choice of the Sudanese people” (*Xinhua* 2011). Hu expressed his views before the visiting President that, in fact, the Chinese government the North and the South of Sudan should continue to implement the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CAP) signed in 2005 and hoped to reach a peaceful national reconciliation. He also said, “The two sides should observe the spirit of mutual understanding and forgiveness to solve their problems through dialogue and consultation properly and to realise good neighbourly friendship, cooperation and common development.” Al-Bashir responded by saying, his government is ready to “maintain peace and stability between the north and south and will develop a new mode of country-to-country relations with the south” (*Xinhua* 2011). Hu also said, “China is ready to maintain close communication and coordination on Darfur and other regional and international issues,” and “The Chinese side will firmly pursue a friendly policy towards Sudan, no matter of the changes in the international situation and internal situation in Sudan, this policy will remain unchanged.” In this meeting, the Chinese President was ensuring its traditional partner Sudan that the relations will remain unchanged even if the Chinese oil interests remain with the new state South Sudan. He ensured Bashir that China would further its cooperation with Sudan in the fields of agriculture and mining, and it will provide technical support for Sudanese agriculture development and encourage Chinese companies to participate in Sudan’s mining exploration and development. It was the last high-level meeting between China and Sudan before the independence of South Sudan. Bashir said, Sudan is ready the expand pragmatic cooperation and mutual trust with the Chinese side to take the bilateral relationship to a higher level. During the visit, Bashir in an interview with *Xinhua* said, “We regard China as the strategic partner for Sudan in various fields, including the political, economic, commercial and cultural fields.” He said, “We are completely satisfied with this relationship which constitutes a living and successful model for the south-south relations. We are convinced that we are moving

towards new horizons in the cooperation between the two countries in various fields.” His statement reveals that Bashir is in secure about the Chinese support and investment in Sudan after the independence of South Sudan because only 30 percent of the oil reserves will remain with Khartoum after the referendum. The purpose of Bashir’s visit to China is probably to maintain a diplomatic pressure on the Chinese government and reminding of their traditional friendship. Bashir said to *Xinhua* reporter, “In the political field, we receive support from China at various international forums, while in the economic field, China is a partner for us in many projects, where it is funding many projects, and the Chinese companies are the ones implementing many of our projects.” Through this interview Bashir reminded China that he was the one who invited China to participate in the oil exploration in Sudan, he said, “When the American companies refused to work in the oil field, and when restrictions were imposed on the Western companies operating in Sudan, we found in China the real partner.” He also praised the Chinese oil companies in Sudan; he said, “While the agreements with the Western companies were unfair and a hundred percent in their favour, the agreements with the Chinese companies constitute a real exchange of benefits, In fact we have received a better offer from China than that of the Western companies.” This statement merely reveals Bashir’s insecurity about oil industry in Sudan, as long back he has already has deteriorated its relations with the Western countries including the US, and since the China has become the largest partner in oil sector, so it will be difficult for Bashir regime if China’s oil companies shifts towards South Sudan. He also said, “Additionally, the Chinese companies work to train the Sudanese cadres to replace the Chinese cadres, which represents transferring of knowledge in the field of the oil industry to the Sudanese side, This did not exist in the previous agreements.” As pointed out by Bashir that the Western companies are unfair this means he is more convenient to the Chinese companies in its oil sector business and is more confident about them. On the other hand, the Chinese leaders also ensured Bashir that China would not change its policy to Sudan. During his visit, he also met with Wu Bangguo, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and Vice Premier Li Keqiang. Wu said, “China will treasure its relations with Sudan. No matter how the international situation changes, China’s friendly policy towards Sudan will remain unchanged, and the trend of our substantial cooperation won’t change either”

(*Xinhua* 2011). Wu said, the NCP shares friendly relations with the National Assembly of Sudan and called for further expansion of the areas of engagement. Bashir replied that he hoped for further deepening of cooperation among parties, parliaments and governments. At the meeting, Ki Keqiang said, “China is willing to join the international efforts to play a constructive role in promoting long-term peace, stability and development in Sudan and the region.” As Bashir wrapped up his China visit, the Sudanese Foreign Minister Ahmed Ali Karti said at a press conference that, “President Bashir’s visit to China is ‘historical’ as southern Sudan is to realise formal independence on July 9. This visit is aimed at supporting the good Sudanese-Chinese relations and to sustain its continuity.” This press briefing was significant for the Khartoum as it wanted to clarify to the Chinese government that its government wants to sustain the continuity of China-Sudan relations. He also pointed out that, his government wishes to continue all the economic cooperation agreements signed with China and urged the Chinese investor to invest in Sudan’s oil and gas and agriculture and mining sectors even after July 9. He appreciated Chinese support for Sudan at the international stage. The President Bashir’s visit to China is significant because the leaders of both sides wanted to convey to the world that even after the independence of South Sudan on 9 July 2011, Sino-Sudan will remain a global ally. In December 2011, Liu Guijin, Chinese Government Special Representative for African Affairs visited Sudan. Before his visit, Hong Lei, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said at the daily press briefings, “China is concerned about the recent tensions between north and south Sudan, and in particular that negotiations over oil and related issues had stalled.” This statement and Liu’s visit was because of the comment by the Sudanese Ministry of Petroleum that “Sudan had decided to halt exportation of South Sudan’s oil through its territory until South Sudan pays for four months’ arrears amounting to \$727 million.”

On 8 August 2011, Yang Jiechi, the Chinese Foreign Minister visited Khartoum and held talks with Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Ahmed Karti to discuss bilateral relations. In the meeting, Yang repeats Hu Jintao’s statement stated before Bashir in Beijing June 2011. Yang said, “The regional situations currently continue to undergo profound changes, but China will not change its policy of developing friendly and cooperative relations with Sudan.” He added, “China supports Sudan’s efforts in protecting its



national sovereignty, enhancing the national reconciliation and promoting economic and social development. China appreciates Sudan's adherence to the one China policy and support on issues of China's core interests and major concerns." Yang emphasised on expanding cooperation in the areas of petroleum, agriculture and mining resources exploration. On the other hand, Karti said, "Despite domestic changes, Sudan will continue its endeavours to develop relations with China, enhance cooperation in the fields of petroleum, agriculture, and mining, provide more convenient and safe atmosphere for Chinese investments, and retain coordination with China on international and regional issues." Yang commented on the ongoing Darfur crisis that, "China has been working hard to promote efforts in properly solving the Darfur issue. China will maintain contact and coordination with Sudan to play an active role in promoting proper settlement of the Darfur issue and realising peace and stability in the region." On the day Yang wrapped up his two days visit to Sudan, Karti announced Sudanese government decision to grant concessions to China on exploring oil in three promising areas in the country. At present, the Chinese companies daily oil output after exploration and production is 110,000 barrels per day, before the partition of Sudan it was 500,000 barrels per day.

**Table No: 4.1 Chinese Leaders visits to Sudan, 2002-2013**

Year of Visit	Name of the Chinese Leader	Leader's Designation
2002	General Du Tiehuan	Political Commissar of the Beijing Military Region, PLA
	Ma Wenpu	Deputy Director of the Liaison Department, PRC
2003	General Qiao Qingchen	Commander of the PLA Air Force
2004	Li Zhaoxing	Foreign Minister of the PRC
	Chen Haosu	President of the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign countries
	Wang Shucheng	Minister of Water Resources, PRC
	Lu Guozeng	Assistant Foreign Minister of the PRC
2005	General Xu Caihou	Vice Chairman of the CMC, PRC
2006	Lu Guozeng	Assistant Foreign Minister of the PRC
	Li Ruogu	President of EXIM Bank China
2007	Hu Jintao	President of the PRC
	Major General Chang Wanchuan	Commander of the Shenyang Military Region, PLA

	Li Ruogu	President of EXIM Bank China
2008	Liu Guijin (February, October)	Special Representative of the Chinese Government for Darfur
	Zhai Jun	Assistant Foreign Minister, PRC
	Gao Hucheng	Vice Minister of Commerce, PRC
2009	Zhou Yongkang	Standing Committee of the Politburo and Secretary of the Political and Legislative Affairs, PRC
	Liu Guijin	Special Envoy of the Chinese Government on Darfur Issue
	Li Jinjun	Vice-Minister of the International Department of the CPC Central Committee, PRC
	Zhu Mingguo	Member of the Standing Committee, PRC
2010	Chen Shu	Minister of Health, PRC
	Liu Guijin (March, July, November)	Special Envoy of the Chinese Government on Darfur Issue
2011	Zhai Jun	Vice Foreign Minister of the PRC
	Liu Guijin	Special Representative of the Chinese Government on African Affairs and Darfur Issues, PRC
	Luo Xiaoguang	New Chinese Ambassador to Sudan
	Jiang Yaoping	Vice-Commerce Minister, PRC
2012	South Sudan Li Yuanchao Li Jinjun Sudan	Minister of the Organisation Department of the CPC, PRC Vice Minister of International Department of the CPC Central Committee, PRC
	Li Yuanchao	Minister of the Organisation Department of the CPC, PRC
	Wang Jiarui	Minister of International Department of the CPC Central Committee, PRC
	Li Jinjun	Vice Minister of International Department of the CPC Central Committee, PRC
	Zhong Jianhua (March, May, August, December)	Special Representative of the Chinese Government on African Affairs, PRC
2013	Zhong Jianhua (April, June, August, December)	Special Representative of the Chinese Government on African Affairs, PRC

Sources: China's Foreign Policy, 2002-2013

**Table No: 4.2 Sudanese Leaders visits to China, 1996-2013**

Year of Visit	Name of the Chinese Leader	Leader's Designation
2004	Zuberi Ahmed Hassan	Minister of Finance and National Economy, Sudan
	Zahawi Ibrahim Malik	Minister of Information and Communications, Sudan
2005	General Abbas Arabi Abdulla	Sudanese Chief of General Staff
	Lieutenant General Mohamed Ismail	Sudanese Deputy Chief of General Staff
	Peter Niyot Kok	Minister of Higher Education, Sudan
	Dr, Faroug al-Bushra	Deputy Secretary General of the Sudanese Council for International People's Friendship
2006	Abdul Rahim	Minister of National Defense of Sudan
	Lam Akol Ajawin	Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sudan
	Nafie Ali Nafie	Assistant to the Sudanese President
	Omar Al-Bashir	President of Sudan
	Al-Zubair Ahmed Hassan	Minister of Finance and National Economy, Sudan
	Mohamed Yousif Abdalla	Minister of Defense, Sudan
	Al-Zunair Bashir Taha	Minister of Internal Affairs, Sudan
	Mohamed Al-Amin Kabashi	Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, Sudan
2007	Haj Ahmed El Gaili	Joint Chief of Staff of the Sudanese Armed Forces
	Nafie Ali Nafie	Deputy Chairman of the NCP, Sudan
	Ali Ahmed Karti	State Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sudan
	Al-Zahawi Ibrahim Malik	Minister of Information and Communication, Sudan
2008	Ali Osman Mohammed Taha	Vice-President of Sudan
	Awad Ahmad Mohamed Eljaz	Special Envoy of the Sudanese President and Minister of Finance and National economy, Sudan
	Ali Ahmed Karti	State Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sudan
	Siddig	Under Secretary of the Sudanese Foreign Ministry
	Al-Zubair Ahmed Hassan	Minister of Energy and Mining, Sudan
2009	Alfred Ladu Gore	Advisor to the Government of Sudan on Diplomatic Affairs
	Abdel –Haleem Ismail	Minister of Agriculture and Forest, Sudan
2010	Al-Tigani Salih Fedail	Minister of International Cooperation, Sudan

	Nafie Ali Nafie	Co-deputy Chairman of the Sudanese National Congress Party and Presidential Assistant
	Zubair Hassan	Economic Secretary of the NCP, Sudan
	Awut Deng Acuil	Minister of Labour and Public Services of the semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan.
	Mohamed Bushara Dousa	Sudanese Justice Minister
2011	Omar Hassan Ahmed Al-Bashir	President of Sudan
	Dr. Mustafa Osman Ismail	Presidential Advisor and Chairman of the External Relations Department of National Congress Party (NCP), Sudan
2012	Ibrahim Gandur	Minister of External Relations of the NCP, Sudan
	Salah Wanasi Khair	State Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sudan
	Kamal Abdullatif Abdurahim	Sudanese Minister of Minerals
	Dr. Faisal Hassan Ibrahim	Minister of Animal Resources, Sudan
	Igbal Gaffar Elhusain	Secretary General of the Sudanese Women General Union
	Alsamawaal Khalafallah Alquraish	Sudanese Minister of Culture
2013	Nafie Ali Nafie	Vice President of Sudan's NCP
	Eltigani Seisi Ateem	Chairman of Darfur Regional Authority, Sudan
	Ali Karti	Foreign Minister of Sudan
	Omar Eisa Ahmed	China's new ambassador to Sudan
	Bahar Idris Abu Gardah	Minister of Health, Sudan
	Ali Mahmoud Abdurrasoul	Minister of Finance and National Economy, Sudan
	Anmed Saad	Sudan's Minister of Council of Ministers

*Sources:* China's Foreign Policy-2004-2013

In January 2012, Li Yuanchao, a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee visited Sudan and met with Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir. At the meeting, Li said, "Sudan is one of China's best friends in Africa and cooperation between the two countries will not change no matter how the situation changes" (*Xinhua* 2012). He repeated the statement of Hu Jintao said during Bashir's visit to China in June 2011. Li added, "China is willing to strengthen dialogue and exchanges with Sudan, deepen political relations, expand pragmatic cooperation, achieve

mutual benefits and win-win outcomes, boost the traditional friendship, enhance coordination and preserve the peace and stability. In the same month, Jia Qinglin, Chairman of the National Committee of the CPPCC met with Sudanese President Al-Bashir in Addis Ababa. At the meeting, Jia said, “China and Sudan boast a traditional friendship, and they have always trusted and understood each other despite changing international landscape and situations of both countries.” He added that China would support the Sudanese government in maintaining stability and developing economy (*Xinhua* 2012). As it is to be noted that high-level visits from the Chinese are frequent to Sudan and reiteration of statements on strengthening and deepening bilateral ties. It is targeted to ensure Sudan about the Chinese political trust and economic cooperation to its government. Though the Sudanese government has constantly been failing in providing security to Chinese oil companies and its citizen in Sudan, but they aspire to expand its economic cooperation with China.

#### **4.4 China and South Sudan**

On 6 July 2011, Hong Lei, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson announced that China would send Jiang Weixin, Special Envoy of President Hu Jintao and Minister of Housing and Urban-Rural Development to attend the Independence Ceremony of the Republic of South Sudan scheduled to be held on 9 July in Juba (*Xinhua* 2011). Salva Kiir became the first President of the Republic of South Sudan; he is also the President of the ruling party of the state, Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). Kiir described the independence referendum in southern Sudan as “A choice between being ‘the second class in your own country’ or ‘a free person in your independent state’.” In the southern Sudan referendum, about 99 percent population of the region voted for independence. On 9 July 2011, China was among the first states to establish diplomatic relations with South Sudan and declared that China would assist the best of its ability to develop South Sudan. Jiang Weixin on behalf of the Chinese government signed the joint communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic relations with Deng Alor Kol, Foreign Minister of the South Sudan. The Chinese government sends his envoy to attend the independence ceremony of South Sudan and establishes diplomatic relations on the day of its independence shows that significance of southern Sudan region to China. China’s

major oil sector investment and enterprises are in the southern region of Sudan about 70 percent of oil reserves are in this region, so it is utmost important for China's economic interests which are at stakes in this region. Soon after the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Republic of Sudan, China also inaugurates the Chinese embassy in Juba. At the opening ceremony of the Chinese embassy, Jiang Weixin said, "South Sudan is newly founded, and lots of work needs to be done. China would strengthen its political contact with South Sudan, provide assistance at the best of its ability, and expand pragmatic cooperation in an all-round way" (*Xinhua* 2011). This statement shows that China is very eager and concern about the development of South Sudan because it is a newly independent state, but it is to be noted that when the mass killing was taking place in this region under the leadership of Sudan's regime, China seemed to be least concerned about the happening. On the contrary it helped Bashir's regime with its economic and military support. During the ongoing civil war in Sudan and Darfur crisis, the requirement of weapons increased substantially for the Sudanese national army and China took it as a good opportunity to exchange oil for weapons as the deal boosted China's defence industry. Jiang also said, "The establishment of diplomatic ties and the official operation of the embassy have brought the relations between the two countries to a new stage. We also hope that South Sudan will set up an embassy in Beijing as soon as possible to promote communication." This also shows China's eagerness to establish South Sudan embassy in Beijing so that the business engagements does not interrupt as the Khartoum's embassy in Beijing will not be helpful in dealing with its economic partner of South Sudan. Jiang also said, "There are still ongoing negotiations on some unsettled issues between South Sudan and Sudan. We believe that the two aides would put peace first and solve the issues through negotiations and consultations based on mutual understanding. We sincerely hope South Sudan and Sudan would be good neighbours, partners and brothers forever." This statement is significant which makes it very clear from the Chinese side that if there will be on going conflict between Sudan and South Sudan, the Chinese government cannot support to any particular side because now, its interests lie equally on both sides. Secondly, stability and amicable relations between Sudan and South Sudan will ensure the security of the Chinese investments and enterprises in both the countries. So, for China peace and stability in Sudan and South

Sudan becomes significant. On 9 July 2011, Li Zhiguo, China's Consul General in Juba on the eve of independence ceremony of South Sudan said, "Maintaining peace is beneficial to people on both sides of Sudan and is also in the interests of China." She also said, "We would like to continue to play a constructive role in promoting peace and develop cooperation with both sides in fields including energy, agriculture and infrastructure, and continue the good model of South-South cooperation." She pointed out China's position as, "China, with its good relations with both sides, is uniquely positioned to support these special programs to keep peace and stability." Soon after the establishment of South Sudan, the Chinese government put into actions all its diplomatic channels to influence newly formed bilateral relations. In December 2011, Liu Guijin, Chinese Government Special Representative for African Affairs made a two days visit to South Sudan. During his visit, he met with President Salva Kiir Mayardit, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Nhial Deng Nhial and Minister of Petroleum and Mining Stephen Dhieu Dau of South Sudan. Liu was accompanied by Li Zhiguo, Chinese Ambassador to South Sudan. At the meeting, Liu said, "China will work with the two parties and other parties to resolve the differences as soon as possible and achieve cordial neighbourliness between the two countries that stand on mutual interests." He added, "South Sudan is a newly born state, and preservation of peace, dealing with Sudan and developing cordial relations with it is in the interest of all concerned parties including South Sudan." This visit of part of the Chinese endeavours to push the governments of Sudan and South Sudan to end differences relating to sharing the oil resources produced in South Sudan and exported via Sudan's pipelines. In this conflict of oil exporting pipelines the bigger loss is for the Chinese because most of its oil exploiting projects are in the South Sudan, and oil passes through the Sudan's pipeline to reach the Port Sudan and then finally it is exported to China. The Khartoum government has applied a condition of oil exports' transit fees on South Sudan's oil export through Sudanese territories. Liu's visit is also streamlined to resume a talk between Sudan and South Sudan which is supposed to take place a week after his visit to Addis Ababa on various issues including the oil file. This visit was meant to create a diplomatic pressure on the governments of Sudan and South Sudan to keep restraint and resolve the pending issues through dialogue and negotiations. During the visit, the South Sudanese side

ensured that their government is committed to resolving the pending issues with Sudan and they will not involve in deteriorating the situation.

On 9 August 2011, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi visited South Sudan and met with South Sudanese President Salva Kiir Mayardit and Foreign Minister Deng Alor Kol in Juba. At the meeting, Yang congratulated Kiir on the independence and establishment of the Republic of South Sudan. Yang appreciated South Sudan's adherence to one China policy. He expressed China's willingness to develop friendly and comprehensive relations with South Sudan based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Yang put forward four proposals to further develop their bilateral relations.

- He welcomed embassy of South Sudan to be established in Beijing. He called to set up a legal framework for the bilateral exchanges and cooperation in all areas. To strengthen the political mutual trust, both sides should enhance the contacts at the top and other levels.
- He hopes for effective cooperation with South Sudan in various areas such as mineral explorations, agriculture, oil, transportation, communication, housing construction and water conservancy. He insists for bilateral pragmatic cooperation to achieve mutual benefit. He ensured the Chinese support in the development and improvement of people's living standard in South Sudan.
- To gain the public opinion in favour and support for the bilateral friendly exchanges emphasis on closer people to people and cultural exchanges and cooperation.
- Further, enhance mutual coordination in regional and international affairs.

Yang also insisted on a neighbourly and friendly relationship between Sudan and South Sudan that will benefit the two peoples and help in maintaining peace and stability in the region. Yang also invited President Kiir to visit China. Yang ensured Chinese entrepreneur's investment and businesses in South Sudan, and exchanges of students and dispatching of Chinese medical teams to the country.

On 24 November 2011, Joseph Lual Acuil, special envoy of South Sudan's President and Minister of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management visited China and held talks



with Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi. At the meeting, Yang Jiechi commented on the bilateral relations and said, since the establishment of diplomatic ties between the two countries a sound start has been made in developing China-South Sudan relations. He said both sides have to experience closer contacts at all levels and cooperation in all areas. Yang emphasises on further expansion of cooperation in the fields of infrastructure, mining, agriculture and energy. Yang also added, “South Sudan and Sudan are both China’s friends, adding that China always firmly supports the peace process, and hopes the two African countries can actively cooperate with the mediation by the African Union and the United Nations, to properly solve differences through negotiations.” On 25 November, the visiting leader Joseph also met with Liu Guijin, special envoy of the Chinese Government on African Affairs, and both sides exchanged views on the situation in Sudan and South Sudan.

On 13 January 2012, Li Yuanchao, a senior official of the CPC visited South Sudan and met with President Salva Kiir Mayardit. At the meeting, Li said, “China attaches great importance to developing ties with South Sudan and is willing to enhance the friendship, strengthen the political trust, deepen the cooperation on tangible basis, promote the cultural exchange and enhance the bilateral cooperation within the framework of the FOCAC” (*Xinhua* 2012). On 23 April 2012, Chinese President Hu Jintao held talks with the visiting South Sudanese President Salva Kiir Mayardit, and both sides agree to expand cooperation and advance friendly ties. Hu said, “Bilateral friendly cooperation is in line with the fundamental interests of the two peoples, and also beneficial to the development of a new type of China-Africa strategic partnership as well as regional peace and development.” Hu proposed three points for developing bilateral friendly cooperation.

- To further beef up the bilateral political relations, expand dialogue at all levels, and enhance cooperation within the framework of the FOCAC.
- Expansion of pragmatic cooperation in the fields of economic and trade, energy and infrastructure by mutual benefit.
- To promote people-to-people exchanges, deepening cooperation in education, health, culture and personal training.

Kiir reiterated that South Sudan firmly adhere to one China policy, and he welcomed the Chinese enterprises to invest in his country and ensured South Sudan's active participation in the upcoming 5<sup>th</sup> ministerial meeting of FOCAC in Beijing. Kiir also met with the Chinese Vice Premier Li Keqiang. Li expressed his appreciation for Kiir's adherence to on China policy. In September 2013, Srop Deng Kuol, South Sudan's Ambassador to Ethiopia said, "South Sudan welcomes more investment from China and hopes the two countries could further enhance bilateral cooperation for mutual benefits" (*Xinhua* 2013). He added that South Sudan calls China to participate in the country's agriculture and industrialisation, and asks for the implementations of more development projects." In November 2013, South Sudan sent a delegation of 105 business groups to China, and its government stated that the visit of the delegation was aimed at strengthening business relations with China.

**Table No 4.3 : Chinese Leaders' visits to South Sudan, 2011-2013**

Year of visit	Name of the Chinese Leader	Leader's designation
2011	Jiang Weixin	Special Envoy of President Hu Jintao and Minister of Construction and Urban-Rural Development, PRC
	Li Zhiguo	First Ambassador of the Republic of South Sudan
	Yang Jiechi	Chinese Foreign Minister
	Liu Guijn	Special Representative of the Chinese Government on African Affairs and Darfur Issue, PRC
2012	Li Yuanchao	Minister of the Organisation Department of the CPC, PRC
	Li Jinjun	Vice Minister of

		International Department of the CPC Central Committee, PRC
2013	Zhong Jianhua (April, June, August, December)	Special Representative of the Chinese Government on African Affairs, PRC
	Ma Qiang	China's new ambassador to South Sudan

Sources: China's Foreign Policy-2011-2013

**Table No 4.4: South Sudan's high-level visits to China**

Year of Visit	Name of the South Sudan leaders	Leader's Designation
2011	Pagan Amum	Secretary General of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), South Sudan
	Joseph Lual Acuil	Minister of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management, South Sudan
2012	Salva Kiir Mayardit	Chairman of the SPLM and the President of South Sudan
	Eluzai Mogga Yokwe	South Sudan's First Ambassador to China
	Nhial Deng Ngial	Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, South Sudan
	Marial Awou	Deputy Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, South Sudan

2013	Stephen Dhieu Dau	Minister of Petroleum and Mining South Sudan
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*Sources:* China's Foreign Policy-2011-2013

#### **4.5 China-Sudan Defense & Security Relations, 1996-2013**

##### **4.5a Introduction**

China-Sudan defence relations are mainly limited to arms sale and very rare military visits & exchanges and training. During the civil wars in Sudan, China supplied arms to the Sudanese government, and later, after 1989, Omar Al-Bashir regime was assisted militarily by the Chinese government. The supply of arms reduced gradually after China began to participate in the UN initiative peace process in Sudan in 2004. The Chinese arms supply to Sudan was easily traced during the Darfur crisis because the Chinese made arms were prevalent among the Sudanese national army as well as with the Sudanese rebel groups. Though, the Bashir regime is dependent on China for weapons since he has been in power in Sudan. It is difficult to trace the Chinese weapons in Sudan after the crisis began to normalize, but certainly, China is still the prominent arms supplier for the Sudanese national army.

China-Africa security relations became prominent after it began to participate in Sudan's oil exploration and production in 1995. Initially, when the Chinese government was completely in support of Bashir's regime against the Sudanese rebel groups, the security of the Chinese investments, enterprises and the citizens were targeted by these rebel groups. The Sudanese national army was given the responsibility to provide security to Chinese interests in the country. The rebel groups in southern Sudan believed that China is a supporter of Bashir government and recognise it as an opposition force in their fight against their government. The Chinese companies were often targeted by these rebel groups, and they were threatened to shut down their projects in their region. On several occasions, the Chinese were kidnapped and later on released on ransom with the Chinese government, and at times they were also killed. Later on, China gradually changed its policy towards the southern Sudan, largely the Chinese government began to realise that Bashir government will fail to suppress the ever rising rebels in Sudan. China could also

foresee that the Darfur crisis will lead to the independence of South Sudan because the large scale violence had created a global influence. The US began to highlight the crisis and termed it as 'genocide'. The call for the peace process in Darfur very rapidly became a global consensus. An international movement to stop the Darfur crisis started and Al-Bashir regime were held responsible for the ongoing killings and violence in Sudan. China could foresee the future consequences of this the UN led peace process for Darfur crisis, and secondly, for its unconditional support to Al-Bashir also led worldwide condemnation for China, and it was also seen as a major actor responsible for the Darfur crisis. After 2004, the Chinese government began to mediate between the SPLM/A and Sudanese government to resolve the crisis and seek peace and stability in the region. By this time, China realised about its major stakes in the southern Sudan will be at high risk if Bashir fails and the SPLM/A will gain independence of southern Sudan. Therefore, China during the peace process acted as a mediator and began to support the SPML/A's interests at the same time the Chinese government played a major role in postponing Bashir's arrest and diplomatically saved him from the UNSC sanctions. After the independence of South Sudan in July 2011, the security challenges for the Chinese companies and citizens were reduced because of the overall stability of the region resulted in referendum in southern Sudan and subsequent establishment of the Republic of South Sudan. There are still security issues for the Chinese in Sudan as well as South Sudan because there are still some issues unsettled between the North and the South Sudan and China still proposing for peace and stability between the two neighbour largely because the conflict between them affects Chinese economic interests in the region.

Due to the Chinese security concerns in Sudan, in 2008, China used its bilateral ties to pressurise Bashir's regime to accept the UN peacekeeping forces in the southern Sudan. On 8 October 2011, President of South Sudan Salva Kiir Mayardit and Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir held joint talks to reach a consensus on some outstanding issues between the two countries. Al-Bashir said, "We reiterate our commitment not to return to the war square. We will work together to enhance peace and establish good relations on basis of good neighbourliness and mutual respect" (*Xinhua* 2011). He said, "Realisation of security and stability is associated with defusing the conflict and

preventing foreign intervention in our affairs. We should depend on our self-abilities and work together to establish a good relationship on basis of the historical ties between our peoples.” He added, “If we lost unity, at least we should win the peace. The international law abides us to observe the good neighbourliness. It is important that we work together to secure our borders and make them flexible to facilitate the movement of the citizens and commodities.” This statement suggests that China has been successful in their policy to pressurise the Al-Bashir regime to seek for peace and stability in the region. In the meeting, South Sudan President Salva Kiir Mayardit said, “We are committed to not going back to war again.” On 28 February 2012, Chinese Vice-President Xi Jinping raised his concerns before the visiting Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Ahmed Karti regarding the recent disputes between Sudan and South Sudan. The repeated attempt by the senior Chinese leaders to retrain differences between the governments of Sudan and South Sudan reflects the Chinese government security concerns in the region. Xi said, “Differences between Sudan and South Sudan have recently led to disputes, drawing attention from the international community and raising China’s concerns. China hopes the two countries remain patient and maintain communication, keeping in mind their fundamental interests and the overall regional situation” (*Xinhua* 2012). In the case of security issue of Sudan and South Sudan, a unique scenario has been created if we take in to account the past shared experiences between the Bashir’s regime and SPLM it is difficult for both the government to restrain their differences and disputes so fast. On the other hand, it is also difficult for the people of southern Sudan to forget the large scale humanitarian crisis created by Al-Bashir. So, it is difficult for the two peoples as well as two governments to resolve the unsettled issues quickly and maintain an amicable and cordial relations among them. Undoubtedly, the two peoples and the two governments do aspire for peace and stability in the region as they are already tired of such a long period of political crisis which the region has experienced earlier. But for China, their differences has become a major security challenge with the ever increasing Chinese economic expansion in the region. During the visit, Karti also met with his Chinese counterpart Yang Jiechi and exchanged views on bilateral relations. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hong Lei briefed about two foreign ministers meeting and said, “China and Sudan have enjoyed a long-standing relationship and fruitful cooperation in

all fields, bringing concrete benefits to their respective peoples. It is the common will of the two peoples to strengthen cooperative ties between the two countries.” Hong also added, “Oil is the economic lifeline shared by Sudan and South Sudan. The Chinese side will continue to make joint efforts with the international community to realise a peaceful coexistence between Sudan and South Sudan.” During the visit, Karti assured Xi to resolve Sudanese government differences with the South Sudan through negotiations ( *China Daily* 2012). Yang said to Karti, “The two countries will not achieve substantial development unless an appropriate solution is reached to address issues, including borders and oil-related interests.”

In March 2012, Liu Weimin made the remarks on the Zhong Jianhua, China’s Special Representative for African Affairs visited Sudan and South Sudan. He said, “The main purpose of Zhong’s visit was to exchange views with leaders of Sudan and South Sudan on bilateral relations and encourage the two sides to resolve differences through dialogue and negotiation, to maintain the overall situation of regional peace and stability” (*Xinhua* 2012). In March 2012, Hong Lei, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson commented on the report that suggested Omar Al-Bashir cancelled his planned visit to South Sudan because of the latter’s attack on Sudan’s oil area. Liu said, “We have noticed the reports, and urge both sides to handle disputes through negotiations properly.” The Chinese government uses every possible diplomatic channel to de-escalate the disputes between Sudan and South Sudan to protect interests of Chinese oil companies. On 10 April 2012, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) seized Heglig oil field which resulted in a ten-day battle with Sudanese army. Finally, the Sudanese army recaptures the Heglig oil fields. On 22 April 2012, Liu Weimin, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said, “Chinese oil companies and their partners have major projects in both Sudan and South Sudan. Their legitimate rights and interests deserve substantial protection.” He said, “The oil industry is an economic lifeline for both Sudan and South Sudan, calling on the two nations to remain rational and appropriately resolve oil disputes through negotiation.” On 24 April 2012, Zhong Sheng writes comments on the ongoing Heglig oil field dispute between Sudan and South Sudan in *People’s Daily*, and he says, the tension in oil rich Heglig region has reached a dangerous level, and on 18 April Omar Al-Bashir has declared war to South Sudan. He said Bashir has vowed to topple the government of

South Sudan. He finds that a war between Sudan and South Sudan will destroy their economies and ruin the hard-earned peaceful lives of the people of both countries. He observes that the Chinese government is maintaining balanced relations with both countries because the Chinese have considerable interests in both the countries. He urges to resolve their conflict through dialogue rather than war because it may hamper their long-term interests.

In April 2012, Chinese vice Premier Li Keqiang met with the visiting South Sudanese President Salva Kiir Mayardit in Beijing. Li emphasised on the security of Chinese investment and its people in South Sudan. He said, “China encourages more competent Chinese companies to invest in South Sudan, expressing hope the South Sudanese government will create a better investment environment and protect the security of employees of Chinese companies and their properties.” He added, “South Sudanese side should properly handle its oil cooperation with China and guarantee the stability and continuity of the cooperation” (*Xinhua* 2012). In May 2012, China raised its concern on the issue of ongoing dispute between Sudan and South Sudan. Chinese UN Ambassador Li Baodong said, “We hope Sudan and South Sudan actively provide their cooperation to the mediation efforts of the African Union and the international community, take practical steps to implement the AU roadmap and seek an early and proper solution of the relevant issues” (*Xinhua* 2012). The recent clash between the armies of Sudan and South Sudan stopped the channels of negotiations. On 29 May 2012, Mondaysemaya Kumba, acting charge of affairs at the South Sudan embassy in Beijing said to *China Daily*, “China, an old friend of Sudan and a new strategic friend of South Sudan, is playing a significant role mediating between the two countries...I believe, South Sudan President Salva Kiir had urged Beijing to use its friendship with Sudan to resume the talks.” He also added that “We hope the who can earnestly follow the African Union roadmap and the UN Security Council resolutions to resolve the outstanding issues through negotiations.” It is to be noted that whenever the government officials of Sudan and South Sudan interacts with Beijing, they express their eagerness to resolve the unsettled disputes through negotiations but at the ground level the situation is different and both sides can be held responsible for the rising the Chinese security challenges in the region.



For instance, in June 2013, Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir once again announced that South Sudan's oil exportation through the Sudanese territories would be stopped due to South Sudan's support for the Revolutionary Front rebel forces. His announcement raised the Chinese concerns over its oil supply, immediately, Hua Chunying, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson remarks that, "We call on both sides to remain calm and restrained, take care of each other's major concerns, implement the agreements and settle disputes through negotiations and consultations so as to safeguard the overall situation of the two sides." She pointed out, "China is closely watching the recent twists in relations between Sudan and South Sudan and their impact on the oil sector." On 28 September 2013, Luo Xiaoguang, Chinese ambassador to Sudan said in Khartoum,

"China appreciates the two parties adherence to the option of peace and urges them to find solutions to the outstanding issues between them through dialogue, and we reiterate China's readiness to play a vital role in enhancing the relations between the two countries." This statement had some impact on the Sudanese government as, soon after Luo statement, Al-Bashir said at the Sudanese National Assembly, "All barriers have been removed, and we are currently moving to implement the cooperation agreements and reactivate all the mechanism. The two countries are seeking, with a political will, to resolve the issues which are still outstanding." He added, "I will work with my brother Salva Kiir Mayardit to find a solution for the Abyei issue to be satisfactory to all the political components and local communities in the area" (*Xinhua* 2013). On 22 October 2013, Al-Bashir visited South Sudan and held talks with Salva Kiir, and two sides issued a joint communiqué and reached a consensus that both sides will prevent support and host of armed groups in their country. Hua Chunying, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, welcomed President Al-Bashir's attitude towards the territory of Abyei in the regular press briefings. In November 2013, Liu Jieyi, the rotating UN Security Council president and China's permanent representative to the UN had a closed-door consultation with Sudan and South Sudan leaders. After the meeting Liu said, the issue of Sudan-South Sudan has been closely monitored by 15 member council and recently seen "encouraging development" in the issue. He said Al-Bashir and Kiir have exchanged visits and agreed on issues of border crossing, the establishment of a safe demilitarised border zone and oil transportation (*Xinhua* 2013). Peter Shadbolt (2011) suggests that the rising conflict in

South Sudan impacted the China's oil import as there was a drastic drop in oil production the country, therefore, China began to participate in the UN led peace process in the region.

Since the 1990s, China is a major supplier of military equipment and small arms to Sudan (Kotecki 2008). The military cooperation and arms supplies is a significant area and major component of their bilateral ties. According to Large (2008), since 1971, China has been a major arms supplier to Sudan, and Chinese arms supplies were prominent during the Sudan civil war (1983-2005) and the Darfur crisis (2003-2007). In the 1990s, the Sudanese government generated funds from the oil fields in southern Sudan, so to be in power it became utmost important for the government to control the oil producing areas by suppressing the rebel groups by force, for which the government required weapons (Attree 2012). The Sudanese government used a large share of oil revenue to buy weapons. Despite the UN Security Council arms embargo on Sudan, from 1996 to 2006, its government has bought aircraft and small arms worth US\$700 million from China (ibid.).

In November 2011, Sudanese Defense Minister Abdel Rahim Mohamed Hussein visited China and met with Chinese counterpart Liang Guanglie. Both sides pledged to strengthen military relations and deepen political cooperation between military forces. Liang said, "As an important part of bilateral relations, China-Sudan military ties have developed well. We hope to advance the relationship with the joint efforts of Sudan." Ken Bacon, President of the non-profit group Refugees International and a former Pentagon official, made a trip to Darfur, and Ken claims that the Chinese weapons were spotted in the Darfur region and these weapons were used in the conflict. Ken said, "There is a military and arms relationship between China and Sudan" (Nwazota 2006).

#### **4.5b *Chinese arms supply to Sudan***

Before China began to invest in GNPOC in December 1996, it has already conducted arms dealings with many Sudanese governments. China began to sell advanced aircraft to Sudan in the late 1960s. In between 1969 to 1985, during the Nimeiri government in Sudan, China was a major arms supplier to the country. The first reported shipment of

arms to Sudan was under the Sadiq al-Mahd regime (1986-1989). The Chinese arms sale to Sudan increased substantially in the 1990s due to Sudan's civil war and the promise of improved finances and enhanced international credit derived from its oil potential. According to a Sudanese government official, after 1980 China became a major supplier of anti personnel and anti tank mines to Sudan. After 1995, China's weapon deliveries to Sudan included fighter aircraft, helicopters, tanks and ammunition. In 1997, soon after the outbreak of the crisis in Darfur, China delivered six or seven F-7M fighter aircraft to Sudan. In 1997, the SPLA overran Sudanese government garrison towns, and in one town alone, there was one Chinese 37 mm anti-aircraft gun, five Chinese made T-59 tanks, and eight Chinese 122 mm towed howitzers abandoned by the government army. In 2003, China sold twenty A-5C Fantan fighter bombers, and in 2006, it supplied six K-8 advanced trainer aircraft to Sudanese government (Shinn 2009). From 2003 to 2008, China was the largest weapons supplier of Sudan, and during this period, Sudan purchases Chinese weapons worth average \$14 million every year. In 2006, a UN panel of experts in Darfur collected shell casings in Darfur which revealed the weapons used were made in China. In 2007, at the Independence Day celebration, Sudan displayed the Chinese made infantry fighting vehicles and model tanks (ibid.).

In 2008, Chinese made military trucks were tracked by the *BBC* in Darfur, and it reported that China was helping the Sudanese government military in Darfur. China supplied A5 Fantan fighter jets to Sudan and provided training to Sudanese pilots. China did not respond to the *BBC* findings in Darfur because its public position is that it abides by all UN arms embargoes. According to the UN Panel of Experts report, Chinese North Industries Corporation (Norinco) sold arms, ammunition and related materials to the SPLA, the government armed forces of South Sudan. The report claims that Chinese supplied arms to SPLA and the Sudanese Government army was instrumental in prolonging and escalating the war. The report says, China supplied 9,574 automatic rifles with 2 million rounds of ammunition, 100 HJ 73D anti-tank guided missile launchers (plus 1,200 missiles), 40,000 type-69 high explosive anti-tank rockets, 2, 394 grenade launchers to the SPLA and the Sudan government forces (Shadbolt 2011). Although China continues to sell weapons to Sudan, in line with UN sanctions China stipulated that

“weapons sold to the Sudan government were not to be used in Darfur and did not sell arms to non-state identities” (Shinn 2009).

According to United Nations Comtrade data, in 2002 and 2005, China has supplied weapons and small arms worth US\$1 million and the US \$23 million respectively (Phillip Manyok 2016). Since 1999, China’s arms sale to Sudan increased exponentially because of increase in Sudan’s oil production. According to Human Rights First report, Sudan’s small arms purchase tripled between 1999 and 2000, it quadrupled in 2001 and increased to about 15 times in 2002. The report suggests by the end of 2005, the import of small arms by Sudan increased to 680 times that of 1999. Phillip Manyok (2016) suggest in the period from 1999-2005, China-Sudan military cooperation increased with the significant increase in Chinese arms supply to Sudan. According to Human Rights First report, Chinese government helped Sudan to build weapon factory in Khartoum. These factories helped Al-Bashir regime to produce rocket launchers, machine guns, mortars, ammunitions and anti tank weapons and these were used against the antigovernment forces in southern Sudan. During the Darfur crisis, in 2007 and 2008, Chinese made weapons were used widely including 28 attack helicopters, 44 combat planes, 25 light tanks and 350 battle tanks (Darge 2011). Between 2001 to 2008, China supplied 72 percent of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) to Sudan, and other Chinese supplied weapons also included fighter aircraft, helicopters, tanks, ammunitions, anti-personnel and anti-tank mines (Atrree 2013). The conflict in Darfur started in 2003, and it escalated in the next successive years until 2008, and in this period, Chinese arms export to Sudan was regular and increased in type and quantity (Ermias Egziabher ). According to the UN Comtrade data, in 2002, China supplied arms to Sudan of worth US\$ 1 million, and it increased to US\$ 23 million in 2005. From 2003-2005, China supplied aircraft equipment to Sudan worth US\$ 57 million. After the onset of Darfur crisis, China was the largest supplier of arms to Sudan.

China provided weapons and diplomatic support to Al-Bashir regime in exchange for its oil supply. It is estimated 80 percent of Sudan’s oil revenue goes to buy arms (Miller 2007). Sudanese government armed forces failed to control the Darfur crisis with small arms. Therefore, Sudan demanded heavy weapons such as mortars, military trucks, and

fighter aircrafts, etc. (*Xinhua* 2006). According to the report by Amnesty International, China has always been supplying military vehicles and military experts to Sudan. The report suggests that there were 222 heavy military vehicles were found in Darfur which was manufactured by Dongfeng Automobile of China. In October 2005, a consensus was reached between the PLA and Sudanese Minister of National Defense to train the Sudanese soldiers in China. During the Darfur crisis, an official from southern Sudan said to the Human Rights First, “China is the enemy number one. They are the one who kept Bashir in power for so long, providing him with weapons to try and win the war in the South. They are the ones who supplied him with helicopter gunships on the attacks on Bentiu district of Darfur, and other places. They are evil. They are the ones providing military support to the government on Darfur” (HRF 2007).

#### ***4.5c Security of Chinese Citizens & Enterprises***

Sudan is one of the African countries where the Chinese have serious security challenges of its citizens and enterprises. In Sudan, since China began to invest in the GNPOC projects a large number of Chinese workers were sent there. China admitted that it sent about 10,000 Chinese workers in a team to Sudan to complete the GNPOC project before the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of National Islamic Front (NIF) on 30 June 1999. Soon after the independence of South Sudan in July 2011, in about nine months the number of Chinese citizens and commercial actors increased substantially. As China’s larger stakes are in the South Sudan, and after independence, the scope in this region increased for the Chinese beyond the oil production, a large number of Chinese enterprises were interested in the infrastructure development projects in South Sudan. The infrastructure projects included, dams and irrigation system, water treatment facilities, municipal buildings, hospitals schools, electricity grids, power plants, telecommunications, bridges and roads. The Chinese government plays a major role in providing access and security to the Chinese private commercial actors in South Sudan.

In most of the cases, the rebel groups directly attack the oil fields or the Chinese invested projects leading to serious casualties. In 2004, in the western Sudan, two Chinese workers were abducted by anti-government rebel group (*China Daily* 2004). In 2007, a rebel group in Darfur attacked a Chinese invested oil field and abducted two Chinese workers,

the head of the rebel group sends a message after the abduction, “the latest attack is a message to the Chinese companies in particular, the Chinese companies are the biggest investors in the Sudanese oil industry which incorporate the regime in power” (Osman 2007). In 2008, in Southern Kordofan, 9 Chinese CNPC workers were abducted by the rebel group Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), and later killed five of them. The Commander of the JEM said the reason behind the killing is the exclusion of local population from oil wealth (Large 2009). On 2 October 2011, a group of armed men attacked an oil field in South Kordofan province in southern Sudan that killed a Chinese engineer and wounded the other. While the employees of Chinese oil company were working in its oil field the assailants opened fire on them (*Xinhua* 2011). It seems that the violent situation in South Kordofan oil fields sustained and the government of South Sudan failed to control and stabilise it. And in January 2012, the Chinese government had to dispatch a rescue team of six members to South Kordofan state. The immediate cause of sending the team was the Chinese oil company camp was attacked by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, and there were altogether 47 Chinese were working at the time of the attack, 17 of them successfully managed to flee from the site, but 29 of them were made hostages by the rebel group. The Chinese embassy in Sudan sent its four official along with the Sudanese authorities to negotiate the release of the Chinese hostages with the rebel groups Arno Taloudy, Spokesperson of the SPLA told *Xinhua* “Armed clashes took place between our forces and the Sudanese army at an area near Al-Abbasiya Tagali town in South Kordofan. We took control of the area, and 29 Chinese were seized.” He said, “The Chinese workers have been transported to a safe area, and they are in good health.” The Chinese government raised its concern about the safety of the Chinese workers and followed an emergency mechanism to rescue the workers. Soon after the incident, Chinese Ministry of Commerce warned about the security risk of the Chinese companies in Sudan. The Ministry statement said, “Chinese companies should closely monitor changes in the country’s security situation and take stronger precautions to ensure the safety of lives and property.” Sudan’s ruling National Congress Party (NCP) condemned the attack and blamed the South Sudan government. Haj Majid Suwar, the NCP political mobilisation secretary, said, “The hands of the SPLM, Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and the South Sudan government are stained with the blood of

the citizens of South Kordofan and the Blue Nile because they keep providing support to the SPLM's northern sector." He said, "South Sudan is responsible for the Chinese workers being held captive and the displacement and killings of innocent citizens for its support to the rebels in South Kordofan." Such harsh official statement from the Sudanese government official for South Sudan suggests the differences between the two governments are still prominent. The Sudanese government is probably not very happy about the developing relations between China and South Sudan. The Chinese government used multiple channels and finally all 29 kidnapped Chinese workers were freed. These kidnappings and killings of the Chinese workers by the anti-government rebel groups in Sudan are one of the reasons that Chinese government began to pressurise the Al-Bashir government to seek for peace and stability in the region. The Chinese economic ambitions have repeatedly been "spoiled by Sudan's gloomy security climate which enables to think critically to resume going out from Sudan" (Holslag 2009). Since 2004, the violence in Darfur continues to escalate, and so the insecurity and risk for the Chinese oil operations and workers also increased.

On 17 December 2013, 12 Chinese workers were stranded in a sand pit near the Nile, Chinese embassy and South Sudan government worked in coordination to rescue all the 12 stranded workers. The Chinese embassy in South Sudan issued safety tips for the Chinese citizens and institution working there. Hua Chunying, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, said, "China will take all necessary measures to protect the safety of its nationals and organisations." The other forms of violence are also seen against the Chinese in Sudan that has emerged due to the conflict of interests with the local Sudanese people. For instance, Chinese immigrated to Sudan have opened "China shops" and are indulge in a retail business such as leather products, textile products, toys, small household appliances and electronic goods (Park 2009). The Chinese businessman usually sales the Chinese made goods which are cheaper to the local manufacturer's price, and they repatriate the profit earn back to China. This causes a conflict of interests between the Chinese businessman and the local ones.

#### **4.5d Chinese Peacekeeping Operation in Sudan**

In July 2007, the Resolution 1769 of the UNSC authorised the deployment of UN-AU peacekeepers in Darfur. China also provided its peacekeeping forces in the UN-AU peacekeeping operations in Darfur. On 15 November 2011, the Chinese government announced the dispatch of its first police squad to participate in the United Nations peacekeeping mission in South Sudan. The official statement said, “The 14 member squad, composed of police officers from the southwestern municipality of Chongqing has left for South Sudan.” The squad members included experts on criminal investigation, fire-fighting, departure and entry, public security, training as well as traffic and patrol. In February 2012, 52 UN-AU peacekeepers were abducted by the anti-government sect Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in Darfur. On the issue, Hong Lei, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson condemned the attack and said, China will continue to support the UN-AU peacekeeping operation and the political process in resolving the Darfur crisis. In 2011, China supported the UNSC Resolution 2155 for the United Nation Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) with the responsibility to protect South Sudan’s oil installations and workers. China provided an infantry battalion of 700 soldiers in the mission (Zhou Hang 2014). The ongoing conflict in South Sudan prevents the stability and normalcy in the region which is necessary for the development of social and economic infrastructure of the country, and it affects the Chinese invested projects and its benefits (Zhou 2014).

In July 2013, the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) was attacked by a rebel group at Khor Abeche in southern Sudan resulted in the killing of seven Tanzanian peacekeepers. The UN issued a statement that read as, “The Secretary General condemns this heinous attack on UNAMID, the third in three weeks, and expects that the Government of Sudan will take swift action to bring the perpetrators to justice” (*Xinhua* 2013).

In December 2013, China sent the first squad of the ninth peacekeeping contingent for an eight month UN peacekeeping mission. The squad includes 105 personnel from the PLA’s Jinan Military Region, and so far they have participated in four times in Sudan peacekeeping mission. Since 2007, it will be the longest term Chinese peacekeeping



mission in Sudan. The peacekeeper's duties include building fortifications, repairing airports, and construction of bridges and roads. The Political Commissar of the contingent Li Songfeng said, "The squads have enhanced emergency defence training, including light weapons, individual soldier tactics, security alert and dealing with camp attacks" (*Xinhua* 2013).

#### **4.6 Conclusions**

Sudan is a major partner of China in Africa in all three aspects, political, defence and security. In the political aspect, Sudan is a global ally to China. This is because both the countries share traditional friendship due to their similar experience of struggle against the imperial and colonial powers before they established into a free state. Sudan was one among the few African countries that recognised and established diplomatic relations with the PRC in the late 1950s. The third world solidarity shared between the first generations leaders of both sides gave a common platform to develop in depth political understanding and mutual trust. This mutual trust has worked as a basic foundation for the China-Sudan political relations. Throughout, the four decades they have been tested and manifested as a major global ally. For example, in 1971, Sudan worked to win support for the PRC's membership at the UN. On several occasions, China used its veto power at the UN Security Council to save Sudan from UN sanctions.

China began to seek a new policy to Africa which was reflected in Jiang Zemin's tour to Africa in 1996. The major change that came about in the China-Sudan ties in 1995, due to their engagements in the oil business. After that, the bilateral political relations developed in accordance with the Chinese oil interests in Sudan, and Sudanese government's reliance on the Chinese oil imported money and military cooperation to suppress southern Sudan rebel groups to remain in power. After 1995, the leaders from the two sides experienced high political understanding and mutual trust. Sudan's oil supply became a significant means for the achievements of China's economic ambitions. The Chinese diplomacy from 1996-2013, circulates to maintain and safeguard the security of Sudan's oil supply to China. In the initial period throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s, China provided supports the Omar Al-Bashir's government without much consideration of its international implications. Throughout this phase, China avoided its global criticisms for

its support to Al-Bashir's regime. In fact, this was the phase, when China emerged as an important economic power in the world which was unprecedented. Now, China was acknowledged as a major global power, and the world also began to expect from China to bear the global responsibilities and duties of being a major global power. Secondly, Omar Al-Bashir's government and its national armed forces failed to address the economic exclusion of oil production southern region of Sudan and; it also failed to control and suppress the southern Sudan rebel groups. This led to a major escalation of violence and conflict in Sudan, which gradually became an international issue of a humanitarian crisis. Looking at the incapability of the Al-Bashir's government to deal with the crisis in its southern region, which by now, has taken a shape of serious security threat to China's oil supply and the Chinese workers, and at the same time, it became imminent for the Chinese government to respond to the UN led peace process in Darfur crisis, finally, the PRC government changes its long standing diplomatic position on Sudan. The Chinese government began to persuade and also pressurise the Al-Bashir government in Sudan to transform their policy of brutal suppression of southern Sudan rebel groups and go for the resolution of the political crisis through peace talks and negotiations. By now, Al-Bashir's regime was dependent on the Chinese to a great extent, and Al-Bashir had already become a prime target of the West especially the US for his prominent role in the Darfur crisis. Omar Al-Bashir seems to have no other options but to accept the Chinese proposal to pursue peaceful resolutions of the Darfur crisis.

After that, China's policy towards the southern Sudan and the SPLM changed, and the Chinese leaders began to approach leaders of the SPLM directly, rather than following their previous policy of dealing them through the Sudanese government indirectly. The Chinese government acted as a mediator in the UN led resolution of the Darfur crisis. This policy shift helped China to gain many advantages in their favour. First of all, the Chinese government successfully secured its invested oil production projects in South Sudan as the majority of its oil projects are in the southern region. China manages to influence Salva Kiir Mayardit during the resolution of the Darfur crisis, and the subsequent, referendum in southern Sudan to found and establish the Republic of South Sudan. The Chinese government succeeded in their attempt to establish friendly political relations with the newly found South Sudan, without damaging its ties with Omar Al-

Bashir. Soon after, the establishment of South Sudan, the Chinese leaders frequently visited Juba to strengthen the newly established diplomatic ties further, but after visiting Juba, these leaders also visited Khartoum. During the visits, it was seen that the leaders of Sudan, as well as South Sudan, reiterate along with the Chinese leaders of the peaceful resolution of the unsettled outstanding issues between Khartoum and Juba through peace talks and negotiations. There were major unsettled disputes still existed especially of oil fields between Sudan and South Sudan, that often led to violence and conflict in both the countries particularly in the oil fields. The attacks or violence at the oil fields by the armies of two sides often harmed the Chinese oil interests and security of its investment and nationals. The Chinese government began to warn Khartoum and Juba repeatedly for providing security of its investment and safety of Chinese nationals. Repeated attempts by the Chinese leaders helped Khartoum and Juba to remain in the process of resolution of disputes through negotiations. On several occasions, the conflict escalated between Khartoum and Juba, but with the Chinese efforts and pressure, both sides resume talks and even exchanged visits. Now, the security of the Chinese invested oil production projects, enterprises and safety of Chinese nationals has become the major aims and objectives of the Chinese political relations with Sudan and South Sudan. Secondly, China used its political ties with the Al-Bashir regime to depict itself as major actors in the resolution of the conflict between Sudan and the southern Sudan.

From 1996 to 2013, China-Africa Defence relations had varied implications in Sudan, but the Chinese purpose of defence cooperation had always been the same i.e. export of the Chinese manufactured military weapons to Sudan. China also took advantage of the escalating civil wars in Sudan to expand its Defence ties with Al-Bashir's regime. China's arms sale to Sudan is the major component of China-Africa relations.

From 1996 to 2013, China-Africa Security relations have changed its method earlier to suit the Sudanese government and later to Chinese government. Throughout, the late 1990s and early 2000s, China primarily supported the Sudan government approach of forceful suppression of rebel groups to provide security of Chinese investment and nationals. This method helped China to benefit economically largely because of the rise in demand for the Chinese weapons in Sudan due to continued escalation of the crisis.

China shifted to a policy of peace in resolving the conflict between Sudan and the southern Sudan due to many other reasons, but one of the prime reasons was the suppressive method of Al-Bashir using armed forces failed to provide security of the Chinese investments and citizens. By late 2007, China already established itself as a major global economic and political power, and so it became an international obligation for China to continue to boost its arms market in Sudan by taking advantage of the humanitarian crisis the country. Before 2007, China always avoided its participation in the international led peace process in Sudan and had been maintaining its policy of non-interference. It is not difficult to speculate the reasons, one is the perpetual civil wars and political crisis in the late 1990s, and early 2000s have certainly helped China boost its defence industry through large scale arms sales to the Sudanese government. Secondly, China's arms sales and military cooperations with Sudan helped China to consolidate and strengthen its political mutual trust and ties with Al-Bashir government. Undoubtedly, Chinese government affinity to Al-Bashir favoured China in securing oil production projects in Sudan, which was the primary goal of the Chinese to accomplish their economic ambitions. The Chinese government arrangements with Al-Bashir repeatedly failed to provide a stable environment for the Chinese oil companies in Sudan, but it did secure oil production projects for China. Before 2008, Chinese oil companies and national did suffer due to constant unrest and violence in Sudan, but the major diplomatic and military support of China to Al-Bashir established the Chinese oil companies as a significant player in Sudan oil business. By late 2007, China had already secured a majority of oil fields in Sudan, and now the Chinese government major concern was the security of Chinese invested oil production projects and safety of its nationals. Therefore, the peace and stability of Sudan were the only way out to address China's security challenges in the country. In 2007, China supported the UN Security Council Resolutions for the deployment of UN-AU hybrid peacekeeping operation in Darfur. From July 2007 to 2013, China reformulated its non-interference policy to Sudan and began to participate in the UN led peace process and also deployed police squad as part of the UN-AU peacekeeping mission. The Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson began to speak loud and clear at any forms of conflict or violence in Sudan and South Sudan. At the same time, the bilateral visits at all levels between Sino-Sudan and Sino-South Sudan have

seen the reiteration of the Chinese government position on peaceful resolution of unsettled issues between Khartoum and Juba through negotiations. China has been successful in creating diplomatic pressure on Sudan and South Sudan governments to seek peace and stability in their relations. Undoubtedly, Chinese government effort was commendable in transforming the situation in Sudan and South Sudan. It is also a hard earn peace and stability for the two peoples after decades of civil wars in the region, but China's prime interest behind this humanitarian action is the security of its oil fields, investments, enterprises and safety of its nationals in Sudan and South Sudan.

The soft power policy is prevalent in China-Sudan relations in the given period from 1996 to 2013. In the late 1990s, China supported the ruling regimes of Sudan in their effort to fight internal insurgencies caused by the anti-government rebel groups, but in the mid-2000s, China began to participate in the UN-AU led peace initiative. China also used its friendly diplomatic ties with the Al-Bashir regime to persuade and mediate the disputes between the Sudanese government and the southern Sudan. China's soft power approach was also seen in its engagements with the leaders of southern Sudan, which subsequently resulted in successful establishment of diplomatic ties between the PRC and South Sudan. The policy of soft power helped China to mediate and pressurise the governments of Sudan and South Sudan for the resolution of Darfur crisis through peace talks and negotiations. Even after the independence of South Sudan in July 2011, China mediated between the governments of Sudan and South Sudan to resolve the unsettled disputes through peaceful negotiations. There were incidents of violent disputes between the two armies in the unsettled oil fields and China often called for restraint and to restore the stability and normalcy of the region. Chinese government attracts the governments of two Sudan through its lucrative Chinese companies' infrastructure investments, and China also deters to stop its infrastructure projects if the suitable environment is not guaranteed in the region.

In 2006, China adopted the 'New Strategic Partnership' for the development of friendship between China and Africa. This policy also had impacts on China-Sudan relations. The three main connotations of China-Africa new type of strategic partnership were prevalent in the Sino-Sudan ties from 1996 to 2013.

- First, on political aspects, the mutual trust between China and Sudan strengthened unprecedentedly, but on equality aspects, Sudan, as well as South Sudan, has compromised in their engagements with China in the given period. From 1996 to 2013, the political understanding and mutual trust between the governments and leaders of China and Sudan strengthen in all three aspects of their relations. In between 1996 to June 2011, China provided support to the Omar al-Bashir's regime, which was facing serious charges of a humanitarian crisis for its alleged role in the Darfur crisis. China supplied weapons and arms to Sudanese government after it faced arms embargo of the West including the US. China often has greater priorities in its security relations with Sudan and South Sudan, and most of the time the Chinese government had pressurised the Sudanese side in their terms against any forms of security challenges emerged in that respective country.
- Second, China-Sudan relations in the given period have followed the economic win-win cooperation, and no doubt, the Sudan and its people have benefitted economically because of large scale Chinese investment in Sudan's oil production infrastructure. China's security in Sudan was prerequisite conditions for major economic cooperation between the two sides. The strengthening of mutual trust between the Chinese and the Sudanese leaders due to their military cooperation often led to economic benefits limited largely to the Sudanese leaders and their regime.
- Third, the China-Sudan relations provided a platform for both sides for cultural exchanges and mutual learning through expansion of their ties at various levels, such as education, health, agriculture, communications, etc.

The independent variables are economic interests, political trust, security and, Africa in the study of China-Sudan relations. China is the dependable variable has undergone many changes due to the changes in the independent variables namely, economic interests, political trust, security and Africa. The Chinese economic interest in Sudan in the period from 1996 to 2013 was primarily limited its arms sales and oil imports. In the given period, the political trust between the two sides deepened further, and China had the advantages to secure more oil production projects and arms market in Sudan. China faced

serious security challenges in Sudan, and the Chinese government used its diplomatic channels to improve its security situation in the country. China's relations with Sudan in the given period have benefitted the Sudanese people and the governments of Sudan and South Sudan. Long standing political crisis in Sudan was resolved through a peaceful referendum in July 2011, which resulted in the independence of South Sudan. After July 2011, the ongoing crisis in the region was stopped, but still, there were relatively small scale disputes between the two Sudan. China's diplomatic effort in mediating the unsettled disputes between Sudan and South Sudan had positive outcomes. China's policy on Sudan is the intervening variable. In the given period, the Chinese policies to Sudan have multifaceted influences in their ties. Chinese interests in Sudan have been safeguarded, and Sudan has benefitted economically as well as politically.

China-Sudan relations (1996-2013) have helped China's rise in the international system. Since 1995, Sudan's oil supply had been a prime reason for China's manufacturing led development. From 1996 to 2013, is a significant phase for the Chinese economy, and it achieved an unprecedented growth and expansion largely due to uninterrupted oil supply from the continent. China's military cooperation and assistance to Sudan's ruling regime helped the Chinese leaders to secure oil fields projects in the continent. China's economic rise made it a major global player in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century and also a major participant in the international institutions. China's involvement in the Sudan's peace and stability process in particular during the Darfur crisis to address its security challenges in the continent, provides the Chinese government and its leaders a major platform to interact and work with the United Nations as a responsible global power.

In the case study of China-Sudan relations, it is found that China experiences political as well as economic influences in Sudan. Security of the Chinese interests in Sudan is an issue of serious concern for the Chinese government. Though China is working on its security issues in Sudan but so far the situation of Chinese security in the country is not yet under control. China's repeated efforts in this regard has improved the overall security environment in the continent. China often put pressure on the Sudanese government to ensure security of the Chinese interests in he country. In the case of Sudan, so far, even the ruling regime has failed to stabilise and retain normalcy in the region.

Therefore, at present, China cannot ensure security of its interests in Sudan. No doubt, China is expanding its economic as well as political influences in Sudan as well as South Sudan. But unless, China safeguard its security in Sudan, it will be difficult for the Chinese government to aspire for maximalist interests in the region.



## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSIONS

Since the early 1950s, the China-Africa Political relations have developed at various levels to set solid foundations of bilateral ties in contemporary times. In the first four decades of their bilateral ties, China and Africa shared similar ideology and experiences of resistance against the western colonial and imperial powers. China and Africa have struggled together to create new international platforms and space to challenge the hegemony of superpowers. The Bandung Conference also is known as the Asian-African Conference was held in Indonesia from 18 to 24 April 1955, was the first major shared platform between China and Africa to express solidarity with each other and set the foundation for south-south cooperation. Mao Zedong identifies Africa to be a suitable partner in the contemporary world order for the third world solidarity. Zhou Enlai has played a key role in implementing Mao's policy to Africa. In fact, Zhou's role in Africa in the 1950s and 1960s set a strong foundation not only between China and Africa but also between the people of two sides. China compromises with its economic development while assisting Africa financially and militarily. The strong foundation of the bilateral ties is because of the hard earned African political trust by the Chinese. In the late 1970s, China under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping followed a policy that focused on domestic economic development, and its foreign policy should serve the central economic task. China almost abandons Africa and subsequently, the bilateral relations weakened. Later in the early 1980s, Zhao Ziyang under the framework of reinvigorated foreign policy made a tour of 11 African countries. Zhao's tour and his Africa policy re strengthening the bilateral ties which were weakened in the 1970s due China's inclination towards the west. Zhao's visit to Africa was part of China's ambitious program of economic modernization through expanding trade and economic cooperation with Africa. Zhao followed anti-hegemonic policy in Africa to encourage resistance against the expansion of superpower on the continent.

In May 1996, Jiang Zemin state visits to six Africa countries were a major breakthrough in reviving and consolidating the Sino-Africa relations. Jiang formulated China's new Africa policy aimed at strengthening solidarity and cooperation with African countries and work together to contribute to world peace and development. Jiang called for long-term stable China-Africa relationships to foster a sincere friendship between the two sides and become each other's reliable "all-weather friends". He calls for African support to promote the establishment of a new international political and economic order in the 21st century. In fact, the present China-Africa relations is an outcome of Jiang Zemin's Africa policy, and the bilateral relations have developed under the framework of this policy.

The Chinese President Hu Jintao carried forward Jiang Zemin's Africa Policy and further deepens and strengthens the all-round cooperation between China and Africa. The bilateral exchanges and engagements were encouraged in various areas, and he has used all the possible platforms to increase contacts with the African leaders.

On 5 November 2004 entitled "Enhancing mutual trust and promoting common development." He read out the 3-point initiatives of Hu Jintao to upgrade Sino-African relations, which are as follows:

- To Build on the traditional friendship and push for new progress in China-Africa relations.
- To persists in mutual assistance and mutual benefit and promote common prosperity of China-Africa relations.
- To cooperate even more closely to safeguard the rights and interests of the developing countries.

On 19 July 2006, during the leader's meeting of six developing countries namely, India, Mexico, South Africa, Brazil, Republic of Congo and China, Hu Jintao said the international community should pay more attention to Africa's stability and development. He is quoted as "without stability in Africa, there will be no world peace. Without development in Africa, there will be no world prosperity." He urged the developing countries to implement New Partnership for Africa's development (FOCAC Archives 2006). On 21 April 2005, Hu Jintao delivered a speech titled, "Seize the opportunity for

all-round cooperation and common development" at the Asian-African Business Summit 2005, Jakarta. Hu Jintao urged to establish a new type of strategic partnership for closer cooperation between Asian and African countries. He pointed out that China will strengthen cooperation with Africa in the following fields.

- Deepen political relations of equality and mutual trust.
- Broaden win-win economic cooperation.
- Promote balanced and harmonious global development.
- Strengthen Cooperation and mutual support in international affairs.

To forge a new type of China-Africa strategic partnership and strengthen our cooperation in more areas and at a higher level, the Chinese Government will take the following eight steps:

- Double its 2006 assistance to Africa by 2009.
- Provide US\$3 billion of preferential loans and US\$2 billion of preferential buyer's credits to Africa in the next three years.
- Set up a China-Africa development fund which will reach US\$5 billion to encourage Chinese companies to invest in Africa and provide support to them.
- Build a conference centre for the African Union to support African countries in their efforts to strengthen themselves through unity and support the process of African integration.
- Cancel debt in the form of all the interest-free government loans that matured at the end of 2005 owed by the heavily indebted poor countries and the least developed countries in Africa that have diplomatic relations with China.
- Further, open up China's market to Africa by increasing from 190 to over 440 the number of export items to China receiving zero-tariff treatment from the least developed countries in Africa having diplomatic ties with China.
- Establish three to five trade and economic cooperation zones in Africa in the next three years.
- Over the next three years, train 15,000 African professionals; send 100 senior agricultural experts to Africa; set up 10 special agricultural technology

demonstration centres in Africa; build 30 hospitals in Africa and provide RMB 300 million of grant for providing artemisinin and building 30 malaria prevention and treatment centres to fight malaria in Africa; dispatch 300 youth volunteers to Africa; build 100 rural schools in Africa; and increase the number of Chinese government scholarships to African students from the current 2000 per year to 4000 per year by 2009.

On 19 July 2012, Hu Jintao while addressing the opening ceremony of the 5th Ministerial Conference of the FOCAC at the Great Hall of the People proposes measures on five priority areas to strengthen China-Africa relations.

- Expansion of the Chinese investment to support sustainable development in Africa.
- China's economic and technical assistance for the development of the African people.
- Chinese government support for the African integration process.
- Jointly work to deepen people to people friendship further.
- China will promote peace and stability in Africa.

After 1996, the Chinese diplomacy succeeded in convincing to the African countries that we belong to the third world with common struggles, challenges, and goals. In this process, China at times compromised by its domestic development and provided much needed economic assistance to Africa. The interesting as well as significant is China succeeded diplomatically, politically as well as economically in Africa without compromising with 'one China Policy'. The June 1989 Tiananmen incident was a breakthrough that reminded China the significance of Africa for it to survive in the contemporary world order. In the aftermath of the incident, the immediate response from the African leaders in favour of China was largely an outcome or influences of the earlier generations' Chinese leaders' sincere efforts in establishing a solid foundation for the Sino-Africa relations. For instance, in 1964 Zhou Enlai visited 10 African countries to develop an idea about its people, socio-economic and political situation, and accordingly

laid a foundation of Sino-Africa relations. The non-interference policy and south-south cooperation were a new lesson for the Chinese leaders in formulating their foreign policy.

Jiang Zemin played a key role in shaping the contemporary Sino-African relations. He outlined new policies to establish a long term, more reliable and interdependent relations to seek common interests at national as well as international level. His idea was to an emphasis on creating a new political and economic order. He was probably the first Chinese leader to come up with the notion of Africa's economic development and political stability. China has been successfully set up a platform for a long-term strategic engagement with Africa in the fields of economic, politics and culture. Later on, Hu Jintao and now, Xi Jinping have been working on Jiang's outlined Africa policy, but some new additions are made whenever it is required.

After 2006, China began to further deepen its political relation with Africa by increasing its channels of engagement such as exchanges between legislative bodies; exchanges between political parties; to establish consultation mechanism; cooperation in internal affairs; and exchanges between local governments. These forms of engagements helped China in gaining more confidence upon African sides in securing its interests and stakes in the continent. For many, it may sound the engagements are interdependent between China and the African countries but actually in many ways or forms of engagement China is highly dependent on Africa. China's major or key interests in Africa are oil, export market and political support at multilateral forums. The African dependence on Chinese is explicitly projected in their engagements largely because the Chinese negotiate better. Although China's economy and international political status to a great extent are dependent on Africa still China can negotiate and deal with the African countries in their terms and conditions. The possible reasons can be the Africa's economic dependence and secondly, the Chinese high-level visits and exchanges with African countries, which is prominently frequent at any possible opportunity. Most of the African countries are newly established states and so, China is one of the major countries that successfully manage relations and gives high priorities to its African partners. This makes China significant to Africa. Most of the time, the gestures of the Chinese leaders towards an

African state makes them feel special, which is highly appreciated by the Africans leaders and the people.

The establishment of FOCAC facilitated China to deal with Africa uniformly as a single unit, and on the African sides, it helps in integrating the continent. China declares its Africa development plans or financial assistance projects through FOCAC forum, and the funds allocated will be equally distributed across the continent for development. For instances, in the field of human resource development, China will invite personnel from all the African countries to train them in their country. The existence of such forum does not give much scope to the Africa countries to negotiate with China at the bilateral level to get more financial assistance, and so there is also not much scope of China favouring some states and ignoring the others. Thus, it helps China to maintain balanced and uniform bilateral relations with all its African partners.

The soft power policy began to be more prevalent in China-Africa political relations (1996-2013) after 2007, and the reason was in 2007 former General Secretary of CPC, Hu Jintao explicitly stated in the 17<sup>th</sup> CPC Central Committee meeting that China needs to improve and enhance its soft power influence. He emphasised on enhancing China's National cultural soft power, CPC Central Committee under the new situation of transformations and changes that the contemporary China and the World have experienced, should promote this new concept. Secondly, China's security challenges in the continent increased due to the expansion of Chinese investment, enterprises and its nationals in Africa. Earlier, China supported the ruling government or regime economically, politically and militarily to ensure its security of stakes in Africa, but the larger expansion of Chinese business and increasing numbers of Chinese nationals throughout the continent also became major security challenges. The host African government had limitations in providing security of Chinese interests and national largely because of the constant instability and crisis within most of the resource rich African states. China began to take part in the development of peace and stability in the continent. Hu Jintao called for the 'Harmonious World', and the Chinese government began to pursue soft power policy in Africa. In the late 2000s, the Chinese government began to persuade the African governments to resolve their internal crisis through peace talks and

negotiations and attracted the ruling governments through its lucrative Chinese company's infrastructure investments.

Since 2006, China's began to follow its 'New Strategic Partnership' policy in Africa, its objective of the formulation was that China will 'unswervingly carry forward the tradition of China-Africa friendship, and, proceeding from both the Chinese and African people, establish and develop a new type of strategic partnership with Africa. China in its political relations with Africa in the given period followed the three main connotations of new strategic partnership.

- First, on political aspects, China practised mutual trust in its relations with Africa, and from 1996 onwards there was a gradual increase in political understanding and mutual trust between the governments of both sides. The significant reasons behind it can be the increasing visits and exchanges at all levels of their ties. The strengthening of cooperation at the regional and international forums also manifests deepening of mutual trust between the two sides. As far as, equality in China-Africa relations in the given period is concerned, China always maintained an advantageous side for itself and was the main actor, who manipulated the process of their engagements with Africa in their terms and conditions.
- Secondly, positive impacts on China-Africa political relations in the given period are seen in the overall economic growth of the continent, but in most cases, the ruling regime or political party have enjoyed the larger share of the economic benefit of the bilateral ties. In some cases, the African ruling party used the Chinese money to suppress the anti-government voices and forces to remain in power.
- Thirdly, the bilateral ties between China-Africa in the given period have seen the positive developments in cultural exchanges and mutual learning. The student exchange program expanded significantly, and new areas of cultural engagements also initiated.

The policy of realism was also prevalent in China-Africa political relations in the given period. China gains power in Africa to ensure greater security of its core interests in the

continent, and it creates strong incentives for the states to seek opportunities to gain power at the expense of competitors.

China's political engagement with Africa do have the components of capitalism, globalisation and Chinese cultural influences in the continent, but so far China has not established a direct political or military control over the African region, and therefore, it is too early to speculate that China is practising neocolonialism in Africa.

The independent variables Chinese economic interests, political trust, security, and Africa have been affecting the dependable variable China. The intervening variable Chinese policy to Africa has been changing and had a causal impact on dependent as well as independent variables of the research. China's core interests in Africa are an economic expansion, strengthening mutual political trust, security of the Chinese investments, enterprises and its nationals in the continent, and finally, since 1996, so far, there are many positive impacts of China-Africa political relations in African as well as Africa. China-Africa political relations have enhanced and deepened the political trust between the Chinese government and many African country's governments. The deepening of political understanding and mutual trust has enabled a suitable condition in securing China's economic expansion in the continent. China-Africa political relations have enhanced and deepened the political trust between the Chinese government and many African country's governments. The deepening of political understanding and mutual trust has enabled a suitable condition in securing China's economic expansion in the continent. China-Africa political relations have positive outcomes on China's security concerns in the continent, and the Chinese government repeated attempt to provide security and safety of Chinese investment and its national by pressurising the respective African country's government had reduced the instability and political crisis or disputes in Africa. China's political engagements with Africa have certainly improved the scenario of peace and stability in the continent, for which the African people have been longing since decades due to frequent and perpetual political conflicts in the region. The China-Africa political relations have positive outcomes in the continent, as China has always voiced for Africa's development at the international forums. Since 2008, China is



a major diplomatic partner of Africa that participated in the UN led peace process and stability in the continent.

China-Africa political relations (1996-2013) have helped China's rise in the international system. Since 1995, Africa's oil supply had been a prime reason for China's manufacturing led development. From 1996 to 2013, is a significant phase for the Chinese economy, and it achieved an unprecedented growth and expansion largely due to uninterrupted oil supply from the continent. The development of political understanding and mutual trust with several regimes in Africa helped the Chinese leaders to secure oil fields projects in the continent. China's economic rise made it a major global player in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century and also a major participant in the international institutions. China's involvement in the Africa's peace and stability process in particular during the Darfur crisis to address its security challenges in the continent provides the Chinese government and its leaders a major platform to interact and work with the United Nations as a responsible global power.

Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949, a gradual trend of the Chinese military engagement was seen in Africa. China's military involvement was generally in the form of its unconditional support for revolutionary and independence movements in Africa against the imperial and colonial powers. The major shift in China-Africa defence engagement was seen after China's *Reforms & Opening Up* policy in 1978. Now, China adjusted its scope, objectives, scale, and means of military assistance to the continent, and there was a decline in China's military assistance to liberation movements in Africa. Under the leadership of Jiang Zemin, there was a major change in China's overall military diplomacy. Since 1996, China's high-level military visits and exchanges increased with greater emphasis on expansion of its military diplomacy. Besides, in the 1990s China began to change its position on United Nations Peacekeeping operations from unwilling participation to responsible contribution. From 2000 onwards, witnessed the further development of China's military diplomacy in Africa with closer cooperation in security affairs and more diversified exchanges. China-Africa Defense engagement became more prominent with the declaration that "China will promote high-level military exchanges between the two sides and actively carry out

military related technological exchanges and cooperation,” in its China's Africa Policy-2006. It also said that China would support the defence and army building of African countries and help train African military personnel to strengthen their security. Later it became more clear with the release of China's Defense White Paper 2008 which said,

"The PLA develops cooperative military relations with other countries that are non-aligned, non-confrontational and not directed against any third party, and engages in various forms of military exchanges and cooperation to create a military security environment featuring mutual trust and mutual benefits."

China-Africa Defense Cooperation is in the forms of military visits & exchanges, military training, and warships visits. Arms deals have been on the aspects of Sino-Africa Defense Cooperation. China gains significant African allies in the UN through arms sales and military relationship for its political goals, for example, Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Nigeria. Chinese made arms are cheaper compared to the competitors in the continent, and it is a big market which is highly profitable and helps in the growth of the Chinese defence industry. The regular demand of arms in Africa is largely because of frequent and perpetual unrest or turmoil in the region. Igor Pejic (2016) estimates that in 2003, Chinese generated revenue of more than US\$1.3 billion from African market. Judith Van de Looy (2006) says, "Selling arms to some African countries leaders improves the bilateral relationship and can enhance Chinese access to oil and natural resources". Military visits & exchanges have become an important component of China-Africa defence relations. Since the late 1990s, the frequency of military leaders visit begun to increase, and from 2000 onwards the high-level military visits from the Chinese side began to increase gradually till 2010, and from 2011 to 2013, the high-level visits from the Chinese side declined drastically to merely one in 2013. Similarly, even from the African side, the high-level military visits from 2000 increased gradually and remained in similar pattern till 2010, and then there was a slight decline in the number of high-level visits till 2013. In 2007, the high-level military visits were highest from African as well as the Chinese side. Apart from the visits, the significant development worth noting is that since the late 2000s, the Chinese frigates sent for the anti-piracy or escort mission in the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters usually visits the Port of Djibouti for replenishment

or emergency maintenance. These two Chinese frigates had also paid goodwill visits to South Africa and Seychelles in 2011. There are very rare joint military exercises between China and Africa. Djibouti is significant for Chinese PLA Navy because of its geopolitical significance in the region, so the engagements between the two navies are frequent.

China-Africa Security relations became prominent only with the expansion China's economic engagement in Africa. For the first time China officially proposes for security in China-Africa relations, in the Follow-up Actions of the Second Ministerial Conference of the FOCAC, when it was reported that by the end of July 2004, China and Africa have further enhanced their cooperation in the fields of peace and security (FOCAC 2004). The FOCAC Summits became a major platform for China to push forward its security interests in the continent. In the FOCAC Summit-Addis Ababa Action Plan (2004-2006), it was mentioned that the non-traditional security issues such as terrorism, drugs trafficking, small arms smuggling, transnational economic crimes, illegal migration and natural disasters had become new variables affecting international and regional security (FOCAC 2004).

Later, the Chinese Government has added the component of 'peace and security' in the China's Africa Policy -2006. The various aspects of this component are military cooperation; conflict settlement and peacekeeping operation; judicial and police cooperation; and non-traditional security areas. The document says, China will assist to train the African military personnel and support defence and army building of the African countries for their security. The basic forms of China's security engagement in the continent are the UNPKO, anti-piracy mission and security of its citizen in Africa. China's participation in the UNPKO is part of its public diplomacy or soft power. The UNPKO provide opportunities for the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) to boost its capabilities in many aspects of military other than combat. The Chinese PLA can project its strength and power in the region which will certainly enhance China's political and military influence. Undoubtedly, China peacekeepers are consistently rated among the most professional, well trained, effective and disciplined in the UN peacekeeping operation. Chinese soldiers also benefit in the areas of operational logistics, multilateral

operations and civil engineering. The Chinese forces will get invaluable knowledge about logistics, ports, lines of operations, operational intelligence, lines of communication, local atmosphere and modus operandi, and means of sustaining forces in Africa over prolonged period. The UN mission in Africa will add to the tactical value to China, and it will enable the PLA to build an extensive knowledge base.

Security of the Chinese citizens in Africa is a major concern of the Chinese government. The number of Chinese nationals on the continent is increasing significantly with the expansion of trade between China and Africa. The security issues related to citizens are ill-treatment and attack by the local; burglary by local petty thieves; kidnapping or killings by militia or rebel groups; Chinese citizens involved in criminal activities such as gold mining, illegal ivory smuggling, etc. One of the reasons for the attacks on Chinese by the local Africans is that in the recent few years, the Chinese businessman or employee residing in Africa has become a major competitor to the local African. An anti-Chinese xenophobia is emerging in the African countries like Zambia, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe and South Africa.

China began to participate in anti-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali waters to provide security of its ships against the rampant rise of attacks by the Somalia pirates in the region. China's participation in the UN led anti-piracy operations provides an opportunity to the Chinese PLA Navy to enhance its military capabilities as well as political influences through its military strength and power projection.

China intervenes in the conflict or crisis, whenever its investment and citizens are at risk. In the recent past several years, China's role as a mediator has significantly increased in any political turmoil or conflict in any region of Africa. It has been seen that now the Chinese Government do take a position on any forms of crisis in Africa, and at the same time, it also give its suggestions or acts as a mediator in resolving the crisis. We have seen China often raises its concerns over the Africa's peace and security situation at the UN. With the growing Chinese interests in the Continent, the Chinese government obvious concern for Africa's security has also been raised.

China supports the country's ruling government in any forms of turmoil escalates in that country. At the same time, the Chinese government is very cautious to check its citizens' involvement in criminal activities in Africa, and usually, the Chinese embassy of the respective country is responsible for this task. Whenever any Chinese led economic project or enterprises or employee is under attack by militia or the rebel group of the African country, the Chinese government negotiates directly with the respective government of that country and most of the time creates pressure on the government to resolve the crisis as soon as possible to resume the project. The government mobilises its national military to stabilise the crisis to bring normalcy.

China began to follow the policy of soft power in China-Africa Defence and Security relations after the mid-2000s, and it began to participate actively in the US led peace process in Africa without considering its previous ardent policy of non-interference. Previously, China overlooked the humanitarian crisis in Africa and often supported the African regimes responsible for the crisis. The gradual rising of China's security concerns in Africa compelled its government to adopt soft power policy towards the continent. China began to motivate the ruling African regimes to resolve the internal political crisis with the rebel groups through peace talks and negotiation and at the same time enticed and attracted the respective Africa country's government towards the Chinese infrastructure investment projects.

Reflections of New Strategic Partnership were seen in the China-Africa Defense and Security relations (1996-2013). The three main connotations of China-Africa new type of strategic partnership were prevalent in the times from 1996 to 2013.

- First, on political aspects, the mutual trust between China and Africa strengthened unprecedentedly, but on equality aspects, African countries have compromised in their defence and security relations with China in the given period. China often has greater priorities in its security relations with the African counterpart, and most of the time the Chinese government had pressurised the African side in their terms against any forms of security challenges emerged in that respective country.
- Second, China-Africa defence and security relations in the given period have followed the economic win-win cooperation, and no doubt, the Africa and its

people have benefitted economically because of large scale Chinese investment in African infrastructure. China's security in Africa was prerequisite conditions for major economic cooperation between the two sides. The strengthening of mutual trust between the Chinese and the African leaders due to their military cooperation often led to economic benefits limited largely to the respective African leaders and their regime.

- Third, the China-Africa Defence and Security relations provided a platform for both sides for cultural exchanges and mutual learning through China's participation in UN peacekeeping operations.

China did follow Realist approach in its defence and security engagements with Africa in the given period. China gains power in Africa to ensure greater security of its core interests in the continent, and it creates strong incentives for the states to seek opportunities to gain power at the expense of competitors.

China's defence and security engagements with Africa do have the components of capitalism, globalisation and Chinese cultural influences in the continent, but so far China has not established a direct political or military control over the African region, and therefore, it is too early to speculate that China is practising neocolonialism in Africa.

The independent variables Chinese economic interests, political trust, security, and Africa have been affecting the dependable variable China. The intervening variable Chinese policy to Africa has been changing and had a causal impact on dependent as well as independent variables of the research. China's core interests in Africa are an economic expansion, strengthening mutual political trust, security of the Chinese investments, enterprises and its nationals in the continent, and finally, since 1996, so far, there are many positive impacts of China-Africa Defence & Security relations on African as well as Africa. China-Africa Defence relations have enhanced and deepened the political trust between the Chinese government and many African country's governments. The deepening of political understanding and mutual trust has enabled a suitable condition in securing China's economic expansion in the continent. China-Africa security relations have positive outcomes on China's security concerns in the continent, and the Chinese government repeated attempt to provide security and safety of Chinese investment and its

national by pressurising the respective African country's government had reduced the instability and political crisis or disputes in Africa. China's Defence and Security engagements with Africa has certainly improved the scenario of peace and stability in the continent, for which the African people have been longing since decades due to frequent and perpetual political conflicts in the region.

China-Africa Defence and Security relations (1996-2013) have helped China's rise in the international system. Since 1995, Africa's oil supply had been a prime reason for China's manufacturing led development. From 1996 to 2013, is a significant phase for the Chinese economy, and it achieved an unprecedented growth and expansion largely due to uninterrupted oil supply from the continent. China's military cooperation and assistance to several regimes in Africa helped the Chinese leaders to secure oil fields projects in the continent. China's economic rise made it a major global player in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century and also a major participant in the international institutions. China's involvement in the Africa's peace and stability process in particular during the Darfur crisis to address its security challenges in the continent provides the Chinese government and its leaders a major platform to interact and work with the United Nations as a responsible global power.

Sudan is a major partner of China in Africa in all three aspects, political, defence and security. In the political aspect, Sudan is a global ally to China. This is because both the countries share traditional friendship due to their similar experience of struggle against the imperial and colonial powers before they established into a free state. Sudan was one among the few African countries that recognised and established diplomatic relations with the PRC in the late 1950s. The third world solidarity shared between the first generations leaders of both sides gave a common platform to develop in depth political understanding and mutual trust. This mutual trust has worked as a basic foundation for the China-Sudan political relations. Throughout, the four decades they have been tested and manifested as a major global ally. For example, in 1971, Sudan worked to win support for the PRC's membership at the UN. On several occasions, China used its veto power at the UN Security Council to save Sudan from UN sanctions.

China began to seek a new policy to Africa which was reflected in Jiang Zemin's tour to Africa in 1996. The major change that came about in the China-Sudan ties in 1995, due to their engagements in the oil business. After that, the bilateral political relations developed in accordance with the Chinese oil interests in Sudan, and Sudanese government's reliance on the Chinese oil imported money and military cooperation to suppress southern Sudan rebel groups to remain in power. After 1995, the leaders from the two sides experienced high political understanding and mutual trust. Sudan's oil supply became a significant means for the achievements of China's economic ambitions. The Chinese diplomacy from 1996-2013, circulates to maintain and safeguard the security of Sudan's oil supply to China. In the initial period throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s, China provided supports the Omar Al-Bashir's government without much consideration of its international implications. Throughout this phase, China avoided its global criticisms for its support to Al-Bashir's regime. In fact, this was the phase, when China emerged as an important economic power in the world which was unprecedented. Now, China was acknowledged as a major global power, and the world also began to expect from China to bear the global responsibilities and duties of being a major global power. Secondly, Omar Al-Bashir's government and its national armed forces failed to address the economic exclusion of oil production southern region of Sudan and, it also failed to control and suppress the southern Sudan rebel groups. This led to a major escalation of violence and conflict in Sudan, which gradually became an international issue of a humanitarian crisis. Looking at the incapability of the Al-Bashir's government to deal with the crisis in its southern region, which by now, has taken a shape of serious security threat to China's oil supply and the Chinese workers, and at the same time, it became imminent for the Chinese government to respond to the UN led peace process in Darfur crisis, finally, the PRC government changes its long standing diplomatic position on Sudan. The Chinese government began to persuade and also pressurise the Al-Bashir government in Sudan to transform their policy of brutal suppression of southern Sudan rebel groups and go for the resolution of the political crisis through peace talks and negotiations. By now, Al-Bashir's regime was dependent on the Chinese to a great extent, and Al-Bashir had already become a prime target of the West especially the US for his prominent role in the



Darfur crisis. Omar Al-Bashir seems to have no other options but to accept the Chinese proposal to pursue peaceful resolutions of the Darfur crisis.

After that, China's policy towards the southern Sudan and the SPLM changed, and the Chinese leaders began to approach leaders of the SPLM directly, rather than following their previous policy of dealing them through the Sudanese government indirectly. The Chinese government acted as a mediator in the UN led resolution of the Darfur crisis. This policy shift helped China to gain many advantages in their favour. First of all, the Chinese government successfully secured its invested oil production projects in South Sudan as the majority of its oil projects are in the southern region. China manages to influence Salva Kiir Mayardit during the resolution of the Darfur crisis, and the subsequent, referendum in southern Sudan to found and establish the Republic of South Sudan. The Chinese government succeeded in their attempt to establish friendly political relations with the newly found South Sudan, without damaging its ties with Omar Al-Bashir. Soon after, the establishment of South Sudan, the Chinese leaders frequently visited Juba to strengthen the newly established diplomatic ties further, but after visiting Juba, these leaders also visited Khartoum. During the visits, it was seen that the leaders of Sudan, as well as South Sudan, reiterate along with the Chinese leaders of the peaceful resolution of the unsettled outstanding issues between Khartoum and Juba through peace talks and negotiations. There were major unsettled disputes still existed especially of oil fields between Sudan and South Sudan, that often led to violence and conflict in both the countries particularly in the oil fields. The attacks or violence at the oil fields by the armies of two sides often harmed the Chinese oil interests and security of its investment and nationals. The Chinese government began to warn Khartoum and Juba repeatedly for providing security of its investment and safety of Chinese nationals. Repeated attempts by the Chinese leaders helped Khartoum and Juba to remain in the process of resolution of disputes through negotiations. On several occasions, the conflict escalated between Khartoum and Juba, but with the Chinese efforts and pressure, both sides resume talks and even exchanged visits. Now, the security of the Chinese invested oil production projects, enterprises and safety of Chinese nationals has become the major aims and objectives of the Chinese political relations with Sudan and South Sudan. Secondly,

China used its political ties with the Al-Bashir regime to depict itself as major actors in the resolution of the conflict between Sudan and the southern Sudan.

From 1996 to 2013, China-Africa Defence relations had varied implications in Sudan, but the Chinese purpose of defence cooperation had always been the same i.e. export of the Chinese manufactured military weapons to Sudan. China also took advantage of the escalating civil wars in Sudan to expand its Defence ties with Al-Bashir's regime. China's arms sale to Sudan is the major component of China-Africa relations.

From 1996 to 2013, China-Africa Security relations have changed its method earlier to suit the Sudanese government and later to Chinese government. Throughout, the late 1990s and early 2000s, China primarily supported the Sudan government approach of forceful suppression of rebel groups to provide security of Chinese investment and nationals. This method helped China to benefit economically largely because of the rise in demand for the Chinese weapons in Sudan due to continued escalation of the crisis. China shifted to a policy of peace in resolving the conflict between Sudan and the southern Sudan due to many other reasons, but one of the prime reasons was the suppressive method of Al-Bashir using armed forces failed to provide security of the Chinese investments and citizens. By late 2007, China already established itself as a major global economic and political power, and so it became an international obligation for China to continue to boost its arms market in Sudan by taking advantage of the humanitarian crisis the country. Before 2007, China always avoided its participation in the international led peace process in Sudan and had been maintaining its policy of non-interference. It is not difficult to speculate the reasons, one is the perpetual civil wars and political crisis in the late 1990s, and early 2000s have certainly helped China boost its defence industry through large scale arms sales to the Sudanese government. Secondly, China's arms sales and military cooperations with Sudan helped China to consolidate and strengthen its political mutual trust and ties with Al-Bashir government. Undoubtedly, Chinese government affinity to Al-Bashir favoured China in securing oil production projects in Sudan, which was the primary goal of the Chinese to accomplish their economic ambitions. The Chinese government arrangements with Al-Bashir repeatedly failed to provide a stable environment for the Chinese oil companies in Sudan, but it did

secure oil production projects for China. Before 2008, Chinese oil companies and national did suffer due to constant unrest and violence in Sudan, but the major diplomatic and military support of China to Al-Bashir established the Chinese oil companies as a significant player in Sudan oil business. By late 2007, China had already secured a majority of oil fields in Sudan, and now the Chinese government major concern was the security of Chinese invested oil production projects and safety of its nationals. Therefore, the peace and stability of Sudan were the only way out to address China's security challenges in the country. In 2007, China supported the UN Security Council Resolutions for the deployment of UN-AU hybrid peacekeeping operation in Darfur. From July 2007 to 2013, China reformulated its non-interference policy to Sudan and began to participate in the UN led peace process and also deployed police squad as part of the UN-AU peacekeeping mission. The Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson began to speak loud and clear at any forms of conflict or violence in Sudan and South Sudan. At the same time, the bilateral visits at all levels between Sino-Sudan and Sino-South Sudan have seen the reiteration of the Chinese government position on peaceful resolution of unsettled issues between Khartoum and Juba through negotiations. China has been successful in creating diplomatic pressure on Sudan and South Sudan governments to seek peace and stability in their relations. Undoubtedly, Chinese government effort commendable in transforming the situation in Sudan and South Sudan. It is also a hard earn peace and stability for the two peoples after decades of civil wars in the region, but China's prime interest behind this humanitarian action is the security of its oil fields, investments, enterprises and safety of its nationals in Sudan and South Sudan.

The soft power policy is prevalent in China-Sudan relations in the given period from 1996 to 2013. In the late 1990s, China supported the ruling regimes of Sudan in their effort to fight internal insurgencies caused by the anti-government rebel groups, but in the mid-2000s, China began to participate in the UN-AU led peace initiative. China also used its friendly diplomatic ties with the Al-Bashir regime to persuade and mediate the disputes between the Sudanese government and the southern Sudan. China's soft power approach was also seen in its engagements with the leaders of southern Sudan, which subsequently resulted in successful establishment of diplomatic ties between the PRC and South Sudan. The policy of soft power helped China to mediate and pressurise the

governments of Sudan and South Sudan for the resolution of Darfur crisis through peace talks and negotiations. Even after the independence of South Sudan in July 2011, China mediated between the governments of Sudan and South Sudan to resolve the unsettled disputes through peaceful negotiations. There were incidents of violent disputes between the two armies in the unsettled oil fields and China often called for restraint and to restore the stability and normalcy of the region. Chinese government attracts the governments of two Sudan through its lucrative Chinese companies' infrastructure investments, and China also deters to stop its infrastructure projects if the suitable environment is not guaranteed in the region.

In 2006, China adopted the 'New Strategic Partnership' for the development of friendship between China and Africa. This policy also had impacts on China-Sudan relations. The three main connotations of China-Africa new type of strategic partnership were prevalent in the Sino-Sudan ties from 1996 to 2013.

- First, on political aspects, the mutual trust between China and Sudan strengthened unprecedentedly, but on equality aspects, Sudan, as well as South Sudan, has compromised in their engagements with China in the given period. From 1996 to 2013, the political understanding and mutual trust between the governments and leaders of China and Sudan strengthen in all three aspects of their relations. In between 1996 to June 2011, China provided support to the Omar al-Bashir's regime, which was facing serious charges of a humanitarian crisis for its alleged role in the Darfur crisis. China supplied weapons and arms to Sudanese government after it faced arms embargo of the West including the US. China often has greater priorities in its security relations with Sudan and South Sudan, and most of the time the Chinese government had pressurised the Sudanese side in their terms against any forms of security challenges emerged in that respective country.
- Second, China-Sudan relations in the given period have followed the economic win-win cooperation, and no doubt, the Sudan and its people have benefitted economically because of large scale Chinese investment in Sudan's oil production infrastructure. China's security in Sudan was prerequisite conditions for major

economic cooperation between the two sides. The strengthening of mutual trust between the Chinese and the Sudanese leaders due to their military cooperation often led to economic benefits limited largely to the Sudanese leaders and their regime.

- Third, the China-Sudan relations provided a platform for both sides for cultural exchanges and mutual learning through expansion of their ties at various levels, such as education, health, agriculture, communications, etc.

The independent variables are economic interests, political trust, security and, Africa in the study of China-Sudan relations. China is the dependable variable has undergone many changes due to the changes in the independent variables namely, economic interests, political trust, security and Africa. The Chinese economic interest in Sudan in the period from 1996 to 2013 was primarily limited its arms sales and oil imports. In the given period, the political trust between the two sides deepened further, and China had the advantages to secure more oil production projects and arms market in Sudan. China faced serious security challenges in Sudan, and the Chinese government used its diplomatic channels to improve its security situation in the country. China's relations with Sudan in the given period have benefitted the Sudanese people and the governments of Sudan and South Sudan. Long standing political crisis in Sudan was resolved through a peaceful referendum in July 2011, which resulted in the independence of South Sudan. After July 2011, the ongoing crisis in the region was stopped, but still, there were relatively small scale disputes between the two Sudan. China's diplomatic effort in mediating the unsettled disputes between Sudan and South Sudan had positive outcomes. China's policy on Sudan is the intervening variable. In the given period, the Chinese policies to Sudan have multifaceted influences in their ties. Chinese interests in Sudan have been safeguarded, and Sudan has benefitted economically as well as politically.

China-Sudan relations (1996-2013) have helped China's rise in the international system. Since 1995, Sudan's oil supply had been a prime reason for China's manufacturing led development. From 1996 to 2013, is a significant phase for the Chinese economy, and it achieved an unprecedented growth and expansion largely due to uninterrupted oil supply from the continent. China's military cooperation and assistance to Sudan's ruling regime

helped the Chinese leaders to secure oil fields projects in the continent. China's economic rise made it a major global player in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century and also a major participant in the international institutions. China's involvement in the Sudan's peace and stability process in particular during the Darfur crisis to address its security challenges in the continent provides the Chinese government and its leaders a major platform to interact and work with the United Nations as a responsible global power.

China has attained its minimalist interests of 'one China policy' in Africa. At present, China's Africa policy is also aimed at ambitious maximalist interests in the continent. China's participation in the UNPKO and anti-piracy mission in Africa is a major step in the expansion of Chinese political and military influence in the continent. China has yet to ensure security of its interests in Africa. China's policy of 'peace and stability' in Africa can be seen a major initiative to safeguard and control Chinese security in the continent. In most of the African countries, the ruling fails to ensure peaceful and stable environment because the region have experienced decades of violence and political crisis. In Africa, the security situations have improved but it is not yet under control of the respective government in power. China's policy of 'peace and stability' is a long-term policy to achieve a stable and normal environment in Africa. The peaceful and stable environment in Africa will provide larger scope for China's political and economic expansion in the continent.

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### Annexure: 1

#### Chinese Military Leaders' Visits to African countries, 2000-2013

Year	Name of Officer/Leader	Designation of Officer/ Leader	Country visited
2000	Li Jinai	People 's Liberation Army General Equipment Department Political commissar	Kenya; Tanzania; Zambia
	Zhang Bangchen	Deputy Director of the Foreign Affairs Office of the MoD, PRC	Equatorial Guinea
	General Zhou Kunren	Political Commissar of the PLA General Logistics Department	Mali; Guinea
	Wang Tailan	Deputy Director of the PLA General Logistics Department	Zimbabwe; Namibia;
	Major General Huang Jiang	Chief of Staff of the South Sea Fleet, PLA Navy	Tanzania; South Africa
	Lieutenant General Chen Dazhi	Deputy Director of the PLA General Armament Department	South Africa
2001	General Bo Quanyou	Chief of General Staff of the PLA	Kenya; Zambia
	General Qian Shugen	Deputy- Chief of General Staff of the PLA	Tanzania
	General Wu Quanzu	Deputy- Chief of General Staff of the PLA	Nigeria; Angola; South Africa
	Major General Jiang Pumin	Director of the Foreign Training Department, National Defense University, PRC	Togo; Cote d'Ivoire; Guinea
	General Chi Haotian	Defense Minister of the PRC	Nigeria

2002	General Chen Nade	Commander of the Jinan Military Region PLA.	Guinea
	Wang Guangya, General Chen Nade	Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs PRC, Commander of the Jinan Military Region PLA	Mali
	General Du Tiehuan	Political Commissar of the Beijing Military Region, PLA	Sudan, Zambia
	Major General Ding Yiping	Commander of the North Sea Fleet, PLA Navy	Egypt
	General Gui Fulin	Deputy- Chief of General Staff of the PLA	Lesotho; Namibia
	Tang Tianbiao	Deputy Director of the PLA General Political Department	Zimbabwe
	Lieutenant General Wen Guangchun	Deputy Director of the PLA General Logistics Department	Morocco
2003	General Wang Huaiqing	Political Commissar of the PLA Navy	Algeria
	Lieutenant General Lei Wuqiu	Political Commissar of the Nanjing Military Region, PLA	Botswana
	General Qiao Qingchen	Commander of the PLA Air Force	Egypt; Sudan
	General Liang Guanlie	Chief of General Staff of the PLA	Morocco
	Lieutenant General Zhang Wentai	Political Commissar of the PLA General Logistics Department	Zambia
2004	Major General Zhang Bangdong	Chief of the Foreign Affairs Office of Ministry of National defence, PRC	Central Africa Republic;

			Ghana; Seychelles
	General Li Qianyuan	Commander of the Lanzhou Military Region, PLA	Angola; Zambia
	General Guo Boxiong	Vice-Chairman of the CMC	Egypt
	Lieutenant General Liu Dongdong	Political Commissar of the Jinan Military Region, PLA	Egypt
	General Qian Shugen	Deputy Chief of General Staff of the PLA	Egypt; Zimbabwe
	Lieutenant General Jia Runxing	Deputy Political Commissar of the Chinese People's Armed Police	Lebanon
	Lieutenant General Zhang Li	Deputy Chief of General Staff of the PLA	Tanzania
	Lieutenant General Sun Zhongtong	Deputy Director of the General Political Department, PLA	Uganda
	Lieutenant General Wen Guangchun	Deputy Director of the General Logistics Department, PLA	Gabon
	General Guo Boxing	Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC)	South Africa
2005	General Li Quanyuan	Commander of Lanzhou Military Region	Zambia
	General Jing Zhiyuan	Commander of the Second Artillery Corps, PLA	Algeria
	General Cao Gangchuan	Vice Chairman of the CMC and Minister of National Defense, PRC	Egypt; Tanzania
	Lieutenant General Zhu Wenquan	Commander of the Nanjing Military Region, PLA	Ethiopia

	General Xu Caihou	Vice Chairman of the CMC	Sudan
2006	Liu Dongdong	Political Commissar of the Jinan Military Region, PRC	Tanzania
	Minister Zhang Yunchuan	Commission of the Science Technology and Industry for National defence	Egypt
	Lieutenant General Zhao Xingfa	Vice Navy Commander of PLA	Morocco
	General Liu Dongdong	Political Commissar of the Jinan Military Region	Tanzania
2007	Major General Ding Jingong	Deputy Director General of the Foreign Affairs Office of the Minister of National defence.	Angola; Cape Verde; Sierra Leone
	Lieutenant General Jia Runxing	Deputy Political Commissar of the Headquarters of the Chinese People's Armed Police Force.	Cameroon
	Lieutenant General Wang Qian	Deputy Director of the General Logistics Department of the PLA	Morocco
	General Deng Changyou	Political Commissar of the PLA Air Force	Mozambique
	Major General Chang Wanquan	Commander of the Shenyang Military Region, PLA	Sudan
	Major General Zhu Chenghu	Dean of the Defense Affairs Institute for China's National Defense University	Guinea

	Major General Liu Weiping	Deputy Chief of Staff of the Headquarters of the General Logistics Department	Guinea
	General Cao Gangchuan	Vice Chairman of the Central Military, State Councilor and Defense Minister of PRC	Kenya; Chad
	Chang Wanquan	Defense Minister of PRC	Rwanda
	Major General Chang Wanchuan	Commander of the Shenyang Military Region, PLA	Sudan
2008	Sun Jianguo	Assistant Chief of General Staff of the People's Liberation Army.	Botswana
	General Sun Zhongtong	Deputy Director of the General Political Department	Morocco
	Lieutenant General Sun Jingguo	Assistant Chief of PLA General Staff	South Africa
	General Jing Zhiyuan	Commander of the Second Artillery Force, PLA	Tanzania, Uganda
2009	General Francisco Pereira	Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces	Angola
	Vice Admiral Sun Jianguo	Deputy Chief of General Staff of the PLA	Kenya, Namibia

	General Liu Zhenwu	Deputy Chief of General Staff of the PLA	Mozambique
	Lieutenant General Liu Xiaojiang; Major General Li Changjiang; Major General Qian Lihua	Political Commissar of the PLA Navy; Head of Armament Department of the PLA Navy; Head of the Foreign Affairs Office of the Ministry of National defence PRC.	Tanzania.
	General Liu Zhenwu	Deputy Chief of General Staff of the PLA	Zambia
2010	General Chen Bingde	Chief of General Staff of the PLA; Member of the CMC	Angola, Namibia, Tanzania
	Major General Jia Xiaoning	Deputy Director General of the Foreign Affairs Office of the Defense Ministry	Cape Verde
	General Ma Xiaotian	Deputy Chief of General Staff of the PLA	The Democratic Republic of Congo
	General Ma Xiaotian	Deputy Chief of General Staff of the PLA	Kenya
	Major General Jia Xianing	Deputy Director General of the Foreign Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defense	Libya
	Jian Tingan	Deputy Director of PLA General Political Department	Mozambique
2011	General Liang Guanlie	Minister of Defense, PRC	Ghana, Seychelles, Uganda
	Rear Admiral Zhang Huachen	Deputy Commander of the East Sea Fleet of the PLA	Tanzania
2012	General Ma Xiaotian	Deputy Chief of General Staff of the PLA	Algeria; Seychelles;

			Tanzania
	Sun Jianguo	Deputy Chief of General Staff of the PLA	Gabon; Senegal
2013	Lieutenant General Chen Yong	Assistant Chief of General Staff of the PLA	South Africa

*Sources:* 中国外交 2001-2014 年版

**Annexure: 2**

**African Military Leaders' Visits to the PRC, 2005-2013**

Year	Name of Officer/Leader	Designation of Officer/ Leader	Country visited
2005	Colonel Antoine Gambi (In November 2005)	Chief of General Staff of Central Africa Republic	PRC
2006	Ali Bongo (In September 2006)	Minister of State and Minister of Defense, Gabon	PRC
	Lt. General Papa Khalilou Fall (In February 2006)	Chief of Staff of the Senegal Military Force	PRC
	Brigadier Mathieu Boni	Chief of Staff of the Benin's Armed Forces.	PRC
	Major General Batista Tagme Na Wae	Chief of General Staff, Guinea-Bissau Military	PRC
	Njenga Jarume and General Jeremiah Jianga	Minsiter of State for Defense, Kenya; Chief of General Staff	PRC
	Marcel Gatsinzi	Minsiter of Defense of Rwanda	PRC
	Lt. General Papa Khalilou Fall	Chief of General Staff of the Senegalese military forces	PRC
	Abdul Rahim	Minister of National Defense of Sudan	PRC



2007	Chikez Diemu	Minister of National defense and Old Commandants Affairs, Democratic Republic of Congo	PRC
	Mahamat Nour Abdelkerim	Minister of National defense, Chad	PRC
	General Mani N'Guessan Michel	Minister of Defense, Cote d'Ivory	PRC
	Albert Kan-Dapaah	Defense Minister of Ghana	PRC
	Major General Traore Seydou	Chief of Staff of the Malian Armed Forces.	PRC
	General Lagos Lidimo	Chief of General Staff of the Armed Defense Forces, Mozambique	PRC
	Brigadier Leopold Payet	Chief of Defense Forces, Seychelles	PRC
	Lieutenant General Carlo Gagiano	Chief of South African Air Force	PRC
	Haj Ahmed El Gaili	Joint Chief of Staff of the Sudanese Armed Forces	PRC
	Juma Athuman Kapuya; Lieutenant General LM Mwamunyange	Minister of Defense and National Service; Chief of Staff of the Tanzanian People's Defense Forces (TPDF)	PRC
	General Aronda Nyakairima	Chief of Uganda People's Force	PRC
	Albert Kan-Dapaah	Defense Minister of Ghana	PRC
	Major General Zhu Chenghu	Dean of the Defense Affairs Institute for China's National Defense University	Guinea

	Aronda Nyakairima	Chief of Uganda People's Defense Forces	PRC
2008	Major General Rene Claude Meka	Chief of General Staff of Cameroon	PRC
	Brigadier General Salimou Mohamed Amiri	Chief of Staff of the National Development Army	PRC
	Sammi Anan	Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of Egypt	PRC
	Ali Bongo Ondimba	Defense Minister of Gabon	PRC
	Lieutenant General Solly Shoke	Army Chief of the South African National Defense Force	PRC
2009	Bokam Jean-Baptiste	State Secretary Incharge of gendarmerie of Cameroon	PRC
	Charles Mwando Nsimba	Minister of National Defense, DRC.	PRC
	Field Marshal Mohammed Hussein Tantawi	Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces, Minister of Defense and Military Production, Egypt	PRC
	Brownie Samukai	Defense Minister of Kenya	PRC
	Lieutenant General Abdoulaye Fall	Chief of General Staff of Armed Forces, Senegal.	PRC
	Vice Admiral Johannes Mudimu,	Chief of the South African Navy	PRC
	Hussein Mwinyi	Minister of National Defense and National Service of Tanzania	PRC
2010	General Samora Yenus	Chief of Staff of Armed Forces of Ethiopia	PRC
	Joseph Henry Smith	Defense Minister of Ghana	PRC

	James Kabarebe	Minister of Defense of Rwanda	PRC
	Mpumi Mpofu	South African Secretary for Defense	PRC
	Crispus Kiyonga	Minister of Defense, Uganda	PRC
	General Abdoulaye Fall	Chief of Defense of the Senegalese Armed Forces	PRC
	Kalombo Mwansa	Defense Minister of Zambia	PRC
2011	Colonel Abdourahman Aden Cher	Navy Commander of Djibouti	PRC
	Pacome Rufin Ondzounga	Defense Minister of Gabon	PRC
	Joseph Henry Smith	Defense Minister of Ghana	PRC
	General Davis Mwamunyange	Chief of Defense Forces, Tanzania	PRC
2012	Colonel Jean-Francis Bozize	Minister Delegate Incharge of National Defense, Central Africa Republic (CAR)	PRC
	Major General Fathi Ahmed Houssein	Chief of Staff of the Djibouti Armed Forces	PRC
	Sadio Lamine	Defense Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and International co-operation, Mali	PRC
	Filipe Nyusi	Minister of Defense, Mozambique	PRC
	Charles Namoloh	Special Envoy of the Namibian Government and Minister of Defense, Namibia	PRC
	Geoffrey B. Mwamba	Defense Minister of Zambia	PRC
2013	General Geraldo Nunda	The Chief of Staff of the Angolan Armed Forces	PRC
	Charles Richard	Minister at The Presidency in charge of	PRC

	Mondjo	National defence, Congo	
	Hassan Darar Houffaneh	Minister of Defense, Djibouti	PRC
	General Paulino Macaringue	Chief of General Staff of Defense Force, Mozambique	PRC

*Sources:* 中国外交 2006-2014 年版