

# **Changing Security Perceptions of Nepal**

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
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**DECLARATION**


I declare that the thesis entitled “**CHANGING SECURITY PERCEPTIONS OF NEPAL**”, submitted by me in fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the Degree of **DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY** is a bonafide work and that has not been submitted to any other university for the award of any other degree.


  
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It is hereby recommended that the thesis may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

  
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
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## ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS

ACAP	: Annapurna Conservation Area Project
ADB	: Asian Development Bank
AI	: Amnesty International
APF	: Armed Police Force
CA	: Constituent Assembly
CARITAS	: Catholic Agency for Overseas Aid and Development
CBES	: Chure Bhawar Ekta Samaj
CBS	: Central Bureau of Statistics
CCW	: Central Child Welfare Board
CHR	: Commission on Human Rights
CIA	: Central Intelligence Agency
CITES	: Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
CPN (Maoist)	: Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
CPN (ML)	: Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist-Leninist)
CPN (UML)	: Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist Leninist)
CRED	: Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disaster
CWIN	: Child Workers in Nepal
DFRS	: Department of Forest Resources and Survey
DHM	: Department of Hydrology and Meteorology
DNPWC	: Department of National Parks and Wildlife Conservation
DPTC	: Defense Police Training Center
EC	: European Commission
EIA	: Environment Impact Assessment
EIA	: Environmental Investigation Agency
EU	: European Union
FSW	: Faculty of Social Work
FY	: Fiscal Year
GDP	: Gross Domestic Product
GLOF	: Glacier Lake Outbursts Flood
HAMAS	: Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyya
HQs	: Head Quarters
ICC	: International Criminal Court



ICG	: International Crisis Group
ICIMOD	: International Center for Integrated Mountain Development
IDC	: International Development Community
IDMC	: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDPs	: Internally Displaced People
IDS	: Integrated Development System
ILO	: International Labour Organisation
IMF	: International Monetary Fund
INGOs	: International Non-Governmental Organizations
INSEC	: Informal Sector Service Centre
IOM	: International Organization for Migration
IR	: International Relation
IUCN	: The World Conservation Union
JAFTA	: Japan Forest Technology Association
JTMM	: Jana Tantrik Mukti Morcha
KFSB	: Korean Federation of Small Business
KTM	: Kathmandu Metropolitan
LTTE	: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam
MJF	: Madhesi Janadhikar Forum
MoEST	: Ministry of Environment, Science and Technology
MoF	: Ministry of Finance
MoFSC	: Ministry of Forest and Soil Conservation
MoPE	: Ministry of Population and Environment
NAFEA	: Nepal Association of Foreign Employment Agencies
NATO	: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NC	: Nepali Congress
NGOs	: Non-Governmental Organizations
NHRC	: National Human Rights Commission
NID	: National Investigation Department
NLFS	: Nepal Labour Force Survey
NPC	: National Peace Campaign
NPC	: National Planning Commission
NPWC	: National Parks and Wildlife Conservation

NSP	: Nepal Sadvawana Party
OCHA	: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	: Overseas Development Assistance
OXFAM	: Oxfam International
PSA	: Public Security Act
RIM	: Revolutionary Internationalist Movement
RNA	: Royal Nepalese Army
RRN	: Rural Reconstruction Nepal
SAARC	: South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SAFHR	: South Asian Forum for Human Rights
SC	: Save the Children
SCA	: Save the Children Alliance
SEEEPOT	: Socioeconomic and Ethno-political Research and Training Consultancy
STI	: Sexually Transmitted Infection
TADO	: Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Control and punishment) Ordinance
TIA	: Tribhuvan International Airport
UAE	: United Arab Emirates
UK	: United Kingdom
ULFA	: United Liberation Front of Assom
UN	: United Nation
UNDP	: United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	: United Nations Environment Programme
UNFPA	: United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	: United Nations High Commission for Refugee
UNICEF	: United Nations Children's Fund
UPFN	: United People's Front of Nepal
US	: United States
USSR	: Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic
VDCs	: Village Development Committees
WCN	: Wildlife Conservation Nepal
WECS	: Water and Energy Commission Secretariat
WWF	: World Wide Fund for Nature

# Chapter I

## Introduction

### 1.1 Introduction

"Security is a contested concept" (Buzan 1982). It has different meaning and value for different people and in different context. 'Security' and 'insecurity' have relative connotation in different situations and for different people. "Concept of security in fact lies to a large extent in the perception of an individual or an institution. For some, insecurity comes from lack of employment or loss of social welfare. For others, insecurity stems from the violent conflict or denial of human rights"(Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy 2007). Similarly, the issue of security for a nation is different than the issue of an individual. However, in general security is defined as the freedom from threats either to the state or to an individual (Dupont 2001). Traditionally, state has been the only referent object of security in international relations discourse. "Under this framework of an omnipresent state, the question of peoples' security as an independent subject does not prevail because the security of citizens is identified with that of the state" (Buzan 1993. This discourse sees state as the given, eternal referent and anarchy as the permanent condition of international relation. "Threats to national security emanate from external force led military actions that is backed by the state power. National security has been focused mainly on protecting the state, its territorial boundaries, institutions and values from external attack" (Anoi, 1992). This is reflected in the realist and neo-realist schools of thought in the international relations theories which dominated the 20<sup>th</sup> century national security discourse and agenda. For realist, "There is nothing above the national interests" (Burchill 1996).

However, with the end of Cold War and expansion of the processes of globalisation, the agenda and the definition of security have tended to widen and deepen. There are many new dimensions and issues which have now become the prime concerns in the study of security. While the state centric security concern has tended to be underplayed, the non-traditional threats to security are increasingly highlighted. These newer threats encompass a range of situation including ethnic and religious conflicts, terrorism, migration, environmental degradation, contagious diseases, democracy, human rights violation, gender, crime, poverty, hunger and deprivation. In contrast to

the orthodox concept of security the basic referent object of the non-traditional security threat is human beings and related insecurity. Today, states are not only bound to defend their territorial integrity and political independence but also are increasingly asked to ensure and protect their citizen's freedom, economic independence, social stability and cultural identity (Anoi 1992). The end of Cold War did not deliver the peace as it was expected. The nations and the individuals continue to be confronted with new forms of insecurity and in most parts of the world the conflicts continued and remain unabated.

For a long time, rethinking the meaning of security yielded only marginal results. Neither 'Common Security' promulgated in the Palme Commission's 1982 report<sup>1</sup> nor a radical extension of the idea as 'Collective Security'<sup>2</sup> could go beyond state-centric notion of security. "While some concepts of security during the 1970s and 1980s like 'comprehensive security' and 'cooperative security' did go beyond state centric security, they were far from making a decisive break from the Realists school" (Sabur 2001). The end of Cold War and the accompanying structural changes of monumental proportion introduced a revolutionary change in security thinking. The new security agenda came to include issues as diverse as intra-state conflict, ethnic-religious violence, landmines, terrorism, democracy, human rights, gender, crime, poverty, hunger, deprivation, inequality and health hazards, economic security, water, energy and so on. One of the earliest concepts that recognized the expansion of the security agenda was the 'Bonn Declaration of 1991'<sup>3</sup> which was issued by the European Parliamentarians Conference on Building Human Security.

It defined human security as, 'the absence of threat to human life, lifestyles and culture through the fulfillment of basic needs'. Likewise, in January 1992, the United Nations Security Council issued a declaration recognizing that economic, social, humanitarian and ecological source of instability have become threats to peace and security. Furthermore, the concept of non-traditional security threats issue gained

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<sup>1</sup> See Olaf Palme Commission's Report under the title of "*Common Security: A Blue Print for Survival*", published by Simon and Schuster in 1982.

<sup>2</sup> See more detail about the collective security on David Yosto's article on "NATO Transformed: The Alliance New Roles in International Security" published in 1977, London: Licester University.

<sup>3</sup> See Bonn Declaration 1991 of European Parliament under the title of "Absence of Threats to Human Life, Life Style and Culture" published by Institute for Security Studies, Africal Security Review Vol 6, No 1, 1997.

further prominence after the publication of the *Human Development Report* in 1994, an annual publication of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). According to this report, the concept of security “has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of the territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interest in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust.... Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their lives” (UNDP 1994).

In 1995, the Ramphal Commission<sup>4</sup> on Global Governance issued a report called *Our Neighbourhood*, which said "Global security must be broadened from the traditional focus on the security of states to include the security of people and the security of the planet" (Ramphal 1995), thus presaging the intensive link that was to develop between security and the environment. This wider idea of security has gradually drawn a large number of scholars and institutions across the world to examine the empirical and operational validity in a range of issues including that of security related to human, energy, environment and food.

Many territorially ‘secured’ states achieved their national security at the expenses of the security of the individual or people in terms of their political, social, environmental, economic, and cultural rights and choices. There are many countries around the world where people are still deprived of their basic rights and forced to compromise their freedom for the sake of ‘national interests’ and sovereignty. Today, almost all the countries across the world are faced with one or another forms of threats resulting from the migratory movements, environmental degradation, attacks from the terror groups, outbreak of contagious diseases, ethnic, racial or religious conflicts, abject poverty situation, inequality etc. These threats are different and their impacts are far greater and deeper from the ones generated by traditional inter-state rivalries and conflicts. This has resulted in the suffering of hundred of thousands people. They have been deprived from enjoying their fundamental rights to live and livelihood. In other words, protecting citizens’ lives have increasingly become more prominent and vital both in the national security discourse and global security environment. This has injected newer challenges to the nation states. It is found that

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<sup>4</sup> See Sir Shridath Ramphal's Commission's Report under the title of "*Our Neighbourhood*" 1995, Oxford University Press.

"over the last century, thirty million people were killed in international wars, seven million in civil wars and 170 million people were killed by their own governments" (Thakur 2000).

The end of Cold War has on the one hand, significantly decreased the external threats to the nation states, on the other hand the world has been confronted with a series of intra-state violent conflicts of various types, nature and that entail and lead to large-scale atrocities and human miseries. "Of the 103 wars since the end of Cold War, ninety-seven have been fought within rather than between states" (Preston 2000). The genesis of these conflicts have been varied and the effects in the society enormous. It not only poses challenges to the particular society or state but the whole region. "The hallmark of all these conundrum has been that most of these cases have far reaching trans-national or trans-regional characteristics and reach that are doubly detrimental to the stability and peace of the region. In fact the growing processes of globalisation has precipitated powerful trans-national actors – private companies, international organisations, NGOs and non-state entities – and enabled them to become relevant actors in international relations. However the flipside of this process has been the rise of networks of discontent, as witnessed in the rise of Al Qaeda and organised terrorism penetrating borders and making unprecedented use of the modern communication systems and gadgets. This has also shown that the non-traditional threats to security have the potential to destabilise states and the regions" (Dupont 2001).

"Though the non-traditional threats to security has been criticised as a superficial concept that lacks precision and scientific connotation and has unending definition" (Paris 2001), there are mainly two basic aspects viz., 'freedom from want' and 'freedom from fear' that constitute its core intents. UNDP's emphasis was more on 'freedom from want'. This reflected the developing countries perspective. Canada put greater emphasis on freedom from fear. Canada's emphasis was the protection of civilians in the time of war. However, country like Japan, which has also recognised the significance of the security paradigm shift since the last decade, view that the freedom from want is no less critical than freedom from fear. Similarly, country like China, South Korea and members of the Association of South East Asian Nations are

also faced with growing threats from the non-traditional security issues. They have recognized its criticality and have initiated number of programs at national and regional level.

South Asian region has been a major theatre of non-traditional security threats. The region has some of the poorest people in the world plagued by illiteracy, ethnic discord and other oppressive social orders. The economic underdevelopment, poor governance and feeble political structures have added to the level of instability. Some of these country's social indicators continue to remain dismal and alarming. The region has been facing growing religious fundamentalism, ethnic conflicts, environmental degradation, refugee crisis, social crimes and terrorism. However, the minds of the ruling elites in the region are still dominated by the state centric security views. Their obsession with the traditional form of national security, nationalist passion and jingoism directed against the neighbouring states as well as the 'internal enemies' of national integration. "While regional cooperation is indispensable for addressing the issues of socio-economic development, the ruling elites in South Asian states have a vested interest in sustaining the conflicts with their neighbours because conflict becomes the most convenient means of diverting the mass grievances in the region caused by the enormous human deprivation that prevails" (Sabur 2000).

Located in the middle of two largest Asian countries India and China and being a landlocked state, issues of national security have always been the major concern for Nepal since its unification by King Prithvi Narayan Shah in 1769. King Shah described the country's situation as a "yam between two boulders", and emphasized that Nepal's territorial integrity can be preserved only through a defensive strategy by maintaining good relations with the two giant neighbours. This dictum remains the reference point of Nepal's security policy even today. Nepal's foreign and security policy evolved against the backdrop of concurrent but separate threats posed by the British East India Company on the South and steadily expanding Chinese presence in Tibet on the North. During the period of rising British power, the Rana family oligarchy tailored a foreign policy favourable to British interests primarily to maintain and sustain their oligarchy while preserving national independence and security.

Even after the emergence of India as an independent country in 1947 and China as a People's Republic in 1949, Nepal's security threats perception did not alter significantly in the past six decades. The dynamics of relations between India and China constitute the basic ingredient of Nepal's geo-strategic thinking and maintaining good neighbourly relations with these two neighbours remain core strategy of Nepal's security policy. Though various factors including its location, size, public psyche, political culture and national ethos can be counted towards Nepal's maintenance of traditional threats perception, the single most important factor that determines its threat perception has been the protracted conflictual relationship between India and China after 1962 war. This was made more complex by the competitive policy of India and China to expand their area of influence in the region.

During the time of 1960s and 70s under the leadership of King Mahendra, Nepal's policy of equal-distance and to isolate itself from increasing democratic influence from the Indian side triggered a range of activities that brought element of competition in Chinese and Indian presence in Nepal. This could be witnessed in foreign aid participation where these countries built a number of infrastructural projects of high strategic significant. For instance, the building of Tribhuvan Highway to link plain land of India with Kathmandu by India and Kodari Highway linking the border region of Tibet with Kathmandu by China injected a new sense of security dynamics in Nepal. Similar actions could be seen in the trade and the investment front. On the one hand, India extended a liberal trade exchange regime that provided unilateral access to Nepalese products into Indian markets on the other hand China provided adequate space for widening the traditional economic exchanges in its border areas with Nepal. Interestingly, one finds China seeking to undertake investment and aid projects in the plain land of Nepal which are contiguous to Indian territories.

The British colonial rulers of India had sought to keep Nepal within the Indian sphere of influence and regarded the Himalayas as second frontiers under the widely practiced views of 'Himalayan frontier policy'<sup>5</sup>. Due to its strategic importance for its

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<sup>5</sup> The first post-Independent Indian Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru signed Treaties of Peace and Friendship with three Himalayan countries of its northern border in early 1950s and it was said that India aimed to tighten its grip over those northern countries against China. India also took up the defence responsibility of other two Himalayan states; Sikkim and Bhutan. Further readings see S.P. Subedi's "When is a Treaty in Law?" Asian Year Book of International Law, Vol 5, Koswan Sik et al, (ed.), - 1997 – Netherlands.



defence against China, the British did everything they could to transform Nepal into a friendly buffer state between China and British possessions in India. After the end of British rule in India, the post colonial government of India also took note of Nepal's strategic importance and quickly signed a Treaty of Peace and Friendship<sup>6</sup> covering all aspects of Nepal-India relations including defence and security related issues in 1950 followed by a letter of exchange. It was quite interesting that the post independent Indian government persuaded to sign such a comprehensive Treaty with an oligarchy Rana regime at a time when it was facing mounting pressure from the pro-democratic forces and the regime that was itself about to collapse. Likewise, Nepal and India had concluded an Arms Assistance Agreement in 1965<sup>7</sup> under which India undertook to supply arms, ammunition, and equipment for the entire Nepalese Army. China was also concerned about the security and stability of Nepal and took several measures to extend its own sphere of influence in Nepal. The diplomatic relations between two countries was established in 1955 and five years after in April 1960 a bilateral treaty known as a Treaty of Peace and Friendship<sup>8</sup> was signed during the first democratically elected Prime Minister B. P. Koirala's China visit. It was this treaty which has resolved the two countries' long-standing border disputes including the question of Mount Everest.

## **1.2 Nepal's changing perceptions**

In the past two decades, the security perception of Nepal vis-à-vis India and China has shown some significant deviation from the typical traditional military based threats to a more diverse threats emanating from a range of non-traditional non-military canons. These emerging changes in the perception of the nature and trends of threats could be largely attributed to both internal dynamics and external environment. Internally

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<sup>6</sup> See The Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed on July 31, 1950 between the then Prime Minister of Nepal Mohan Shamsher Jang Bahadur Rana happened to be the last Prime Minister of Nepal under the Rana Oligarchy system and then Indian Ambassador to Nepal G.N. Singh and since the beginning of signing of this Treaty, it has generated controversy inside Nepal. It is alleged that some of the provisions and articles of the Treaty allows India to maintain its dominance over the security, economy, and natural resources of Nepal.

<sup>7</sup> India and Nepal signed a security treaty called 'Arms and Ammunitions Arrangement' in 1965 under the treaty provisions which India took the responsibility of supplying arms and ammunitions to Nepal and it was signed at a time when the opposition parties were launching pro-democracy movement against Royal takeover to be based in various cities of India. It was claimed that after signing the treaty, the then Indian government started to tighten the activities of pro-democracy parties in India and softened its stance towards the royal regime.

<sup>8</sup> The Treaty of Friendship was signed with China during a maiden visit of then Prime Minister of Nepal B.P. Koirala in 1960 and this treaty resolved most of the pending issues related to border and other bilateral matters between Nepal and China.

Nepal has gone through major changes in its political structures in the last two decades. The 1990's democratic transition<sup>9</sup> has generated enormous amount of political consciousness and social awareness among the Nepalese people. The freedom of speech, right to organise and the flourishing of media have played significant role in empowering the general public. People have become more attentive on their rights and issues that relate to their day-to-day lives. Problems like political instability, failure to maintain law and order, social discrimination, regional disparity, inequality, ethnic deprivations, lack of inclusiveness, poor institutional capacity and delivery mechanisms and inefficient governing system have generated enormous interests and debates all across the country. In the past successive government's failure to address these problems have played instrumental role for the ultra-left forces like Maoists and other terror and criminal groups to consolidate and expand their strengths and activities. This has caused armed conflicts for the last 10 years<sup>10</sup>, which has led the country to the current state of chaos, instability and violence.

During the Maoists insurgency in the country more than 14,000 people have lost their lives, tens of thousands of them have been injured and a larger number of people have been displaced from their native places and livelihood precipitating a serious internal refugee crisis. People's desire for peace and democracy resulted in a massive uprising in April 2006 which has forced the King to surrender power to the political parties and reinstate the earlier dissolved parliament. The reinstated parliament had made a historic declaration by curtailing the power of the monarch. It was the first time in the 240 years of history, the authority of the monarchy had been reduced and it became a titular institution. Earlier, the role of the monarchy symbolizing the traditional leadership category of the Nepali state was to be an all powerful institution of the country. The excessive centralization of the power by monarchy had become the

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<sup>9</sup> Nepal entered into the pluralistic multiparty democratic system with constitutional monarchy in 1990 after a successful pro-democratic struggle against the absolute monarchical system by the political parties.

<sup>10</sup> The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) launched armed struggle against the newly established multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy from February 1996 to April 2006. Maoists ended their armed struggle only after the popular mass movement in April 2006 which forced the then King Gyanendra to surrender power to the political parties and restored the earlier dissolved elected parliament. After that Maoists have agreed to give up the violence and ready to engage in the peace process and democratic system under which Constituent Assembly Election was held and Nepal was declared as a Republican State after overthrowing the 240 years old institute of monarchy.

causes for the mis-governance, destabilization and underdevelopment. The reinstated parliament had also declared that constituent assembly election would be held within the two years of time to draft and promulgate the new constitution. It was also declared that the newly elected constituent assembly would decide the fate of the institution of monarchy in the country.

As per the earlier declaration, the election of the constituent assembly was held in April 2008 where 601 constituent assembly members were elected through multiple election processes declared Nepal as a Federal Democratic Republic by abolishing the 240 years old monarchical institution. The proposal presented in the parliament for the implementation of Democratic Republic states that "Respecting the Historical Struggles made by Nepali people time and again since before 1950, respecting the people's mandate expressed in the people's movement, acknowledging the responsibility entrusted by the history, Nepal Government tables following proposals at the first meeting of the Constituent Assembly for implementation of declaration of republic to institutionalize the achievements achieved in the past as per the agreement between political parties and Article 159 (2) of the Interim Constitution 2006"<sup>11</sup>.

The first meeting of the CA declares that Nepal is officially converted into a Federal Democratic Republic. "Nepal shall remain sovereign, independent and integrated, secular and inclusive with sovereignty and state authority vested in the people" (Ibid). The newly formed government of Nepal after the CA election is under tremendous pressure in freeing its people from the clutches of violence and securing their basic needs such as sufficient food, shelters, education, health care, human rights, political stability and security.

Similarly, the last 10 years of conflictual situation has triggered many other social and environmental crises in Nepal. For instance, due to the escalation of violence in the rural areas, forced outmigration both within and outside the country has emerged as a key issue and this has precipitated large number of internally displaced persons and refugees particularly in the mid and far western hill districts as well as in the mid-Terai regions. Similarly, the out migration has also become a common phenomena

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<sup>11</sup> Constituent Assembly Declaration on 28 May 2008, Gorkha Patra National Daily, May 29, 2010, Kathmandu.

and hundreds of thousand young people are leaving the country to seek jobs<sup>12</sup>. On top of this over 110000 Bhutanese refugees<sup>13</sup> have been languishing in various camps in two eastern districts Morang and Jhapa since last almost two decades. There are also about 25000 Tibetan refugees<sup>14</sup> who have taken shelter in different parts of Nepal. Both these refugees and the internally displaced persons have triggered a variety a range of social and security problems in the country.

Using terror tactics to assert their own political and social agendas by the extremist groups have become quite common in Nepal. Apart from the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists), the small armed-groups who had split earlier from them are also involved in arbitrary killing, abduction, intimidation and harassment to the common people in the mid and eastern-Terai districts of Nepal. This has posed a serious challenge in maintaining law and order in these districts and surrounding areas. Likewise, recently the Bhutanese refugee based in Nepal have also formed a Communist Party of Bhutan (Maoists) and decided to launch armed rebellion against the King's regime in Bhutan. It is reported that the Bhutanese Maoists are establishing their links with the Maoists and other extremist groups in India<sup>15</sup>. Their involvement in the violent activities would have serious impacts in the bordering regions of Nepal and India too.

Environmental insecurity is another serious threat that Nepal has been facing today. The fast depletion of forest, decreasing number of endangered species, weakening security of the protected parks, degradation of shared rivers, frequent outburst of glacier lakes and increasing landslides and floods due to the torrential rainfalls in the middle mountains are some of the issues that Nepal is faced today in the environmental front. The impact of climate change on various aspects of Nepalese society, economy, biodiversity and more importantly on glacilogy have become rather

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<sup>12</sup> It is reported in the national daily news papers that around two million Nepali are currently working outside Nepal. It does not include Nepali working in various states of India. [www.nepalnews.com](http://www.nepalnews.com) accessed on April 21, 2010.

<sup>13</sup> Since the early 1990s, Nepali origin Bhutanese citizens were forced to leave their country by the Bhutanese regime due to their involvement in the pro-democratic movements inside Bhutan. According to the UNHCR, there were 110000 Bhutanese refugees languishing in various camps in the eastern part of Nepal under UNCHR supervision. Among them, around 30000 were resettled in various Western countries under the newly developed scheme by the International Migrant Organisation and governments of those western countries.

<sup>14</sup> Tibetan people are taking shelter as refugees in various parts of Nepal since early 1970s.

<sup>15</sup> Reported in The Nepali Times, June 13, 2003, Kathmandu.

critical and noticeable. Furthermore, the growing urbanisation and growth of unplanned city centres have created serious threats to the people's lives. A report recently published by Asian Development Bank stated that the capital city Kathmandu has become the most polluted city in Asia in recent years (Huizenga, 2006).

Meanwhile, the changing external atmosphere of Nepal especially the increasing rapprochements between India and China have added to changing nature and trends of threats perception in Nepal. Since the last two decades<sup>16</sup>, the bilateral relations of India and China have improved remarkably. China's decision to adopt open door policy in the early 1980s and India's adoption of economic liberalization policy since 1991 have been a marked shift in their traditional foreign policy behaviour. Both Indian and Chinese leaderships realized that the old ideology led foreign policy is not so effective in the changing dynamics brought about by the process of globalisation and interdependence. In line with their changing relations in bilateral level, India and China have also started to co-operate with each other in managing their relations with the neighbouring countries including Nepal.

Both countries are trying to find new ways of managing the relations in the changing context. Since last decade, both India and China have adopted several policies in line with changing environment. The introduction of the 'Gujarat Doctrine'<sup>17</sup> in the mid 1990s was one of the steps in injecting a newer dynamics in its approach towards the neighbouring countries. Likewise, India's willingness to participate in private level relations with Nepal rather than typical government-to-government level in the past also indicates that it encourages relations with Nepal based on multiplicity of partners and actors. Similarly, China has revitalised its neighbourhood policy in the last decades by introducing a "Comprehensive Periphery Policy"<sup>18</sup> which means to have an integrated regional policy with the neighbouring countries. The Chinese

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<sup>16</sup> It has been widely recognized that the landmark visit made by late Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1988 contributed significantly for the improvement of Sino-India bilateral relations.

<sup>17</sup> Gujarat Doctrine is a set of five principles to guide the conduct of the foreign relations with India's immediate neighbours spelt out by I.K. Gujral, the former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of India.

<sup>18</sup> China calls its immediate neighbours as 'periphery countries' and first time it has developed a comprehensive policy towards its neighbours. Further readings, see "China's Periphery Policy and Changing Security Environment in the Asia Pacific Region" by Suisheng Zhao, [www.google.co.in/search](http://www.google.co.in/search). Accessed on August 25, 2008.

government has also been cautiously expanding its political influence in the subcontinent.

India and China have expressed their serious concerns on escalation of violence and breakdown of law and order in Nepal in recent years. They view that the growing conflict in Nepal would have spill over impacts on bordering areas of both countries. The hijacking of an Indian Airlines New Delhi bound flight from Kathmandu by the Islamic terrorists in December 1999 has raised serious possibility of using Nepali land for anti-India activities. The growing nexus between the different armed groups in Nepal and India, human trafficking, uncontrolled migratory movements are the issues that India and Nepal have identified as the newer threats to the security and interests of both countries. New Delhi has repeatedly asked Nepal to control the activities of allegedly Pakistani intelligence-supported groups acting against India from Nepali soil. Similarly, China's concern today is that insecurity and instability in Nepal might strengthen anti-China elements along its Tibet Autonomous Areas borders which has been regarded as China's major trouble spot.

More human lives are lost everyday in Nepal not because of the external conflicts. It is because of the internal problems. Insecurity emanates from vulnerabilities which need not necessarily be inter-state; they could be intra-state with the potential to weaken and destroy state institutions, political order and even national sovereignty. "What are the sources of Nepalese vulnerability? Is Nepal's insecurity more due to its military weakness, small size, land-locked, a geographical location sandwiched between two nuclear powers, or the open border with India which could be misused against either country or due to poverty, economic deprivation, poor governance, exclusion of large proportion of the population from the basic needs of human life or failure to meet rising aspirations of the people" (Mahat 2004)? The vulnerability of a nation state like Nepal arises from internal problems –failure of the state, underdevelopment, rampant corruption, erosion of institutions, crisis of leadership, aberrations within the system and the failure of the leadership to correct them and influence gained by the external powers and international institutions in the decision making echelons and agencies of the government. With these changing internal and international and regional atmosphere, Nepal has found many of its traditional

security threats diluted and many more new non-traditional security threats have become pronounced.

### **1.3 Research Questions**

- What are the factors that contributed in bringing about tangible as well as invisible shifts in the nature of security threat perceptions in Nepal?  
Are these paradigms of newer threat perceptions real and to what extent these are explained by the shift from traditional state-centric military threats to the people-centric non-military?
- Could issues like migration, terrorism and environmental threats be considered as non-traditional security threats in Nepal? In what way they fit into the security basket that could bring instability and threats to an emerging nation state like Nepal?
- In what sense these newer varieties of threats are non-traditional?
- In what way these newer threat perceptions are related to the immediate neighboring countries like China and India?
- How these changing threat perceptions are likely to be taken and played by the neighbouring countries and what are the converging issues that bring cooperations and deviations that bring conflicts with these neighbours ?
- What are the steps or likely steps that Nepal could devise in curbing these threats?

### **1.4 Objectives of the Study**

- To examine the theoretical underpinning and conceptual basis of issues related to traditional and non-traditional national security threats.
- To trace how the national security perception of Nepal evolved in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries.
- To examine various components of national security threats of Nepal in terms of relationships vis-a-vis India and China.
- To understand the new phenomenon and the discourse about non-traditional security threats in Nepal. To identify the components of non-traditional security threats including migration, terrorism and environmental insecurity of Nepal

- To examine how these threats have impinged upon the orthodox concept of Nepal's national security.
- To assess the extent of dilution of traditional security threats perceptions of Nepal and emergence of new threats on its security in the changing context of India China relations.
- To understand and assess the trans-border consequences of migration, environmental degradation and terrorism issues and it's effects on national security.
- To identify the possible strategies to counter the non-traditional security threats.



## **Chapter II**

### **Concept of Security: Changing Perceptions**

This chapter will examine diverse concepts of security and analyze various canons of national security threats. It will also focus on shifting paradigm of security primarily from a traditional military based perspective to much broader themes of security based on non-traditional perspectives. It will also review the security theories and examine various mechanisms and instruments with which the modern nation states manage threats to their security.

#### **2.1 Concepts of Security**

Many writers agree that there is no agreement as to what 'security' means. The idea of security has proved too complex and there is much dispute about its meaning. At the same time many agree that it is "essentially a contested concept" (Weldon 1953, Gallie, 1962, Buzan 1982). Such concepts have largely generated protracted debate about their meaning and applications because, as Little points out, they "contain an ideological element which renders empirical evidence irrelevant as a means of resolving the dispute" (Little 1981). Wolfer argued that "it may not have any precise meaning at all" (Wolfer 1962). The ambiguity about the concept of security has been felt by the academicians as well as the practitioners since a long time. Several questions have been raised which include issues related to "security for whom", "of what values", "from what threats" and "by what means". Answers to these questions rely on the different conceptions and definitions of the security. As Realists and Neo-realists, the state centric and military means to achieve maximum security in an anarchical world propounded by persons like Hobbes, Waltz and Kissinger argue that the referent object of security is the state. According to Realist School of Thought, "nation states are the main actors in the international politics and its protection should always be on the top of the priority" (Bajpai 2002). It is a state-centric theory of international relations. They believe that the international system is governed by anarchy and there is no central authority. Realism theory claims to rely upon an ancient tradition of thought which includes writers such as Thucydides, Machiavelli and Rousseau. Likewise, the Neo-Realists like Kenneth Waltz argues that "the state

of structure must be taken into account in explaining state behavior". The Neo-Realists question the classical Realists about the similar behaviour exhibited by both Super Power during the Cold War period despite different political orders in the US and previous USSR. According to the Neo-Realists it is because of the systemic forces homogenize foreign policy behaviors (Waltz 1979). According to them, in a Hobbesian world, the state is the primary provider of security; "if the state is secure, then those who live within it are secure" (Bajpai 2002).

National independence and territorial integrity are the most critical to a nation and these two values must be protected. "If any state is attacked on its two values with violence that must be responded with violence" (Sheehan 2006). Because of conceptual ambiguity and lack of clear definition, we find only some interesting yet provocative discussions on security. The best known conceptual piece on security is Arnold Wolfers' chapter on national security in his book *Discord and Collaboration*. "Wolfers emphasis on national security certainly reflected the dominant orientation in the empirical literature" (Buzan 1982). In the post World War period, writers like Bull, Brodie, Trager and Simoney (Bull 1961, Brodie 1973 and Trager and Simoney 1973) wrote about the concepts of security where basically they argue that security as an "ambiguous symbol and it may not have any precise meaning at all" (Buzan 1982). But again they all have found difficulties in finding a common definition. It is a contested concept and no precise definition. It generates unsolvable debate about its meaning and application as Richard Little points out, they "contain an ideological element which renders empirical evidence irrelevant as a means of resolving the dispute" (Little 1981). Macdonald and Jervis have attempted to tackle the ambiguity of the concepts but again ended up by saying that security as an 'inadequate' concept (Macdonald 1981). L. B. Krause and Joseph Nye have observed that "neither economists, nor political scientists have paid enough attention to the complexity of the concept of security including its instrumental role in the enhancement of other values" (Krause and Nye 1975). Due to its complexity as well as lack of agreed definition, there have been very few literatures that particularly deal with the concepts of security. According to Buzan, 'the existing works do not even begin to add up to a coherent investigation of the concept, and their impact on the study of international relations has been marginal' (Buzan 1982). Many of the existing literature focus on empirical aspects that deal with contemporary security problems

and issues. While dealing with national and international security issues, most of the literatures analyze the foreign, military and economic policies of states. In other words, "the concept of security is inadequately addressed in terms other than the policy interests of particular actors or groups, and the discourse has rather a heavy military emphasis" (Ibid).

The realists, who have dominated the Post War interpretations of international political thinking and system have come up in defining the concept by using the idea of national security. The whole gamut of security thinking has been focused on ensuring the security of an insecure state. According to the Realists, the nation states are the basic building blocks of the international system with unlimited sovereignty and primary function of a nation state is to survive and enhance its power in an anarchical and conflictual international system. "Competition between states to maximize one's interests, often at the expense of others and the development of the state's capability (military and otherwise) to ensure security are the basic features of Realists" (Sabur 2003). The source of the Realists school of thought was the Westphalian ideas of a nation-state. In the Realist concept of security the state is the clear referent point. Buzan defines "threats to states in three senses: to the idea of the state (nationalism); to the physical base of the state (population and resources); and to the institutional expression of the state (political system)" (Buzan 1983). There has been a debate on whether one definition suffices for the entire world or whether different countries and different regions require different notions of security.

The Neo-realists see the system as dominant and argue that security anywhere is derived from the system's anarchic nature. The Realists make the state the referent point and stress fragility and comparative infancy of the Third World state. For example, Ayooob argues that "Third World security refers to 'vulnerabilities –both internal and external – that threaten or have the potential to bring down or weaken structures, both territorial and institutional, and governing regimes" (Ayooob 1995). "The demands of the state-making process and the societal responses in the Third World state generate vulnerabilities and this becomes a tremendous load on the institutional machinery of the state, a load which the state is usually unable to handle effectively" (Ibid). Furthermore "The Third World state's lack of control over its international environment and, even more importantly, its inability to insulate its

state-making process from international systemic pressure produce an all-pervading security problem that is basically insoluble" (Ibid).

Richard points out that "The security is a political condition, in which Third World states can have external threats, but are also internally threatened, often primarily, by the political impact of a low level of social cohesion and lack of regime legitimacy" (Norton 1991). However for others, such as Ball, "it is not Third World states but ruling regimes that are the key referent point. Regime security is central in this literature because for some Third World states it is clear that the purpose of government policy is not to make citizens secure but to safeguard the elite's grip on power" (Ball 1988). "In a bipolar world, security essentially meant the concern with the territorial integrity of the state to be managed by military means. Within the 'Realist' framework, the state would exchange loyalty of its citizens with the protection it would provide them from external aggression. The possibility that the security of the individual and the state need not coincide or that the state might be a threat to its citizens was not contemplated. Despite its major interest in war, realist theory showed little interest in civil conflicts" (Ibid).

"However, these views of the Realists have been strongly criticized by the writers like Worlfers, Ashley, Booth and Beaton saying it as excessively narrow, hollow and militarized interpretation of security" (Worlfers 1962, Ashely 1980, Booth 1991, and Buzan 1983). Criticizing the Realists approach on concept of security Ashley mentions that "it is a reductionist, actor oriented, narrowly focused approaches to security analysis and makes an urging instead for a more holistic, linkage-oriented systemic view" (Ashley 1980). He argues that technical rationality is itself a principal factor exacerbating the security dilemma.

Despite their wholly different starting points, both Ashley and Booth come to similar conclusions. Booth states that "Tthose strategists who do not attempt to be part of the solution will undoubtedly become an increasingly important part of the problem" (Booth 1991). Similarly, for the need to expand conceptions of security, Beaton argues that "It must be expanded from the limits of parochial national security to include a range of systemic considerations" (Beaton 1972). Bull argued "against excessive self-interest in approaches to national security, and for a broader view in

which common interests and linkage among national securities receive greater attention" (Bull 1961).

Observing the concept of security, Krause and Nye have pointed out that "neither economists nor political scientists have paid enough attention to the complexity of the concept of security, including its instrumental role in enhancement of other values" (Krause and Nye 1975). There has been dissatisfaction with the traditional ideas, about security at least, since the end of the World War in 1945, and the analysis of its causes that followed. Security is about protecting people as individuals and in groups, and this protection should be not only against war and other forms of unstructured violence but also against hunger, disease, terrorism and drugs. So, even in the 1960s, security came to be associated with development, which could have a better effect on one's feeling of security than simply continuing to acquire arms (Ibid).

Elaborating the underdevelopment of concepts of security (Buzan 1982) Buzan argues that there are basically five reasons for the conceptual underdevelopment of the security and because of these reasons despite being a core concept it has remained relatively unexplored idea. Firstly, the idea has proved too complex to attract analysts, and therefore has been neglected in favour of more tractable concepts. This explanation has some weight, for security clearly is a difficult concept. But security is no more difficult than other core concepts in the social sciences. Like power, justice, peace, equality and freedom, such concepts necessarily generate unsolvable debates about their meaning and application.

Secondly, it is compounded by the overlap between security and concept of power. The Realists model of international politics as a struggle for power and as a dominant ideology in the Post War period, confined the definition of security concepts into a power struggle. Thirdly it is revolt against the Realists by the Idealists. The Idealists had to deal with power, because it represented the dominant orthodoxy. Fourthly, the very nature of strategic studies as a sub-field produced a large volume of empirical literature on problems of military policy. It still exists largely within the confines of the classical Realists model of the struggle for power. And finally it is undefined notion of national security which offers a scope for power-maximizing strategies to

the political and military elites. Because of the considerable leverage over domestic affairs which can be obtained by invoking the issue of national security.

## **2.2 International relations and security**

The very conceptual underpinning of international relations is associated with security. Words like war, peace and security have always been the central issues in International Relations. Realists like Carr views that International Relations began some two thousand five hundred years ago with Thucydides and the conflict amongst the Greek city-states. Thucydides wrote that "The strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept"(Thucydides 1980). Echoing Thucides, Carr wrote that "The majority rules because it is stronger, the minority submits because it is weaker" (Carr 1946). Carr's views reflect the Realists' point of view. However, Holsti and Knutsen argue that "There is a consensus amongst scholars of international relations that a single state system or society of states has existed since the treaties of Westphalia" (Holsti 1991 and Knutsen 1992) and Armstrong suggests that "By the time of seventeenth century, the concepts of sovereignty, national equality of states, international law, legitimacy and international society had emerged along with the practice of diplomacy and the balance of power" (Armstrong 1993).

The experiences and implications of the war and insecurity largely shaped the theoretical approaches to International Relations. It is not surprising that security is the "Preeminent concept of international relations.....No other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, or commands the disciplinary power of 'security" (Derian 1995). As Mann has argued that "What is really sought from 'International Relations' is substantive theory on its most important issue of all: the question of war and peace" (Mann 1996). The first academic enquiry of International Relations began in 1919 with the establishment of a department at the University of Wales at Aberystwyth in the United Kingdom. The intensity of violence in the First World War pursued the Academicians not only to analyze the origins and conduct of war but to prescribe means of preventing it. The experiences of the First

World War brought into intellectual and diplomatic communities that the old assumptions and prescriptions of power politics to be totally discredited.

Peace could be preserved by a system of collective security; this involved transferring the concepts and practices of domestic society to the international sphere. Together with a nineteenth-century belief in the inevitable progress of mankind, these 'idealists' or 'utopians' as they came to be pejoratively called, invested their hopes for a new, peaceful world order in the idea of creating an international organization such as the League of Nation.

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This led to considerable investment in the study of war and International Relations in the Post Wars period. In early 20<sup>th</sup> century, many universities created departments of International Relations mainly in United Kingdom and United States. Similarly, the research institutes such as Royal Institute of International Affairs in London and Council on Foreign Relations in New York were established. Academic journals like International Affairs in Britain and Foreign Affairs in the US started to publish. The first 'school' or 'theory' of international relations emerged to dominate the discipline's early history. The idealists (also known as liberals and utopians) argued that war was not a product of human nature, but the result of misunderstandings by politicians who had lost control of events leading up to hostilities in 1914. According to the idealists, "If secret diplomacy could be replaced by collective security, and autocratic rule by democracy, war would be seen as a senseless and destructive tool of international statecraft" (Burchill and Linklater 1996).

It was believed that a more peaceful and just world order could be established if the lessons of the First World War were understood and acted upon. The belief that the system of international relations that had given rise to the First World War was capable of being transformed into a fundamentally more peaceful and just world order; that under the impact of the awakening of democracy, the growth of the international mind the development of League of Nations. "The good works of men of peace or the enlightenment spread by their own teachings, it was in fact being transformed; and that their responsibility as students of international relations was to assist this march of progress to overcome the ignorance, the prejudices, the ill-will and the sinister interests that stood in its way" (Bull 1990).

The reaction of scholars to the liberal-utopians dominates the discipline's early life. The realist critique of the liberal-utopian school launched by Carr just before the outbreak of Second World War, was regarded as the first such great debate that happened between idealism and realism. The very purpose of this debate was to change the world for better by eradicating the scourge of war. Insecurity was core issue. As the discipline grew this foundational normative concern of International Relations was supplemented by other theoretical issues. Though the pre-occupation with conflict and war remained, the discipline became more generally concerned with a wider range of other international actors and phenomena as well as a series of introspective philosophical questions. In the Cold War, Neo-realist theorists like Waltz and Gilpin promoted the bipolar model and argued that this as the most stable. "This was because the two superpowers would have sufficient material power to reduce uncertainty about the enemy's intentions, to keep their allies from defecting, and to not rely upon them too closely" (Waltz 1979). By the 1990s, the Neo-realist discipline had undergone a rapid transition.

The 1990s transition represents drastic change in the discipline and traditional boundaries of International Relations. It has been widened to the point where it would be barely recognizable to its earlier practitioners.

The classic Realists viewed that the issue of war was at the heart of the academic study of International Relations. Hobbes said that "in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly is glory. The first makes man invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third for reputation..... Hereby it is manifested, that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war, as is of every man, against every man" (William and Wrights 1993).

## **2.3 International relations theories and security**

### **2.3.1 Classical Realist approach to security**

State has been the referent object for Realist . Realist school focuses on states and military to achieve security in an anarchical context. The term 'anarchy' in its common usage implies chaos and disorder. However this is not exactly meant in the



international relations. Here, anarchic means there is no overriding authority or government in the international system to discipline the states. Each state is autonomous, exercising sovereign authority over its own affairs. For the realist, state is everything and as long as state is secured everything is secured. State is simply taken for granted as the inevitable and sole provider of security for humanity. The classical realists like Hobbes who believes that "Men are in a constant state of war in the absence of a superior sovereign power that ensures their security" (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy 2007). Hobbes was very much influenced by persons like Thucydides and Machiavelli. Machiavelli who wrote prince (the sovereign power)

Stated that power had no morality. Self-interest for the state was the supreme. According to the realist school, "State is the supreme actor and acts in the context of international anarchy. In the international system there is no regulatory system which can enforce compliance on states unlike in the domestic system where individual comply national rules and regulations. There is no binding international law or legal system which can bring states to account for their behavior. States can get away with whatever their power allows them to achieve. Realists assert that the international system is characterized by self-help" (Grieco, 1993).

A state always aspires for the maximum security. Power is the central notion. As Stausz-Hupe perceived international relations as being "Dominated by the quest for power' and that 'at any given period of known history, there were several states locked in deadly conflict, all desiring the augmentation or preservation of their power" (Stausz-Hupe and Possony 1954 and Terriff and Croft 1999). The state can never be sure of the intentions of others. Therefore, state is in a permanent state of rivalry, tensions, and wars. As Tickner puts it, "What are justified by one state as legitimated security enhancing measures are likely to be perceived by others as a threatening military build-up" (Tickner 1995). For the realist, the stability of the entire system derives from its structure and from the distribution of military power between the states. The key factor in ensuring stability is the balance of power. As Carr argued that "...pure realism can offer nothing but a naked struggle for power which makes any kind of international society impossible" (Carr 1946, Buzan 1982).

Realism further assumes that certain largely immutable factors such as geography and human nature affect international conduct. Realists generally agree that a state's location affects its national capabilities and its foreign policy orientation. Owing to geography some states are more vulnerable to attack and occupy more strategically important areas than others. They assume that moral principles in the abstract cannot be applied to international political actions. The criterion for judging a particular policy in international relations is whether its political consequences serve and preserve the needs and interests of the state. According to their definition, the primary responsibility of statesmen is the survival of the state and its vital interests (Ibid).

The realism dominated theory and practice of the international system after the Second World War when influential writers like Morgenthau, Aron, Neibuhr, Kennan, Herz, Kissinger and Wight produced major theoretical books and articles<sup>1</sup>. They argued that they looked the world as it was rather than as they would like it to be as what liberal internationalists opined. The post War dominant theory and its foundation were subjected to critical questioning on number of grounds by the time of 1960s.

### **2.3.2 Neo-realist approach to security**

"Neo-realism sought an advance from realist perspectives by adding the 'scientific' element into its theory, in addition to rational choice. It maintained continuity with realism in the importance it gave to the state, military power, and polarity of the international system" (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007). Neo-realism emerged in the 1970s and it is a theory that does not necessarily overlook the safety of the citizens, rather it assumes this as given. The development of Neo-realism theory was a response to the increasing criticism that the classical realism was facing in those period. Meantime, the new challenges were also posed by other theories like interdependency and cooperation in the global level. The founding father of Neo-

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<sup>1</sup> Morgenthau, Hans (1948), *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, NY, Knopf, Kissinger, Henry (1957), *A World Restored*, Castlereagh, Metternich, and *The Problem of Peace, 1812-1822*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, and Carr, E.H. *'The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939*, London, Macmillan were some of the prominent writings during the period.

realism Waltz attempted to bring what he sees as scientific methodological rigor of disciplines such as anthropology and economics to the study of international politics." Waltz's 'neo-realism' or 'structural realism' is both critique of traditional realism and a substantial intellectual extension of a theoretical tradition which was in danger of being outflanked by rapid changes in the contours of global politics" (Burchill and Linklater 1996).

The main point which Waltz poses and then proceeds to answer is: why do states exhibit similar foreign policy behavior despite their different political systems and contrasting ideologies? He gives example of superpower behaviour during the Cold War. Despite the different political and social orders in the US and ex (This book was written in 1979 when Soviet Union was not ex-) USSR, their behaviour during period of Cold War was remarkably similar. Their pursuit of military power and influence, their competition for strategic advantage and the exploitation of their respective spheres of influence were strikingly parallel.

According to Waltz "It is because of the systemic forces that homogenize foreign policy behaviour by interposing themselves between states and their diplomatic conduct" (Waltz 1979). The identification of these systemic forces (the states which have different political system but their foreign policy behaviors are similar) is perhaps neo-realism's single greatest contribution to the international theory. Similarly, Waltz promoted the bipolar model as the most stable one because the two superpowers would have sufficient material power to reduce uncertainty about the enemy's intentions to keep their allies from defecting, and to not rely upon them too closely (Waltz 1979).

According to Neo-realist theory, security was ensured by nuclear deterrence and nuclear power-balancing while bipolarity produced a balance of power which assured considerable measure of security. For them, "Security exclusively means order and international boundary maintenance, to be achieved by the preservation of a hierarchical internal system in which the great powers act as the world's policemen" (Tickner 1995). "System structure is composed of the most powerful states. These actually determine whether the system is bipolar, multi-polar, and so on. Variation in the distribution of power across the system introduces variation in structure.

Capabilities, or power, strongly influence the success or failure of a state in its interactions with other, often competing, states; those with great power are more likely to achieve their ends. The nature of the power relationship amongst states affects their expectations of success or failure. Thus, large changes in relative power across the system constitute a change in the structure, which affects the expectation of how states will behave and outcomes their actions will produce" (Waltz 1979).

Like the classical Realists, Neo-realists also believe that the key characteristics of the system's units – state – remain unchanged as long as the system remains anarchic. In spite of greater interdependence, the growth of international organizations, and a significant increase in the number and influence of transnational non-state actors, the international system remains more or less anarchic. Realism and Neo-realism are part of the same continuum of political theorizing about international politics. "Both have identified two variables – the anarchic nature of the international system and capability or power – as critical to any theory about international affairs, though they vary in how they utilize these variables to develop a theory. The key to the impact of anarchy is that 'good ' behaviour by states is never guaranteed. No state can be certain that all other states will behave in a highly pacific fashion and not resort forces, or the threat of force, to have their way" (Ibid). The Neo-realist school of thought makes clear that states can be and frequently are dangerous to each other, and are quite capable of inflicting deliberate physical harm on each other, for whatever reason.

### **2.3.3 Liberalist approach to security**

For liberals, peace is the normal state of affairs. According to liberals, "The laws of nature dictated harmony and co-operation between people. Therefore, war is unnatural and irrational. Liberals have a belief in progress and the perfectibility of the human condition. Through their faith in the power of human reason and the capacity of human beings to realize their inner potential, they remain confident that the stain of war can be removed from human experiences" (Zacher and Matthew 1995). A common thread running through liberal thought, from Rousseau, Kant, Cobden, Wilson to Schumpeter and Doyle, is that wars were created by militaristic and undemocratic governments for their own vested interests. "Wars were engineered by a 'warrior class' bent on extending their power and wealth through territorial conquest"

(Burchill 1996). According to Paine in his article 'The Rights of Man', "The 'war system' was contrived to preserve the power and the employment of princes, statesmen, soldiers, diplomats and armaments manufacturers, and to bind their tyranny ever more firmly upon the necks of the people" (Howard 1978).

According to the liberalist school of thought, war can be prevented by the human being themselves and they had the capacity to do it. They prescribed two medicines to prevent it; democracy and free trade. "Democratic processes and institutions would break the power of the ruling elites and curb their propensity for violence. Free trade and commerce would overcome the artificial barriers between individuals and unite them everywhere into one community" (Burchill 1996). As Kant argued that the "Establishment of republic forms of government in which rulers were accountable and individual rights were respected would lead peaceful international relations because the ultimate consent for war would rest with the citizens of the state" (Kant 1970). War was the outcome of the minority rule (Ibid). "When the citizens who bear the burden of war elect their governments, war becomes impossible" (Doyle 1986).

Like the realists, liberalists too believe that the international system is anarchic. However, the latter assumes that there is room for regulation and that states can be constrained by means other than the use of force. Unlike the realists and neo-realists, they argue that security does not comprise only military and material capacities but there are other factors like institutional, economic, and political. They see the transnational institutions do play important role in security making process in the international level. Regional and international organisations like United Nations, European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organisations and Association of South East Asian Nations etc. are often cited as institutions which have an important role to play in helping to maintain stability in regional and international level (Burchill 1996).

They also see the non-state actors such as NGOs, INGOs, international laws and other instruments like Covenants and Resolutions can play important role in prevention of war and promotion of security and stability in the regional and global level. The creation of networks and multilateral institutions, harmonization of norms, and the establishment of common values would naturally reduce the aggressiveness and help to maintain communications and dialogues between the states and among the states.

This will further enhance the culture of negotiation and compromise instead of conflict (Zacher and Mathew 1995).

Another liberal approach to international security is the democratic peace theory. According to it, the democratic states tend not to fight with other democratic states. This theory was propounded by Kant in 1795, who argued that "Democracies were less warlike than other forms of government, and in recent times this concept was promoted by Doyle and Russett" (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007). This theory contends that "Democracies do not fight against each other: firstly as they have propensity to settle their tensions peacefully, and secondly, in a democracy, citizens influence decisions about going to war" (Ibid).

The democratic peace theorists contend that democracies are more likely to settle mutual conflicts of interest short of the threat or use of any military force. It is accepted that conflicts of interests will and do, arise between states, but shared norms and institutional constraints mean that democracies rarely escalate those dispute to the point where they threaten to use military forces against each other or actually use force (Ibid).

Liberals also felt that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries most of the wars were fought by states to achieve their mercantilist goals. Therefore, free trade would break down the divisions between the states and unite individuals everywhere in one community. It will expand the contacts and communication between the people of the world. According to Kant, "Unhindered commerce between the peoples of the world would unite them in a common, peaceful enterprise. Trade.... would increase the wealth and power of the peace-loving, productive sections of the population at the expense of the war-orientated aristocracy, and .... would bring men of different nations into contact with one another; contact which would make clear to all of them their fundamental community of interests" (Howard 1978). Free trade and removal of barriers to commerce is at the heart of modern interdependency theory (Burchill 1996).

The rise of regional economic integration in Europe, for example, was inspired by the liberal belief that the likelihood of conflict between states would be reduced by creating a common interest in trade and economic collaboration among members of

the same geographical region. This would encourage states such as France and Germany which traditionally resolved their differences militarily, to co-operate within a commonly agreed economic and political framework (Burchill 1996). This view reasserts the role of interdependence, globalization, free trade and international financial networks in security where the growing commercial interdependency will prevent the conflict in bilateral as well as in multilateral level.

However, the liberals approach to security system was also not free from the criticism. The critiques argue that liberal internationalists had been wrong to assume that there was a self-evident value system, committed to international harmony and cooperation, which had universal validity (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007).

As Carr commented, "These supposedly absolute and universal principles were not principles at all, but these were unconscious reflections of national policy based on a particular interpretation of national interests at a particular time" (Carr 1946 and Burchill 1996).

#### **2.3.4 Constructivist approach to security**

The Constructivist approach to security is a new approach which argues that fundamental structures of international politics are social rather than strictly materials. And structure is the product of social relationships. The Constructivists argue that without giving weight to the underlying dimension of different social groups, which determine not only the position of different social groups within the country and between the countries. It brings individual, groups, NGOs and the emerging transnational civil society actors into focus. It criticizes the traditional realists and liberalist theories for their over emphasis on state security. They argue that the notion of international relations are not only affected by power politics but also by ideas is also shared by writers who describe themselves as 'critical theorists'. They believe that fundamental structures of international politics are social rather than strictly material. As opposite to the neo-realists, constructivists think that structure is the product of social relationships. Social structures are made up of elements, such as shared knowledge, material resources and practices. Constructivist Wendt argues that 'security dilemma is a social structure composed of inter-subjective understandings in

which states are so distrustful that they make worst-case assumptions about each other's intentions, and, as a result, define their interests in 'self-help' terms' (Wendt 1992). He opposed both realists and liberalists arguing that the international system is not the reflection of power relationships and desires to dominate but concepts of images. Thus security is only a question of what he calls 'inter-subjective' perceptions (Ibid)

Constructivists like Onuf argues that 'there is no single truth, for truths are linked to the arguments with which they are justified' (Onuf 1995). Constructivists consider that tensions between states flow from values, aspirations, and perceptions that change from time to time. Such shifts do not stem from materials conditions as realists think but from self and subjective representations (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007).

Not only the security dilemmas are socially constructed but also whole structure of the international system: anarchy, competition, search for power, constant tensions are not objective realities. These are 'inter-subjective constructs' integrated by states since the Westphalia treaties in 1648. Thus, 'anarchy is what states make out of it' (Alder 1997 and Wendt 1992). According to constructivist, the determinants of security are not material conditions (military for the realists and economic or financial for the liberalists) but ideas and norms. States' interests are not exogenously given. However, Constructivist international relations theory is not a single unified movement, its significance lies in its assumption that behavior, interests, and relationships are socially constructed and can be changed. The theory believes that threats are constructed and they can be altered or mitigated.

### **2.3.5 Collectivist approach to security**

Collective security approach is one type of coalition building strategy in which a group of nations agree not to attack each other and to defend each other against an attack from one of the others, if such an attack is made. The principal is that "an attack against one, is an attack against all"<sup>2</sup>. The NATO and Warsaw Pact were the example of collective defense. Proponents of collective security argue that domestic

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<sup>2</sup> International Online Training Program On Intractable Conflict, University of Colorado, obtained from [www. Colorado.edu/conflict/peace/treatment/collsec](http://www.Colorado.edu/conflict/peace/treatment/collsec).



politics, beliefs, and norms must be included as important determinants of state behaviour. In line with democratic peace theorists, the liberals also view that peace depended on the spread of democracy, collective security was an attempt to reproduce the concepts and processes of domestic law at the international level. They believed that the destructive forces of international anarchy could only be brought to an end if the international system was regulated in the same way as domestic society. They opine that though military force remains an important characteristic of international life, there are nevertheless realistic opportunities to move beyond the self-help world of realism, especially after the end of cold war. According to Charles and Kupchan, under collective security, states agree to abide by certain norms and rules to maintain stability, and when necessary band together to stop aggression when necessary ( C. Kupchan 1991).

First World War brought to the fore liberal thinkers and politicians who 'considered the old assumption and prescriptions of power politics to be totally discredited and who helped to substitute for its erratic procedures a firm system of international law and organization preserving peace by a system of collective security' (Howard 1978). Until 1914 most scholars and statesmen assumed that the 'balance of power' was the self-regulating system, the political equivalent of the law of economics. However, the balance of power had failed to prevent the war because, instead of allowing for flexibility of realigning each other against the aggressor, the great powers had locked themselves into two antagonistic blocs. The commitment to collective security was designed to prevent this situation recurring by ensuring that in the future, the aggressor would be confronted by all other states.

The establishment of League of Nations immediately after the First World War was designed as an overarching authority which would regulate the behaviour of states towards each other. Members would be required to submit their disputes to arbitration and, if necessary, use sanctions to compel aggressor states to conform to a peaceful method of conflict resolution. According to President Wilson (the architect of the League of Nations), 'there must be not a balance of power but a community of power; not organized rivalries but an organized common peace' (McKinlay and Little 1986). The liberalists asserted idea of open diplomacy and argued that there would no longer be any need for covert alliances between governments because secret diplomacy

would be replaced by open discussion in the Assembly of the League. The commitment of member states to the principle of collective security would override any other alliance or strategic obligations. States would formally renounce the use of force as a means of settling international disputes (Burchill 1996).

Another view of liberalists is the economic liberalism which has become dominant perspective and ideology of the contemporary period. The move towards a global political economy organized along neo-liberal lines is a trend as significant as the likely expansion of peace. They believe that democratic society, in which civil liberties are protected and market relations prevail, can have an international analogue in the form of peaceful global order. "The spread of liberal democracy in the post Cold War period and the zone of peace is an encouraging development as is the realization by the states that trade and commerce is more closely correlated with economic success than territorial conquest. The number of governments enjoying civilian rather than military rule is increasing, and there are signs that ethical considerations have a permanent place in the diplomatic domain" (Doyle 1983).

It is also argued that collective security institutions contribute to the task of creating a more benign international system. They help create greater confidence so that states can concentrate their energies and resources on their own domestic welfare rather than on non-productive and excessive national security arrangements.

The collectivists argue that there are profound advantages to institutionalizing a security system that promised to deepen the accord among states rather than letting a self-help system take its course and simply hoping that great power conflict will not re-emerge. "The aim, as with liberal institutionalism and democratic peace ideas is to ameliorate security competition between states by reducing the possibility that unintended spirals of hostility will escalate in to war" (Ibid).

Despite the failure of League of Nations – the first collective security arrangement in the international level – the supporters of these ideas insist that the post Cold War era has created a more conducive international environment in which greater opportunities exist than in the past for states to share similar values and interests. The collective security is based on three main conditions viz., i) states must renounce the

use of military force to alter the status quo; ii) they must broaden their view of national interest to take in the interest of international community; and iii) states must overcome their fear and learn to trust each other (Polanyi 1944 and Baylis and Smith 1999).

### **2.3.6 Postmodernist approach to security**

"The postmodernists who reject the modernity and do not accept normative positions that they believe are grounded in privileged ethical assumptions. They argue against meta narratives and grand theories of knowledge on the grounds that there is no single truth, ideology, or text" (Sheehan, 2006).

The emergence of postmodernist idea on security studies challenged the realist mode of thinking in the past decades and has produced a somewhat distinctive perspective towards international security. Postmodernist writers like Ashley share the view that "idea matters, but they also see discourse – how people talk about international politics and security – as an important driving force that shapes the way states behave" (Ashley 1984). He sees realism as one of the central problems of international security. This is because realism is a discourse of power and rule which has been dominant in international politics in the past and which has encouraged security competition by states. Vasquez states that "power politics is an image of the world that encourages behaviour that helps bring about war. As such the attempt to balance power is itself part of the very behaviour that leads to war. According to him, alliances do not produce peace, but lead to war" (Vasquez 1993). The postmodernists aim to replace the discourse of realism with a 'communitarian discourse' which emphasizes peace and harmony.

The most influential amongst the most postmodernists are Lyotard, Foucault and Derrida, who reject modernity and do not accept normative positions that they believe are, grounded in privileged ethical assumptions (Sheehan 2006). For the postmodernists, "security is part of the linear narrative characteristic of the modern Western understanding and self-interest. The Cold War is a triumph of Western capitalist values. Modernity is linked to war and its brutality and those who reject it,

postmodernists argue, are seen as obstacles to development" (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007).

Postmodernists essentially attempt to dislodge the state as the primary referent of security. And place emphasis on the inter-dependency and trans-nationalization of non-state actors. The postmodernists criticize the states and argue that states are increasingly becoming source of insecurity. The postmodernist approach asserts that national sovereignty is unraveling and that states are proving less and less capable of performing their traditional tasks. Global factors impinge on government decisions and undermine their capacity to control either external or domestic policies. Carim has argued that if state sovereignty has not ended, it is under severe challenge (Carim 1995 and Tadjkhsh and Chenoy 2007).

The key difference between realism and postmodernism is their very different ideas. Mearsheimer has noted that, "where as realists see a fixed and knowable world, post-modernists see the possibility of 'endless interpretations of the world around them ... there are no constants, fixed meanings, no secure grounds, no profound secrets, no final structures or limits of history ... there is only interpretation ... History itself is grasped as a series of interpretations imposed upon interpretations –non primary, all arbitrary" (Mearsheimer 1994 and Baylis and Smith 1999). However, postmodernists believe that it is not only essential to replace realism with a communitarian discourse but it is an achievable objective. Because experts, specially academic writers have an important role to play in influencing the flow of ideas about world politics, it is vital for them to play their part in the process of transforming language and discourse about international politics. "The whole global politics can be transformed and the traditional security dilemma can be overcome, if post-modern 'epistemic communities' play their part in spreading communitarian ideals" (Sheehan 2006).

#### **2.4 Broadening the concepts of security**

The end of the Cold War not only has resulted in many non-traditional security issues becoming a focus in international relations, but it also set the stage for a comprehensive re-evaluation of the whole concept of security. It reflects changing

threat perceptions and also changing attitudes towards the nature of security. The demise of the Cold War has clearly played a large part in the emergence of growing prominence of 'nontraditional' or 'unconventional' security issues, as they are often also termed (Bedeski 1992; Allison and Treverton 1992; Fischer 1993; Utagawa 1995). As old threats have receded and new ones have emerged, traditional thinking about the meaning of security has come under intense scrutiny and reappraisal (Mathew 1989, Sorensen 1990, Buzan 1991, Booth 1991, Klare 1996). The criticism of the traditional realist security paradigm which had been the dominant concept did not begin with the end of cold war. At various times, commentators have assailed the prevailing orthodoxy as being one-dimensional and shortsighted (Brown 1977; Westing 1986).

Some concept of security during the 1970s and 1980s like 'comprehensive security and cooperative security' did go beyond the classical concept (Moller 2000 Or Sabur 2003). In 1980 while writing about a report first time entitled *North-South: A Programme for Survival*, the Brandt Commission called for a new concept of security which would transcend the narrow notions of military defense and look more towards conditions conducive to peaceful relations (Brandt Commission 1980). The Commission criticized the military focus security system by ignoring the development agenda particularly in the developing countries. It noted that the glaring disparity between the living conditions of the rich and those of the poor would ultimately lead us to the crisis. The report prioritized "development as the core issue, which could no longer be ignored if the world were to be saved from hunger, misery and possible destruction" (Kumar 2008).

Further elaboration on the question of the survival of humankind was provided in the next Brandt Commission report of 1983, entitled '*Common Crisis, North-South: Cooperation for World Recovery*', in the introduction to which Brandt wrote, "we may be arming ourselves to death without actually going to war – by strangling our economies and refusing to invest in the future" (Brandt Commission 1980).

The crisis facing the human race, Brandt stated, should therefore, lead to the development of "common interests' between the industrialized North and the underdeveloped South. Arguing about the issue of growing gap the report says that

this does not reduce moral obligation of the rich to the poor, in particular towards those whose conditions have become more desperate, Brandt suggested deepening cooperation in order to eliminate the situation in which a child dies of hunger or disease every two seconds" (Ibid).

Similarly, the Olaf Palme Commission Report, *Common Security: A Blue Print for Survival* published in 1982, put serious concern with increasing poverty and deprivation which was threatening people's very survival. The report argued for disarmament and security to prevent the Third World countries from further decline. The report argued for "common security, with socioeconomic and political rather than military factors as the basis for enhancing it.

Common Security requires that people live in dignity and peace that they have enough to eat and are able to find work and live in a world without poverty and destitution" (Palme Commission 1982). The Palme Commission's recommendations on common security are very much reflected in the discourse on international relations especially after the end of Cold War.

The South Commission criticized the focus on the pervasive impact of militarisation in the developing countries, the human and social costs of the arms race, the abandonment of democracy and human rights and breeding corruption and growth in military culture. The Commission which was initiated by then Prime Minister of Malaysia Mahathir Mohammad in 1987 aiming to examine the problems in the countries of the South in order to 'help the people and governments of the South to be more effective in overcoming their numerous problems, in achieving their ambitions in developing their countries in freedom and in improving the lives and living conditions of their people' (South Commission 1990).

The report laid stress on expanding South-South cooperation, clearly stating that the 'responsibility for the development of the South lies in the South, and in the hands of the people in the South (Ibid). The focus of the Commission's report was that on pervasive impact of militarization on development, the human and social costs of the arms race, the abandonment of democracy and human rights, the breeding of corruption and the perverse implications for political systems of the growth in military

culture. The military expenditure of developing countries on average amounted to 25% of the world total. "Their arms imports alone averaged \$ 22 billion per year during the 1980s. But only a few developing countries as rightly claim that their military expenditure is proportionate either to any external threats or to the resources at their disposal" (Ibid).

The increasing military expenditures are reflected in the development crisis of developing countries. The report recommended that "development as the first thing first', in order to fulfill the basic needs of the mass of the people and make a firm commitment to the removal of poverty and hunger" (Ibid).

All these arguments had a common element: the shift from state centric security system to the collective security and focus has been given to the economic development particularly in the developing countries.

Besides these three global commissions, the issue of broadening the security agendas as well as criticism of classical realists and neo-realists' perspectives were done by two prominent writers in the 1980s. Ullman's article 'Redefining Security' (1983) in the *Journal International Security* and Barry Buzan's book *People, States and Fear* (1983) argued that other types of threat are rising in importance regardless of the decline of military concerns.

Other security issues, such as the suffering of the poor in the third world, were not new, but had not been seen as issues requiring an urgent large-scale response during the Cold War era. The concept of security needed to be opened up in two directions. Firstly, the notion of security should no longer be limited to the military domain. Rather, it should have a more general meaning that could be applied not only to the military realm, but also to the economic, the societal, the environmental and the political field. Secondly, the referent object of 'security', the thing that needed to be secured, should not be conceptualized solely in terms of state, but should embrace the individual below the state, and the international system above it (Buzan 1983).

Thomas believed that 'security in the context of the Third World states does not simply refer to the military dimension, as is often assumed Western discussions of the

concept, but to the whole range of dimensions of a state's existence which are already taken care of in the more-developed states, specially those of the West' (Thomas 1987). She argues that most of the Third World states are artificial creation of the European colonial powers and their territorial boundaries pay insufficient attention to ethnicity, indigenous historical divisions or even at times geography. They are the result of colonial scramble and division. As such these youthful states must undertake the process of nation-building. For this, the Third World states have to work to forge a domestic political and social consensus to create a nation (Ibid).

The literature of non-traditional security has evolved over the years from an early focus on incorporating individual and people centric approaches into the definition of "security" to a new focus on how the social, economic and environmental change can be a cause or amplifier of violent conflict. More radical critique emerged. Feminists, critical theorists, and postmodernists argue not just that the earlier and important part of the way in which dominant groups with societies imposed particular interpretations of 'reality'. These have the effect of promoting interests of some sections of society at the expense of others, underpinning a fundamentally unjust political and economic order (Sheehan 2006). Analyzing the security agendas beyond the classical realists, Buzan argued, in today's world the national security problem needed to be seen in terms of a general security problem in which individuals, states, and the system all play a part and in which economic, societal, and environmental factors can be as important as political and military one (Buzan 1991). Buzan suggested that "there were three main reasons for wanting to broaden the concept of security. First, broadening was needed in order to capture the changing realities of the world. Second, he argued that the concept had useful political qualities. Various groups in society would want to 'securitize' particular issues in order to make governments prioritize them. Third, security had potential as an integrative concept for international relations as a field of inquiry that had notoriously fluid boundaries" (Ibid).

Another reason for the broadening of the security was the growing interaction and interdependence among the nation states and people in the world wide level. As political ideas such as democracy got circulated globally, many issues were discussed in global forums such as United Nations, and the model of the Western industrial



democracies emerged as a standard route to development. Economically the world was characterized by the concept of globalization, with a global market of production, trade, and finance (Sheehan 2006). The act of securitisation is always related to the claimed presence of an existential threat, and exactly this led the Copenhagen School which places particular emphasis upon the social aspects of the security and Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wild are regarded as the profunder of this school of thought to make a distinction between "international security" and "social security". Within the former, it is argued, "security is about survival. It is when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated object (traditionally, but not necessarily, the state incorporating government, territory, and society)". In contrast, "social security" concerns questions of "entitlement and social justice". And problems within this field are not located within the same rhetoric of danger, urgency and survival (Sheehan 2006).

The distinction between international and social security rests less on whether an issue, or potential security problem, is located at the national or international level, than on the extent to which the situation is successfully presented as one of *collective* survival. It is argued that what constitutes the field of security studies is the concern with "international security". Problems falling within the realm of "social security" might be worthy of political consideration and, therefore, important in their own right, but they should not be confused with those of "international security". The key point is not, however, that particular problems carry a certain essential security character, but that they are located within different modes of reasoning.

Non-traditional security is not in opposition to the earlier trends of redefining security. In fact, it is an outgrowth of these trends. Indeed, many early attempts to broaden the definition of "security" used language very similar to that found in today's discussions on "human security." Myers' states that "security applies most at the level of the individual citizen. It amounts to human well-being: not only protection from harm and injury but access to water, food, shelter, health, employment, and other basic requisites that are the due of every person on Earth. It is the collectivity of these citizens needs— overall safety and quality of life—that should figure prominently in the nation's view of security" (Myers 1993).

**Table II.I**

**Comparison : Traditional (state centered) versus non-traditional (human centered) security.**

	<b>Traditional (Realists and Neo-realists vision)</b>	<b>Non-traditional (human centered) Security</b>
Security referent (object)	In a Hobbesian world, the state is the primary provider of security: if the state is secure, then those who live within it are also secure.	Individuals are co-equal with the state. State security is the means, not the end.
Security value	Sovereignty, power, territorial integrity, national independence.	Personal safety, well-being and individual freedom: 1. Physical safety and provision for basic needs; 2. Personal freedom; 3. Human rights; economic and social rights.
Security Threats	Direct organized violence from other states, violence and coercion by other states and from non-state actors.	Direct violence: death, drugs, dehumanization, discrimination, international disputes, WMD; gendered violence. Indirect violence: deprivation, diseases, natural disasters, underdevelopment, population displacement, environmental degradation, poverty, quality, ethnic/sectarian oppression.
By what means	Retaliatory force or threat of its use, balance of power, military means, strengthening of economic might, little attention paid to respect for law or institutions.	Promoting human development: basic needs plus equity, sustainability, and greater democratization and participation at all levels. Promoting human rights. Promoting political development: global norms and institutions plus collective use of force as well as sanctions in case of genocide, cooperation between states, reliance on international institutions, networks and coalitions, and international organizations.

*Source: Chart adopted from Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007), Human Security Concept and Implications. London and NY, Routledge.*

Scholars belonging to Copenhagen School of Thoughts who contributed immensely in broadening the security studies have posited that security studies be moved “beyond a

narrow agenda which focuses on military relations between states while avoiding ending up with an all-embracing, inflated concept” and explored at various levels of analysis, and correspondingly that “the special nature of security threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them” (Huysman 1998). Nontraditional security threats include diverse issues. However it does have some common features. It is not a state centered view and do not confirm the state-centered theories. The second common feature of the non-traditional security threats that it has no particular geography focus. Non-traditional challenges represent dangers which are multidimensional and multidirectional. And third, these challenges can not be managed by traditional defense policies alone. Military organizations may have a role, especially where is involved, but effective management requires a range of non-military approaches.

#### **2.4.1 The UN approach to security**

The end of bipolar rivalry between the two superpowers in late 1980s further contributed in reduction of the traditional security threats. The inter-states war has significantly decreased. The world has however recorded a series of intra-state violent conflicts of various origins, large-scale atrocities and even genocide. Moller mentions that ‘ “out of the 103 wars since the end of Cold War, ninety-seven have been fought within rather than between states” (Moller 2000). The Human Development Report in 1994 urged that the concept of security must be changed and focus had to be given from the state-centric security to the human security. The Report urged that the concept of security must change in two ways: From an exclusive stress on territorial security to a much greater stress on people's security; and from security through armament to security through sustainable human development (Human Development Report 1994). In the Report, the threats to human security were synthesized under seven broad categories; economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, security to other state groups, community security and political security (Ibid). “According to the human security approaches, security is about the social, political, environmental and economic conditions conducive to live in a free and dignify manner” (Hammerstad 2000).

This human development approach to human security was not only concerned with gross violations of human rights, armed conflicts, and natural disasters, but encompassed wide-ranging aspects of underdevelopment: inequality, public health, international crime, population growth and environmental degradation. In 2002, the UN adopted the human security agenda in the quest for a new UN mandate in the 1999 Millennium Declaration. Defining peace as 'much more than the absence of war' the then UN General Secretary Annan called for human security to encompass economic development, social justice, environmental protection, democratization, disarmament, and respect for human rights and the rule of law' (Annan 2001). By the end of 2005, two documents tried to clarify further human security threats and what the international community should do about them. The UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change entitled *A More Secured World: Our Shared Responsibility* and the reform agenda proposed by Annan in *Towards All Freedom* played a major role in further consolidating the emerging discourse on human security and a changing dynamics of security (UN Report 2004).

The first report released in 2004 proposed to advance the human security by setting up a broad framework of collective security to address new and exacerbated threats such as economic and social threats, internal violence, nuclear and chemical weapons, terrorism, poverty and infectious diseases etc. Likewise, another UN Report produced by the commission headed by Kofi Annan states that " the need for a more human centered approach to security is reinforced by the continuing dangers that weapons of mass destruction, most notably nuclear weapons, pose to humanity" (Annan 2001). "The list of the human security is long but most can be considered under several main categories which are; economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security" (Ibid).

Another important report that the UN adopted was called *Responsibility to Protect* which was basically an answer to critics of military interventions for humanitarian purposes in sovereign states. This report had a number of impacts. The report first redefined the meaning of sovereignty to include dual responsibility – externally to respect the sovereignty of other states and internally to respect the dignity and basic rights of all people within the state. Similarly, another global Commission on Human Security co-chaired by Sadako Ogata, former head of UNHCR and Nobel laureate

Amartya Sen under the auspices of the Japanese government ( 2001) attempted to examine new responsibilities with a focus on development communities and states. In its final *Report Human Security Now*, the Commission described human security as the necessity to protect vital freedoms by building on people's strengths and aspirations and protecting them from critical and pervasive threats and situation (UN Report 2003).

In the UNDP Reports, human security was broadly defined as "freedom from fear and freedom from want' and characterized as 'safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression as well as protection from sudden and harmful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities" (UNDP 1994).

The state has the duty to provide the security needed by minority groups, individuals and system. The issue of the non-traditional security concept was further advanced by the importance given to it in the report of the Commission on Global Governance (Commission on Global Governance 1995). The report tried to shift the direction of the security discussion by focusing on issues of human life and human dignity rather than on weapons and territory. "An emerging trend within this evolution has been a move toward greater emphasis on the concept of human security" (Dabelko & Mark Halle 2000).

#### **2.4.2 Canada: 'freedom from fear'**

As some of these humanitarian issues appear to be existential threats, these have been constructed in 'securitisation' processes. As a result, the responses from the states have also begun to be seen since the last decade or so. In 1996, government of Canada came out with its own version of human security that places greater emphasis on 'freedom from fear' (Govt. of Canada 1996). These include protection of people from war and conflict and also to promote the agenda of peace. The Canadian government while criticizing the UNDP definition of human security as so all inclusive as to render it an unwieldy policy instrument, concentrated on the goal of 'freedom from fear' calling for 'safety for people from both violent and non-violent threats, a

condition characterized by freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, their safety, or even their lives' (Axworthy, Canadian Foreign Minister 2001).

Canada's human security policy is based on five priorities: a) public safety (building international expertise with the capacity to counter growing cross-border threats posed by terrorism, drug trafficking and spread of crime); b) protection of civilians (establishment of legal norms, reduction of the human costs of armed conflict, human rights field operations and deployment of military forces in extreme situations to control atrocities and war crimes; c) conflict prevention (strengthening the capacity of the international community to resolve violent conflicts, building national and local capacity to manage political and social tensions without resorting to violence, by using targeted economic sanctions to reduce the chances of civil war breaking out); d) governance and accountability (fostering improved accountability of public and private sector institutions with emphasis on building an effective International Criminal Court (ICC) and promoting reform of security institutions including military, police and judiciary, reducing corruption, promoting freedom of expression and encouraging corporate social responsibility); and e) peace support operations (bolstering international capacity undertake peace missions, dealing with issues related to women, providing policy and civil experts to undertake complex missions) (The Government of Canada 2007).

To reach these objectives, the Canadian government launched a human security programme. Canada sees through the promotion of the agenda of human security, it could enhance its role in the international stages. It had earlier played a leading role in the campaign banning the deployment of landmines where 122 countries gathered in Ottawa in 1997 and signed Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition, Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Landmines and their destruction. Similarly, Canada has been in the forefront in setting up ICC which it has regarded a part of promoting the issue of 'freedom of fear'.

#### **2.4.3 Japan: 'freedom from want'**

While identifying the foreign policy of Japan for the 21<sup>st</sup> century, in 1999 the government of Japan came out with its own version of security where it put emphasis

on 'freedom from want' (MFA Japan 1999). To initiate the idea of 'freedom from want' Japan established a Commission on Human Security and set up a largest trust fund in the United Nations. Japan has become one of the leading countries to provide leadership and funding for human security. The Japanese approach to human security promotes measures designed to protect people from threats to their livelihoods and dignity while supporting self-empowerment. The Japanese human security policy took as a model a ministerial-level programme which proved successful in the areas of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), and which became very popular with the Japanese public (Yeo 2004).

The Japanese government claims that its ODA policy is very much similar with the definition made by the Commission on Human Security. However, Japanese foreign aid based on reciprocal agreements and reliance on multiple credit sources, has drawn criticism from those who see it as a way to promote Japan's own economic status (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007). Furthermore, despite Japan's claim that its foreign policy is based on human security, it continues to pursue traditional security interests in the region. Thus, the human security agenda in Japanese foreign policy is a complement and not a replacement of traditional security concerns (Yeo, 2004).

Apart from Canada and Japan, another country that has been strongly promoting human security is Norway. Through the human security approach, it has been playing active role in the international arena. It has taken the process as an opportunity for these 'middle power' countries to gain greater independence vis-à-vis the international stage. Suhrke argues that "for Japan, a contribution of approximately \$ 170 million to the Trust Fund for Human Security through the UN Secretariat cemented its status as a primary donor to Overseas Development Assistance and reinforced the country as an economic power, not only regionally but internationally'. Through the Ottawa Process, Canada focused on gaining recognition for its handling of post-conflict situation as peacekeepers – an area in which it had already established a reputation.

For Norway, international power lies above all in the promotion of powerful ideas" (Suhrke 1999). Though these three middle power countries have been pursuing the idea of human security, their interests in this area are not free from the questions. "What interest does human security serve as a foreign policy framework? From the specific perspective of the Canadian and Norwegian governments, human security

represented an opportunity of enhancing their status and influence in the international arena" (Ibid).

Paris describes "human security as the 'glue' holding together a coalition of 'middle power' states, development agencies and NGO, which together seek to adjust policy goals and resources" (Paris 2001). He further argues that " as a rallying cry, the idea of human security has successfully united a diverse coalition of states, international agencies and NGOs. As a political campaign, the human security coalition has accomplished a number of specific goals, such as the negotiation of the landmine convention (Ibid).

The government of China also came out with its position paper known as "China's Position Paper on Enhanced Cooperation in the Field of Non-traditional Security Issues" (Govt. of PRC 2002). Where it has stated that "China is seeking to enhance its own ability to resolve non-traditional security issues and taking all measures to crack down on trans-national crimes and address other non-traditional security problems". The paper provides the increasing realisation of the Chinese establishment to address the issue particularly in international crimes and terrorism (ibid).

**Table II.II**  
**Definitions of non-traditional (human centered) security : A Comparison**

<b>Who?</b>	<b>Definition</b>	<b>Value, angle, focus</b>	<b>Conception of threats</b>	<b>Usability potential (purpose of definition)</b>	<b>Strategies</b>
Commission on Human Security (CHS)	To protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human fulfillment. The authors also acknowledge that this definition might vary across cultures: 'The vital core of life is a set of elementary rights and freedoms people enjoy: What people consider "vital"...varies across individuals	Survival, livelihood and dignity (freedom from fear, want and a life of dignity),	Protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. Joint focus on poverty and violence.	Political agenda, 'operationalization'	Making such freedom possible requires protection from critical and pervasive threats and empowerment, i.e. building people's strengths and aspirations. This needs to take place in political , social, environmental, economic, military and cultural spheres of life.



	and societies.'				
UNDP 94 definition	Safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression and protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life, whether in homes, jobs or communities.	Freedom from want, freedom from fear.	Includes 7 components: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political security.	Peace dividend	Coordinated actions by states, international community and people's groups.
Government of Canada	'Freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights safety or lives'.	Focus on freedom from fear. Rights, safety, Lives.	Truly people focused, but with no major revolution in the definition and lists of threats, those being somewhat traditional: armed conflict violence, human rights abuses, public insecurity and organized crime.	Lessen impact of conflict on people, ban on landmines, creation of a criminal court, protection of civilians and reduction of the costs of conflict: - peace operations viewed as human security missions - conflict prevention - good governance and political accountability as part of the basic human rights aspects of the concept of public safety.	Public safety, protection of people, conflict prevention; governance and accountability, peace support operations; small arms and light weapons; international plan of action; humanitarian interventions; responsibility to protect; international campaign to ban landmines; Ottawa Coalition.
Government of Japan	'Comprehensively seizing all the menaces that threaten the	Freedom from fear and want lives,	Poverty, environmental degradation, illicit drugs,	To offer durable solutions for the region in	Concentrated on protection from threats to livelihoods, dignity

	survival, daily life and dignity of human beings and to strengthen the efforts to confront threats'.	livelihoods, dignity.	international organized crime, infectious diseases such HIV/AIDS, the outflow of refugees, etc. The focus is that primarily on physical and material well-being.	the aftermath of the Asian financial Crisis. To emphasis a set of goals that seemed compatible with so-called Asian values.	and everyday life, and sought empowerment to bring out the potential (capabilities, empowerment).
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*Source: Chart adopted from Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007), Human Security Concept and Implications. London and NY, Routledge .*

#### **2.4.4 Non-traditional security and South Asia**

Traditional security issue still dominates in South Asia despite being one of the worst regions on non-traditional security threats. There are two important factors that contribute to these persisting concerns, namely, the unresolved territorial issues and the nuclearisation of India and Pakistan. The reinvigorated conflict between two countries over Kashmir, their intense arms race, particularly after their nuclearisation and the Kargil conflict indicate this trend (Sabur 1999). The evidence shows that while global military spending declined by about 37 percent during the period of 1987-94, it increased in South Asia by 12 percent. During this period, global standing armies reduce by 17 percent. But, in South Asia, they increased by 7.5 percent. Similarly, military holdings declined by 14.5 percent in the world, but increased by 43 percent in South Asia (World Development Report 1994). India and Pakistan are almost solely responsible for the militarization of the region. The share of India and Pakistan in the total military expenditure of South Asia is 93 percent and in total armed forces personnel is 87 percent (Ibid). The overarching emphasis on military focused national security as against the non-military or nontraditional security over the last six decades has severely deteriorated the security situation in South Asia.

Such a situation has transformed South Asia into the poorest and most deprived region in the world. In 1949, the average per capita income in Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan and the present Bangladesh was almost double than that of the Philippines,

South Korea and Indonesia. The per capita income in Japan at that time was less than double the average per capita income in these four South Asian countries (Akash 1992).

Today, South Asia has turned into one of the poorest regions in the world. The percentage of population living below poverty line ranges from 26.7 to nearly 50 percent as per the nationally defined poverty line. On average 31.7 percent of South Asian people are living in abject poverty (SAARC, 2003). As many as 40 to 73 percent of the adult population are still illiterate (except in Sri Lanka and Maldives) and 34 to 54 percent of secondary school-age children do not go to school. Curable diseases such as tuberculosis, malaria and respiratory diseases still claim a large number of lives every year. Infant mortality rates range between 61 and 85 per 1000 live births (except Maldives and Sri Lanka). Large number of women suffer from poor nutrition and lack of preventive measures against vulnerability to chronic disease such as anemia or ability to bear and nurse children' (Ibid). Some 205 million people of South Asia are denied access to safe water and 614 million are deprived of proper sanitary facilities. To look at country-wise data India and Nepal present the worst scenario where sanitation facilities available to 72 percent of people in each country are below the required standard. Shortages of doctors and nurses contribute to poor health in rural areas. Rural people who constitute the majority of the poor are those always on the edge (Ibid).

Similarly, the region is marred by conflicts and insurgencies. All three principal of concerns of human centered security, namely, security of life and freedom from fear, freedom from want and search for quality of life and security environment are rampantly present in South Asia. Decade old Maoists violence and ongoing violence in Terai in Nepal, ethnic war in Sri Lanka, various insurgencies in North East India and Kashmir, the increasing communal riots in India, growing terrorist threats are some of the examples of non-traditional security concerns in the region. Moreover, all states suffer from lapses in governance on account of lack of transparency, spread of corruption and absence of clearly defined responsibility towards people (Hussain 2000).

Despite this massive human deprivation discussed above, South Asian countries remain non-responsive to the contemporary global trend. Writing on non-traditional security issue in the South Asian context, Sabur argued that non-traditional threats to security in South Asia is one of the worst in the world characterized by a high degree of both want and fear (Sabur 2003: 47). "The region experiences persistence of threats of violent intra-state conflicts, non-democratic rule, violation of democratic and human rights, bad-governance, health hazards, overpopulation, environmental degradation, natural disaster, corruption, crime, terrorism, gender violence, trafficking in women and children. The intractable conflicts between India and Pakistan and their continuous focus on military security have become inapplicable when it comes to taking up the non-traditional security threats perspectives" (Ibid).

The governance theory offers no explanations about "how the miracle, in which a marginalised state is a more legitimised state, is to be achieved," and yet, many in South Asia have uncritically adopted the agenda. In the context of Bangladesh, for example, Ahmed points out that the "current terms of reference, including aims and objectives" of Bangladesh's compulsions for good governance is very much akin to the politics and world-view of the international development community (IDC).

The concept of human security is fast emerging as a major discussion point in South Asian security debates. Bajpai traces the genealogy of the concept of human security to Mahbub-ul-Haq's work at the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and that of the Canadian government as well as academics who led a middle powers' initiative. The individual is the central variable of human security. Mahbub-ul-Haq identified five, rather radical and necessary steps, to give life to the new conception of security 'a human development conception with emphasis on equity, sustainability, and grassroots participation; a peace dividend to underwrite the broader agenda of human security; a new partnership between North and South based on "justice, not charity" which emphasizes "equitable access to global market opportunities" and economic restructuring; a new framework of global governance built on reform of international institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and United Nations; and finally, a growing role for global civil society' (Bajpai 2000).

In a similar vein, the 1994 UNDP Report articulated human security to be "people-centered," and that is not concerned with weapons, but with "human life and dignity." It is concerned with how people live and breathe in a society, how freely they exercise their many choices, how much access they have to market and social opportunities and whether they live in conflict or in peace" (UNDP Report 1994).

More specifically, the UNDP Report lists seven "components", or specific values of human security: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security (Ibid).

Commenting on nuclearisation of South Asia, Bidwai opines that 'embracing the doctrine of nuclear deterrence means seeking security through insecurity, terror, and threat to cause havoc on a mass scale with pitiless disregard for life (Bidwai 2000). On the deteriorating democratic polity in the South Asian countries, Chari states that South Asian politics is in a state of violent flux (Chari 2000). The weakening of secular ideology has strengthened religion-based parties leading to a struggle between liberal and the revivalist sentiments. Lama holds the view that the region's overuse of resources invariably leads to questions relating to sustainability of both livelihood and ecological balance. Among the types of migratory phenomena that characterize South Asia, the most notable has been the one triggered by poverty related displacement, which is often gradual and sometimes visible if triggered by environmental dislocation' (Lama 2003). The bigger challenge of the region on the non-traditional security issues is the static mindset of policy-making elites who continuously put emphasis on military aspects of security which serve their better interests. Therefore, while dealing with nontraditional security, both in theory and practice, the fundamental issues in South Asia under these two broad themes on the basis of the analysis of available literature on the subject and the South Asian reality.

The institutional mechanism which the countries in the South has been able to create to deal the increasing nontraditional threats in the region long time back however, due to the failure of its implementation the region still remains one of the worst in the world.

The SAARC convention on terrorism, which was signed in 1987 still remains non-operational as some member countries have failed to legislate on domestic enabling

laws. This is despite the fact that in the Islamabad Summit in January 2004, governments of the regions went as far as to add protocol to control the financing of terrorist activities in the region. (Khatri 2004). After 19 years, the convention still remains a paper document that has little impact on developments in the region.

The intra-state conflicts in South Asia has been pervasive. This region has become known as one with the largest numbers of armed groups, the longest insurgencies and the rising number of fatalities in terrorist related violence in the world. According to the report *Military Balance 2002-2003* prepared by International Institute of Strategic Studies, Bangladesh, out of the 18 identified groups, 3 are in Bangladesh, 8 in India, 5 in India/Pakistan and one each in Nepal and Sri Lanka (Khatri 2004).

Most of the groups are transnational in character which often leads to accusations of cross-border terrorism. Same report cited that conflicts in South Asia have lasted longer than in any other region of the world. Of eight armed conflicts in the region, only one (East Pakistan) ended in the same calendar year, and another (Baluch) lasted for 4 years (1973-77). The rests have lasted more than 10 years including Chittagong Hill Tract, Mizo, Naga, Ealam, Assam, and Maoist etc. Similarly, the number of fatalities in terrorist-related violence, the report stated that Asia accounts for 75 percent of all terrorism casualties worldwide. It is interesting to note that in South Asia alone, the annual number of fatalities in terrorist-related violence surpasses the death toll in the Middle East, which is often seen as the traditional place of terrorism. Even after the 9/11 the number of fatalities in terrorist related violence has increased significantly in the region. A recent report identified at least 54 groups that are proscribed under various terrorism laws in South Asian countries. They include 32 in India, 1 in Nepal, 11 in Pakistan, 1 in Sri Lanka and 9 in Bangladesh<sup>3</sup>.

As Khatri states that 'the non-traditional security approach is increasingly gaining currency in South Asia due to two factors. The first has to do with the shifting emphasis on security studies from inter-state to intra-state issues (Ibid). A compelling reason for the paradigm shift was the recognition that inter-states wars alone do not

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<sup>3</sup> See P.V. Raman, "RCSS Data Chapter on Profiles of 'Terrorist' Groups in South Asia." This is part of the RCSS project on "Understanding and Responding to "Terrorism in South " that is currently being completed by the Center.

account for the insecurity that nations face today. During 1990-2002, there were 58 different major armed conflicts in 46 different locations throughout the world, out of which all but three were internal conflicts (Eriksson 2003). The intra-state conflicts, along with the tendency of states to inflict violence on its own citizens, accounted for the largest number of deaths. According to one estimate, some 151 million persons were killed by government in addition to the death toll from war and civil war (which is said to account another 39 million). A majority of deaths perpetrated by governments on their own citizens among them, the totalitarian states responsible for 84 percent of these deaths and authoritarian states for most of the rest (Rommel 1994).

The situation has been no different in South Asia, which is known as having one of the largest numbers of armed groups in the world, with the longest duration of conflicts, and an ever rising number of fatalities in terrorist-related violence. Similarly, the region is also marred by the cross border migration, trafficking of women and refugee crisis (Sabur 1999).

The conflictual situation of the region has triggered many other social and environmental crises. For instance, due to the escalation of violence in the rural areas, forced migration has been taking place and this has precipitated large number of internal refugees in the region. Environmental insecurity is another serious threat that the region is facing today. The growing urbanization and depletion of natural resources people are finding hard to get basic facilities such as drinkable water, public spaces as well fresh air to breath. Due to the lack of these basic needs, countries of the region are facing serious health related crisis. The challenge of 'non-traditional security threats' that South Asian countries are experiencing today is immense and there is a need to take actions in both regional and local levels.

**Table II.III**  
**Non-traditional (human centered) security issues in South Asia and Potential Responses**

<b>NTS issues</b>	<b>Possible Responses/Methods</b>	<b>Concerned Actors</b>
Freedom from Want		
Economic security (assured basic income)	Development policies and activities; creation of employment and conditions for self-employment through investment (domestic and foreign), foreign trade and aid.	State; private enterprise (domestic and foreign); regional cooperation; UN; international development agencies; developmental NGOs.
Food Security (physical and economic access to food)	Increasing food production; improving distribution mechanism; poverty alleviation; particularly income generation for the vulnerable groups.	State; peasantry; private enterprise; NGOs; regional cooperation; UN; International and multilateral organizations.
Human development: health and education	Viable health and education policy; protection against pandemic diseases; ensuring economic and physical access to health care and education.	State; private enterprise; NGOs; regional countries; UN; International and multilateral organizations.
Population control	Farsighted policy; access to maternity and reproductive health services; normative and attitudinal change.	State; NGOs; regional countries; UN; International and multilateral organizations.
Environmental degradation	Dealing with the causes and consequences; sustainable environmental management; devising and implementing policy options through concerted efforts; capacity building.	State; private enterprise; NGOs; regional countries; UN; International and multilateral organizations.
Misuse and overuse of natural resources	Sustainable resource management; capacity building.	State; private enterprise; NGOs; regional countries; UN; International and multilateral organizations.
Natural and man made disaster	Dealing with the causes and consequences; disaster	State; civil society; NGOs; regional countries; UN;



Freedom from Fear	prevention and management; capacity building.	International and multilateral organizations.
Personal security of the individual from violence or harm (violent conflicts within and along the borders)	Legal and physical protection of people in conflict, insurgency war zones; conflict prevention; management and resolution; post-conflict peace-building; arms export control; humanitarian reaction; normative and attitudinal change.	State; regional countries; civil society; NGOs; International and multilateral organizations.
Good governance: democracy and human rights	Ensuring representative form of government and democratic governance; constitutional/legal and juridical protection of human rights; normative and attitudinal change.	State; regional countries; civil society; NGOs; UN; International and multilateral organizations.
Rights of ethnic and religious minorities	Constitutional, legal and juridical protection; minority rights articulation; normative and attitudinal change.	State; regional countries; civil society; NGOs; International and multilateral organizations.
Discrimination against and abuse of women and children	Constitutional; legal; and juridical protection of the rights of women and children; effective measures against trafficking in women and children; normative and attitudinal change.	State; regional countries; civil society; NGOs; International and multilateral organizations.
Crime, Corruption and Terrorism (national and international)	Law enforcement measures; dealing with the causes and consequences; ensuring transparency and accountability in the process of governance; controlling the proliferation of small arms; capacity building; normative and attitudinal change.	State; regional countries; civil society; NGOs; International and multilateral organizations.
Migration and	Legal and physical protection of	State; regional countries;

refugee	migrants and refugees, humanitarian reaction; resolving the cause of forces migration; normative and attitudinal change.	civil society; NGOs; International and multilateral organizations.
Drugs	Law enforcement measures; curtailing the production; trafficking and use; dealing with causes consequences.	State; regional countries; civil society; NGOs; International and multilateral organizations.

Source: Chart adopted from Sabur, A.K.M. (2003), "Evolving a Theoretical Perspective on Human Security: The South Asian Context", *Human Security in South Asia: Gender, Energy, Migration and Globalisation*, New Delhi, Social Science Press.

## 2.5 Conclusion

This chapter gives the theoretical underpinning of the various dimensions of concept of security and its broadening definitions. This will help to understand the various dimensions of security theories and its changing dynamics. With the widening definition of security particularly after the end of Cold War and emergence of a range of other non-military challenges has become a focus of attention. Increasing socio-political and ethnic conflicts, mass movement of people and growing scarce of natural resources and environmental insecurity are identified as security challenges. These are the non-military challenges which are perceived as more threatening than the military power of some prospective enemy state. There is greater danger from 'non-sovereign' actors such as migrating peoples, organized crimes and environmental insecurity than from any sovereign state (Stefanowicz, 1996). These issues, like environmental degradation, are very non-traditional and they arise from factors and actors which are sub-state or trans-state in character, are defuse, are multi-dimensional and multi-directional, cannot necessarily managed by traditional military means, and are often threatening to something besides the state (Ibid). As a consequence, inclusion of these issues in the security agenda constitutes a broadening of security. Security of the state is the primary concern, nevertheless, promoting them as security challenges or assessing the nature of those challenges and means to confront the dangers, many analyses center on a particular reference (Ibid).

The issue of migration or migratory movement of people, armed conflicts and environmental insecurity are not the only non-traditional threats that may be

considered in Nepal today. As all the non-traditional threats cannot be discussed and analysed in one thesis, therefore, I have confined the discussion to these three, as they are fairly representative of the ways in which non-traditional challenges are arguably facing by the country today. It is generally perceived that vulnerabilities usually derive from the external factors, however, these days in Nepal it has been primarily caused by internal factors. Nepal's vulnerabilities and its weakening position today did not come from the external factors rather it has been caused by internal factors. The failing state machineries and their ineffectiveness has severely weakened the state's delivery system including providing minimum security to its citizens. This has had serious implications on our overall national security strength and increased the nation's vulnerabilities.

## **Chapter III**

### **Evolving Security Threat Perceptions of Nepal**

This chapter deals Nepal's strategy for survival at an earlier stage. It focuses especially on tactics that had been formulated and practiced earlier. It also reviews Nepal's major strategic issues with India and China and provides a narration of major strategic events between India and China. Focus is also given on the changing security dimensions in the region especially after the growing proximity between India and China. This is done to understand and assess the implications of such proximity on the regional security per se and in comprehending and managing the threat perceptions of Nepal.

#### **3.1 Background**

Nepal is one of the ancient countries of Asia. It is a country that has maintained its independence since its birth as a nation-state. Although Nepal has contemporary written records from the fifth century A.D. on, the origins of Nepal are still shrouded in a veil of mystery. According to Rishikesh Shah "Nepal is mentioned in several of the classical Indian sources and we have several classical literary sources of Nepali origin such as the Puranas and Pasupati Purana, the Himvat Khanda, Nepala Mahatmya, yet these are fairly late works and not works of history but mythologies rich in cultural lore" (Shah 1992). In the later part of the history, we find several chronicles (Vamsawalis) which give us some information about the origins and earliest history of Nepal. The oldest and most reliable of these is called the Gopalarajavamsawalis (The Chronicle of the Gopala Kings) However, these are the narrative version of the earlier days and do not include the analysis of those period. In this sense, there is no such historical analysis about Nepal's earlier history. Another famous earlier Chronicle about Nepal's earlier history was written by William J. Kirkpatrick where he had compiled the list of rulers and the length of their reigns. Therefore, it is hard to get the analytical view of the Nepal's security and foreign policy in the earlier days.

Nonetheless, it does not mean that one of the oldest countries in this region did not have foreign and security policy of those days. When we discuss about Nepal's foreign and security policy, generally we find the analysis since the sixth century A.D. "From sixth century A.D. up to the middle eighteenth century, external factors had become crucial for the survivability of the nation as well as the rulers of that time" (Khadka 1997). The fear of possible attack and annexation especially by the ruling powers from the southern border states had been deeply rooted even before the seventh century A.D. Likewise, it was around this time that the risk of Nepal being attacked from Tibet was profound. As demanded by the situation, some of these petty states accepted a tacit subordination to Tibet by way of establishing family ties. One of such example was "the marriage between Princes Bhrikuti, daughter of the Lichchavi King Amsuvarman with the Tibetan King Srong-bstansgam-po in the early seventh century" (Regmi 1983).

The Malla Kings from early thirteen century to second half of the eighteenth century of Nepal had to use all possible options in order to safeguard their territorial integrity. "Their dynasty was protected not so much by their power vis-s-vis the numerous surrounding fiefdoms<sup>1</sup>, nonetheless by sheer emergence of the numerous surrounding rival powers. The self balancing of one against another was a delicate act, however there appeared over time a built-in security for one another because of the existence of too many contending powers" (Khadka 1997).

With the emergence of a unified nation state after a difficult task of unification drive launched by the King of Gorkha State in the middle of eighteenth century, the internal political environment began to shape its foreign policy and also started to affect the security environment of the country. Meantime the ruling forces started to fear that their political rivals could be used by foreign power against them. Therefore, since the middle of eighteenth century not only the preservation of security and independence of the country but also maintenance of the regime become the major foreign policy objectives of the ruling elites in Nepal.

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<sup>1</sup> According to Shah, Nepal until its unification in end half of eighteenth century was divided into several "regional" principalities. There were the kingdoms of Makawanpur, Chaudandi and Vijayapur, in the eastern hills and Terai. There were three kingdoms in the Kathmandu Valley, Chaubise (24) principalities in the west of the Valley, and the Baise (22) principalities in the far west. Shah, Rishikesh (1990), *Modern Nepal: A Political History, 1769-1955* Vol. 1, New Delhi: Manohar Publications.

Security and strategic issues of any country are primarily determined by its geography, climate, size of population, availability of resources and the postures, power and intents of immediate neighbours. Nepal being sandwiched by two largest Asian countries alongwith the fact of its open border with India has had enormous impacts on its security and strategic perceptions since its inception in the mid of 18<sup>th</sup> century. The founder of modern Nepal and the great strategist of the time late King Prithivi Narayan Shah described Nepal's geo-strategic as a 'yam between two boulders'. While describing this, the late King was very much aware about Nepal's geographical location, its size and its two immediate neighbours. He further believed that Nepal should keep good neighbourly relations with both of its neighbours and should not ally with one against the other. This apt description of Prithivi Narayan Shah has been reflected in many major writings on the relationship between these three countries. Many of these scholars believe that if anything dictates and determines Nepal's foreign policy, it is its geographical position (Gupta 1993, Singh 1995, Dahal 1997, Khadka 1997, Mahat 2004, Bhattarai 2005).

By the existing standard of size and power, Nepal is a small and one of the least developed countries in this region. Some of the poorest countries designated by the United Nations as 'least developed' on the basis of health care, literacy, and per capita income. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, there are currently 49 of such countries mostly in Africa and few are in Asia under this category<sup>2</sup>. However, various writers argue that in terms of size Nepal is not as small as it appears. "It is because it is located between Asia's two largest countries and the most populous nations of the world – China and India – that Nepal has acquired an image of a 'small' nation" (Pandey 1999)<sup>3</sup>. With an area of 147,181 square kilometres, Nepal is bigger than some other states in the region. According to the 1996 World Bank Atlas, only 41 countries out of 209 have a population larger than that of Nepal.

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<sup>2</sup> See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 'UN list of LDCs after the 2006 triennial review, accessed on 25 March 2008, <http://www.unctad.org/templates/page.asp/inttemID>

<sup>3</sup> See Pandey, D.R. (1999), *Nepal's Failed Development*, Kathmandu: Nepal South Asia Center. As he argues, the geography of the country has affected not only the perception of its size but also substance of its public policies and performance.

There are many scholars who argue that Nepal is often described as a 'small' Himalayan state. According to them "the adjective, 'small' and 'Himalayan' have certain implications especially with respect to the attitudes and orientations of the Nepalese people and to that of the people of its neighbours and other countries. Nepal's perception of insecurity is a psychological phenomenon resulting from its physical environment, which in turn is a consequence of its size" (Khadka 1997 and Pandey 1999). Since such a perception has also shaped its relations with the outside world, it has been preoccupied almost single-mindedly with devising a strategy as to how best to seek protection from any potential risk to its sovereignty. This defensive mentality has been created and somehow nurtured because of the fact that its immediate neighbour India is twenty-three and China sixty-eight times bigger in size. King Birendra, the ultimate foreign policy maker under the party-less Panchayat era<sup>4</sup> (1972 – 1990), stated that Nepal, one of the least developed countries, "is also a small country sandwiched between the two countries with the highest population in the world". The sense of insecurity that arises from this to ensure that in no situation and under no circumstances is our sovereignty threatened"<sup>5</sup> (Birendra 1973).

King Prithivi Narayan Shah's direction where he stressed that Nepal should maintain neutrality towards its both neighbours India and China and protect itself from the outside encroachments. Being aware of about own unified countries potentiality and the capacities of the surrounding powers, King Prithivi Narayan Shah formulated external and security policies which were followed as his 'divine counsel' by his successors. Describing Nepal metaphorically as a 'Yam between two stones' Prithivi Narayan Shah suggested that the country should adopt friendly relations with the emperor of China and the British in India. However, he warned that Nepal should adopt a very cautious approach to the British rule as 'it had kept India suppressed' and encroaching on the plain (Pant 1985) has been the basic guideline for Nepal to formulate the foreign policy and his successors have always pursued such a policy. Even during the British occupation of India, Nepal preserved its sovereign status by reconciling with the imperial regime. During the period, it had pursued a policy of alignment of its external policy with the British. It allowed British to recruit Nepali

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<sup>4</sup> From 1960 to 1990, Nepal was ruled by absolute Monarchical system which was called Panchayat system and Birendra was the powerful King from 1972 till the end of Panchayat system in 1990.

<sup>5</sup> See King Birendra's interview to the *Newsweek* (weekly), reproduced in the Nepal Press Digest, September 10, 1973.

citizens to the British army known as Gurkha. Nepal had also allowed free trade to the British India. According to Charles Bell “Nepal’s friendly attitude towards the British at times led to its own injuries because the trade routes suffered and its position as an “intermediary” was gone” (Bell 1924 and Shah 1990).

Traditionally, Nepal was an isolated country<sup>6</sup> but only after India's independence from the British and the end of Rana oligarchy system in Nepal in 1950, it has got opportunity to expand its relations with the outside world. Today, Nepal has diplomatic relations with 119 countries, with permanent diplomatic missions in 26 countries. The security threat perceptions that have been evolved since the foundation of Nepali state have been undergoing significant changes. In the past two decades, the security perception of Nepal vis-à-vis India and China has shown some significant deviation from the typical traditional military based threats to a more diverse threats emanating from a range of non-traditional non-military components. These emerging changes in the perception of the nature and trends of threats could be largely attributed to both internal dynamics and external environment.

### **3.1.1 Location, climate, and Population**


*Location:* Nepal's central location on the southern slope of the imposing mountain system that separates the Tibetan plateau from the plain of India has always strongly conditioned the country's history and security policy. According to the Department of Survey, Ministry of Land Reform, Government of Nepal, "Nepal shares a 1590 kilometers-long border with India and 1414 kilometers with China. Nepal occupies a pivotal position in the Himalayas located between the Central and South Asian regions, a part of Eurasian landmass, to use Mackinder's terminology" (Dahal 1997). To the north of Nepal lies Tibet, the Autonomous Region of China; to the east, west, and south are the federal states – Bengal, Bihar, and Uttar Pradesh – of the Republic of India. As Dahal argues that such a position of Nepal forms its geo-strategic setting with regards to the Gangetic belt, an area critically important for India's security and the stability of its heartland, where enormous share of its human and resources base is concentrated. "This is the primary reason why India has been striving toward a firmer

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<sup>6</sup> Nepal continued the policy of isolation by restricting the movement of Europeans inside Nepal-a policy that was adopted from the time of King Prithivi Narayan Shah in the second half of the 18<sup>th</sup> century..



influence in Nepal for its territorial and political defense in areas that border China, which Indian strategists perceive is the actual rival of India" (Shah 1992).



### 3.1 Nepal's location in between India and china

source: [www.connectin.com/map-india-nepal-china/photos](http://www.connectin.com/map-india-nepal-china/photos)

The northern Himalayas and the mountains of Nepal have been natural bastions against foreign invasion. In the past, the malaria-prone jungle in the south warded off foreign penetration. With this natural barrier, Nepal's position as a buffer state was secured. However, "with the eradication of malaria, the construction of various roads and the migration of people from the hills to the Terai, Nepal's position as a buffer region has undergone a change. Numerous roads and entry points have been built to connect India, resulting in the economic, cultural, and political permeability of Nepal" (Subedi 2006).

On the northern side, there are a number of passes connecting Nepal with Tibet, such as the Takla Khar Pass, the Mustang Pass, the Kuti pass, and the Hatia Pass, but it is

extremely hard for Nepal to gain access to Chinese seaports via Tibetan territories. The Kodari Highway links Nepal with Tibet in the north and currently, Rasuwa Syaphrubeshi Road is also being constructed with Chinese assistance. Upon completion, this road will be the second major road link to Tibet. Nepal and China have reached an understanding to open up other passes such as Mustang, Kimathanka–Sankhuwasava and Humla. If these proposed links are opened, the flow of Nepal-China trade and tourism, as well as other economic and cultural activities will speed up, bringing both Nepal and China much closer. This would certainly reduce Nepal's over-dependence on India. As Nepal's bilateral trade with India has been increasing year after year and the trade gap also rising in alarming rate. According to the Ministry of Trade, Commerce and Supplies, Nepal's bilateral trade with India was Rs. 28.8 billion in 1995-1996, however in the year 2008 -2009, it reached Rs. 204.8 billion (MoTCS 2010). During same period, Nepal's export increased from Rs. 3.7 billion to Rs. 40.9 billion nonetheless the Indian export to Nepal increased from Rs. 24.4 billion to Rs. 163.9 billion in the same period. According to the Ministry, it covers the two thirds of Nepal's total trade with India. Therefore, there is a growing view within Nepal that Nepal's competitiveness on its international trade should be enhanced by increasing its productivity as well as diversifying the trade items. There is a growing need of increasing the number of its export items as well as simplifying the trading procedures not only with India but also with other countries including its northern neighbours. Therefore, opening up more links towards north will help in enhancing trade with China as well as get more economic activities. Reducing its dependency over India and also taking full advantage of the economic development of the two rising economies of both of its neighbours would be the top priority of the Government today (MoF 2009). For this Nepal has also given top priority in building north-south highways connecting Nepal's borders with China in the north to India in the south<sup>7</sup>.

The southern most strip of Nepali territory, known as the Terai, forms the intermediate zone between the Gangetic plain and the Siwalik range. The Mahabharat range, some of whose peaks attain an elevation of nearly 10,000 feet is Nepal's principal defence wall on the south and conversely, present-day India's main line of

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<sup>7</sup> See the Ministry of Finance Annual Budget 2009 where it has given priority building north-south Highways connecting both of its rising economic giants.

defence against any Chinese thrust from the north in this sector of the frontier. During the period of eighteenth and nineteenth century Tibet the northern border of Nepal had taken very aggressive foreign policy. "Nepal had to fight with Tibet four wars within short period of time in the late eighteenth century (1778 to 1792)" (Dahal 1997). Likewise, as a small country surrounded by two giants, the northern peaks are regarded as the kind of natural frontiers to protect it from the north.

Nepal's international boundaries with neighbouring states are well-defined topographically and have been delimited in a series of treaties and in some places have also been demarcated on the ground. There were numbers of treaties that Nepal signed with its neighbours on boundary issue. After the 1791 war with Tibet later China was also drawn into the war ended with the revision of the 1789 treaty which was regarded as not favourable as was it in the earlier. Likewise, Nepal signed a Sugauli Treaty after its humiliating defeat in a war with East India Company in 1816. Under this treaty, Nepal lost one third of the territory on the west and on the south to the British and the relations between the two countries were governed by a treaty of peace called the Treaty of Sugauli concluded in 1816<sup>8</sup>. "This has not precluded the occasional eruption of minor border disputes, but such disputes have been confined to disagreements over a few square miles of territory. Furthermore, Nepal's both neighbours India and China have formally recognised its independence in treaties" (Khadka 1997)..

***Climate:*** Despite relatively small in size, the climate of Nepal offers wide variations. To the south, the Terai and doon areas have a hot, humid, tropical climate. At the other extreme, the Bhot valleys in the north offer a typically tundra climate, with cool summers and very cold winters. Even the centrally located mountainous zone offers great variations. However, here the climate tends to be more moderate. Towards the south of this zone and in the lower elevations the summers are warm. "Most of Nepal gets heavy monsoon rains from June to September. The rainfall is much heavier to the east and lighter to the west. Because of the influence of topography, great variations in the amount of rainfall are found even in rather small localities" (MoFSC 2003).

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<sup>8</sup> The treaty was drafted in Sugauli in December 1815 but Nepal accepted it in March 1816. The treaty was modified in December 1816 by the Memorandum presented by the Company to Nepal. See Rose, Nepal Strategy for Survival, op. cit.

Nepal has three principal river system; the Karnali in the west, the Gandaki in the central region and Koshi in the east. All the rivers emerge from Tibet and are joined by innumerable tributaries originating in the hill region before they finally join the Ganges in the plains of north India. Nepal has immense potentiality of generating hydropower. It can export this power and also provide irrigation within Nepal and to India also.

**Population:** "Nepal apparently was populated mainly by large-scale migrations, over a period of many centuries, from all the surrounding areas" (CBS 2003).

The intermixture of Mongoloid groups from Tibet with Indo-Aryan people from northern India has gone far to break down homogeneity of race, and has produced a complex cultural, linguistic and religious history. "Nepal has no distinct races in the strict sense; on the other hand, the great variations of environment in this country of contrasts and the difficulty of communication between different regions have preserved distinctions of language, culture, and even physical characteristics between population groups" (Stiller, 1973). According to Harka Gurung, "the land corresponding to present-day Nepal in the Central Himalayas represents an area of interface of two cultural worlds - Indic and Bodic. Their contact zone runs north-west to south west at a tangent to mountain Azis whereby the Caucasoids (Khas) predominate in the Karnali basin and the Mongoloids (Kirantis) eastwards. The peopling of Nepal Himalaya therefore, was the outcome of successive migrations of Mongoloid groups from the north-east and the Caucasoid people from the south-east" (Gurung 1997).

The northern region of Nepal has been inhabited by immigrants from Tibet and the southern region by people of Indian origin. The Nepalese citizens of the Terai region, who are of Aryan stock and are predominantly Hindu, have linguistic, cultural and religious bonds with the people of India. Similarly, the people of upper hills and mountain region are of Mongoloid stock, and share close cultural, linguistic and religious ties with the people of China (Bhattarai 2004). Thus, Nepal is a meeting point for two civilizations. Therefore, it is argued that "Nepal is a meeting point for two specific civilizations – the Indian and the Chinese" (Dahal 1997). It is a host country of two religions - Hinduism and Buddhism, and both of these religions are the

dominant religions in India and China respectively. Being the birthplace of Siddhartha Gautam, Nepal can attract a large number of Buddhist pilgrims from China on the one hand, and there are several Hindu shrines where equal number of Hindu pilgrims can visit. It is said that "the cultural and religious ties and commonalities are stronger than the geographical proximities or other economic interests" (Dahal 1997)..

A large proportion of the Nepali elite has received at least part of their education in India and has absorbed, if only subconsciously the ethos and spirit of that educational system. It has been a common practice, especially for Nepalese students, to receive higher education and training in different cities of India. In the border area, there are a large number of Nepalese people who have family ties with the people in northern Indian states such as Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. A large number of Nepalese are working as migrant labourers in different parts of India. Similarly, a large number of Indian citizens are also working in Nepal as doctors, teachers and shopkeepers. A major share of business in Nepal is also occupied by Indian citizens. Therefore, it can be argued that Nepal and India has multidimensional relations not only the geographical proximity, the economic, cultural, religious and family ties between the people of two countries are stronger and deeply rooted. Such a close cultural links of two countries have also been promoted by other social and educational exchanges. It has been a common practice, especially for Nepalese students, to receive higher education and trainings in India. A large number of Nepalese are working as a migrant labour in different part of India. Similarly, a large number of Indian citizens are also working in Nepal in various fields such as teachers, shopkeepers and also occupy the Nepalese businesses.

The political relationship between the leaders of post-Rana Nepal and newly independent India is another determinant factor between the two countries. The political leaders of two countries have had their personal and political association. Large number of Nepalese politicians had taken their education in India since there were no facilities for higher education in Nepal for the common people during the Rana oligarchy system (1846-1904) due to the lack of schools and colleges in the country. During the student time in India, many Nepalese leaders were put into Indian jails because of their participation in the freedom against the British colonialism. The two dominant political parties of Nepal (the Nepali Congress and the Communist

Party of Nepal) were established in India in the late 40s and they launched pro-democracy movement in Nepal while they were in exile in India. This had helped to develop a close personal and political association between the leaders of the two countries. P. R. Sharma has pointed out that “The comradeship between the two countries’ leaders had a great bearing on both countries relations when these Nepalese leaders occupied positions in the government after the overthrow of the Ranas in 1950s” (Sharma 1968).

The economic links of two countries is also very strong. Due to Nepal’s small size, its geographical location and its limited size of resources compels it to depend on India for essential commodities such as fuel, salt, coal and also for manufacturing products. Though, Nepal had considerable amount of trade with Tibet in the past and also it still imports some manufacturing products from there, still it is limited and for the basic goods it has to rely on India. It is also because Nepal shares an open border with India where it can have more access with India than with Tibet.

It is not only Nepal’s economic dependency on India, the Indian economic interests in Nepal are also quite profound. All the Nepalese rivers flow to India from Nepal and India has been able to utilise them to irrigate massive portion of farming lands in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. Nepal has always been a safe market for Indian manufactured goods. The volume of two countries annual trade is also significant. There are considerable amount of Indian investment in Nepal. As Hari Krishna Jha has pointed out, “If Nepal’s economic interests in India are vital, those of India in Nepal are also substantial” (Jha 1975).

Nepal’s geographical location is also very important for India’s defence. Due to its strategic importance for Indian defence from China to the north, the British had done everything to transform Nepal into a friendly buffer state between China and British possessions in India. After the end of British rule in India, the post colonial government of India had also taken note of Nepal’s strategic importance and quickly signed a Treaty of Peace and Friendship covering all aspects of Nepal – India relations in 1950, followed by a letter of exchange subsequently. Similarly, both countries concluded a defence treaty in 1965 and in 1978 India agreed to sign a trade and transit treaty with landlocked Nepal. This was renewed in 1991 and again in

1996. In the recent past both countries agreed to work together on hydro-electrical and irrigation project. For this, they have concluded a treaty of Integrated Mahakali and Pancheshwor Project in 1996. In the same year, the two countries have also signed a trade treaty by widening the area of future trade between two countries.

Likewise, people in the northern Nepal and the Chinese people of the Tibetan Autonomous region have had economic, cultural, religious and to some extent family ties since a long time. As Kathmandu was the major trading route between Tibet and India till the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the Newar community of Kathmandu Valley have had family connection with people in Lhasa and Shigatse. Because of the geographical difficulties and low population density in the high Himalayan zones, the activities between the people of China and Nepal are not as extensive as between the people of Nepal and India in the plain Terai zone. However, with the expansion of road links and growing economic activities between Nepal and China, the relations between two countries people especially in the bordering areas have been expanding and deepening. Thus, the geographical proximity and shared cultures, religions and ethnicity have contributed in developing its security and foreign relations with the two neighbouring countries since last hundreds of years.

### **3.1.2 Security policy in pre-unification period**

Long before the emergence of present Nepal, the issue of security was still one of the most formidable issues for the ruling elites to manage and sustain their dynasties. The fear of a possible attack and annexation especially by the ruling powers had run deep even before the 7<sup>th</sup> century A.D. It was during this time that the risk of Nepal being attacked from Tibet was found to be profound. Therefore, some of these petty states accepted a tacit subordination to Tibet by way of establishing family ties. It is argued that one of the reasons of Bhrikuti's (daughter of the Lichchavi King Amsuvarma) decision to marry the Tibetan King was motivated by this fact. According to the historians, this marital relation between two influential families in Nepal and Tibet had significant impacts on the political, cultural and economic aspects of Nepal. The main political reason was that "In the period between 7<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> century, the Tibetan kingdom was one of the powerful kingdoms in Central Asia. In his young age, the Tibetan King Srong-bartsan-sgam-po had led an attack on the kingdom of the Chinese

King Tai Tsung, founder of the Tang dynasty. The risk of the takeover of the Tsung kingdom was abated by offering a princess to the Tibetan king. Nepal's then King Amsuvarma followed the same suit" (Shah 1992).

"Not only the external attacks, the internal rivalries among the principalities also used to be quite serious leading even to wars. Politics especially in the hills before 1769 was characterized by a multiplicity of small principalities, often mutually antagonistic, whose rivalries sometimes dated back to centuries. Before the rise of unified Nepal, present Kingdom of Nepal was divided into a number of principalities. In the western regions from Kathmandu Valley to the Mahakali River, there were at least 46 separate principalities. These were traditionally divided into two groups; Chaubisi in the Gandaki region and Baisi in the Karnali region. Only few of these principalities had territories in the Terai and the inner Terai. Kathmandu Valley was the center of three independent political unit, Kathmandu, Bhadagaun and Patan" (Joshi and Rose 1966).

The boundaries of these kingdoms were not limited to the valley. "The frontiers of both Kathmandu and Bhadgaun touched Tibet in the north, while in east they included parts of present Dolakha district. Patan's boundary was stretched up to present Bara, Rautahat and Parsa. In the east, the kingdom of Chaudandi controlled the districts of Okhaldhunga and Bhojpur in the hill region, in addition to Saptari, Siraha, Mahottari, Dhanusa and Sarlahi districts in the Terai. Further east, the Kingdom of Vijayapur controlled the whole of the far-eastern hill districts of Dhankuta, Panchthar, Taplejung, Terhathum and Sankhuwasabha as well as the Terai districts of Morang, Sunsari and Jhapa" (Joshi and Rose 1966).

"The Baisi states in the Karnali region had all formed part of the Malla Kingdom of the 11<sup>th</sup> century to 14<sup>th</sup> century which centered in Jumla district, included Kumaun and Garhwal to the west and western Tibet to the north of the Himalayas. In the south this Kingdom included Surkhet in the inner Terai. The Chaubisi states in the Gandaki region had not been able to expand their dominions in the whole of this region. Until 1559 a triangular area stretching eastward from Lamjung and Tanahu towards areas adjoining Kathmandu Valley between the inner Terai in the south and Tibet in the north was still ruled by local tribal chieftain. In that year, a prince of the royal dynasty



of Lamjung supplanted the Magar chieftain of Gorkha and founded a new Hindu Kingdom” (Joshi and Rose 1966). Palpa was the largest and most powerful Chaubisi state. It included Butwal which was an important trade center. Moreover, it had acquired extensive areas in the Terai on lease from the rulers of India.

Many historians stated that there is little evidence, for instance, to indicate that any of these groupings functioned as effective alliances or political associations. "Indeed some of the most intense rivalries were found within rather than beyond their confines. The process of territorial expansion and disintegration had by the middle of the 18<sup>th</sup> century proceeded to an extent which made it difficult for any principality to encroach upon its neighbours without inviting retaliation" (Sharma 1951). "Territorial expansion was therefore, possible only if any principality was able to achieve the active support or at least the neutrality of surrounding principalities" (Khadka 1997).

"The three wealthy kingdoms -Kathmandu, Patan and Bhadgaun – flourished in the valley, deriving much of their wealth from their central position in the inter-Himalayan trade complex between India and Tibet (Pandey 1983). However chronic internecine warfare wore down the strength of all three kingdoms, and eventually they had to seek the assistance of adjacent hill rajas and martial communities against each other. The conquest of most of these small principalities including the valley by Prithivi Narayan Shah in 1750s and 60s was greatly facilitated by the rajas of these principalities. "One of the reasons of his success to conquer all those small states into the Gorkha was the prevailing rivalries among those states which Prithivi Narayan Shah was able to take advantage of their contradictions and conquered them" (Pandey 1983).

During the period of Malla kings (early 13<sup>th</sup> century to till the second half of the eighteenth century ) of Nepal (as Kathmandu Valley was known) had to use all possible options in order to safeguard their territorial integrity. "The self-balancing of one against another was a delicate act, but there appeared over time a built-in security for one another because of the existence of too many contending powers" (Manandhar 1986). The act of self-balancing among the surrounding powers indeed became too important, for example, King Pratap Malla (1624-74) channeled his power to attack Tibet in the pursuance of the vital trade route (Rose 1971). When Ram Shah of

Gorkha (1606-1633) attacked Tibet and brought Kerong trade route under his control, Pratap Malla led an attack on Tibet, and not on Gorkha, and brought the other trade route, Kuti, under his authority. The delicate position can be understood by the fact that the unification and disintegration of the Valley at different periods of time led to the formation of four principalities.

However, when the power of Gorkha increased, the self-balanced 'national' security was disturbed and the Malla Kings were forced to look for a counterbalancing power. Loss of Kerong trade route was a severe blow to the Malla dynasty. They sought the help before the British in India who attempted to interfere in 1762-63 but sustained a single defeat under the walls of Makawanpure" (Rose 1971).

Writing about the pre-unification period, British writer Ippolito Desideri after his visit in 1721 A.D. in his famous account stated that, "the Kingdom of Nepal is not large, one can go from one end to the other in a few days; part of its is flat, open country, but the major part is mountainous; the mountains, however, are well wooded and pleasant.

The chief products are wheat, rice, certain black millet, vegetables and various kinds of fruit such as prickly pears, pine-apples, lemons and oranges" (Ross and Power 1937 and Gupta 1993). The Malla kings used to mint coins for the Tibetans since the reign of Mahindra Malla. According to Kirkpatrick "mining of coin was first the monopoly of Kathmandu and later the kings of Patan and Bhadgaun also sent silver coins to Tibet. He estimated that before the Gorkha conquest the silver coinage had yielded Nepal over 100,000 rupees per annum" (Kirkpatrick 1811 and Gupta 1993).

The expansion of the British in northern India injected a new factor in Nepal's relations with its neighbours after the mid-18<sup>th</sup> century. In August 1765, the British East India Company signed a treaty with the Mughal Emperor under which it secured control of the administration in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. "The domination of East India Company thus touched those of Nepali principalities in the eastern and central regions. The East India Company had visions of establishing European commercial houses in Kathmandu and using Nepali trade routes for its trade with Tibet" (Regmi 1972). It was natural therefore, that it should tend to unfavour any change in the

political structure of Nepal that might jeopardize the attainment of these objectives. Relations with the East India Company eventually proved to be the most important factor determining the course of Nepal's political history both during and after political unification. "During the expansion of Nepali state in the period of late seventeenth century, Gorkhas were busily annexing all the neighbouring petty states so that in 1790 their territories extended from Bhutan to Kashmir, and from Tibet to the British provinces" (Khadka 1997 and also cited "The Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. XVII (New York: The Werner Company, 1899). The loss war with British India Company in 1816 not only reduced its geographical size but also laid down a condition for Nepal to accept a British Residency at Kathmandu. Although, "the British Resident in Kathmandu supposed not to interference Nepal's internal affairs however, due to the fragile internal environment it had created scope for interference in the internal affairs by the British Resident" (Shah 1992).

### **3.1.3 Security policy during and after the unification**

Nepal's present international boundaries are of comparatively recent origin, extending back only to the mid-18<sup>th</sup> century when the unification process was started under the leadership of Prithivi Narayan Shah – King of Gorkha- in the mid-mountain area of Nepal approximately forty air-miles from Kathmandu. King Shah had completed the process of unification after capturing the Kathmandu Valley in 1768. Though, much of present-day Nepal had been incorporated into his empire before his death in 1775, his successors continued the process of unification and expansion until the whole of the sub-Himalayan hill area from Bhutan in the east to Kangra in the west was under Gorkha domination. Nepal even challenged Chinese suzerainty in Tibet (1788-92) and British authority on the plains of northern India (1814-16) though it lost war with the British badly. Nepal made an attack Tibet in 1778 and successfully in forcing Tibet to sign a treaty highly favourable to Nepal. However, after few years time Tibet refused to comply Nepal's conditionalities. Later again in 1791, "Nepal attacked Tibet to make it to comply the provisions laid down by the earlier war however, this time China was drawn into the war and Nepal made heavy loss with Tibet" (Shah 1996).

Prithivi Narayan Shah ascended the throne of Gorkha in April 1743. It is said that from the very beginning of his ascending the throne his eyes were on the conquest of

the three Kingdoms of Kathmandu Valley. During this period, he visited India to procure firearms as well as technicians to arrange for their local manufacture (Naraharinath 1953). The first district that King Prithvi Narayan Shah annexed to Gorkha state was Nuwakot in 1744. It gave him leverage for ensuring Gorkha's participation in the profitable trade between Tibet and the southern area (Pant 1977). Kathmandu's King had no alternative but to accept this new role of Gorkha because the main trade route between Kathmandu and Gorkha lay through Nuwakot. The second major victory of King Shah was the annexation of Sindupalchok, Kavrepalanchok and other eastern part of NEpal. "Through these districts he could now control the main trade routes with Kuti and Kerong of Tibet. His conquest Makawanpur, Bara, Rautahat and Parsa in 1762 enabled him to disconnect the links between Kathmandu valley and India" (Sharma 1951).

"The conquest of Kirtipur in March 1767 gave him first strategic foothold in Kathmandu valley. Military expeditions were sent against him by Nawab Mir Kasim of Bengal in Makawanpur in January 1763 and by the East India Company in Sindhuli-Gadhi in 1767. These were repulsed. In the process, however, the eastern Terai district of Bara, Parsa and Rautahat remained under the occupation of the East India Company until January 1771" (Regmi 1972). These successes enabled Shah to concentrate his efforts on the conquest of the three Kingdoms of Kathmandu valley. His control over territories adjoining these Kingdoms in all directions made it possible to impose an economic blockade against Kathmandu Valley. "The Kingdom of Kathmandu was finally overrun in September 1768 and Shah then shifted his capital from Gorkha to Kathmandu and thus laid the foundation of the present Kingdom of Nepal" (Regmi 1972).

With the victory over Kathmandu Valley, King Shah developed a regular and professional armed forces from his militia men and sent them to conquer new territories in all directions. By the time of his death in 1775, the Gorkhas over-ran the whole of the Kiranti land east of Kathmandu, Morang in Terai, and Ilam touching the borders of Sikkim. After Prithivi Narayan Shah's death, Gorkha conquered was pushed further by Bahadur Shah who acted as the Regent of his nephew, King Rana Bahadur Shah (1777-97). "After winning over the Rajah of Palpa by a marriage alliance, Bahadur brought under control the Baise and Chaubise states and sent his

forces as far west as Kumayun. In the East ,Gorkha arms penetrated into Sikkim and even threatened Bhutan" (Regmi 1961 and Sharma 1951). Emboldened by these victories, the Gorkhas began to cast a longing eye on Tibet.

"Preserving national security was the issue that always occupied King Shah's mind while he was pursuing Nepal's unification process. During this time, he had formulated Nepal's foreign and security policies" (Prithivi Narayan Shah's'Dibyopadesh') where he stated "The kingdom is a yam between two boulders. Great friendship should be maintained with the Emperor of China in the North. Great friendship should also be nourished with the British India Company in the South". (Panta et al 1985).

This remains reference points for Nepal's security and foreign policy even at present. His deep knowledge about the capacity and potentiality of his own state as well as its neighbours helped him to adopt the policies that remain valid even after more than two hundred years of his death. "Nepal's territorial integrity can be preserved only by maintaining good neighbourly relations with the two giant neighbours. Furthermore, he warned that Nepal should adopt a very cautious approach to the British rule as it had kept India suppressed and was encroaching on the plains" (Gnawali 1962 and Panta et al 1985).

Even now, the dynamics of relations between India and China constitute the basic ingredient of Nepal's geo-strategic thinking, and maintaining good neighbourly relations between the two remains the core strategy of Nepal's security policy. "King Shah's successors (Bahadur Shah, Rajendra Bikram Shah etc.) based their foreign policy on two premises. First, power potential can be enhanced by absorbing gradually the weaker principalities into their domain. And second, in order to face possible encounter with the East India Company, which was becoming entrenched on the Terai border and was bent on influencing Tibet for its trade interests, must increase their power as well as resource potentials by expanding their territories both east and westwards without first challenging the Company's vital interests" (Khadka 1997)..

"The successors of King Shah pursued an aggressive foreign policy triggered by the goal of a greater and powerful Nepal. As more territories became annexed towards east, Nepal's propensity not only to control the trade routes via Sikkim to Tibet but also to 'intervene in the internal dissention then prevalent in Tibet' during the time" (Rose 1971). After winning over the war with Tibet in 1778, Nepal also dictated its terms of trade and forms of coinage and the demand for a better quality salt on it was enhanced.

Nepal's such historical precedence is a strong element in the psyche of its citizens and policy makers. As James Rosenau stated, "At the foreign policy level, too, (as at the level of "human system"), the forces of the past and those of the present can conflict, coexist, or synthesize. The choices and activities of foreign policy decision-makers can be guided by the cultural norms and historical precedents that governed the behavior of their predecessors; or the choices and activities can be guided by the changing demands that emanate from the international system or from the decision-makers' own society" (Rosenau 1980).

Nepal has maintained its independence and sovereignty despite several assaults from the colonial forces in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries. Its foreign and security policy evolved against the backdrop of concurrent but separate threats posed by the British East India Company on the South and steadily expanding Chinese presence in Tibet on the North.

The growing threat that Nepal was facing during the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century from both Southern and Northern borders had gradually determined its security threat perceptions. "The Nepali world view in the modern period appeared to be primarily a reflection and extension of its perception of the country's two giant neighbours, India and China" (Joshi and Rose 1966).

#### **3.1.4 The period of Nepal's assertiveness - 1769-1816**

Considerable success was achieved in annexing new territories and reasserting the power status during the unification period. By the time of Bahadur Shah (1775 to 1794) Nepal's territory stretched from Tista river in the east to Sutlej river in the west

(Acharya 1957). In 1775 Prithvi Narayan Shah died and his brother Bahadur Shah took the regency and forwarded the annexation policy. By 1789, all the Baisi and Chaubisi states were conquered and the frontier extended to the Mahakali river. Kumaun was conquered in 1790. According to Regmi, "by 1808, the Gorkhali army had reached Kangra across the Jamuna River. The frontiers of Nepal thus extended to a distance of approximately 13,00 miles from the Tista River in the east to the Sutlej River in the West" (Regmi 1972).

***War with Tibet:*** Nepal made a simultaneous attack on Tibet and Sikkim in 1778 and was successful in forcing Tibet to sign a treaty favourable to Nepal. Under this treaty which Nepal continued to have trade with Tibet and the Tibetan coinage supplied by Nepal. However, Nepal attacked Tibet again in 1791 due to Tibet's failure to comply with the provisions of the Treaty of 1789. Tibet stopped to accept Nepal's coinage and also refused to pay the annual tribute to Nepal as agreed after the 1778 war, then Nepal again attacked to Tibet.

This time, China was drawn in the war. Nepal was defeated by China. The successors of king Prithivi Narayan Shah of Nepal wanted to continue pursue the expansion of Nepali territories. They were motivated by the successful pursuance of unification process under the King and started to attack the neighbouring states including Tibet and territories under the British India Company. Their war with Tibet this time was to "Nepal failed to assess its actual military power and declared wars with Tibet (1788) and the British (1814). The growing internal conflicts between the various factions in Tibet encouraged Nepali rulers to attack Tibet.

The invasions of Tibet in 1788 and 1791 were not merely conflicts between Nepal and Tibet nor were they only raids aimed at the seizure of loot. "As per the 1775 treaty, Tibet supposed to pay full compensation for expenses involved in the war as well as the "50 dharnis of gold", when this was rejected by the Tibetans, then the Nepalis demanded the cession of Kuti district (next to Rasuwa northern district of Nepal) and payment of annual tribute from Tibet" (Nepali 1964). The Tibetan refused to agree and the treaty was collapsed. Then Nepal constituted an intervention in Tibetan politics and an attempt by the Gorkhals to support those Tibetan political factions whose interests were, temporarily at least, most closely aligned with those of Nepal.

There was a report that the Tibetan government was divided on the question, some of them were urging continuation of war (Regmi 1972). The problem of trade with Tibet and the failure to comply with the currency question motivated Nepal to attack on Tibet. "In the spring of 1788, Bahadur Shah sent letters to Tibet demanding a settlement of the currency question and protesting about the quality of salt imported from Tibet. Nepal threatened to seize the four border districts of Tibet in the Kuti and Kerong pass areas if it did not receive satisfaction on these questions" (Regmi 1972).

The Tibetan government in Lhasa rejected the Nepali demand for the devaluation of the debased Malla currency in Tibet and closed the trade routes between the two countries as a protest against Kathmandu's threats. When Nepal received negative response to its demands from the Tibetan government on currency as well as earlier agreed compensation under the 1775 treaty, it decided to invade Tibet. The Gorkhali forces crossed the border in July 1788 and seized the four districts in the Kuti and Kerong pass area. Similarly, the Gorkhali forces launched a simultaneous attack on Sikkim in mid-1788. According to Rose, "the objective of attacking in the eastern region was the trade route through the Chumbi Valley and Sikkim that the Tibetan government had opened in 1784, in violation of the 1775 Nepali-Tibetan treaty and in disregard of strong and repeated protest from Kathmandu..The attack met with immediate success. Rabdentse was captured and all of Sikkim west of the Tista came under Nepal's control. This gave the Gorkhalis a common border with Bhutan, which then held the Kalimpong area to the east of the Tista" (Rose 1971).

A treaty was signed in June 1789 which consisted number of letter of exchange between Nepal and Tibet. Bahadur Shah assumed that it was unlikely that China would intervene in the conflict between Tibet and Nepal and he was confident that the attack against Tibet could be launched with relative immunity to effective retaliation. Therefore, "he presumed that the strong Nepali army would defeat Tibetan and impose their terms and conditions over Tibet" (Gnawali 1962).

Nepal's attack against was also partly to silence the growing opposition against Bahadur Shah within the Nepali palace. As Rose argued that "working as a regent of king Rana Bahadur Shah, Bahadur Shah was able to consolidate his position within the palace which did not make everybody happy" (Ibid ). Even his nephew Rana



Bahadur Shah was suspecting on Bahadur Shah's move and giving support to his opponents indirectly. Therefore, there were growing internal opposition within the palace and Bahadur Shah hoped to use the war against Tibet to silence the internal opponents. Some of the main opponents were sent to the battle front under close supervision. Victory over the Tibetan in this war would have certainly emboldened his power. As king Rana Bahadur Shah was in suspicion that his regent was even trying to create an opportunity to depose his nephew and to seize the throne for himself – an ambition he is alleged to have cherished earlier.

The Nepali mission which was sent by Bahadur Shah to Peking had returned to Kathmandu bearing a letter from Emperor warning Nepal against a renewal of hostilities with Tibet. Despite the comparatively unfavorable situation, Bahadur Shah was confident that the limited capacity of Peking forces in Tibet could be effectively counterbalanced if the need arose. The war broken out second time and in the initial days, the Gorkhali forces advanced their position quite well and captured Tibetan areas including Shigatse. Later when the Chinese forces joined with the Tibetan, Gorkhali forces were retreated. Compare to earlier war with Tibet, this time Nepal lost and this had weakened Bahadur Shah's position inside the palace. His opponent got a chance to consolidate themselves. Peace was reestablished in terms that were neither humiliating nor catastrophic for Nepal. "The Nepali Durbar reverted to the fundamentals of Prithvi Narayan Shah's foreign policy, under which a non-threatening relation with China was preserved" (Shah 1992).

### **3.1.5 Treaty of Sugauli**

By early 19<sup>th</sup> century, Nepal emerged as a power to reckon with in the region. It gained confidence and pursued its policy more assertively. Khadka argued that "The psychological as well as real effects of Nepal's power were manifested in its war of extension, in Kathmandu's offer to mediation between Bhutan and East India Company, in expelling the Kashmiris and Sanyasis into their homeland, and in the offensive launched against Tibet for forcing it for accepting trade terms and conditions set by it" (Khadka 1997).

Likewise, 'letter sent by Panchen Lama to King Pratap Sing Shah, stated that 'at present, they are afraid of you and no one will enter your country' (Rose 1971). The British writers described about the possible implications of Nepal's rising power in the region in the last quarter of 19<sup>th</sup> century. Writing about the Himalayan power, Richard Temple wrote that "As a Himalayan power placed between two countries, the Chinese and the British, actually without being cognizant as yet of other powers. It is nearly certain as a matter of historical retrospect, that if it had not been for the rise of the British power, the Sikhs and the Gorkhas would have divided between them vast territories now comprised under the designation of the Bengal Presidency, and the Nepalese are doubtless aware of this" (Temple 1887). As P.E. Roberts writes "The British had perceived a danger of alliances of powers among the Sikhs and Gurkhas against them. The Gorkha had sent their emissaries far and wide to Sindhia, Ranjit Singh, the Pindari chieftains and even to the capitals of the Burmese and Chinese empires against the British" (Roberts 1958).

Initially, the successors of Prithvi Narayan Shah pursued the policy of not challenging the East India Company's interest. However, later they adopted a very intransigent attitude towards the regional contenders. They also failed to assess the East India Company's capabilities and its diplomatic rapprochement with other groups. Similarly, the Nepal's conquests in the west also provoked disputes with the British over certain districts in the plain. Rose mentioned that, the Nepal conquerors assumed that all the territories of these small kingdoms including those in the plains, now belonged to Nepal and they occupied these areas in 1810. That move ran counter to the broad aims of Company policy. As the two powers began to share unmarked frontiers both having territorial ambition, war became inevitable.

"A showdown with Calcutta was thus forestalled. Nepal realized that the problem would become increasingly acute in the future. Therefore, Kathmandu intensified its diplomatic efforts in preparation for the day when the British ultimatum would be delivered. The 1812 Nepali mission to Peking was one of the efforts to get Chinese assistance in the event of war with the British. However, it received negative reply. Similarly, the Nepali Durbar sent envoys to central India seeking to form alliances against the British. But Nepal's efforts to bring those small states such as Rampur, Lucknow, Lahore etc. into the anti-British alliance were failed" (Rose 1971).

"Between 1808 and 1814 several disputes arose between Nepal and British India all along their common border – on the frontier of Purnea in the east, on those of the frontiers of Gorakhpur and Saran to the south of Central Nepal and on the frontiers of Bareilly in the west" (Sanwal 1965).<sup>9</sup> As stated by Shaha, "the most serious differences were those regarding the borders of Gorakhpur and Saran where the Butawal and Syuraj incidents and the Gorkhas' capture of 22 Saran villages triggered the war of 1814-1816 between Nepal and British India" (Shaha 1996).

"A war broke out between the Company and Nepal in the period 1814-1816 and Nepal was defeated. As a result of the war Nepal lost about one third of the territory on the west and on the south to the British and the relations between the two countries were governed by a treaty peace called the Treaty of Sugauli concluded in 1816" (Stiller 1973). Nepal's defeat with the British was a serious setback in its ambition to become a regional power in the Himalayan region. Under the treaty, Nepal agreed to loose one third of its territory on the west and on the south that include present Bardia, Banke to Kanchanpur Districts to the British . Nepal also accepted a British residency at Kathmandu for the first time in its history. Though the British Resident was not supposed to interfere in the domestic position, however, the weakening domestic position allowed British to intervene in the internal political matters particularly meddling inside the royal palace politics. Similarly, "provision was made to allow the British to recruit Nepali youth to the British armed forces" (Shaha 1996).

Since then, unrestricted recruitment had been allowed to the Nepali youth for the British Indian forces. In August 1947 about a week before British departure in India, a tripartite agreement between Nepal, India and British was signed wherein among the total 10 battalions that served British India so far, 4 would serve under British and 6 remain in Indian forces.

After the Sugauli defeat, as argued by Khadka, "Nepal pursued every policy ranging from seeking Chinese assistance and playing China and Britain off one against the other to intensifying both secret and open missions for forming an anti-British alliance

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<sup>9</sup> Sanwal, B.D. (1965), *Nepal and the East India Company*, Bombay: Asia Publishing House

by sending envoys to various princely states of India, Burma and Afghanistan" (Khadka 1997).

However, the various strategies that Nepal contemplated did not come to fruition due to fragile domestic situation, China's unwillingness and the growing military strength of Britain which was aptly demonstrated by its military superiority in the war with Afghanistan in the late 1830s and with China in the early 1840s. "The various anti-British policies Nepal pursued in the 1820s and 1830s only created a scope for interference in the internal affairs by the British Resident" (Ibid).

As stated earlier, the Treaty of Sugauli with British India Company in 1816 had had the far reaching implications not only in shaping present Nepal's geographical territories but also had significant impacts on its internal and external policies of the country. As Shah summed up the implications of the treaty that "the treaty put a decisive check on Gorkhali expansion towards the west and restricted the Gorkhas to the hills east of the Mahakali river. Likewise, the Company annexed the districts of Kumaun, Garhwal and Himanchal Pradesh and also the western Terai between the river Rapti and Mahakali. Moreover, the presence of the Company's representative in Kathmandu enabled the Company's Government to keep a constant and close watch over the machinations of the Gorkhas against the Company's Government. The Company continued to suspect that Nepal might be in league with other powers, such as the Sikhs and the Marathas who at that time, had not been entirely subjugated" (Shaha 1996). Apart from allowing the British residency to be based in Nepal, "the Sugauli treaty forced Nepal to accept British arbitration in the event of any dispute with other countries" (Agrawal 1976).

Lost in the war was the major setback in Nepal's foreign policy of the time. Although, there was not significant change in the domestic politics after the loss of the war, however the post-war period was the most frustrating period in the foreign relations. Kathmandu's attempts to weld the Indian states into an effective anti-British alliance had been disastrously unsuccessful. Likewise, Nepal's another attempt to attract Chinese interest against the British expansion in the South Asian region was also not successful (Paudel 1963).

It was argued that if the Chinese had seriously objected to the British presence in Nepal, the Resident would have been withdrawn, because the Company Government was in no mood to endanger the long-term interests of Anglo-Chinese maritime trade by giving offence. However, "the Chinese did not press the matter, and this Nepali ploy had no effect" (Shaha 1996).

As immediate after the conclusion of the Sugauly Treaty with Nepal, the British Government India's preoccupation with the suppression of the Pindaris and the Marathas in Central India, prevented the Company Government's from insisting on the strict implementation of the terms of the treaty' (Regmi 1962).

### **3.1.6 British and China's policy towards Nepal in 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century**

Though both China and British India were the two strong powers in the region in the late 18<sup>th</sup> and early 19<sup>th</sup> centuries, both of them were not willing to directly confront each other in the Himalayan region during the period. Chinese empire was very much engaged in maintaining their domestic order including Tibet. On the other hand British Indian Company Government was engaged in suppression of the Marathas, Sikhs and Pindaris in India. At the time of war with Nepal, the British was also heavily engaged war with Napoleon in Europe and hence it had to abandon its confrontationalist policy.

Similarly, the Chinese Emperor in Peking was also aware of growing British presence in South Asia, However it also did not want to involve in war with British. The Chinese refusal time and again to accept Nepal's request for military and economic support against British was an example of remaining away from such a confrontationalist engagement. For instance, "when it became obvious by 1810 that a British invasion was imminent against Nepal, the Nepali Durbar sent several letters to Chinese Emperor in Peking through Tibetan Amban in Lhasa claiming that the British were planning to invade Nepal in order to force a passage through to Tibet. The Emperor in Beijing expressed skepticism about Nepali Durbar's apprehension that British had any such intention, and rejected Nepal's request for both military and financial assistance. Both the Chinese Emperor and Tibetan Amban were completely indifferent to the request made by Nepali Durbar. In fact the Tibetan Amban replied

by sending a letter where he stated that 'there is no tradition of giving monetary aid by China, we Ambans cannot submit such request to the Emperor ..... from now on never make such requests in your letter" (Regmi 1961 and Rose 1971).

In response to Nepal's repeated requests, the Chinese Emperor once commented that "As a matter of fact they can join the British rule if they like, so long as they send us tribute, and so long as the British do not cross the Tibetan frontier" (Regmi 1972). This shows the Chinese Emperor's emphatic unwillingness. This also in a way indicates the confidence of Chinese Emperor on British policy of not crossing north to the Himalayas. In fact, "Chinese policy at that time was to defend its own heartland of its own Empire from the encroachment of the Westerners and had little interest as well as strength to spare to meet the challenge on its outer periphery" (Stiller 1975).

The war with Nepal and the establishment of a British Residency at Kathmandu marked the reemergence of the Company as interested participant in trans-Himalayan developments. There was however, a fundamental difference between British policy in Nepal in the post-1814 period and that of earlier. The British earlier interest in Nepal had been primarily a reflection of a desire to open Tibet and western China to British commerce, and this policy carried within itself the seeds of dispute between the Company and Peking.

However, "British had given up its earlier consideration and it did not want to drag Chinese into the conflict while it decided to go war against Nepal. Such considerations, however, played no role to British India Company Government's decision to resort to war against Nepal in 1814, nor did the Company even contemplate challenging China's predominant influence in Tibet, even indirectly, or altering the relationship between Nepal and China. British India Government may have hoped that trans-Himalayan trade would develop but this was at best a secondary consideration (Ibid).

During the pre-1814 period, China regarded Nepal as an independent country and took a stand that it had to deal with British on its own. "As long as Tibet was secure and accepted by the British as an integral part of China, the Emperor in Peking was

unwilling to involve in conflicts between Nepal and British despite the repeated requests made by the Nepali side" (Shaha 1996).

As Khadka argued that "China's policy in these events were consistent with its broader goals in the Himalayan region. Tibet was an integral part of the Chinese frontier security system, and Peking was prepared to react to the limit of its capacity to any challenge to its authority there" (Khadka 1997). "Peking's viewed Kathmandu Durbar as an independent power unbound by any restrictions on its capacity to act in both domestic and foreign affairs except for its treaty obligation to dispatch periodic missions to China.. Peking was interested in the maintenance of status quo so far as its own rights were concerned. On the other hand, the British also did not intend to challenge China's status in the area" (Shaha 1996).

Broadly, the Nepal Durbar maintained its policy in balancing two immediate powers in the post Sugauli treaty. However, the growing fratricidal conflict inside the palace weakened Nepal's role in the region. Physical decimation of political rivals, intrigues, maneuverings, and bloodshed became the hall marks of the power politics in the politics of Nepal Durbar. "This reached a climax in the mid 1840s after the removal of long time Prime Minister Bhimsen Thapa in 1837" (Stiller 1976). Thapa had been the longest serving Prime Minister in the history of Nepal where he had ruled over 33 years. The end of Thapa's regime meant the rise of Jang Bahadur Kunwar and the beginning of a family autocracy. The years from 1816 to 1846 had witnessed a fragile moment in the foreign policy management of Nepal. Its repeated attempts to get support from Chinese were not successful. Meantime, its wishes to create anti-British alliance with the northern Indian states had also been unsuccessful. The British was aggressively launching war against the Indian states and absorbed them into its own Empire one after another.

### **3.1.7 Rana's appeasement policy towards British**

The later half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century was the most challenging period for Nepal to maintain its sovereignty and independence. The rise of British Empire and subsequent absorption of many princely states of India under its control posed a great threat to Nepal. Similarly, British Empire in India wanted to expand its influence in Tibet and

West Asia via Nepal. Meantime the Chinese power (Nepal's counter balancing country of the north when it faces threats from the south) was increasingly becoming weak after the defeat in the Opium War in the 1840s. This was followed by a series of uprisings in the Chinese provinces of Taiping, Nien, Yunan and Sehnsi. As a result, China failed to protect Tibet from foreign invasion after 1792, particularly in 1842 in the war with Ladakh. Even its own protected zone was invaded by the outside force. Its weakening internal strength forced Chinese power not to assume risks. "The growing challenge from the British in the south and increasingly weakening position of the northern power increased Nepal's vulnerability" (Regmi 1962).

Interestingly, Nepal's challenging external situation was further marred by the internal conflicts within Nepali Durbars. The fratricidal conflict and physical decimation of political rivals led to the Kot massacre inside the palace in September 1846. The Kot massacre where over 30 senior most Bhardars including the then Prime Minister were brutally killed in a single night. "It actually paved the way to rise of Jang Bahadur Kunwar into power" (Adhikari 1984).

***Jang Bahadur's foreign and security policy:*** Jang Bahadur's rise to power resulted in a major redefinition of Nepal's foreign policy toward both British India and China. Jang Bahadur became the first Prime Minister to change Nepal's traditional foreign policy based on King Prithvi Narayan Shah's descriptions - maintaining balanced relations with both of Nepal's immediate neighbours – India and China. In his initial days, Jang Bahadur adopted the policy of appeasing the British Empire in the south and shown cold shoulder to the declining Chinese power in the north. "Jang Bahadur was well aware of the rapid decline of Chinese power and recognized that distant Peking was neither willing nor able to challenge the British in the Himalayan area" (Khadka 1971). Jang Bahadur formulated his external policy on two primary basis, "First that Nepal's independence can be maintained only by respecting British power and interest in the region, and second that its external independence must be asserted without disturbing the vital interests of the British" (Adhikari 1984).

Jang Bahadur realized that the anti-British policy adopted by earlier kings would no longer be tolerated by British. He was of the view that it was essential to have good will of British India if Nepal were to avoid the fate that had recently overtaken the last



of the major Indian states i.e. the Sikh kingdom in the Panjab. This was the policy that he had accepted and followed by his successors 104 years of Rana rule (1846 to 1950). "Jang Bahadur's perception and stand was further strengthened after his visit to England in 1850 as the first head of government from a Hindu state. He felt that British rule in India could not be easily overthrown and this perspective helped him to shape Nepal's foreign policy" (Rose 1971).

Jang Bahadur mobilized support of the British India Government after his visit to England. However this external support did not provide much succor to silence his internal critiques. Jang Bahadur's opponents started to criticize him for his visit to England and his increasing inclination towards British. On the other hand, a dispute with Tibet surfaced again in 1855. After the defeat in Opium War in 1840s, Chinese power was rapidly declining and its influence over Tibet had also been waning. Similarly, due to the growing conflicts among various factions in Tibet, the Tibetan Ambans had also been facing serious problems in Lhasa. Jang Bahadur had been observing the developments in Tibet and China very closely. He therefore, wanted to strengthen Nepal's position and renegotiate with Tibet with better terms. "He may have hoped that a successful war against Tibet would provide the occasion for the removal of his opponents and consolidate his own position. War broke out in April 1855. However, within few months time without much destruction both sides, a treaty was signed between Nepal and Tibet on the basis of equality and mutual benefits" (Ibid).

This 1856 treaty provided a superior position to Nepal. However, after few years of the agreement the Tibetans were disinclined to recognize the privileged position accorded to Nepal under the treaty. Nepal – Tibetan relations once again underwent a crisis in 1872 when Kathmandu accused Lhasa of maltreatment of Nepali merchant residents in Tibet. In early 1880s, a serious dispute surfaced with Tibet and riot broke out in Lhasa against the Nepalese merchants and their shops were vandalized. This time, China intervened between Kathmandu and Lhasa's dispute and resolved the crisis. "During the time the Nepal-China remained cordial. Though the dispute was resolved, Nepal lost its monopoly it used to have in the trade with Lhasa before the riot" (Adhikari 1984).

As stated earlier, Jung Bahadur adopted the policy of respecting British power in India and took several steps to appease Calcutta. One of the most controversial decisions of Jang Bahadur was his decision to go to India with 8,000 Nepali troops in December 1857 to suppress the mass uprising against the British in northern India (Shaha 1992). The Nepali armed forces captured several rebels and suppressed the movement which is known as Sepoy Mutiny. "Jang Bahadur's help in the hour of crisis was rewarded by British India by returning the part of Terai which was captured by British during the war in 1814-16. Meanwhile, Jang Bahadur had also imposed restrictions on the recruitments of Nepali Gorkha into the British Indian army" (Adhikari 1983).

Another area where Nepal reacted against the British assertion in the region was British's growing interest in trans-Himalayan trade after the 1860s. "British wanted to revive the trade route from Peking to India via Tibet. Nepal knew that it would badly hamper Nepal-Tibetan trade which Nepal had been monopolized since a long time. It was a direct threat to Nepal's virtual monopoly in Tibet" (Regmi 1972). "Nepal's negative response towards opening land route to Tibet did not stop British to look for other options. It had forced Sikkim to allow British to survey a road to Tibet border in 1873-74 and completed in 1877 despite the objections raised by Tibetan and Chinese" (Rose 1971).

After the death of Jang Bahadur in 1877, intra-familial rivalry had become a chronic feature of the Rana regime. This had provided space to the foreign power especially the British who had residency in Kathmandu to play with one group against the other. Similarly, recognition of successor regime's official status by Calcutta and Peking was essential for the Rana regime. Therefore, to get their backing, the successive Rana regime started to make concessions against the interests of Nepali people and the country. One of such cases was their agreement to allow British India government to recruit Nepali citizens into their army. Jang Bahadur had introduced several restrictions on it. Likewise, the British had also consolidated their position in Nepal and adopted the policy to contain Chinese influences in Nepal. The British Indian government started to pay close attention to Nepal and its relations with China.

During the First World War, Nepal sent ten battalions of the Nepali army to the British India government. About 35000 Nepalese were recruited into those battalions during the war. The Rana Prime Minister Chandra Shamsher had made alliance with the British by sacrificing the basic theme of Nepal's foreign policy. As Shaha argued that "the most important reason why Nepal was not brought under British rule in the 19<sup>th</sup> century was that, after the mid-nineteenth century, the British got everything they wanted from Nepal without having to exert themselves further. The Rana rulers of Nepal were convinced that Nepal could not hope to match the British in a trial of strength and hence made themselves, as rules of independent country, so useful to Britain that there never arose any real need for the British to bring Nepal under direct rule" (Shaha 1992). Another writer argues that "free trade with Nepal and the recruitment of Gorkhas were the two major objectives the British had sought to achieve in Nepal. As Nepal subsequently proved to be a source of British military strength in Asia, and the British Empire found the services of Gorkha troops invaluable in times of crisis" (Regmi 1962). Nepal became a virtual appendage of the British Indian empire responsive to the requirements implicit in the alliance with the British..

*The Treaty of 1923 with the British India Government:* Nepal's contribution to the First World War to the British somehow played a role in agreeing the British Government to sign a treaty in December 1923 where it recognized for the first time Nepal as an independent country. In announcing the new nomenclature, the Government of India declared that "This decision is intended to emphasize the unrestricted independence of the Kingdom of Gurkha which is on entirely different footing from that of the Protected State of India" (*The Times*, London, 4 June 1920 and also cited in Regmi 1961). Chandra Shamsher, the Rana Prime Minister of the time pleaded for a new treaty during the visit of the Prince of Wales to Nepal in 1921. The Treaty signed on 21 December 1923, at Sugauli – where the 1816 treaty had also been concluded – Nepal finally obtained an "unequivocal recognition of its independence". In the first Article, both governments agreed 'mutually to acknowledge and respect each other's independence....' (Para 1 of the Treaty of 1923).

Though the treaty's first Article was exclusively recognized Nepal's independence however, under the third Article of the Treaty somewhat limited Nepal's

independence which obligate each government 'to exert its good offices ' to remove causes of any serious friction or misunderstanding with neighbouring states whose frontiers adjoin their. According to the treaty provision which meant that Nepal would continue to consult the Government of British India on its relations with Tibet, Sikkim, Bhutan and China. Similarly, the clause five of the treaty obliged Nepal to get approval to import arms and ammunitions. Here, again Nepal's rights were limited. Nepal gained further recognition of its independent status in 1934 when the British Government agreed to the establishment of a Nepal Embassy in London. In the Second World War also Nepal contributed over 200,000 Gorkhas who served in British units during the war (Regmi 1961).

The foreign and security policy of Ranas as initiated by Jang Bahadur was based on firm friendship with the British and isolation of Nepal from other powers including its neighbours for ensuring peace and tranquility at home (Hussain 1970). There have been many opinions about the impact of the foreign policy pursued by Ranas. King Mahendra - a shrewd politician - stated once that "The Rana period was less eventful and more ignominious and it was bolstered up externally by the British and internally by bayonets, the Rana regime rode rough-shod over the destiny of Nepal. The measure of Rana subservience to the British power is the measure of Nepal's ill-luck" (Mahendra 1964).<sup>10</sup>

Some writers like Rose argued that "the friendly policy that the Jang Bahadur and his successors adopted during their tenure was tailored to the elemental need of the survival of the country" (Rose 1971). Meantime the Ranas time and again tried to use the Chinese leverage against the British cautiously. It had continuously followed the recruitment of Gorkhas despite some restrictions during the Jang Bahadur period. It had supplied military assistance to British India during the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 in support of the British India Empire and also during the First and Second World Wars. The Rana regime had also adopted the policy of isolation by restricting the movements of people as well as Europeans activities inside the country.

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<sup>10</sup> See King Mahendra's address to the Indian Council for World Affairs on April 20, 1962. See also in Bhasin (1994), "Speech of King Mahendra at the Indian Council of World Affairs, (Excerpt), New Delhi: April 20, 1962. Also in Major Foreign Speeches by H.M. King Mahendra, Kathmandu: Department of Publicity, Ministry of Panchayat Affairs.

"The successive Rana regimes' policy of appeasement did work specially when Nepal was able to restore section of the Terai in 1858 from the British India regime and was also able to persuade British to sign a Treaty of Friendship in 1923 which recognized Nepal's independence and sovereign status" (Shaha 1996).

### **3.2 Emergence of Modern Nepal**

The end of the Second World War marked the beginning of an era of freedom and equality among the nation-states. The bloom into independence of quite a number of Afro-Asian states in the post-World War period radically changed the patterns and trends of international politics. Small countries which had no say in international affairs before the First World War now started clamouring for a meaningful role in world politics. With the establishment of United Nations and its adoption of various resolutions in favour of the Third World national liberation movements provided larger roles to the small and developing countries. In Asia, India became independent in 1947 so did Pakistan. Others like Burma, Indonesia, Ceylon followed suit. Japanese lost war and withdrew from China, Korea and other South East Asian countries where it had been waging colonial wars. "These states which were under the colonial regime started to interact each in accordance with their own national interests" (Regmi 1961).

In this changing regional and international situation, Nepal was still under the oligarchy system and the country had been in complete isolation from the outside world. Nepal was one of the few Asian countries which escaped the direct colonial rule. For this, the Rana rulers embarked upon a dual strategy where on the one side they extended their cooperation with the British, on the other hand they kept the country completely in isolation from the outside world. These strategies were implemented in the whole 104 years of Rana rule. "Ranas policy did ensure Nepal's independence. However, the British support to the Rana rulers continued their autocratic and hereditary system and denied general people their fundamental rights" (Shaha 1996).

Despite Rana regime's restrictions on social and political activities in the country, people of Nepal began to defy the restrictions and got involved in various social and

political activities since the end of First World War. The participation of Gorkhas soldiers under the British command in the First World War had tremendously contributed in promoting various social and political activities inside the country. The aftermath of the First World War, the soldiers returned to their native villages. "During this war, the soldiers were exposed to the outside world where they had experienced and witnessed the different society other than they had been living in Nepal. They began to express their dissatisfaction in ways ranging from mere complaining to establishing Western type organizations" (Gautam 2001).

An organization named Gorkha League based in India run by the ex-Gorkha soldiers began to organise the former soldiers against Rana regime and started to advocate for the social and political reform. Under the name of this Gorkha organization, a periodical named *Gorkhali* started to publish from Banaras and the first issue was published in 1921. The periodical was aimed to generate social and political awareness among the people of Nepal. Similarly, another publication 'Makaiko Kheti' published in 1935 by Subba Krishna Lal which became popular within a short period of time" (Acharya 1958 and Gautam 2001). "With the initiation of young activists Praja Parishad (People's Council) was formed in late 1930s in Kathmandu and it was the first political organization that came into existence in Nepal to launch a clandestine movement against the Rana rule. However, within few years of its establishment, number of its activists were arrested and put in jail. Among the arrested, four of them were hanged in 1941 in Kathmandu who became the first martyrs for the sake of freedom and democracy" (Devkota 1959).

On 31 October 1946, All India Nepali National Congress was formed in Banaras (Devkota 1959) which spearheaded the anti-Rana movements. In 1949, Communist Party was established in Calcutta and decided to join the struggle for democracy and freedom with the Nepali National Congress. The All India Nepali National Congress held its first conference in Calcutta in 1947 and dropped 'All India' from its name and became Nepali National Congress. "The selfish interests the British and our present rulers have in keeping Nepal artificially independent and different are well known to all. It is in order to bring forth important and greater aspects of this situation that the Nepali National Congress has been formed" (Sharma 1958, Devkota 1959, and Gautam 2001).

The withdrawal of the British from India in 1947 created a new situation to which Nepal had to readjust itself. On the one hand, the British departure from the region left the autocratic Rana regime in Nepal unprotected and vulnerable where they not only lost their long time mentor but also had to face rebels who were launching struggle against their 104 years autocratic rule. "They also had to reconcile with the post-independent government in India which had a soft corner to the rebels who had been fighting to usher in democracy in Nepal" (Devkota 1959).

In this situation, the last two Rana Prime Ministers pursued a policy of expanding relations with other countries based on 'independent' policy (Shah 1990). Prime Minister Padma Shamsher sent missions to China and the United States. The response from the US was favourable and established diplomatic relations in 1947. However, there was no positive response from the Chinese side and the mission could not meet the concerned government leadership due to its heavy engagement with the Communists rival. The Rana regime had also sent a delegation to attend the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in March 1947. Similarly, Mohan Shamsher, the last Rana Prime Minister, established diplomatic relations with France in 1949. During Mohan Shamsher's tenure, Nepal had also applied for the membership in the United Nations. However, all these efforts of the Rana Prime Ministers did not prove effective to foil the anti-Rana movements and neutralize India's interest in Nepal. "Shaken by the risk of being overthrown by the democratic movement on the one hand, and prompted by the urge to appease India on the other, Mohan Shamsher signed the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship with India. This saved him from being violently overthrown by the revolution as he had retained his premiership in the Rana-Congress coalition in February 1951 under the 'Delhi Compromise' which ended in November 1951" (Bhasin 1970, Bhandari, 1958, Khadka 1997).

Another factor that had also contributed in generating anti-Rana movement in Nepal was the role of the returnees Gurkha soldiers after the end of Second World War. Like in the First World War, over 200,000 Gurkha forces who were sent to serve the British interests in Asia and Europe came back after the Second World War. They had been exposed to the influence of the Indian nationalist movement and also practices in other democratic and open societies in Asia and Europe. These returnees had become the harbinger for spreading the messages of democracy and freedom in the hilly

region where newly established political parties were also launching their propaganda against the Rana regime and establishment of democracy. This which ultimately led to overthrow the 104 Rana oligarchy systems. "In this changed context, the post-Rana government of Nepal discarded its isolationist policy and began to expand its relations beyond the region" (Regmi 1952 and Shaha 1992).

The beleaguered Rana regime was more concerned with the maintenance of their power than the security of the country. Decision to send troops in Hyderabad to quell the riot in 1947 or ready to make Nepal's security a matter of Indian care and concern, the Rana regime wanted to maintain the status quo in any cost (Shaha 1992). Their sole aim was to winning over the Indian Government's sympathy and preventing post-British government from giving any support to the democratic movement launched by the political parties. The Ranas and the post-independent government of India agreed to retain the system that was introduced after the Sugauli Treaty under which Nepalese were recruited into the Indian army. A tripartite Treaty was signed between Nepal, India and Britain on 9 August 1947 just one week before independence. In order to achieve this end, the Ranas used the same technique they had applied in the past to win over the sympathy and support from the British Government in India. Prime Minister Mohan Samsher wanted to give continuity all those arrangements and agreements that were made with the British India Company Government even after the post-Independent Indian government. Among them, agreeing to allow Gorkha recruitment to the Indian and also British army was one of it..

"They repeatedly pleaded with New Delhi that they would always remain friendly and loyal to the new Government in India, as they had earlier been to British" (Jha 1982).

"The Rana regime's foreign policy from 1947 -50 was solely aimed at winning over the newly established Indian government's sympathy and support to their regime's continuity by preventing India from giving any moral and material support despite their very limited diplomatic maneuverability and bargaining power" (Khadka 1997).

Despite the Rana regime's various efforts to win over the support from India, they were not able to retain it. Firstly, the Nehru government was convinced that there was no possibility of maintaining oligarchy system in the changing regional and global



context especially after end of colonialism and resurgence of democratic and liberation movements in the Third World countries. Similarly, the beleaguered Rana regime was not in a position to resist the growing struggles launched by the political parties inside Nepal. The wave of democratic struggles which was joined by the King Tribhuvan Bir Bikram Shah Dev and his departure to New Delhi made the situation more favourable to the pro-democracy forces.

However, it was a situation where non of the three political forces of the time (King, Rana and Nepali Congress) were in position to ignore each other. India was very much known about this situation and tried an arrangement which was suited to these three forces. Therefore, he was for the limited political reforms in Nepal which could also avoid going for a radical change. Second, "the political parties' struggles against the Rana rules and for the establishment of democracy was gaining momentum inside Nepal and even in a minimum level their demands needed to be addressed to end the growing dissent within Nepal" (Regmi 1952). Thirdly, "The Indian nationalist forces were well aware about the active participation of the Rana regime in the anti-nationalist movements in India during the colonial era where there was a kind pressure to Nehru to support the ongoing movements launched by Nepali political parties" (Regmi 1952).

Therefore, it was not possible for post-independent Indian government to give support and sympathy to the oligarchy system and sidelined the pro-democratic forces. Nehru pleaded for 'middle way' where some sorts of change could be accommodated by avoiding the "upheaval" (Nehru 1963).

Describing Indian middle way approach, Nehru stated that "We have tried for what it is worth to advise Nepal to act in a manner so as to prevent any major upheaval. We have tried to find a way, a middle way, if you like, which will ensure the progress of Nepal and the introduction of some advance in the ways of democracy in Nepal. We have searched for a way which would, at the same time, avoid the total uprooting of the ancient order" (Nehru, 1963).<sup>11</sup> The 'middle way' policy that Nehru stated earlier

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<sup>11</sup> See Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches (1949-53), Publication Division, Government of India. Quoted in Leo Rose (1971), *Nepal's Strategy for Survival*, NY: Oxford University Press and also in Avtar Singh Bhasin (ed.) (1994).

had become the consistent theme in Indian policy towards Nepal until early 1950s. The post-Rana government was formed on the basis of this policy of Nehru where last Rana Prime Minister was allowed to retain his position even after formal demolition of 104 years Rana regime.

*The 1950 Treaty and the issue of security:* A 'Treaty of Peace and Friendship' was signed between Nepal and India on 31<sup>st</sup> July 1950 (Bhasin 1994). The Treaty and the attached letter of exchange which was made public only in 1959 was signed by the beleaguered Rana Prime Minister Mohan Shamsher, the head of an oligarchic government which was about to be overthrown by a democratic movement few months later. In its last days in power the government was desperate for foreign assistance for its survival. Prime Minister Nehru realized the vulnerability of the regime and quickly grasped the situation and opportunity it offered. The security issue was the main factor in signing of the Treaty in a hasty manner by Nehru. The Treaty has become quite controversial and received criticism especially from Nepali side immediate after the signing and ratification by the two governments. The Articles which generated enormous concerns in Nepal are Article 2, 5, 6 and 7<sup>12</sup>. Like, Muni argues that "The Ranas fully accommodated India's security and commercial interests" (Muni 1973).

Article 2 obligates both governments "to inform each other of any serious friction or misunderstanding with any neighbouring state likely to cause any breach in the friendly relations subsisting between the two governments" (Article 2 of the Attached Letter of Exchange of the Treaty). The "letters of exchange" that accompanied the treaty further stipulates that "Neither Government shall tolerate any threat to the security of the other by a foreign aggressor. To deal with any such threat the two Governments shall consult with each other and devise effective countermeasures" (Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1950 and Rose 1971). Similarly, Article 5 deals with importing of arms and ammunitions by the Nepali government with the permission of India. Treaty itself does not specify the provision that Nepal needs to get permission from India while importing weapons especially from outside the Indian land. However, India raised this issue and imposed sanctions on Nepal when Nepal

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<sup>12</sup> For the text of the Treaty, see Bhasin, A. V. (1994) cit. op.

imported certain weapons from China in 1988. Under the 1950 Treaty provision, New Delhi view, Nepal had a duty to consult with India before purchasing such weapons from China. Concerning the provision in the 1950 Treaty on importing weapons by Nepal it says; "Any arms, ammunition or warlike material and equipment necessary for the security of Nepal that the Government of Nepal may import through the territory of India shall be so imported with the assistance and agreement of the Government of India" (Para 2 Exchange of Letters). Under this provision, Nepal view that it had to consult only importing through Indian territory (Subedi 2005).

"Nepal had no defence treaty with India in 1989 and was under no obligation to inform India of its actions to acquiring arms" (Subedi 2005). The Article 6 and 7 under which of the treaty, the Government of Nepal and India are bound to grant to the nationals one country in the territories of the other. "The same privilege in the matter of residence, ownership of property, participation in the trade and commerce, movements of similar nature" (Article VI and VII of the Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1950)<sup>13</sup> had become disuse immediately after the Treaty due to the impracticality of both of these clauses.

The Treaty covers all aspects of Nepal-India relations including security, economics, socio-cultural exchanges and provides basic framework for the relationship of two countries. However, the internal and external environment that prevailed while the Treaty was signed was not favourable to Nepal at least. As stated earlier, Nepal was passing through a turmoil because of the anti-establishment movement launched by the political parties. The regime was about to collapse. Equally, the external environment was also fluid. The end of Second World War and beginning of the Cold War indicated a phase of transition at the global level also. Moreover, the coming into power of Communist Party in China after a long civil war and its subsequent claim of sovereignty over Tibet generated serious security concerns in the region. "It was perceived as a security threat to both Nepal and India. Against this backdrop, the ruling elites of both these countries agreed to have a deal which culminated in the Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1950. India had already signed such type of treaties

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<sup>13</sup>See Article VI and VII, Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Nepal and India, 31 July 1950.

with Bhutan and Sikkim earlier and this time pushed Nepal in the same direction" (Subedi 2005).

The 1950 Treaty deals with several issues, including with questions of defence and the treatment of each other's nationals on a reciprocal basis. In view of the treaty's provisions, India claims a 'special relationship' with Nepal (Ibid). India imposed sanctions in 1989 against Nepal and one of the reasons of its imposition of sanctions and closure of border was that Nepal's importation of arms from China.

For India there are genuine and legitimate security concerns and states that Nepal must consider these. . However, Nepali side perceives that respecting India's sensitivity does not mean that it has to tilt or compromise its sovereignty and neutral foreign policy. In 1950, Nehru said, "Nepal is geographically almost part of India, although it is an independent country" (Norman 1965).

Again for India the Himalayas are the only natural barrier that separates the Indian subcontinent from Central Asia and even a partial control of these mountains would give the Chinese a highly strategic advantage. In Nehru's own words, the Himalayas that lie between Nepal and Tibet were important to India. He stated that "From time immemorial, the Himalayas have provided us with a magnificent frontier... we cannot allow that barrier to be penetrated, for it is also the principal barrier to India. Much as we stand for the independence of Nepal, we cannot allow anything to go wrong in Nepal or permit that barrier to be crossed or weakened because that would be a risk to our own security" (Nehru 1950, Bhasin, 1994).

China's assertion over Tibet further enhanced India's security concerns in the northern frontier. Nehru himself gave a statement on December 6, 1950 just after the Chinese take over of Tibet, wherein he mentioned that "condition of Nepal have become still more acute and in view of the developments across our borders, in China and Tibet" (Ibid). Indians was concerned over the possibility of Chinese crossing the Nepali part of the Himalayan chain. and they had paid attention over Nepal, a vital point in its northern borders. India considered that any political activities in its northern neighbouring region detrimental to its security interests and a threat to its dominant position in the region. For this reason only Nehru had concluded treaties with its

neighbours Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. 'India took up the defence responsibility of other two small Himalayan states; Bhutan and Sikkim. It seems, "its plan of security arrangements against China in the Himalayas, New Delhi followed some kind of a Himland theory somewhat similar to what has been propounded and know in international politics as rimland theory" (Jha 1992). India's involvement in Nepal's internal political affairs in 1950s and signing of treaty stemmed from two main considerations; "political commitment to the establishment of a liberal democratic governments in Nepal and New Delhi's concern with security considerations" (Sharma 1986).

*1951-55 British inherited policy of independent India:* Finally, a compromise was made with the mediation by the Indian government in New Delhi, where Rana regime agreed to end its 104 years oligarchy system by forming a coalition government with the democratic forces, especially with the Nepali Congress. They also agreed to reinstate the King as a constitutional monarch. An Interim Government Act was also introduced which was similar to the post-independence India's constitution. "The Internal Political Act may seem the final proof of India imposing its own system of democracy on Nepal." (Huftun 1999). This had become a starting point of the Indian government's involvement in the internal political affairs of Nepal. The new regime of Nepal had become dependent on India on each and every issue. According to the annual political report from the British embassy, "King Tribhuvan visited India six times in 1952. The main purpose being to consult the government of New Delhi on political matters in Nepal" (Ibid). "Even the formation of the new cabinet was virtually decided in New Delhi" (Yadav 1989). According to the British embassy report "The Indian advisor (C.P.N. Singh) attended all Council meetings, replacing the Nepali Secretary and was in a position to ensure that Indian wishes were followed" (Jha 1975). This was also the year in which "India decided to send a military and civilian mission to help to build up the Nepalese army and to assist the bureaucracy in Nepal. Indian troops were sent to Nepal three times between 1951 and 52 to suppress general unrest against the newly established compromise government" (Devkota 1959 and Shaha 1990).

Gradually such an excessive Indian involvement had become a matter of controversy and the two parties which were outside the coalition government; Praja Parishad

(People's Council) and Communist Party formed a united front against the coalition government, which they accused of being pro-Indian. In fact, these parties together with Nepali National Congress, K. I. Singh's group who organised armed revolt and coups against the new regime were against the 1951 Delhi compromise between the King, Rana and Nepali Congress. They accused the compromise of being a betrayal of the popular movement against the Rana and sell out of national sovereignty to India. They viewed the new Nepalese government as "...a puppet government formed to follow the dictats of Nehru Government and to put up a brake on the growing movement of the peoples of India, China and Nepal. This fact is proved by every action taken by the Government at the present moment. In every Department the Nehru Government has stepped into interfere, and the appointments of all Ministers, including that of the Prime Minister, are made by the Nehru Government" (Devkota 1959).

Similarly, another political party leader of the Nepali National Congress D. R. Regmi, remarked at a press conference on 19 February, 1951 that "I will expose the real character of the compromise between the Ranas and the Nepali Congress... the present settlement has been reached in complete disregard of popular interests without consulting the real representatives of the people. The interim cabinet formed by the agreement between the ruling Ranas and the representatives of a particular political party is not surely going to be a popular body" (Ibid).

There seemed India tried to defuse the growing anti-Indian sentiment in Nepal by providing financial assistance and undertaking several development projects as well as making public assurances. During his visit in June 1951 to Kathmandu, although Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was met by black flag demonstration at the airport, he emphasised that "Nepal's freedom was essential to the well-being of India, Nepal and the world. Those who thought that India had wanted to interfere with and compromise this ancient land's independence were wrong" (Regmi 1972).

During 1952-53, India decided to construct a road link to Kathmandu from the Indian border and offered to expand the size of the only airport of Nepal, Gauchar (Tribhuban International Airport) in Kathmandu.

In the post-Rana government, "the King Tribhuvan became heavily influenced by India (. By 1954 Nepal also agreed to coordinate its foreign policies with India"

(Kessing 1952 and Khadka 1997).<sup>14</sup> The then Nepal's Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that the foreign policy of Nepal was "very much allied to that of India" (*The Statesman* 1954).<sup>15</sup> It was also because India considers its geographical location and physical size as the basis for defining its South Asia policy. "The 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship was also a move by India to include Nepal in its 'sphere of influence' without any formal military alliance" (Khadka 1997). India's central and dominant position in South Asia, has promoted it to relate it to the security of the entire sub-continent and "it also considers its 'job to protect the region from outside" (*Asia Week*, 1 September 1989).

India views its relations with Nepal as a special one. As Nehru pointed out in 1954 that "So far Nepal is concerned, it is a well known fact and contained in our treaties and in our other agreements with that country that we have a special position in Nepal, not interfering with their independence but not looking with favor on anybody else interfering with independence either" (Nehru's Speeches 1963 and Bhasin 1994). After the entry of the Chinese forces in Tibet, India urged Nepal to work towards setting up check-posts to watch the border passes between the Nepal and Tibet for security and intelligence purposes. "The check-post was established in September 1951 was and manned by Nepali army personnel and Indian wireless operation".(Muni 1973).

Nehru's policy statement with respect to Nepal became the bedrock of India's security framework for both the government and scholars interested in Indo-Nepal relations. As Ray observed 'the transformation of Tibet into a Chinese military base and the continued movement of Chinese troops to Nepal's northern frontier alarmed India. Nepal now became a frontier state of permanent importance. The threat to India's security also became real because it has an open border with Nepal. The 500 mile long Nepal-Tibet Frontier is also the natural defence line of India. "If China were to draw Nepal under its influence, India's strategic position would be seriously undermined China's claim over Tibet and subsequent sending People's Liberation Army injected a sense of insecurity among Indian policy makers" (Ray 1983). Nepal's efforts to establishing diplomatic relations with China further exacerbated the

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<sup>14</sup> Kessing's Contemporary Archives, 5-22 November 1952.

<sup>15</sup> See *The Statesman*, May 9, 1954

situation. Indian Prime Minister Nehru and Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai agreed on some sort of understanding during Nehru's China visit in November 1954. This was reflected in a statement made by Nehru immediately after his visit when he said that "It is a matter which the Nepalese government no doubt will deal with in its own way in effect giving Nepal the green light to undertake serious discussions with Peking on this subject " (The Hindu, 15 November 1954 and Rose 1971).

Despite this growing bonhomie between India and China, India's foreign policy towards Nepal was heavily determined by India's overarching role in South Asia.. Similarly, the fragile regime in Kathmandu especially in the aftermath of the overthrow of Rana regime in 1951 somehow developed a tendency among the Nepalese decision makers to consult India for settling even the internal political differences. It allowed India to play its excessive roles in the internal matters of Nepal. This aroused feeling of anti-Indianism among the public and the political parties (Khadka 1997).

### **3.2.1 Foreign and Security policy issues under King Mahendra**

The death of King Tribhuvan and accession of King Mahendra to the throne in March 1955 did bring visible changes in Nepal's foreign and security policy. King Mahendra, a shrewd and ambitious monarch, was not comfortable with his father King Tribhuban's close affinity with India and its leaders. After taking refuge in India and later rescued by Indian help from the grip of Rana rulers, King Tribhuvan had developed a strong loyalty to India. King Mahendra did not want to follow his father's footsteps. Immediate after his accession to the throne, he asserted his position internally as well as externally. He immediately removed Prime Minister Matrika Prasad Koirala who had been held this position since 1952. He appointed T. P. Acharya as the new Prime Minister. "It was the first move that indicated King Mahendra's new approaches to foreign policy. Likewise, he pardoned K.I. Singh who had been in exile in China after his attempt of military coup earlier" (Devkota 1959 and Joshi and Rose 1966). Meantime, two events - the membership of the United Nations and the establishment of diplomatic relations with China took place which had far reaching implications in Nepal's foreign and security policies. Though the initiatives were taken by the previous governments, but the pace of negotiation was



speeded up after his accession. Similarly, "Nepal participated in the first Afro-Asian Conference held at Bandung and joined the league of non-aligned nations in the early 1960s" (Pradhan 1964).

Prime Minister Acharya had been a vehement critic of Nepal's special relationship with India. Prime Minister Acharya in his first press conference announced that his government would pursue a policy of "Equal friendship with all in its foreign relations and accept aid from any quarter if such aid was unconditional" (Khanal, 1964). Asserting his neutral foreign policy line, Acharya declared few months later "We must develop neutrality under which Nepal will be able to serve the cause of peace and afford sympathy for the oppressed" (Ibid). "Nepal for the first time voted in line with the Western countries when the Hungarian issue was brought before the U.N. General Assembly in November 1956 whereas India sided with the Soviet Union" (Devkota 1959 and Pradhan 1964). "This stand of Nepal on Hungary received popular support back in the country and was cited as an illustration of the independent existence of Nepal's foreign policy" (Khanal 1964).

Relations between Nepal and China had literally come to an end following the termination of the Ching dynasty in 1912. There had been hardly any interactions between the two countries. The establishment of Chinese Communist Party's government in 1949 and its subsequent claim over Tibet made its impact felt on the entire Himalayan region including Nepal. The regional political order which had been dominated by the British in the last number of decades, which the post-independent India wanted to continue, had been changed after China's take over of Tibet. "China's takeover of Tibet raised serious concern especially to India" (Khadka 1997).

India, being the largest country in the region began to assert its position in Nepal as a country of direct interest. Some Indians also believed that Nehru by recognizing China's position in Tibet in 1954 secured Chou En-lie's "Unwritten assurances' about India's special position in regard to Nepal's external affairs" (Muni 1971). However, the subsequent developments proved that this was a wrong perception. Above all, Nepal's establishment of diplomatic relations with China had been the most significant one. Relations with China also provided Nepal some space for the diplomatic maneuverability which had been time and again 'used' and misused by the

Nepali ruling classes. As in the in early 1960s when India-China war took place, King Mahendra played Nepal's geo-strategic position and played 'China card' to consolidate his undemocratic Panchayat regime. Prime Minister Acharya made a visit to China in October 1956 and several agreements were signed between Nepal and China including China's offer of annual economic assistantship to Nepal.

India was not happy with Acharya's propagation of Nepal's neutral foreign policy that was against 'special relationship status' with India. Such remarks and subsequent China visit brought concerns in New Delhi. The Indian press was particularly hostile to the visit of Acharya. 'Organiser' stated that 'legally China has nothing more to do with Tibet than we have to do with Nepal. That being so New Delhi erred grievously in letting Beijing has a locus standee in Nepal – Tibet affairs. How would Beijing relish New Delhi's direct negotiations with Lhasa"? (*Organiser*, 15 October 1956). After this visit, New Delhi began to look for an alternative by undermining the Acharya's foreign policy.

This was done in the form of bolstering K.I. Singh, who since his return from China in September 1955 had been taking an extremely pro-Indian stand in his foreign policy pronouncement. While Acharya was wrapping up his China visit, K. I. Singh made a surprise visit to New Delhi where he met Prime Minister and other senior ministers and political leaders. After meeting with Indian leaders, Singh held a press conference where he opposed his own PM's China visit and agreement signed by him. (*Hindustan Times*, 12 October 1956 and Sharma 1986).

Meantime, the frequencies of the bilateral visits were increased from both India and China to Nepal. On 21 October, 1956, Rajendra Prasad, the Indian President arrived in Kathmandu for a four – day state visit. Similarly, Chinese Prime Minister Chau En-lai visited Nepal on 25 January 1957 upon the invitation extended by Prime Minister Acharya. During his visit Indian President reiterated India's earlier stand that any threat to peace and security of Nepal was as much a threat to India (*The Times of India*, 23 October 1956). Likewise, Premier Chao addressed a large public gathering at Tundikhel in Kathmandu declaring that China admired the independent development of all the countries in the world. He concluded his speech by saying that

'Nepal and China are blood brothers and nothing can poison this relationship' (*Samaj*, 27 January, 1957 and text of the speech in Bhasin 1994).

During Acharya's tenure the policy of 'special friendship' with India came to be discarded and was replaced by what came to be known as "equal friendship with all". This development constituted a significant change in Nepal's earlier foreign policy" (Devkota 1958). In July 1957 King Mahendra asked PM Acharya to resign and appointed K.I. Singh as the new Prime Minister. Despite his controversial past, Singh<sup>16</sup> had already become a great favourite of the Indian Government since his return from China. Though, Dr. Singh's government could last for less than hundred days, special importance was attached to Nepal's association with India. New Delhi immediately welcomed the appointment and promised huge financial aid for various infrastructures projects including airfields in the hilly districts. The King dismissed Singh's government in November 1957 and introduced his direct rule. The King stated in his dismissal announcement that "he had been compelled to take the action in the interests of the country and the welfare of the people" (*Gorkhapatra Daily*, 23 November 1957).

King Mahendra wanted to play active role in the politics. For this he wanted to marginalize the political parties and their leaders. In the external front, he wanted to maintain good relations with India. He seemed to believe that political parties, democracy and Indian influence were intertwined. Similarly, he also wanted to strengthen ties with China and expand Nepal's relations with other major powers like the US and USSR. The long pending election was held in May 1959 and B.P. Koirala of Nepali Congress became the first elected Prime Minister of the country. Outlining the newly formed government's foreign policy, Koirala announced that 'active friendship and not passive neutrality is the keystone of our foreign policy towards India and China' (*Gorkhapatra*, 28 May 1959). During his term Koirala successfully balanced Nepal's highly sensitive nationalism and geopolitical challenges posed by its relations with its neighbouring countries.

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<sup>16</sup> Dr. Singh was the former rebel who had been captured with the assistance of the Indian Army following his refusal to accept the Delhi Compromise in 1951. Later he organized a revolt from the prison and managed to escape to China where he stayed until he was pardoned by King Mahendra in 1955.

More subtly he pursued a policy of "equal friendship' and nonalignment" (Khadka 1997). Though Nepali Congress was critical on Chinese actions in Tibet, the two General Secretary of the Party; Ganesh Man Singh and S.P. Upadhyaya expressed their criticism publicly just before the formation of Congress led government in Kathmandu. However, the pragmatist B.P. clarified the party's position on April 17 when he stated that it is absurd to suggest that recent Tibetan developments will affect our traditional relations with our great neighbour China (*Gorkhapatra*, 18 April 1959).

However, despite his public assertion Koirala abandoned the policy of 'equal friendship to all and nonalignment in the Sino-Indian dispute'. During his visit to Nepal in June 1959, Indian Prime Minister Nehru proposed for strengthening Nepal's northern border posts if necessary with the assistance of Indian personnels. Koirala accepted the proposal (*Gorkhapatra*, 8 June 1959).

Despite Koirala government's intimacy with India and its leaders, he was very clear on certain issues including that Nepal needed to be distanced itself from India. One of such proposals that came from Indian side was to have a joint defence arrangement between Nepal and India. In a press conference during his India visit in January 1960, Koirala said he did not envisage a joint defence arrangement between Nepal and India, as military alliances were 'worse than useless'.

In response to a question concerning the 'similarity of approach' mentioned in the joint communiqué the Nepali Prime Minister stated that this referred to his government's adherence to the 'policy of neutrality enunciated by Mr. Nehru. In the context of the Sino-Indian dispute, we are friendly to both the countries. We want an amicable settlement between the two' (*Gorkhapatra*, 31 January 1959 and Bhasin 1994).

Koirala government resolved various bilateral issues with China. One of it was the boundary agreement with China. Similarly, the issue of Sagarmatha (Mt. Everest) was also resolved. Earlier China had claimed Mt. Everest to have been located within its own borders. However, after Nepal's claim, Chau En-lie said that China did not plan to press a claim for Mt. Everest but was prepared to accept the demarcation of boundary line along the peak (*Gorkhapatra*, 28 April 1960). Despite his personal and

party affinity with India and political parties, Koirala government tried to balance Nepal's relations with both of its neighbours.

### **3.2.2 Use of geo-strategic factor to consolidate power**

King Mahendra dismissed the elected government of Nepali Congress on 15 December 1960 by charging them as 'anti-national elements'. To justify his military coup, he strongly implied that foreign policy considerations especially Koirala government's closeness with India had played an important part in his decision. He then introduced his direct rule in the name of Party-less Panchayat System. In the immediate aftermath of the royal takeover, King Mahendra spelled out the guidelines of its foreign policy. It was stated that the goal of the foreign policy of Nepal "shall be to maintain friendly relations with all the friendly countries" (Sharma 1986). The king's speech at the Belgrade Conference of the nonaligned countries stated "As we are absorbed completely in the national development we want to keep away from all sorts of military alliances and so far as bloc formation is concerned, we are not in favour of forming even a neutral bloc" (King Mahendra 1961).<sup>17</sup>

The king while reemphasizing his balanced relations approach maintained that "in spite of differences in political systems between China and Nepal, the two countries could have friendly and cordial relations. He also made it clear that Nepal's close relations with China did not differ fundamentally from India's relations with China and Nepal had never pursued a policy of playing one neighbour against the other" (Ibid). Under his rule, Nepal's diplomatic relations were massively expanded and diversified. The King's policy of diversification as Rose stated 'were intended to provide the basis for eventual termination of the special relations with India' (Rose 1971). Hence, political relations were established with a large number of countries and on a different basis than in the past. By 1977, Nepal had diplomatic relations with 64 countries and maintained 14 embassies in Kathmandu and 2 Consulate Generals in Calcutta and Lhasa.

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<sup>17</sup> See Major Foreign Policy Speeches of King Mahendra, (1962), Kathmandu: Department of Publicity and Broadcasting.

Neutrality and nonalignment were thus made the cornerstone of Nepal's foreign policy of the party-less Panchayat system (1960 to 1990). King Mahendra consolidated his power, tested the strengths and weaknesses of the potential leaders and examined the foreign policy options for keeping India and China at bay for limiting their interferences (Khadka 1997).

The King's abrupt dismissal of the popularly elected government with the support of the military was criticized by political parties of the country and outside countries especially India. The Indian press and the political parties strongly denounced the coup however, government's response was cautious. Indian PM Nehru characterized the coup as 'a complete reversal of democratic process' (Rajya Sabha Debate, 20 December 1960).<sup>18</sup> Six month after the coup, "New Delhi signed four agreements under which India promised aid totaling Indian Rs. 132 million for development purposes" (Rose 1971). New Delhi's concessions to the royal regime at that very juncture had a considerable political impact in Kathmandu. Despite those cautious response and the concessions made by India, the position assumed by the royal government was also interesting. Some of the ministers were allowed to criticise India while others took soft position and became harsh to China. Meantime, the King was also able to exploit the prevailing nationalist sentiments in the country. According to Rose, King Mahendra deliberately gave an anti-Indian orientation to his foreign policy in order to solidify popular support behind the royal regime. "It was to his political advantage to pose the alternatives as an Indian-influenced democratic government or his own autocratic but independent rule" (Ibid).

Nepal's other neighbour China did not make any comments about King's dismissal of the governments. Rather China and Nepal held series of meetings and understanding on economic cooperation and border issues were reached with the regime immediate after the coup. King Mahendra made during his visit to China in October 1961 signed an agreement on the construction of a road between Kathmandu and Tibet. "It was a surprise development for New Delhi" (*The Hindu*, 26 October 1961).

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<sup>18</sup> Rajya Sabha Debates, XXXI (17), 20 December 1960. Also in Bhasin (ed.) (1994), "Speech of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in the Rajya Sabha moving a Motion on the International Situation, (Excerpt), New Delhi, December 20, 1960. Also quoted by Rose cit.

India raised the issue of 1950 Treaty and mentioned that Nepal's unilateral move to go along with China where undermining the Indian security interest in its northern borders. Meantime, the Sino-Indian bilateral relation was at the lowest ebb while Nepal signed the agreement in Beijing. The relations between King Mahendra's regime and Nehru government further deteriorated after this agreement. Indian public and press were very critical on the agreement (*The Hindu Weekly Review*, 4 December 1961). Though government of India did not react publicly, while responding to the query in the Parliament, Nehru made it clear that "He was not satisfied that India's interests were not affected by the road" (Ibid).

Nepali government sources dismissed the alarmist accounts of the road in the Indian press and Parliament and described it as unwarranted intrusions into Nepal's domestic affairs. While defending the agreement with China on construction of the road and the hostile reactions from the Indian public and press King Mahendra argued that Communism would not enter Nepal "in a taxi cab" (*Gorkhapatra* 14 November 1961).

### **3.2.3 Peace and Friendship Treaty with China**

Nepal and China signed a boundary settlement agreement and a separate Treaty of Peace and Friendship Treaty in Kathmandu on April 29, 1960 during the official visit by the then Prime Minister China Zhou En-lai to Nepal. With signing of this Treaty, the territorial disputes particularly confusion over the Mt. Everest (known as Sagarmatha in Nepali) was also resolved (Kalpana Daily (editorial) 29 April 1960)<sup>19</sup>. Nepal's claim was accepted by the Chinese side. As stated earlier, Nepal and China established diplomatic relations in 1955 and signed a bilateral new Treaty in 1956 terminating the Treaty of Thapathali of 1856 and Nepal recognized Tibet as part of China (Ibid). Nepal and China exchanged residential ambassadors by 1960. After the establishment of diplomatic relations, Nepal also began supporting the change of China's seat in the United Nations. It was a time when Indo-China relation was began to deteriorate and Nepal had to assert its neutral position in the Sino-Indian dispute. Meantime, China asserted its suzerainty over Tibet. China wanted to know Nepal's

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<sup>19</sup> See Kalpana Daily (editorial), 29 April, 1960 quoted from Sharma, *Nepal's Existence for Survivability*, Kathmandu, 2006.

clear position regarding its move to Tibet and also expressed its concern whether Nepal would tilt towards the US-Nepal-India nexus.

Nepali Congress led government taken neutral position on Sino-India dispute and followed by an official visit by the then Prime Minister B.P. Koirala also helped dissipate China's suspicion particularly whether Nepal will become a part of some kind of US-India-Nepal support to the Tibetan rebels. During the visit of Chinese Prime Minister Zhou En-lai in April 1960 to Kathmandu, he supported Nepal's charting of the line of "an independent policy of neutrality not to join any military bloc, and to carry out firmly the Five Principle of Peaceful Co-existence." He further stated that Chinese government people warmly welcome and fully support this policy of His Majesty Government of Nepal. Such a policy was not only in the interest of Nepal's peaceful development and smooth implementation of its Five Years Plan for economic construction, but also in the interest of the noble cause of preserving solidarity of Asian countries and consolidating world peace."<sup>20</sup>

The Nepali Congress led government neutral position helped to normalize the relations however, the main opposition party in the parliament the Gorakhparishad had very strong anti-China policy. The party representing the feudal and right wing elements of the Ranas, had on several occasions alleged that China violated Nepal's territory, conducted unauthorized survey in some part of the Baitadi district, collected taxes in Humla and Jumla in Karnali Zone. Another development in 1960 when Nepal abstained in the UN resolution on condemning China's behavior in Tibet this had also played an important role in developing the trust between the two countries. After the dissolution of Nepali Congress government in 1960 and King's takeover power, the relations between Nepal and China had taken a new turn. China's interest and its attitude towards the new regime became more positive and accommodative. It was because of King's anti-India attitude and India's criticism on the dissolution of the elected parliament and the government led by Nepali Congress (Sharma 2006).

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<sup>20</sup> See China Today, 5 May 1960 reproduced in A.S. Bhasin (ed.) Documents on Nepal's Relations with India and China, 1949-66, Bombay, Academic book, 1970.



### **3.2.4 Arms agreement with India and national security**

King's regime took full advantages from the growing animosity between India and China in the early 1960s for the consolidation of his political power. Taking this advantage, he had been able to strengthen ties with China and now he was willing to improve relations with India. At the same time, the steady deterioration in Indo-Nepal relations had become quite alarming. King Mahendra made a state visit to India in April 1962 and held series of meetings with Indian leaders including Prime Minister Nehru. Both sides raised their concerns on the issues that had created misunderstanding. These issues included Nepal-China agreement on road construction and Nepali Congress's launching of struggle against the King's coup based in Indian soil. At the end of his visit, King Mahendra stated that Nehru had given a 'convincing assurance that the Government of India would not permit Indian soil to be used as a base for anti-Nepal activities, and that he was now convinced more than before that he will fulfill his promises' (Rastriya Sambad Samity, 23 April 1962).

Despite this positive tone, the relations with India did not improve significantly. However, it was only after the outbreak of Sino-Indian border war, in October 1962, India was ready to make fundamental changes in its Nepal policy and relations started becoming normal. New Delhi's offer of a rapprochement based on acceptance and support of the royal regime therefore, was welcomed by the King. The suspended border trades as well as economic activities were lifted by India and it urged Nepali Congress to suspend its anti-King agitation. Meantime, with the advice of the Indian Government, Nepali Congress suspended their anti-King agitation in India. King Mahendra further tightened his grip in domestic politics by further discrediting the political parties and their leaders.

Nepal and India reached another important understanding on the former's security issue in 1965. It was not made public for a long time, known as the 1965 'secret' Arms Agreement between the two governments was an example of mending ties between Panchayat government of Nepal and post-Nehru government of India. The two government exchanged the letter on this issue on 30 January 1965 where it states that "the request of King Mahendra during his visit to India in August 1963, he had raised the question of the reorganization and modernization of the Nepalese Army.

The Government of India agreed to provide necessary assistance.<sup>21</sup>” The deal was signed against the backdrop of Sino-Indian border war and insurgent activities carried out from Indian soil against autocratic Panchayat system by the Nepali Congress.. It was a secret agreement between the two governments under which India undertook to 'supply arms, ammunition, and equipment for the entire Nepalese Army' (Para 3 of the agreement)<sup>22</sup>. 'The procedure for giving effect to this arrangement shall be worked out by the two governments acting in consultation' (Para 5 of the agreement). However, within another year, Prime Minister, K. N. Bista claimed that '1965 agreement no longer has any validity' (*Rising Nepal* , 25 June 1966). In fact both the governments were hesitant in making this agreement public. For the Indian side, such an understanding with the autocratic regime was difficult to sell to the progressive forces especially to the Nepalese political parties who had been launching struggle against the King's regime. The Nepali side, was also cautious about the negative impact on its relations with China.

The issues of special relations and security between Nepal and India were again brought by the Indian Minister in early June 1969. The then Indian Minister of External Affairs stated during his visit to Kathmandu that 'Nepal and India were bound together by defence relations' (*Gorkhapatra*, 9 June 1969). He further made his remarks by saying that 'India was concerned with the security of Nepal because of the long and open border between the two countries' (Ibid. 10 June 1969). In response to India's reassertion its responsibility for the defence of the Himalayan Kingdom, Prime Minister K.N. Bista called for the withdrawal of the Indian military personnel and wireless operators being stationed in Nepal's northern check-posts who were being stationed there since 1950s to monitor and supervise the Chinese activities in Tibet. Though India argued that removal of the personnel would undermine the security situation of the sensitive zones in the context of growing Chinese activities in Tibet however, Nepal did not heed its pursuance and implemented the decision in 1970 (Gorakha Patra, Kathmandu, 14 July 1971).

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<sup>21</sup> See the exchange of letter between His Majesty Government of Nepal and Government of India on the 1965 'secret' Arms Agreement between Nepal and India, 30 January 1960.

<sup>22</sup> See the text of the Treaty signed on January 30, 1965 in Bhasin 1994 (ed.), "Letters of Exchange between India and Nepal regarding import of Arms by Nepal".

The Sino-India border war fundamentally changed the direction of Indo-Nepal relations. King Mahendra consistently worked on the issue of diversifications of relations with more and more number of countries. He once stated that, 'Nepal, which until a few years ago, was practically unknown to the world, is now gradually acquiring its place in the international field. Gradually, we have attained a situation in which we need not listen to threat, intimidation or flattering from any quarter, and need not manage our country's affairs by looking towards anybody' (*Gorkhapatra*, 17 December 1967).

### **3.3 India – China one upmanship and Nepal's security**

India and China are the two largest and most populous adjacent neighbours of Asia. In the past, both these Asian giants suffered from foreign occupation and humiliation for a long period of time. India got independence after almost 200 years of British occupation in 1947 after a prolonged non-violent struggle led by Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. Two years after in 1949, Communist Party of China captured power in Beijing after two decades of protracted guerrilla war against Japanese occupation earlier and later on with the nationalist Chiang Kai-Shek government. After achieving independence and stability in the domestic front, both these Asian giants began to prioritize and redirect their foreign policy objectives and started to expand their roles and influence in and around them. India an independent country, and yet a middle power tried to fill the vacuum left by the British in the region. It even began to assume the role of leadership, championing the cause of freedom and independence for countries that were still under the yoke of colonial rule. However, around the same time India was asserting its position in regional and global affairs; China became the world's largest Communist Country and also began to assert its historical position in Asia (Khadka 1997).

India's hasty move to conclude Treaties of Peace and Friendship with Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal in 1949 and 1950 were the part of its assertiveness in the neighbourhood. Likewise, China's claim of suzerainty and decision to march People's Liberation Army in Tibet in October 1950 was also its policy to expand its control and influences. These moves added a new and yet complex situation in South Asia for

Nepal which is in the middle of these two giants in Asia. Though until late 1950s and early 1960s, India and China enjoyed a very cordial and close relation with the intimate slogan like 'Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai', after early 1960s bilateral relations between these two giants began to deteriorate and ultimately led to a war in 1962. The confrontational relations between India and China after the war have had a tremendous implication in Asia and particularly in South Asia (Dahal 1997).

Nepal benefited from its strategic location between China and India as the two countries competed for a dominant position in the conduct of its both domestic and foreign affairs. Both countries' paramount concern in Nepal related to security and stability. Nepal shares a 1590 kilometer-long border with India and 1414 kilometers with China. As Dahal argues 'Nepal occupies a pivotal position in the Himalayas located between the central and South Asian regions, a part of Euro-Asian landmass, to use Mackinder's terminology' (Dahal, 1997). To the north of Nepal lies Tibet, the Autonomous Region of China; to the east, west and south are the federal states – Bengal, Bihar, and Uttar Pradesh – of India. Such a position of Nepal forms its geo-strategic setting with regard to the Gangetic belt, an area critically important for India's security and the stability of the heartland, where an enormous share of its human and resources base is concerned. This is the primary reason why India has been striving towards a firmer influence in Nepal for its territorial and political defence in areas that border China, which Indian strategists perceive is the actual rival of India (Ibid). Nepal's geographical location is very important for India's defence. Due to its strategic importance for its defence from China, the British India Government did everything they could to transform Nepal into a friendly buffer state between China and British possessions in India (Jha 1975).

Likewise, Nepal's northern neighbour Tibet, is also a strategically important location for extending China's relations with South Asia. Tibet is regarded as China's trouble spot where a large number of anti-China forces exist. China is sensitive about not allowing Nepali soil to be misused by anti-Tibet or anti-Chinese forces. China's concern is that insecurity and instability in Nepal might strengthen anti-China

elements along its own borders. The Khampa uprising in the 1960s and 1970s<sup>23</sup> was the most sensitive issue for the Chinese (Ray 1983).

India and China are competing regional powers in Asia and their interest regarding Nepal lies in extending their respective sphere of influence and contain the other's including the super power interests. According to Mihaly 'India's foreign policy interest in Nepal is guided by five major objectives; security or strategic, sphere of influence or restriction of super power influence, economic, political and image building (Mihaly 1965). Similarly, China's foreign policy objectives in Nepal are three fold viz., "strategic" i.e. to safeguard its vital strategic interest, "political" i.e., to present itself as a real competitor of and a counterweight against Indian influence, to neutralize or reduce U.S.-Western and Soviet influence in Nepal and to keep Nepal independent and neutral and free from domination from any power, regional or global and "economic" i.e., to support Nepal in its effort to reduce dependence on India and to strengthen economic ties with its Tibetan region and that serve its long term interest of trade and penetration in Nepal (Ibid).

China has basically two strategies in Nepal, first it wants to separate Nepal from India's security system which means encourage Nepal to pursue the independent security and foreign policy. On the other hand, China also wants to wean away from Nepal's dependency on Western countries particularly the US.

In early 1960s, Nepal's policy of equidistance and to isolate itself from increasing democratic influence from the Indian side triggered a range of activities that brought element of competition in Chinese and Indian presence in Nepal. This could be witnessed in foreign aid participation where these countries built a number of infrastructural projects of high strategic significant (Khadka 1997).

For instance, the building of Tribhuban Highway to link plain land of India with Kathmandu by India and Kodari Highway linking the border region of Tibet with Kathmandu by China injected a new sense of security dynamics in Nepal. Table 3.1

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<sup>23</sup> After 14<sup>th</sup> Dalai Lama of Tibet left Lhasa, armed conflict between Tibetan rebellion forces and Chinese army started in Amdo and Kham regions of Tibet and the guerrilla warfare was spread later in other regions including Nepal side of the borders.

and 3.2 presents the roads and highways which India and China have built during this crucial period characterized by confrontation and competition. . Major road projects linking Nepal with the territories of India and China have undoubtedly high strategic values for both countries. 'It is only natural for the Chinese and the Indians to be interested in the roads connecting Nepal with their own territories and also those that make a quick push towards each other's territories' (Shah 1973). The construction of the Lhasa-Kathmandu road by China in the early 1960s was no doubt motivated by strategic consideration. However, as the subsequent developments in Nepal-China relations showed, the road was more of a counter move to the Tribhuban highway, built by India that links Kathmandu with Raxual, a border town in India.

Although building a connecting road between China and Nepal via Khasa was surfaced in mid 1950s however, the agreement was reached only in mid 1960s particularly after India's initiation to build Tribhuban highway and the 1962 Sino-India conflict. It was initially proposed during the time of Tank Prasad Acharya's premiership however China did not give priority at that time. But later when China agreed<sup>24</sup> during the time of B.P. Koirala premiership, the Koirala government was reluctant to construct this road citing the strategic region. Koirala stated his position by saying that "Nepal did not want to build roads for strategic reasons" (The Commoner, 30 April 1960). As Nepal's relations with India began to deteriorate when King Mahendra dismissed the elected government of Prime Minister Koirala and took authority in his own hands. Then King Mahendra convinced that the road needs to be built. He sent his envoy State Minister Dr. Tulsi Giri to visit China and asked him to sign an agreement about the construction of the road (Rose and Khadka 1997). Nepal benefited from its strategic location between China and India. When Nepal's with India was bad, it accepted a strategic road, the Kathmandu-Kodari highway offered by China. Similarly, when there is relations improved India also proposed to a counter strategic roads; the Pokhara – Sunauli highway which was signed in 1964 during the visit of India's External Minister Swarna Singh in Kathmandu in 1964, was to be completed by 1968 (Shah 1973). Both India and China want to expand their area of

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<sup>24</sup> See speech by Prime Minister Chou En-lai at a reception hosted by the Nepalese Chambers of Commerce (Lhasa), Kathmandu, April 26, 1960 cited by Khadka, N. Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy Major Powers and Nepal 1997.

influence in Nepal through providing supports in infrastructures and industrial sectors and building connecting roads have always been their priorities.

**Table III.I**  
**Road Project built with Indian Assistance**

*(Amount in Million IRs)*

S.N.	Project	Length (km)	Completed in	Total costs	Zone
1.	Tribhuban Rajpath	116	1953-59	820.00	Narayani
2.	Siddartha Rajmarg	200	1965-72	225.8	Gandaki, Lumbini
3.	Dakshinkali Road	19	1969	1.95	Bagmati
4.	Kathmandu-	16	1973-75	10.30	Bagmati
5.	Godavari	300	1969-75	417.8	
6.	Mahendra Rajmarg	69	1972-75	10.0	Mechi, Koshi
7.	(eastern sect)	28.2	1975-77	10.8	
8.	Kathmandu-Trishuli	13.5	1983	15.95	Bagmati
9.	Road	310	--	--	
	Hanumannagar-				Sagarmatha
10.	Phatehpur	200	1992	850	
	Hanumannagar-				
	Rajbiraj				Seti, Mahakali
	Mahendra Rajmarg				
	(Butwal-Kohalpur)				
	Kohalpur-Mahakali				
	Road				

*Source: HMG/N, Ministry of Finance, mimeo (undated) and the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu. (Khadka 1997)*

**Table III.II**  
**Chinese aid in Transport Sector (1)**

*(Amount in Million NRs)*

SN	Name of the Project	Length (km)	Year of completion	Zone	Estimated costs
1.	Arniko Highway	104	1963-67	Bagmati	88.8
2.	Arniko Highway	13	--		--
3.	Maintenance	13	1969-71	Bagmati	20.5
4.	Kathmandu-Bhaktapur	174	1965-67	Bagmati,	117.0
5.	Road	60	1976-82	Gandai	344.0
6.	Prithivi Highway (Ktm-	14	1973-75	Gandai,	30.0
7.	Pokhara)	27	1974-77	Narayani	90.0
8.	Gorkha-Narayanghat (2)	--	1973	Bagmati	n.a.
9.	Trolley Bus	73	1987-90	Bagmati	n.a.
	Kathmandu Ring Road			Gandaki,	
	Pokhara-Mustang Road			Dhaulagiry	
	(3)				
	Pokhara Baglung Road				

*In the early 1960s, China had agreed to build the Itahari-Dhalkebar section of the East-West highway (170 km) at an estimated cost of Rs. 18 million, and the Janakpur-Biratnagar portion of that highway (170 km). Nepal asked China to withdraw from these projects under India's pressure. An agreement was also signed in 1975 for the construction of 407 km Pokhara – Surkhet road in west Nepal for an estimated cost of Rs. 800-900 million on February 2, 1975 but has been cancelled.*

- 1) This road includes two sections, Naranghat-Mugling Road (36 km) and Majuwa-Gurkha Road (24 km) both built with Chinese assistance.*
- 2) A survey was conducted in 1973 by the Chinese team and it agreed to provide financial and technical assistance in 1975 for the road. Later in March 1987 for this road, the Pokhara-Baglung sector and finally contract was awarded in March 1987 for this road.*

*source: Ministry of Finance, HMG/N, "Project under Chinese Assistance" (mimeo), Kathmandu. (Khadka 1997).*



Similar actions could be seen in the bilateral aid, trade and the investment front. On the one hand, India extended a liberal trade exchange regime that provided unilateral access to Nepalese products into Indian markets on the other hand, China provided adequate space for widening the traditional economic exchanges in its border areas with Nepal. Interestingly, one finds China seeking to undertake investment and aid projects in the plain land of Nepal which are contiguous to Indian territories. China's interest to undertake aid projects in Terai is basically motivated by its strategic interest. It expressed its interest to help Nepal build the 170 km Biratnagar-Janakpur road in the eastern Terai, which Nepal had to cancel because of India's protest (Gorkhapatra, Kathmandu, 31 March 1965). Likewise, the East-West high way is one area where India and China had competed to provide economic assistance to Nepal. India has been asserting that south of the Siwalik range is a strategically very sensitive area for its defence and any attempt on the part of china to execute its aid projects in this area would be unwarranted. The Para 4 of the annexure to the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship stated "if the Government of Nepal should decide to seek foreign assistance in regards to the development of the natural resources of, or any industrial project in Nepal, the Government of Nepal shall give first preference to the Government or nationals of India, as the case may be, provided that the terms offered by the Government of India or Indian nationals, as the case may be are not less favorable to Nepal than the terms offered by any other Foreign Government or other foreign nationals" (The Treaty of Peace and Friendship, 31 July 1950).

India has been providing economic assistance to Nepal since 1952-53. Until 1965 India was the second largest donor after the United States, and from 1966 to 1980-81 it had been largest donor. Japan took over India from 1982-83 but India has still been providing significant amount of economic aid to Nepal. The table 3.3 shows the total aid Nepal received from the period of 1960 to 1990.

Building connecting roads are the high strategic value for India. By the early 1960s, India had financed a large number of road projects. As stated by one Nepali scholar who observed "It is only natural for Indians and Chinese to be interested in the roads connecting Nepal with their own territories and also those that make a quick push towards each others territories" (Shah 1973). It was not say that donors acted unilaterally in allocating aids for building roads. Obviously, road projects were the

vital prerequisites for Nepal's aspirations for modernization and development. As stated by another Nepali scholar " India anticipated possible entry of major powers, for example, the United States which had made its aid presence earlier than India in areas of vital interests. India made efforts to prevent other donor countries from competing with it on strategically vital areas" (Khadka 1997). It was also stated that as early as 1957, one Nepali paper observed that Indian Advisor in Nepal, G.R. Nayia, was reported that he had submitted a 20 year plan for constructing 5500 miles of roads in Nepal, connecting almost every district headquarters and several other places of hilly districts with each other with an estimated budget of Rs. 750 million" (Commoner Kathmandu, 21 October 1957).

As the relations between Nepal and India turned unfriendly after the dissolution of the elected government and parliament in 1960, Nepal turned toward China. Even though India's relations with Nepal deteriorated, it did not want to withdraw its economic aid commitments to Nepal, for this would have pushed Nepal even more closer to China. In fact as Mihaly pointed out, India 'though disappointed by the military coup of December 1960, it appeared determined to proceed with its aid program. The 1961 agreements in fact broadened the program's scope' (Mihaly 1965). India provided Rs 41 million in aid to Nepal in 1962 but was reduced in the subsequent years until 1965 and sharply increased in the 1970s when China also augmented its support to Nepal. Actually, this was the period Sino-Indian bilateral relations were in the lowest ebb. The 1962 border war broke the bilateral diplomatic relations withdrew the both countries ambassadors. It was only in 1976 the diplomatic relations was reestablished and allowed the residential ambassadors of both India and China to station in both countries capitals.

### **3.3.1 Indian Aid to Nepal**

India offered aid to Nepal in the larger context of its foreign policy objectives i.e., strategic, political and economic. As stated by Muni that 'India backed her political and strategic objectives in Nepal with massive economic aid' (Muni 1971). As stated earlier, India inaugurated its aid programs in Nepal with the construction of two strategically vital projects, the Tribhuban Highway, and the Tribhuwan International airstrip in Kathmandu. Undoubtedly, strategic consideration gained paramount in

India's aid allocation. As Ayoob pointed out that "it may be admitted that economic and strategic considerations may have coincided in India's calculations in undertaking various projects in Nepal" (Ayoob 1970). As Muni mentioned, during the Nehru years, the South Asian region was considered mainly the multilateral strategic community which was a group of countries in a region having broadly shared and mutually coordinated security, strategic and foreign policy interests' (Muni 1979). Furthermore, he said that 'India's approach to the social and economic issues in the region was subordinate to the main goal of evolving a multilateral strategic community', and 'India's economic assistance to Bhutan, Nepal, Sikkim, and Bangladesh was mainly geared to protect and nurse security and strategic interests as perceived by the leaders of India' (Ibid).

**Table III.III**  
**India's Share in Bilateral Aid from 1960 to 1990**

*(Amount in NRs million)*

Year	Total Bilateral Aid	Total Indian Aid	India's Share (%)
1960	93.2	18.5	19.8
1961	137.1	22.3	16.3
1962	186.4	40.9	21.9
1963	97.5	13.6	13.9
1964	180.0	34.0	18.8
1965	198.5	62.4	31.4
1966	181.0	93.0	51.4
1967	151.9	78.9	51.9
1968	162.5	97.9	60.2
1969	221.2	140.4	63.4
1970	251.2	125.9	43.8
1971	287.2	105.6	41.2
1972	256.2	88.0	35.7
1973	192.6	126.4	51.1
1974	247.4	117.8	42.6
1975	276.5	103.9	31.4
1976	330.7	117.6	31.7
1977	370.9	117.8	25.8
1978	456.7	121.4	22.5

1980	538.8	182.9	21.6
1981	846.4	213.7	24.9
1982	858.1	241.7	26.5
1983	909.5	239.8	25.3
1984	947.2	210.8	21.4
1985	983.2	156.3	13.5
1986	1156.3	300.4	20.3
1987	1078.4	196.5	11.5
1988	2261.6	285.6	12.6
1989	1707.7	196.5	11.5
1990	2553.9	166.6	6.5

Sources: HMG/N, *Economic Survey (various issues)*, HMG/N, *Ministry of Finance, Budget in Nepal (1951/52-1981-82)* Indian Embassy Information Handout and other secondary sources (Khadka 1997)<sup>25</sup>.

**Table III.IV**  
**Sectoral Distribution of Indian Aid**  
**(Up to 1969 and up to 1990)**  
**(Amount in million Rs. Indians)**

S.N.	Sector	Up to 1969 (a)	%	Up to 1989	%
1.	Roads and Airports	258	43.1	1566	56.5
2.	Irrigation and Power	222	37.1	765	27.6
3.	Agriculture and Allied	9	1.5	11	0.4
4.	Community Development	30	5.0	213	7.7
5.	Education and Health (b)	6	1.0	-	-
6.	Industry	4	0.6	33	1.2
7.	Postal and Telecom	4	0.6	19	0.7
8.	Technical & Special Asst.	66	11.0	164	5.9
	Total	599	100	2771	100

a) These figures pertain to March 31, 1969.

b) Breakdown of education and health is not available for figure up to 1989.

Sources: Computed from the information obtained from the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu (Khadka 1997).

<sup>25</sup> India has been disbursing aid to Nepal in a large number of areas, possibly in almost every sector of the economy however the major source of bilateral assistance from India is road projects initiated with the first motor road project linking Kathmandu with India and continuing up to the present day for detail see table no. 3.1.

Besides the road projects, India has also supported in other areas such as water resources, agricultures etc. The Koshi Agreement Project on 25 April 1954 was the first such kind of agreement where India took the financing of the project. However, immediately after its signing, the project has generated controversies and it has been argued that Nepal has not gained much from the projects only Indian side has benefited from it. Basically, it was argued that the dam which was built at the border between Nepal and India and the Indian land gets irrigated from the most of the water than from Nepali land. Likewise, it was basically controlled the floods in Indian side than to Nepali. The dams and its storage system are controlled by India and whenever they felt that the river flow is threatening to Indian side, they do operate accordingly without caring the effects Nepali side. Therefore, almost every year, Nepali land specially the low land around the river of Nepal side gets inundated and destroys lives and properties.

Similarly, in December, 1959 another agreement was signed with India, the Gandak Project Agreement to harness the Gandak river. The benefits like generated power share of both of these projects were nominal for Nepal . Similarly, India's aid contribution in social sectors such as health, education, drinking water etc. has been of great use for an underdeveloped economy like that of Nepal. . India's aid for industrial and agricultural sectors has also beneficial. They have contributed to industrial development in Nepal. Since 1990s, India has shifted its policy and also diversified its aid policy towards Nepal. Indian Economic Cooperation was diversified to focus on grassroots projects in 1990s. According to the data obtained from the Ministry of Finance, GoN that in January 2002 Prime Minister of India, Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee committed INRs 50 crore (NRs 80 crore) for executing Small Development Projects (costing up to NRs. 3 crore later the cost will make to go up to NRs. 50 million) in the sector of education, health and community development. As agreement was signed between GOI and GON on November 7, 2003 to facilitate implementation of “Small Development Projects Scheme” for a period of two years, and this agreement was renewed on June 29, 2006 and again in August 2008. According to the data till Dec 2010, total value of projects undertaken under the India-Nepal Economic Council Cooperation since 2003 works out to NRs 1747 crore on large projects and NRs 433

crore on small and intermediate projects.<sup>26</sup> The Small and Intermediate Development Projects that includes gifting Ambulances, Buses, Medical Equipments, Scientific Instruments etc.

Following major projects that were initiated after 1990 and recently completed and also some ongoing are:

1. East-West Optical Fibre Cable Project, MoU was signed in 2002 and completed 2006 and the total cost of the project is NRs 274.8 crore.
2. Construction of 22 Bridges on Kohalpur-Mahakali secot on East-West highway completed in 2002. Cost of the bridge construction is not available.
3. Construction of B.P. Koirala Institute of Health and Sciences, Dharan, MoU was signed March 1994 and completed in 2001 and the total cost is NRs 192 crore.
4. Establishment of 200 bed Emergency and Trauma Centre at Bir Hospital, MoU was signed in July 2003 and completed by 2009 and cost is n.a.
5. Establishment of Nepal-Bharat Maitri Bakhtawari Hari Eye Hospital at Krishnanagar, Kapilwastu, MoU was signed in April 2007, cost is n.a.
6. Establishment of Manamohan Memorial Polytechnic at Biratnagar, MoU was signed in June 2003 and the total cost is NRs 48 crore.
7. Establishment of a Polytechnic at Hetauda, date of MoU signed n.a. the total cost is NRs 35.2 crore.
8. Nepal-Bharat Maitri Bidyalaya, Pokhara, MoU was signed in June 2006, cost of project is not available.
9. Development of 22 farmers managed deep tube well irrigation systems in Jhapa, Sunsari, Saptari and Siraha, MoU was signed in January 2004, cost of project is NRs. 7.39 crore.
10. Establishment of Science Learning Center in Kathmandu, MoU was signed in 2002, the cost of project is NRs. 16 Crore.
11. Construction of Dharmashala at Pashupati Temple, Kathmandu, MoU was signed in March 2004, the cost of project is NRs. 12.27 crore.

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<sup>26</sup> Data obtained from Nepal A Profile of Development Partners, Foreign Aid Cordination Division, Ministry of Finance, Government of Nepal 2011.

12. Integrated Border Checkposts; at Birgunj, Bhairahawa, Nepalgunj and Biratnagar, the MoU signed was in August 2005, estimated cost of is NRs. 440 crore.
13. Terai Road Projects including 1445 km roads in the border region and bridges, MoU was signed in June 2006, the estimated cost of the project is 1248 crore.
14. Mahendranagar-Tanakpur Link Road; MoU was signed in January 2003, estimated cost is NRs. 54 crore.
15. Rail Links; Jogbani India to Biratnagar, Jayanagar, India to Bijalpura, Nepalgunj Road, India to Nepalgunj, Nautanwa, India to Bhairahawa, New Jalpaiguri, India to Kakarbhitta, MoU was signed in August 2008, estimated cost for total projects is 2,137.6 crore.
16. Development of 1000 shallow tube wells in Dhanush and Mahottari, MoU was signed in April 2008, estimated cost NRs. 8.87 crore.
17. Auditorium at Lalitpur, MoU signed date n.a., estimated cost is NRs 15 crore.
18. Irrigation Projects (Saptakoshi hydro, Marginal construction of embankment of Lalbakeya river, marginal construction of embankments of Bagmati river, marginal embankments of Kamla and Khando rivers.
19. Scholarships: both Mahatma Gandhi and Golden Jubilee Scholarships schemes were doubled since 2006.

India has increased its economic aids to Nepal significantly in the recent years. In terms of volume and also areas, India's economic assistance has gone up since the past decade. The growing India's economic development has been reflected its supports towards its neighbours including its support to Nepal. Meantime, India has also diversified its aid programs to Nepal. "India aid has been directed towards a very wide range of programs" (Blaki 1979). As stated in the above mentioned lists, India has expanded its assistance in the rural areas particularly in the areas of education, health, drinking water, village roads focusing on grassroots people since 2003 as the Small Scale Project Scheme. The large scale projects are also being carried out in the Terai region such as East-West Terai roads, Integrated Check-posts, Railway links, Shallow Tube Wells are some of it. India offered aid to Nepal in the larger context of its foreign policy i.e. strategic, political and economic. One Indian scholar stated that "India backed her political and strategic objectives in Nepal with massive economic aid."(Muni 1979). India and China's policy toward Nepal have been guided by

strategic, political and economic interests. All their support and assistances were guided by these basic objectives of both countries. India's interest in Nepal has also been to bring Nepal under its own security umbrella and maintain the arrangements made by the Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1950. India has been extending assistance and investment in Nepal in strategically vital areas. Since, last five years due to the emergence of Terai based political movement, Indian assistance has been concentrated mainly in the Terai region where it shares open borders with Nepal and also mainly the Indian ethnic groups are based there.

Its assistance are directed to education, construction, roads, hospital equipments, drinking water etc. It has also started to upgrade the infrastructures at the border entry points mainly the five major entry points in both Indian and Nepali side are being upgraded with spending of large amount of money. The east-west Hulaki road which is being built in the borders of two countries, the ongoing up gradation of border checkpoints in Birgunj, Bhairawa, Nepalgunj and Biratnagar, extension of broad gauge railway system from Janakpur to Bardibas to Birgunj, construction of Nepal India City Hall in Birgunj, numerous projects on school and college buildings, drinking water etc.

Meantime, India has also expressed its willingness to extend its railway line up to Kathmandu from its border city of Raxual.

***India's willingness to harness Nepal's water resource:*** Another area, India sees its vital interest in area of water resources. As Nepal has huge potentiality of generating hydropower and irrigation facility. India wants to harness this strategically vital resource. and India have signed number of agreements including Koshi in 1954, Gandak in 1959 and Mahakali in 1996 in this area and implemented some of them. Many more such projects are being discussed between the two countries. The government owned Indian Power Trading Corporation has been actively involved in organizing Power Summit since 2006 together with some Nepalese organizations. The PTC has been providing guidance to the Indian investors in power sectors. According to Nepal magazine, PTC has been suggesting to Nepal that if it produces 10,000 MW power by 2020 and export it to India, it would earn Rs 110 billion annually (*Nepal Weekly*, 23 September 2007). The Government of Nepal has opened a bid for three major power projects; Budhi Gandaki - 600 MW, Upper Karnali - 300 MW, and Arun



3 – 402 MW, and about one and half dozens Indian companies are bidding for these three projects (Ibid). This shows the India's interest on Nepal's water resource and its importance for its economic development. The Indian Strategic interest and harnessing water resource consideration were the main factor for India's aid interest in Nepal.

### 3.3.2 Chinese Aid to Nepal

Like wise China started extending aid to Nepal in 1956. It was during Nepal's PM T.P. Acharya's visit that China had 'agreed to give aid to help Nepal for its first five year plan' (Khadka 1997). "Under this support, China agreed to provide 60 million Indian rupees of aid in the next three years to help Nepal for its first five year plan" (Bhasin 1949-66). PM Acharya announced in his press conference in Peking that the Chinese aid had no condition attached and China would not "send any technical personnel to Nepal. The Aid was in the form of money and material and was completely at the disposal of Nepalese government and the Chinese would not interfere (Ibid)

Since then China's economic assistance to Nepal began to grow. As Table 3.4 shows that the aid which had steadily grown in the 1960s and 70s started waning during the 1980s. The reason behind this could be the changed of government's policy after the modernization drive started in 1978<sup>27</sup>. A significant feature of Chinese aid was that it avoided any ideological biases in its allocation of aid. Chinese aid to Nepali Congress governments in 1960 and after 1990 were the examples of its intention to create an impression of ideological neutrality<sup>28</sup>. Similarly, it had maintained one of the major donors during the party-less Panchayat regime. Its support did not increase significantly however, it had maintained regular annual grants during those periods.

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<sup>27</sup> The foreign aid data shows that China reduced its foreign aid volume after it adopted open economic policy not only in Nepal but also in other countries for detail see a weekly magazine of Chinese News and Views, Peking, March 29, 1960 and also cited by Khadka, Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy: Major Powers and Nepal, Vikas Publishing House, 1997.

<sup>28</sup> During the period of Cultural Revolution under the leadership of Mao Tse-Tung, China attached great importance on ideological issue to counter the Soviet Union influence, however after rise of Deng Xiao Ping, China abandoned the previous policy and started to adopt neutrality more on Chinese nation's interest than to its ideology. It had stopped its military and economic supports to numbers of Communist Parties in Asia such as in Burma, Malaya, Thailand, Philippines and many parties in Africa except support to Khmer Rouge in Cambodia.

However, unlike India, Chinese aid has not been increasing from year to year. Table 3.4 presents the pattern of Chinese aid between 1961 to 1990 and show that aid fluctuated between 158 million in 1983 and 3.2 million in 1962.

China accorded special in its aid allocation to Nepal because 'Nepal is the only county to whom China gives assistance and had adopted the same policy even after the democratic change in the spring of 1990s in Nepal' (Ibid). After adaptation of open door economic policy in 1978, China drastically reduced its economic aid policy and focus was given to the domestic economic development and reduction of poverty. Despite the changed of its aid policy, particularly reduction of economic assistance to other countries. Singling out Nepal from its general policy shows China's concern on Nepal and its geo-strategic vitality. It can be attributed to its firm believe in using economic aid as a flexible and effective diplomatic weapon to counter both India and western countries' influence in Nepal. According to Khadka, 'with regards to China's aid objectives in Nepal, it apparently had pursued two sets of objectives. The first objective was was linking aid to Nepal with maintaining traditional trade ties with Tibet, specially in the 1950s and 1960s. The second objective was to introduce its modern goods into Nepali market as a component of its global endeavour for stimulating trade with aid and facilitating its national development an objective that has dominated Chinese economic policy since 1978' (Khadka 1997).

The first "Agreement between China and Nepal on Economic Aid" was signed in October 1956. Ever since then, China has been providing financial and technical assistance to Nepal especially in infrastructure building, establishment of industries, human resource development, health, sports, etc. The total volume of China's assistance in 2009 is about 150 million RMB, including 10 million RMB allocated for the human resources training projects agreed upon the two Governments.

**Table III.V**  
**Chinese Aid to Nepal (1961 to 1990)<sup>29</sup>**

*(In million NRs.)*

Year	Total Bilateral Aid	Chinese Aid	China's Share %
1961	137.1	0	0
1962	186.4	14.8	7.9
1963	97.5	3.2	3.3
1964	180.0	14.7	8.2
1965	198.5	27.1	13.6
1966	181.0	16.2	9.0
1967	151.9	24.6	16.2
1968	162.5	26.1	16.1
1969	221.2	37.6	17.0
1970	251.2	48.5	19.3
1971	287.2	47.2	16.4
1972	256.2	53.2	20.7
1973	192.6	24.3	12.6
1974	247.4	33.6	13.6
1975	276.5	52.2	18.9
1976	330.7	49.4	14.9
1977	370.9	105.9	28.5
1978	456.7	76.2	16.7
1979	538.8	40.3	7.5
1980	846.4	35.9	4.2
1981	858.1	50.5	5.9
1982	909.5	25.4	2.8
1983	947.2	18.1	1.7
1984	983.2	124.8	12.7
1985	1156.3	96.7	8.3
1986	1078.4	42.4	2.8
1987	2261.6	118.0	10.9
1988	1707.7	72.0	3.2
1989	2553.9	0	0
1990		0	0

*Source: Aid figures are from HMG/N, Economic Survey, various issues, Ministry of Finance, source book on aid, and Nepal Rastra Bank documents (Khadka 1997).*

<sup>29</sup> The aids under this category are mainly the directly provided economic grants to the central government which partially included some of the road projects such as Pokhara-Baglung and Kathmandu Ring road.

**Table III.VI**  
**Chinese Aid to Nepal (1990 to 2009)**

*(In million RMB)*

Year	Description	Amount in Million	Remarks
1992	B.P. Koirala Memorial Cancer Hospital	n.a.	Agreement
1993	11 persons training in China (BICC)	n.a.	Agreement
1994		n.a.	
1995	Grant assistance	80	Agreement
1995	BICC	115	Agreement
1996	Grant assistance	80	Agreement
1997	Grant assistance	30	Agreement
1998	Grant assistance	30	Agreement
1998	Nepal Television	50	Agreement
1999	Nepal Television	80	Agreement
2000	Grant assistance	30	Agreement
2000	Grant assistance	50	Agreement
2001	Grant assistance	80	Agreement
2002	Mobile vehicle/container inspection system	80	Agreement
2003	Grant assistance	80	Agreement
2004	Grant assistance	50	Agreement
2005	Grant assistance	100	Agreement
2006	Grant assistance	100	Agreement
2007	Grant assistance	100	Agreement
2008	Grant assistance	100	Agreement
2009	Grant assistance	150	Agreement

*Source: Nepal: A Profile of Development Partners, Ministry of Finance, Government of Nepal 2011.*

Following lists show China's sector wise economic supports in Nepal's economic development.

### **Past Economic Cooperation**

#### **Road and Transport**

1. Arniko Highway
2. Arniko Highway (Rehabilitation)
3. Kathmandu Bhaktapur Road
4. Prithvi Highway and Surface Pitch Paving
5. Narayanghat-Mugling Road
6. Gorkha Narayanghat Road
7. Kathmandu-Bhaktapur Trolley Bus
8. Kathmandu Ring Road
9. Pokhara-Baglung Road
10. Seti River Bridge at Pokhara

#### **Industries**

1. Bansbari Leather and Shoes Factory
2. Hetauda Cotton Textile Mills
3. Harisidhi Brick Factory
4. Bhaktapur Brick Factory
5. Industrial Gloves and Apron Manufacturing at Bansbari
6. Bhrikuti Paper Mills
7. Lumbini Sugar Mills

#### **Water Resources**

1. Sunkoshi Hydroelectricity Plant
2. Pokhara Water Conservancy and Irrigation Project (Multipurpose)
3. Sunkoshi Vicinity Electricity Transmission Project
4. Sunkoshi-Kathmandu Electricity Line Transmission Project

#### **Health**

- 1) B.P. Koirala Memorial Cancer Hospital, Bharatpur.
- 2) Civil Service Hospital

### Sports

1. Sports Complex at Kathmandu and Lalitpur
2. Construction of Sports Facilities for the 8th South Asian Federation Games in 1999 (Swimming pool, shooting gymnasium, plastic-runway, floodlight, electric-score board, and various sport equipment etc.)
3. Repair of Lighting System in the Sports Complex

### Other Construction Projects

1. National Trading Complex
2. Warehouse at Kathmandu and Birgunj
3. City Hall in Kathmandu.
4. Birendra International Convention Centre
5. Consolidating Seti River Bridge in Pokhara
6. A three-month arch bridge training course for 15 Nepalese engineers
7. Pokhara Sedimentation Pond
8. Provision for one set of the Television rebroadcast for NTV
9. Mobile X-ray Machine for Birgunj Dry Port
10. Nepal Television Metro Channel Station Expansion and Improvement
11. Polytechnic Institute in Banepa
12. Air-cargo inspection system in Tribhuvan International Airport
13. Khasa-Kathmandu Optical Fiber Project
14. National Trust for Nature Conservation Research Centre
15. Tube-Well and Water Treatment Plant of Civil Service Hospital
16. Clean Vehicles and Equipments to Kathmandu Metropolitan City

### China On-going projects

1. Syafrubeshi – Rasuwagari Road ( 16km) to be completed in 2012
2. National Ayurvedic centre completed
3. Food Assistance in Northern 10 bordering Districts RMB 3 million each year for five years

### China Pipeline

1. Upper Trishuli 3 A hydropower (30 MW) ( approx. 120 million) EXIM Loan Agreement completed for plant, line agreement is waiting to be done.
2. Ring Road Improvement with three flyover bridges – Grant – Team coming
3. Tatopani Customs Infrastructure Improvement (Grant) Agreement done.
4. Pokhara Regional International Airport ( \$ 175 million)- EXIM Bank) pipeline
5. Upper Modi Hydropower ( 14 MW) Grant- pipeline

### Miscellaneous

#### 1 Technical Training and Refresher Courses

In order to promote and exchange the advanced experiences in management and of various fields technologies, the government of China provided various refresher courses and training courses- multilateral training and bilateral trainings.

#### 2 Scholarship

About 100 Nepali students enjoy the chances to study in China under the scholarship supported by the Government of China every year.

#### 3 Chinese Volunteer Teachers Project

China will dispatch about 50 volunteer teachers in 2010 to teach Chinese in schools of Nepal.

#### 4 Medical Team Project

The sixth Chinese medical team (consists 17 members) is now working in B. P. Koirala Memorial Cancer Hospital in Chitwan.

**Table No. III.VII**

**Trade statistic between Nepal and China via Tatopani corridor**

Year	Import	Export
2006/7	4826.5	327.6
2007/8	4980.2	579
2008/9	8956.4	767.5

*Source: Custom Dept. and Economic Survey of Ministry of Finance, Government of Nepal 2009.*

In order to reduce Nepal's dependence on India and at the same time strengthen its economic links with Nepal, China helped Nepal establish various import substituting type of industries. These are also the industries in which China has developed expertise and technical know-how such as establishment of Banshari Leather Industry, Birgunj Agriculture Tools Production Industry etc.

China has also helped to establish a variety of consumer goods industries like sugar, paper, leather etc. China began to assist Nepal in establishing industries since 1961-62. The various import substituting and domestic resources based industries are present in the list above.

The strategic interest occupies the main objective of China's interest in Nepal too. To minimize any strategic threats to Tibet has always been the major factor for China. Its major concern has been to see that no powers engage themselves in destabilizing Tibet and in supporting anti-China activities in Nepal. Furthermore, during the Cold War time, China aimed to counter Indian and Soviet influences in Nepal and expand its own area of influence. China's another interest in Nepal is to strengthen its presence. As a a rising power it wants to strengthen and expand its presence in Nepal through which it can connect with India as well as with whole of South Asian region. In this strategic link roads and other connectivity have been used by China as a crucial instrument. Currently, it has been building a connection road at Rasuwa district via Ganesh Himal from Tibetan Autonomous Region. It is reported that it is also planning to construct a road at Dhankuta-Sangkuwasabha (Koshi Rajmarg) and also Baglung-



Mustang road in Dhaulagiri zone (Kantipur Daily, 15 October 2004)<sup>30</sup>. Similarly, China is willing to extend its Quinhai-Lhasa railway up to Nepal's borders (Kathmandu Post, 25 September 2007)<sup>31</sup>.

Increasing connectivity through roads and rail links are the examples of the strategic consideration in China's aid allocation to Nepal. Besides road projects, China has also been steadily increasing its annual grants scheme to Nepal since last decades. As stated by Khadka, Chinese continuing interest in providing aid can be attributed to its firm belief in using economic aid as a flexible and effective diplomatic weapons to counter India's and US influence as well as their aid in Nepal (Khadka 1997). China's another major motivational factor in continuously supplying aid to Nepal is the latter's unwavering support for one China policy and on Tibetan issue. The growing economic development has also reflected its steady increment of aids.

Both India and China's increasing roads connectivity and also their support in infrastructural projects have contributed significantly for the overall economic development and job creation in Nepal. Moreover, the increasing economic cooperation from both of our neighbours has also increasingly diluted the threat perceptions against our neighbours and also increasing cooperation between them within Nepal. However, the growing connectivity and accessibility with them has also triggered many of the new threats that also needs to be identified and examined.

### **3.4 Changing security threat perceptions of Nepal**

The perception of security threat in Nepal has been changing since the last two decades.

Both the external development and Nepal's internally evolved situation have contributed in shifting the threats perception. The external changing environments including the processes of globalizations and inter-connectivity and the internal political dynamism that have evolved in the region as well as in the domestic front have broadened the traditional mindset of the threat perceptions. Meanwhile, the normalization of Sino-Indian relations is another development that has also added to

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<sup>30</sup> Kantipur Daily, Kathmandu, 15 October 2004.

<sup>31</sup> The Kathmandu Post, Kathmandu, 25 September 2007.

this changing perception. . The end of 30 years of authoritarian rule and the establishment of democratic and plural system in 1990s further provided the democratic space to the people to raise their voices and aspirations. The issues of poverty, backwardness, violation of human rights, social discriminations and marginalization, isolation, issue of migration, refugees have surfaced in a noticeable manner and the democratic state has to respond to all these issues.

#### **3.4.1 Changing external atmosphere**

The end of bipolar world markedly shifted the dominant state-centric and militarist security threat perceptions at the global level and broadened the security beyond the state centric framework to the human centric concept. The mighty Soviet Union which possessed huge amount of the nuclear war heads and other high-tech ammunitions collapsed. Similar situations have been witnessed in the Eastern European countries. Both these events have discredited the realists' views of security and contributed in changing the discourse about the security perceptions. At the same time one could witness the events in Somalia in the 1991-92 and the Rwandan massacre in 1994 where more than a million people were killed due to the ethnic clashes and massacres. This brought a new dimension to security issue. The breakdown of the USSR drove home the point that the military might alone cannot be a sole factor for saving nation-state's integration and sovereignty. It has opened up and broadened the security discourse (Dalby 2010).

Likewise, the normalization of Sino-India relations in the 1990s also added in Nepal's changing the dominant views on security which was earlier very much dominated by the direct threat from India and China to Nepal's territorial integrity and its sovereignty.. The Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's China visit in 1988 has been regarded as the breakthrough in the process of normalization of two countries relations after a long chill. The normalization of the relations has deepened the economic interactions between China and India. Bilateral trade and economic investment has increased significantly. Currently, the two countries bilateral trade increased from US\$ 265 million in 1991 to US\$ 13.8 billion in 2004 (Mukharjee

2005).<sup>32</sup>India China bilateral trade stood at \$ 51 billion in fiscal year 2009 up from \$ 15 billion in 2005. Bilateral trade is likely to touch \$ 60 billion this year (Datt 2010). According to Dutt, 'trade is badly skewed with a trade surplus of \$ 24 billion in China's favour this year in 2010' (Ibid). India is selling raw materials such as iron ore while rising exports of Chinese power and other equipment add value to the manufacturing sector struggling with falling demand in recession-hit developed economies and create badly needed jobs in China. Likewise, India has become the biggest overseas market for Chinese companies undertaking contract projects. In the year 2009, Chinese companies awarded contracts worth \$ 12 billion for various construction projects in India (Ibid). It is expected that China, currently growing at over 9% and India 8% per annum, would emerge as the top economies of the world by 2030. It is predicted to have the largest gross domestic product in another two decades, they could dramatically change international trade equation now dominated by the US and Europe (Aiyar 2007).

India and China are the two closest neighbours who share over 4000 miles [of borders and they need peace in their border zones. Therefore, maintaining stability and peace in their borders is not only their desire but also a strong basis for both countries' interests to get prosperous and powerful. Any disturbances on each side would have spill over impacts in both countries. Similarly, both countries have been taking various steps in promotion of the bilateral relations. India's adoption of Look East Policy, acceptance of reopening the Nathu la trade route with Tibet and China's expansion of railway link to Lhasa as well as plan to extend it to the border of Nepal are some developments that show that both countries are ready to further enhance their bilateral relations (Pandey 2004).

Investigating the last three decades of foreign policy of China, Suisheng Zhao concludes that 'if the Chinese decision-makers' expectations for future trade are high, they will be less likely to use force to deal with unresolved disputes with neighboring countries. China's expectations of foreign trade are by and large optimistic' (Zhao 2004).

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<sup>32</sup> See Mukharjee, I. N. (2005), "India - China Trade" (unpublished article), Jawaharlal Nehru University, School of International Studies, New Delhi

Similarly, India after its liberalization policy in 1990s by adopting the liberal economic started to emphasize on economy and development in the making of foreign policy than the politics which it used to prioritize in the past. According to Raja Mohan, 'India's foreign policy was transformed from idealism to pragmatism in the 1990s. India now is seeking foreign direct investment and access to markets in the developed world. Trade not aid, would be the national priority. India also recognized the basic truth that its claim to great power status could no longer be sustained without rapid advances on the economic front' (Raja Mohan 2004).

What are the implications of the Sino-India rapprochement on the smaller neighbouring countries like Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Myanmar are a very vital question? Matrices of their relations with these small neighbours were framed when two countries were in competitive mode both in terms of strategic reach and geo-political influences. What are new frame works that the two countries are adopting in terms of their relations with the neighbouring countries in the changed context? These are striking questions today in the region particularly to the small states of the region (Dahal 2008). It is argued time and again that the overlapping spheres of influence sought by India and China in South and South-East Asia has been fundamental source of tension between the two Asian giants, each with its own exalted sense of its place in the world and Asia. While India believes that the subcontinent and its environs are its natural security zone, China believes it cannot let India exercise dominance on its southern borders (Graver 2003). Other scholars argue that ideological differences as well as the territorial disputes have become less important than the economic issues in the foreign relations. Therefore, the economic interests of both these countries will now be a critical factor in shaping their ties with the small neighbouring countries.

'Gujral Doctrine' initiated in in the mid 90s by the Indian Prime Minister I. K. Gujral was one of the steps taken towards changing traditional approaches and policies towards the neighbours. Similarly, China has revitalised its neighbourhood policy in the last decades by introducing a "Comprehensive Periphery Policy" which means to have an integrated regional policy with the neighbouring countries. The growing uneasiness with the neighbourhood - military intervention in Sri Lanka and the trade blockade of Nepal – in the late 1980s demanded a new approach from New Delhi

towards its neighbours. Former Prime Minister of India, Indra Kumar Gujral initiated new approaches after realising the gravity of the situation in the region. Basically he offered non-reciprocity policy towards its neighbours. As he first outlined it in a speech at Chatham House in London in September 1996 that 'United Front Government's neighbourhood policy now stands on five basic principles, firstly, with neighbours like Nepal, Bangladesh, Butan, Maldives and Sri Lanka, India does not ask for reciprocity but gives all it can in good faith and trust. Secondly, no South Asian country will allow its territory to be used against the interest of another of the region. Thirdly, non will interfere in the internal affairs of another. Fourthly, all South Asian countries must respect each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty. And fifthly, they will settle all their disputes through peaceful bilateral negotiations' (Gujral 1998).

As Zhou states that 'Beijing's periphery policy was aimed at exploring the common ground with Asian countries in both economic and security arenas by conveying the image of responsible power willing to contribute to stability and cooperation in the region (Zhao 2007). Unlike in the past, the Chinese government has also been cautiously expanding its political influence in the subcontinent without harming the growing amity with India. As states by Lavin 'in the past China's ambiguous position in the region more than merely a regional actor but still less than a global power which left China in an uncertain relationship with its neighbouring countries (Levin 1998). The peaceful rise of China and its policy of creating harmonious relations with its neighbours is the main objective of its foreign policy in recent decades. The long-term peace and stability in the region is the basic requirement for maintaining its continuous rise and development that Chinese policy makers realize today (Zhao 2004). It is important to note that Beijing's good neighbouring policy was closely related with its reform minded leaders' objectives of economic modernisation. In order to achieve high rate of economic growth, these leaders looked for the common ground in cooperation with neighbouring countries in order to take a share of the rapid economic growth in the region. This economic motivation was very influential in guiding China's periphery policy evident in their attempt to make diplomacy serving domestic construction after the inception of market-oriented economic reform (Huaqiu 2008).

*Setting up Confucius and China Study Centres:* Aiming to promote the Chinese culture, languages and enhance cooperation between China and Nepal, a Confucius Institute in Kathmandu University has been established in with the support provided by the Department of Education of Hubei and the University of Hubei. It was the first such institute Nepal which offers higher degree course exclusively about Chinese culture, languages and enhance cultural exchanges and promote multicultural exchanges (Xinhua 14 June 2008). Highlighting the objectives of the institution, Mr. Zhai Haihun said that “the University should not only inherit and develop the excellence traditional national culture but also commits itself to the communication and exchanges between different cultures and promote the prosperity and development of human civilization” (Ibid). The Confucius Institute is a new form for the Chinese University including Hebei University Economics and Business to promote Chinese language and culture to boost cultural exchanges between China and other countries and enhance the understanding between different cultures.

The President of Hebei University of Economics and Business, Ms.Wang Ying, pointed out that in the increasingly tight economic and cultural ties between China and the world, the most direct obstacle is not the geography ,transport and technology, but the language and cultural barrier. She said that the Confucius Institute is an international network of Chinese language learning center base, an important platform for the continuous deepening of educational cooperation and exchange between China and other countries, and a bridge to span economic and cultural exchanges for China with the world."We will together with Kathmandu University, through multilevel, all-round cooperation and exchanges such as Chinese language training, Chinese teacher training, Chinese speech contests, co-development of teaching material and Courseware, Chinese language teaching seminars, strive to make Confucius Institute become an advanced Chinese teaching base in Nepal and an important channel for Sino-Nepalese exchanges." (Xinhua News Agency 16 June 2011).

China Studies Centre was also established in 2000 in Kathmandu and expanded its branches in many districts of the country. According to the report obtained from CSC in Kathmandu, they have expanded the branches up to now 25 in major cities in outside Nepal. According to the Chairman of CSC, the main aim of the Centre is to play an effective role strengthening the relationship between Nepal and China where

people from diverse background including diplomats, sociologists, medical doctors, social activists are the members.<sup>33</sup> The central office of CSC organises seminars, workshops, hosts the visits of the Chinese academicians and also exchanges of visits, publishes books and bulletins on regular basis.

To promote the Chinese language and its cultures, China has introduced sending volunteers since 2004 to other countries as the ‘Program of International Overseas Volunteer Chinese Language Teachers’ known as Overseas Volunteer Program. As stated its introduction “the mission of is the recruitment of qualified citizens to volunteer as Chinese language teachers in order to improve foreigners’ understanding of Chinese language and culture and strengthen the exchange and friendship between the Chinese and people of other countries at the same time”.<sup>34</sup>

The Overseas Volunteer Program is operated by organisation called ‘Hanban’. Education offices of Chinese embassies in foreign countries are commissioned by Hanban to instruct authorised organisation in charge of recruiting, screening training and employing of overseas volunteers signing contracts, consultations and outlay payment and routine administrative works. As stated in its introductory chapter, any genuine citizens who has completed his/her bachelor degree can apply to the Hanban organisation. Currently in Nepal, there are around 22 volunteers working as language teachers in different schools in various parts of Nepal. These volunteers who are working in Nepal most of the time teaches at their assigned schools but in many occasion they also take part cultural programs organised by the embassy in Kathmandu and other organisations like Araniko Samaj, Nepal China Friendship Organisation etc.

### **3.4.2 Growing India-China proximity**

The strategic setting of Nepal has attracted the attention of the region. Whatever happens inside Nepal is of major importance for its immediate neighbours. Because Nepal shares open border with India and also with China’s autonomous region of

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<sup>33</sup> Interview with the Chairman of the CSC at CSC central office at Dillibazar in Kathmandu on 24 May 2011.

<sup>34</sup> Excerpt from the statement obtained at the Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu website (URL web) Accessed on 28 May 2011, <http://np.china-embassy.org/eng/>

Tibet. China and India's paramount concern in Nepal is related to security and stability. Any disturbances in Nepal would have spill over impacts on both countries. Similarly, both countries are competing regional powers in Asia and their interest regarding Nepal is to extend their own sphere of influence and contain the other's. Apart from their economic and trade interests, another common interest of both these countries is to contain the super power influences in the region (Grover 2007).

The growing cooperation on bilateral trade, economic investments, socio-cultural exchanges, frequent high level political exchanges, common stands on issues in World Trade Organisation, Climate Change and working jointly in organisations like Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) of the two major powers in the region has diluted various dimensions Nepal's foreign policy of the time.

New dimensions and opportunities are emerging in this new era of cooperation. Though Nepal's comparative advantage particularly on the strategic, security as well as geopolitical dimensions may not be as strong as it was in the past, because of two Asian powers growing convergence of interests however, their opening up markets, growing bilateral trades and investments, increasing cooperation in science and technology, environment issue, energy as well as growing interaction on cultural, religious activities and other social exchanges have created new impacts on Nepal as well as in the whole region. Nepal has also been asked to provide a transit route in this growing connection between the two countries, two civilisations and two cultures' (Pandey 2005).

### **3.4.3 Economic issue comes up as one of the major issues in India and China relations**

The growing economic relations between India and China in the recent years have become a new phenomenon in the Asia Pacific region. Historically, economic interactions between China and India have been much less than their cultural interactions. Due to the high cost of transport across the Himalayan border and also partly the border war of 1962 and subsequent chill in bilateral political relations, effectively eliminated trade and other economic relations between the two countries



(Srinivasan 2004). China and India enjoyed very cordial relations during the 1950s and India was one of the first countries which recognized the Chinese Communist Party's takeover power in 1949. According to Bhattacharjea, "Nehru saw Chinese revolution as part of the nationalist movements that were then sweeping Asia.... These emergent countries would eschew 'narrow' national interests, would seek instead to cooperate, to avoid dispute and war, to resolve differences through peaceful negotiations"<sup>35</sup> (Bhattacharjea 2001). However, after Sino-Soviet differences and new development in Tibet and along the Sino-Indian border, Nehru seemed to have concluded that China had reversed its earlier policy. The image of China after those events was that China was seen as committed to re-establishing a past national supremacy, as a country which displayed an arrogance of might and power. India therefore saw China as desirous of weakening India, its closest Asian competitor, perhaps saw all this as a prelude to a possible Chinese invasion of India (Ibid).

The deteriorating relations between India and China in the pre-1962 was fueled by the Dalai Lama's escape to India on 17 March 1959. The Dalai Lama reached in India on 31 March 1959 and made a statement by saying that "he was in India of his own free will" (Deepak 2005). However, the Chinese reacted swiftly to the Dalai Lama's statement on 20 April 1959 by saying that the "so called statement of the Dalai Lama issues through an Indian diplomatic official in Tezpur on April 18 was a crude document, lame in reasoning, full of lies and loopholes" (Renmin Ribao 21 April 1959 also cited at Deepak 2005). Chinese attitude took a sharp turn after Dalai Lama's statement. The leaders of "great friendly country" (India) turned into "expansionist" and condemned together with the imperialist within a few days (Deepak 2005). China viewed India granting asylum to the Dalai Lama was a hostile act and interference in its internal affairs. In October 1962, all out war was broken between China and India. India blamed China for the invasion. In a broadcast to the nation on 22 October 1962, Prime Minister Nehru called on the people to face united "the greatest menace that has come to us since we became independent" (MEA 1963)<sup>36</sup>.

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<sup>35</sup> See also Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961*, New Delhi: MIB, Government of India.

<sup>36</sup> See Prime Minister on Chinese Aggression, MEA, 1963:1 and also B.R. Deepak, *India and China (1904-2004): A Century of Peace and Conflict*, New Delhi, Manak.

After the border war of 1962, bilateral trade was suspended and did not reopen until 1977 (Srinivasan 2004). However, even after 1977, the volume of bilateral trade was insignificant. Only after the Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's landmark visit in December 1988, and subsequent agreements for setting up joint working groups on boundary issue, and joint group on economy, trade and science and technology (MFA-PRC 2000). Similarly, the two countries signed 'an agreement on cooperation in science and technology, an agreement on civil and aviation transportation and plans to implement the bilateral cultural agreements for 1988 to 1990' (Ibid). After this visit, the high level visits between the two countries have increased significantly, and the bilateral exchanges on various fields expanded quickly. The two governments have worked to promote bilateral cooperation in the trade, culture, science and technology and many other fields and enhanced consultations and cooperation in international affairs.

Since last two decades both countries have attempted to deepen their economic interactions between themselves and within Asia. Bilateral trade and investment links of the two countries have grown rapidly over the past few years, suggesting the presence of complementarities and unexploited potentials (Srinivasan 2004).

The economic reform program carried out by both countries (China since late 70s and India from early 90s), which is extended to the most sectors of the economy, now has contributed in enhancing the economic cooperation between two countries. Today, China and India are the two highest growth economies of the world where China has been maintaining average 9% growth in the last 20 years and India 6% in average since it has liberalized its economy in 1991. Both countries have taken same economic paths of reducing incident of poverty by accelerating rapid economic growth and penetrating in the world markets. They have opened their economy, created investors friendly environment It is expected that China, currently growing at over 9% and India 8% per annum, would emerge as the top economies of the world by 2050. It is predicted to have the largest gross domestic product in another four decades, they could dramatically change international trade equation now dominated by the US and Europe (Mukharjee 2005). Similarly, it is said that if they can maintain their current pace of economic growth by the year 2050, China and India will

takeover Japan, Germany, UK and France and become the world second and third largest economy respectively after the United States.

Their increasing convergence of interests in the global economic forum like in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) also provides space for cooperation than the competition. However, again, there is limit to this phenomenon of getting closure of these two countries as there are troubled political relations, contrasting ambition of becoming dominant power in the region and at the global level as well as their competition for securing world's strategic resources. Many Sino-India experts do believe that the underlying element of competition between the two Asian giants may bring forth if not downright rivalry at least a fiece degree of political and military one-up-manship<sup>37</sup>.

Traditionally, India-China economic interaction was not an important factor in determining the two countries bilateral relations as well as shaping the power balance in the region. The 1962 border war completely eliminated whatever little economic link they had cultivated . The situation started to change only after the restoration of diplomatic relations in 1976. The after signing of a protocol on economic co-operation and granting most-favored nation (MFN) status to each other in 1984 and signing of a trade agreement on avoidance of double taxation in 1991 brought much warmth in promoting economic relations= between these two countries.

The two countries trades have further enhanced the regular high-level meetings and formation of the joint task groups. The visit of Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongjhi in 2002 and subsequent visit by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in June 2003 have made significant boost in promotion of the two countries trades.

The two countries trade in 2010 was surpassed US\$ 60 billion mainly driven by the surge in Indian imports of Chinese telecom power generation machinery (Rediff business 2011). Commenting on the new trade figures, the first secretary at the Indian Embassy in Beijing said while bilateral economic trade ties were on positive track,

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<sup>37</sup> See, for example, "Sino-Indian Relations Old Legacies and New Vistas", *China Report* 30, no. 2 (April-June 1994): "It needs to be borne in mind that relations between the two largest Asian nations are bound to be marked by an undercurrent of competition and contest, given the inherent logic of the unalterable realities of geographical proximity and national rivalry".

China has to understand the importance to provide market access to India specially Indian products like IT and pharmaceuticals (PTI 21 January 2011).

**Table III.VIII**  
**Trends in India-China Bilateral Trade**

(US \$ Billion.)

Partner Countries	Trade	1998-99	1999-00	2000-01	2001-02	2002-03	2003-04	2004-05 Apr-Sept
India	Export	0.4	0.5	0.8	1.0	2.8	3.0	1.6
	Import	1.1	1.3	1.5	2.0	2.8	4.0	3.0
	Total Trade	1.5	1.8	2.3	3.0	4.8	7.0	4.6
	Trade Balance	-0.7	-0.7	-0.7	-1.1	-0.8	-1.1	-1.4
China	Export	1.0	1.2	1.6	2.0	2.7	3.3	NA
	Import	0.9	0.8	1.4	1.7	2.3	4.3	NA
	Total Trade	1.9	2.0	3.0	3.7	5.0	7.8	NA
	Trade Balance	0.11	0.34	0.21	0.20	0.40	-0.91	NA

*Source: Indian data from Ministry of commerce, Government of India, Chinese data from Chinese Ministry of commerce. Trade values fro China are for respective calendar years. Data up to 2004-05 presented in the Prof. I. N. Mukherji's article on India China Bilateral Trade – 2005.*

**Strategic issues:** India and China concluded their second round of “strategic dialogue” and declared 2006 a Sino-Indian friendship year. The Chinese Premier Wen Jiabo visit in April 2005 and signing of a joint statement of two countries’ Prime Ministers underscored the need to establish a strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity. The joint statement of the two Prime Minister in the 2005 stressed an all-round expansion of China-India economic cooperation including trade and investment constituted an important dimension for deeper China-India friendship (Mukherjee 2005). During the visit the two sides satisfied the Joint Study Group (JSG) reports<sup>38</sup> which was formed earlier to study the two countries bilateral trades status as well as recommendations for the further expansion. One of the recommendations of the JSG was to appoint joint task forces to study in detail the

<sup>38</sup> Joint Statement of the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of India, F: India-China/125627-jt.commu.htm.

potential areas of economic cooperation and it is noted that both sides have taken it positively (Ibid).

Similarly, the growing bilateral trade between the two countries has itself triggered controversy. The flooding of India domestic markets by cheap Chinese goods has become a cause of concern in Indian business circles. They found that the varieties of Chinese products are unbeatable in prices as well as quality. They alleged China for dumping practices and pressurized the government to take anti-dumping measures. As a result the government of India has ordered anti-dumping measures against Chinese goods in May 2001.

The Customs department has carried out raids on Chinese products in major Indian cities and confiscated these goods which was obviously not a healthy sign of business co-operation between India and China. However, China has strongly refuted those charges and clarified that it has neither pursued a policy of dumping goods anywhere nor has it violated any norms of the WTO under which quantitative restrictions on certain categories of products have been removed.

*International Affairs:* Another area where India and China find space to work together is in WTO. After China's entry into WTO in 2002 both countries have become the member of the world trade regime. And both countries are the developing countries and they share common interests in dealing with a number of issues within the WTO regime. Specially areas like agriculture particularly on food security, technology transfer from industrialized countries to the developing countries and also fixing tariffs, quotas, negotiating on non-tariffs barriers and over-all protecting the interests of developing countries both countries can work together. Since last several Ministerial level meetings India and China together with other developing countries have formed informal alliance and asserted their agendas and which have become very effective. It is regarded that due to the developing countries joint efforts they were able to achieve partial success in Hong Kong.

Generally, Indian side has taken positively China's entry into the WTO in 2002. It offers India a big opportunity to increase its exports to China in fields such as information technology, software, agricultural and construction products. For China

also, there will be much scope for trade with India in sectors like electronics and telecommunications. However, it is also argued that India will have to face an even tougher competition with China now ( Shrinivasan 2004).

Another potential area of India-China cooperation is the setting up joint ventures by Chinese and Indian entrepreneurs in both countries. In the recent years, the Indian entrepreneurs have significantly increased the number of joint ventures in China. Indian software companies and training institutes have significant presence in the Pudong Software Park in Shanghai. Those are mainly in the area of pharmaceuticals, banking and computer software. China has also set up many joint ventures in India in a variety of fields such as forestry products in Karnataka, diesel engines, manufacture of isobutyl benzene, mini blast furnace technology, glass manufacturing technology, bio-tech, optical fibers and telecom etc. Both countries have given IT as of their high priority and it is one of the thriving sectors in both countries. Likewise, the bilateral flows of foreign direct investment are increasing. India's lead in software and China's capability in hardware have opened up possibilities of increasing trade in products and services of the information technology sector.

China has also established several joint ventures in India especially in the manufacturing areas. A dominant Chinese software company has an office in India's software capital of Bangalore, and many Chinese software engineers are also being trained there. To cater to the Indian markets, China has set up a base production of washing machines and color television sets in India. Similarly, bilateral cooperation has also been extended into the agricultural sectors. Indian farmers have started in cultivating a Chinese-developed hybrid rice variety that can yield twice as much rich per unit of land. The political and business communities in both countries have touted the complementarities of their industries.

Though both countries have given enough emphasis in promotion of bilateral investments however, they have yet to make significant investments in each other's economy.

*Area of cooperation in Energy:* Another area where India and China started to work jointly is the energy sector. As both countries are the net importer of energy from the global market, they have started to cooperate in various countries oil fields. “We look on China not as a strategic competitor but as a strategic partner,” said the Indian Petroleum Minister Mani Shankar Aiyar during his visit to Beijing in 2006 (The Hindu, 13 January 2006). While in China, Aiyar, who was accompanied by representatives of major Indian petroleum firms, signed five memoranda on energy cooperation with the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission. And on January 12, the Indian delegation met with top officials from China’s main energy companies, including the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China Petrochemical Corporation, and China National Offshore Oil Corporation. In his public appearances while in China, Aiyar repeatedly argued that China and India, both of which have a burgeoning need for oil and natural gas imports, have a common interest in seeking to lessen competition for energy supplies and in working together to discover and develop new energy supplies.

On several occasions in the past India has lost significant bids to China, including in Angola, Kazakhstan, Ecuador and Burma. Chinese oil firms, have made several deals in which they overpaid for energy assets. Last August, CNPC paid \$4.18 billion to acquire Canadian oil company Petro Kazakhstan. India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) had bid \$3.9 billion (Ibid). In the same occasion, the director of the China Energy Strategy Centre seconded India’s call for cooperation between India and China in the energy field. Unbridled competition between India and China for oil and natural gas “will be harmful to all concerned,” said Xia Yisehn, “and so the necessity of co-operating to share risks and reducing costs in a multilateral way have been gaining currency here” (Ibid).

However, energy is a scarce resource and both countries have been facing enormous pressure of energy demand for their domestic consumption. Securing it in the very competitive global markets is not an easy task. Despite their agreement in working jointly in this sector, they will certainly have to face certain level of competition as well. The importance is that whether the competition would dwarf the interests.

To secure smooth supply of this scarce and highly strategic resource, the emerging world power India and China have equally been competing too and their intensification of competition in this area cannot be ignored despite their agreement for cooperation. Similarly, the issue of security, their long pending issue of border disputes, nuclear weapons, blue-water naval aspirations and more than their ambition of expanding their area of influence in the region as well as in the global level invariably carry a heavy assumption of rivalry between the two Asian emerging powers.

Despite increasing joint ventures and bilateral investments as well as two countries convergence of interests in economic and trade areas in global level, the impact of international trade competition as well as FDI competition is being felt in both countries.

Impacts on small countries improving bilateral relations of Nepal's two giant neighbours India and China has contributed in changing the nature and trends of the threat perception in Nepal. Lama writes, "What is striking in all this is the seemingly irreversible nature of the growing economic engagement between China and South Asia. These economic ties cannot be withdrawn with the flick of a switch when tensions flare" (Lama 2006). Knudsen argues that the policies of great power are seen to determine the fate of small states. He argues, "in times of high tension between the great powers, even small problems loom large. The actions of other governments may more easily provoke reactions under high tensions" (Knudsen 1996). He further elaborates, "In period of low tension, there is no apparent security problem for the small state, a perception which grows stronger as a low-tension period endures" (Ibid).

Considering the serious consequences of increasing instability and conflicts in Nepal, India and China have started playing both visible and over roles in the domestic affairs of Nepal. After taking over the regime on 1 February 2005, King Gyanendra tried to play "China card" similar to what his father did in the 1960s. Chinese soon realized that it would not be in the interest of China as well as the whole region. It also involved a high risk for China to ally with a force which has been completely isolated from the international community. Commenting on China's role, India's then



External Affairs Minister K. Natwar Singh replied that 'regarding Nepal's ongoing development we have been coordinating with China and we will coordinate with them in future on regular basis. The international community by and large together this time including India, US, EU, China and Japan and we will act on the basis of consensus' (Kathmandu Post 23 March 2005).

### **3.5 Nepal's internal changes and shift on threat perceptions**

Against the backdrop of the changing security environment in the global and regional level, Nepal has also been experiencing significant deviation from its traditional state – centric threat perception into a new and non-traditional threat perception. A noted security expert Rai stated that 'when we talk about Nepal, perception of threat in mind, Nepal has least possibilities of direct external arms attack today but there are maximum chances of threat for the people of Nepal. In other words, Nepal is not secure from internal threats – insurgency, poverty, education and health problem (Rai 2006).

More people die every day in Nepal due to malnutrition, poverty, disease and natural calamities and the conflicts. And such conflicts are not inter-states but intra-state with potential to weaken and destroy state institution, political order and even national sovereignty. The 10 years (1996-2006) of armed conflict that Nepal has experienced and lost of almost 14000 lives and tens of thousands injured and displaced not because of the external factor it was mainly due to internal factors.

(Rai 2006)

Pointing out Nepal's source vulnerability, Mahat poses some interesting questions, e.g., 'what are the major threats that Nepal face today? Is Nepal's insecurity today more due to our military weakness, small size, land-lockedness, a location which is sandwiched between two nuclear powers, or the open border with India which could be misused against either country, or due to poverty, economic deprivation, poor governance, exclusion of large proportion of the population from the basic needs of human life, or failure to meet the rising aspirations of the people?' (Mahat 2004)

Nepal's prime vulnerabilities do not come from outside. The vulnerable situation that Nepal has been experiencing since last couple of decades actually arises from its internal governance failure and political fluidity. The regime's failure to provide good governance, maintain law and order, speed up the development programs made the country more vulnerable and provided ground to the extremist forces to expand their influences and enhance their agendas. After the pro-democratic movement and establishment of multiparty democracy in 1990, it was expected that the democracy will bring changes particularly the successive regimes would bring economic development and make changes in the lives of the common people. However, in contrary, the country had to go through a very instable political situation where the changes of government became so frequent and lack of coherent policy and planning, the much expected economic development did not take place. As a result the extremist forces like Maoists gained the ground through their violent activities and marginalised the democracy that was established in 1990.

The corrupt, inefficient political leadership, bureaucracy and functionless institutions, exclusive and non-representative system are main threats to the sustainability of the country today. The failure of the state and increasing terror and violence activities pursued by various armed groups precipitated number of social and economic crisis in the country. The issue of internally displaced people, refugees, migration, and environment crisis are some of the problems that the country has been facing these days. As a consequence the country has to go through another cycle of democratic struggle in 2006 known as People's Movement II. After the historic mass movement of 2006, the Comprehensive Peace Accord was signed and election to the Constituent Assembly was held to draft a new constitution. The constitution supposed to be drafted by May 2010 after concluding the ongoing peace process, however, political parties' particularly Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) failure to comply the earlier agreements, it has not been completed yet. Therefore, again the county is passing through a period of uncertainty and chaos.

### **3.6 Growth of extremism and increased vulnerabilities**

The dismal situation of the post 1990s democratic regime and its overall failure to deliver good governance provided fertile ground to the extremist forces like the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) to initiate armed rebellion under the name of 'people's war' against the state and expand its influences. What began as a very small group of insurgents and political ideologues quickly grew because their platform of economic and social equality appealed to marginalized and disenfranchised groups. Similarly, the political instability, economic crisis and the social discriminations and the regime's failure to initiate pro-people policies and programs further added the fuel in the fire. For example the successive elected governments of 1990s were not able to take concrete and effective steps to reduce the rampant corruptions, social discriminations, and abject poverty situation (Baral 2007).

Rather than adopting policy to tackle the growing insurgency by political way the governments of the time sought the military solutions. It set up new armed police forces – the Armed Police Force - to fight the CPN (M). The Armed Police Force (APF) was created and deployed in the year 2000. The newly established force also failed to contained the insurgency and improve the law and order security situation. However, the growing Maoists attacks forced the government to deploy the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) in November 2001. And a unified command was created incorporating both the RNA and the APF (Rai 2008).

CPN (M) has pursued the revolutionary programs based on violence and murder. It scattered guerrilla tactics in the terrain of Nepali mountains became quite effective and the state security forces became quite ineffective to control the rapid expansion of the insurgency. By the time of 2001, five years after the launch of the 'people's war' it has become a formidable force to tackle to the state and posed a serious challenge to the state system. With their 10,000 guerrillas and 25,000 militias (ICG Report 27 October 2005) they were able to push the almost 90,000 of Royal Nepal Army in the defensive position. Both the civilian police and the armed police forces were demoralized and lost their confidence to stand and fight against the guerrilla group due to the sporadic violence as well as low level of their combat capacity. The Royal

Nepal Army was called to mobilize after declaring the state of emergency in November 2001 after Maoists attack on RNA's Dang barracks. This was the first time that the RNA which supposed to be the force to fight against the external enemy has been mobilized contained the insurgency inside the country (Kumar 2006).

In the initial days, force mobilization was limited with the police mounting campaigns known as 'Operation Romeo' and 'Kilo Sera II'. However, as the violence spread all over the country, the consecutive governments introduced new legislations to widen the power of the police and established a paramilitary wing known as Armed Police Force - 2001. After the Dunai (the headquarters of Dolpa District) attack by the Maoists, the then-government decided to station the Army in sixteen district headquarters. It was the first time that the army was mobilized against the Maoist insurgency. After the breakdown of the ceasefire in November 2001 and subsequent Maoist attack on Dang military camp, the State of Emergency was declared and the armed forces were mobilized throughout the country. The police and the army began joint "cordon and search" operations, especially in the Maoists affected areas (Kumar 2006).

During this period, the security forces often exceeded their authority and made arbitrary and illegal arrests, inflicted inhumane torture, and resorted to indiscriminate killings. Disappearances and murders also became common. After the escalation of violence and deteriorating security situation in the country, the state's defence budget has sharply increased affecting development works. To meet the defence expenditures, successive governments have raised taxes, diverted funds from development expenditures and increased foreign debt and aid. In the meantime, the Maoists have attacked some of the big multi-national companies such as Dabur Nepal, Nepal Lever Ltd, Coca-Cola, Colgate and country's largest five star hotel, Soaltee Crown Plaza. This has scared not only the possible foreign investors but has also drawn the attention of the international community. It is reported that after the bombing of Soaltee Crown Plaza, Nepal's ambassador to India Karnadhwoj Adhikari was called by the Indian Foreign Office to express India's displeasure about the escalating violence in Nepal (Kathmandu Post, 19 August 2004).

Though the declaration of state of emergency and mobilization of the RNA had been touted by the state that it would contain the insurgency and restore the peace and tranquility, the much publicized action of the state did not deliver the expected outcome. In fact the situation became worse. The total killing (between 13 February 1996 and 27 November 2005) became much higher during the period of emergency than the earlier and even after lifting the state of emergency. The killing during the emergency period (26 November 2001 - 31 August 2002) was almost double in comparison of the number of the total killing during five years of the Maoists movement (INSEC H/R/ Book Year 2006).

Both the government's security forces and the Maoists significantly increased their atrocities during and after the emergency. The violation of human rights from both sides and destruction of the infrastructures of the country had been increased in alarming level. According to the government figure 1,321 Village Development Committee buildings were destroyed by the Maoists during the emergency period only. Likewise the number of displacement of the people has also been increased significantly during the period. According to the INSEC Human Rights Year Book 2005, by the end of 2004 as large as 38, 191 people were forced to leave their native place due to the conflict. However, the Norwegian Refugees Council estimates the number of displaced people over 200,000 during the period (INSEC H/R Yearbook 2005).

Apart from this, rural infrastructure worth billion of rupees had been destroyed, The mental trauma and suffering of the people was incalculable. The distress conflict had created may not be overcome within one or two generations. As the magnitude of the violence grew, Nepal's vulnerability had also sharply increased. The death toll continues to increase and so had the destruction of rural infrastructures. This leads political analysts conclude that the conflict had evolved into the most serious internal crisis Nepal had face since its founding in the mid-eighteenth century (Thapa 2002).

***1990 Democratic movement and political changes:*** The promulgation of the 1990 constitution was a step forward in guaranteeing basic rights, including civil, political and socio-economic rights to the people of Nepal. The most important feature of the new constitution was its recognition that sovereign power lies with the people.

Similarly, the adult franchise, parliamentary system of governance, multi-party system, rule of law and constitutional monarchy were other features (Baral 2004).

The provision for an independent and competent judiciary and the rule of law ensure freedom and equal treatment to all the Nepalese citizens. The constitution has also provision for checks and balances such as the Election Commission, Commission for the Investigation of the Abuse of Authority, Judicial Council and Security Council. The formation of the National Human Rights Commission, Indigenous People's Rights Commission, Women's Commission and Oppressed People's Commission has also contributed to the protection of human rights of the general or specific groups of people (Ibid).

Despite these constitutional provisions and commitments to the international human rights documents, the human rights situation in general worsened. The initial euphoria that democracy will resolve all the problems of the people was soon dashed. The newly established regime of democratic Nepal failed to tackle economic, cultural, social and political discrimination or backwardness. The marginalized and oppressed people continued to feel excluded on the basis of their caste or ethnic background. The lack of democratization in the bureaucracy, armed forces and police, as well as a culture of impunity created frustration, alienation and anger among the general population. Furthermore, growing political instability and the failure of successive governments to tackle poverty have become issues with which the Maoists can gain popular support especially among rural youths (Karki and Seddon 2005).

Maoists have introduced a permit system in some districts, which has caused serious problem in the mobility of the people. Several relief agencies, NGOs, and international donors, have been forced by the circumstances to pull out their workforce from the remote regions. Similarly, the Maoists have also targeted the properties of neighbouring countries and their embassy staff. The killing of two US embassy staff, the attack on American Centre and several Indian owned industrial units, schools and other areas show the deterioration of the security situation. The National Human Rights Commission, several domestic human rights organizations, Amnesty International, and Asia Watch, have regularly expressed their concerns over the deteriorating situation of human rights. During the annual UN human rights

session in Geneva, the chair country asked Nepal to endorse UN technical assistance (The Kathmandu Post, 30 April 2004). Various international and national human rights organizations have reported that Nepal's current human rights situation is the worst in the world, other than in Iraq. This situation has sparked off fears about Nepal veering toward being labelled a 'country at risk' or a 'failed state' (The Kathmandu Post 30 April 2004).

In the situation of growing violence and destruction, the king had overstepped again in February 2005 and seized the power from the political parties with the support of the army and imposed state of emergency, banned media and arrested leaders of the political parties. With the king's unconstitutional and authoritarian step turned the bipolar conflict (state versus Maoists) into the tripartite (king, political parties and Maoists). The political parties expanded their already existed alliance and began a negotiation with the CPN (Maoists) against the king's move. By the time of November 2005, the political parties (Seven Party Alliance – SPA) and the CPN (M) have agreed to fight jointly against the king's regime.

They have come up with 12 points understanding under which the CPN (M) would stop attacking the political parties' cadres and leaders and allow them to operate their activities in the countryside. Similarly, both have agreed to launch a peaceful mass movement against the king and restore democracy and peace in the country. They have also agreed to draft a new constitution by holding an election of the constituent assembly. With their understanding reached in November 2005, the SPA with the support of CPN (M) organised a sustained peaceful mass movements which turned out to a massive uprising against the king's regime. The king finally agreed to surrender his power and the SPA formed a government and restored parliament.

The newly formed government started the processes of negotiations with the CPN (M). The CPN (Maoists) agreed ceased their armed struggle and ready to join the peaceful political processes. They have signed a comprehensive peace accord with the government in November 2006. Under the peace accord, the weapons were separated from the Maoists combatants and put in the lock system and their combatants are now in the cantonments under the supervision of the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN). However, the cessation violence by the CPN (M) and put of their combatants have not stopped the proliferation of armed groups and their violence

activities in Nepal. Currently, about twenty one small armed groups are operating in all over Nepal and most of them are based in the Terai regions. The Kathmandu Post Daily reports citing the Nepal Police that 'at least 21 disgruntled groups have so far taken up arms or claim to have done so to unleash violence, after the CPN (Maoist) formally laid down their arms November 2006' (The Kathmandu Post, 17 September 2007). It is estimated that if the political transition period protracted the number of such outfit could further shoot up and posing a threat to already precarious security situation of the country.

According to the Nepal police, among the twenty one groups not all the claimed groups have been active in violent actions some of them may exist only in papers and pamphlets. Those which are named by the Nepal Police are the Jantantrik Tarai Mukti Morcha (JTMM) factions led by Jwala Singh, Goit, Bisphot Singh and Himmat Singh, and 10 other groups are carrying out violent activities in the southern plains. According to Nepal Police Headquarters, these groups include the Liberation Tigers of Tarai Elam (Ram Lochan Singh), Tarai Cobras, Madhesi Mukti Tigers, Tarai Bagi, Janawadi Ganatantrik Tarai Mukti Morcha, Madhesi Virus Killers' Party, Shantika Lagi Kranti Tarai, Madhesi Special Force, Tarai Army and Tarai Utthan Sangh. Likewise, Nepal Janatantrik Party, Rastriya Army Nepal, Supa Kranti Dal, Shahi Mukti Morcha, Gorkha Mukti Morcha and Nepal People's Army are reported to have announced through pamphlets an intensification of their violence in other parts of the country besides the Terai. Among these groups more than half are based in Terai region, mainly because it is easy to smuggle in weapons from across the porous border with Indian states of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand (Report provided by Nepal Police Headquarter on 28 May 2008 upon the request of the author).

The freedom of speech, right to organize and the flourish of media have played significant role for the empowerment of the general public. People have become more attentive on their rights and issues that relate to their day-to-day lives. Problems like political instability, failure to maintain law and order, social discrimination, development disparity, lacks of inclusiveness, failure to deliver to the people and inefficient governing system are the most occupied issues today in Nepal. In the past decades successive governments failure to address these problems have played instrumental role for the ultra forces like Maoists and other terror and criminal groups



to consolidate and expand their strengths and activities. The King Gyanendra's seized of power in February 2005 was challenged by the popular uprising in all over Nepal. People's desire for peace and democracy resulted in a massive uprising in April 2006 which has forced the king to surrender power to the political parties and reinstate the earlier dissolved parliament. The newly formed government of Nepal today is in a tremendous pressure to restore peace and consolidate democratic rights by organizing elections of the constituent assembly. People want to be free from the clutches of violence and secure their basic needs such as sufficient food, shelters, education, health care, human rights, political stability and security (Rai 2006).

With these changes in perception of security threats not the state and military - centric security approach, the people-centric security approach has become the dominant perception in Nepal. As described by Lokraj Baral that people-centric approach both in theory and practice on security. He states that 'the recent pro-democracy movement in Nepal has established the fact that the military alone cannot protect the rulers if the people fail to identify their interest with that of the state run by anti-people rulers. The comprehensive security idea has emerged strongly as even democracy without human empowerment and social justice cannot create a congenial atmosphere for security of the state and people' (Baral 2006). The conventional tendency of states to secure their position under the banner of so-called "nationalism" has also been increasingly challenged in the changing context of the security environment (Ibid).

As Baral states that 'in Nepal, for instance, King Gyanendra's coup of 1 February 2005, which drove the King to take back all powers as well as to depart from the established constitutional process, is being justified in the name of safeguarding the country and the people against 'terrorism' perpetrated by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists). But less than one and half year, his regime had become much more vulnerable to domestic conditions and international pressures and was overthrown by the people's popular uprising'. Though, electoral democracy alone cannot ensure all aspects of security or the comprehensive security of the people and nation if it fails to deliver to the general people's basic needs such as food, shelter, clothes, health care facilities, improved environmental condition, and freedom from fear etc. Maintaining the territorial integrity and national sovereignty only would not guarantee the security of the people within the country and if people are not secured on their basic needs then they begin to question the government's functions.

Lama argues that 'the skewed distribution of both development benefits and the development of peoples' capabilities explain to a large extent the ongoing socio-economic dissidence of the 'Maobadi' and the caste-ethnic group resurgence in different regions of Nepal' (Lama 2003). Security under the democratic system is for the people and it is people-centric security. When people become center of the politics, the rulers are not seen as the representatives of 'God on earth' as Hegel had articulated in his theory of ideal state or as a superior class of people notwithstanding the pervasive nature of elitist politics in all forms of governments (Baral 2006).

The growing crisis that Nepal faces today is the product of failures of the past regimes. It is the culmination of problems that Nepal has been facing for a long time of its history. A Report on Poverty stated that Nepal now stands at the crossroads amidst a morass of crisis: economic crisis, political crisis, governance crisis, security crisis, and above all poverty crisis (Poverty in South Asia: Civil Society Perspective 2003). The state's failure to initiate socio-economic development has been one of the major causes of conflict, which has led the current state of chaos, instability and violence. Jagannath Adhikari points out that the changes in national economic conditions like decline in agricultural production and food security and existence of various traditional barriers against women obtaining domestic non-farms work have been the main causes for the increased out-migration of Nepali women (Adhikari 2006).

Restoring peace and maintaining political stability by ending the violence acts unleashed by the Maoists is the major concern for the people of Nepal today. R. S. Mahat states 'the biggest source of insecurity to the Nepalese society at present remains terrorism and violence unleashed by the Maoists' (Mahat 2004). Today, there is a need of Nepal's internal socio-economic, political, ethnic and environmental issues to be constructed 'securitisation' processes because they are increasingly appeared to be the existential threats to the society and the country therefore, it is required to response by the state, civil society and the general people. Only overcoming from the existing socio-economic backwardness, political instability and cultural discrimination, Nepal would emerge as a strong and competent country and that very Nepal would maintain the national sovereignty, its independency, territorial integration.

## **Chapter IV**

### **Migration as a source of Threat: Nature, Extent and Implications**

This chapter evaluates the different categories of migration problems of Nepal from various perspectives including within the 'framework of analyses provided by securitisation theory. This Chapter examines three crucial varieties of migration including i) migration to Nepal from neighboring countries, ii) out migration from Nepal and iii) internal migration in Nepal. Further this Chapter also assesses a range of impact generated by these three varieties of migration and elucidates as how these impacts impinge upon the national security of Nepal. In the process, this Chapter delves into the issues of Tibetans and Bhutanese refugees and Indian migrants into Nepal along with various forms of Nepalese migrants into India and other countries including the trafficking of women and girl children. And finally the issue of internal migration in Nepal is mostly discussed in the context of protracted Maoist movement and violence triggered internally displaced people (IDPs).

#### **4.1 Background**

Since last couple of decades, migration has emerged as one of the key global issues. It concerns both the sending and the receiving countries. Besides the changing nature and orientation of migration, the dimensions and depth of the migration related problems have become complex, intricate and many a times violent and controversial. It has even led to wars and protracted conflicts. How it should be controlled, handled and managed – have become a major political issue to both receiving and sending countries.

Migration particularly the international migration has moved to the top of the security agenda. It has emerged as one of the key issues to handle not only the wealthy states to control its flow from outside but also to the poorer states where large number of working population leaving their homeland. How should it be controlled – has become major political issues to both receiving and sending countries. "Migration flows affect at least three dimensions of national security: state capacity and

autonomy, the balance of power, and the nature of violent conflict" (Adamson 2006). It is also argued that overall, migration management presents a far greater security challenge to weak and failing states because states that are able to formulate and implement their migratory policy are more secure than the weak states.

According to International Migration Organisation's estimation<sup>1</sup>, there are 214 million international migrants, that is, 3.1 percent of world's population which 10 years before was estimated 150 million. Which means one out of every 33 persons in the world today is migrant. Among them 49 percent are women. The total amount of remittances they sent by migrants in the year 2009 has reached about US \$ 414 billion today. In 2009, it is estimated that "more than US \$ 316 billion in remittances went to developing countries only – representing some 76 percent of the total remittances. It is said that formal and informal remittances to developing countries could be as much as three times the size of official development aid" (IOM 2009). Particularly, the international labour migration from and within Asia expanded rapidly from 1970 onwards. During the past 30 years, labour migration to Gulf countries has evolved rapidly in terms of occupation and the participation of women. Likewise, according to the US Committee for Refugees and also United Nations High Commission for Refugees estimation there are 13,599,900 number of refugees in worldwide today (UNHCR 2009). Among them, large numbers are in the developing world.

The growing number of migrants and increasing trend of migration has generated various dimensions in this area, including human trafficking, migrants struggling, gender issues, and welfare of the local population and other crime related issues. Similarly, the international terrorism issue is also broadly related with the migration because of its cross-broader dimension. It also related with issues like controlling borders, ethnic and multicultural affairs and resources and its distribution. Therefore, such a multidimensional issue of migration clearly has had implications on the issue of security.

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<sup>1</sup> The data use here extracted from the report of the International Migrant Organisation and also partly from the United Nation Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, accessed on 5 July 2010, <http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/about-migration/facts-and-figures/lang/en>, <http://esa.un.org/migration/p2kodata>.

According to the University of Oxford's Refugee Studies Centre's<sup>2</sup> definition of forced migration, "a general term that refers to the movements of refugees and internally displaced people (those displaced by conflicts) as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine or development projects" (Centre 2010).

Furthermore, there are three types of forced migration i.e. conflict induced displacement, development induced displacement, and disaster induced displacement. People who are forced to flee their homes for one or more of the following reasons and where the state authorities are unable or unwilling to protect them: armed conflict including civil war; generalized violence; and persecution on the grounds of nationality, race, religion, political opinion or social group (Ibid).

Development-induced displacement, these are people who are compelled to move as a result of policies and projects implemented to supposedly enhanced 'development'. Examples of this include large-scale infrastructure projects such as dams, roads, ports, airports, urban clearance initiatives, mining and deforestation and introduction of conservation parks etc. Likewise, the disaster-induced displacement includes people displaced as a result of natural disasters (flood, volcanoes, landslides, earthquakes) impact of climate change, human made disasters – industrial accidents (Ibid).

Similarly, the effects of the global system not only dislocate workers from traditional occupations and induce their movement abroad to find alternative means of economic survival. In addition, as a consequence of colonialism, military interventions, media saturation and the marketing of goods, potential migrants also develop cultural, educational, ideological, and economic links to specific capitalist societies as well – India to UK, Morocco to France, Mexico and the Philippines to the USA and so on (Castles and Miller 1998).

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<sup>2</sup> University of Oxford's Refugee Studies Centre conducts multidisciplinary research, including policy relevance studies on the causes and consequences of forced migration.

**Table IV.I**  
**Regional Distribution of International Migrants**  
**1960-2010**

By region	1960			2010		
	Total migrants (million)	Share of world migrants	Share of population	Total migrants (million)	Share of world migrants	Share of population
	74.1	2.7%		188.0		2.8%
Africa	9.2	12.4%	3.2%	19.3	10.2%	1.9%
Northern America	13.6	18.4%	6.7%	50.0	26.6%	14.2%
Latin America and Caribbean	6.2	8.3%	2.8%	7.5	4.0%	1.3%
Asia	28.5	38.4%	1.7%	55.6	29.6%	1.4%
GCC States	0.2	0.3%	4.6%	15.1	8.0%	38.6%
Europe	14.5	19.6%	3.5%	49.6	28.4%	9.7%
Oceania	2.1	2.9%	13.5%	6.0	3.2%	16.8%

*Source: Human Development Report 2009, UNDP, New York, <http://www.hdr.undp.org> obtained on 22 July 2011.*

The effects of the global system not only dislocated the workers from traditional occupations but also induced their movement abroad to find alternative means of economic survival. In addition, as a consequence of colonialism, military interventions, and the marketing of goods, potential migrants also developed cultural, educational, ideological, and economic links to specific capitalist societies as well – India to UK, Morocco to France, Mexico and the Philippines to the USA and so on

(Castles and Miller 1998). Growing trend of migration has also generated number of theories on migration in the past five decades.

The phenomenal increase in international migration has also witnessed the proliferation of research projects, conferences and publications dedicated to the study of human movements and its implications. The focus has always been the international migration, with a growing emphasis upon how places and people are interconnected. There has been lot of effects on people's life when they migrate. Even those who do not migrate are affected as relatives, friends or descendants of migrants or through experiences of change in their community a result of departure of neighbours or arrival of newcomers. Migration may contribute to further development and improve economic and social conditions, or alternatively may help to perpetuate stagnation and inequality. Migration helps to erode traditional boundaries between languages, cultures, ethnic groups and nation-states (Massey 1993).

The widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of social life have further contributed people to move from one country to another. The increasing cross-border flows of finance, trade, ideas, pollution accompanied by growing number of international governmental, non-governmental and transnational cultural communities further help in creating conducive environment to migration. Another cause for the migration is the disparity in the levels of income, employment and social well-being between different regions and countries. Both the push and pull factors influence in migration. People ordinarily do not like to leave their places without some motivation-better life, protection from both natural and human disasters such as landslides, floods, earth quake, fear of being killed in sectarian violence, ethnic and other forms of political and social conflicts or wars (Haug 2000).

Migration is related with the education and economic development. Education makes people capable to seek better opportunities and those educated who also can afford the financial costs tend to migrate to other countries. Findings in the Philippines have shown that it is middle- income or lower middle-income groups in developing countries that are most likely to leave their places (MPI 2006). Those people who have a connection with the receiving country would also tend to migrate. The prior

existence of the links based on family ties, cultural or friends or political influences also motivate people to migrate. These kind of social networks of people make the migratory process safer and more manageable for the migrants and their families. Similarly, another reason of migratory movements arise from the existence of prior links between sending and receiving countries based on colonisation, political influence, trade, investment or cultural ties (Ibid).

## **4.2 Theories on International Migration**

Theorising the issue of migration has been the recent phenomenon. Due to its diversity and multifaceted character, there has been number of migration theories developed since second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Prior to the 1960s there were few notable contributions on migration<sup>3</sup>.

However, in the third quarter of the twentieth century, rapid and sustained economic growth, the increasing internationalisation of economic activity, decolonisation, emergent process of economic development in the Third World countries, all brought about an intensification of migration, both internal and international. The general primacy of economic motivations in migration had already been recognised by Ravenstein long time ago. The traditional migration theory which is also known as neoclassical approach in the 1960s was challenged in the 1970s when a variety of studies about migration were undertaken (Partnreiter 2000). The new approaches which arose in consequence, had developed largely as isolated from each other and came from different scientific disciplines, mainly from sociology, economics and geography (Massey et al 1993). There is no single coherent theory about international migration. Rather there is a range of theories explaining different aspects of the initiation of international migration and its persistence over time and space (Ibid).

### **4.2.1 Neoclassical Economics**

The neoclassical economic approach to the migration has been based on labour supply and demand theory. It describes that due to the increasing geographical disequilibrium

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<sup>3</sup> The notable writers and books on migration of that period were *The Law of Migration* by Earnest-George Ravenstein, 1885 and *The Polich Peasant in Europe and America* by William Thomas and Florian Znaniecki in 1932.



between labour supply and demand, the flow of migration increases. Important exponents of these approaches are Lewis, Ranis, Fei, Harris and Todaro (Massey et al 1993). According to them, the resulting differences in wages provoke migration from capital-poor countries (regions) to capital-rich countries (regions). Consequently, the supply of labour decreases in the source region, wages rise and migration ceases. Haug called the neoclassical economic theory as a human capital theory which is also a complement (Haug 2000). Neoclassical micro theory predicates that individual actors take rational decisions to migrate on the basis of cost-benefit calculations (Stark and Bloom 1985).

These theories also recognize the fact that migration is undertaken in expectation of future earnings and those earnings from migration may benefit the individual over long time. O'Connell viewed migration as an investment in human capital (O'Connell 1997). In addition to the financial benefits of migration (higher wages), monetary and non-monetary costs and benefits are involved. Among the monetary costs and benefits are lost gains, travel costs, and maintenance while moving and looking for work. An important argument came from Massey when he mentioned the decision to migrate is not based on direct differences in wages but on a comparison of expected earnings through migration and through non-migration (Massey et al 1993). The migrant has to calculate not only the higher earning level in receiving countries but also the probability of employment, that is the possibility of being unemployed or of finding only occasional work. Both the likely rate of remunerations and the probability of employment in the destination are influenced by factors of individual human capital characteristics, such as skill or age as well as the condition in the receiving countries such as immigration policy and rate of unemployment (Parnreiter 2000).

#### **4.2.2 New economics of migration**

There is a sharp contradiction between new economics of migration and the neoclassical economics in many ways. According to new economics of migration theory, decision making process of migration involves larger group of related people including their immediate family members and the relatives (Stark, Bloom 1985). Even the migrating unit is usually an individual but many people involve in making the final decision. The family or household acts as an income pooling unit which

collectively makes decisions about migration or non-migration of its members. Therefore, appropriate unit of analysis for migration research are families, households or other culturally defined units like production and consumption (Massey et al 1993). In most of the cases the migrant and non-migrating family members are interdependent. Consequently, the intent in labour migration is not the maximisation of the income of the individual, rather a mutually beneficial contractual arrangement (Stark and Bloom 1985).

This theory also propounds that it is not only a means of maximising income but also a strategy of minimising risks. It argues that the family (or household) pools costs and benefits and also there is a great amount of risks. Migration here also means diversification of the income and this certainly helps to reduce the familial risks. The family thereby realises scale economies, yet remains a cohesive group. The result is, according to this both parties, the migrant and the non-migrating family members, providing a co-insurance (Stark, Bloom 1985). New economics of migration doubts that migrants seek to improve income in absolute terms as postulated by neoclassical economics.

The two prominent advocate of new economics migration theories; Stark and Bloom propose that people often compare their income within their reference group and that an individual may therefore, migrate to improve his relative position in the same reference group, or to change his reference group. In this manner, relative deprivation and not mere income differences between alternative destinations and origins function as incentive to migrate. The migration of members of a community may lead to a change in the perception of non-migrants who may feel relatively deprived This could induce another round of migration. (Parnreiter 2000). The new economics of migration does not explain migration using factors of labour markets alone, but it also includes other markets in its analysis.

### **4.2.3 World System Theory**

The conceptual cornerstone of World System Theory is the notion of a 'modern world system' coined in the mid-1970s by historian sociologist Immanuel Wallenstein. It was developed against a backdrop of world system of European

hegemony that took shape since the sixteenth century which consists of three concentric spheres- core-states, semi-periphery and peripheral areas. The world system theory was inspired by dependency theory in the 1960s. It views migration as one more product of the domination exerted by core countries over peripheral areas. This was in the context of international relationships fraught with conflict and tension. These approaches see migration founded on the expanding global market, as it has developed since the sixteenth century (Massey et al 1993). Labour migration is conceived as a sub-system of this global market, it functions as a “labour supply system” (Sassen 1988). According to the world system theory, migration is the natural consequence of capitalist development, catalysed by the penetration of global economy into peripheral regions (Massey et al 1993). In order to increase their profits, owners and managers of capitalist firms enter poor countries in search of cheap labour, raw materials, land and new consumer markets. This expansion of capitalism into non-capitalist societies was and is accompanied by a set of disruptions and dislocations that foster migration through the creation of a mobile population, prone to migrate abroad (Ibid).

Not only globalization uprooted people in periphery regions and forged strong material and ideological links between peripheral and core regions, but it has also increased the need for a labour force willing to take badly paid, unstable and low status jobs (Parnreiter 2000). Besides the short time horizon of migrants and the maintenance of their reference group in the location of origin, these approaches emphasize the legal and social discrimination against migrants, which allows employers to pay low wages and provide bad working conditions (Ibid).

An uprooted proletariat, prone to move abroad, is thus first created and in turn siphoned to the core countries through the same channels that were opened by the economic penetration, and through the cultural, transportation and communication employment in certain sectors which rely on cheap labour to maintain high rate of profit. The world system theory may shed light on the importance of past and present linkages between countries at different stages of development, and about some mechanisms of development which caused up rootedness. It also lends some flesh to the common sense empirical observation that migration often connects countries that

were linked in the past by colonial bonds, account of the many vestiges left by such bonds (Bigo 1994).

### **4.3 Migration and security**

Against the backdrop of the traditional military thinking about international security issues, there has emerged some new trends that include the new non-traditional security threats. International and internal migration has become one of them in recent decades, mostly due to the unprecedented scale of this phenomenon. Both the developed and developing countries have faced with the challenges resulting from the migratory movements. The perception that migration is considered as a security threat is closely connected to global demographic trends, most notably the differential of fast population growth in the South as against ageing and declining populations in the North. Kennedy singled out this 'global population explosion' as one of the most challenging issues facing policy-makers in the twenty-first century. He argues that that the growing inequalities in wealth between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots' would inevitably lead to 'great waves of migration' which would overwhelm traditional immigration controls (Kennedy 1993). International migration, particularly forced migration and irregular movements of persons create new insecurities which are of concern from human rights perspective (CHS 2002).

Despite many positive implications of migration (including reducing demographic pressures, meeting labour demands, transfers of skills and technology and cultural exchange), it can entail great personal sacrifice and hardship. Human security underpins the notion of many threats being common to all people and ensures a broad range of rights for different migration categories including refugees, migrants, internally displaced persons and trafficked persons. However this could prove to be a challenging task (Thouez 2002). The persecution faced by the refugees or the exploitative conditions suffered by victims of trafficking or the vulnerabilities that exist for all migration categories of being far from their homes families and familiar surroundings, have in all of them a deep sense of insecurities.

Scholars have also voiced concerns about the dangers of securitizing migration issues. Debates that emerged in the literature on migration, identity and security in Europe in the 1990s have some useful points for the other regions context. Kostakopoulou and Guiraudon have argued that the European Union's "restrictive and control-oriented" policy approach frames immigrants, asylum-seekers, and refugees as a security issue via various agents and policies. This has been done through the imposition of domestic political agenda on Europe-wide policies towards migration, referred to as the "Europeanization of migration" (Kostakopoulou 2001, Guiraudon 2001). Bigo has examined how the network of EU security professionals including police, immigration officials, and intelligence officials have produced and distributed internal security knowledge that "articulated a continuum between borders, terrorism, crime and migration" (Bigo 1994).

Huysmans provides a lucid discussion of the securitization of migration in the EU drawing upon core aspects of the securitization framework's premises. His analysis of how migration developed into a security issue alongside the process of European integration is a case of study of how practices and policies can actually define issues in terms of security by "mobilizing specific institutions and expectations" (Huysmans 2001). According to Huysmans, migration was securitized in the EU and its member states via three relating themes: (1) internal security; (2) cultural security; and (3) the crisis of the welfare state. Relating to internal security, following the abolition of internal border controls in the EU, he argues the issue of external border control emerged as an "internal security problematic" where it was assumed that free movement within the EU would also facilitate illegal activities by terrorists, international organized crime gangs, asylum seekers and illegal immigrants (Ibid).

Two important shifts then occurred: i) the grouping together of crime, terrorism, and transnational crime with migration to gain "an overall view of the interrelation between these problems and the free movement of persons within Europe," and ii) the consequent emergence of a "security continuum" which can be defined as an "institutional mode of policy making that allows the transfer of the security connotation of terrorism, drugs and money laundering to the area of migration" (Ibid). These groups' status gave them the power to identify dangers to the social fabric and thus within the Copenhagen framework, the power to act as securitizing actors" (Ibid).

Similarly, Huysmans argues that the promotion of the idea of migration as a dangerous challenge to notions of social and political integration in EU states—relating to issues of cultural belonging and security – had strong securitizing effects. Thus, the discourses that posed migration, illegal immigrants, refugees, and so on as a threat to social stability and cultural homogeneity have become an important source for mobilizing security rhetoric and institutions (Bigo 1994). About the effect in welfare state is that migration was securitized via the contemporary struggle in the EU over the viability of the welfare state. Who does and does not have the rights of access to welfare access is another way that belonging could be established within EU states. The burden of the welfare state in difficult economic conditions and the extension of care to illegal immigrants and asylum seekers were seen to rival the rights of ‘legitimate’ citizens of the state. As a result of this view, policies emerged that advocated reducing access to welfare and other social services to deter further migrants (Ibid).

Furthermore, Casteles argues that the fear of a “migration crisis” that emerged in the early 1990s rather is an ideological and political crisis for the North, where migration is symbolic of the erosion of the nation-state’s sovereignty. He suggests that the polemics about the “migration crisis” has two sources: first, the conservative-nationalist form of anti-immigration mobilization, and second, the trend to “securitization” post 9/11 in the form of neo-liberal anti-immigration mobilization linked to US political elite discourse on rogue states and fundamentalism (Castles 2002).

While discussing migration and security linkages various questions arise. Should migration be named a security threat? If it is a threat then is it more a threat to international community or to a state? At which level it should be met – national as a part of national security strategy or at international level? Is migration already a threat or only a challenge to security? Is migration in itself a threat or only some parts of the overall migratory movements, namely illegal migrations constitute a security threat? Is migration threat to the receiving countries or to the sending countries too? Both theoreticians and practitioners argue over the questions presented above (Partnreiter 2000).

There are many aspects of the migration-security links. Aniol identifies three roles that the international migration in relations to the international security can play:

- 1) *International migration can be a consequence of other security threats like human rights violation, ethnic conflict, internal war;*
- 2) *International migration can by itself constitute a threat to international security when it is of massive, uncontrolled character;*
- 3) *International migration can result in other security threats (e.g., xenophobia and racial violence) (Aniol 1992).*

There are other dimensions also which are highlighted in the discourse on migration-security nexus.

Conceptually, the relationship between migration and international security can be located in this move to broaden definitions of security away from its traditional military political renditions of state survival. The question of the forced and illegal movement of populations has become prominent as a security issue of international concern in this respect. Similarly, refugees, IDPs and victims of trafficking are also included in migrant categories= as they face vulnerabilities and they compromise their human security. Each categories' human security 'index' varies, of course, with the persecution faced by refugees or the exploitive conditions suffered by victims of trafficking on the one end, and on the other, where general vulnerabilities exist for all migration categories as a function of being far from their homes, families and familiar surroundings. The impact of migration on host communities' human security especially in cases of protracted refugee presence, and of communities in countries of origin from the effects of 'brain drain' is also examined. A number of factors underpin security considerations including: i) the nature of the threat (direct/indirect); ii) the agents/source of insecurity; iii) the extent/impact of the insecurity; and iv) whether (short and long-term) remedies exist to ensuring a certain level of security (Baldwin 1997).

International migration has been presented as a threat to peace, harmony and economic progress on the national and international fronts, to the extent that even "external security agencies are looking inside the borders in search of an enemy from

outside”, blurring the delineation between internal and external. Movements of persons across borders affect security in international relations at three levels:

- 1) the national security agendas receiving and transit countries which perceive international population movement as a threat to their economic well-being, social order, cultural and religious values and political stability,*
- 2) the relations between states, as movements tend to create tensions and burden bilateral relations, thus impacting regional and international stability,*  
*and*
- 3) irregular migration flows might also have significant implications for individual security dignity (Aniol).*

The problem of migration particularly the illegal migration fits into the expansion of the security agenda in the sense that it not only highlights the vulnerability of the territorial state in terms of the contravention of its key principle of territoriality, but also other dimension such as social, economic and even human security.

The social and cultural values which have been protected as component of security are sometimes threatened by migration and its consequences. The growing inflow of immigration would create risk on social stability as well as raise the xenophobia because of lack of integration. Similarly, international migration can influence the demographic security of the host and sending countries. The increasing number of migration can also pose a risk to cultural identity and threat to social security system and welfare state philosophy. Likewise, it also poses a risk to internal security which is illustrated e.g. by the high level of crimes (Baldwin 1997).

Often, migration has been regarded from the perspective of the host countries in the North and West, emphasizing the question of how to deal with immigrants. Across the developed world, the media and politicians are anxiously redefining the levels of acceptable immigration, and calling for the end of ‘unproductive’ immigration. But, there is no country which is not recruiting migrants. Again, many of them are still declaring that migrants are a threat or burden to the state. All through these debates immigration is increasingly linked to the destabilization of traditional communities,



and migrants are being blamed for the unsettling changes in social relations (MPI 2006).

The critical issues like national entry regulations and international agreements, as well as the integration of immigrants to have security implications. Meantime, the perspective of source countries is less prevalent and remains largely disconnected with the growing complexities in the sending countries.

#### **4.4 Refugees and security**

The issue of security and refugee is very much interlinked. The management of refugees as stated by Lama has been a tight rope walking for a refugee receiving countries as they have to constantly strike a balance in economic, national security and humanitarian interests (Lama 2000). The approaches and responses of many countries towards the resolution of refugee issue indicate a large scale variation both in terms of security/instability and absorption/repatriation framework. It is also to be noted that despite the existence of formal and full scale refugee camps set up by the host government and supported by UNHCR and other organisations, a significant part of refugee population has been living outside these camps. The question of security/instability framework brings in a host of issues that have turned out to be adverse to the refugee receiving countries. At times they acquired the dimension of serious threat to both security and stability of the host nations. These situations are said to have set in when refugees:

- i) are seen as a political threat or security risk to the regime of host country,*
- ii) perceived as a threat to cultural identity,*
- iii) are considered as a social and economic burden and*
- iv) when the host society uses immigration as an instrument of threat againsts the country of origin (Ibid).*

While discussing about the refugees and security, three dimensions have often been used to explain the ways in which refugees threaten security. Within this scheme, national security is compromised when one or more of the three dimensions viz., the strategic dimension, regime dimension and structural dimension is threatened or

eroded. The strategic security is threatened when refugees are armed and when government loses control of the refugees; structural dimension is threatened by increasing demands on and the conflict over scarce resources and regime security threatened when refugees enter the domestic political process and create pressure on the government (Lama 2000).

Security concerns, it should be noted, are not confined to countries that receive migrants and refugees. Sending countries too are often at risk. The sending country can be at risk as well, especially when the host country arms the refugees to invade the home country. In fact, a mere granting asylum can be sufficient to create an antagonistic relationship between the host and the sending countries (Choucri 1992).

Various factors create refugees. Some of these caused by short term and some of it are protracted in nature. According to Daruwalla, most of the recorded conflicts have been offshoots of a complex chain of factors (Daruwalla 2002). The process of refugee generation continued as the conflicts of state formation spilled-over into inter-state conflicts and tensions and stabilisation of territorial boundaries of ethnically, religiously and ideologically defined states. According to yet another estimate, “during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the intercontinental migrations from Old to New World involved some 50 million people, many of whom were fleeing persecution in Europe (Loescher, 1992). The dimension of refugee problem became so enlarged and complex during the inter-war period that attempts were made through the setting up of international organisation to “deal with the millions of refugees generated by the First World War and the break-up of multinationals empires (Daruwalla 2002).

According to the UN Convention 1951 on Refugee there was no mention of right to asylum. The scope of refugee status was expanded when following the exodus of Chinese from Mainland to Hong in 1957, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was mandated to extend his ‘good offices’ to assist the groups of refugees. This helped the Greek Cypriots in 1960 and the displaced persons in Indo-China in 1975, following the US defeat in Vietnam (Gurtov na).

Another category of refugee generating factors relate to the developments outside the region and the flow of extra-regional refugees. So far, such refugees have come from Tibet, Afghanistan and Burma. The flow of Tibetan refugee into South Asia has been the result of central government's action in Tibet during the 1950s. The intensity of this flow has varied, depending upon the intensity of conflict in Tibet, which was most serious in 1959, when the Dalai Lama with thousands of his followers came to India for asylum. Subsequently, Tibetan refugees came to South Asia during the second half of the 1960s when the cultural revolution in China caused extensive disturbances.

Six causal factors have been identified as being responsible for creating refugees (Kilot 1987). They are:

- i) *anti-colonial wars and self-determination movements*
- ii) *international conflicts*
- iii) *revolutions, coups and regime change*
- iv) *ethnic, communal and religious conflicts*
- v) *creation and restructuring of state boundaries*
- vi) *population transfer*

Likewise, in South Asian context there are several categories of refugee generating factors identified. They are:

- i) *The breakdown of colonial rule and the rationalization of some of the colonial legacies created refugee flows. The largest such flow was between India and Pakistan, resulting from a partition of British India which gave birth to a new state of Pakistan on the basis of religion. No precise estimate of the exact numbers of the people involved in these flows is available.*
- ii) *Another way that decolonization generated flow of refugees in the region were in Burma and Ceylon (Sri Lanka) where after the independence both countries nationalised their bureaucracy and industries where large number of workers of Indian origin who were brought to these countries by the British were forced to leave Burma and Sri Lanka. All of them were forced to give up their jobs and were not allowed to get citizenship of these respective countries. They had to return to India as refugees.*

iii) *With the creation of Bangladesh in 1971 another flow of refugees were generated in the region. Large number of people who opposed creation of Bangladesh had to leave Bangladesh and most of them went to Pakistan.*

*The degradation of environment and dilapidated economic situation of the region are other reasons for generating refugees in South Asia (Lama 2000).*

In some cases the refugee issue becomes a serious problem in foreign policy as well. There has been an interesting example here in South Asia where the Sri Lankan Tamil who were trained in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu later turned out to be a reason for the assassination of the former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Likewise the Afghan Mujahideen in Pakistan who were also supported by then Pakistani regime against the earlier Kabul regime later became a dangerous force for the escalation of extremism in Pakistani soil itself. In some cases both of these refugees created serious political as these politically heterogeneous forces started aligning and realigning with the elements that were inimical to the political stability in the host country.

Furthermore, some of the refugees receiving countries have actively supported the refugees and gone so far as to arm the refugees against their country of origin. Many of them have found local allies among members of their own ethnic group like Sri Lankan Tamil refugees in Tamil Nadu, Afghan refugees in NWFP and East Pakistani refugees in West Bengal. 'These refugees to whom they have given protection have in fact turned against them whenever these governments have shown some unwillingness to assist them in their opposition to the government of their country of origin' (Lama 2000).

Another area where the refugees could pose threat to security is launching terrorist attacks within their host country, illegally smuggled arms, allied with the domestic opposition against host government's policies, participated in drug trafficking and in other ways eroded governments willingness to admit refugees (Suryanarayan 1998). However, sometimes the host countries denied the facts due to the negative implications that it received in national as well as international arena. "What was tragic-comic about the whole situation was the fact that New Delhi was trying to hoodwink the world by asserting that there were no militant camps in India" (Weiner 1993).

Afghanistan has become a place of concern due to the growing supply of heroin in Europe. This has generated tremendous pressure on the government in Pakistan. It is reported that over 50% of the world supply and 80% of European supply of heroin comes from Afghanistan with a street value of \$ 30-40 billion. This has put a tremendous pressure on Pakistan as it has both domestic and international implications. There has also been growing nexus between the politicians and drug barons in Pakistan. Large chunk of drug money allegedly goes to support cross-border insurgencies. A report of the Anti Narcotic Force of Pakistan stated that in 1997 alone among the 50,555 defendants arrested for drug trafficking, 206 were foreigners from 38 countries. With 71 defendants Afghanistan topped the list followed by Tanzania 31 and Nigeria 25 (Lama 2000).

Another major problem has been that of the refugees' involvement in supplying sophisticated weapons to the rebels. Example is that of Afghan refugees who began to supply Kalashnikov automatic rifles and anti-aircraft missiles to the Afghan refugee militants. This changed the entire profile of crimes and terrorist activities in Pakistan. "It is widely believed among officials involved with the pipeline (to deliver weapons) that anywhere from 20-70 percent of US military aid for insurgents never reached its real destination rather, for reasons ranging from expediency to personal profit, it has been appropriated, traded sold or hidden by groups with access to the shipments – to the Pakistan armed forces, Afghan political parties based in Peshawar, rebel commanders or individual guerrillas" (Ibid). Furthermore, the arms trade has been topped by trade in drugs that were mainly produced by the Mujahideen and processed in the factories that were set up in the border areas.

It is not only the inter-countries conflict that has been the main source of refugees and displaced persons in the past history. Conflicts resulting from variety of issues have now led to the greatest source of forced flight, eclipsing other major causes such as natural and man-made disasters like famine, draught, flood, ecological devastation and ill-advised development projects. Another dimension of conflict is ethnic conflict which has become very serious particularly since the end of Cold War. The ethnic based politics has become the main focus and root cause for the upheavals. The decline of the ideology based division in the global politics as well as in the domestic fronts in many countries has been accompanied by the identity based politics.

Ethnicity is currently the manifestation of the struggles by different interest groups over the distribution of power, territory and resources. Meantime, the prevailing insecurity and disparity within a country – economic, social and political– provided fertile ground for manipulation. Likewise, the status of migrants, aliens, minorities and even of ostensibly naturalized person is ill-defined or unresolved in many states (Weiner 1993).

Conflict also arises from ethno-cultural discrimination and alienation and extreme regional disparities. The attempts to bring about structural change in the polity by Maoist elements in Nepal and India and historical dislocation and poor post-independence adjustment such as that affect India's Nagaland also bring serious conflicts. Other causes ranging from religious persecution and fundamentalist indoctrination to the non-or malfunctioning of democracy, as well as protracted bad governance and environmental dislocation figure prominently in some theaters of conflict such as Pakistan's Karachi and Baluchistan (Dubey 2003, Lama 2000).

#### **4.5 Migration and security in Nepal**

This section examines three crucial varieties of migration including i) internal migration in Nepal, ii) out migration from Nepal and iii) migration to Nepal from neighboring countries and. Further this section also assesses a range of impact generated by these three varieties of migration and elucidates as how these impacts impinge upon the national security of Nepal. The issue of internal migration in Nepal is mostly discussed in the context of protracted Maoist movement and violence triggered internally displaced people (IDPs). This section also delves into the issues of Tibetans and Bhutanese refugees and Indian migrants into Nepal along with various forms of Nepalese migrants into India and other countries including the trafficking of women and girl children.

Migration is now becoming a researchable issue in Nepal as compared to other demographic dynamics despite the fact that many socio-economic, demographic and political problems are closely associated with the process of both internal and international migration.

#### **4.5.1 Internal migration**

Analysing migration data from various censuses is scrutiny complex task due to frequent changes in geographical boundaries and changes in urban and rural definitions. Temporary comparisons and longitudinal analysis have been severely limited due to changes in the content of migration questionnaires in various censuses. Analysis of primary data on migration was confined either within resettlement areas of the Terai or in Terai districts and the three towns of Kathmandu Valley (Gurung et al 1993).

According to the census data obtained from the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS 2001), Nepal has a total population of 23.15 million with a density of 157 persons per square kilometer. The agricultural sector contributes about 40 per cent to the GDP and supports 80 per cent of the Nepalese population. Trade, tourism and service sectors contribute to a larger proportion of GDP while the manufacturing sector contributes only 10 per cent to the GDP. As per the World Bank's report, the per capita Gross National Income (GNI) is at US \$ 250 (The World Bank 2003). Every two in five persons lives below absolute poverty line and every other person in rural areas is poor. A high unemployment and underemployment rate of 17.4 and 32.3 per cent respectively, (NPC 2003) have compelled people remain either under the vicious circle of poverty or migrate to other places within and outside the country for the better opportunities of livelihood.

Nepal is a landlocked country with 147, 181 square kilometer with a diverse geography. There are three major belts that include Himal, Hills and Plain area known as Terai. In the other direction it is divided into three major river systems; from east to west Koshi, Narayani and Karnali. Administratively it is divided into 14 zones and 75 districts and Kathmandu Valley is its capital lies in the middle of the country.

**Table IV.II**  
**Life-time migrants by origin and destination**  
**for ecological zones Nepal, 2001**

Origin Destination					Per cent	Net- migration
	Mountain	Hill	Terai	Total		
(Both sexes)	-	125,597	169,825	295,422	17.1	-255,103
Mountain	33,895	-	1,157,035	1,190,930	68.9	-830,759
Hill	6,424	234,574	-	240,998	14.0	1,085,862
Terai	40,319	360,171	1,326,860	1,727,350	100.0	
Total	2.3	20.9	76.8	100.0		
Per cent						
(Male)						
Mountain	-	57,170	84,783	141,953	16.8	-127,610
Hill	10,822	-	597,513	578,335	68.4	-400,001
Terai	3,521	121,164	-	124,685	14.8	527,611
Total	14,343	178,334	652,296	844,973	100.0	
Per cent	1.7	21.1	77.2	100.0		
(Female)						
Mountain	-	68,428	85,040	153,468	17.4	-127,511
Hill	23,061	-	589,528	612,589	69.4	-430,746
Terai	2,896	113,415	-	116,311	13.2	558,257
Total	25,957	181,843	674,568	882,368	100.0	
Per cent	2.9	20.6	76.4	100.0		

*Source: CBS, 2002*

The population of Nepal is growing at an annual rate of 2.25 per cent between 1991 and 2001 with a sex ratio of 99.8. Population momentum created by the young age population (39.4% below 15 years) will contribute more to population growth and migration in the country (CBS 2002).



Internal migration constitutes in-and-out- migration between rural-to-rural, rural-to-urban, urban-to-rural and urban-to-urban areas. There are many reasons for migration of which sometimes migrants themselves do not seem to know why they have migrated to the destination or are intending to migrate. Additionally, there are various types of time bound migrations such as seasonal migration followed by temporary, semi-permanent and possibly a permanent move, unless a migrant keeps on circulating or moving by just changing the location several time a year or more. The short and long distance migration from rural-to-rural and rural-to-urban inside the country is vital for migration analysis. Whatever the types of migration in terms of both time and space, except forced migration due to natural calamity and war, migrants usually respond to pull and push factors depending upon whether it was an individual migration or a migration involving the entire family members and other relatives. A large number of migrants would say they had migrated from the origin for better employment opportunity, for earning more income, to raise their standard of living, for education, for survival, for business or service or even environmental factors among many others (Khatiwada 2008).

Nepal has been experiencing increasing volume of internal migration after the control of endemic malaria in the Terai and inner Terai Valleys since the early 1950s. The census data of 1961 showed 170,137 as inter-zonal migrants (KC 1998), which increased to 445,128 in 1971, 929,585 in 1981 and 1,228,356 in 1991 (Table 4.1). In 2001 the total volume of intern-zonal migration by three ecological zones increased to 1,727,350 persons (Table 4.2). Female constituted 51 per cent of the total inter-zonal migrants between 1991-2001 (CBS 2003). In 2001, mountain (-14.8 net-migration) and hill (-48 net-migration) lost 1,085,862 persons, all gained by the Terai (+62.8 net migration). Volume of intern-regional migration by 15 sub-regions would be 2,047,350. The volume of inter-district life-time migration by 75 districts would increase to 2,929,062 persons. This constituted 13.2 per cent of the total native born population in Nepal (CBS 2003).

According to the NLFSII (2008), out of 100 migrants (all ages) in the country, 80 percent reported that they have come from rural areas, 7 percent from urban areas and 13 percent from another country (see Table 4.1.1). About 13 percent migrants have moved from urban to urban, 77 percent have moved from rural to urban and 11

percent from outside Nepal to rural Nepal. Following table 4.1.2 shows the latest status of migration in Nepal. On ecological basis, Terai is still a very popular destiny for the Nepali migrants. It has been a case since late 1950s and early 1960s when the malaria eradication programme were launched. The NLFSII 2008 survey shows more than 49 percent people are the migrant in Terai.

**Table IV.III**  
**Distribution of migrants (all ages) by sex and current location**

	Number of Migrants (in Thousands)			Migrants as percent of total for each groups (percentage of the total)		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
<b>Total</b>	<b>7840</b>	<b>2371</b>	<b>5469</b>	<b>33.3</b>	<b>21.3</b>	<b>44.0</b>
<b>Ecological Belt</b>						
Mountain	399	98	300	24.4	12.6	35.3
Hill	3117	1011	2106	30.9	21.4	39.3
Terai	4324	1262	3063	36.6	22.5	49.3
<b>Development region</b>						
Eastern	577	1349	1926	35.4	22.5	47.0
Central	868	1900	2767	34.1	22.1	45.4
Western	433	1072	1505	34.1	21.2	45.1
Mid-western	256	591	847	25.5	16.3	33.6
Far-western	238	556	794	35.2	23.3	45.0
<b>Urban</b>	<b>1814</b>	<b>818</b>	<b>996</b>	<b>51.1</b>	<b>46.3</b>	<b>55.9</b>
Kathmandu Valley	618	312	305	54.5	53.1	56.1
Eastern/Central Hill/Mt.	169	73	96	52.7	48.3	56.6
"West" Hills/Mt.	276	117	159	55.0	49.4	60.0
Eastern Terai	285	119	166	47.1	40.6	53.4
Central Terai	200	84	117	46.9	38.0	56.4
"West" Terai "	266	113	153	47.3	40.8	53.7
<b>Rural</b>	<b>6026</b>	<b>1553</b>	<b>4473</b>	<b>30.1</b>	<b>16.6</b>	<b>42.0</b>
Eastern Hills/Mt.	471	121	350	25.8	13.9	36.7
Central Hills/Mt.	668	187	481	24.6	14.7	33.5
Western Hills/Mt.	661	170	491	29.2	16.6	39.5
Mid/Far-western Hills/Mt.	654	130	524	22.0	9.5	32.7
Eastern Terai	1101	305	796	38.1	22.6	51.7
Central Terai	1182	243	939	32.5	13.9	49.7
"West" Terai "	1289	398	892	34.8	23.1	45.1

"West" refers to western, mid-western and far-western development regions

Source : Nepal Labour Force Survey II 2008, CBS, 2009

A wider discrepancy existed between the percentage of internal migration by sex in the 1996 survey and the 2001 census. For example, the percentage of life-time migrants among females as the per cent of the total native born population in 1996 was 32.7 as against only 14.6 in 2001.

**Table IV.IV**  
**Summary of Inter-regional migration by sex 1981 – 2001**  
**(region of birth by region of enumeration)**

Migration region	Year		
	1981	1991	2001
From mountain to hill	134,254	76,503	125,597
% Female	50.1	58.9	54.5
to Terai	162,832	121,826	169,825
% Female	46.8	49.5	50.1
Total No.	297,086	198,329	295,422
% Female	48.3	53.2	51.9
From hill to mountain	33,423	32,003	33,895
% Female	58.7	68.9	68.0
to Terai	561,211	895,888	1,157,035
% Female	47.4	50.5	50.9
Total No.	594,634	927,891	1,190,930
% Female	48.0	51.1	51.4
From Terai to mountain	2,196	4,671	6,424
% Female	49.0	38.1	45.1
to hill	35,669	97,465	234,574
% Female	51.3	49.2	48.3
Total No.	37,865	102,136	240,998
% Female	57.2	48.7	48.3
Inter-regional migration			
Total No.	929,585	1,228,356	1,727,350
% Female	48.2	51.2	51.1

*Source: CBS, 2002, Gender Disaggregated Indicators, Nepal*

The 2001 census of Nepal provides qualitative information to calculate four streams of migration within the country (Table 4.3). In Nepal, the major streams of internal migration are rural-to-rural (68.2%) and rural-to-urban (25.5% in 2001 and 31.2% in 1996). Urban-to-urban (2.8%) and urban-to-rural (3.5%) are of lesser importance.

**Table IV.V**

**Rural-urban, urban-urban, rural-rural and urban-rural migration streams by Eco-development regions, Nepal, 2001**

Eco-development		Migration streams							Total migration
Region	Rural-urban		Urban--urban		Rural-rural		Urban-rural		
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	
Mountain	2,150	4.5	188	0.4	42,364	89.0	2,884	6.1	47,586
Eastern	1,523	9.1	81	0.5	14,522	86.5	656	3.9	16,782
Central	627	4.7	107	0.8	11,483	85.6	1,204	9.0	13,421
Western					3,516	93.7	237	6.3	3,753
Mid-wsten					3,999	95.2	200	4.8	4,199
Far-wstern					8,844	93.8	587	6.2	9,431
Hill	424,801	38.8	60,031	5.5	565,527	51.6	44,851	4.1	1,095,210
Eastern	16,500	11.4	1,529	1.1	118,905	82.2	7,659	5.3	144,593
Central	334,951	52.3	53,097	8.3	225,908	35.3	26,246	4.1	640,202
Western	61,673	29.4	4,495	2.1	136,518	65.1	6,860	3.3	209,546
Mid-wstn	9,107	12.8	580	0.8	58,657	82.6	2,677	3.8	71,021
Far-wstn	2,570	8.6	330	1.1	25,539	85.6	1,409	4.7	29,848
Terai	319,334	17.9	21,206	1.2	1,389,956	77.8	55,770	3.1	1,786,266
Eastern	114,262	20.5	7,927	1.4	420,504	75.477.5	14,841	2.7	557,534
Central	74,202	17.5	6,232	1.5	328,274	82.0	14,846	3.5	423,554
Western	44,475	13.8	2,930	0.9	265,278	81.2	10,714	33	323,397
Mid-wstn	27,480	14.2	1,876	1.0	157,394	75.9	7,022	3.6	193,772
Far-wstn	58,915	20.5	2,241	0.8	218,506	68.2	8,347	2.9	288,009
Total	746,285	25.5	81,425	2.8	1,997,847	68.2	103,505	3.5	2,929,062

Source: CBS, 2002

The magnitude of this stream can not be compared with data provided in the previous censuses as the number of urban centers has drastically increased with many of the newly designated urban centers being rural in character.

Therefore, Nepal still has an overwhelming rural-to-rural migration. Rural-to-urban migration is gaining more visibility in districts with large urban areas such as Kathmandu (71.8%), Kaski (82.7%), Lalitpur (56.6%), and Bhaktapur (44.6%). Internal migrant to urban areas has increased over time from 13.4% in 1971, 16.3% in 1981, 17.2% in 1991 (KC 1998).

**Table IV.VI**  
**Migrant population (all ages) sex, current location and origin of last migration**

Origin of last migration	Number (in thousands)			Percentage		
	Currently located in urban area	Currently located in rural area	Total migrant	Currently located in urban area	Currently located in rural area	Total migrant
<b>Male</b>						
From urban Nepal	103	126	229	12.5	8.1	9
From rural Nepal	626	1153	1779	76.6	74.2	75
From outside Nepal	89	274	363	10.9	17.7	15
<b>Total male</b>	<b>818</b>	<b>1553</b>	<b>2371</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
Male by current location				34.5	65.5	100
<b>Female</b>						
From urban Nepal	130	200	330	13	4.5	6
From rural Nepal	762	3748	4509	76.5	83.8	82
From outside Nepal	104	525	630	10.5	11.7	11
<b>Total female</b>	<b>996</b>	<b>4473</b>	<b>5469</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
Female by current location				18.2	81.8	100
<b>Both sex</b>						
From urban Nepal	233	326	559	12.8	5.4	7
From rural Nepal	1388	4900	6288	76.5	81.3	80
From outside Nepal	193	799	993	10.7	13.3	12
<b>Total persons</b>	<b>1814</b>	<b>6026</b>	<b>7840</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
Persons by current location				23.1	76.9	100

Source: Nepal Labour Force Survey II 2008, CBS, 2009

According to the NLFS II (2008), migration from rural Nepal to urban Nepal dominates the migrant population. In both sex, moving from rural to urban the most common phenomenon in migration. Table 4.3.1 shows that both sex, 80% of the migrant population are from rural to urban area.

Basically, there have been five major reasons for migration such as business, agriculture, service, study and marriage (CBS 2002). The category in other reasons comprised 31.6 per cent followed by marriage (23%), agriculture (18.1%), service (11.5%), study (10.3%) and business (5.5%). Internal migration in Nepal is very much a permanent phenomenon as 44.1 per cent of the total inter-district migrants are living in destination for more than 10 years (CBS 2002 and Table 4.3).

#### **4.5.1.1 Internal migration and security challenges**

Internal migration has led to both positive and negative social and economic implications for the place of origin and destination. Initially, low density and economic potentialities in Terai area prompted migration from the mountain and hill to the Terai. However, at present Terai has low capacity to absorb additional population due to the growing number of people to migrate from hills and also to some extent from across border states of India. Urban areas are also over crowded through rural-to urban migration. The Tenth Plan (2002 – 2007) has emphasized on balanced spatial distribution of population by promoting socio-economic factors in both sending and receiving areas. The flow from hills to Terai has also created tension in Terai. The increasing rural – urban migration (see Table 4.3.1 NLFSII 2008) has made the urban cities over crowded, lack of basic infrastructures such as; drinking water, roads, sanitation, electricity etc and posed serious environment related problems. One of the major reasons for the stir in Terai which we have witnessed in recent years has been the migration of hill population to Terai.. As Jha argues that January and February 2007 movement in Terai was focused upon the proportional representation through restructuring the state institutions for inclusive and federal state, which reflects the meaning of equal sharing of power in the state restructures with full recognition of identity (Jha 2011). Madhes movement was part of a broader movement which widen the traditional hill centric notion of Nepali nationalism (Jha 2007). It was for the glorification of the term ‘Madhes’ which was imposed by the

Rana rulers as a colonial token. The movement has challenged the 'Nepalisation' processes of Terai that has given legitimacy to the hill ruling elites to hegemonies the state (Gaije 2009).

"As the identity based politics became major feature of Nepali politics, various ethnic groups have become more assertive and also started to engage in violent activities. In the hill regions as well various ethnic groups particularly in the eastern hill districts like; Ilam, Panchthar, Dhankuta, Taplejung, Terhathum, Bhojpur, Khotang, Solukhumbu and Okhaldhunga ethnicity based politics has begun to emerge and organisations like Kirat National Front and Limbuwan Liberation Front have become active" (Bhattarai and Sharma 2011). These groups have been engaging activities like killing, extortion, harassment etc. Though in number, these groups are very small but still they have been able to create disturbance in the local peace and tranquility and posing serious threats to the existence of the central state's presence in those areas and also halt the government employees works.

Terai includes twenty districts: from east to west, Jhapa, Morang, Sunsari, Saptari, Dhanusa, Siraha, Mahottari, Sarlahi, Rautahat, Bara, Parsa, Chitawan, Nawalparasi, Rupandehi, Kapivastu, Dang, Banke, Bardia, Kailali, and Kanchanpur. In Nepali context synonyms of Terai is also *Madhes*. It also denotes the plains of eastern and central Terai. *Madhesis* have been defined as non-Pahadis with plains languages as their mother tongue. The term encompasses both caste Hindus and Muslims. However, the indigenous groups in Terai like Tharus and Rajbanshi have defied such definitions and refused to call themselves as Madhesis (Lieten 2002).

Tharus and Rajbanshi are the original inhabitants of Terai and Madhesis came in much later as migrants. However, the *Madhesis* do not regard the Pahadis who have been living in Terai for couple of generations as Terai people. Madhesi community has been arguing that since the 1950s, the government has encouraged hill people to migrate to the plains. Facilitated by malaria eradication programs, clearing of forests and land resettlement schemes, the Pahadi proportion of the population in Terai has increased several folds. According to the 1951 census there were 6 per cent Pahadis population in the Terai, 2001 census it has reached up to 33 per cent (CBS 2001).

Hill origin migrants even constitute the majority in several districts today. The Madhesis community felt threat from the increasing number of Pahadiya population in Terai. Various armed groups and other peacefully engaged political organisations identified the Terai issue as one of the central government's colonialism and wanted to liberate from it. Among these groups like Jaya Krishan Goit, and Jwala Singh factions demand for an independent Terai state. There are dozens of such group in the Terai to be fighting for the Madhes cause. Though, their activities are largely criminal and their numerical strength is also not very significant. However, these groups have been creating serious trouble in maintaining law and order in the region (Khatiwada 2008).

Another group which was formed after the Terai movement was Chure Bhawar Ekta Samaj (CBES)<sup>4</sup> This group was set up by Pahadis in the central Terai, to protect their interest against growing Madhesi mobilization. The members in this group consists people from various political parties including mainstream parties. The people affiliated with this group are living around East – West Highway (Jha 2007).

The recent Madhes movement picked up the momentum only after the success of the April 2006 movement. As the April 2006 movement was able to re-establish democratic state with republican order and federal structures. This has been the marked departure from its traditional monarchical and centralized state into a republican and federal set up.

The flashpoint of the Madhesi movement was in Nepalgunj, when administration tried block the march organised by one of the Terai based parties Nepal Sadvawana Party (NSP) in January 2007. During that time, several people were arrested and also in Siraha districts a young Madhesi activist was shot dead on 20 January. Since, then the tension was escalated and during the period there were 30 dead and 800 people were injured. The movement forced the government and other major parties to pay serious attention to Madhesi grievances (Jha 2007).

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<sup>4</sup> CBES is a group of hill people living in Terai which advocates for the interests of the hill people in Terai. It was formed during the 2007 Madhes movement and has a representation in the Constituent Assembly of Nepal.



After the movement, there is a real risk of violence between Pahadis and Madhesi in Terai. The line between the struggle against the state and against Pahadis has been blurred among the Madhesi parties and armed groups (Jha 2011). Both the peaceful agitators of Madhesi groups and the armed groups targeted the Pahadis community and used violence tactics like abduction, killings etc. Since then, the Pahadis community particularly government officers and business persons in Terai districts have been targeted. Likewise, the formation of Pahadi group like Chure Bhawar Ekata Samaj has further polarized the situation because the formation of CBES group which is an exclusively based on Pahadi community and its anti-Madhesi activities further deepened the rift between Madhesi and Pahadis in Terai. Therefore, the security environment has further deteriorated in Terai districts in recent days which has tremendous implications on maintaining law and order situation in Terai (Ibid).

As the identity based politics (various minority and indigenous groups have begun to assert their identity and demand better representations in the state organs) became major feature of Nepali politics, various ethnic groups have become more assertive and also started to engage in violent activities. In the hill regions as well various ethnic groups particularly in the eastern hill districts like; Ilam, Panchthar, Dhankuta, Taplejung, Terhathum, Bhojpur, Khotang, Solukhumbu and Okhaldhunga ethnicity based politics has begun to emerged and organisations like Kirat National Front and Limbuwan Liberation Front have become active. Among these groups, some of the groups even demand for secession from the central state and some of the groups want a province exclusively based on their ethnic groups. These groups have been engaging activities like killing, extortion, harassment etc. Though in number, these groups are very small but still they have been able to create disturbance to the local peace and tranquility and posing serious threats to the existence of the central state's presence in those areas and also halt the government employees works. Due to their increasing violent activities, easy access to the weapons because of the porous borders, financial incentives for criminality, and groups using violence to compete for territorial supremacy. Likewise, these groups in some of the areas particularly in the eastern districts i.e. Ilam, Panchthar, Taplejung are running parallel administration and collect regular money from the local people and from those who visit in those areas. This has created serious challenge to the state and its authority in maintaining the security environment in the region.

Similarly, the increasing migratory movement from hill region to Terai has also generated serious problems particularly in Terai. On the one hand the density of population has increased significantly in the Terai on the other hand, the Madhesi population starting to feel that Pahadi people's increasing presence in the Terai would ultimately be a threat in their long run prosperity and existence. As Terai is the fertile land of Nepal where the agriculture productivity is much higher than in the hills, because of low productivity, lack of daily wage mechanism and opportunity and unfavorable geographical setting to gain economic support therefore, most of the Pahadis people want to move into Terai to settle or even seek works (Lal 2008).

Another reason for people tending to migrate Terai has been better infrastructures facilities. Compare to hills, the roads, markets, schools etc. are much better in Terai. The hill people's growing attraction to migrate and settle in Terai had been taken by the Madhesi people as an encroachment to their land and cultures (Jha 2007). Particularly, people in mid-Terai region (Sunsari, Saptari, Siraha, Dhanusha, Parsa etc.) and began to attack to the hill origin people in those districts. Many hill origin people who had been living there since their two three generations have started to leave from in those districts to move either in Kathmandu or other hill districts. Such a situation further intensify the polarization the community in Terai region and deteriorate the security environment of the country.

#### **4.5.2 International migration and security**

As stated earlier, Nepal has a long history of migration. Nepalese people have been emigrating temporarily or permanently since the first quarter of the 19<sup>th</sup> century leaving behind women, children and old people to take care of agriculture in rural areas of Nepal. The reason cited for this kind of migration are forced labour within the country, forced recruitment in British Army and British-India, indebtedness at home and extreme poverty. Later waves of migration to foreign countries expanded from a few neighbouring countries like India, Burma, Bhutan and Sikkim to many other labour importing countries in South-east, East and Far-east Asia, Middle-east, Europe and North America (Kilot 1987).

The Government of Nepal has listed 105 countries where official permission can be granted for those seeking jobs overseas. The list has been compiled on an ad hoc basis. Iraq is the only country as of December 2006 banned for employment for security reasons following the kidnapping and murder of 12 Nepali migrant workers by Islamic militants on 31<sup>st</sup> August 2004. Despite the ban, a sizeable number of Nepali migrant workers still go to Iraq. Thus, while officially the government does not issue permission Nepalese to work in Iraq, large number of people are working in Iraq (Adhikari 2008).

Nepalese who have been absent for more than six months from their place of origin in Nepal and were living in foreign countries increased substantially since the people's movement<sup>5</sup> of 1951. The 1951/54 census enumerated 198,130 persons or 2.3 per cent of the total population being absent from the country for more than 6 months and living abroad. Of this absentee population, 97.3 per cent were originally from the mountains and hills of Nepal. According to the data obtained from the CBS, this flow of emigration increased to 328,470 (3.4%) in 1961, 402,977 (2.7%) in 1981, 656,290 (3.7%) in 1991 and 762,181 (3.4%) in 2001. Such a movement during the last 50 years period was overwhelmingly destined to India. The proportion Nepalese going to India increased to 92 per cent in 1961 than in 1951 (CBS 2001).

According to the 2001 census report, even larger number of Nepalese emigrated to India however, in term of the proportion it has gone down in the year 2001. This was because many Nepalese have changed their destination to Gulf countries, Malaysia and other East Asian countries than to India (CBS 1991, 2001 and also cited by KC 1998).

Large number of Nepalese used to go India as a seasonal migrant worker in the agriculture fields like in Hariyana, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Punjab. Such flow to India has now gradually shifted from India to the Gulf countries like Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait and Malaysia. For example, personal service, business, institutional service and other reasons accounted for 95 per cent of all reasons, while

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<sup>5</sup> The pro-democracy movement launched by political parties of Nepal in 1950 -51 was overthrown the 104 years old Rana Oligarchy system and established a multi-party democratic system with constitutional monarchy.

agriculture merely accounted for less than one per cent (CBS 2002). Out of total absent population from Nepal in the year 2001 census, males comprised 89.1 per cent and females 10.9 per cent. Almost 90 per cent of absentees were from rural areas of Nepal and 10.3 per cent were from urban areas. Females from rural areas comprised 85.3 per cent compared to 14.7 per cent from urban areas. About 70 per cent of these absentees population were from the poverty-stricken mountain and hill districts in the mid-western and far-western region of Nepal. Private jobs or personal service alone accounted for 63 per cent of all reasons for absentee. Out of this, 76% per cent were destined to India (KC 2003).

The 2001 census data gives a much smaller volume of Nepalese emigrants to foreign countries. However, a recent statistics indicate that the growing trends towards international migration, from 3,605 in FY 1993-94 to 183,929 in FY 2004-05 (Migrant Year Book 2006). It is extremely difficult to determine with any precision the number of Nepalese working in India or for that matter Indians working in Nepal (Adhikari 2006).

The range of working Nepalese in India varies. The census data do not provide data on Nepalese working in India. First, they do not include the seasonal migrant workers who go their from Far-West and Mid-West regions. Secondly, the number of people officially working in overseas countries excluding India based on Government's data and Census reports is considerably less than those suggested by research studies. For example, one recent report estimated that there are about 2.5 million Nepalese working in India. However, this estimation is based on a case study undertaken by researchers in five VDCs in Achham district, where they found that at least one member from 70% of the households – mostly males – were working in India (Ibid).

**Table IV.VII**  
**Migration trends in the past years**

Year	Total number of people going to foreign countries
1993	3,605
1994	2,185
1995	2,134
1996	3,259
1997	7,745
1998	27,796
1999	35,543
2000	55,025
2001	104,739
2002	105,055
2003	91,540
2004	183,929

*Source: Department of Labour, Employment Promotion, Government of Nepal 2006*

According to the estimate obtained from Migrant Year Book, the flow of Nepalese migrant workers to countries other than South Asia is calculated as per the monthly basis. The figures for the first month of the year include second half of December 2005 and first half of January 2006. This figure includes only those who sought and got government permission to go and work in overseas countries. There are no figures available on the exact number of Nepali going overseas for foreign employment without taking the government permission (Migrant Year Book 2006).

India used to be the first destiny to the Nepali migrant workers. Because of easy access due to the open border system, availability of jobs for the unskilled workers, seasonal jobs availability etc. were there reasons. Similarly, people from the most lower class those who could not afford going third countries usually opt for India. Still in terms of number of migrant workers, India is the most popular destiny for both permanent and temporary or seasonal workers in Nepal. However, in terms of remittances sender countries, Qatar (21.3%) is the highest sender country (see Table

No. 4.4.1 NLFS II 2008) and India (13.%) comes to the fourth after Malaysia (19.2%), Saudi Arabia (14.9).

**Table IV.VIII**  
**Summary of Migration Statistics**

Description	Nepal Labour Force Survey 2008
Percentage of households receiving a remittance: from either absentee or other	30.0
Percentage of households receiving a remittance from abroad: from either absentee or other	23.0
Average remittance received in the last 12 months (total) by households receiving remittance (NRs)	65,755
From within Nepal	28,976
From outside Nepal	80,462
Average remittance received in the last 12 months (total) over all households (NRs)	19,721
From within Nepal	3,366
From outside Nepal	16,355
Share of amount of remittances received by household:	
From within Nepal	16.8
From outside Nepal	83.2
Total	100.0
Share of amount of remittances received by household from outside Nepal	100.0
From India	13.4
From Malaysia	19.2
From Saudi Arabia	14.9
From Qatar	21.3
From United Kingdom	2.2
From other countries	29.0
Per capita remittance amount for all Nepal (nominal NRs.)	4,042
Total amount of remittance received (nominal NRs.)	95,155,180,411

Note: Nominal Rupees are values in current prices without adjustment for price changes over the period.

Source: Nepal Labour Force Survey II 2008, CBS, 2009

**Table IV.IX**  
**Remittances received from outside Nepal (absentees and others combined)**

Location	No. of households receiving remittance	Percentage of households receiving remittance	Average amount of remittance over HHs receiving remittance from absentees & others (Rs.)	Average amount of remittance from absentees & others over all HHs (Rs.)
Nepal	3,379	23	80462	16355
Mountain	150	17.5	60667	8485
Hill	1,702	23.6	85422	17395
Terai	1,527	23.2	77993	16566
Eastern	747	23.1	86575	17994
Central	1,007	16.8	98242	14032
Western	920	31.7	90383	27449
Mid-Western	321	20.3	49898	8680
Far-Western	384	31.3	31571	7733
Urban	1,474	19.2	145926	21736
Kathmandu Valley	293	12.4	213411	18375
Eastern/Central Hill/Mt.	187	25.9	91128	13507
West Hill/Mt.	362	30.2	140633	38349
Eastern Terai	209	16.5	151273	21099
Central Terai	173	19.2	169357	25595
West" Terai "	250	21.4	88060	14807
Rural	1905	23.8	71,140	15252
Eastern Hill/Mt.	172	22.8	81209	15776
Central Hill/Mt.	172	14.3	87331	9758
Western Hill/Mt.	402	35.7	79057	26864
Mid/Far Western Hill/Mt.	264	22.1	38674	7178
Eastern Terai	281	24.3	81247	18981
Central Terai	267	20	75225	14363
West" Terai "	347	27.7	61123	14965

#### 4.5.3 Nepali migrant workers popular destinations

Traditionally, getting recruitment in the British army was the most sought after foreign work that the people mainly from the hill regions wanted. The second popular

recruitment was to the Indian army. However, since the past few decades, people's perceptions have also been changing and the area of activities and destination countries have also been changing. The recruitment in the British army is still immensely popular among the indigenous community. However, foreign jobs have also become popular among the people from other ethnic background and they have preferred to go outside the country to do work. These days the newly industrialized countries of East Asia and Southeast Asia have become the main destination. Likewise some Gulf countries specially Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE etc have also become major destinations for the Nepali migrant workers (Gurung 2007).

**Table IV.X**  
**Workers going for foreign employment**  
**by country in 2006**

Names of countries*	Number of people
Malaysia	80,926
Qatar	59,746
Saudi Arabia	29,158
U.A.E.	19,715
Kuwait	1093
South Korea	787
Bahrain	759
Israel	708
Macao	250
Hong Kong	226
Russia	201
Oman	117
U.S.A.	44
Afghanistan	20
Maldives	15
Cyprus	3
New Zealand	3
Seselsa	2

*Source:*

*Department of Labour and Employment Promotion, Ministry of Labour, Government of Nepa, 2007l*

*\* This list does not include India where largest number of Nepalese people go for work*



Apart from India, Malaysia remains the most destined place for the Nepali migrant workers. According to the available data 41.8% of Nepali workers went to Malaysia in the year 2006 which is the largest. The second most popular destiny is Qatar where 30.8% people went there in the same year. Third is Saudi Arabia where 15% of workers went and United Arab Emirates with 10.2% as shown in the Table 4.5. In East and Southeast Asia, apart from Malaysia, Hong Kong, Macao, South Korea are also other destinations. After the completion of negotiation between Nepali Government and South Korean Government about allowing Nepali workers to work in South Korea, it is expected that the number will increase sharply. In fact, these countries are popular destinies but due to the lack of accessibility and also several restrictions imposed by these countries to obtain working visa, the number is less (Gurung 2007).

#### **4.6 Migrant workers and Security**

As the number of out country migration has been increasing rapidly the problem related with the migrant workers has also been increasing. Despite being one of the main countries in labour sending for quite a long time, Nepal still does not have clear and comprehensive policy in this area as well as legal framework. Cases like fraudulence, trafficking, lack of work place safety etc are the other major challenges in this area (Migrant Year Book 2008). The increasing number of fraudulence cases and the insecurity that the migrant labours are facing in various labour receiving countries and Nepali government's failure to curb in those problems have generated number of problems in this area. First, it has sent a message that the Nepali state is so weak it not only resolve its unemployment problem but also could not ensure minimum level of security to its citizens. Likewise, those migrant workers who are mistreated or cheated by the foreign employment agencies or by the employers in those countries would return back to the country with anger and frustration, then there would be high possibility of them taking revenge against the government through various means and ways. This would ultimately affect the security and prestige of the country.

#### **4.6.1 Weak legal protection**

One of the basic problems that Nepal faces today is lack of a comprehensive policy and laws on the management of foreign employment and the workers safety and security. The Labour and Employment Policy, published in February 2006 by the Ministry of Labour and Transport Management to replace the National Labour Policy of 1999, takes into account the changing realities of the labour market and incorporates the commitments made by the government during the Second Labour Conference held in 2005. The policy seeks to promote cordial relations between the employee and the employer based on mutual trust in order to boost production. The long-term objective of the policy is to promote atmosphere conducive for investment by introducing reforms in legal framework, developing labour information system, integrated small enterprises with micro-credit programmes among others. However, this policy also does not deal in depth the issue of foreign employment and the challenges out country migrant workers face (Ibid).

The Government of Nepal controls foreign employment through the Foreign Employment Act 2042 (1985) which has become anachronistic in terms of context as well as the contents of the Act. During the time of enactment of this Act, Nepal had miniscule number of people working outside the country. Very few number of people were seeking foreign employment. But today, there are such a large number of people who have been working outside the country and sending huge amount of money as a remittance, a single largest source of national income for driving the Nepalese economy. However, in the absence of proper policy and legal protection the Nepali migrant workers who have been working in various parts of the world have been facing serious problems. The 1985 Act states that it was formulated “to protect and to provide support the matters relating to foreign employment” but it still is restrictive in nature. It aims at controlling and managing foreign employment in order to “maintain economic interests and conveniences of the general public.” It provides for issuance of licenses, prior permission to be obtained to select workers for foreign employment, processes for the selection of workers, contract, information on the country where the workers has to be employed, and punishments for violation of the Act provisions. The government holds the special power to cancel licenses given to recruiting agents in special situation (Foreign Employment Act 1985).

The National Planning Commission in its Ninth Plan and the Tenth Plan envisaged to promote foreign employment by mobilizing Nepali diplomatic missions and establishment of Labour Attaches in countries where the number of Nepali migrant workers exceeds 5,000 and other activities aimed at ensuring safety and welfare of Nepali workers (NPC – Ninth and Tenth Plan 2006). These however remain pious hopes as Nepal's foreign policy has neither the policy instruments nor it has sufficient infrastructure to promote employment of Nepali workers overseas. The 1985 Act was amended twice – the first in 1992 with minor changes followed by the second in 1998.

However, both the amendments have failed to address the key issues affecting foreign employment. In 2005, the Government introduced an Ordinance for Making Arrangements Regarding Foreign Employment to replace the Foreign Employment Act 1985. The Ordinance recognises first time the importance of foreign employment and its contribution in the national economy as well as resolving the unemployment problem of the country. The Ordinance has had the twin goals of making the foreign employment recruitment dignified, systematic, service-oriented and transparent while at the same time protect the rights and interests of migrant workers. Still, the problems of the migrant workers and the tedious process of securing foreign employment and the roles of the employment agencies (middlemen) are the issues that remain literally unaddressed. (Migrant Year Book 2007).

Even the Ordinance does not address the increasing numbers of problems that are related with the international migrant workers. The most important one is the protection of the workers in foreign lands. It is reported that almost everyday, one or two Nepali migrant workers die in foreign land. This has become a routine to receive the corpse at Tribhuvan International Airport on daily basis. How to make their workplace safety has become a major challenge to the government while promoting the it's the young workers to work in the foreign land. Second important issue is the legal protection. As large numbers of workers have been working in foreign countries illegally, to regularise their works and bring them under the legal framework is another challenge. It has become utmost important for the government to legalise their works. Likewise, many Nepali migrant workers in many counties do not get wages as per the rules and regulations of the host countries. Most of them receive lower than the minimum level that has been fixed. Lack of proper channels to address this issue

as well as government's failure to raise the issue with the host countries, large number of migrant workers have been suffering from this unjust and discriminative behavior (Adhikari 2008). If such a situation persists continuously on the one hand it will tarnish the image of the country and on the other hand if these mistreated and cheated migrant workers started to express their frustration and anger in an organised manner against the government, it would create a serious security problem in the country as well.

#### **4.6.2 Increasing Fraudulent Cases**

Due to the lack of proper policies and also strong legal protection, the migrant workers as well as job seekers are increasingly becoming victims. The migrant workers are often cheated by the employment agents. Most of the cases are related with charging them with hefty sums or placing them in work or places other than agreed upon in the job contract. According to the data obtained from Labour Department, Government of Nepal, there are 559 foreign employment recruiting agencies in operation in the country. The license of 117 foreign employment recruiting agencies has been cancelled for not complying with the Government rules and regulations. Only 106 fraudulent cases concerning migrant workers were filed at the Kathmandu Labour Court in 2006. It is reported that the number of cases do not reflect the total fraudulent cases, most of which are never filed at the Court (Migrant Year Book 2006,).

According to the record obtained from the Kathmandu Labour Court, the total amount claimed for fraudulent foreign employment cases amounted to Rs. 154.3 million in the year 2006. This includes Rs. 112.8 million in the case of individual cases and Rs 41.5 million relating to organisational cases. Among these cases, a total of Rs. 60 million was recovered, including Rs. 27 million by individual agents and Rs. 33 million by registered agents. Such fraudulent cases are increasing day after day with the increment of the number of job seekers in abroad. The government of Nepal has to give top priority to control the situation otherwise, people who have lost their money and job would start to take revenge against the government. For example the killing of 12 Nepali migrant workers by the terrorist group in Iraq in August 2005 and subsequent demonstrations and vandalism in Kathmandu which became the loss of

billions of Nepali rupees properties and destruction of infrastructures was the stark example in this area (Migrant Year Book 2006). The government of the time was completely failed to control the situation of the time. This event not only disturbed the security environment of the time but also shown the vulnerability of Nepali state. Therefore, the growing out country migration and related detrimental activities have become another form of threat to the security.

The foreign employment related issues such as complaints, claimed money, payment settlement, cases filed in court, company liquidation, registration of new manpower company, renewal and approval of foreign labour registered at the Department of Labour Employment Promotion during the period of 2004 and 2005, are illustrated at the Table 4.6.

**Table IV.XI**  
**Fraud Complaints**

Description	FY 2004-05 (million NRs.)	F Y 2005-06 (million NRs.)
Number of individual complaints	359	493
Amount for individual complaint	159.69	157.84
Total amount of money compensated	14.42	2.02
Number of complains against the agencies	500	364
Amount claimed	65.07	52.07
Amount compensated	Rs. 23.85	Rs. 23.85
Cases filed at district court	86	116
Number of licenses cancelled	16	16

*Source: Department of Labour Employment Promotion, Ministry of Labour, Government of Nepal 2006.*

How the lack of government's incoherent policy and its further mishandling the migrant workers issue that has affected the thousands of migrant workers? The issue of sending workers to South Korea can be the best case to illustrate the situation. South Korea has a promising prospect for Nepali workers. Though, the number of Nepali workers working in South Korea is still low, those who have been there they earn better wages than Malaysia and Gulf countries. Since 2003, the Nepali

government has authorized two private recruiting agents – Lumbini Overseas Concern Pvt. Ltd. and Moondrops Overseas Services Pvt. Ltd. – to recruit Nepali workers to South Korea. The selection processes of these companies have often been mired in controversy because of political interference by government ministers to bend rules and regulation to recruit their political loyalists and voters. For example, Moondrops had secured pre-approval to recruit 1,380 trainee workers in April 2004 so that it could send them to Korea after short training. However, government's allocation to Moondrops has been marred by controversy and the Nepal Association of Foreign Employment Agencies (NAFEA) alleged that government did not follow the due process therefore it must be cancelled and investigate the matters (Gurung 2007).

The government ordered Moondrops to stop the processes. Subsequently the Cabinet decided to authorize the Ministry of Labour to select the workers since Moondrops had failed to meet the terms and conditions of pre-approval as agreed with the Department of Labour and Employment Promotion. Immediate after the government's decision, the Korean Federation of Small Business (KFSB) which looks after the recruitment process of the migrant workers in Korea issued a 24 hours ultimatum on 30 May of to the Nepal government to decide on the selection, and threatened to refuse workers from Nepal if the deadline was no honored (The Kathmandu Post 3 May 2005).

On the same day after receiving the threat from KESB, the Cabinet asked for two weeks to resolve the matter. Meantime, the Cabinet decision to authorize the Department of Labour and Employment Promotion to undertake direct recruitment was challenged at the Supreme Court. The Court verdict further complicated the matter with two contradictory and controversial decisions on the same case within 10 days. The Single Bench of Judge issued on 1 June an interim order to the government to allow the process already initiated by the Moondrops company. After 10 days of its earlier verdict, the Full Bench of Supreme Court declared null and void the Interim Order issued by the Supreme Court earlier, and backed the government's decision to prevent Moondrops from taking any further action on the selection of migrant workers for South Korea.

This shows the incompetency and incoherency of the government handling migrant workers issue. Same time, the uncertainty and stress that the prospective workers have to go through is another serious matter of concern. This is one of the many such events that lack of proper policy and laws, the issue of sending migrant workers in foreign countries has been marred. The issue of legal security not only in the working place or in the host countries but also in their own sending country has become a major issue and needed to be addressed to protect the migrant workers rights. State's failure to address such issues has increasingly becoming a new form of a threat in our security system. Therefore, the focus has to be given by the state its agencies towards addressing these issues which has had implications on large number of populations.

#### **4.6.3 Threat to economic security**

The contribution of remittance from out country migrant workers has become a major source of income to Nepal. It not only contributed for steadily increment of foreign currency reserve but also helps significantly to pay the mounting trade gap with India and other countries. Compared to 2005, 49% growth in remittance in the year 2006 has tremendously contributed to keep current account surplus of \$ 186 million. In the context of declining foreign grants and lack of adequate Indian Currency to make up the trade deficit, only the remittance that has been sent by the migrant workers has helped in narrowing country's surging trade gap with the foreign countries particularly with India (Nepal Migrant Year 2008).

Likewise, remittance contribution can be seen in maintaining country's economy by and large despite the last 10 years violent conflict and turmoil. If there was no flow of remittance into the country, Nepal would have not been able to import goods from foreign countries and the national economy would have been in serious trouble. Due to the past conflict situation, the economic growth had declined steadily, investments were dampened and expansion of business were stopped. In this very difficult situation, only remittance flow from the migrant workers helped to keep the economy running in the country (Gurung 2007).

Furthermore, the unemployment and underemployment situation is already grim. It is next to impossible for the economy to absorb the additional 500,000 labour force that

join the national labour market annually. However, the successive governments in the past did not pay sufficient attention such a vital area. The role of out country migration has become an important area in terms of maintaining national economy and absorbing manpower for the employment. However, the successive governments in the past failed to address the issue and initiate necessary steps to protect and promote foreign employment. Even today, the newly formed government after the election of the Constituent Assembly has not taken this issue seriously (Adhikari 2008).

**Table IV.XII**  
**Remittance through the Nepal Rastra Bank, 2006**

<b>Month</b>	<b>Rs in million</b>
Dec-Jan	9139.1
Jan-Feb	7544.3
Feb-Mar	7752.6
Mar-Apr	9065.4
Apr-May	7600.6
May-Jun	9820.4
Jun-Jul	9841.6
Jul-Aug	7713
Aug-Sep	7924.8
Sep-Oct	8124.2
Oct-Nov	7911.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>92437.3</b>

*Source: Nepal Rastra Bank, 2007 including month of December 2005*

The flow of remittance has been growing consistently, making significant contributions to the economic growth. According to the Nepal Rastra Bank, the inflow of remittance decreased from Rs 9,139.1 million in mid-December 2005 - mid - January 2006 to Rs 7,911.3 million by October-November 2006 as shown in the Table 4.7. This amount is based on remittance sent back to Nepal via formal banking channels. It however, does not include amount sent through informal channels like hundi or through friends and relatives (Gurung 2009).



The government's estimation shows that the amount of remittance has been steadily growing over the years. It increased from nearly Rs. 37 billion in 1999-2000 to 47.2 billion in 2000-01, nearly 66 billion in 2004-05. It was reported in the national daily that the remittance that has been sent by migrant workers reached up to 141 billion (Kantipur Daily, September 15, 2008).

**Table IV.XIII**  
**Government's Estimation of Remittance (Rs. Billion)**

Items	1999-00	2000-01	2001-02	2002-03	2003-04	2004-05
Remittance	36.81	47.2	47.54	54.20	58.59	65.54
Pensions	5.94	6.31	8.27	7.32	7.90	12.50
Total	42.76	53.52	55.81	61.52	65.49	78.04
GDP	366.25	394.05	406.14	437.54	474.91	508.65
Remittance as % of GDP	11.7	13.6	13.7	14.1	13.9	15.3

*Source: Economic Survey 2005-06*

Most of the migrant workers of Nepal are being employed as the unskilled labour. The wages they receive is less than minimum level in most of the countries. In many countries, they even do not receive the minimum which has been fixed by the respective host government. It is because, most of them are unaware about government policy and many of them were also cheated by the agents or the employees. Some of them even do not receive the minimum amount that has been agreed upon before their departure. Even Nepal Government made provision of US \$ 125 per month as a minimum wages but many workers still do not get it. Many workers are making wages merely enough for them to survive. In Malaysia, the country that absorbs largest number of Nepali workers, the average income is Rs. 10,000 (around US \$ 125) per month from which each worker has to pay Rs 2000 as levy to the local government. So, the insecurity of the migrant workers in terms of wages persist each and every country (Ibid).

As the number of migrant labour has been growing up, the flow of remittance to Nepal has also steadily been increasing since the last ten years. Despite the severe global financial crisis, there seem little effect on both the number of labour going

abroad and also receiving remittance from abroad. According to the study conducted by World Bank and NIDS in 2009 that there were about 2.6 million Nepali working away from home i.e. migrant labour in 2009. Whereas in 2001 only 0.76 million migrant workers working abroad (NIDS 2009). The contribution ratio of workers' remittance to gross domestic product (GDP) is gradually increasing. It has registered 21.8 per cent in the FY 2008/09 against 17.4 percent in the FY 2007/08 (Adhikari 2009). The increasing flow of out country migration has resulted in declining production in agriculture as well as industrial sector and our economy is getting dependent more and more on remittance send by the migrant workers. If there is any disturbances happened in this area such as events like in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya earlier this year, this would severely affect our national economy which would have implications on our national security.

Therefore, maintaining regular remittance flow from outside to inside Nepal has become a major challenge for Nepal. Another economic aspect of migrant workers is about utilization of their saving for the future. It is another vital issue that the saving that has been making by the migrant workers and sent as remittance to the country has not been used in productive sector. Such income in fact could be invested in areas such as income generating projects which would give them regular return even after their return from the foreign country. However, most of the money that has been sent by the workers is being spent for the daily consumption goods and resolving the day to day problems of their families back at home. Such spending will not give any benefit to the workers in long run. Such practice would ultimately bankrupt the worker and his/her family. In this situation, if the worker could invest certain amount of his/her saving into the income generating project, this would provide them regular support after their retirement (Adhikari 2006). However, in the absence of proper policy from the government and as well as private sector, it remains pious hope for the migrant workers and their future is continuously seen insecure and vulnerable.

The above situation of the country particularly increasing out country migration and country's growing dependency on remittance on our national economy has had multiple implications on overall national security environment. On the one hand it has already declined the country's overall production system particularly in agriculture

sector in the rural areas stated in the national budget 2009.<sup>6</sup> Likewise, any types of disturbances erupted or any kinds of unwanted Iraq like events<sup>7</sup> happen in those countries there would have multiple effects on our national security. It would reduce the flow of remittances to the country which would have serious implications for the sustainability of the economic activities. Likewise, remittance has become a major source for maintaining the balance of payment to our steadily increasing imports. Declining remittance mean declining our foreign currency reserve which would have implications on our imports of daily usable goods i.e. petroleum products, foods and other consumer goods. If there is a scarce daily usable goods in the markets, this would create chaos and disturbances. Ultimately, it would affect country's security environment. Therefore, maintaining regular flow of remittances has had impact on our security and failure in this area would have implications on our national security environment which is again a new challenge for the state to address.

#### **4.6.4 Increasing victims of HIV AIDS and issue of security**

Though the HIV/AIDS victims' comprehensive data among the migrant community are not available, but available data shows the HIV/AIDS epidemic is rapidly spreading in Nepal. As estimated by one research organisation, there are around 63,000 people estimated to have HIV infection today and migrant workers and their families are identified as the most vulnerable group (NIDS 2005). The research was focused on migrant communities-spouses/families and returnees for HIV/AIDS awareness and community empowerment.

According to the research finding, the incident of HIV/AIDS is more pronounced in urban areas and transportation routes where high-risk sexual behaviour is prevalent. It is associated with high mobility and migration of people and trafficking of women and children. In Nepal, every year, 12,000 girls under age 18 years are trafficked to India and abroad (KC et al 2001). About 200,000 Nepalese women and girls are said to be in Indian brothels. The high mobility of Nepali people range from 1.5 to 2

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<sup>6</sup> See the annual budget, Ministry of Finance, Government of Nepal 2009.

<sup>7</sup> Twelve Nepali migrant workers were abducted and killed by Iraq based terrorist group in July 2005 and subsequently there was a massive demonstrations in Kathmandu, where the protesters vandalized most of the offices of foreign employment agencies and destroyed huge amount of public properties and assets.

million each year (permanent or seasonal migrant workers) for their economic survivability go to India and other countries to find jobs. Most of these people are young mostly below the age of 35 and they are not stick with the traditional values often engage with the multiple sexual partners. A study suggests that HIV prevalence is nearly 8 per cent in migrants returning from Mumbai (Tamang 2007).

The increasing number of HIV/AIDS cases in Nepal is largely due to commercial sex workers, intravenous drug users, and high rate of STI. So far, high mobility and migration, internal and external and poverty have been overwhelmingly considered as root causes of the high incidence of HIV/AIDS in Nepal and elsewhere (UNDP 1999).

According to a report, there are between 25,000-34,000 female sex workers in Nepal with an estimated HIV prevalence of 1.3-1.6 percent. HIV infection rates among street-based sex workers in the Kathmandu Valley are between 15-17 percent. Due to their highly marginalized status, FSWs in Nepal have limited access to information about reproductive health and safe sex practices. Cultural, social, and economic constraints bar them from negotiating condom use with their clients or obtaining legal protection and medical services. Almost 60% of their clients mainly transport workers, members of the police or military, and migrant workers, do not use condoms. Nationally, clients of FSWs have an estimated HIV prevalence of 2%. A major challenge to HIV control is the trafficking of Nepalese girls and women into commercial sex work in India. About 50 percent of Nepal's FSWs previously worked in Mumbai, and some 100,000 Nepalese women continue to work there. It is estimated that 50 percent of Nepalese sex workers in Mumbai brothels are HIV positive (Tamang 2007).

#### **4.6.5 Trafficking of women**

The trafficking of Nepali young girls to mainly to India cities like Mumbai, Calcutta, New Delhi have been a major problem since a long time. However, after receiving job offer in countries other than to India for the women workers have also become victims of trafficking. As stated by a report that trafficking of women remained a major problem these years (Migrant Year Book 2007). Many young girls have been promised of foreign employment opportunities by dream merchants but most of them

have ended up in the brothels in Indian cities. Every year, thousands young Nepali girls are lured and sold into brothels in Bombay, Calcutta, Pune and other Indian cities. A report published by a local non-governmental organization that works against women trafficking, ABC Nepal, reported in 2003 that there are as many as 200,000 Nepali women trafficked in India and forced into the sex trade every year. A 2007 report of Child Workers in the Nepal Concern Center, (CWIN), reported that the number of young girls, between the ages of 10 and 16, trafficked into the Indian sex trade can number as many as 7,000 annually.

Various factors that contributed in selling Nepali women in the brothels, one of the main reasons was the prevailing poverty in the countryside. The rampant poverty situation forced young girl to sell their bodies or their parents to send them to the brothels as young as 10 to 15 years of their age. Likewise, the illiteracy is another reason where the parents and girls themselves have been duped by the middlemen or even their relatives very easily.

Another reason is the open border system between Nepal and India where people from both countries can cross the border without visa and any documents. This has also contributed grossly to the trafficking of women mainly into the Indian cities but also vial India to the Gulf countries as well. However, the main destiny is still Indian cities as reported by one study, with India's booming sex trade, it is no wonder that at least half of the 200,000 women trafficked out of Nepal end up in Bombay alone. The other half ends up in other major Indian cities. According to an article published in the August-September 2005 issue of the reputed Nepali magazine Himal, the demand for Nepali women is high in brothels in India as clients are said to favor their fair complexion, soft nature, and unique beauty. Brothels typically pay as much as \$1,700 USD for a beautiful Nepali woman, who can, according to the Himal article, earn brothel owners upwards of \$50,000 USD over five years, the average work span of a prostitute.

Nepal's security agencies' failure to control supplying of Nepali women into the brothels in various places particularly in the Indian cities has been regarded as its weakness. This also shows the ineffectiveness of our legal and security systems. It has given a message that the country even cannot provide minimum level of security to its

citizen how would it can assure security to the international community. Such a situation of the country has tarnished its image in the international arena.

#### **4.7 Forced migration and security in Nepal**

The issue of migration cannot be analyzed and interpreted by sidelining the issues of forced migration. The ten year long armed conflict induced internal displacement which has become a burning issue in Nepal. Although exact figure is still not available but various organisations working in this field have put their estimation that up to 200,000 people have been internally displaced during the ten years of war (IDMC 2006).<sup>8</sup> Caught between two evils, abuses by the Maoists and repression by the security forces, most people have fled their own native villages and sought refugee in the district headquarters, many urban centers or in the capital city. The last ten years war has also thrown large number of people to India which has been a traditional migration destiny for Nepalese people since a long time.

The armed rebellion of Maoists started in few districts of Mid-Western and Western regions. In the initial days, their targets of attack were to the police, members of other political parties, school teachers, and local government officials. These people were forced to leave their villages along with their family members for their safety. Most of them moved to the district headquarters where they chose to settle. However, after the declaration of State of Emergency and deployment of Army in November 2001, the forced leave issue has not been confined within the above mentioned groups. By then, displacement has also started to affect other poorer strata of the population. The general people started to feel insecure because of the escalation of fighting two armed forces and also Maoists imposition of policy of forceful recruitment into their guerilla forces. In many areas the conflict led to the breakdown of the education, closure of businesses, weakening of local economies and interruption of public services. Insecurity and blockade further reduced the availability of food and exacerbated a long standing trend toward rural exodus (SAFHR 2005). Particularly after November 2001, when security deteriorated in rural areas many people started to fleeing to urban district centers.

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<sup>8</sup> Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC), (2006), "Nepal: IDPs return still a trickle despite ceasefire", *A Profile of internal displacement situation*, Norwegian Refugees Council, Kathmandu

Another reason which has contributed for the increment of the IDPs was the government desperate efforts to regain the control of the Maoists influenced areas. For this, the then government started to create 'village defense committee' in various districts of the country (ICG 2004). These groups were often formed by the local pro-government people with the tacit support of the army and the other security agencies. Formation of such groups had further contributed in escalation of the conflicts in the rural areas.

**Table IV.XIV**  
**Number of IDP Estimated by Different Agencies**

IDP Figures	Source	Date	Limitation
38,000	Government of Nepal	Aug 2006	NHRC 2006 source
212,985 – 272,600	Caritas	Aug 2006	IDPs in District HQs
200,000	UNHCR	May 2007	
350,000	Caritas	Feb 2006	
100,000	CHR	Jan 2006	
400,000	UNFPA	Nov 2005	
18,666	Ministry of Home Affairs	Jul 2005	Displaced only by Maoist
17,583	SCA/CCWB	Jul 2005	Children migrating to India, Jul – Oct 2004
40,000	ILO/CWIN	Jun 2005	
300,000 - 600,000	Ministry of Finance	May 2005	
50,000	INSEC	Apr 2005	
2.4 million	ADB	Sep 2004	
Over 100,000	Government of Nepal	Aug 2004	
Over 60,000	NMVA	Aug 2004	CPN-M induced IDPS in KTM
350,000-400,000	CSWC	Jan 2004	
100,000 – 150,000	GTZ/INF/SNV/CECI	Mar 2003	
500,000	EC/RRN	Apr 2003	Incl forced migration to India
80,000	UNDP/RUPP	Jan 2003	Between 2001-03
7,343	Ministry of Home Affairs	Jan 2003	Displaced only by Maoists

*Source: Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, 2006*

Various organisations estimated that the total number of IDPs are in between 100,000 to 200,000 which does not include people who fled to India. As stated by various groups which have been working in this area, many people refused to register their names as IDPs because if they were known by the Maoists as IDPs they would be targeted again. Secondly, they also did not feel they would get support from the government or other agencies even after they do registered. As a consequence, the majority of those displaced by the Maoists remained either unaware of their status or preferred to remain unidentified. Likewise, both the government and Maoists' lack of clear policy on IDPs has another problem in identifying the number of people who were displaced. The UN mission conducted during 2006 revealed that in many areas of the country, group of displaced persons that would clearly fall within the international IDP definition, such as youth fleeing from forced recruitment or people fleeing extortion and abuses, were not considered as IDPs by the Maoists, or local authorities or by the IDPs themselves (UNHCR et al 2007).

The highest number of IDPs concentrated in the capital city Kathmandu where one organisation put the number well above 100,000. In region-wise estimation, the largest number is in the Mid-western region and Central region. On district basis, there are 10 districts which have the largest number of IDPs. Among those districts are; Kathmandu, Lalitpur, Sunsari, Banke, Kanchapur, Morang, Kailali, Kavrepalanchowk, Rolpa, Kalikot, Jhapa, Lamjung, Rukum and Surkher (Caritas 2006).

After formally signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in November 2006 between the Government of Nepal and the CPN (Maoists), the 10 year long armed conflict was formally ended. Since then, people from different districts have begun to return sporadically. However, due to the lack of comprehensive programs from the government side as well as continue threat, extortion and harassment and refusal to return the confiscated properties by the Maoists, the issue of IDPs has not been resolved in Nepal. Both the Maoists and government made clear reference in the Code of Conduct about the needs of IDPs and their rights during the return phase and committed to provide assistance (OCHA 2006). Even after the declaration of the ceasefire, abuse of human rights and other atrocities were continue by the Maoists. This has created further hurdles in speeding up the return of the IDPs,



Years of conflict have brought the country in the brink of humanitarian disaster and left people in rural areas with little opportunities to make a living and very limited access to basic services. Another obstacle in this area is the lack of government's representatives in rural areas to monitor return and reintegration condition and guarantee the protection of the displaced.

#### **4.7.1 Dismal living condition of IDPs**

The displaced continue to face difficulties in their living in the urban areas. Often belonging to the farming community and unprepared for making a living in urban areas, most IDPs who find employment engage low-paid labour-intensive jobs. Placing a strain on the municipalities' capacity to deliver basic services such as water supply, sanitation, and waste management, the arrival of large number of IDPs has also increased real state and rental prices, making it very difficult for the poorest to proper accommodation in cities like in Kathmandu (Himrights, Population Watch & Plan Nepal 2005). Displaced children often face particularly difficult conditions in urban areas. Although majority of them manage to attend schools in their new location, some of them are denied education because they lack proper documentation to enroll or because they need to contribute financially to the survival of their families (UNICEF 2005). On the streets of the main cities, children are exposed to a variety of threats, including child trafficking, sexual exploitation and forms of child labour. A study revealed an increasing trend of migration of young children from rural areas, fleeing Maoists forced recruitment of the breakdown of the education system. Sent by their parents to safer conditions in urban areas, many children end up working as child domestics, subject to severe exploitation and exposed to physical and psychological abuse (TDH and SCA 2006).

According to the ILO report 2005, there were about 40,000 children had been displaced since the Maoists conflict began in February 1996. About 10,000 to 15,000 children would be forced from their homes during the year (Xinhua, 12 June 2005). But the majority of the children displaced by the conflict appear not to end up in Nepalese cities, but rather in India where economic opportunities are slightly better. In a report published by Save the Children showed that over 17,000 have crossed the

border to India in just three months, between July and October 2004, a quarter of them citing the conflict as the main reason for migrating (SCA & CCW 2005).

#### **4.7.2 Factors hindering to return and tense situation in the villages**

Fear has been cited as one of the main obstacles to return of the IDPs even after two years of signing CPA and election of the Constituent Assembly. Many expressed their distrust to the Maoists due to their continue violation of human rights, extortion and harassment. Similarly, the Maoists have put conditions such as each returnee has to carry a letter issued by their district headquarters which is a kind of approval letter that is being issued by the Maoists. To get their 'seized' property back, the Maoists often have put conditions to commit 'mistake' of the past and commit to improve their behavior in front of the community which most of the returnee find difficult to swallow the pills. Persons closely involve in the conflict either a combatants, supporter or informant on both sides perceive threat to their physical security upon return. Many IDPs, some of them were in leadership position in the community, are not willing to return to the villages whose dynamics are more or less dictated by the Maoists, and they will compel them to keep a very low profile, particularly when the police and other state organs are not in position to guarantee basic political freedom.

Another reason of their reluctance of return is most of them have lost their basic properties needed for survival. Unlike wealthy landlords, subsistence farmers whose land were confiscated and houses were destroyed. They seem still are unable to re-establish their basic livelihoods. Some of the groups are waiting for incentive and compensation packages from the government. These groups are unlikely to move unless they see the final 'offer' on the table for fear of loosing out to a later and better offer. General deterioration of basic infrastructures is another reason their hesitance to go back to the villages and re-settle. Equally responsible is the lack of government's policy and also motivation to the IDPs for their safe and dignify return at their own villages. The failure of government to guarantee the security to the IDPs for their return has shown its weakness. The state apparatuses of the country have become so ineffective that even it cannot ensure its policy and decisions are being implemented properly. Therefore, maintaining internal security environment has become more important for Nepal today than managing the external threats.

#### **4.7.3 Terai unrest creates new IDPs**

The unrest in Terai in the year 2007 - 08 has created number of problems in the region. Often neglected in the past by the ruling elites of Kathmandu, the people of Terai origin have revolted against what they called injustice and negligence by the state. With the growing resentment as well as violence carried out by various armed groups, large number of people lost their lives and thousands of them left their homes. The continue violence activities conducted by the armed groups like Jana Tantrik Mukti Morch (JTMM) and other groups further worsen the situation. With the rise in abduction for ransom and killing by different factions of JTMM and other groups people felt insecure and started to flee particularly the people of hill origin. An Inter-Agency Mission to Eastern Terai in April 2007 was informed that a substantial number of people of hill origin have already left for Kathmandu and their land is occupied by various agitating groups (IGC 2007).

Basically, there are two reasons for the displacement of people of hill origin; terror stemming from the threats being made directly against them and new perception of disrespect from Madhesis, apparently most evidence of civil servants of hill origins. After JTMM's issuance of letter urging all the people of hill origin to leave Terai, many civil servants who have been posted in the Terai districts are taking prolong leave and even seeking transfer or thinking of resigning. Likewise, people of hill origin have sold their lands and shifted from the areas. Most of displaced people were shifted Kathmandu or Hetauda. The situation has been deteriorating day after day and the number of IDPs are also growing. This has further deteriorated the law and order problems both in Terai and big cities like in Kathmandu and Hetauda. According to the report obtained from Police Headquarter<sup>9</sup>, the crime rates have gone up alarming level in those areas. This has become an another challenge for the country to manage.

#### **4.8 Bhutanese refugee and security**

In the late 1980s and early 90s tens of thousands of ethnic Nepali origin Bhutanese were forced to leave their country first entered to India as their natural choice due to

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<sup>9</sup> The Nepal Police Crime and Investigation Department releases report about the criminal activities and this report was published on 22 May 2009 in The Kathmandu Post National Daily.

the contiguous border between Bhutan and India. Then from India they entered to eastern Nepal – Jhapa District. The reason behind this exodus of Bhutanese Nepalis was the arbitrarily deprivation of their Bhutanese citizenship by the Druk regime in Thimpu. By the time of 1993, around 95,000 Bhutanese Nepali were arrived Nepal’s eastern border with India and started to take shelter in various places of Jhapa and Morang districts. Since then, these Bhutanese refugees have been languishing in seven refugee camps with no resolution in their plight in near future.

**Table IV.XV**  
**Bhutanese refugees in Nepal (population by camp: gender and family size)**

Camp	Total	Population		# of Families	Family size	# of Huts	Persons per huts
		Male	Female				
Beldangi –I	18,335	9,361	8,974	2,524	7.3	2,843	6.45
Beldangi - II	22,542	11,467	11,075	3,358	6.7	3,604	6.25
Beldagi-2ext	11,594	5,922	5,672	1,672	6.9	1,827	6.35
Goldhap	9,513	4,935	4,578	1,348	7.1	1,511	6.30
Khudunabari	13,392	6,740	6,652	1,960	6.8	1,960	6.83
Shanischare	20,993	10,770	10,223	2,790	7.5	3,212	6.54
Timai	10,293	5,241	5,052	1382	7.4	1,716	6.0
Total	106,662	54,436	52,226	15,034	7.1	16,673	6.40
%	100	51.04	48.96				

*Source: CRED 2007*

Describing the undemocratic nature of Bhutanese regime, as Lama states that Bhutan has been an absolute monarchy with no democratic system in its background meaning an absence of a proper constitution, court of justice, elected representatives, human, civil and political rights and freedom (Lama 2000). The people of Bhutan mainly the Nepali origin Bhutanese who called Lhotsampas have been fighting for a democratic rule since as early as in 1952 under the leadership of Bhutanese State Congress. With their relentless struggle, all the people of Nepali origin or Lhotsampas were given proper citizenship. However, the 1985 Citizenship Act and 1988 Population Census

declared at least 100,000 Lhotsampas as illegal immigrants (Lama 2000). Then most of citizenship denied people were forced to leave Bhutan in the early 1990s.

Ethnic asylum seekers from Bhutan started leaving their country since 1991 and they have been residing in eight camps in Jhapa and Morang districts of Nepal. The refugees came in streams in the early period of 1990s and settled in those camps. The three Beldangi camps which are divided into three sectors, constitute the largest population of over 52,000. The agencies that are involved in the maintenance of camps are UNHCR, World Food Programme, Lutheran World Services, Save the Children Fund, Nepal Red Cross Society, OXFAM and CARITAS Nepal etc. The camps are well organised along with basic needs of life such as water, health, food, education etc.

Since their first arrival in Nepal, these refugees have been hoping one day to return their homeland. Such their hope is not against the international laws and recognized practices. However, due to the adamant behaviour shown by the Drukpas regime of Bhutan, the prospect of their return to their native land has become quite bleak. With diminishing of their expectation of return back to their country of origin, refugees in the camps are getting frustrated. A new development has emerged when the Bhutanese refugee in Nepal have been offered to settle in third countries since October 2006. Various countries including the United States, Australia, Norway, New Zealand, and Canada have offered them for the resettlement in their respective countries. The Government of US has expressed its willingness to accommodate as large number as 60,000. Likewise, the other countries have also shown their willingness to accommodate significant number of refugees. For this the process of resettlement has already been started and few thousands have already left the camps in Nepal and arrived in their respective resettlement countries.

In this way, the long protracted refugee issue is being tried to settle with this new alternative. However, a large number of refugees want to go back their own home country. Their popular will is to be repatriated. Many of them find to opt for third country settlement not as their choice but a compulsion and some of them even completely refused to the third country settlement offer and want to face the consequences. They felt it as against their will and also deprivation of their right to

return back their own land of origin. It is also against the international laws and practices. As contrary to Bhutanese regime's contention, under international law most, if not all, refugees in the camps in Nepal have a right to return to Bhutan.

The available evidence relating to the events of the early 1990s makes clear that the refugees did not leave Bhutan voluntarily. The right to return is not by itself a sufficient condition for the promotion of voluntary repatriation as durable solution. Repatriation with adequate security and dignity is feasible only if the country of origin is willing and able to guarantee respect for returnees' human rights. Not only does Bhutanese regime remain unwilling to accept vast majority of the Bhutanese refugees but it also continues to discriminate against the remaining ethnic Nepali population in Bhutan. Even in the camps, the support that refugees have been receiving from the donor countries via UNHCR is dwindling these days. As the years have passed without a solution in sight, donor countries have steadily grown more reluctant to keep providing the funds to cover refugees' needs. As a result the support system in the camps has come under increasing strains.

#### **4.8.1 Repatriation Dilemmas**

Securing a dignify return of Bhutanese refugee has remained an elusive issue. As early as in 1993, there have been more than a dozen high-level political meetings between the governments of Bhutan and Nepal to try and resolve the crisis. They have agreed to conduct joint-verification of the refugees in 2001. However, the process has been plagued by problems and was severely criticized by refugee community. The process did not give any role to the UNHCR which been playing a coordination role in managing the refugees in the camps. Only the representatives from Government of Nepal and Bhutan were included in the verification group. But when it started the verification process and completed one camp, the Bhutanese side abandoned it citing the security reason. The Government of Nepal has opposed the local integration of the refugees and majority of the refugee leaders want early repatriation. However, the regime in Thimpu has continuously been denying the refugee and other international community's views. Therefore, the repatriation issue seems quite elusive at this very stage.

The resettlement scheme that has been offered also does not guarantee that all the 110,000 would be resettled in those countries. Apart from US which agrees to accept 60,000, the rest of the countries which have expressed their willingness to accommodate have not specify their numbers yet.

So, such a situation has generated anguish and fearful environment among the refugees who are in the camps. Another fear that resettlement in Western countries including the US of many of the Bhutanese refugees in Nepal could encourage the Bhutanese authorities to coerce more Nepalese to leave. Many elderly people do not feel going to a land of alien. Even those young people who overjoyed with the resettlement plan in the US have a fear about the prospect of employment, housing and their children's future education, health care etc. Likewise, there are around 10,000 to 15,000 unregistered refugees in India and this issue and about their fate has not been addressed properly by both the receiving countries as well as the mediating agency like UNHCR.

A number of prominent leaders have also opposed the resettlement plan. They argue that such a plan will reward to the Bhutanese regime for its unlawful expulsion of its own citizens, undermines the struggle for right to return for the Bhutanese refugees in Nepal, and endangers the position of the remaining ethnic Nepalese in Bhutan by giving the green light to the Bhutanese government to embark on a new round of expulsions (Human Rights Watch 2007).

#### **4.8.2 Refugees and its implications on Bhutan and Nepal relations**

Depicting the real condition inside the camps Human Right Watch states that 'refugees dependency on donor support and seen such supports are dwindling and complete lack of control over their own lives, and fading hope of change of policy on the part of Bhutan to recognize refugees' right to return have produced increasing levels of anger and frustration in the camps. Parents despair about their inability to offer a future to their children, while refugees youth are increasingly becoming restless in the face of ongoing uncertainty about their prospects. The poor conditions in the camps combined with anxiety about the future to contribute to strains and

tensions that result in domestic violence and conflict in the camps' (Human Rights Watch 2007).

Furthermore, the desperate condition that persists in the camp and do not see immediate solutions in near future, refugees particularly the youths are joining the extreme forces. The formation of the Communist Party of Bhutan (Maoists) and subsequent declaration of launching armed struggle against the Monarchical system in Bhutan is one of the initiatives taken by the ultra-forces. This group has opposed the resettlement plan and those who advocates it, they use threats to silence them. Although no actual act of violence have been committed so far (except few bombs were exploded inside Bhutan in February 2008 and this groups had taken the responsibility) , fear among the refugees is widespread and most are extremely reluctant to express an interest in the resettlement offer publicly.

The refugee movement in Bhutan is directly link with the democratic movement in Bhutan. Alarmed the possible threat to the royal regime, the surging Nepali population and its gradual politicization is viewed as destabilizing for the narrow-based Bhutanese power. The Drukpas regime in Bhutan has continuously been trying hard to underplay the refugee problem maintaining that most people residing camps are not Bhutanese nationals because many of them are from India and have joined the camps in Nepal for money distributed by the UNHCR. Similarly, they blamed that Nepali government has been providing support and also encouraging them to stay at the camps and continue play roles against the government of Bhutan. Such a Bhutanese position is successful as the agreement on the categorization of people in the camps would reduce its anxiety of the repatriation of all refugees from Nepal. The agreement of categorization between Bhutan and Nepal has provided good excuse to the Drukpas regime not to take back "even small number of the total refugees population" unless they received strong pressure from outside particularly from India.

However, any Indian pressure on Bhutan is unlikely as Baral states that in view of India's own threat perception of the emerging Nepali nationalism in the Indian corridor between Nepal and the Northeast. Since the narrow corridor is vital for Indian security, any guerrilla type armed movement for democracy and human rights in Bhutan and the support it garners would endanger Indian security. The eruption of



such a pro-democracy movement in Bhutan cannot be ruled out in view of the demand of various organisations based in India and Nepal. The Bhutanese government's reported move to bring back the non-Nepali community to Southern Bhutan cannot be wholly dismissed (Baral 1996).

There is growing possibility of Bhutanese movement for democracy and justice likely to forge a new alliance within and outside the country. One of the possibility of joining the group with the agitating Nepali ethnic groups would be community of Tibetan origin – the Sarchop – is a deprived community inside Bhutan. Analyzing the prospects of joining these two groups, it is said that 'if the Nepalis could bring the Sarchops into the movement, then the united front would represent some 75% of the population of Bhutan, and it would be hard for the government to hold on to power. A united front would remove the ethnic colour of the movement today. It would give the movement more legitimacy, and undermine the government's claim (Dhakal and Strawan 1994). Likewise the other dissatisfied community of Bhutan like the Ngalong can become another element of the dissident movement. As this community is also suppressed by the Drukpas and if they found reliable allies, there is a strong possibility that this group would also join hand against the regime.

As many refugees see no sign of repatriation in near future and many of them and also did not find third country settlement is a viable option. They are very anxious and stressful today than anytime before. To assert its falsify message and not accept the repatriation of any refugees, the Bhutanese regime has consistently asserting views by saying that 'ethnic Nepalese from neighbouring areas in the region, including Nepal itself, began to congregate in the refuge camps to avail of the free rations and free health care and education facilities provided by international agencies' (Inhured International 2003).

As back as in 2004 after Bhutan's denial of participation in the joint Bhutanese-Nepalese process of verification and access to areas of potential return, the UNHCR announced 'three key measures' towards resolution of the refugee problems. Firstly, local integration, as the "Nepalese Government has offered to settle those willing to remain and to grant them citizenship". Secondly, support to "resettlement initiatives

for vulnerable cases.” And thirdly, the UNHCR will not promote refugee return to Bhutan (Lama 2004).

The withdrawal of the UNHCR would have a huge problem in managing the refugees in the camps. Though, it has not formally declared it but time and again it has been stating about the possibility of its withdrawal from the management of the refugee camps. One of the reasons of its withdrawal statement possibly it wants to give notice to both the Bhutanese and Nepali governments of its thinking about withdrawal from camp management. It also literally pre-empted the ongoing negotiations at the ministerial level between Bhutan and Nepal. As Lama further states, “UNHCR’s utter frustration with the negotiation process is understandable in the context of both aid and ‘compassion fatigue’ among the agencies that are involved in the humanitarian interventions in the camps” (Lama 2005).

Protracted refugee problem has always been a burden for both the host countries as well as the creating country. Even its neighbours get in trouble. The refugees seem to represent an economic burden, a political liability, and a foreign policy complication or all of the above. As of the Bhutanese refugee problems remains, it would not only be a problem to the Nepal but it would have equally affect India and also would pose threat to the Bhutan itself. It is not only an ethnic problem but the cost for the royal regime would be heavy if it is seen Nepali design to expand its territory. The formation of Communist Party of Bhutan – Maoists and its declaration of carrying out the armed struggle against Monarchical regime inside Bhutan is one of the desperate measures that the frustrated refugees would like to get involved.

There is a strong possibility of this group joining hands with the other ultra-groups in India like their counterpart organisation the Communist Party of India – Maoists which has been launching armed rebellion against the Indian state in various parts of India. There are other groups such as ULFA in Assam and Naga rebellion in Nagaland and also in Mizo. As Baral states that ‘the South Asian terrorist movements have their humble origins but their national and international developments and linkages have made them aggressive and protracted movements (Baral 1996). As many of such movements have external dimensions and the prospects of them being

converted into terrorist movements cannot be ruled out. The frustrated dissidents may turn into aggressive guerillas. In fact, terrorist-type movement had begun in 1989-90.

Nepal as a receiving country is also prone to several negative effects. Although the camps in Nepal are managed comparatively better way, but tensions are heightened by the psychology and activities of the refugees. Some reports of clashes between police and the refugees come in. As the refugees are uncertain about their future, they are restive in their camp life. Another serious implication from the continue presence of refugee is in environmental degradation. The deforestation and other elements of environmental degradation are connected to the influx of refugees and their routine activities. The woods in the forests are destroyed and also have serious implication on demographic structure of those particular districts.

Likewise, another impact of Bhutanese refugee can be seen in Nepal's relations with its two close neighbours – Bhutan and India. Since the refugees began to settle inside Nepal, this issue has been one of the major issues in three countries high level talks. The successive Nepali government in the past has been criticized for its failure to pursue a firm policy towards Bhutan as well as relation with India. In this refugee issue, Bhutan seems to be succeeding in outmaneuvering Nepal forcing the later to comply with Bhutanese stand so much so that the government has failed to pursue India. Without getting India's active involvement the Bhutanese refugee problem would not be resolved. As the refugees in Nepal first came to India and entered in Nepal. However, the regime in New Delhi does not want to get involved and it regards it is a bilateral issue between Nepal and Bhutan. But it refused to accept that these refugees were entered first to Indian land and came to Nepal. Likewise, if they return they will go via Indian land since there is no land connection between Bhutan and Nepal. Another reason of New Delhi's unwillingness of getting involved in this process is its relations with Thimpu. Indian state's appeasement policy towards Druk regime it does not want to give pressure to the regime in Thimpu.

Equally responsible is Nepal's lack of proper homework and prevailing political instability which is another reason for the continuation of refugee problem. Nepal has had three main options towards resolving this problem; in bilateral level between Nepal and Bhutan, regional level getting India's involvement and multilateral level.

The best and effective option would be the regional level where Nepal, Bhutan and India get together and seek amicable solution. However, regime in Thimpu's continuous refusal and India's reluctance to get involve in this very critical problem compelled Nepal to seek other international community's support. As a result, the international community including US and its close allies has come up with this new option which is third country settlement. As stated earlier, how many of them would be included and how many of the refugees get interested it yet to be seen.

Despite the third country settlement option, the issue of Bhutanese refugee cannot be resolved even most of the refugee accept the third country settlement. As stated earlier, the refugee issue is linked with the issue of democracy and Druk regime's ethnic policy inside Bhutan. Unless the problems of democracy and ethnicity are addressed properly, Bhutan cannot remain problem-free. As long as the Thimpu regime's policy of ethnic cleansing and suppression to the dissident remained, the problem would continuously be there. As stated by Baral again, if the peaceful transition becomes difficult to manage at the present juncture, more guerilla-type violent activities are likely to be mounted by the dissidents. If such a situation develops in Southern Bhutan, the entire Nepali speaking belt would be affected by the 'terrorist' trends. Bhutan's development activities have been 'stalled' because of the internal conflict (Baral 1996).

#### **4.9. Tibetan (Chinese) refugees in Nepal and implications on security**

It is estimated that there are as many as 25,000 Tibetan (Chinese) refugees residing in Nepal. There are mainly two camps in Nepal one is in Jawalakhel and another is in Pokhara for the Tibetan refugees. Both of these camps are managed by the UNHCR. The Tibetan population in Nepal is the second largest after in India where around 85,000 live along with the Dalai Lama (Norbu 1996). However, both of these figures have not been verified and the government of China denied the number.

In Nepal, the refugee population involve in entrepreneurships like setting up hand woven carpet factories. The refugees' factories have employed significant number of Nepali population in the past. Another area they have involved is running restaurants

and hotels and selling woolen sweaters in the winter. There are schools and hospitals which are also run by the refugees in Nepal.

#### **4.9.1 Rising tensions between refugees and host population**

One of the main reasons for arising tensions between refugee community and local population is lack of understanding each other's culture and languages. Similarly, their control of economy and more on control of Tibetan Monasteries is another area where the local and the refugee community often face tensions. As stated by one writer that many monastic institutions are controlled by Tibetan refugee priests and also that Tibetan refugees in the area have not learned local languages (Stobdan 1996). It is argued that the one of the reasons for increasing ethno based conflict in the Himalayas as a result of Tibetan refugees and their cultural and economic dominance (Ibid). The writer cited the conflict between Bhutan and China – Tibet in the early 1970s.

Various factors have been cited about the host-refugee tension however, there are mainly two which has been emphasized by Stobdan; i) Prosperity of refugee community and the subsequent economic disparity between the local population and the refugees. ii) The perpetuation of cultural and religious chauvinism in the local areas. This has become a fact particularly in Northern part of Nepal which borders to China's Tibet. It is partly because the refugees from Tibet and the local people share so many commonalities. Such commonalities make the chances of more politically ambition among the refugees some what more 'realistic' to involve themselves in local politics which is acutely resented by the indigenous middle-level elites as politically threatening (Norbu 1996). The centuries of traditional Tibetan cultural dominance in the Himalayan regions seems to lend credence to the native Himalayan elites and generate fear and threat perceptions from the refugees.

Another major factor of tension or threat to security is the host land being used/mis-used by the refugees for their vested political interest. As in the past the Tibetan refugees were used by the governments particularly the United States and deployed them in security operation against the Chinese government. The Tibetan refugees in Nepal had become a useful instrument to operate anti-China activities from Nepal.

This shows how sensitive are the refugee community for the host countries and provide serious threats to the security environment of the host country.

In the late 1960s and early 70s, in the Western part of Nepal particularly in Mustang District, the Tibetan refugees set up armed guerilla and launched attacks across the border against Chinese forces. These guerillas were armed and financed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States of America. Known as a Khampa rebellion, it was quelled by the then government of Nepal after sometime. It was argued that Nepal's decision to disarm the Khampa was because of establishment of détente between China and the US in 1971. The refugees involvement in such activities created serious security problems in Nepal. Though it was again argued that the Tibetan refugee involvement in the Khampa rebellion was not their intention rather they were used by certain group or person, but again large number of Tibetan refugee direct involvement in that movement countered such arguments. As argued by Norbu that 'Khampa base in Mustang, Nepal was a creature of the Cold War, which enhanced neither Nepal's security nor Tibeta's freedom (Norbu 1996).

#### **4.9.2 Tibetan refugee and Nepal - China relations**

The 1970s Khampa rebellion was controlled by the Nepal government after a strong pressure that Beijing asserted to Nepal. Nepal's timely taken steps to control the Khampa rebellion had been appreciated by the Beijing authority time and again. As Nepal has been time and again extending its views to China that it stands for one China policy and believes that Tibet is an integral part of China. Nepal's such position has always been appreciated by Chinese government in the past particularly its effort to contained the Khampa rebellion and also strictly checking the Tibetan refugees entering Nepal from Tibetan side. Meantime, in the past Nepal also did not allow Tibetan refugee to involve activities which are against the interest of Chinese government. This is Nepal's long standing position. This has helped tremendously Nepal to build good neighbourly relations with China since it was established in 1955.

However, the recent Tibetan refugees' involvement in organising protest programmes in Kathmandu against the Beijing Olympic Games has become a serious matter of concern for China. The Chinese authorities have taken this event as a ploy to diminish

the Chinese image in pre-days of Beijing Olympics planned by the people those who wanted to split Tibet from China. This has not only created problem for Chinese but also left far reaching implications on Nepal's security environment as well as Nepal's relations with China. During the period of Beijing Olympic Game, the Tibetan refugees based in Nepal (it is also reported that large number of refugees went from Dharmasala, India to Kathmandu during the time to join the protest programs) staged number of protests in front of the Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu. They organised regular protests and received wide coverage in the international media especially in the Western media.

Nepal as a democratic country organising peaceful protests are not prohibited. However, the refugee community's regular protests during the Olympic Game and Nepal police's forceful dispersion of the protesters received wider coverage in the medias. This has created two pronged problems, on the one hand Nepal as a newly achieved democratic state has to involve in containing the protesters for not on its own domestic reason but for the external reason. Which did not generate positive image as a liberal state around the world rather such protests and its forceful contentions tarnished its democratic credential and free society image in the international community.

Similarly, Nepal being a close neighbour of China, it cannot allow anti-Chinese activities to be organised in its own soils. As Nepal has a long standing policy about Tibet that Tibet is an integral part of China and any activities against it inside Nepal would not be tolerated. If Nepal continues allow such protests inside Nepal this will have seriously impacted on Sino-Nepal bilateral relations. The geo-strategic factor of Nepal also does not allow it to be used its land against any of its friendly countries particularly against its two neighbouring countries.

Secondly, the continuous protests in Kathmandu certainly draw Beijing attention towards Nepal and it will pressurize Government of Nepal to take further actions. It is reported that Nepal has closed down two refugee related offices in Kathmandu in 2005 and expelled from Nepal some of the Tibetan who do not hold necessary authentic documents. Again, as of the 1970s, the Tibetan refugee community's involvement in the protest programmes in Kathmandu has created problems in Nepal

and China's relations. As both of these countries are very close neighbours and have been enjoying a very cordial relation since the establishment of bilateral relations in 1955.

Both countries have resolved all the contentious issues including the border dispute in early 1960s and Nepal has also been receiving significant amount of development aids from China each year and also benefited from large number of infrastructural projects completed by China in the past years. In this situation, Nepal cannot risk its good neighbourly relations to be damaged by continuously allowing refugee community's engagement in the anti-China activities in its own soil. Furthermore, being in the middle of two major powerful countries of Asia – India and China, Nepal has to maintain the security sensitivity of both of its neighbours. Therefore, the politically motivated activities of the Tibetan refugees inside Nepal would not get support from Nepal and it does not allow its relations to be affected by such activities.

The issue of migration and security is interlinked and increasing number of migratory movements both internal and external does have a great implication on the security environment of Nepal. On the one hand it has to control the ongoing internal migration which has not only disturbed its demographic structure of the country but in a long run it would create serious problems. As we have observed the increasing communal polarisation in Terai and eastern hill region and growing scarce of basic utilities such as drinkable water, sanitation, electricity, roads and parking areas in the urban areas certainly are not the healthy signs in the long run.

Likewise, the increasing flow of out country migration has also been another problem that Nepal today faces. On the one hand the most energetic and educated youth force has been leaving country to get the employment which has created huge vacuum in the rural areas. The absence of rural work force has had huge implications on rural economy particularly in the agriculture. As over 70% of Nepali population still belong to agriculture and majority of them are the subsistence farmers. The lack of working population in the agriculture field has declined the agriculture production in the rural areas. Similarly, the lack of their legal protection in foreign land and also lack of proper utilization of remittance that they have sent would create huge problem in future.



Similarly, the growing number of HIV/AIDS affected migrant community and trafficking of women are other problems that certainly have had implications on Nepal's overall security environment. Similarly, the protracted refugee problem both Bhutanese and Tibetan would further create problem as the emergence of China and India as global powers, the geo-strategic importance of Nepal would be increased and the countries outside the region would try to use the refugees to fulfill their vested interest. Therefore, Nepal needs to be more cautious being in the middle of the two powers and dealing such sensitive issues. Again, the issue of migration both internal and external has become more pertinent to Nepal today than anything else.

## **Chapter V**

### **Armed Conflict: Newer Dimensions and Challenges**

This Chapter examines the various forms of armed conflicts and related activities in Nepal and its national and international dimensions and implications. The root causes of these conflicts including their political dynamics, socio-economic inequalities, caste, ethnic, religious issues are dealt with. The rising cross border terrorist activities, its sources and other challenges are analyzed within the framework of securitization theory. The study also examines how the increasing numbers of insurgency and terrorist groups in Nepal with trans-national connections have now emerged as newer varieties of threats to the national security of the country thereby challenging the conventional security based threat perceptions.

#### **5.1 Background**

Armed conflict is a multi-faceted problem. It creates both human tragedies and humanitarian crisis and that ultimately affect the overall security environment of a nation and the region. The major cause for the armed conflict is invariably underdevelopment and poverty. It was expected that the end of the bipolar rivalry would reduce the inter-states and intra-state conflicts in the global level. But despite the end of the Cold War, conflicts are very frequent and most of them occur in developing countries. The number of countries embroiled in armed conflict has increased since 1994. A report stated that during the period of 10 years, from 1989 to 1999; there have been 110 armed conflicts in 73 locations around the world. Categorizing these conflicts, an interesting fact emerges that 94 of these conflicts were intra-state, 9 intra-state with foreign intervention and 7 inter-states. In 1999, there were 37 active conflicts in 28 locations out of which with the exception of two, i.e. India-Pakistan and Eritrea-Ethiopia all were intra-state (Mallika and Joseph 2004).

Likewise, during the 40 years period of the Cold War, there were 120 wars involving many developing countries. According to one study, between 1950 to 1990, some fifteenth million deaths caused directly and indirectly by wars of all types – including

international conflicts, civil wars, and government's violence against the citizens (Stewart and Fitzgerald 2001). In the period 1997-2006 there were 34 different major armed conflicts in 45 locations around the world (SIPRI 2002). Most of these locations were in developing countries and more than half of the least developed countries have experienced major armed conflicts during the past twenty years (Fitzgerald 2000). Many of the conflicts during this period occurred in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. All most all the South Asian countries are experiencing one or another form of armed conflicts.

Though the nature of conflicts has changed the proportion of civilian casualties have sharply increased. Thousands of women, men and children die each year as a direct and indirect consequence of war. Likewise, the causes and consequences of the conflicts are often a complex; a mix of inter-linked economic, political, environmental, cultural and religious factors. There is also not denying that the proliferation of illegal weapons trigger the forced displacement, destroy infrastructure, ruin local economy and more importantly undermine the state authorities. It is a clear threat to the state as an institution. How to reconcile the traditional notion of security discourse, tied to territorial challenge, with a larger and more comprehensive discourse that encompasses 'soft' security issues like small arms, environment, energy and health is a critical question (Knudsen 1996).

Developing countries are the one which have been experiencing all forms of armed conflicts. On the one hand, the prevailing situation provides grounds for the social, religious, political, ethnic tension in society and that leads ultimately to the conflicts situation. On the other hand the scarce resources of the states are being diverted to the military and security areas and this has severely affected socio-economic progress of these countries. Any society that falls in the conflict situation, then it would find hard to forward the economic, social and development agendas. For all these reasons, ending conflict and reducing its intensity must be a very high policy imperative in the development agenda particularly in the underdeveloped and least developed societies like Nepal.

Armed conflicts are not a homogeneous phenomenon. Their origins, motivations, objectives are vary. According to Murshed and Tadjoeeddin the discussion on typology

of civil war points to four broad types: genocides, revolutions or rebellions against the state, secessionist wars and international wars (where the adjoining states or the great powers get involved). Many examples of the contemporary conflict do not always fit neatly only one of the categories mentioned. Besides civil war, there are other forms of large scale organised violence. Transnational terrorism is the most important other type of 'collective violence where the perpetrators have the very different motivation compared to participants of civil wars. In addition we also have routine and sectarian violence where the state is not a direct protagonist (Mushred and Tadjoeeddin 2007).

The use of threat of violence carried out by non-state organisations against the national state or foreign states and also against the population of either within the national states or outside. As Ahmed argues that in the past, the non-state organisations lacked the power and sophistication of the state in enforcing violence and therefore the threat from their violence remained limited, but lately with the availability of modern weaponries the non-state organisations are becoming no less destructive than the state in the use of violence. Some of the violent operations of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) and Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyya (HAMAS) are good examples (Ahmad 2006).

## **5.2 Armed conflict and security**

While the state centric security concern has tended to be underplayed, the non-traditional threats to security are increasingly highlighted. These newer threats encompass a range of situation including ethnic, religious, environmental conflicts and terrorism. Mainstream literature in the discipline of International Relations (IR) usually privileges the security considerations of states, and defines security primarily in inter-state terms (Buzan 1991). "Political realism still the predominant paradigm of International Relations derives the definition of security from a state of anarchy, and, in the process, equates power and security. Realism postulates a primal anarchy in which states are exposed to high levels of mutual threat, following from an unhindered freedom of action. The original realist conception of power and security had nothing to say about the internal dynamics of security, since its legitimate epistemic domain constituted of the external relations of states. Very soon, however,

the artificiality, if not outright impossibility, of such watertight compartmentalization was granted, and considerations of internal security became a legitimate pursuit of security experts in its own right”

(Chatterjee 2001).

The proliferation of conception again took a decisive step when it was realized that states had agendas against communities and the individuals that can become a social and political threats against both. The result of all this has been to expand the ambit of security manifold, without, however, ignoring the central realist assumption, i.e. international security remains essentially a security of and for the nation-state. The idea of societal security, as distinct from state security, remained unexplored in scholars, who, working with modified socialist assumptions and pioneering the theories of dependency and world system, were found defining security in economic and systemic terms (Ibid).

In a number of significant studies explained the external and internal linkages of conflicts and generally concluded in favour of negative correlation between the two. A major breakthrough in this direction came with the publication of Rummel’ ”Dimensions of conflict behavior within and between nations” in the General Systems Year Book, 1963, in which the author, by using the mathematical techniques of factor analysis and regression, concluded “foreign conflict behaviour is generally completely unrelated to domestic conflict behaviour” (Rummel 1963). Rummel’s astonishing conclusions were subsequently supported by R. Tanter, who found a very weak positive association between domestic and conflicts behavior and foreign bellicosity (Chatterjee 2001). Similarly, Sahadevan argues that the studies of external-internal linkages in the source and evolution of conflicts had little use in the study of ethnic conflicts, since the investigations were primarily related to internal strife, rebellion, civil war of and ideological nature, and their impact on external behaviour of states (Sahadevan 1998).

Focusing on ethnic conflict in South Asia, Urmila Phadnis in her 1989 classic Ethnicity and Nation Building in South Asia made a comprehensive enquiry into the external dimensions of ethnic separatism and the broad conclusions of this study are equally relevant today (Phadnis 1989). She provided explanation about various

dimensions of conflicts and how the external factors affect in the several ethnic and political conflicts in South Asian countries.

A number of efforts were made to apply conflict theory to current problems, specially control of local conflicts and the wars. After the end of Cold War, the fear of nuclear war between the superpowers is now subordinate to the fear of a protracted series of local wars with great power involvement. For most conflict theorists today, this prospect presents itself as one fraught with dangers much more than with opportunities, danger of which the possibilities of escalation of nuclear war is only one among many. According to Warner conflict is as the opposite of peace (Warner 2001). Interpreting conflict in different way than the common perceptions, another noted peace scholar John Galtung says that conflict occur each and every society and it does contribute positively for the change of society (Galtung 2004).

It is manifested within an individual, between individuals, within a family, between families, among community members and social groups, between community groups and external organisations, between countries. Conflict is an indicator of a changing society. Rapid changes due to new technologies, commercialization of common property resources, privatization of public services, growing consumerism and government policies all contribute to emergence of conflicts (Buckles 1999; Warner 2001, Upreti 2006).

Conflict has two stages: (i) latent conflict – a relatively permanent condition between conflicting parties with divergent and competing interest or (ii) active conflict – actual interplay of the disputants over a specific problem. Based on manifestation, conflict is divided into: (a) peaceful (like civil disobedience) and (b) violent (like armed rebellion, war, terrorists' attack) as well as (a) silent and (b) open conflict (Upreti 2006, and 2004). Conflict can be constructive as well as destructive. Constructive conflict is a type of manifestation that has positive result.

People in a violent social setting interpret conflict as violence or bloody war. Conflict is an active stage of disagreement between people with opposing opinions, principles and practices manifested in different forms such as grievance, conflict, dispute and war (Buckles 1999). Grievance is an initial stage of conflict in which individuals or a

group is perceived to be unjust, and provides grounds for resentment or complaints. This condition potentially erupts into conflict (Vayrynen 1991). When antagonistic clash of cultural, political, social or economic interests between individual and group occurred that lead to conflict (Ury et al 1989).

As pointed by Rubin, Rubestien and Sanddelin conflict discourse has been dominated mainly by two school of thoughts: (i) pathological and dysfunctional and (ii) functional or positive for social change (Rubin et al 1994, Rubestein 1993 and Sanddelin 1997 and Upreti 2006). The first school of thought views conflict carries a negative connotation and is interpreted as something irrational that needs to be suppressed because it is opposite to co-operation and peace. Another school of thought considers that conflict can also be a functional means for social change. The second school of thought of conflict acknowledges prevalence of conflict and it could also be a constructive social process to establish group boundaries, strengthen group consensus, develop a sense of self-identity, and contribute towards social integration and progressive economic and social change (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1990). According to this perspective, conflict is a continuous social process and has great influence in shaping and reshaping social relations and the power structure of society.

Unlike the first view, conflicts encompass adaptation by a society to a new political, economic and physical environment. Destructive conflict is a type of violent confrontation and often has largely negative results. It pushes people apart, destroys relationships, and leads to a host of negative personal and social change including an escalation of violence, fear, and distrust (Upreti 2006). It is contrasted with constructive conflict, which has more benefits than costs, which pulls people together strengthens and improve their relationship by redefining it in a more appropriate or useful way and one that leads to positive change in all of the parties involved.

The intractable conflicts like Maoists insurgency in Nepal, People's War in India, New People's Army's war in the Philippines, the Burmese ethnic groups armed struggle and Naga people's struggle in Nagaland, India are some the examples of the violent and intractable conflicts. These conflicts have begun with political and social motive and have been there since the last dozens of years. These show that the politically motivated conflicts that go on for a long period of time, defying most

attempts to resolve them. Typically, they involve fundamental value disagreements, high stakes distributional questions, and domination issues. They often involve unavoidable win-lose situation as well.

**Box 5.1**

***Basic Causes of Conflict***

- *Opposing interests*
- *Competition over scarce resources, power and position*
- *Ambiguity over roles, responsibilities and authorities*
- *Poor communication and lack of information*
- *Differences in perceptions, work styles, attitudes among individuals*
- *Contradictory reward and incentive systems*
- *Tension between equity (reward relative contributions) and equality (everyone receive same)*
- *Divergent ideologies*
- *Lack of basic understanding of social processes*
- *Development mismatch*
- *Resistant to social, political, cultural, technological, economic and any other changes*
- *International vested interests.*

*Sources: Folger and Jones 1994; Caplan 1995.*

Various writers argue that conflict is a part of social process and outcome of social developmental and change. How to make it useful for understanding various conflicts is the main concern. In functionalism theory, Durkheim argues that society is held together by the values that people in that society share; hence society is normally in a state of equilibrium based on moral consensus. Functionalist rule out disequilibrium or conflict. Parson's structural functionalism theory also considers conflict as dysfunctional and abnormal condition of society (Vayrynene 1991). An alternative perspective was put forward by Karl Marx citing a vivid case of conflict between two basic economic classes of people (Scimecca 1993).

Marx emphasizes that there is always constant conflict between the bourgeois who own the means of production and the proletariats who sell their labour. Dahrendorf further elaborates that social organisations typically contain two groups (those who rule and those who are ruled) with opposing interest, thus conflict is not only limited to class struggle over economic resources but also can be a power struggle between interest groups. Scimecca criticises the Marxian analysis of conflict on the ground that



it emphasises only an economically determined system of social relations and conflict than co-operation. Another critic Max Weber in his Social action Theory suggests that societies vary between conditions of equilibrium and conflict. In this perspective conflict is endemic in social process but tends to operate in favour of powerful people of the society. Weber gives explanations of how power is legitimatised and stabilised in society. Weber's Social Action Theory has four major components (Weber 1948): (a) Role of power, (b) Emphasis on organised system, (c) Legitimacy and (d) Self-interest.

Different forms of conflicts in society which involved group argues for seeking the positive results of conflict. The positive outcome of the conflict has been dominated the conflict discourse. It motivates people to try harder to win.

**Box 5.2**

- ***Characteristics of Conflict***

- *Requires at least two parties*
- *Arises from position scarcity, resources scarcity or power scarcity*
- *Behaviour attempts to destroy, injure, thwart, or control another party*
- *Requires mutually opposed interaction actions and counteraction among parties*
- *Relations attempts to gain control of scarce resources and positions or to influence behaviour*
- *Relations constitute social-interactions with important consequences*
- *Process represents a temporary tendency of interaction between the parties*
- *Relations shift in the governing norms and expectations*

*Source: Sidaway 1996, Pruitt and Carnevale 1993 and Galtung 2000*

However, it does not necessarily the conflict always leads to the positive outcome in the society. There are numbers of conflicts which lead to destruction, failure and breakdown of the society. The conflict can lead to the anger, avoidance, snapping, frustration, fear etc. It hampers social and economic development, encourage to breaks social harmony, religious tolerance and gender understanding. It ruins public and private relations, destroy human values, products, development infrastructures and historical legacy. Furthermore, the violent conflict causes the human rights violations, curtail the personal freedom and peaceful activities. Ultimately the violent conflict leads to the killings, abduction, terrorism in the society by silencing the voices of the masses. The conflict also breaks the ethical and moral values. It also

destroys the system based on rule of law. It does not respect the existence of the different views and pluralism. It always tries to impose its own will on society and individual by using violent activities as tools. Therefore, conflict specially the violent conflict usually leads to the negative outcome (Galtung 2000).

**Table V.I**  
**Structural Causes of Conflict in Society**

<b>Causes</b>	<b>Key characteristics</b>	<b>Examples</b>
Social	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Unequal, unjust or unrepresentative social structures</li> <li>• Social exclusion</li> <li>• Vertical social stratification</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Difference in education, wealth and income, information etc.</li> <li>• Lack of legal awareness</li> <li>• Insecure social system, vulnerability and deprivation</li> <li>• Inaccessible social benefits</li> </ul>
Legal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Legal systems with bias towards certain groups</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Legal arrangements providing privilege to powerful, e.g. Land Act discriminative to unregistered tenants or bounded labour</li> </ul>
Economic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Economic arrangement and power biased towards certain group of people</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Economic power and influence of commercial companies over indigenous practices</li> <li>• Government's policies and provisions favouring extractive industries while ignoring local interests and customary ownership</li> </ul>
Political	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Party and ideological biases and discrimination</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Misuse of power and administrative resources by the ruling political party members and government to create problems to the supporters of opposition and minority parties</li> </ul>
Cultural	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ethnic minority groups hold deep-seated values that define their identity</li> <li>• Cultural discrimination by state/government</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous people and minority hold different values for their identity</li> <li>• Elites and politicians exploit racial, religious, tribal, ethnic or linguistic differences and prejudices</li> <li>• Groups dislike each other</li> </ul>

Source: Upreti 2004, Warner 2001, BHCT 2003

### **5.3 Armed conflict and changing security perceptions in Nepal**

Over the last two hundred years after the Sugauli Treaty in 1816<sup>1</sup>, Nepal has not required engaging in defending its territorial integrity and national independence. As Kumar argues that “the perception of insecurity germinating in Nepal among the people is neither caused by threats of external aggression not by the ethnic violence, separatism and secessionism. Rather the threats and insecurities are caused by the lapses in the government’s responsibility to protect its citizenry from violent domestic conflict and from deepening anarchy. Expanding domestic insecurities are not the consequences of the threats to security of the state sovereignty. Neither are the predicaments of the people caused by any distant but cataclysmic external factors than the persistent social anomalies and internal dimensions couple with the neglects of the state to uphold its normative obligations to the citizens. Insecurity of the people therefore is not only limited to the threat to the means of their livelihood but also expanded to the threats of physical violence” (Ibid).

Implying terror tactics to assert their own political and social agendas by the extremist groups have become quite common in Nepal these days. Apart from the violent activities carried out by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) in the past decades, small armed groups who were split earlier from the Maoists are also involved in arbitrary killing, abduction, intimidation and harassment to the common people in the mid and eastern-Terai districts of Nepal. Their increasing such activities has posed a serious challenge for maintaining law and order in those districts and surrounding areas. In this scenario, the issue of internal security problem has become the main threat to the Nepali state than the managing the external challenges.

As Nepal has been facing internal violence conflicts and instable political situation since the past two decades, Nepal’s two closest neighbours India and China’s concern in Nepal is related with internal security and stability. Both of these two giants need peaceful environment not only within their own borders but also in the neighbours to grow and expand their area of influences. Any disturbances in Nepal would have spill

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<sup>1</sup> Sugauli Treaty was signed between Nepal and British India Company in 1816 after Nepal lost its war and also huge proportion of territories with British forces. It was a humiliating defeat for Nepal after many successful fights with British India Company and Chinese the previous decades.

over impacts on both countries (Bhattarai 2005). Such a changing internal dynamics and the external nature and trends of threats perceptions in Nepal needs to be analyzed in a boarder framework of non-traditional discourse.

Though, Nepal has had experiences of occasional armed rebellion against the despotic regimes in the past (in pre-1950s and post 1960s and 70s) all those revolts were the temporary phenomenon, had minimum casualties and did not have countrywide impacts. However, the 'People's War' launched under the banner of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) since the mid 1990s has become the most destructive revolt both in terms of losing human lives and properties and causing huge national security concerns.

On 13 February 1996, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) declared a "People's War in Nepal", issuing a leaflet that called on the people of Nepal to 'March along the Path of the People's War to Smash the Reactionary State and Establish a New Democratic State'. Elaborating the objectives of launching protracted people's war, it said 'to uproot semi-feudalism and to drive out imperialism, in order to establish a new democratic republic with a view to building a new socialist society'. To achieve these objectives, CPN (Maoists) adopted the strategy and tactics of a 'protracted People's War' with aim or purpose of establishing base areas in the rural and remote areas, so as, eventually, to surround urban areas and seize state power. Earlier in January, the United People's Front of Nepal (UPFN), frontal organisation of CPN (M) presented a 40 point<sup>2</sup> demand on behalf of their mother party to the Nepali Congress government led by Sher Bahadur Deuba. Under this the UPFN focused on a number of issues that had become increasingly pressing in their influential areas particularly Rukum and Rolpa districts of mid-western hill region (Karki and Seddon 2003).

The 10 years (1996 to 2006) of protracted armed conflict has shaken the very foundation of the country and it has faced a serious crisis after the infamous Sugauli Treaty with the British India colonial regime in 1816. Even after one and half years (22 November 2006) of conclusion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between

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<sup>2</sup> See below in the box 40 points demands presented by the United People's Front of Nepal (Maoist frontal organization) to the Government of Nepal, January 1996.

the government and rebel in Nepal has still been experiencing its' left over scars. The proliferation of armed groups has become the common phenomenon in Nepal. Since the signing of Comprehensive Peace Accord, about two dozens of armed insurgency groups claimed their existence and most of them are indulged in killing, abduction, extortion. These groups are mainly based in the Terai regions and their activities have paralyzed the middle and eastern Terai. Most of these groups were the break way factions of the CPN (Maoists) in the past. Even the state has been in the process of negotiated settlement with CPN (M), the emergence of the various armed groups has posed serious challenges to the overall security environment of the country and break the law and order situation (Bhattarai 2005).

Another development in the country since the restoration of 1990's democratic movement was the increasing activities of the dalit, indigenous and ethnic groups who have become assertive for their rights and dignity. These groups have been demanding for their better representations and presence in different organs of the states and other policy making bodies. They have also been asserting autonomy and separate regions on the basis of their ethnicity. Some of these groups have also decided to wage armed insurgency and also pose challenge to the states particularly in eastern hill region. The successive coalition governments of the parties which was formed after the popular people's movement in April 2006 in the center have not been able to maintain peace and provide security to the citizens. They have failed to provide sense of security and create environment where people can feel secure and go any parts of the country without any hindrances. The people are facing serious problems in finding basic facilities such as gas, petroleum products and other basic goods. This has raised the question of the existence of the regime (Ibid).

Meantime, increasingly deteriorated governance system in the post-1990 democratic era provided ground to the Maoists to assert their agendas. Economic security is an imperative to individual freedom which is the genuine concern for human security as "freedom from want" in a poor and underdeveloped country like Nepal. It is a basis for both human capital and capacity building for human development (Sharma 2004). On the other hand, the state has already been in financial crunch. Increasing security expenditures and the growing demand from the population to pursue the development activities in the rural areas have deepened the crisis. This has also affected the

livelihood of the general populace. The breakdown of the security system and increasing financial problem, the state has become vulnerable and faces a severe threat to its survivability and sustainability not from outside forces but within the country itself.

#### **5.4 Armed conflicts in Nepal in a historical context**

There has been a long history of rebellion in Nepal against the despotic and autocratic rulers. Such tendencies of revolting against the autocratic rulers were existed even before the unification of Nepal in 1769. However most of these uprising were not documented properly. We can find only scattered references in the historical literature (Regmi 1999). Perhaps the first documented revolt was against Jung Bahadur Rana by the people of Lamjung and Gurkha Districts. The revolt was initiated by Jamdar Sripati Gurung in Tundikhel, Kathmandu during the military parade. Though he was killed immediately and his associate Sukadev Gurung led the movement and mobilized people in Lamjung and Gurkha districts. The revolt was crushed he was died in prison in 1857 (Bhattachan 2000).

Similarly, in 1876, Lakhan Thapa Magar, a resident of Gorkha district also led a revolt against Jung Bahadur Rana from the central hill region of Gorkha. Within short period of time, the uprising became popular and hundreds of people of that region joined the movement. The leaders-Lakhan Thapa Magar, Aja Singh Thapa and Achhami Magar-were eventually executed by hanging in Gorkha; others were jailed or sent exile (Ibid). The revolt against the despotic Rana regime became popular not only in the western part of the country but also in eastern region (Karki and Seddon 2003).

A widow named Yog Maya from eastern hill district of Bhojpur led a popular movement against the caste discrimination and oppression and other forms of state discriminations in early 20<sup>th</sup> century. The movement was known as 'a campaign for justice and truth' (Satya Dharma Bhichha) was essentially non-violent movement which mobilized thousands of people and lasted several decades. Like many previous rebels, she was also arrested and put in jailed for several years. When she was

released in 1940, she again began her campaign and committed mass suicide together with her other 59 followers, drowned themselves in the Arun River in 1942 (Ibid).

Apart from these, dozens of other anti-Rana campaigns were organised during the period of 1920s and 1930s by publishing poems, books, pamphlets. The first organised revolt in 1930s was called 'Prachanda Gorkha' where a group of young Nepali planned to bomb all the senior Rana rulers. However, most of them were arrested before they could undertake their plan; some were exiled others were jailed. Immediate after Prachanda Gorkha revolt, Praja Parishad was formed, the first political party, whose aim was to establish democracy and constitutional monarchy, on the British model. The Praja Parishad published a leaflet in 1940 against the Rana regime in October 1940 where those involved were arrested and charged with plotting the assassination of the Rana family. Four-Gangalal, Dharmabhakta, Dasharath and Sukraraj- were sentenced to death and other to long jail sentences (Gautam 2001).

The death of four young men ignited the anti-Rana autocratic movement and given impetus to the pro-democracy struggle in Nepal. Meantime, the 'Quit India Movement' against the British in India in 1940s and subsequently Indian independence provided favourable environment to the pro-democratic forces in the country. During this period two major parties were formed-the Nepali Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal. Both parties were established in India by the people who were already in India. Pushpa Lal Shrestha who initiated the formation of the Communist Party of Nepal in 1947 and immediately he published the Communist Party Manifesto in Nepali which became the first event in shaping the communist movement in Nepal. The espousal of armed struggle as an element in the strategy of the Nepali communist movement was clear from the start. The first leaflet produced by the Communist Party of Nepal published in April 1949, declared that Nepal should establish a 'new democracy' as in China-if necessary through armed struggle-so as to create a People's Republic. Not only the Communist Party of Nepal advocated the armed struggle at that time, the preacher of non-violence and centrist party the Nepali Congress had also put aside the principle of non-violent struggle and adopted and agreed that only armed struggle would lead to the overthrow of the Rana regime in Nepal (Karki and Seddon 2003).

The then party chairman M.P. Koirala was appointed to the post of military supreme and the main leaders of the party were allocated military responsibility for the different regions of Nepal. By the time of 1950s, the Nepali Congress led armed rebellion began to attack many districts in the hill districts and border zones. That had forced the government garrison to surrender to the Mukti Sena (Liberation Army) in Birgunj and many other places. The armed insurrection were developed and spread in the country. The main bases of the Mukti Sena were in India and weapons were imported from Burma (Gautam 2001).

Meantime the newly formed Communist Party of Nepal had also launched campaigns against Rana rule. Finally, 104 year old oligarchy system was overthrown and introduced a multiparty system with the mediation of Indian government in New Delhi in December 1950. This happened with the combination of armed insurrection by the NC, the scattered anti-Rana campaigns by the CPN, the fleeing of King Tribhuvan to New Delhi (in November 1950, King Tribhuvan took a shelter at Indian embassy Kathmandu and later flew to New Delhi with his family) and the pressure exerted by the Indian government on the Rana regime. A ceasefire was declared by the armed group and a compromise was made between King, Rana and Nepali Congress where a coalition government would be formed of two Rana and NC under the Premiership of Mohan Samsher Rana. It is known as Delhi Compromise which was vehemently opposed by the other political parties particularly the CPN of that time as a betrayal to the people's movement and the dreams of the martyrs.

The former prime minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru was the key player in making this compromise in New Delhi. While making decisive intervention on Nepal's new political arrangement, he had in mind both democracy and stability in Nepal. Since, stability was the priority of his foreign policy of the time when communist takeover of China in 1949 was taken as a serious threat to India. The specific foreign policy of the government of India towards Nepal was to prove equally dependent on its vision of India's wider strategic interests, as the region as a whole and in the wider world throughout the next half-century (Rawal 1988).



Under the 1950's political arrangement between the King, Rana and Congress was that the election of constituent assembly would be held and new constitution would be framed on the basis of that election (actually this has become the key demand of CPN (Maoists) for launching 'people's war' in 1996). King Tribhuvan never allowed holding elections and drafting the constitution. His son King Mahendra, who succeeded Tribhuvan in 1955, also did not follow the agreement that was made in New Delhi and later became the Royal Proclamation of 1951 (Devkota, 1954).

Both factors; the India's excessive role on Nepal's internal matter and the Kings' failure to honor the election to the constituent assembly had become the major point of contention to the political parties especially the Communist Party with the governments during the period of limited multiparty democratic system in 1950s. After a prolonged political uncertainty and pressure from the political parties, King Mahendra agreed to hold the election in 1959 not for the constituent assembly but for a parliament. So, the 1950's agreement of holding election of the constituent assembly to draft a new constitution by the people's representatives had never been materialized. During this period series of campaigns including armed rebellion were organized by parties and individuals. K.I. Singh's rebellion against the 'Delhi Compromise in 1952 and his arrest subsequent breakdown of jail and exiled to China was one of the major events of that time. Similarly, Bhim Datta Panta organized a popular rebellion in far western part of Nepal against the central government and India's intervention was another event which mobilized thousands of people in Mahakali and Seti zones. To quell that revolt, the regime in Kathmandu sought security assistance from India (Devkota 1959).

In the year of 1959 instead of election to the constituent assembly, a new constitution was promulgated and under that new constitution King Mahendra agreed to hold parliamentary election and retained the power to dissolve parliament and cabinet without consulting the elected Prime Minister. The election was held and the Nepali Congress won more than two third majority in the election out of 109 seats, it won 74 and Communist Party of Nepal won 4 seats only. However, within less than two years, King Mahendra with the support of military took power (using the same emergency power that was vested in him by the 1959 constitution) dismissing and dissolving the cabinet and Parliament. Most of the central leaders including Prime

Minister was arrested and put in jails and parties were banned and imposed autocratic party-less Panchayat system in the county (Shah 1990).

This development had created division within the political parties including the Communist Party. The then Secretary General Kesharjung Rayamajhi supported the king's coup and the other group led by Pushpalal opposed it. From this point, CPN began to experience significant divisions. The movement was split into various small groups not only as a result of different orientations towards popular struggle and revolution within Nepal, but also as a result of the Sino-Soviet split and its international repercussions. Those party leaders who opposed the king's action went to exile or underground and initiated clandestine movements against the absolute monarchical Panchayat system (Rawal 1988).

#### **5.4.1 The rise of Maoism in the Nepalese Communist movement**

Two events that had contributed for the rise of Maoism in the communist movement in Nepal in 1970s and 80s; first was the Cultural Revolution of China and second was the Naxalite movement in India. Both these events had greatly influenced the radicalization of Nepali communist movements in those periods. In 1971, first time a group of young communist activists formed a committee in eastern region of Nepal later it became an All Nepal Revolutionary Coordination Committee (ML). That very group launched a guerilla movement popularly known in Nepal as a 'Jhapa Uprising' in line with the concept of 'the protracted people's war'. The Jhapa Uprising was the first attempts by Nepali communists to undertake armed struggle as a central component of their revolutionary strategy. The movement actually started from Jymirgadi village in Jhapa on 16 May 1971 and drawn attention and support from many young political activists across the country (CPN – M.L. Fourth Congress Documents 1989)<sup>3</sup>. It was an initiation led by a small group of radical youth however was brought to a swift end by a brutal counter-insurgency campaign by the police, which killed number of activists and dozens of them were arrested and jailed for long sentences. The suppression of the movement had made its leadership, who were either

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<sup>3</sup> See the documents of the Communist Party of Nepal (M-L)'s which is known now as CPN -UML after the unification in 1991, held its Fourth National Congress in August 1989.

in the prison or outside, to realize and review their earlier strategy and tactics (KC 2004).

The same group emerged as a Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist-Leninist) in 1978 and rejected the armed insurgency and advocated for the militant mass movement. As Mikesell records 'it changed its name to the Communist Party Marxist-Leninist, taking the Nepal acronym "Ma-Le" and abandoned the people's war for underground educating and organizing in village, town, school and campus in order to build a mass movement. This marked the first emergence in Nepal of a large, cadre-based and ideologically coherent party with a strong organizational base among the masses. Although the Ma-Le continued to draw its leadership almost completely from the same national propertied classes that had been vying for state power, the party represented itself in terms of a radicalization program along the ideological lines of the Chinese revolution, and for the first time Nepali communist party members lived and worked among the rural and urban working classes on a relatively large scale' (Mikesell 1999).

Meantime, another radical line that had emerged from the mainstream party was the Mohan Bikram group which formed under the leadership of Mohan Bikram Singh in 1971 was called 'Central Nucleus'. This group was following a Fourth Party Congress held in 1974 and therefore known as 'CPN (Fourth Congress)'. Its strategy was to launch a people's movement that could at the opportune moment be converted into an armed revolt. As stated by Deepak Thapa, 'the top leadership of today's Maoists come from this school' (Thapa 2002). Even if the divisions that subsequently developed within the group became of critical significance. After the death of Mao tse Tung in China in 1976 and subsequent ceased of Cultural Revolution and arrest of Gang of Four created serious debates within the Nepali communist movements in the late 1970s and early 1980s. This had led the divisions within the CPN (Fourth Congress).

As Mohan Bikram Singh denounced the arrest of Gang of Four as well as reform path initiated by Deng Xiao Peng while another leader Nirmal Lama had become supportive towards the change that had taken place in China after Mao. As a result the CPN (Fourth Congress) was divided and Mohan Bikram and Mohan Baidya (the

Maoists ideologue) formed a CPN (Masal). However, within two years of their break with CPN (Fourth Congress) again CPN (Masal) was broke again and this time Mohan Baidya led the group and formed another CPN (Mashal). It was in the Mashal party led by Mohan Baidya that Pushpa Kamal Dahal – now known better as ‘Prachanda’ and chairman of CPN (Maoists)-emerged as one of the leaders, to become general secretary in 1989. In 1990, the breakaway faction of CPN (Masal) and CPN (Mashal) formed a CPN (Unity Center) (Ibid).

Meantime, Nepal entered into the multiparty democratic political setup after the successful people’s movement in 1990. After that again, debate was raised within the CPN (Unity Center) whether they should accept the change and involve in it or remain underground and criticized the changes. As Liz has pointed out that ‘after the introduction of democracy there were ideological struggles within the Maoists party as to whether they should opt for constitutional politics or remain committed to classic Maoists armed struggle. The Maoists party’s split and re-amalgamated over questions of ideology, tactics, power and personalities in a bewildering and never-ending fashion’ (Philipson 2002). When in the 1990s pro-democratic movements led by Nepali Congress and Left Front (coalition of different moderate and communist parties) gained momentum, the two Mashal/Masal group and Revolutionary Workers Party supported the movement but did not take part formally. They maintained their commitment to the ‘People’s War’ (Karki and Seddon 2003).

When the newly established government of Nepali Congress and Left Front after the successful pro-democratic movement promulgated new constitution, the three groups Mashal/Masal and Revolutionary Workers Party rejected the constitution considering it an inadequate basis for a genuine democracy and demanded for the constituent assembly election originally planned in 1951. However, the newly formed CPN (Unity Center) under the leadership of Pushpa Kamal Dahal decided to contest the general election for the parliament held in May 1991 under the banner of United People’s Front of Nepal (frontal organisation of CPN (Unity Center). The Unity Center under the leadership of Prachanda brought together several Maoists groups: the CPN (Mashal), under Prachanda; the CPN (Fourth Congress); under Nirmal Lama; the Proletariat Workers Organisation, under Rupal Bishwakarma and a

splinter group of the CPN (Masal) led by Baburam Bhattarai (which was split from Mohan Bikram Singh's CPN (Masal) (Thapa 2002).

The CPN (Unity Center) participated the election in 1991 under the banner of United People's Front of Nepal (UPFN) led by Bhattarai and won nine seats in the parliament. This had made UPFN as the third largest party after Nepali Congress and CPN (UML). The UPFN had also contested the local bodies election held in 1992 and won considerable number of villages and few municipal wards. Despite their involvement in the electoral politics after the 1990 political changed, they continued advocated the relevance of the armed struggle to capture the state power. 'Despite its status as a legitimate party, it had underground groups working within the party, as it continued to espouse the cause of revolutionary struggle in order to capture state power through armed struggle' ((Khatri 2002)

**Table V.II**  
**General Election Results, May 1991**

Party	Seats	Share of poll %
Nepali Congress	110	39.5
Communist Party of Nepal (UML)	69	29.3
United People's Front Nepal	9	5.0
Communist Party of Nepal (Democratic)	2	2.5
Nepal Worker's and Peasant Party	2	1.3
National Democratic Party (Chand)	3	6.9
National Democratic Party (Thapa)	1	5.6
Nepal Sadbhavana Party	6	4.3
Independents	3	1.2

*Source: Derived from House of Representative Members' Election – 2048: Final results (Kathmandu: Election Commission, 1991)*

The CPN (Unity Center), mother party of UPFN held its first national congress in December 1991 and decided to adopt 'Marxism-Leninism-Maoism' as its guiding principle for the Party and the path of protracted people's war through the initiation of open class struggle in the rural areas on the classic Chinese model. The Congress

dismissed the new parliamentary politics as incapable of leading to progressive change.

According to Prachanda, the ‘parliamentary road to socialism, had been undermined by the 1991 Constitution of Nepal and the limited form of ‘politics’ being adopted by what were evidently no more than fractions of the political elite and acceptance of the doctrine of economic liberalisation and collaboration in parliamentary politics risked the party’s revolutionary goals’ (Prachanda 2000). The Congress had also taken decision to enhance Party’s underground works while UPFN continued to be in the parliamentary activities. In 1994, again the CPN (Unity Center) was divided and CPN (Maoists) was formed and Prachand became the leader of the party and decided to boycott the 1994 parliamentary election. The UPFN had also split and the group led by Baburam Bhattarai was not recognized by the election commission and it had also followed the decision of its mother party the CPN (Maoists) and did not take part in the election.

**Table V.III**  
**General Election Results, November 1994**

<b>Party</b>	<b>Seats</b>	<b>Share of poll %</b>
Communist Party of Nepal (UML)	88	30.85
Nepal Congress	83	33.38
United People’s Front Nepal	-	1.32
Nepal Worker’s and Peasant Party	4	0.98
National Democratic Party	20	17.93
Nepal Sadbhavana Party	3	3.49
Independents	6	4.3
	7	6.6

*Source: Derived from House of Representative Members’ Election – 2051: Final results (Kathmandu: Election Commission, 1994)*

After the boycott of the 1994 parliamentary election, the Maoists began to radicalize its members and prepared for the armed struggle. During this period, the CPN (Maoists) was able to strengthen its party base and its Third Plenum held in March 1995 adopted the Strategy and Tactics of Armed Struggle in Nepal (CPN – Maoists’

Third Plenum Document 1995)<sup>4</sup>. This document states that ‘the conscious peasants class struggle developed in the western hill districts, particularly in Rolpa and Rukum, represents the high level of anti-feudal and anti-imperialist revolutionary struggle. That struggle had given birth to some new tendencies in the Nepali Communist Movement which have inspired us to be more serious about the business of armed struggle’ (Maoist 1995). By now, the CPN (Maoists) was also become a member of the Maoists parties international network, the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM)<sup>5</sup>, which provided moral support to them. The meeting that took place on July 1, 1995 between the Indian Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) (People’s War) and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), the two parties issued the following joint statement:

*“The parliamentary system of the reactionaries is facing a crisis everywhere, but the revisionists still are shamelessly trying to take the people along that path. It has, therefore, become essential to eliminate the counter-revolutionary confusion of the parliamentary system and lead the people toward people’s war. The Marxist-Leninist-Maoist revolutionaries of all countries thus bear the historic responsibility of united leadership to the imminent world revolution so as to direct it along the path shown by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Mao by thwarting revisionist conspiracies”*(Adhikari, 2003).

#### **5.4.2 Intensification of ‘People’s War’ and threats to traditional security perceptions**

The CPN (Maoist) formally launched a ‘People’s War’ on 13 February 1996 by attacking few police posts and one branch of government owned Agricultural Bank in mid-western, western and central region’s hill districts namely Rolpa, Rukum, Salyan, Jajarkot, Gorkha and Sindhuli. These were the core areas of CPN (Maoist) where they had strong organisational bases and won the parliamentary and local elections in 1991

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<sup>4</sup> Communist Party of Nepal – Maoists, held its Third Plenum in March 1995 and that Convention decided to launch a protracted ‘People’s War’ to encircle the cities by liberating villages to establish a ‘New Democratic’ similar path that was taken by Chinese Communist Party under the leadership of Mao tse Tung in China during the 1930s and 1940s.

<sup>5</sup> Revolutionary Internationalist Movements (RIM) is based in the US, an international network of Maoists Parties around the globe which provides moral and sometimes physical supports to the armed struggles mainly in the developing countries.

and 1992 respectively. Stating the main objectives of launching the war in a leaflet, the Maoist called on the people of Nepal to ‘March along the path of the People’s War to smash the reactionary state and establish a New Democratic state’. They have divided the People’s War into three strategic stage is further divided into sub-stages or phases. Within each of these, tactical action plans were to develop and employed to achieve the strategic plan.



### 5.1 Nepal Maoists Insurgency (Districts and Key Settlements)

Source: [www.digitalhimalaya.com/projectteam/download/janasarkar](http://www.digitalhimalaya.com/projectteam/download/janasarkar).

Before formally launching ‘people’s war’, on 4 February 1995 Baburam Bhattarai, the second in command of the CPN (Maoist) presented the Nepali Congress-led coalition government of Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba with a list of 40 point demands related to “nationalism, democracy and livelihood” (Karki and Seddon 2003).



**Table V.IV**  
**CPN (Maoist) 40 point Demands**

<b>Nationalism</b>	<b>Political</b>
Abrogation of 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship Abrogation of Mahakali Treaty Border regulation Discontinue Gurkha recruitment Introduce work-permit system End imperialistic hegemony	Republican constitution End royal privileges Civil authority over army Repeal regressive regulations Release prisoners End state terrorism Enquiry on actions against Maoists Recognition to martyrs and penalty to perpetrators Ethnic autonomy Freedom of Speech Freedom of thought Freedom of devolution Local governance
<b>Economic</b>	<b>Social</b>
End capital aggrandizement Self-reliant economy Land to the tiller Nationalization of dubious property Employment generation Set minimum wages Resettle squatters Debt relief, credit provision Cheap inputs, fair price for agriculture products Control price Provide road, electricity and water supply to rural areas Promote cottage industries Control corruption	Secular state Equality to women End ethnic oppression Abolish untouchability Equality of languages Access to education and health services Protection of the disabled

*Source: Gurung, Harka, "Nepal: Maoist Insurgency and Indigenous People", Nepal Journal of Contemporary Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2 September 2003.*

Though, the people's war received little attention in the initial days, the government dispatched police to deal with what was perceived as a law and order problem for several years. Dealing with this problem, the government introduced two operation programs – Operation Romeo and Kilo Sierra Two. However, both of these programs were criticized later as the most oppressive method and contributed for the expansion of Maoists war than to control it. The police became so violent and barbaric in operation particularly in the mid western hills. They treated everyone as a potential Maoist and many innocent people were arrested, ill-treated, tortured and killed almost randomly. 'The police actions resulted in a substantial proportion of the local population making common cause with the Maoists and the mid west was effectively confirmed as a Maoist heartland' (Karki & Seddon 2003).

With the onset of their people's war in February 1996, the CPN (M) developed series of plans. They had categorized the beginning of war was the first plan which lasted barely a month till March 1996. Then they entered into second plan in March 1996 tht lasted till Jun 1997 under which they had developed 'people's war' in an organised way and included the 'elimination of selected enemies' which means they had killed number of unarmed political activists of other political parties, confiscated weapons and intensify extortion and recruitment in their parties. Those who were targeted under second plan were the popular local leaders of various mainstream parties. Maoists felt that without elimination of these mass based local leaders of the other parties, it would impossible to expand their influences in those areas. During this period they had also captured some important weapons by attacking the police posts. The third plan of the Maoists was to boycott the local elections held by the government in May 1998. In this process, they were able to create vacuum in local government by threatening the other parties' candidates.

The overall military strategic planning of the Maoists is elucidated by the phase-wise "action slogans" of the party are cited as follows:

*First Phase (February 1996) - "Let's advance on the way of people's war to establish a people's state regime destroying the reactionary regime"*

*Second Phase (March 1996) - "Let's develop well-planned guerrilla warfare"*

*Third Phase (1997) - "Let's take a new height of guerrilla warfare"*

*Fourth Phase (1998) – “Let’s forward to construct a base area”*

*Fifth Phase (1999) – “Strike against shock campaigns”*

*Sixth Phase (2000) – “Let’s march towards the direction of constructing base areas”*

*Seventh Phase (Feb 2001) – “Consolidate and extend the base area, march on towards*

*the direction of forming New People’s Central Government”*

*Eights Phase (2002 onwards) – “Strategic Offense”*

In February 1998, the CPN (M) declared the existence of a Central Military Commission; and they also organised a rally in New Delhi under the banner of ‘Solidarity Forum to Support the People’s War in Nepal’ with the support of six local Indian organisations. By this time, the CPN (M) had been able to expand its activities in various parts of the country and able to recruit significant number of people in their fold. With the intensification of the Maoists brutality, the government had also taken suppressive measures by launching another police operation called ‘Kilo Sierra 2 in 1998. This operation had significantly increased the confrontation and clashes. As a result the number of death had also been increased. According to one report, the number of casualty from October 1997 to April 1998 (six month), the number of death officially recorded was 34 (18 by the police), but from April 1998 to May 1999 (14 month), the number of death was 596 (457 of them as a result of police action) (INSEC 1999).

The second time police operation ‘Operation Kilo Sierra Two’ too proved negative to the state than controlling the Maoists. In fact it had become another factor largely to contribute to the intensification of the People’s War. As stated by many including a popular English Weekly Nepali Times pointed out in its editorial in October 2000, ‘it is now clear that it was state terrorism unleashed by the police in 1997-98 in Rukum, Rolpa and Jajarkot that lit the spark for an expanding insurgency’ (Nepali Times October 2000). By the time of 2000, Maoists had been able to expand their presence more districts. Maoists claimed that ‘there were only 9 out of 75 districts that had not come under their direct influence’ (Mulprabaha, 14 February 2000).

Meantime, in line with the party’s policy of people’s protracted war and to suit best with its pursuance of base areas, the Maoists have started forming its own government

at village level by late 1998. They had their four tiers of governments: central (United Revolutionary People's Council led by Baburam Bhattarai), regional (nine autonomous regional governments):

- *Seti-Mahakali Autonomous Region*
- *Bheri-Karnali Autonomous Region*
- *Tharuwan Autonomous Region*
- *Magarat Autonomous Region*
- *Tamuwan Autonomous Region*
- *Tamang Saling Autonomous Region*
- *Newar Autonomous Region*
- *Kirat Autonomous Region*
- *Madhes Autonomous Region.*

The Maoists guerrilla attacked was heightened after 2000 when they attacked one of the district headquarters (Dolpa district, Karnali Zone), in September. After this attack, the then government of Nepal headed by Prime Minister Girija Parasad Koirala wanted to mobilize Royal Nepal Army against the Maoists, however, the king who was the custodian Commander In Chief of the Army did not allow to mobilize RNA against them. As the result of this, the then Home Minister Govinda Raj Joshi resigned from the Cabinet and the division within the ruling elites surfaced on dealing the increasing offense of the insurgency. After rejection to mobilize the army, the Koirala government decided to set up a new Para-military force; the Armed Police Force to deal with the Maoists in 2001 (Rai 2005).

The political situation was turned worse from the bad when the country experienced royal massacre in June 2001. The apparent opportunism with which Maoists responded to the massacre-claiming it as an imperialist and reactionary plot involving the new king, Gyanendra and India-and proposing a immediate formation of an interim government, a new constitution and the establishment of a republic (Karki & Seddon 2003). With this growing political instability in the country further provided the ground to the Maoists for their expansion. The frustration as well as disillusionment with the mainstream politics and deteriorating economic, social and

political scenario had also helped the rebels to advance their forces (Bhattarai and Cave 2009).

**Table V. V**  
**No. of Victims before the state of emergency**  
**(13 Feb 1996 – 25 Nov. 2001)**

By state	By Maoists	Total
992	811	1803

Source: INSEC website: [www.insec.org](http://www.insec.org) (Feb 2008).

### 5.4.3 Declaration of State of Emergency and mobilization of Army

With the breakdown of the first ceasefire and CPN (M)'s unilateral declaration of leaving the dialogue<sup>6</sup> with the government which was started in August 2001, the Sher Bahadur Deuba led government declared the state of emergency on 26 November 2001 and decided to mobilize the army against the rebel. The government had also promulgated the 'Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Control and Punishment) Ordinance (TADO). Under this ordinance the CPN (M) was declared a 'terrorist organization'. Until this point the conflict had been largely, a low intensity conflict-it was estimated in October 2001 that around 1800 people had been killed up to that point in the conflict over a period of five and a half years, with hundreds reported missing, and thousands displaced (INSEC Human Rights Year Book 2002). Before government taking that decision, the CPN (M) had attacked Royal Nepal Army's Dang district barrack killing 14 soldiers and it was the first time the guerilla attacked Royal Nepal Army. During the first month of Emergency, it was reported that 606 people were killed by the state security forces and a further 153 killed by the Maoists. The Maoists claimed that in the first 3 months of the Emergency, they had killed some 600 Royal Nepal Army personnel (INSEC HR Year Book 2002).

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<sup>6</sup> See, the statement of chairman Prachanda, CPN (M), 'The old regime's unwillingness to address our demands, we have decided to discontinue the dialogue", 24 November 2001.

**Table V.VI**

**No. of Victims during state of emergency (26 Nov 2001 – 31 Aug. 2002)**

By state	By Maoists	Total
2580	948	3528

Source: INSEC website: [www.insec.org](http://www.insec.org) (Feb 2008).

As Deepak Thapa suggested that ‘the Maoists seemed buoyed by their initial success against the army, but there also seemed to have been some doubt about their ultimate victory by military tactics alone’ (Thapa 2001). However, the conflict intensified further, with the Maoists launching several further major attacks on army positions, police posts, infrastructure and other targets. The intensification of the conflict in Nepal had also been reported widely in the international press and foreign governments and international agencies were becoming increasingly alarmed at the intensification of the conflict. The more worrying was the escalation of violence and the apparent failure of the constitutional political actors, even with a significant deployment of the security forces to deal with the insurgency. The Royal Nepal Army was offered logistic and training supports by the US, India and UK Army. The Indian, US and UK governments condemned the CPN (M) and declared it as ‘terrorist’ organization. They pledged every supports to the government of Nepal.

Nepali people believed that their goal had been achieved with the success of the 1990 movement and forming up a constitution that incorporated the basic democratic and civil rights. Though, again compromises were made with the monarchy where the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) remained under the guise of the palace, and provisions were retained in the constitution for the King to have some powers.<sup>7</sup> Despite those provisions and retention of powers, the royal elites were not happy especially they were being accountable to the people. From the very day of democracy they started to undermine the political parties and their efforts to strengthen democracy in Nepal.

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<sup>7</sup> The provisions were made in the 1990s Constitution where the King remained the Supreme Commander of the Royal Nepal Army and the constitutional body like National Security Council chaired by the Prime Minister supposed to keep the RNA under its command had become functionless during the democratic era, ‘Nepal Adhirajyako Sambidhan, 2047 (Constitution of Kingdom of Nepal – 1990), HMG of Nepal.

On the other hand, the political parties who spearheaded the people's movement and established democracy in the country had the responsibility to consolidate the democratic rights and make the democratic system to deliver to the needy. However, the successive governments of last 12 years of democratic Nepal were unable to institutionalize the democracy and initiate the process towards the fulfillment of the growing expectations of the general populace. Furthermore, political parties and their governments were marred by internal divisions, groupism and corruption charges. The subsequent elected governments and the sovereign Parliament have failed to deliver the basic needs of the people and fulfill their aspirations. Similarly, the marginalization, caste and class based social discriminations were continued. The gap between haves and have not further widened. This all contributed in breeding of frustration and anger among people and it has surfaced under the banner of Communist Party of Nepal - Maoists. The growing Maoists violence as well as failure to address the popular aspiration of the general masses by the subsequently elected governments provided the ground to the both extremist forces to spoil the democratic process.

On October 4 2002 King Gyanendra over stepped the Constitution and assumed executive power by dismissing the elected Prime Minister. Subsequently he started to appoint Prime Minister of his own handpicked men. King's such extra-constitutional move not only paralyzed the hardly won 1990's democratic constitution, it had also seriously challenged the sovereign rights of the people which was vested in the hands of people in 1990, first time in Nepal's history. Similarly, increasing Maoists violence and killing of innocent civilian created terror in the country. The people of Nepal were caught in between two extreme forces - the King supported by the Royal Nepal Army and the armed rebellion led by the CPN (M).

King Gyanendra took the throne following a mysterious and still unexplained massacre of the Royal family on June 1, 2001, breaking the original Royal bloodline and passing the crown to Gyanendra. King Gyanendra almost immediately began playing a political game of sticks and carrots to confuse and undermine the political parties and the members of government. The parties were weak with infighting and were tainted with all-too-true accusations of corruption, which the monarchy used to its advantage in order to influence legislative process and in particular to redistribute

financial resources to the palace's benefit. The political bickering peaked when Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba split from the Nepali Congress to form the Nepali Congress (Democratic) and dissolved parliament. Citing the incompetence of Deuba to hold elections and invoking the interest of national security (King's Statement October 2002).<sup>8</sup>

Prime Minister Deuba dissolved the Parliament on May 27, 2002 and called for a parliamentary election after failing to secure his party's support for the extension of State of Emergency. However, within a few months time his government realized that the deteriorating security situation of the country making impossible to hold the declared elections. Therefore, his cabinet recommended for postponement of the elections on October 2, 2002 to the King. Instead of announcing the postponement of the elections as per the cabinet recommendation, King Gyanendra took this as an opportune to dismiss the Prime Minister and assume executive power in his hands. To justify his action, he cited the Article 127 of the 1990 Constitution, which has been regarded by the political parties, legal community as well as the international community as against the norms of the constitutional monarchy defined in the constitution of 1990.<sup>9</sup> After assuming the power, the King appointed Lokendra Bahadur as the Prime Minister and he was lasted for 8 months. Again Surya Bahadur was appointed and he was also lasted only for 12 months. Then Sher Bahadur was again asked to be the PM which was also lasted less than a year.<sup>10</sup> The growing Maoists attacks forced the government to deploy the RNA in November 2001. And a unified command was created incorporating both the RNA and the APF.

The parties were confused in the initial days to respond the King's unconstitutional actions however, after sometimes they took the decisions to and started to launch protest programs against the King and his appointed governments. The King was able to take advantage of the parties' weaknesses and offered them positions of nominal power, which they accepted and later apologized to the Nepalese people for. King Gyanendra continued his reign behind the façade of a multi-party appointed

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<sup>8</sup> King Gyanendra's Statement on dismissing the Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba's government on October 4, 2002.

<sup>9</sup> Statement issued after t 4 October 2001 King's takeover by Nepali Congress, CPN (UML) and other political parties as well as Nepal Bar Association, Kantipur Daily, Kathmandu, 5 October 2001.

<sup>10</sup> Nepali political situation became like in the 1950s where dozens of Prime Ministers were appointed by the King within 8 years of time and non of them were allowed to stay more than one or two years.



government, but discontent was growing. Once again, citing national security and trying to "save" democracy, King Gyanendra used his military, now consisting of the RNA and the APF under the unified command to seize all powers. Erroneously invoking article 127 of the 1990 constitution<sup>11</sup>, the King usurped all power on February 1, 2005, and in his infamous coup address, the king tried to pre-empt the immediate fallout of his move by announcing that he would give power back to the people after controlling "terrorism" and establishing peace.

After taking over the full control, the King declared state of emergency and suspended the civil and political rights. Political leaders were arrested, communications shutdown, media houses and telecommunications offices seized by security forces, the press was censored, security forces used intimidation tactics on civil society and the media, and the right to information, freedom of peaceful assembly, and freedom of expression were altogether abandoned. After the end of state of emergency in April 2005, most of the political detainees were released however; the restrictions that had come into force during the state of emergency remained.

It has now been more than a year since the king proclaimed himself the Chairman of the Council of Ministers (though his direct rule essentially began from the 4<sup>th</sup> of October 2002), but he had not fulfilled his promises of peace and democracy, and in fact he had taken steps that counter efforts for peace and legitimate democracy. The king had systematically curtailed the power and rights of the people, and was forcefully restoring the autocratic Panchayat by using the RNA and through promulgations and ordinances, to fortify his absolute power and ambition for total control over the economic, social and political spheres of the country.

The declaration of state of emergency<sup>12</sup> and also suspension of some of the constitutional provisions in 2001 raised serious questions on Nepal's democratic credential and its commitments to make the state more open, democratic and human rights friendly. As the post-1990s successive elected regimes were failed to deliver to

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<sup>11</sup> The Article 127 of the 1990 Constitution

<sup>12</sup> The Government of Nepal declared national emergency on 26 November 2001 after CPN (Maoists) made two attacks Nepali army barracks in two districts of Nepal and subsequently promulgated the anti-terrorist ordinance by declaring the Maoists as "terrorist" with a decision to counterinsurgency mobilization of the armed forces.

the general people's basic needs such as food, shelter, clothes, health care facilities, such a situation led to the public disenchantment over the regimes despite their electoral pledges. "The skewed distribution of both development benefits and the development of peoples' capabilities explain to a large extent the ongoing socio-economic dissidence of the 'Maoists' and the caste-ethnic group resurgence in different regions of Nepal" (Lama 2003). The state's failure to initiate socio-economic development has been one of the major causes of conflict which has led the current state of chaos, instability and violence (Bhattarai 2005).

The proliferation of violent groups and their activities provided alibi to the government and security agencies to undermine the fundamental values of democracy and human rights which are enshrined in the constitution. This had encouraged the culture of impunity. As human rights are central to the human security architecture (security for whom, security of what values, security for what threats and security by what means), its violations by the state or non-state have been primarily dealt with as the direct threat to human security (Kumar 2007).

It is this war that has pushed the country in a protracted crisis. With the passage of time, the war became a major national problem. With the growing magnitude of the war, the country was pushed to the state of emergency, House of Representatives was dissolved, people's fundamental rights were suspended, thousands of Nepalese lost their lives, and parliamentary elections were impossible to be held. The constitution became functionless and the earlier deposed reactionaries and revivalists unfurled their hat in the name of saving the state going worst. The much needed development activities were halted and government's delivery to the people had become impossible. This has had serious implications for weakening on our national strengths and also tarnish our image in the international arenas as a stable, democratic and peaceful country.

**Table V.VII**  
**Killing by the State and the Maoists**

Period	Killing			Per-day killing ratio
	By the security forces	By the Maoists	Total	
Killing up to 27 November 2005	8283	4582	12865	3.65
Killing before emergency (13/2/1996 to 25/11/2001)	992	811	1803	
Killing during the emergency (26/11/2001 to 31/08/2002)	3849	1952	5801	2.43
Killing before king's takeover (13/02/1996 to 03/10/2002)	3849	1952	5801	2.43
Killing after king's takeover (04/10/2002 to 27/11/2005)	4438	2630	7086	6.28

Source: INSEC annual report 2005 and computed by author.

***Maoists violence and issue of Non-traditional Security:*** The violence that Maoist insurgency has spread in the country has some fundamental implications on the Nepali society. First, it has changed the mode of social conflict to militarized conflict by forcing the state towards militarization of its coercive institutions as well as finding a modus Vivendi for repression. Such a situation has turned to increment of the security budgets (Mahat 2004). The violent conflict has become an alibi both to the country for reallocating the resources to security sector by reducing the development expenditure adding further miseries to the already vulnerable and marginalized people. Violent has pushed the country towards the unrestrained militarization at the cost of social welfare and development. This is becoming a greater threat to society where the coercive instrument of state power runs unbridled by the law of the land with development aspirations curtailed.

Likewise, the consequent repercussions of violence and insurgency internally and “war and terrorism” internationally have compelled Nepal to bolster its internal security and intelligence capacities through the available military means for regime security (Kumar 2011). Under the pretext of violence committed by the non-statutory forces, and unrestrained use of force to justified by the government’s interests of national security not only against the forces of insurgency but also against those deemed a threat to state authority (Ibid). Such a situation led to the denial of rights to the citizens, evasion of constitutional impediments to misuse of power, censoring information and even mobility of people. Ultimately, violence becomes impediment to any measures of reform or development as the successive regimes’ priority would be security.

The Maoists violence increased the role of security forces. Therefore, the problem of insecurity caused by the Maoists violence coupled with several other structural incongruities led to erosion of democratic consensus, questioning the validity of political order established after 1990 people’s movement. Maoists insurgency that led to counterinsurgency resulting into militarization of the social sphere forcing the country to move towards militarization. The violence divided the society, deepened the political polarization of our society, skewed the democratic space, curtailed the development activities and sideline the social reform agendas. As a consequence the overall the political situation of the country became instable, economically the country was further weakened and community harmony was eroded. Thus, the country has to focus on dealing the internal problems particularly in fighting insurgency and other forms of ethnic and secessionist activities by using the already scarce resources. Being one of least developed countries of the world, the democratically elected regimes of the post 1990s supposed to focus on most urgent tasks for example enhancing economic development, generating employment and social harmony and promoting Nepal’s prestige and roles in regional and international arenas. However, the 10 years long violent conflict dragged all our focus and resources to deal the home grown insurgencies which not only weaken our overall security and economic strength of our nation but also eroded our country’s image in the international arenas.

#### 5.4.4 Skewed democracy and increased role of armed groups threats to national security

The political parties and civil society increased public processions and demonstrations calling upon the government to restore the fundamental rights of the people. However, mass arrests of party cadres and upper level leaders of political parties, human rights defenders and representatives from civil society, professionals and journalists combined with other repressive measures by the government included imposition of curfews, restriction of communications and absolute bans on demonstrations in various parts of the capital, and mass arrests had become the policy of the state in the past two years. According to one estimate, during the first ten months of the royal takeover, around six thousand political activists and human rights defenders were arrested. While the state blatantly violated the fundamental rights to freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom of association, the court ordered releasing such detained people were too often ignored, establishing a new pattern of re-arrests. Re-arrests were carried out within moments after the release and mostly from within the court premises. With sweeping powers to detain people for prolonged periods of time by using draconian laws such as the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Control and Punishment) Ordinance (TADO) and the Public Security Act (PSA), these laws were even used in detaining persons that were not even connected with any terrorist activity or with the Maoist insurgency (for which the laws were introduced), but were held for the lawful exercise of fundamental rights. The number of people arrested under TADO was unknown.

The 12-point understanding between the political parties<sup>13</sup> and the Maoists was a landmark that brings the Maoists and the political parties under an alliance directly pitted against the monarchy. It was also important in the sense that the Maoists had expressed through the agreement their commitment to join in a multiparty system, while the political parties had agreed to a process of constitutional change. This willingness and an apparent show of flexibility from the Maoists had also been expressed through the leadership through an interviews given to the national daily *Kantipur* first time such interview to a national daily in which the Maoist party leader

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<sup>13</sup> The parties are collectively known as the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) consisting of seven of the larger and mainstream political parties in Nepal who are opposing the royal takeover.

Prachanda had once again expressed the need to proceed further in building upon the cooperation between the Maoists and the parties based on the 12 points understanding (Kantipur Daily 15 December 2005). While this understanding enabled the Maoists to join the mainstream, it also stated that the parties commit themselves to work together for the restoration of democracy in Nepal. The parties also committed to uphold human rights in the context of moving the peace process forward in Nepal.

As Owen argues that ‘protection of gross violations of human rights is a necessary, but not sufficient, conditions of human security (Owen 2002). Though Owen’s assertion that all human rights and democratic rights abuses cannot be qualified as threats to human security, but violation of human rights and curtailment of democratic rights provided by the constitution and legal provisions can be considered as a threat to human security. Protecting human rights and democratic rights are fundamental to human security in Nepal (Kumar 2007).

**Table V.VIII**

**No. of Victims killed by state and Maoists in connection with the ‘People’s War’**

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
By State	59	16	334	328	180	243	3266	1217	1606	815	313
By Maoists	22	32	75	141	219	390	1337	646	1113	709	266
Total	81	48	409	469	399	633	4603	1863	2719	1524	579

*\* 13 Feb 1996 to 30 November 2006 (just after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord) per-day killing of human beings were 3.4*

*Source: Insec website [www.insec.org](http://www.insec.org) (Feb 2008) computed by author.*

## **5.5 Various dimensions of conflict**

Various factors had contributed for the rapid development and expansion of Maoists insurgency in Nepal. Among these were the geographical location, Indian factor, mobilization of peasant and the excluded ethnic groups and guerrilla tactics etc. The Maoist document adopted from its Third Expanded Meeting of Central Committee in

1995 (a year before the commencement of the guerrilla war) showed the Maoists' confidence. The well planned blueprint of the Maoist insurgency indicates the possibility of advancement of the armed struggles by careful utilization of the geo-political and other social and economic factors:

- *The geographical situation of Nepal is the most favorable for waging guerrilla war with direct links with the people.*
- *A good mass base for guerrilla war can be created from the struggle against the national oppression on the majority of nationalities (ethnic groups)*
- *There is no condition of direct military collision among the enemies for political power, from which the armed forces of the people could take advantage to seize a definite area.*
- *There is possibility of initiating and developing guerrilla wars in different parts of the country by taking peasant revolution as the backbone, by centralizing activities in the rural areas and by relying on and uniting with the poor peasants.*
- *The people's support will go on increasing if the right revisionists are thoroughly exposed and the tactics of armed struggle is pursued carefully.*
- *The pace of development of armed struggle to establish people's alternative revolutionary power would be faster and inspires us to undertake bold tactics to achieve the same.*
- *Nepali workers in foreign countries – mainly those working in India – would be mobilized by conducting political work amongst them and using the area for supply of various logistics for success of the armed struggle in Nepal.\*<sup>14</sup>*

For the escalation and expansion of the Maoists conflict not a single factor that contributed but it had its own multi-dynamics. Various writers and analyzers had differences in identification of the major factors that led to successful intensification of insurgency. Divergent views follows mainly in line with disciplinary background of analysts (Thapa and Sijapati 2002m Muni 2003).<sup>15</sup> As Pandey argues that the

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\*<sup>14</sup> "Strategy and tactics of Armed Struggle in Nepal" (Document adopted by the Third Expanded Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPN (Maoist) in March 1995.

<sup>15</sup> For detail, see, Arjun Karki and David Seddon (eds.), *The People's War in Nepal, Left Perspectives*, New Delhi Adroit Publishers, 2003; Michael Hutt (ed.), *Himalayan People's War: Nepal's Maoists Rebellion*, London, C. Hurst and Co. Ltd, 2004; Deepak Thapa and Bandana Sijapati, *A Kingdom under Seize: Nepal's Maoist Insurgency, 1996 to 2003*, Kathmandu, The Print House; Deepak Thapa (ed.), *Understanding the Maoists Movement's in Nepal*, Kathmandu, Martin Chautari, 2003; S. D. Muni, *The Maoists Insurgency in Nepal: The Challenge and the Response*, New Delhi, Rupa Co, 2003.

Maoists movement “is basically a social and economic issue and is produced and sustained by failed development” (Pandey 1999). Similarly, another noted intellectual Harka Gurung states that ‘The Maoist insurgency is mainly fueled by poverty (Gurung 2003). It is worthwhile to mention that Maoists armed activity was started from the Mid-West hills – the heartland of insurgency – and hill districts of this region (i.e. Rolpa, Rukum, Salyan, Dailekh, Jajarkot) fall into the category of the 18 lowest rank districts in human development index of Nepal (NESAC 1998). Another sociologists and ethnic activist Bhattachan sees the Maoist insurgency mainly from ethnic angle.

The hill high caste Hindus, Brahmin and Chhetri, Newar (an urban ethnic group) – with their combined strength of 35 per cent in total population of the country – have long been in dominant position in the power structure of the country. Others, i.e. hill ethnic groups, Terai caste and tribal groups and Dalits are generally considered as the excluded and marginalized groups. The restoration of democracy in 1990 has witnessed the emergence of ethnic activism. About link between ethnic rising and the Maoist insurgency, one argues that “People’s War ... has blended class-based and caste/ethnic based insurgency in the country” (Bhattachan 2000). The ethnic groups had always been in forefront in battle grounds irrespective of ideological content, be it in the time unification of Nepal in 1768 or in the 1950-51 anti-Rana revolution or in several small-scale armed protest movements in the post-1960 period. Additional part is the involvement of some other marginalized groups i.e. Tharus of Terai, Dalits and women in the recent insurgency of the Maoist party.

Likewise, the political scientists emphasized that the post-1990s elected regimes failure to deliver good governance, and speed up the economic development had been the major reasons behind the weakening position of the state and strengthening of the Maoists. Various writers argue that the post-1990 politics had been characterized by ambiguity of Constitution, King’s assertion fro power against the spirit of constitutional monarchy, lack of effective leadership, power centric intra-party and inter-party factions and conflicts, political instability, lack of institutionalization of party and parliament, pervasive corruption etc. They all had impeded the task of democratic consolidation in Nepal (Kumar 2000). Despite the divergent views follow mainly in line with disciplinary background of analyzers, these were however,



supplementary factors and were not sufficient to explain why the Maoist had opted the course of armed struggle, not other options provided the by the political space after the 1990s change. Therefore, broadly there three factors that had contributed for expansion and escalation of the Maoist conflict in Nepal which were:

- *The ideological factor*
- *The ethno-cultural factor*
- *The failure of post-1990 governance system*

### **5.5.1 The ideological factor**

The ideological factor played main role in driving the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) towards taking up the arms against the state. As stated earlier, since the foundation and its evolution in 1950/60 and 70, various communist factions preached the armed struggle and even carried out for the short period of time. For the Maoist faction of CPN had always been advocating the role of guerrilla movement to capture the state power. They had always tried to emulate the Communist Party of China's takeover through the protracted guerrilla war in 1949 under the leadership of Mao Tse Tung. The Maoist party's proclaimed goal is to establish a 'new people's democracy', prototype of the Mao's China model. This conforms to the objective of the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) – a parent organisation of all communist parties of Nepal – set at the time of its formation in 1949 (Rawal 1988 & KC 1999). In addition to the adaptation of core components of communist ideology i.e. class struggle, armed revolution, dictatorship of proletariat etc. Similarly, the communist movement of Nepal has its own native contents, i.e. republican and nationalism and the CPN (Maoist) has been able to sustain the theoretical and native contents of communist movement of Nepal during this period.

The division of the international communist movements between USSR and China in early 1960s and rise of Maoism in the 1970s had had strong influence in the rise of Maoist party in Nepal. Though, the faction that in the 1990s led by current CPN (Maoist) president Prachanda was not as influential as it had in the 1970s and 80s had it become in the late 1990s. But the ideological inspiration it had drawn from the time of 'Cultural Revolution' – 1966 to 1976 Chinese political upheaval - in China. The

question of translating the idea of armed struggle into action led to form the organization of the present Maoist party as a separate group. Only in February 1995, the CPN (Maoist) was established formally, as a consequence of split of the leaders and workers of the CPN (Unity Center). Those who stood for continuous involvement in parliamentary process inherited the name of the party CPN (Unity Center) and other advocating for the implementation of the armed revolution gained new name, the CPN (Maoist).

The political stand during and after the 1990 democratic struggle that had taken by Prachanda group even before forming the CPN (Maoist) party in 1995 also indicates continuous adherence to the ideology of class war is evident. The following statement of their party's indicates that their position even before starting the 'People's War' in 1996.

- *During the 1990s anti-Panchayat and pro-democratic struggle, the then CPN (Masal) led by Mohan Bikram Singh – the current CPN (M) leadership were also with that faction at that time - refused to join the movements together with the other moderate left parties and the Nepali Congress. They pleaded for the 'new democratic struggle'. They termed the 1990s political arrangement agreed between King and the mainstream parties was the sell out of martyrs aspirations and dreams of establishing an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal 'new democratic' system. As their 1991 Party document states that "...our political strategy is to establish a news democratic republic of Nepal with a people's democratic dictatorship against feudalism and republic of Nepal with a people's democratic dictatorship against feudalism and imperialism and on the basis of an alliance of peasants and workers under the leadership of the proletariat... For this, it is a must to adopt the line of protracted people's war with a strategy of encirclement of the city from the country side".<sup>16</sup>*
- *They opposed the 1990 Constitution and refused to be a part of the constitution making process and pleaded for the election of the constituent assembly.*

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<sup>16</sup> Text of the resolution passed by the Unity Congress of the Communist Party of Nepal (Unity Center) held in 1991 which had elected Prachanda as the General Secretary of the Party, *Major Document's of CPN (M)*.

- *The Prachanda faction of the CPN (Unity Center) boycotted the 1994 mid-term parliamentary election and it formed a new party named CPN (Maoist) in February 1995. The third expanded meeting of the central committee of the party held in March 1995 decided to launch the protracted people's war.*

The CPN (Maoist) had chosen the armed struggle consciously and persuaded it vigorously to achieve their ideological and political goals as to establish a 'new democratic' state which will ultimately lead towards establishment of socialist state. And for that they remove the present form of capitalist parliamentary system through the protracted guerrilla war. As stated by its ideologue Babu Ram Bhattarai "...People's War is the inevitable instrument for overcoming the oppressive situation in the process of the historic new democratic revolutionary transformation" (Bhattarai 1998). Maoist leadership had effectively been contextualized the necessity of the armed struggle in Nepal. The existing socio-economic structures of the state, the neo-liberal market oriented capitalist economic system and the prevailing poverty, injustice and exploitation provided ground to them to justify the need of revolution. As observed by a writer while doing research in Baglung District "People hear that communism is about redistribution of wealth and as most people in the area are extremely poor, this notion is very appealing, especially to disillusioned youth who turn to Maoism because it promises to better their living conditions" (Millard 2002).

Likewise, the 2003 International Crisis Group's report could be a good reference of contextualizing the class ideology in the local milieu.

"The Maoists have quite successfully appealed to what are widely viewed as deep injustice within Nepal, including abuses by the security services. Much of their attraction has stemmed not from the resonance of Maoist theory among poor and often illiterate villagers, but from the frequently inescapable logic of a general population that feels at best poorly served by their government and at worst preyed on by officials. Early Maoist attacks were effective in capturing the public's imagination because they targeted some of the most obvious signs of inequality in the form of local upper caste politicians, police posts, the judiciary, rural banks and land revenue offices" (ICG 2003).

During the last 10 years of Maoists insurgency in the country, more than 17000 people<sup>17</sup> have lost their lives, ten of thousands of them have been injured and a large number of people have been displaced from their native places. It has triggered many social crisis in Nepal. The Maoists were able to establish their political and political and military acumen by creating the condition for the government concede to the reality of the “two states and two armies” within the state (Thapa 2002). Their extortion networks were spread villages, cities and also in the capital city. Perhaps this is the reason why “Maoists were regarded as the most richest “terrorist group” (Tilly 2004). Both their economic strength and militaristic prowess and capacity to indulge in violence were able to pose threats and create terror among the people in all over the country. Meantime, they were able to succeed in holding the reins of power of the state and break law and order of the state. These are the newly emerged security challenges under the purview of non-traditional security issues which poses greater threats to the Nepali state.

### **5.5.2 The Ethnic and Cultural Factor**

Another factor that had been very much contributed in expansion of the Maoist strength and intensification of the conflict was the ethnic and cultural issues. As Nepal has been a very diverse society and home of the various ethnic and cultural groups. For a long time, the various minority ethnic groups, Dalits and women were marginalized and kept in isolation. These groups had been systematically marginalized by the state in the nation building process. According to the recent survey, the indigenous groups occupy the 37.1 per cent of the total population (A recent survey on Indigenous People in National Development: Major Issues, Obstacle and Opportunities: 2002) There are different races and tribal groups living in different parts of the country. The Rajbansi, Tharus, Yadavs, Dhimals, Satars are found in the Tarai region. The Sherpas are found in the Himalayan region. The Limbus, Rais and Sunuwars are found in eastern hills. The Magars, Tamangs and Gurungs are found in midhills. Other indigenous (oppressed) groups like Chepangs, Mushahars, Majhi, Damai, Chhyame, Chamar, Poude, Kami and Thamis also constitute large part of Nepal. The dominant groups like Bahuns, Chhetry and Thakuris are found in all over

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<sup>17</sup> According to the data obtained from Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, Government of Nepal in May 2011, the number of people who were killed during the ten year period was 17003.,

Nepal. Yet there was a lack of inclusion of the diverse groups in the nation building process.

Though the 1991 constitution of Nepal had declared the kingdom as a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual nation and prohibited discrimination against caste, creed, sex and religion, the declaration of a national religion in the constitution and its protection by the state had encouraged institutionalization of the discriminatory practices. Marginalization of these non-dominant groups could be seen at all levels – economic, political, and social. Their literacy rate was strikingly low where only 10 to 30 per cent of minors are the literates. As a result, their representation in the governing bodies including the government bureaucracy was also very nominal. According to a survey; there were only 2.3 per cent minorities among the government officers except Newars.

The governments had taken few steps to promote their interests by constituting a national level Dalit Commission and Indigenous People's Commission and also integrating few of them in national level media – broadcasting news in different languages. These were the very few steps and only limited to an awareness raising steps but not in real empowerment of these groups. The 1990 democratic space had provided the ground to these marginalized and discriminated groups to assert their views and enhance their role in making them more inclusive and better position in the state mechanism as well as other decision making processes. The CPN (Maoist) had been able to cash the post-1990 ethnic upsurge in Nepal.

‘Since the time of unification of Nepal in 1768, the rulers – Shahs, Ranas and Panchas – had tried to develop Nepal as a homogeneous, monolithic and unitary state providing protection to one language (Nepali), upper castes people (Brahman and Chhetri) and one religion (Hindu) ignoring the diversified and pluralistic character of Nepali society’.<sup>18</sup> Such discriminatory practices had led to increase the disparity among different social groups. The hill high caste Brahmin-Chhetri and Newar had long been in privilege position. Other groups i.e. Janajati, Madhise and Dalit were

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<sup>18</sup> The 2001 census of Nepal recorded 101 caste and ethnic groups and 91 languages and dialects. Based on caste, ethnic, regional, cultural and linguistic cleavages, Nepali population can be broadly classified into groups: Parbatiya (Hill people), and Madhesia (Terai people), jat (Caste groups) and janjati (ethnic/tribal groups), and high caste and low caste Hindus.

generally marginalized. The legacy of history was well reflected in unequal distribution of socio-economic resources and in representation of political power structure of the country (Bista 1991 & Gellner et al 1997).

**Table V.IX**  
**Human Development by Caste and Ethnicity, 1996**

		Dominant Group			Marginal Groups			Nepal
		Bahun	Chhetri	Newar	Madhesi	Janajati	Dalit	
1.	Life Expectancy	60.8	56.03	62.2	58.4	53.0	50.3	55.0
2.	Adult Literacy	58.00	42.00	54.80	27.50	35.20	23.80	36.27
3.	Means years of schooling	4.464	2.786	4.370	1.700	2.021	1.228	2.254
4.	Per-capita income Nrs.	9921	7744	11953	69116607	6607	4940	7673
5.	Educational Att.	0.490	0.342	0.462	0.221	0.280	0.186	0.295
6.	Life Expectancy Index	0.957	0.552	0.620	0.557	0.467	0.422	0.500
7.	Income Index	0.237	0.181	0.289	0.160	0.152	0.110	0.179
8.	Human Dev. Index	0.441	0.348	0.457	0.313	0.299	0.239	0.325
9.	Ratio to HDI Nepal = 100	135.87	107.3	140.7	96.28	92.21	73.62	100.00

Source: NESAC 1998, Nepal Human Development Report 1998. Kathmandu, NSAC.

**Table V.X**  
**Gender Participation in Economic and Political Activities**

Sector	Details	Male %	Female %
Economic level (job sector)	Agriculture and Forest	52	48
	Fuel and water supply	78	22
	Public admin.	88	12
	Education	74	26
	Health	71	29
	Other community, social and private works	85	15
Political level (1)	National level (MPs)	94.2	5.8
	District level	93.3	6.7
	Village level	92.3	7.7
	Ward level	80	20

Source: Central Bureau of statistics 2002 ka cited in *Nepal Human Development Report 2004*, Kathmandu: UNDP.

1) Based on Parliament and Local bodies election held in 1999 and 1997 respectively.

The observation made by Neupane on how had the state been organised in the contemporary milieu was relevant to cite here. His findings suggest the pervasive dominance of hill high caste people in each and every sensible state apparatus. Be that in the constitutional bodies and commissions (Khas – Brahmin and Chhetris 56%), Newar 24%), or in ministries, cabinet secretariat, prime minister’s offices as well as police and military services or chief district officers. The Brahmin and Chhetris constitute 77.5% and the Newars 17.6% of the total in the services mentioned in the later categories. Neupane argues that the Brahmins/Chhetris constitute 66.5% percent and Newars 15.2% in professional occupations with their combined strength of 81.7% as a whole (Neupane 2000).

**Table V.XI**  
**Integrated National Index of Governance, 1999**

		Dominant groups		Marginal Groups				Total
		Bahun/ Chhetri	Newar	Madhesi	Janajati	Dalit	Other	
1	Court	77	13.6	7.6	1.7	0	0	235
2	Constitutional Bodies	56.0	24.0	12.0	2.8	0	0	25
3	Cabinet	62.5	9.4	15.6	12.5	0	0	32
4	Parliament	60.0	7.6	17.4	13.6	1.5	0	265
5	Public Administration	77.6	17.6	3.7	1.2	0	0	245
6	Party Leadership	58.8	10.9	15.8	15.2	0	0	165
7	Leadership: local elected bodies	55.5	15.7	16.2	12.0	0	0	191
8	Leadership: commerce and industry	16.7	47.6	35.7	0	0	0	42
9	Leadership: educational arena	77.3	11.3	7.2	2.1	1	1	97
10	Leadership: cultural arena	69.1	17.9	0	4.9	0	0	123
11	Science/technology	58.1	29.0	9.7	3.2	0	0	62
12	Civil society leadership	75.9	14.8	7.4	1.9	0	0	54
	Total	66.5	15.2	11.2	7.1	0.3	1	
	Population %	31.6	5.6	30.9	22.2	8.7	1	
	Difference with Population %	+34.9	+9.6	-19.7	-15.1	-8.4	-1	

Source: Neupane, Govinda 2000, *Nepalko Jatiya Prasna (Question of Caste/Ethnicity in Nepal)*, Kathmandu, Center for Development Studies.

The monopolistic pursuits to power and privileges by the three high castes Hindu groups had marginalised the other three main social groups by design. According to Gurung, these were the Janjati (ethnic) minority on the basis of culture, the Dalits on the basis of caste, and the Madhesi on the basis of geography that in combination forms the majority of the Nepali population (Gurung 2003). Data on bureaucracy suggested an increasing stranglehold of the high caste. According to Gurung, 83.1 percent of the gazetted posts of the civil service were filled with the Bahun-Chhetris in comparison to 3.4 percent of the ethnic officials (Ibid).



Discontent against the domination of hill high caste was central issue of the emerging minority movements in Nepal. The unequal power distribution among the caste/ethnic groups could not be changed in the existing structures of Nepali state: monarchical rule, Hindu state, unitary form of government, primacy of one language, domination of hill Brahmin, Chhetri and Newar, centrality of Kathmandu, centralized administration, feudalism and patron-client based authoritarian culture. With a project of state restructuring, the minority groups had asserted for their inclusion. The agenda of state restructuring had several interrelated components: i.e. secular state, republican system, federal form of government, regional and ethnic autonomy, proportional electoral system, devolution of power to local government, equal treatment for all languages, equitable sharing of state resources, positive discrimination/reservation for minorities and representation of different groups in the public positions (Bhattarai 1998).

From the early days of the insurgency, the various ethnic groups concerns were well addressed by the CPN (Maoist). As quoted by Sudheer Sharma “to maintain the hegemony of one religion (Hinduism), language (Nepali), and nationality (Khas), this state has for centuries exercised discrimination, exploitation and oppression against other religions, languages and nationalities and has conspired to fragment the forces of national unity that is vital for proper development and security” (Sharma 2002). The Maoist proposal of state restructuring was converged with the ethnic demands. Some key points of the Maoist’s scheme of state restructuring that had direct bearing with ethnic and minority rights are (Bhattarai 1998):

- *Declaration of Nepal as a secular state*
- *Equal treatment to all languages of Nepal*
- *Ethnic and regional based autonomy and right to self-determination*
- *End of caste, ethnic, regional and gender based discrimination*
- *Special policy for the promotion of interest of dalit and women*

With formulation of these policy on ethnic and gender policy, the CPN (Maoist) has made intensive efforts to merge the ethnic issues with the political and ideological issue and formed ethnic and regions based people’s organization. Among these ethnic

based organizations were: Tamang National Liberation Front, Magarat National Liberation Frong, Tamuwan National Liberaton Front, Limbuwan National Liberation Front, Nepal Dalit Liberation Front, Nepal Tharuwan Liberation Front, Thami Liberation Front, Newa Khala (Newar), Madhesi National Liberation Front and one region based organisation: Karnali Regional Liberation Front. After formation of these frontal organizations, CPN (M) had been able to penetrate with different ethnic groups and able to win their support and sympathy to its armed rebellion (Gurung 2003).

Furthermore, on the basis of these frontal organizational set up it had adopted a federal structure under which the country was divided into nine federal provinces namely as stated earlier. Maoist party had not only adopted the policy of restructuring the state on the basis of ethnicity, but it had also adopted to guarantee autonomy as well as right to self-determination to all these groups. Such a policy had rendered tremendous help to CPN (M) to expand its influence in the ethnic community but also been able to recruit large number of young people in its own organizational fold. This has proven the Maoists following acclaimed: “New and young party members from poor peasant, women, oppressed communities, oppressed nationalities and backward regions rapidly came out of the crucible of the people’s war in an unimaginable number”.<sup>19</sup> CPN (M)’s stress on ethnicization of conflict was also because, the origin of the Maoist armed rebellion was based in Rolpa, Rukum, Gulmi and these are the districts which are dominated by Magar ethnic group. Similarly, the composition of the People’s Liberation Army were also mainly from the ethnic and dalits groups of rural Nepal (Bhattarai, 1998).

Its ethnicisation policy had also been reflected in its selection of candidates for the election to the constituent assembly. According to the media report, the CPN (M) had the most inclusive list of candidates among the three major parties for the Constituent Assembly election slated for 10 April 2008 (Kathmandu Post 1 March 2008). The Maoists had beaten both Nepali Congress and CPN (UML) on the number of women, Madhesi and Janajati candidates. For the 240 seats on offer, the CPN (M) had fielded 43 women candidates. Of these 8 are Madhesi, 6 Janajati, 4 Dalits, 2 Newar, and 23

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<sup>19</sup> Text of a resolution passed by the Second National Conference of the CPN (Maoist) in February 2001.

others. Similarly it has fielded 71 candidates from Madhesi communities – including Tharu, Muslim, Rajbansi, Dhimal and Danuwar. It has 46 Janajati candidates, 10 Dalit and 15 Newar (ibid).

Likewise, women were regarded as the "second class" citizen and they had been very much marginalized and socially excluded. Women constitute 51 per cent of the total population but their role in economic development had yet to be recognized fully by the society. "...while women are considered vital and productive workers, their access to productive resources has remained limited" (Report 1995). The poor health facilities, poverty, illiteracy, patriarchal society, the conservative traditions and religious practices were the main constraints in the access of the development opportunities for the Nepali women. Furthermore, the lack of inheritance rights and low paid jobs had also barred them to develop themselves freely and independently. The practice of early marriage, priority of the son, dowry system, high fertility rate and girls trafficking and growing rate of domestic violence against women were also responsible for the worsening of the women's situation in our country. The gender biased practices and laws had further worsened their situation. However, the democratic regimes were not able to improve the situation of women in the country (Thapa 2002).

The contention of various minority, ethnic and oppressed groups with the state have increased significantly and some of these groups even began to take arms against the state. These groups' assertion for power with violence means may represent other sources of insecurity and the country could fall victim to this problem. This will not only create security problems but also pose challenge to the territorial integrity of Nepal and beyond its borders as well. The growing deaths, destruction of properties and infrastructures and the trauma that the Nepali people have been witnessing since last 12 years, has been the first such problems that the country has to face after the war with British India government in 1814 to 16.

### **5.5.3 Democracy and unfulfilled aspirations**

There were many reasons for the outbreak of the insurgency and the unfulfilled expectations were also said to be among them. As Liz Philipson wrote; 'the democratic constitution was ushered in with expectations so high they could only be

dashed' (Philipson 2002). To the ordinary people especially those from marginalized and underprivileged groups, the democratic government remained continuation of the power relations of the past. Likewise, the lack of adequate institutional development and mechanism needed by a democracy and the inability of the democratic leaders in power to internalize the general aspirations and take necessary actions that caused the failures. Nepal's democracy was never to be stabilized. For example, non of the parliaments served their full-five year terms (Kumar 2004)).

Another factor that provides fertile ground for the extremist force like Maoist to expand and grow was the failure of the democratic regimes in the post-1990s. After successfully overthrowing the old authoritarian Panchayat system, a new democratic government was established in 1990. The newly elected government of Nepal initially faced two major challenges; first, it had to consolidate and institutionalize the newly achieved political power and second it needed to initiate economic development and social reform programs from which majority of the people could directly benefit (nearly 70 per cent of population had been suffering from high level of poverty, illiteracy, starvation, disease and malnutrition at the time) (Hutt 2004).

It was very clear from the beginning that without reasonable access to the majority of the people to education, health care, food, housing and other basic needs, democracy could not take root in any meaningful sense. People's participation for the change of the system was not just for the replacement of the political leadership, but also more importantly for the improvement of their daily lives. "During the final years of Panchayat regime, democracy became the panacea for all of the country's ill and it was supposed to facilitate long postponed economic development" (Brown 1996).

However, instead of taking initiatives and formulating programs towards meeting the people's aspirations and expectations the successive democratically elected governments and the political parties were indulged in inter-party and intra-parties squabbled for power. The newly elected parliament was also not able to address the growing problems and curb the increasing inefficiencies and incompetents of the successive executive bodies. Similarly, the old centralized and discriminative state structures, inefficient and corrupt bureaucracy, military, police apparatuses were remained same and there were not concerted efforts from the government side to

democratize and make them more function oriented. However, not only the elected regime was responsible in the failure of democracy in Nepal, the institution of monarchy had also become one of the major factors in instabilizing the democracy in Nepal. The detrimental role played by the king and the failure of the democratic forces to address the political, social, economic and cultural issues led the country towards the chaos and conflict (Thapa 2002).

The Royal massacre of June 1, 2001 where entire family of King Birendra was wiped out inside the palace in one night had also eroded the credibility of the elected government and brought the change in relations between monarchy and people in Nepal. People those who used to have a faith on institution of monarchy have started to question the very institution which could not prevent of killing of its own families. Secondly, the King, which was also regarded as the unity factor of the country, had also been questioned especially after present King Gyanendra declared as a Hindu Sammrat (empire) in a public ceremony. So, both of these events had seriously shaken the faith on monarchy among the Nepali people as well as eroded the credibility of the institution itself (Karki and Seddon).

The failure of the political parties in various fields especially on the following areas had provided ground to the CPN (M) to capitalize the deteriorating situation and intensified the armed conflict:

#### **5.5.4. Problems of executive, legislative and judiciary**

It is crucial in democracy to ensure the correct functioning of each branch of governance (legislative, executive and judiciary) including the bureaucracy. "Democracy is a system of checks and balances based on the separation of power with independent judicial and legislative branches" (UNDP 2002). In many cases democracy faces problems when the institutions like – legislative, executive and judiciary which have been created and protected by the constitution were not functioning properly. In Nepali context, the executives (the post 1990s governments) have failed to meet the expectations of the general public. In democratic Nepal, most of the elected regimes had created massive controversies and their performances were far below the general expectations (Thapa and Sinjapati 2004).

The inefficiency of the Ministers, lack of vision and clear-cut policies and inability to mobilize the bureaucracy and corrupt mentality of the members of the Council of Ministers had created massive social and political problems. The politicization of bureaucracy and police, wide spread nepotism and undue favoritism had also crossed the norms and values of state bureaucracy and created anarchy and chaos in the governance. The government's failure to maintain law and order situation and to deliver basic goods to the people have led to develop negative impacts on the mind of the people. The most striking feature of the Nepalese executive was its discretionary power of patronage at all levels. The Prime Minister could distribute ministries to win political support. Ministers can distribute top civil service positions, and the senior civil servants, often at the behest of their ministers can recruit as many as hundreds of workers. Ministers could also use discretion in tenders and commercial matters (Haq 1999).

The judicial system of Nepal in the last 12 years was also not free from the controversies. There had been cases when the judiciary had failed to hold the executive and legislature accountable for their misdeeds. For example, 'the duty free Pajero facility (from the most popular SUV-Mitshubishi Pajero imported at the time) extended to the senior officials of all the three branches of government, the executive, legislature and the judiciary – trampled all the tax laws of Nepal and destroyed the beauty of democracy by undermining the separation and checks and balances of power existing in the constitution' (Dahal 2002). Questions had also risen about the efficiencies of the courts and their slow pace of justice delivery. In year 1999 and 2000, "out of 4564 cases registered in the Supreme Court, only 1884 cases or 41.28 per cent cases were finalized" (Supreme Court Report 2000-2001). Similarly, in 2000 – 2001, among the 4131 cases registered only 1398 cases received verdicts. This indicated the efficacy of the Supreme Court and its pace of delivering justice to the public. Such factors undoubtedly discouraged the concept of justice system, and its fairness also (Dahal 2000).

In democracy, the role of the elected bodies like the Parliament which is the supreme policy making body is very important. It is the only body where the executive has to be accountable and the judiciary acts in accordance to the bills passed by it. Therefore, the role of the legislatures in the Parliamentary democracy is very vital and

decisive. But in our context, the Parliament had also appeared weak in playing leading role in issues, which were vital for the national development. The lack of governments' stability, frequent dissolution of the House by the Prime Ministers, legislatures' inability to show their performance as policy makers and the government's and political parties' lack of proper policies and programs, in the last 12 years (1991-2002) had rendered the Nepali Parliament highly ineffective in directing the country and influencing the developmental issues (Baral and Hachhethu 2001).

"Fewer than a dozen of Nepal's 205 members of parliament have any training in economics" (Haq 1999). The parliament took six years to pass the political parties regulations bill. Furthermore, "The parliament had not been sincere in terms of forming up public policies relevant to the nation and the diverse sections of the society to promote gender, social, inter-generational and ecological justice" (Dahal 2002). The parliament also failed to pass the election reform bills. The weak performance of the parliamentary committees to monitor and supervise the executive was another failure of the Nepali parliament.

### **5.5.5 Problems in Political Parties**

Another problematic area in the democracy was the problems within the political parties. Political parties are the pillars of the democracy. They play vital role in strengthening and deepening democracy in each and every societies. Their role is not only to bring democracy and contests in the elections, they are also supposed to play exemplary role by democratizing the whole society. As stated in the Human Development Report: 2002; " A well functioning democracy depends on well functioning political parties responsive to people." However, last 13 years (1990 – 2002) of Nepalese democratic experiences show that the major parties have not been able to fulfill their role. The Nepali Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal (UML) had fought decisively in establishing the democracy in the country but when they had to embed the democratic culture in the country and play exemplary role in consolidation and institutionalization of democracy in the country, they failed (Bhattarai 2003).

Lack of inner party democracy – centralized decision making system, hierarchical and bureaucratic organizational structures, feudalistic attitude and power and position

centered leaderships were the some of the factors in their failure to institutionalize democratic culture. As stated in the Human Development Report: 2002 “Without internal democracy, parties become individual fiefdoms”. Moreover, these political parties and their leaders' lack of financial transparency was another problem that also hindered the promotion of the accountable and transparent society after the restoration of the democracy in Nepal. It had also eroded public confidence on these leaders as well as the political parties. The sudden change in living standard, increased spending habits and political leader's involvement in the irregular financial activities had generated public anger towards the leaders. “The party leaderships' sheer jockeying for power rather than committing themselves towards good governance exacerbates the situation. The core elites take all-important decisions, whether they are elected or not. They seem cohesive enough in controlling the society by maintaining the status quo and assuming a hereditary succession of leadership” (Dahal 2002).

#### **5.5.6 Problem of Governance**

The governing behaviors like lack of social norms, moral correction as well as the lack of accountability of the policy makers – politicians, people in bureaucracy, civil societies and other people in high levels - have been the major problems in the last 13 years of governing system. The 1990 pro-democratic movements had brought the political democracy but reform in governing behaviors of the leaders was very much disappointing (Brown 1996).

The lack of accountability was another problem. One of the beauties of the democracy is - it allows people to demand the accountability from those who are holding public positions or are involved in the public service related works. Not only from the political leaders or the bureaucrats, it demands accountability and financial transparency from the institutions and people in different professions – people in multi-national organizations, public and private companies, NGO/INGOs, doctors, engineers, businessmen etc. According to the Human Development Report: 2002; “...in democracy, people can demand accountability in two ways, through action by civil society and through structures of representation and delegation”. Every citizen, as Article 16 of present constitution of Nepal mentions, "...shall have the right to demand and receive information on any thing of public importance". Constitutionally



the system was supposed to be transparent, but in practice this constitutionally recognized right has hardly been put to practice (HDR 2002).

Lack of democratic cultures, wide spread corruptions and corrupt behaviours and self-centeredness of the leadership had hindered the implementation of the constitutionally guaranteed rights. Similarly, the lack of financial transparency of the leaders, rampant corruptions and inability to deliver the public goods and services, mismanagement and nepotism in the public services have also created governing problems in the country. What happens when " ... the state is failing to deliver its side of the Faustian Pact, where the individual submits to the legitimate violence of the state in return for protection on security" (Angell 1995). In the light of deteriorating law and order and declining economic situation of the country, the intellectuals have warned the government. "The structures of the state and its government have not become all inclusive. Due to status quo in its thinking and action ordinary people of Nepal have begun to realize that there is no democracy in the country" (Dahal 2002).

The given dismal situation of the post 1990s democratic regime and its overall failure to deliver good governance had provided fertile ground to the extremist forces like the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) to initiate armed rebellion under the name of 'people's war' against the state and expand its influences. The critical situation that had developed in every fields; political, social, governance, social as well as economic areas have been effectively cultivated by them and enhanced their strengths, intensified armed conflict and pacify the state machineries (Thapa 2002).

## **5.6 Spiraling security expenditure and decreased of development expenditure**

With the escalation of the conflict, the security expense of the country had been steady increased. As a result, the development expenses had decreased significantly and this has had wider implications in the economic development, employment generation, expansion of the social welfare programs etc. The economy began to stagnate and the rebel again capitalize negative economic situation of the country and further advanced their positions in the countryside. The government had consciously shifted the attention from social to security sector. The violent conflict had had greater

impact not only impeding the development projects but also demand for the rise of the security budgets. Since intensification of the conflict situation, the steady rise of the regular expenditure of the government in comparison to the falling development expenditure in the national budgetary. The development expenditure declined sharply since 2001/02 against the background of the negative economic growth -0.5 per cent in the fiscal year 2001/02 (MoF 2003, Budget speech 2004). The following table shows the declining trend of development expenditure and the increasing trend of the security expenditures.

**Table V.XII**  
**Estimates of Regular Expenditures (in Rs.'000)**

Fiscal Year	Security Sector		Social Sector		
	Military	Police	Education	Health	Drinking Water
1989/90	1,114,067	748,030	349,423	318,603	2,540
1990/91	1,113,888	822,379	349,483	316,070	2,322
1991/92	1,571,985	1,223,411	471,418	390,938	3,028
1992/93	1,737,572	1,423,176	694,959	473,173	4,402
1993/94	1,879,653	1,582,976	746,712	529,891	4,457
1994/95	1,938,040	1,674,108	3,636,538	705,428	10,407
1995/96	2,201,984	2,033,300	4,641,057	940,832	11,368
1996/97	2,424,685	2,235,571	5,069,290	960,812	11,185
1997/98	2,619,691	2,898,281	5,579,820	1,071,900	?
1998/99	3,027,890	2,922,067	6,391,743	1,255,861	12,563
1999/2000	3,499,089	3,871,283	6,696,466	1,445,791	?
2000/01	3,897,127	7,815,876*	8,203,401	1,663,365	15,572
2001/02	4,521,287	5,794,641	10,428,840	2,228,058	10,717
2002/03	7,228,182	6,303,830	10,968,479	2,150,866	10,246
2003/04	7,184,221	7,053,671	11,137,179	2,175,125	13,593
2004/05	8,000,257	6,749,834	17,903,061**	6,539,524**	448,163**

Source: Drawn from Budget Speeches, Kathmandu: Ministry of Finance, Documents of the years indicated.

\*Includes the amount for raising armed police force and purchase of arms.

\*\*The amounts are lumped together with the development assistance by donors.

The above mentioned figures indicate the sharp rise in budgetary figures for the security sector by nearly 300 percent in comparison to regular allocation to social sector in 1993/94. These figures include only the maintenance cost of the core security sector. It does not disclose both the operational cost and the off-budgetary allocations from the security sector. For example, within the first month of military mobilization, the government had spent about Rs. 500 million more than stipulated cost for counterinsurgency by transferring 50 per cent of originally allocated amount of Rs. 2 billion for Village Development Committee (Kantipur Daily 26 January 2002).<sup>20</sup> Further the Finance Ministry had disclosed that Rs. 4 billion had already been transferred from social sector to security sector. It was estimated that Rs. 18.35 billion was spent in the first year of counterinsurgency mobilization. In the following year 2002/03, the revised estimate puts the combined security expenses approximately at Rs. 15.20 billion (MoF 2003). The increasing trend of transfer of social sector budget to the security sector did not stop even later years. It was partly due to the shrinking space for social development especially in the rural areas partly also growing demand for the expenses in the security sector. Even the balanced allocations had been shown in the annual budgets, due to these factors, the social sectors expenses significantly decreased during the time of conflict (Ibid).

Similarly, along with those expenses, the Royal Nepal Army receives additional amounts from sources like charges for guarding strategic installations like hydropower plants, telecom towers, industrial structures and commercial buildings, from non-transparent or largely aggregated budgetary categories, funding for road building and health service activities, involvement in businesses like petroleum products that remains undisclosed (Kumar 2004).

The RNA had further asked government in 2004 to sanction its demand for the recruitment of 17,000 additional troops along with the release of additional amount of Rs. 8 Billion as per the requirement within the end of fiscal year 2004/05. The spokesperson of the RNA had disclosed that the army had asked for Rs. 14 billion allocation in the past fiscal year which was halved by the government budget (Ghimire 2004).

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<sup>20</sup> Kantipur Daily 26 January 2002, Kathmandu

**Table V.XIII**

**Current Status of Security Forces**

Category	Prior to November 2001	Current	Remarks
Military	47,411	78000*	Expanded to 6 Division with Corps concept. Planned for 200,00 numbers of armed forces in near future.
Armed Police Force	15,156 (est. 2001)	18,000	On 16 December 2004, decision was made to raise one Kathmandu Valley Brigade and 3 Battalions. # Planned to expand 35000.
Civil Police	46,574 (in 2000)	48,500**	New recruitment of some 850 permitted recently. ##Government has been urged to increase police force from 1:600 police – population ratios to 1:200 ratios.

*Source: Official data*

*\*According to publicity disclosed figure of the RNA Spokesperson.*

*\*\* Including traffic police.*

*#Annapurna Post, 17 December 2004.*

*## The Himalayan Times, 15 October 2004.*

*(Note: The earlier planned those increments of security personnel have been cancelled since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government and the CPN (M) in 2006.)*

The consequent repercussions of violence and insurgency internally and “war on terrorism” internationally compelled Nepal to bolster its internal security and intelligence capacities through the available military means for regime security. Under the pretext of violence committed by the non-statutory forces, an unrestrained use of force was justified by the government in the interest of national security and only against the forces of insurgency but also against those deemed a threat to regime security. It led to the denial of rights to citizens, evasion of constitutional impediments to misuse of power, censoring information and even mobility of people. The Maoists violence had sharply eroded the importance of the security forces particularly in the context of internal policing. With the failure of police to exercise

control and maintain law and order, the military became the last resort to politicians to hang on for their survival in power. Therefore, the problem that insecurity caused by the continued non-state violence coupled with several other structural incongruities led to erosion of democratic consensus questioning the viability of political order established after 1990 pro-democratic movement (Kumar 2000).

The intensification of Maoist violence naturally led to counter-violence resulting into militarisation of the social sphere had defeated the purpose of strengthening the civilian governance under democratic dispensation forcing the country to move towards military control under the direct rule of monarchy in the course of time. Though, the monarchical rule did not long last due to the strong opposition of the general public and collapsed after 15 months of its takeover, however, the Maoist had also not been able to get popular support to its violence and their heinous acts that it had committed during the last 11 years of armed conflict (Maharjan 2000).

### **5.7 Proliferation of armed groups**

Started about three years back with a small breakaway faction of CPN (Moiast), the armed groups in Terai now have reached more than a dozen and posed serious challenge in the security and political environment of the region. Earlier only Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha led by senior Maoist leader Jay Krishna Goit had taken up arms in the region keeping different demands. However, the number of such organized armed groups after the beginning of peace process with the Maoist Party has increased significantly. Among these groups, most of them are involved in criminal activities with the cover up of the political agendas. Most of these groups have raising demands like independent state in Terai, federal government, liberation of Madhesi people, equal opportunity to the Madhesi people in state machinery. Reported in a national daily citing the Nepal Police source, at least 21 disgruntled groups have so far taken up arms or claim to have done so to unleash violence, after the CPN (Maoist) formally laid down their arms in November 2006 (The Kathmandu Post 17 September 2007)<sup>21</sup>.

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<sup>21</sup> The Kathmandu Post Daily, 17 September 2007, Kathmandu

### **5.7.1 The armed groups exist in Terai**

1. *Jantantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (Goit)*
2. *Jantantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (Jwala Singh)*
3. *Jantantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (Bishfot Singh)*
4. *United Jantantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (UTJMM)*
5. *Terai Cobra*
6. *Terai Tigers*
7. *Nepal Defense Army*
8. *Madhesi Tigers*
9. *Terai Bagi*
10. *Terai ko Shantika lagi Kranti*
11. *Madhesi Virus Killer*
12. *Ganabadi Ganatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha*
13. *Terai Uthhan Sangh*
14. *Madhesi Special Force*
15. *Nepal Janatantrik Pary*
16. *Rastriya Army Nepal*
17. *Supa Kranti Dal*
18. *Shahi Mukti Morcha*
19. *Gorkha Mukti Morcha*
20. *Nepal People's Army*

Most of these groups came to exist after signing the Comprehensive Peace Accord between Government of Nepal and the CPN (M) in November 2006. Though few of them like Goit and Jwala group were broken their affiliation with Maoist earlier, rest were after the peace accord. And such groups are already mushrooming at an alarming rate. According to the Nepal Police report, within the four months time (May 2007 to August 2007), at least 12 armed groups have emerged (Nepal Police Report 2007).<sup>22</sup> Though, most of these groups claimed their existence in Terai however, they have expanded their activities in Kathmandu as well. As reported in the

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<sup>22</sup> Report, (2007), Obtained from the Investigation Cell, Police Headquarter, Kathmandu.

news paper, the Terai Army, Terai Uttan Sangh and Nepal Defense Army, all three groups have claimed responsibility through media for multiple bomb blasts in the Capital city Kathmandu on 2 September 2008 (Kathmandu Post 17 September 2007).

The Jana Tantrik Mukti Morcha (JTMM) is an armed Madhesi militant group which has split into three factions. Jai Krishna Goit broke from the Maoists to set up the organisation in July 2004. In August 2006, he expelled the group's eastern commander, Nagendra Paswan (Jwala Singh). Goit says he acted against Singh and did not follow the party discipline, however, Singh, who complains of Goit's dictatorial tendencies and caste attitudes forced him to secede from Goit and established his own JTMM (Jwala) group (ICG 2007). Both factions endorse violence and have been responsible for abductions, extortion, physical attacks and murders. Their involvement in such acts are the proof their criminal offenses. Despite their involvement in the criminal activities, both groups; Goit and Singh have been raising political agendas (Jha 2007).

Both these groups have been regarded as the most influential armed groups based in Terai. Both of them have been demanding independent Terai. Goit refuses to call himself a Nepali citizen and believes that Nepal has no legal claim to Terai (Ibid). Goit has also demanded that all administrative posts in Terai be filled by Madhesis and the government should return the tax revenues raised from the region back to the people of Terai (Ibid).

Other groups are little known about them, and residents view them as opportunistic and deteriorating the already weak law and order situation in Terai districts. Their activities are largely criminal, and most have not issued political manifestos. Activities include abductions and killings, especially in Sunsari, Saptari and Siraha. The Nepal Defense Army supports a Hindu kingdom in Nepal. It may have royal links but it is unlikely Indian Hindutva (militant Hindu) organisations actively support it (Karki and Seddon 2003).

***The major demands of the agitating groups in Terai:***

- 1. declaring all those killed during the movement martyrs and providing compensation;*
- 2. withdrawal of cases filed during the Madhesi movement and release of those arrested;*
- 3. UN technical assistance during talks;*
- 4. dismissal of Home Minister Krishna Pasad Sitaula;*
- 5. establishing participatory democracy;*
- 6. a federal system with the right to self-determination;*
- 7. a constitutional arrangement for an autonomous Madhes;*
- 8. appointment of Madhesis in government departments in Madhes;*
- 9. half of all positions in state institutions and government-owned media bodies for Madhesis;*
- 10. recognition that Madhesis have the right to the natural resources in Madhes;*
- 11. affirmative action and quotas for Dalits and stringent action against discrimination and untouchability;*
- 12. protection of Muslim religious and linguistic rights;*
- 13. establishment of a madrasa board;*
- 14. declaration of Muslim festivals as public holidays;*
- 15. creation of a Muslim personal law;*
- 16. a three-language policy in government and education which would allow the use of local mother tongue, Nepali or Hindi, and English;*
- 17. making it easier for Madhesis to get citizenship, including by sending citizenship-distribution teams to villages;*
- 18. investing at least 75 per cent of taxes raised from Madhes in the region;*
- 19. return of property seized by the Maoists;*
- 20. dissolution of the interim legislature and formation of a representative caretaker government;*
- 21. an electoral system based fully on proportional representation;*
- 22. reconstitution of the election commission; removal of restrictions on regional and caste-based parties.*

*Note: These were the demands raised last years agitation by them however, in recent, they have reduced the number and made it 6 points jointly submitted by Madhise Janadhikar Forum, Nepal Sadvawana Party and newly formed Nepal Terai-Madhes Loktantrik Party which includes: declaration of Madhes One Pradesh; federalism with right to self-determination etc.*

Another incident that sparked the Terai protest in January 2007 was the killing of Sujit Mahato by Maoist in Lahan, Siraha District. Mahato's killing was the spark for prolonged agitation. Madhesi activists called for a general strike in the Tarai and organised widespread protests; the government responded with curfews and an increased police



presence. On 25 January 2007, the Madhise Jana Adhikar Forum led by Upendra Yadav – another disgruntled person from the Maoist - announced that they would continue go for the protests indefinitely until the interim constitution was amended. During the protest, activists looted government offices, police posts, banks, mainstream parties’ district offices and media organisations; in a move reminiscent of the Maoist actions during conflict time, they vandalized statues of *pahadi* political and social leaders and other personalities. The blocking of Kathmandu’s key supply routes had a more direct impact, leading to travel disruption, price rises and a petrol shortage. Although there were sporadic attacks on Tarai-based *pahadis*, communalism was not a defining feature of the unrest. The state response was harsh: police shot dead more than 30 people and wounded 800.<sup>23</sup>

The protests initially centered around Lahan and Janakpur but soon spread to all other major Tarai towns. The MJF organised some demonstrations but others were spontaneous or organised by local groups. These mobilised people, provided support to the injured and helped coordinate protests. Malangwa, Birgunj, Lahan and Biratnagar saw major clashes. In some cases, agitators turned their ire on journalists, blaming them for not covering the movement sufficiently.<sup>24</sup>

Participation in the protests cut across political divides; activists of other groups, from NC and UML to both JTMM factions, played a major role. Madhesis’ long-standing grievances, aggravated by exclusion from the peace process, even spurred CPN (M) cadres to join in, despite the anti-Maoist theme of many protests (Jha 2007).

### **5.7.2 The Terai Conflict and Human Rights Violation**

As reported by a leading Human Rights organization, INSEC ‘the atrocities that these groups are committed mainly, killings (innocent), abduction and subsequent demand for ransoms, capture of land and other properties, destruction of private and public

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<sup>23</sup> The number of people killed remains unclear. Human rights organisations speak of 27, while Madhesi leaders say 40 or 42.

<sup>24</sup> For example, protestors vandalised the Birgunj FM station and the Federation of Nepalese Journalists’ office; reporters covering demonstrations in Biratnagar, Birgunj, Inaruwa, Lahan, Bara and Saptari were threatened. Journalists say they covered the movement consistently but sometimes missed information about activities in villages where there were no reporters. Crisis Group interview, journalist, Biratnagar, 25 May 2007. See also “IFJ Outraged Over Violence Against Journalists During Demonstrations in Nepal”, 30 January 2007, and “Journalists Attacked and Work Destroyed in Nepal”, 28 February 2007, International Federation of Journalists press releases.

infrastructure, threat to the life of the victims and their families (Human Rights Year Book 2007). Their such activities have created serious problem in human rights and people's right to live. The transitional regime of Nepal has been so vulnerable that it has not been able to assert its authority in those regions and provide peace and tranquility to the people. The state's failure to make its presence in the region was also a prime cause for the rampant violation of the Human Rights. The Terai groups were able to expand their activities after the promulgation of the Interim Constitution in January 2007 where they have felt that their demands were not met and addressed properly. Most of the Terai groups including Peaceful agitators are demanding federal system and equal representation of the Madhesi people in the policy making bodies among others. Though, the government has amended the Interim Constitution and included those provisions and most of their genuine demands were already met, despite this, the groups are continuously involving in the activities related to the violation of human rights.

The Terai based armed groups have also been using the similar tactics that the CPN (Maoist) used during their violent acts. After the end of the Comprehensive Peace Accord in November 2006, these groups' atrocities have become a major cause of death and destruction in Nepal. As above mentioned data show that the increasing number of violence as well as abduction committed by these groups mainly in the Terai region posed a serious threat to the law and order as well as again pushed the country towards the unending cycle of violence and terror. Though, the Nepal Army has been confined inside the barracks under the agreement with the Maoists, the Armed Police Force as well as the Civilian Police are in charge of maintaining the law and order situation in the country. However, their roles are being questioned day after day because of their failure to contain the violence in the region. The death toll has continued to increase and so has the destruction of rural infrastructure (Lal 2007).

**Table V.IX**  
**Human Rights Violations/Abuses**

*[From 24 April 2006 (end of king's direct rule)*

*to 20 November 2006 (signing of the peace accord with CPN (M))*

Perpetrators	Human Rights violation				
	Killing	Abduction	Beating	Threats	No. of incident capturing property
By state	51		346	29	207
By Maoist	63	7290	597	478	18
By Young Communist League	1	90	127	24	
By Madhesi Janaadhikar Forum	33	7	35	5	7
By Jantanrik Terai Mukti Morcha	2	1			71
By Jantanrik Terai Mukti Morcha (Goit)	18	71	10	9	65
By Jantanrik Terai Mukti Morcha (Jwala Singh)	27	107	7	34	65
By Unified Jantanrik Terai Mukti Morcha	3	3			5
By other Groups of Terai	5	22	1	1	9
By Unknown sides	168	77			
<b>Total</b>	<b>371</b>	<b>7668</b>	<b>1123</b>	<b>580</b>	<b>382</b>

Source: INSE online: [www.insec.org](http://www.insec.org)

A leading national human rights organisation, Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC) published a report recently where it stated that the number of killings in Terai districts have significantly increased by both state and non-state actors. Data obtained from January 2010 to December 2010, the total killings in Terai were 263 and among them the highest number is in the middle region of Terai districts such as Mahottari, Parsa, Rautahat and Siraha. Likewise, mid-Western region's district Banke and Eastern region Jhapa also experienced large number of killings.

**Table V.XV**  
**Number of killing and number of abduction in 20 Districts of Terai**

District	Number of killing	Number of abduction	Total
Jhapa	18	1	19
Morang		2	2
Sunsari	10	1	11
Saptari		21	21
Siraha	14	17	31
Dhanusha		8	8
Mahottari	30	8	38
Sarlahi		10	10
Rautahat	23	7	30
Bara		3	3
Parsa	14	1	15
Chitawan		4	4
Nawalparasi	9	1	10
Rupandehi		4	4
Kapilvastu	10	3	13
Dang		1	1
Banke	17	17	34
Bardiya		1	1
Kailali	3	4	7
Kanchanpur		1	1
Total	148	115	263

*Source: Human Rights Year Book 2011, INSEC, Nepal.*

The Terai region has been affected more by violent conflicts. According to a news report that cited a Home Ministry source, 16 and 10 active armed groups respectively were operating in the Terai and eastern hilly regions in 2011 (Lawoti 2011). Data on killings by ethnic organisations, collected by INSEC, show that the Madhesi organisations are involved the most killings, with a high of 108 in 2007, 75 in 2008, 22 in 2009 and 29 in 2010 (Human Rights Year Book 2011). The killings of ethnic organisations have declined after reaching a peak in 2007, but have remained around 25-30 per annum for 2009 and 2010.

According to Jha, the area in which nearly a half of Nepali population live has a small number of police and civil services. Government infrastructures were not systematically designed to help the people (Jha 2011). The systematic bribery, political protection of criminals and the geopolitical environment of Terai is favourable to criminal activities (Transparency International 2009). The following statement of Chairperson of National Human Rights Commissioner Kedar Nath Upadhyaya also reflects the vulnerable situation of Terai. Upadhyaya states that 'political parties' affiliation with armed groups has been matter of serious concern'. In some cases, even security personnel have been involved in abduction, taking ransom, creating terror, murder, seizing properties and various forms of violence' (Upadhyaya 2010). The complexities of the conflict in the Terai are multi-faceted and multi-dimensional and there are not single issues and could be characterised 'as multiple conflicts being waged simultaneously' (Kriesberg (2001). Addressing root causes of armed activities and inspiring efforts for transforming the culture of violence are key areas of concern and leaving it further without dealing these fundamental issues will further escalate the violence.

The Interim Constitution of Nepal which was promulgated after the historic people's movement in April 2006 has guaranteed the basic rights, including civil, political and socio-economic rights to the people of Nepal. The most important feature of the new constitution is its recognition that sovereign power lies with the people. Similarly, the adult franchise, multi-party system, and rule of law are other features. The provision for an independent and competent judiciary and the rule of law ensure freedom and equal treatment to all the Nepalese citizens. The formation of the National Human Rights Commission, Indigenous People's Rights Commission, Women's Commission and Oppressed People's Commission has also contributed to the protection of human rights of the general or specific groups of people (INSEC 2008).

Despite those constitutional provisions and commitments to the international human rights documents, the human rights situation in general worsened. The initial euphoria that democracy will resolve all the problems of the people was soon dashed. The transitional regime of democratic Nepal failed to tackle economic, cultural, social and political discrimination or backwardness. The lack of democratization in the

bureaucracy, armed forces and police, as well as a culture of impunity created frustration, alienation and anger among the general population (Ibid).

The National Human Rights Commission, several domestic human rights organizations, Amnesty International, and Asia Watch, have regularly expressed their concerns over the deteriorating situation of human rights. Various international and national human rights organizations have reported that Nepal's current human rights situation is one of the worst in the world. This situation has sparked off fears about Nepal veering toward being labelled a 'country at risk' or a 'failed state' (Kumar 2007).

### **5.7.3 Terai conflict and cross-border connection**

Nepal's Terai region shares open border with Indian states of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand and West Bengal. There are strong family ties across the border. Similarly economic, religious and social structures are also connected between the two countries citizens. Both Hindu and Muslim celebrate same festivals and practice similar rituals. Those with cross-border marital ties have several advantages, such as legal title to property and a greater chance of accessing second passports. Though, it is not recognized but people of both sides have dual citizenship. People of both countries are benefiting from this however; it is also creating huge problems in those regions. Criminal groups from Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, states with poor law and order records, use Nepal as sanctuary and operational base, especially for car thefts and kidnappings (Goel 1995). A crackdown by Bihar's government coupled with Nepal's weak law enforcement may have encouraged some groups to shift to Nepal's the Terai areas.

Since the time of Maoist armed conflict, the porous border has been used to import weapons as well as used it to escape from the threats by the Nepali security forces. Similar tactics has also been applying by the Madhesi armed and non-armed groups these days. Even sometimes, the criminal gangs based in Indian side involved in abduction, extortion and killings. They even incite unrest in Nepal. During the Rautahat and Kavilbastu incidents (both were in the border districts where large number of killings taken place last year), it is reported that the Indian criminals crossed the border and attacked people in those places. Similarly, the inhabitants of both sides have a keen interest in the politics of the other side. Politicians cross over to campaign for friends,

allies and family members. The fact that the border is sealed during elections reflects the awareness that such linkages are exploited on both sides. Many people are enrolled on voters' lists in both countries. Politicians admit there is also a tradition of hired Indian criminals coming over to support candidates during elections in Nepal. Border sealing does not do much to impede these activities (Maharjan 2007).

Given the open border, a stable Tarai is particularly important, and New Delhi has in recent years developed a clearer sense of how to use economic ties to promote more stable (and binding) political relations. It encourages cross-border ties between the Tarai and Bihar and Uttar Pradesh and is interested in developing new rail links. In 2005 it opened a consulate in the southern industrial town of Birgunj; it has also reoriented its large development aid program to fund many more projects in border areas (Bhattarai 2005).

Though, the issue of national security is still important, but its attainment is linked increasingly to human security. The concept of as long as territorial border is secured everything within is secured is becoming anachronistic. In today's world, the security of the border is not sufficient to guarantee the security and welfare of the people. The Human Development Report, South Asia says that national security cannot be achieved in a situation where people starve and arms accumulate; where social expenditure falls and military expenditure rises. South Asia today is the most militarized region of the world, but that does not make the region any more secure (Haq 1997).

Today, more people lost their lives in intra-state violent conflicts than to the inter-states conflicts. The vulnerability of the state does not necessarily always emanate from the outsiders. This could be from within the state. Today, Nepal has been categorized as one of the most weak and vulnerable states in this region. With the intensification of violent conflicts and the breakdown of the law and order and destruction of the state institutions, it is heading towards a completely 'failed states' category. How has it become like this? Is it because Nepal has been attacked by outside forces or because of its small size or its location etc? The answer is no. Nepal's present vulnerability arises from internal problems – failure of the state, low level of development, widespread poverty situation, bad governance system, rampant corruption, erosion of political and state institutions, crisis of political leadership. In

the midst of this situation, the extremist forces like Maoists waged armed struggle and created terror in the society which had caused a death of nearly 17000 people, thousands were injured and many more were displaced from their own native villages and towns. Apart from this, billion of dollars rural infrastructures were destroyed and the whole country was paralyzed. Such situations increased the vulnerability and weaken the overall strength of the country (Bhattarai 2005).



## **Chapter VI**

### **Environmental Insecurity: Nature, Biodiversity and Cross Border Implications**

This chapter examines as how the environmental change is increasingly being understood and discussed as a security issue. In this context, issues such as biodiversity loss, natural disasters and climatic change will be examined in the context of Nepal and its immediate neighboring countries.. The ongoing growth oriented economic development, increasing urbanization and industrialization, the abject poverty situation, and rampant exploitation of natural resources will also be examined against the backdrop of increasing environmental dislocations and damages thereby leading to an emergence of a new variety of non-traditional security threat

#### **6.1 Background**

For a long period of time, the issue of environmental degradation was not an issue of major concern in the developing world. Their main focus was the economic development even at the expense of the natural environment. The developed countries also became concerned only when their industrial and other forms of pollution emerged as a serious threat to the well-being of their people. This created pressure groups which primarily sought to remedy the situation. According to Saukat Hassan, environmental issues remained unnoticed in the countries of the developing world until much later for a variety of reasons: the low level of industrialization did not generate the same types of concern as in the countries of the North; public interest groups were virtually non-existent because of a generally low level of education and mass participation; much of the media was controlled by the government, which restricted publicity concerning, matters of public interest; and the overriding national priority was economic development even at the expense of the natural environment (Hassan 1993).

However, since last four decades, the issue of environment has become one of the major concerns not only in the developed world but also in the developing world. The credit partly goes to the United Nations and its subsequent agencies for generating enormous level of environmental awareness at the global level. The first global level

initiative was the UN Conference on Human Environment in Stockholm in June 1972 organized by the United Nations where both the delegates from richer and poor countries participated. This drew attention of rich and poor countries alike to this disturbing global phenomenon. With the global initiatives, many of the developing countries including countries in South Asia have begun to take initiatives.

The UN Conference on Environment in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 further contributed in towards generating awareness and bringing environmental agenda into the forefront in the global level. However, still the issue of environmental degradation in most of the South Asian countries was overshadowed by orthodox military based national security concerns. This was despite the increasing disastrous situation in the region. The formation of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and its subsequent conferences began to take steps to develop a common regional environmental security approach (Dasgupta 2008).

Like in many South Asian countries, the environmental issue was not the major concern for Nepal in the past. However, since last couple of decades, the primary security concerns gradually began to shift from traditional defense issues to the non-traditional security issues like social, economic and environmental. Given the increasing frequency of the natural disastrous and growing environment related problems, the policy making elites began to link to issues with the local environment. Deforestation, soil erosion, land degradation, floods, droughts, air pollution mainly in the major cities, lack of proper waste management, glacier lakes outburst, torrential rainfalls in the middle mountains, debris flow dams in the rugged mountain regions and diversion of water resources both upstream and downstream have emerged as diverse and complex sources of environmental insecurity. All these have grave social, political and security implications for Nepal. Most of these problems have now become a common phenomenon in Nepal thereby adversely affecting a large number of populations and resources and huge geographical areas (Bajracharya & et al 2007).

## **6.2 Environmental security threats**

Since last three decades, the notion of security has been expanded and the non-traditional security threats are being increasingly encompassed into the security umbrella. One of the issues that have greatly affected the security of a country and a

society is the growing environmental challenges that the countries are facing. The environmental issues related threats have been recognized as one of the most serious threats for the development and sustainability of the societies of states. Defining the non-military threats Ullman states that ‘a threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that (i) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for inhabitants of a state, or, (ii) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or private, non-governmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state’ (Ullman 1983).

Though threat to the security in environmental related issues has been recognized as a serious challenge, there is also lack of a comprehensive and clear definition about it. Its meaning has been conceived in a multitude of ways. As Charles and Jean state that ‘environmental security is a conceptual paradigm that diverges from traditional international paradigms by ordering and addressing threats in a systemic arena that is increasingly inter-dependent and environmentally degraded. In this paradigm, environmental concerns for global pollution, regional water scarcity, food shortages, population growth, ecosystem degradation, and other ecological factors are considered the independent variables that cause the dependent variables of political instability, economic volatility, social competition, crisis, conflict, and war. The basic causal chain underpinning the environmental security argument is given as follows:

*Population growth/high resource consumption per capita – deteriorated environmental conditions – increasing resource scarcity – harsher resource competition – greater risk of conflict* (Charles & Jean 2006-7).

There are both supporters and critics of this conceptual definition. The central theme of the first debate, then, involves evaluating how the environmental security field as a whole has struggled to re-conceptualize notions of security in order to incorporate aspects of environmental degradation, ecosystem failure, food and water scarcity, soil erosion, pollution, global warming and population growth into the mainstream of political science research. The debate pits those who perceive and support a holistic understanding of security against those who do not (Ronnfeldt 1997).

While this conceptual debate continues today, it no longer retains a position of centrality in the environmental security research agenda. As a “first generation” of research, the definition debate was an interdisciplinary evaluation concerning the proper methods to incorporate emerging environmental issues to security studies (Ibid). Ullman who was the critique of the narrow understanding of national security in the Cold War period argued that traditional understanding of security – the absence of military threat – failed to realize and contend with other non-military threats. According to his broadened security arrangement, security includes any action that ‘threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state’, or any action that threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state’ (Ullman 1983).

The broadening the definition of security Ullman allows for the inclusion of environmental stress and ecological degradation (occurring both endogenously and exogenously), along with other non-military threats into the conceptual state-centric paradigm prevalent in IR theory. The broadening the concept of security, Jessica Mathews argues that as environmental degradation begins to tear the boundaries of national sovereignty, the study of IR must develop a more “analogous, broadening definition of national security that includes resource, environmental and demographic issues” (Mathews 1989)

The security definition was further expanded in the 1980s and 1990s where writers like Myers, Porter and Renner added in shifting the paradigm of the security issues. Focusing on the levels of analysis, calls for a definition of security that incorporates the level of the citizen and features individual needs and quality of life as a security paradigm (Myers 1993). In his article ‘Post-Cold War global environment and security’ Porter suggests that non-military threats to security are not only in need of clarification and identification, but also represent an “incipient transformation of thinking about” world politics, conflict, and global affairs – that is, that non-military security is a wholly novel conceptual paradigm for social and political thoughts (Porter 1990). The focus of growth oriented development paradigm that the world has been experiencing since last four decades has had tremendous implications on the global environment and the quality of life. “Urging the increasing environmental damage Renner adds that ‘the necessarily interdependent nature of ecological

degradation demands a new conception of common threats and shared goals between states that requires a new understanding of national interest and shared security” (Renner 1992).

Writing on environment and security each and every writers include the protection of human beings against environmental problems into the definition of security. During the 1990s, the broadened security concept developed along multiple dimensions involving political, economic, societal, military and environmental issues and incorporated various levels of analysis fostering a more expansive understanding of security with IR literature. The traditional form of security where military plays important roles in defending the territories whereas the language of environmental security, by broadening the security umbrella, weakens the military’s ability to conduct traditional military missions.

Any country’s environmental decline can reduce economic opportunities, causing demographic displacement within states and across international borders. This can rise to political tension between neighbouring countries. Similarly, environmental stress may cause an affected sub national group to shift its allegiance from the center to the periphery, increasing the possibilities of political disorder, civil strife and even insurgency. “Environmental devastation faced by a country due to the natural calamities, especially those originating from beyond its borders, can sour bilateral relations to the detriment of regional security” (McGranahan & et al 2007).

Poor countries are more vulnerable to environmental change than rich one; therefore, environmentally induced conflicts are likely to arise first in the developing world. According to Homer-Dixon in the developing countries, “a range of atmospheric, terrestrial and aquatic environmental pressures will in time probably produce, either singly or in combination, four main, causally interrelated social effects: reduced agricultural production, economic decline, population displacement and disruption of regular and legitimized social relations. These social effects, in turn, may cause several specific types of acute conflict, including scarcity disputes between countries, clashes between ethnic groups and civil strife and insurgency, each with potentially serious repercussions for the security interests of the developed world” (Homer-Dixon 1991).

The second conscious shift made by the literature is toward more empirical research based on case studies in order to understand exactly how environment and conflict are linked. While there are multiple concentrations on this type of research in Europe and America, the most prominent work in this direction came from the Peace and Conflict Studies program at the University of Toronto. Eight key findings of this stream of research were highlighted in Homer-Dixon and Blitt's 1998 book *Eco-violence*:

- *Under certain circumstances, scarcities of renewable resources produce civil violence and instability. The role of this environmental scarcity is often obscure, although it generates intermediate social effects that analysts often interpret as immediate causes of conflict.*
- *Environmental scarcity is caused by the degradation and depletion of renewable resources in addition to the increased demand for these resources and/or their unequal distribution. These causes often reinforce and interact with one another.*
- *Environmental scarcity often encourages powerful groups to capture valuable resources and prompts marginal groups to migrate to areas that are already ecologically sensitive.*
- *If social and economic adaptation is unsuccessful, environmental scarcity constrains economic development and contributes to migrations.*
- *In the absence of adaptation, environmental scarcity sharpens existing distinctions among social groups.*
- *In the absence of adaptation, environmental scarcity weakens governmental institutions and states.*
- *The above intermediate social effects of environmental scarcity can, in turn, cause ethnic conflicts, insurgencies, and coups d'etat.*

- *Conflict generated in part by environmental scarcity can have significant indirect effects on the international community (Homer-Dixon and Blitt 1998).*

However, the critics who counter the environmental security approach argue that maintaining the narrow definition of security preserves the military as an institution whose purpose is to contend with the military threats that invariably arise in the international arena. Similarly, they further state that the issues of environmental security involve cooperative and transparent action while the national security issues center on the conflict between states' security and international behaviours. Lumping's "national and environmental security threats together is problematic because the two are fundamentally different. While conflict and degradation may kill people and diminish human and community welfare, they nevertheless pose very different types of threats and unique security challenges. The term itself is far too blunt to generate appropriate policy responses while others question the usefulness of the 'metaphorical construction imposed by the environmental security label on the policy options available to decision-makers'" (Levy 1995).

According to the critics, while both conflict and degradation may kill people and diminish human and community welfare, they nevertheless pose very different types of threats and unique security challenges. Accidents, aging and other disease destroy life regularly but rarely are considered threats to security. The fear, then, is that a muddled approach to environmental degradation only creates a broad – and ultimately meaningless – understanding of security in general, that effectively acts as a definition rather than a redefinition of the security concept.

The multidimensionality of the environmental security paradigm challenges the very utility of the term itself. What does environmental security mean and what can we do about it if it is only an umbrella concept that incorporates various notions of environment and security? Some add that the term itself is far too blunt to generate appropriate policy responses while others question the usefulness of the 'metaphorical constructions' imposed by the environmental security label on the policy options available to decision-makers (Dalby 1998). The main challenge for the proponents of

the field is to establish a clear demarcation of what is and is not an environmental security issue (Ibid).

Having plentiful resources is a curse for some countries as it provides a favourable base for environmental conflict (Gleditsch 2004). “Where resources are abundant, there is a tendency to misuse them. Slow economic growth despite plentiful resources, skewed distribution of development benefits, and weak institutions provide a set of factors that encourages political instability and armed conflict for control over resources. These have also been referred to as the “greed and grievance” theories (Ibid). The motivation for conflict in the grievance theory is the opportunity to right past wrongs, while in the greed theory the motivation is for seizing the resources through violent means. The more resource becomes valuable, the more likely that it could become a source of conflict (Ibid).

As increasing competition for valuable environmental resources becomes the cause of conflict at a large scale than at present, there is growing interest in “ecological security” (Conca and Dabelko 2002). There is little value in explaining conflict if those explanations do not identify or lead to a peaceful resolution of the problem. “So far, most conflict have affected rural areas, but there may also be conflicts that affect urban areas in the future, especially with the growing scarcity of fresh water and clean air” (Mathew et al 2004). As increasing competition for valuable environmental resources becomes the cause of conflict at a larger scale than at present, there is growing interest in ‘ecological security’ Conca and Dabelko 2002). Increasingly, developed countries are carefully tracking the availability of critical natural resources, assessing the chances of eco-violence and urging their government to develop ecological security guidelines and policies. Developing countries on the other hand see this as another hurdle being put before them by the developed countries in their efforts to promote sustainable development. Any limitations on harnessing available environmental resources could jeopardize their prospects for improving wellbeing of their people (Ibid).

As resources become depleted or degraded, resource rights, vulnerability, food security, marginalization, and resources-related conflict have increased. Clashes between traditional and contemporary systems of property rights are often at the root



of livelihood insecurity. Other pressure from natural resources come from emerging markets, a growing population, and rapid expansions of different types of infrastructure. While these are an integral part of the present development scenario, environmental problem can no longer be overlooked as people displaced by the loss of environmental resources are easily pushed into conflict situation (Tadjbakhsh 2005).

### **6.3 State of Environment in Nepal**

The natural environment comprises water, air, soil, forest, pasture, and wildlife. Likewise, the cultural environment includes settlements and their patterns, transportation technology, utilities, services and others. Nepal's great variation in topography – altitudes ranging from 60 to 8,848 meters above sea level over a small distance of 190 km from south to north- has resulted in a great diversity of climate and vegetation ranging from subtropical to cold desert. Nepal has been endowed with a rich variety of plants and animals. Nepal's 8 bioclimatic zones and 35 vegetation types support a rich biodiversity in terms of fauna and flora. About 18% of the land area has been demarcated as protected and conserved areas (ADB & ICIMOD 2006).

According to the survey done by JAFTA, the country has now 6.8 million ha of forest and shrubland, with 37% of land areas covered by forest and 9% by shrub (JAFTA 2001). Wetlands like rivers, lakes, reservoirs, village ponds, paddy fields, and marchland are rich in biodiversity and different indigenous communities often have cultural attachments to them. Wetlands cover some 5% (743, 500 ha) of the land areas of the country (MOFSC 2003). There are a total of 242 designated wetlands, 163 in the Terai and the remainder in the Hills and Mountain regions. Nepal has more than 100 species of mammals, 800 species of birds which is world's 9% of the world's bird species, and about 4% of the world's mammal's species. In terms of species richness, Nepal is in 11<sup>th</sup> position in Asia and 25<sup>th</sup> position at the global level (MoFSC 2002). "Ecosystem" refers to a unit that includes all organisms (populations, communities, habitats, and environments) in a given area interacting with all components o the physical environment. According to the CBS report, Nepal has 118 types of forest ecosystems spread over four physiographic regions, 181 species of mammals, 844

species of birds, 185 species of fish, 143 species of reptiles and amphibians, over 5,884 species of flowering plants, and about 2,287 species of fungus and lichens (CBS 2003).

There are over 6000 rivers in the country with an estimated total length of 45,000 km (DHM 1998). All large rivers are fed by snowmelt from the Himalayas and hence they are a renewable water resource. The country has 660 lakes more than 1 ha. Nepal is a rural nation, with over 86% of its 27 million population living in rural areas. The rural population is one of the fundamental resources based on the country. During the five decades (1952-2001), both the total population and rural population have increased enormously. In 1952, the country's total population was 8.26 million that increased to 20 million by 2001. The rural and urban population growth rates have been rapid, putting tremendous pressure on natural resources such as agricultural land and forests. Increase in population has a direct bearing on the use of environmental resources, and increased demand for these resources causes their further degradation. The rural population and amount of agricultural land are both expanding, but the forest area is diminishing (IUCN 2004).

Likewise, the quality of air has also been deteriorating in urban areas. Studies over the last decade have shown that ambient air in the Kathmandu Valley is heavily polluted and not in accordance with international standards, and that the air quality is deteriorating (MOPE/UNEP/ICIMOD 2000). This development has mainly been due to a rapid rise in the number of petrol and diesel vehicles plying the streets. Another reason of deterioration of the air quality is continued emissions from the many brick kilns, the dyeing industry (Ibid).

Compare with its giant neighbours, Nepal is a small country but in terms of biodiversity, climatic condition and natural resources it is relatively richer. Its silver shining Himalayas in the north and thick forest in the plain south and ranges of mountains with green forests in the middle Hills with large number of rivers and streams are the beauty and assets of this country. But, increase in population, abject poverty situation and the lack of proper management of natural resources have posed a great threat to its sustainability and existence. "The increasing environmental threat

has pressed hard and deteriorated the quality of life of the common people” (Upreti 2003).

Likewise, environment-related conflict is increasing and attracting attention as a development agenda item along with poverty and human rights. Research to better understand the dynamics of the environment-conflict relationship has increased.

### 6.3.1 Forest as a major source of energy

The forest in Nepal defined as all lands having trees with more than 10% crown cover (DFRS 1999). The Forest is Nepal’s largest natural areas covering Nepal’s 37% land areas (JAFTA 2000). Forest is the main source of energy in Nepal which represents the 75% of the total fuel consumption. According to the Ministry of Forest wood consumption in rural areas exceeds 94% of the total fuel consumption, compared with 39% in the urban areas (MoF 2003). Due to the unavailability of other sources, the fuel wood has excessively been overused in the rural areas. The rural community has also used forest as grazing land for livestock. The increased numbers of livestock mainly depend on forest for grazing. Likewise the forest has been used for the infrastructure development such as roads, schools and institutional buildings (Ibid).

**Table VI.I**  
**Distribution of Forest Resources by Region, 2000**

Region	Area (ha)	Forest		Shrub		Total Forest Resources	
		Area (ha)	% of region	Area (ha)	% of region	Area (ha)	% of country
Mountain	5,181,700	1,181,631	22.8	426,363	8.2	1,607,994	23.7
Hill	6,134,500	3,085,885	50.3	771,842	12.6	3,857,727	56.8
Terai	3,401,900	1,237,545	36.4	85,026	2.5	1,322,571	19.5
Nepal	14,718,100	5,505,061	37.4	1,283,231	8.7	6,788,292	100

Source: Japan Forest Technology Association (2001)

The percentage of total areas covered by forest and shrub is highest in the Hills followed by the Terai and the Mountains. The Hills have 56.8% of the total forest

resources in the country where as Mountains have 23.7% and Terai areas have only 19.5%. (Table 6.1)

**Table VI.II**  
**Change in Forest and Shrub Cover**

Forest Resources	1986	1994	2000
Forest	37.4	29.0	37.4
Shrub	4.8	10.6	8.7
Total	42.2	39.6	46.1

Sources: JFTA (2001)

Table 6.2 shows the finding of surveys regarding the coverage of the forest in Nepal. During the period of late 1980s up to the mid 1990s, the depletion of forest happened in a massive scale. During this time, the country had been experiencing political instability and also there had been large number of internal migratory movement in Nepal particularly from Hills to the Terai. Both the quantity and quality of the forest decreased during this period. This loss can be attributed to:

- (i) *uncontrolled use of forest products*
- (ii) *increasing pressure of livestock,*
- (iii) *trans-boundary smugglings, and*
- (iv) *inappropriately design forest policies.*

Most of the rural population rely on fuel wood for cooking. In the rural areas, alternative energy sources like kerosene and gas are limited. According to one study there are 83% people mainly in the rural areas are dependent on fuel wood. The consumption of the fuel wood in the country is about 94%. Another factor that Nepal experiences depletion of forest was the population growth. Nepal is one of the high population growth countries in the world which remained at over 2% since 1961. In Terai, the migration and cross country smuggling are the other factors behind the diminishing forest resources in Terai. According to the data obtained from the Central Bureau of Statistics, between 1986 and 1991, 99,400 ha of forest were cleared (CBS 1998).

Much of these cleared areas were converted into the cultivated areas both people who have migrated from the Hills and refugees e.g. in Morang and Jhapa districts the Bhutanese Refugees made tremendous encroachment on forest. In the Hill areas the thinning of forest was due to over cutting of fuel wood and lopping trees for fodder (Tamrakar 1996). With the increased logs price in India, the trans-boundary smuggling of logs into India has also intensified. This activity intensified with the increase in price of logs in India (Rajbhandari 1997). Likewise, the lack of government's coherent policy was also responsible for the depletion of forest in Nepal. Some of its policies, such as the Private Forests Nationalization Act 1957 and the Land Tax Act of 1977, were unfavourable for conserving forest resources. "These policies instead allowed local people uncontrolled access to both public and private forests in their areas" (Perdo 1993; Shah 1997).

Wildlife and biodiversity are an important natural resource in Nepal, as well as an indicator of environmental quality. Loss of wildlife and biodiversity means degeneration of environments such as forest and water bodies. Any human or other intervention can cause environmental imbalance, with unfavourable implications for these natural ecosystems. The preservation of these unique ecosystems and the sustainable use of products obtained from them remains an environmental challenge for the country. Forests are the most important natural ecosystem in Nepal. Much of the former forest area has been converted to cultivated land, built up areas, roads and other infrastructure-related uses. Deforestation has a significant impact on flora and fauna. Nepal's threatened animal species constitute 3.8% of the world's threatened mammals and 2.3% birds (CBS 2003). "Clearing and burning forests, draining and filling wetlands, converting natural ecosystems into agricultural land, and meeting the demand for fuel wood, fodder, litter, medicinal plants, and animals for meat and other requirements has resulted in a huge loss of biodiversity" (Baskota 2004).

Habitats have suffered due to loss, alteration, over-extraction or illegal collection of species, poaching or hunting of wild animals, over-grazing and commercial trade. The economic value of endangered or rare species in the world market is very high. "Illegal trade of wildlife products such as rhino horn, tiger skin and bone, ivory, fur, and antlers is a serious problem in and around protected areas. In two decades, the country lost 76 rhinos due to poaching" (DNPWC 2001). Likewise, "the population of

musk deer, red panda, bears, and many other species have declined in the mountains” (Shrestha and Joshi 1996). Due to increased pressure on their usage, many species of plants, butterflies, fish, insects, birds, and mammals have been listed as threatened, vulnerable, or rare (ibid). Out of 32 rare plant species listed, 8 are already extinct (CBS 2003).

### **6.3.2 Government and community efforts in forest conservation**

The successive Governments of Nepal have introduced different programs for conserving and managing forest resources. The most popular and successful program was the community forestry program initiated in 1978, which has emphasized sustainable management and development of forests through communities’ involvement as forest user groups. By 1999, the Government had handed over a total of about 0.7 million ha of state-owned forest to over 10,532 community forestry user groups for development, conservation, management, and sustainable use. According to MoFSC report, a total of 6 million people had directly benefited from being members of user groups by 2000 (MoFSC 2002). Some forest areas have been declared protected areas such as national parks, wildlife reserves, and conservation areas.

The coverage of protected areas increased from 0.976 million ha in 1984 to 2,476 million ha in 1998. The Alternative Energy Promotion Center was created to develop programs for providing alternative energy resources and technology to reduce dependency on traditional energy sources such as fuel wood. Due to the promotional activities of this center with the collaboration of other groups, the number of biogas has increased from about 200 in 1975 to 90,000 in 2002 in 66 districts of the country (MOPE 2002).

Forest conservation and development in Nepal has been promoted through different Government acts and legislation since 1957 among many, some of them are listed below.

*1) Acts*

- a) Private Forests Nationalization Act 1957*
- b) Forestry Act 1963*

- c) *Forest Protection (Special Arrangements) Act 1967*
- d) *Soil and Watershed Conservation Act 1982*
- e) *National parks and Wildlife Conservation Act 1973*
- f) *Forest Act 1993 and Amendment (NPWC) 1993*
- g) *Forest Regulations 1995*
- h) *Environment Protection Act 1997*

**2) Policies and Strategies**

- a) *National Forestry Plan 1976*
- b) *National Conservation Strategy 1988*
- c) *Forestry Sector Policy 1989*
- d) *Nepal Environmental Policy and Action Plan 1993*
- e) *Master Plan for the Forestry Sector 1989-2010*
- f) *Policy Document: Environmental Assessment in the Road Sector of Nepal 2000*
- g) *Nepal Biodiversity Strategy 2002*

**3) Regulations and Guidelines**

- a) *Environmental Impact Assessment Guidelines for the Forestry Sector 1995*
- b) *Buffer Zone Regulations 1996*
- c) *Environment Protection Regulations 1997*

Among these, the **Environment Protection Act – 1997** has been the most comprehensive Act. It covers wider areas including air and water pollution. It also deals environment impact assessment, environment examination and to implement these rules, the government shall have authority to form various committees by including government officials, experts, environment activists and social workers etc. It also covers protection of national heritage, protected areas, establishment of laboratory. It has also provision to establishment and operation of environment protection fund. There is also a provision for the compensation. In case, in consequence of creating or disposal of pollution, sound, heat or wastes by anybody contrary to this Act or Rules or guidelines framed hereunder, any person organisation happens to suffer any loss or damage, the person or organisation affected from such actions, may if he/she desires to have compensation recovered from the person or institution or proponent doing such act, make an application to the prescribed

authority setting out the details thereof (DNPW 2004).

The Acts has also clear provisions on punishment to those who violates the rules. Any person carries out any act without getting a proposal approved under Section 6 or any act contrary to the approved proposal, the prescribed authority may close down such act immediately. So far, it has been regarded as the most updated and comprehensive Act in protection and promotion environment. It clearly states about the rules and give authority to the concerns departments and persons to take necessary measures against the violators. Similarly, it does have very clear provisions to appeal and defend as well as clarify the points from the pollutants point of views (Ibid).

However, environmental governance in Nepal is still regarded uneven and often ineffective, a reflection of broader political processes that have afflicted the country. Despite the improvements in some environment indicators like land protected to maintain biological diversity increased three fold from 1995 to 2004 (UNDP 2005), the proportion of the population with sustainable access to safe drinking water increased from 46% in 1990 to 81% in 2005 etc (UNDP 2005).

### **6.3.3 Government's efforts towards biodiversity conservation**

The Government has established the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Conservation and created a network of protected areas. Sixteen protected areas (together with six Buffer Zones) have been established for the protection of flora and fauna. After creation of the protected area network, there has been an increasing trend in the population of wild animals. The rhino population increased from 60 in the late 1960s to 612 in 2000, the last year for which reliable statistics are available (DNPWC 2000). Similarly, a continued conservation effort in protected areas has improved the habitat and increased the number of wildlife such as endangered tiger, musk deer, and many other species (Ibid). The Government has given legal protection status to 13 plants, 26 mammals, 9 birds, and 3 reptile species. Almost all these species and about 20 plants species are included in the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) appendices (DNPWC 2004).



Similarly, different alternative energy sources to replace or reduce fuel wood use such as back-boilers, kerosene depots, small hydropower plants, solar water heaters, and space heaters have been introduced in Mountain areas (such as Annapurna Conservation Area Project [ACAP] and Sagarmatha areas); and biogas, electricity, kerosene, improved cooking stoves, and solar power in the Terai. Studies show that these have reduced fuelwood consumption and thereby increased conservation of forests (DNPWC 1999; Lama and Lipp 1994; Wells and Brandon 1992). The government has formulated acts and regulations to safeguard the biodiversity of the country. Some of these have been listed above. A buffer zone approach has been implemented around the borders of the Royal Chitawan National Park, Royal Bardia National Park, Langtang National Park, Sheyphoksundo National Park, Makalu Barun National Park, and Sagarmatha National Park to solve park-people conflicts and protect park animals, as well as to ease the biotic pressure on core areas and to promote sustainable management of natural resources (DNPWC 2000).

**Table VI.III**  
**Wetland Types in Nepal**

Wetland Type	Estimated Area (ha)	Percent of Total
Rivers	395,000	53.12
Lakes	5,000	0.67
Reservoirs	1,380	0.19
Village Ponds	5,183	0.70
Paddy Fields	325,000	43.71
Marshland	12,000	1.61
Total	743,563	100

Source: Ministry of Forestry and Soil Conservation (2003)

There are total of 242 designated wetlands: 163 in the Terai and the remainder in the Hill and Mountain regions. According to a report, Nepal's wetlands are home to 193 of 841 recorded bird species. Terai wetlands alone have 187 bird species of which 180 are found in the Koshi Toppu Wildlife Reserve. Wetlands are also home to fish species, reptiles, and amphibians (MoFSC 2003).

Many indigenous communities depend on wetland resources for their survival. Accordingly, Nepal has sought to conserve the wetland ecosystem and ensure the participation of local communities for sustainable use of its components (MOFSC 2003). This policy recognizes wetlands management as an essential component of an ecosystem approach to natural resource management and has identified participatory wetlands management, classified wetlands from a management perspective, and developed other components of sustainable development. Ecotourism development is an integral part of the protected area system in Nepal. “The prime objective of ecotourism has been to promote a symbiotic relationship between tourism and the environment, with a particular focus on uplifting the local host economy. This concept is also applied in village communities sited in and around protected areas” (MoFSC 2003).

The Annapurna Conservation Area Project (ACAP), covering an area of 7,629 sq km in the western Himalayan region, covers one of the three conservation areas of Nepal. ACAP was created in 1986 under the King Mahendra Trust for Nature Conservation and gazette as a Conservation Area in 1992. The Main aim of ACAP is to balance natural resource conservation and sustainable community development. The area is characterized by both biodiversity and cultural diversity. ACAP has been successful in gradually changing traditional subsistence activities into a framework of sound resource management, supplemented by conservation, development of alternative energy programs to minimize the negative impacts of tourism and to enhance the living standards of local people. Annapurna Conservation Area has been a prime destination for trekkers ever since it was opened to visitors (IUCN 2001).

An understanding of conservation and the sustainable use of natural resources has proved to be a crucial catalyst for sustaining development. ACAP has since become a model for conservation and development not only for other parts of the country but also for the rest of the world. Many national parks and protected areas in Nepal have either adopted or refined the ACAP model (ACAP 2002).

## **6.4 Weak environmental governance system**

The environmental governance system is very weak in Nepal. The main reason for this is the lack of farsighted policies, adequate funds and implementation mechanisms. Moreover, the political instability and poor governing behaviour are also the factors. Likewise, the absence of long-term policies, weak mechanism of law enforcing agencies, and government's inadequate attentions become the reasons for decreasing environment quality in the urban and rural Nepal. Lack of sufficient funding and inability of environmental institutions to streamline activities into the national socioeconomic development process are other reasons for this situation. It is argued that these deficiencies have been compounded by inefficient public administration in general, weak monitoring, non-representativeness of the environmental agencies to public opinion, and non-execution of recommendations of many studies conducted for the environment sector through donor support (ADB & ICIMOD 2006).

The government has created and dissolved environmental institutions frequently, without providing them sustainability or continuity, and it is being guided mainly by political motivations. One of the most recent changes was the dissolution of Ministry of Population and Environment in 2005 after 10 years of existence and annexation of its environment division to Ministry of Environment, Science and Technology (MOEST) (Ibid). Institutional and regulatory efforts in Nepal towards the conservation of natural resources and management of environmental issues have had little impact due to the different factors and constraints encountered. The underlying reason for poor environmental governance can be better understood by reassessing environmental performance to date and identifying areas where changes are needed (Banskota 2001).

The abject poverty situation, lack of awareness about the environmental impacts and employment opportunities, the poor people are forced to use and over exploit natural resources for their survivability. Lack of awareness in urban areas has resulted in increased pollution from the misuse and abuse of resources and environmental mismanagement. The frequent changes in government and the ongoing conflict

situation have also contributed in undermining organizational capacity and monitoring at all levels. The inadequate budgetary allocation has been another major problem for the effective implementation of environmental policies (KMTNC 2002).

Another reason for weak governance is the short of skilled human resources specialized in the various environmental fields. This has severely constraints the capacity of the environment related institutions in the country not only in private institutions but also the governmental institutions including the Environment Ministry. Lack of the funds needed to execute their mandates means that the databases, research facilities and laboratories needed for environmental monitoring are lacking (MOFSC 2000).

Such a situation has made the environmental institutions dependent on external facilities. For example, Ministry of Population and Environment even after 9 years of existence, did not have a laboratory of its own for emission testing vehicles and depended on the facilities available with traffic police office. Local government bodies at the district and village levels also need technical staff, facilities and funding, without which they cannot execute their mandated environmental activities as promoted by the Local Self Governance Act 1999. “Lack of logistical support has prevented agencies concerned from making field trips to project sites to carry out environmental surveillance and monitoring activities” (ADB and MOPE 1999).

Another problems related with environment governance is conflicts and overlapping mandates. In many areas particularly areas prevalent between institutions with long histories and those that are relatively new. The lack of clear distinction of works and laws between the institutions has also created problems. Such overlapping cases involve particularly between the Ministry of Population and Environment and Ministry of Forest and Soil Conservation. For example, as per the provisions of the Environment Protection Act and Regulations, Ministry for Environment, Science and Technology (MOEST) is authorized to approve Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) reports on development projects. Nevertheless, the Forest Act 1993 said that in cases where such projects involve forested areas, Ministry of Forestry and Soil Conservation (MOFSC) may take a long time, and often these delay compromise project viability (ADB & ICIMOD 2006).

Experiences of program implementation reveal that while awaiting an environmental decision, developers often take matters into their own hands and clear extra forests and inflict other damage. Legislation and human resources to monitor or prosecute this behaviour are weak or lacking and in the process projects possibly national importance are jeopardized. This kind of overlapping can be found in other areas particularly between Ministries like MOEST and Industry, Agriculture too (Bajracharya 2005).

When it comes to public participation in the environmental areas, the EIA processes has been regarded as one of the best examples. Under this process, hearings and consultations at project sites are required several times as part of the EIA process. These consultations take place with different public and private agencies, NGOs and media. Major projects on hydropower development such as Kali-Gandaki A project, the Pancheswor High Dam Project, Upper Karnali Hydro Project, and Middle Marsyangdi Hydro Project; some large irrigations projects like the Mahakali irrigation, the Sunsari Morang irrigation, and the Narayani irrigation; and the Melamchi Water Supply projects have been widely discussed. The local communities, media, donors and major stakeholders all participated; however, there is still room for improvement which would involve standardizing the process and ensuring that it is conducted more frequently (Ibid).

After the establishment of MOPE (now MOEST) in 1995, a substantial number of environmental laws and regulations were developed. About half of the prevailing environmental laws now in force in Nepal date from 1992. Widespread public concern over pollution led to legislation to curb emission of effluents and airborne pollutants, while concern over the depletion of natural resources led to legislation for preserving conservations areas such as national parks and wildlife areas with special biodiversity value. While the laws exist in principle, institutional weaknesses continue to prevent the effective monitoring implementation of these laws (Ibid). The capacity to monitor the implementation of laws and public expenditures is weak at all levels. Institutions are weak from national to village levels. These deficiencies stem from the general weakness of the public administration system itself. "Inadequate supervision, poor financial management, slow government procedures, and lack of coordination among government entities are some other indicators, all of led to poor performance

generally and to serious neglect of environmental issues in particular” (Pokharel 2003).

## **6.5 Environment-related conflicts in Nepal**

Like in many other countries, environment related conflict has been increasing in Nepal too. The increasing demographic pressure, deforestation, soil erosion, sewers of rivers and eutrophied lakes are some of the examples that created severe problem in the environmental front. As a result, environment-related conflict is increasing and attracting attention as a development agenda item along with poverty and human rights. At the local level, conflicts are closely related to lack of access to critical resources. With changing prices, markets and breakdowns in traditional institutional mechanisms for mediation, conflicts have become more the rule than exception in the use of forest, water, pasture, and other natural resources. While many of these local conflicts are not violent and are resolved peacefully, in other cases disagreements and tensions are very high and violence has erupted in some (Banskota 2005).

Like in many other countries in Nepal too have been facing serious problem of poverty, displacement (both by development and conflict), and degradation of the environment. Increasing conflicts between the local residence of park areas and the park authority like in Chitawan National Park, Bardiya National Park, Langtang National Part etc. The local residence whose daily requirements such as fuel for cooking, grazing their cattle etc are prevented after the creation of the National Parks. So, the local residences are not happy with this situation and they often clash with the authority in those areas.

This has also contributed for the increment of the trade in endangered species, flora and fauna despite Nepal has been a signatory of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) 1973 and the Convention on Biological Diversity 1992 have tried to curve trade in endangered species. Likewise, efforts to exploit resources have been a source of unending conflict. According to the news carried out by the local news papers that due to the increased rhino poaching, the Government of Nepal has declared war against rhino poaching in 2010 and taken number of steps to control the situation. “Increased rhino

poaching in Chitawan National Park has prompted Nepali government to get tough with the killers.” ((My Republica, 20 June 2011). According to the same reporting, the government has increased army personnel in Chitawan National Park, Shoot-on-sight permission was given to the security forces in the areas, and introduced Global Positioning Technology has been introduced to monitor Rhinos in Chitawan National Parks (Ibid).

The issue of environment related conflict has become serious at all levels of society. While there is growing recognition of the problems, ways to deal with them are less clear and full with controversy. Nepal’s situation clearly indicates that conflict conditions are abundant. Though the Nepali scholars have paid little attention on environment-related conflicts, these issues have become one of the major concerns in the public life. Even some of them have given attention which is limited to the conflict between people and protected areas. However, recently some concerns have been raised about the impact of political conflict on the environment. The issue that has attracted the most attention is the poaching of endangered wildlife and trade in endangered wildlife species banned by various international agreements (Hakahaki 2003).

The complex interrelationship between environment and conflict makes it difficult to bring together relevant facts and the scope of the present exercise does not give the flexibility or the time to deeply analyse these critical multidimensional aspects of environment and conflict. In many respects, conflicts indicate that existing social relationships are beginning to change (Banskota and Chalise 2000). For an agrarian economy like Nepal, “environmental relationships may be at the root of changing social, economic, and political interactions” (Bhurtel and Ali 2003). Some forces may be on their way out, some may still be emerging, while others might have clearly established their foothold until new pressures begin demanding further changes.

***Cross border smuggling of endangered species:*** Although, the scientific analysis has confirmed that rhino horn has no medicinal effect on humans, cultural superstitions in China and Vietnam attribute healing powers to rhino horn. The current rhino poaching crisis appears to be driven by the thriving market for rhino horn in China, where the heavily funded pharmaceutical industries continue to manufacture rhino horn “remedies” and promote rhino horn as a medicine to the largest population on earth


(My Republica 25 June 2010). According to the IUCN report Nepal is home to approximately 435 greater one-horn rhinos and they recently classified them as endangered to vulnerable species (IUCN 2009).

According to the BBC report, “the smuggling of Tiger has become out of control. In its report on 4 July 2010, stated that the future of tiger is under grave threat unless China and India crackdown on the growing trend in its skin, a lobby group has warned” (BBC News 4 July 2010). It further stated that ‘China’s economic boom is fuelling the trade in big cats killed in India and smuggled via Nepal and Tibet (Ibid). The EIA said there were fewer than 5000 wild tigers left in the world, down from about 100,000 a century ago and about half of them live in India. According to the EIA’s report, in October 2010, “Chinese officials intercepted a record haul of 31 tiger skins that were being smuggled to China via Nepal and Tibet”.

According to a finding, traders now use land-routes as borders are porous and customs lax. Nepal’s southern border to India is very porous. The clandestine trade routes from India into Nepal include Rajpur, Nepalgunj, Butwal, Bhairahawa, Birgunj, Sarlahi, Janakpur, Biratnagar and Kakarvitta. Nepal has 165 custom offices spread throughout its southern border with India. From Nepal, the trade routes to Tibet are Darchula, Manang, Taklakot, Kyrong, Taplejung and Tatopani. As there are many routes to transport goods into Tibet, traders use backpacks animals and porters to avoid detection. The major smugglers and traders based in Kathmandu are Tibetans. A few are Nepalis (WCN, 2005). Tibet has become the key location for smuggling, distribution and use of tiger skins and bones. As one report states that ‘India, Nepal and China feature as source, transit and destination because of trade in body parts of tigers, rhinos, leopard, snow leopard and musk deer’ (Banks & Newman 2004).

It is stated that the lack of cooperation between India and Nepal is evident in the failure apprehend Nepali nationals to associated seizure in India. The judicial system has virtually failed to deter poachers and smugglers in Nepal (Banks & Newman, 2004).





6.1 Illegal wildlife trade routes in Asia' and protected areas where megavertebrates are poached.  
 Source: [www.eia-international.org/files/reports85-1.pdf](http://www.eia-international.org/files/reports85-1.pdf).

The growing incidences of smuggling both rhino horns and tiger skins from India to China via Nepali land show the fragile security environment of our country. The country's deteriorating security environment not only affecting our domestic issues and citizen's security but also putting in dangers to the endangered species and allowing illicit traders to use our lands. Similarly, as a signature country of international convention, CITES, it is an responsibility and for its own national interest, it should be able to protect those endangered species. However, due to the ineffective security environment in the country, the cross borders smugglers and illicit traders have found safe haven Nepali land. As stated recently by a senior Nepal Police officer, Nepal Such situation tarnishes the country's images in the international arena.

Due to the geo-political realities of Nepal, wildlife trade can and is undermining biodiversity conservation. Nepal, India and China must form an alliance through

tripartite agreements to jointly fight battles against illicit trade to protect endangered species (Yonzon, 2005).

Nepal's failure to control the illicit trade and protect the endangered species has raised a serious question about its ability to protect the world's most endangered animals. On the other hand it also shows the increasing security vulnerability of the country. This shows the weak position of our security agencies and their efficacies. In today's world, when a country cannot maintain minimum level of security environment for its own citizens and its natural assets like endangered species and also fails to control the illicit trades and criminal groups in its land, the regime will not only loose faith from its own people and desert from the endangered species, but also poses question about its assurance to the international community that the country is in the position of maintaining domestic law and order situation and providing better security environment for its neighbours and also those who would like to make investment provide donation for its economic and social development. However, failure to control illicit trades and smuggling would loose credibility and confidence both domestically and internationally. Loosing credibility means also loosing confidence of the foreign investors and also financial supporters and donors. Furthermore, this will ultimately affect on its relations with other countries particularly with immediate neighbours, because, increasingly failure to curb such activities would have spill over impacts on our immediate neighbours and also largely to the international community. And they would began to raise the question of country's security strength and ability to prevent the activities of the unwanted elements within its borders.

### **6.5.1 Conflict related to forest resources**

As mentioned earlier, over 80% of the people in the rural area rely on firewood for their daily consumption of energy. Forest is their part of day to day life. People in the Hills have intensively used the forest and now there is a move to manage it more carefully. Likewise, forest in the Terai has been used for timbers, agriculture, settlement, infrastructure development and establishment of protected areas. In Nepal, there are basically two types of forests management, one is community managed and another is state managed. Both are protection oriented. As forest is one of the mostly demanded resource and it is not easy to manage it because there is a huge gap in

between demand and supply. Certainly, not all the demands are met in one time. Those whose demand are not met, they start to clash with the others or with the management. It is argued by many that if forest management moved towards an active production orientation, the current contribution of \$58 per hectare would go up to \$162 per hectare (Grosen 2000). Even the economists argue that with increased productivity, the forest sector could play a major role in poverty reduction and in dealing with problems of illegal settlers, landless groups and others by providing employment opportunities.

On the other hand, if forests are managed as they are now, with low productivity and a protection orientation, they could become an even greater source of conflict in the future. According to Oli, 'the Maoist insurgency has severely affected the governance of forest and protected areas by restricting the mobility of government officials in the field and destroying forestry sector infrastructures. During the period, 29 districts forest offices, 52 ilaka offices, 235 range posts and 2 training centers have been destroyed by the insurgents (Oli, 2006). Community members and forest guards are afraid to enter forest because of the risk of attacks from both security personnel and Maoists. In the absence of forest offices and forest guards, smuggling of timbers and products from flagship species has also increased due to opportunistic harvest (Ibid).

Similarly, rebels have taken community forest and are using the profits from timber sales to finance their activities. They have imposed 'war tax' in community forestry areas, involved directly in the trade of herbs and medicinal plants (Ibid). In any armed conflict, the combatants prime target is forest resources in order to drive the opposition groups from their shelter, food and energy requirements. "In addition, the combatants use and abuse the biodiversity resources to finance their military operation. During the conflict, the country's law and order situation remains weak. Therefore, the internally displaced people and victims of insurgents have large scale suffering. Individual and groups try to survive on their own within a society with arms and law in their hands, a situation that can have a dire impact on biodiversity resources. Since the domestic law becomes so weak during the conflict, international guidelines for the prevention of hostile activities on biodiversity conservation are urgently required" (Oli, 2006).

## 6.5.2 Conflicts in community forestry

Community managed forestry programme has become one of the successful models in terms of protecting and expanding the forest areas in Nepal. Particularly in the Hill area, after the implementation of this model, the forest covered areas has been expanded and rescued the Hills from further degradation. Despite its successful story, still it is not free from the problems. New challenges and difficulties have been emerging in this sector as well. Following difficulties that have been identified while pursuing this programme:

***Difficulties in formation of forest users groups:*** Forestry user groups formation is one of the primary tasks in the community forestry model. Initially, local people are reluctant to join the group due to its complicated roles. In the initial days, the members of the group has to play important role not only gaining supports from the community they also have to educate and convince the public about the importance of the forest and also provide ways of getting alternative means of energy for the daily consumption. In the local level, there has been increasing tendency to form groups without doing adequate home works. Lack of inclusiveness and the ignorance of local people's daily concerns particularly the lower strata of the population create problems. Likewise, rules regarding sharing of benefits and costs have always been a major source of tension. Questions of personality clashes, differences between active and inactive members and fund misuse and embezzlement are other problems noted within the user groups (Bhatia 1995; Springgate Bagnski et al 2003).

***Problems between user groups:*** The clashes arise between the forest user groups due to the lack of clear boundaries of the forest areas. Without good survey maps and overlapping jurisdiction, the problems are arbitrarily put on hold to surface again. Lack of clear and scientific maps, there has been instances of mistaken handover of forests that are temporarily resolved after intense negotiations involving cumbersome administrative and legal processes (Springgate-Baginski et al 2003)..

***Problems between forest user groups and the forest office:*** The forest office which is belong to the Ministry of Forest and Soil Conservation has many discretionary powers, and without its active support, approval for a community forest group may never come. Many requirements need to be fulfilled before the forest office can

provide approval, and each of these requirements can be a source of difficulties for the user groups. Likewise, the delay in delivering the decision by the bureaucracy and also bribery and nepotism in the government offices has made further difficulties particularly the weaker groups.

***Problems between customary practices and Forest Acts:*** After the introduction of the National Forest Act, the fate of all customary practices is open to question. According to Pant, in some cases, respect for customary rights was negotiated as part of a package recognizing the authority of the rules in Kathmandu (Pant 2002). However, the context has changed to such an extent that the current position of many customary rights is not clear. In some instances local communities still assert that their customary privileges are valid but the Government has a different understanding (Ibid). Some traditional practices are important because of the size of the group and area involved.

The most obvious case is the traditional *Kipat* system of land holding among the Rai and Limbu community in far eastern Hill and mountain areas. It is a system of communal land management where the community members have the usufruct right to use the pasture but no powers to sell it. This right was recognised by the Government in return for their submission to the authority in Kathmandu (Ibid). However, while the people have accepted community forestry rules, there are restrictions on non-forest uses of the community forest land, especially for cultivation of new crops, although this also a subject of discussion. When locals are questioned they maintain that their kipat heritage gives them the freedom to use the forest in any way they decide, but the Government understands the situation differently. The existence of this dual system has perpetuated tensions and severely limited the opportunities for further development of forest resources (Uprety 2003).

In many cases, the traditional practices of indigenous groups have been replaced by state laws. Sometimes these changes take a very heavy toll on the livelihood of the indigenous groups because the new laws have opened access to outside groups. The resources traditionally enjoyed by indigenous groups are then quickly depleted or controlled by more powerful outside groups (DNPWC, 2006).

Another example could be cited about *Route* - one of the last remaining groups of forest dwellers. These people roam in jungle and collect food however; due to the fast depletion of the forest their future has become uncertain. Even they have found hard to collect food and continue their traditional life style. Today the forest they used cannot proved for their needs and they are often hungry-some children have died of starvations (The Rising Nepal 2004).

Nepal has gained reputation in the international arena by introducing and promoting a successful community forestry program. Due to the success of this program Nepal forestry area has been increased by almost 200% in the last two decades. However, the success has not all the time give fruits only but also generated problems particularly in the community level. Some of the problems stated earlier in this chapters where the state authority has failed to manage it. This has also sharpened the ethnic and caste based divisions in the local level. Further it has increased the smuggling of the timbers from Nepal to India and Nepal to China. This also increased the smuggling of the endangered species to China.

### **6.5.3 Problems of Settlement in forest areas**

In Nepal, as large number of people rely on agriculture and there is huge gap between the growing population and lands for cultivation. Therefore, people's hunger for land during the past five decades has been me largely by bringing more forest area of the Terai under cultivation (IDS 1985). Many of ongoing conflicts regarding tenants, landless groups, and illegal settlers have occurred in occupied forest areas. As Ghimire discusses the experience Nawalparasi district, pointing out that given the high demand for land and the relatively low cost of resettlement, the Terai provided an excellent option for people in the Hills as well as those across the border in India. Many Nepali from Assam and Myanmar were encouraged to return and settle in this area (Ghimire 1992).

On the other hand many of the earlier residents were dispossessed of their lands through very unpleasant means and illegal settlements were officially encouraged although the landless people were never a target for settlement. The resulting chaos in land ownership, dealt with only cosmetically by numerous commissions set up to look into problems, has been the basis of longstanding tension between landowners and



landless groups, richer landowners and marginal small farmers, and local groups and immigrants (Ibid).

The increasing settlement in forest area particularly in Terai has not only encouraged people from Nepal but also other countries particularly from some of the Indian states like Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Assam and other North-Eastern states. Similarly, people from Bhutan, Myanmar, Bangladesh and to some extent from China (Tibet) also. Such a situation would generate problems in maintaining Nepal's relations in those countries. For example, Bhutanese refugees have taken shelter in eastern districts of Nepal and some Tibetan refugees are also staying in different parts of Nepal. Both of these refugees issue have become an issue of contentious between Nepal and Bhutan and sometime with China too. Nepal's immediate neighbours are not happy with its inability to stop unwanted refugees from their countries and taking shelters inside Nepal. On the one hand this will impact on Nepal and its neighbours relations on the other hand the refugee would pose number of security related problems including clashes between local people and the refugees, their involvement in the wrong activities like Tibetan refugees engagement with illicit trade with China.

#### **6.5.4 Contradictions between forest acts and other acts**

Another difficulty in the environmental front is the differences between the environment related acts and other acts. There are number of acts which have interrelations and sometimes overlapping that creates confusion and sometimes tensions. As stated by Grosen, the successive Governments' failure address this problem, some of these remain unresolved for decades which only shows the extent to which governments have been unconcerned about removing the conflicts (Grosen 2000). Research should clarify who benefits from these legal contradictions and their impact. There has been a rush to pass new laws, but few efforts to ensure that new laws do not conflict with earlier ones. It is obvious that a new commission is urgently needed to look into this very serious matter (Ibid).

According to Grosen, some of the more obvious conflicts related to the use of forest resources are listed below:


- i) “There are differences in the amount of land that can be owned under the Forest Act and the Land Act. It would be interesting to see how many cases have been recorded because of these conflicting provisions.
- ii) The absence of a cadastral survey in many areas has made it very difficult to separate private and government land, and thus made it very difficult to identify encroached lands. Similar confusion has been noted among community forest groups.
- iii) Provision under the Forest Act and the Nepal Mines Act overlap. The Forest Act maintains that anything in a forest is governed by the Forest while the Mines Act maintains that all minerals are governed by the Mines Act.
- iv) Provisions have been made for compensating landowners when property is acquired for development schemes, but as land demarcation is not clear compensations has often remain pending for a very long time.
- v) Similarly, many overlapping provisions have been found between the Forest Acts and the Local Self Governance Act, which has greatly hampered decentralisation. The central agencies responsible for the different Acts have not removed provisions regarding local resources, creating overlapping jurisdiction and confusion for the public” (Grosen, 2000).

### **6.5.5 Conflicts in parks and protected areas**

As stated earlier, Nepal is one of the successful countries in terms of establishing protected areas and national parks. The first national park that Nepal established was the Royal Chitwan National Park which was established in 1973. Since then there are nine National Parks, three wildlife reserves, one hunting reserves. Among them, two the Chitawan National Park and Sagarmatha National Park have been recognised as World Heritage Sites. In terms of protection as well as promotion of these parks, the Government has followed a number of distinct phases in the management of parks and protected areas. During the 1970s and 1980s, the policy was to exclude people from these areas. In the 1980s, conservation areas for ecotourism were promoted. During the 1990s, the focus shifted to resolving park-people conflicts through buffer



zones and other programs to better integrate people in the conservation and sharing of benefits of protected areas (Shrestha 2001).



## 6.2 Protected Areas of Nepal

Source: [www.forestrynepal.org/online\\_maps\\_of\\_protected\\_areas](http://www.forestrynepal.org/online_maps_of_protected_areas)

According to Nepal and Weber, major conflicts between parks and people relate to the illegal extraction of park resources such as firewood, fodder, timber, livestock grazing, hunting and fishing; frequent crop raids by wild ungulates; and loss of human life and property (Nepal and Weber 1993). In the early years, the problems were few and infrequent, however with rapid increases in population and settlements around protected areas, the conflicts have increased in number and severity – at times entire villages have had to be moved or relocated. The fact that since 1996 buffer zones have been declared around six of the national parks is an important indicator of the extent of this conflict and Government's response to the problem (Ibid).

**Table VI.IV**  
**Summary of the Structural Causes of Instability**  
**in the Koshi Tappu Wetland Area**

Livelihood insecurity	Environmental insecurity	Absence of reliable and affordable legal support
Lack of supply of adequate supplies of safe food	Disturbed ecological services	Non-recognition or denial of indigenous and customary practices
Lack of access to safe shelter	Irrational use of available resources	Abuse of state laws
Lack of access to clothes	Ineffective management	Lack of access to laws (because they are not know, or people lack the resources or time to access the legal system)
Human insecurity	Unrealistic laws and regulations and their abuses	
Lack of access to other basic services (such as educational and health facilities)	Natural calamities and hazards	Politicization of law and justice

Source: Summarized from a case study report of Koshi Toppu Wetland (Upreti 2004)

Another major source of conflict between the local people and the park authority is the open boundaries of parks which facilitated the entry of domestic animals into the National Parks in the absence of alternative sites for grazing. Likewise, wild animals are also attracted by the domestic livestock. Following comments made by park neighbour indicate the difficulties near a park: “Unless a suitable solution is made, we will continue our illegal activities regardless of the price or penalties we will have to pay” (Ibid).

Similar finding is made by another review which points out that wildlife reserve-people conflicts are serious because people lack viable alternative livelihoods to compensate for the loss of access to natural resources inside the reserve, and the customary rights of the people have been ignored (IUCN Nepal 2004). Wild animals like tigers, kill livestock, elephants and rhinos raid crops and to get rid of these animals, which often become easy prey to poachers.

According to Bosley et al, the true outcome will not be determined or sometimes, though if the current trend continues, it seems most plausible that the elephant population will continue to diminish and the conflict will be resolved by its destruction (Bosley et al 2000). Furthermore, as WWF states that with the break in the ecosystems, mega fauna that need larger spaces and have seasonal movements are coming into increasing contacts and conflicts with human settlements, (WWF 2003).

Such a conflictual environment in the Park areas has had negative implications in terms of protecting the endangered species inside the parks as well as preventing the encroachments in those areas. Ultimately, this situation would allow increment of smuggling of species, timbers into the foreign countries, particularly to India, Bangladesh and Bhutan where the demand for timbers are so high in those countries. Likewise, increasing smuggling of the endangered species would mean Nepal would loose all of it and finally it also loose its patent rights. A country which cannot protect its traditional knowledge and species and natural resources, the future of that country cannot be secured. These are the national assets need to be protected and preserved.

## **6.6 Conflictual relations between indigenous people and natural resources**

According to a study in the Koshi Toppu (protected wet land reserve for Wildlife in eastern part of Nepal where recent breakdown of the embankment of the Koshi river created flood hazard. The Toppu is surrounded by 16 villages) revealed the strong relationships between indigenous communities and natural resources in Nepal in terms of livelihood, culture, tradition and religion (Mathew and Upreti 2004). About 78000 people who live in those 16 surrounding villages solely depend upon the resources which are becoming less available to them due to the changes in land tenure, poor conservation practices, and depletion. "Primary resources include gathering grass for roofing and fodder; fishing, collecting fuel including dung and driftwood; irrigation farming; collecting rocks for construction; grazing livestock; and gathering cattails for mattresses" (Bastola 2005).

Another issue of this Wildlife Reserve which established in 1976 is the pending issue of providing compensation to the displaced people. Little or no compensation was offered for the residents and their access to the resources was decreased significantly. Such a frustrating situation was channeled by the Maoists into support for their

insurgency in the past. If continues, another extremists group may use local people's frustration and deprivation (Yonzon, 2004).

According to IUCN report, representatives of 19 ethnic groups who dependent on natural resources of the protected areas with whom interviews were conducted say that their traditional or customary rights to local natural resource have been curtailed or denied (Upreti, 2004). Consequently, their livelihoods have become increasingly perilous, and their willingness to engage in protest and crime has increased. The problem has at least three interactive causes. First, local people have seen few benefits from the development of the dams, the Koshi Barrage, in part due to barriers such as language and lack of information. For example, the construction of dam relied heavily on labour imported from India. Second in the 1950s, the availability of abundant natural resources and fertile land attracted a large number of migrants from nearby hilly regions. But as resources became relatively scarce, the construction of the East-West Highway made the area accessible to even more migrants from other parts of the country (Heinen, 1993; Sharma 2002). The decision to protect the area as a Ramsar<sup>1</sup> site due to its remarkable biodiversity, have further restricted access to essential resources, including fish, birds, forest products, and grasses (Yonzon 2004).

Since irrigation facilities are available to the residents, farmers depend upon rainwater. Much of the area lacks a reliable means of transportation, making it extremely difficult to reach the market, schools and hospitals, especially during the rainy season. Maoists insurgents have promised to return the reserve land to the local inhabitants, thus underscoring their appeal to the beleaguered residents. However, a study conducted by IUCN (2005) offers some grounds for optimism: if government adopts a pro-poor approach to conservation – reconciling ecological limits of the wetland with sustainable development practices and integrating the local community into wetland management – they might win back the support of the people. The rapid increase of population and the constraint of the resources as well as its uneven distribution has been major source of conflict in Nepal. As long as it remains, there is

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<sup>1</sup> The Convention on Wetlands, signed in Ramsar, Iran, in 1971, is an intergovernmental treaty that provides a framework for national action and international cooperation for the conservation and use of wetlands and their resources.

no way that other solutions that mitigate the increasing conflictual environment in rural and urban Nepal (Oli, 2003).

### **6.6.1 Maoists armed conflicts and environment**

The last ten years (1996 – 2006) armed conflicts and the post conflicts activities of Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) has had serious effects on environment in Nepal. The conflict has multi-dimensional effects in destruction of environment. It not only destroyed resources such as forest, forced people for displacement but also damaged country's rural and urban infrastructures such as destruction of the government's district and village level offices, health posts, schools buildings, breakdown of the bridges, telephone towers, offices of the security agencies, forest guards, national parks etc. Due to the breakdown of the security system the poaching and other illegal activities of endangered species were increased. Based on a field review commissioned by the World Conservation Union (IUCN), the Nepal Forum of Environmental Journalists did a selected review of some areas of the conflict's impact on the environment (IUCN 2004). The review identified several points of impact.

- i) *Deforestation is widespread and different sides blame each other. It should be noted that deforestation is not unique to the conflict. It has been an ongoing part of Nepali society. What part of the deforestation can be attributed to the conflict is difficult to ascertain.*
- ii) *Setting forest on fire has many impacts on wildlife. Again, this is not unique to the conflict and it is difficult to know what type of wildlife has been affected and how.*
- iii) *Poaching of wildlife has increased substantially. This is highly plausible with the reduction in security in the national parks. While the Maoists may not be poaching directly, they many be involving traditional poachers and benefiting from the trade, but there is no hard evidence.*
- iv) *Impact on drinking water supply either because of increased demand or because damage to water supply systems has been reported by the local news papers in a number of areas.*

- v) *There has been significant displacement of households due to the difficulties of meeting different demands of the Maoists.*
- vi) *There is an inability to access forest products because of fear of the Maoists who camp in the forest areas.*

In 2004, another report (Murphy et al 2004) came out about the impacts of conflict in environmental front and it identified following impacts:

- i) *Destruction of park infrastructure in almost all the national parks, making these unusable. This has been reported by others (American Embassy 2005) when as many as 54 endangered one-horned rhinos were killed in two national parks but mostly in Chitawan National Park. The absence of protection in national parks is seen as the major reason behind this. In 2003, 50 people concerned with poaching were arrested. During 2003 the officials also made a big catch of 32 tigers skins, 579 leopard skin, 660 otter skins. Authorities have caught people with shatoosh skins. The origins of these materials are not yet established but it is widely speculated that Nepal has become a favourite spot for illegal trade in wildlife parts (Asia Rainforest Conservation News and Information 2000, World Environment Journalist Egroup 2002), and the reduced surveillance in this area could have motivated poachers and others to take advantage of the prevailing situation in Nepal.*
- ii) *Organisations working in conservation have had their work adversely affected either because of direct threats or because of the prevailing insecurity in rural areas. Many organisations have relocated their staffs to the district headquarters or to Kathmandu.*
- iii) *Encroachment of park land has also been mentioned.*

According Hakahaki, the Nepali language environment journal, having reassigned security forces to conflict areas, the national parks are now more vulnerable to poachers, encroachers, and other who value the different resources of the parks. In some areas the security forces have reportedly cleared forests that were hiding grounds for Maoists (Hakahaki 2003). Many writers both from within and outside

Nepal have identified the deteriorating physical environment as a major factor for the insurrection. There is a strong ethnic dimension to this conflict and that ethnic groups are concentrated in relatively difficult environments (Sharma et al, 2000). Murshed and Gates (2003) point out that horizontal inequality across the regions of Nepal is a major factor behind the conflict. Bhurtel and Ali (2003) argue that the deteriorating environment with its combinations of factors such as fragile mountains, deforestation, soil erosion, factors of exclusion, discrimination, marginalization, and disempowerment of ethnic minorities produced a violent eruption that has now lasted for more than a decade.

### **6.6.2 The Maoists conflict and National Parks protection**

During the time of Maoists conflicts, there were direct confrontations between National Parks authorities and the Maoists. The Maoists took the Park security as one of the major hurdles to use shelter inside the Jungle during the guerilla movement. Then they began to attack the park security infrastructures as well as staffs. This had had serious negative implications to the protection of the National Parks during the period (Oli, 2006).

The first attack in the conservation related sector was in December 2000 when insurgents destroyed the Chescan Sector Office of the Makalu Barun National Park. Since then, the insurgents have destroyed 25 guard posts, 7 range posts, 3 sector offices, and one headquarter. Among the 14 protected areas that are directly managed by the government, the Royal Shuklaphanta Wildlife Reserve has been the worst hit and damaged where 5 guard posts, 3 range posts were burned. Likewise, in Chitawan National Park, 6 guard posts, 1 sector office and a staff quarter were set on fire, where as in Bardiya National Park, 6 guard posts were destroyed. In Shey Phoksundo National Park, all the 5 houses and its headquarters were destroyed. Several motorbikes were destroyed and many vehicles were attacked and damaged (Bhujju 2005). During the conflict, insurgents occupied two headquarters of the protected areas, Seduwa of MABNP and Dhorpatan of Dhorpatan Hunting Reserve. Both the protected areas are managed by the government under the civil administration (Yonzon 2004).

According to a report, the insurgents' increasing attacks in the protected zones resulted in human casualties. The first such casualty was on 16 March 2004 when 2 government staffs and 9 civilians were killed in a landmine in Royal Shuklaphanta Wildlife Reserve. Likewise, on 22 November 2003, 2 rangers and 1 security guard and 1 driver were killed in a landmine in the Parsa Wildlife Reserve (DNPWC, 2004). Apart from these, the insurgents involved in harassing park staffs, abductions, beating and forcing to pay regularly etc.

Due to the increasing such incidents of destruction of physical infrastructures and human casualties, the protected areas management authorities started merging the affected guard posts and the sector offices with the respective headquarters. Following the increasing attacks from the insurgents, the park personnel abandoned their field offices, including the headquarters and moved to the district headquarters to carry out their administrative works (Rana, 2003).

It is reported that by 2005, out of 112 armed posts in the protected areas, only 34 remained in their original locations, which means that there had been 70 percent reduction of manpower at the sites. In November 2001, the government had decided to handover the parks' security to the Royal Nepal Army and it had concentrated its men in creating posts and coordination mechanism among the different groups (Sigdel, 2003).

### **6.6.3 Implications of the conflicts**

With the destruction of the field posts and other infrastructures by the Maoists, regular patrolling in the protected areas has been confined to the accessible areas. The lapse of security had contributed for the poaching and other illegal activities. Even after RNA's took over the security of the parks, naturally their focus was more on to protect the encroachment from outside not on promotion and protection of the biodiversity conservation. The insecurity had caused the field personnel abandoned the field visits and also involve in day to day activities. The overall impacts of the conflict had been negative in terms of securing the environment and biodiversity of



the parks. Hence, the endangered species became more vulnerable to poaching and other illegal activities (Sigdel, 2003).

***Security in the Parks:*** The parks itself are a benchmark conservation area, embodying Nepal's significant wildlife, forestry and natural resources. The government declared it a conservation area to safeguard the wildlife, forestry and its ecology. However, this intention alone is not enough to conserve the parks. It is vital to recognize that the people in the vicinity of the park are the prime stakeholders for the protection of the park. Unless the support of the locals is guaranteed; and their reliance on the park's resources recognized, then it is certain that deforestation, pasturing, poaching and illegal ferrying of valuable herbs will continue. Outsiders cannot interfere with the parks without the support of the local residents. The government should initiate necessary provisions for the protection of the park and infrastructure development for its residents. If the government action is feeble, it will be the parks that will suffer, as mounting negative practices will be uncontrollable (Yonzon, 2004).

***Increasing Maoists activities:*** The Maoists declared their war on 13 February 1996 which was begun from the rural areas in the western and central regions of few districts. The military assaults in the remote rural areas had affected the protected parks too. The Maoists started their attacks to the parks security guards most of the parks in Nepal. Due to the mounting attack by the insurgents, the army personnel themselves became quite defensive. As the Chief of the Nepalese Army Kalidatta Division, Yam Bahadur Karki said, "We are not able to patrol every part of the park daily and patrols are not conducted at night." He accepted that there were lack of security after the abandonment of the posts. Likewise, the forest guards could also only patrol within a range of few kilometers from the head offices. As the Executive Warden of Rara National Park explained, "Security cannot be provided without the assistance of the army, if the present situations continue, the wildlife will soon become extinct. The forests guards are without any assignments, as they cannot patrol the parks" (Shakya and Chitrakar 2006). Due to the increasing threats, many parks positions became vacant and Maoists threats prevented them filling the positions.

During the period of 2002 and 2003, there were 368 persons were arrested for various offences, including poaching from six National Parks. During this period six poachers

were killed (DNPWC 2003). The incidents of poaching and other illegal activities were sharply increased during the conflicts this could also been measured through the killed species as well as number of people who were arrested during the period.

***Impact on tourism:*** Though, the Maoists did not attack directly any tourists during their 10 years armed conflicts, however, harassments and extortions became common even with the tourists. In many places, they did not allow tourists to visit. Similarly, the tourists themselves had also abandoned in visiting the parks areas due to the security threats. Such practices significantly decreased the tourists flow in the park areas. To reach many park areas, the tourists had to pass areas which were under Maoists control and they forced them either money to pay them or asked them not to proceed further. Such incidents were rampant and many tourists felt not to visit the areas. The long trek through the jungle is also a matter of serious concern for tourists. On the other hand, the successive governments were not able to provide any security to the tourists (Oli, 2006).

***Wildlife poaching:*** During the armed conflicts, wildlife poaching had been significantly increased. Though, the villagers' guns were taken away by the Maoists, but they were still capable of snaring the musk deer and ghoral. Wildlife snaring is the primary source of income for the people of the villages adjacent to the parks. Large numbers of ghoral, musk deer were hunted annually. Likewise, wild boar, danphe, kaliz, dove and patridge are killed for their meat. Particularly, since 2000/01 hunting of wildlife had been escalated and many species became extinction. Before start of conflict, the locals would hunt the wild life when it ventured outside the park boundaries, but now they hunt inside the parks. According to a park warden, "When the posts wee deployed in every corner of the park, nobody performed such activities. Now they are hunting at will. We cannot do anything to stop them." He further elucidated that Maoists are not restricting poaching. (Ibid)

***Illegal logging and encroachment:*** The illegal logging as well as encroachment in the park area had also been increased. Due to the abandonment of the forests guards and the officers, the villagers began to enter the park areas and do logging as well as encroached the land previously belong to the parks boundaries. Such activities not only one or two parks, but in all the 16 National parks increased. The increment of

deforestation, the villagers also started to cultivate the deforested land. The parks administrations were unaware about the degree of deforestation. Because on the one hand they could not do the regular patrolling and prevent it, on the other hand they even could gather the information due to the mounting security risks in the areas (WCN, 2005b).

As one of the park officers said, “Because we are confined into the headquarters, we can only know the illegal logging, poaching and other activities surrounding areas, but we do not know what are the situation in the whole parks” (Ibid). According to Bardia’s statistics 20 tigers (8 males, 2 females and 10 unidentified) had been killed since 1988. Four rhinos and tiger poachers were standing trial for their crimes. In 2005, several poachers and illegal loggers were apprehended. The conflict had crippled the monitoring and counting wildlife.

*Disputes between locals and the park:* Another negative impact about the conflict was to the local people. There are all together 1.6 million people who are dependent on 16 protected areas. Due to the increasing conflicts, their accessibility has been restricted to the park areas. They were not allowed to cut grass, their cattle’s were restricted to enter parks areas and collection of driftwood from the rivers and park areas were also become impossible. The number of tourists visiting these parks was also gone down. This had severely affected the livelihood of the people since they have lost employment as well as immediate markets for their agro-products. With this situation, the local people opted for alternatives which were more destructives in term of preserving bio-diversity in the park areas. The local people began to encroach marginal lands and also some areas involved in poaching and other activities which were not conducive for the parks protection (WCN, 2005a).

As one example cited by Sakya and Chitrakar of Chitawan National Park mentioned that, for decades the 60,000 strong local population of the Madi Vallye have been living without electricity. During 1996 the foundations were laid for electricity, both electricity poles and wires wee established. However, 10 years later, electricity has still not been connected. A concrete bridge was built over the Rapti River but still public transportation is not able to operate without restriction. Even at a distance of 10 km from the park, the place is devoid of transportation and electricity (Ibid).

Residents of Madi complain that they were deprived of electricity and other facilities despite being guardians of the southern border of the park (WCN, 2005a).

Khanal of Kalyanpur is in anguish as he feels that the park is cheating them. According to him, the residents of Madi may step down from their conservation responsibilities. He blames the park administration for the embargo on constructing a bridge over the Riu River and for the lack of electricity despite the extension of cables. If current conditions prevail, the people of Madi will continue remain isolated from vital infrastructure such as electricity and transportation. However, Chief Conservation Officer, Shiva Raj Bhatta simply disagrees with that notion. He said that means of transportation cannot be operated through the park nor can the electric current flow through the naked wires. The residents still have access to the park, but no form of transportation (Yonzon, 2004).

Residents of Madi Valley in Chitawan are not the only residents embroiled in conflict with the park administration. Many other parks since its establishment and creation of buffer zones such controversies have been engulfed each and every park areas. The parks distribute 50% of its income to facilitate conservation and development programs run by locals who reside within the 730 sq km of park's periphery. The parks administrations believe that the locals should co-operate in conservation, which is their responsibility if they chose to live within the park. However, the local residents accuse the park administration of failing to undertake development work despite their responsibilities (Sigdel, 2003).

### **6.7. Conflicts related to agricultural land**

The dominant economy of Nepal has been agriculture where over 80% of the people still rely on it for their livelihood. However, the pattern of landholding in Nepal has been uneven for a long period of time. As described by Yadav and Aryal that there are huge land hunger in the country and the poor are forced to squeeze onto a small and marginal landholdings which hardly support for a few months of the year (Yadav 1999, Aryal and Awasthi 2003). Likewise, large number of tenants who have been out of land and mostly employed half-a year. Another factor is the decrease of the average

size of landholding. All these factors that are the major factors that create conflicts in the rural Nepal.

Due to increasing prices of seeds, chemical fertilizers and government's abandonment of providing subsidies in those areas have forced the small farmers to abandon their own farming and became agriculture labourers which is still one of the most unorganised and uninstitutionalised sectors. There is no fixed wages as well as fixed working hours in this sector. Furthermore, they are the most vulnerable but largest workers in Nepal. This has become another reason for the conflict in the rural areas. Likewise the large increase of institutional credit to the agricultural sector has also not helped the poor who are still unable to access it (Bhattarai and Pradhan 2004). This has become another factor to contribute to increasing pressure and conflicts regarding all the important natural resources of Nepal (Ibid).

Another factor is the rapidly increasing population which has also played an important role for the increase in various forms of conflict. The past development efforts that were pursued by the successive regimes were not succeeded in diversifying the economic base of the country to the extent necessary for its rising population. Though, large areas of forest land were converted into the agriculture land after the eradication of malaria in the plain Terai in 1960s and 70s, it still did not resolve the increasing demand of agriculture land due to the increase population and uneven distribution of land. The rapidly increasing population has played an important role in this scenario. Nepal's geography, with its very distinct ecological belts and the fragility of the hill and the mountain areas has also contributed to the increase in competition and conflicts. Prior to the eradication of malaria, which was endemic to large parts of plains, the lowlands of Nepal were sparsely populated. Most of the population lived in the climatically more favourable and less disease-ridden hills, where many struggled to eke out a survival often supplemented by seasonal migration to India (Agrawal & et al, 2005).

The issue of land distribution by implementing a comprehensive land reform is a common agenda of all the major political forces in Nepal including the authoritarian Panchayat regime. But as in the past, despite strong rhetoric, actual achievement has been minimal. The opening of the Terai plain after malaria eradication was a

politically unstable period. The land encroachers in the Terai were also not the real landless peasants. In fact, most of them were the big landholders in the hills who went there and occupied the large portion of land. Due to the political instability, the land distribution system was not introduced. Groups of illegal settlers, insecure tenants and interestingly enough 'political sufferers' actively pressed their claims to land ownership. Depending on who was in power, decisions favoured one group and angered others, resulting in many demonstrations and clashes, some of which were violent (Ghimire 1992).

Another major conflict related with land is about bonded labourers (*Kamaiyas*) in southern part of far Western Nepal. In July 2000, the government of Nepal declared the Kamaiya system illegal and freed the labourers of the Tharus living in the Terai and inner Terai districts of far Western and mid Western Nepal (Global IDP 2004) an area that has been the scene of many forest and settlement related conflicts in the past. 'The Kamaiyas have since grabbed more than 10,000 acres of government forest land against the state's failure to rehabilitate them, more than four years after their release' (Global IDP 2004). Delays in providing land were caused by a conflict between the Ministry of Forest and Soil Conservation and Ministry of Land Reform (Ibid).

An estimate (IDS 1985) puts the number of landless families in Nepal at one million, with most of these belonging to low caste and indigenous groups in the Terai, displaced people from the hills and even some labour migrants from India. "In terms of property rights and entitlements to productive assets and natural resources, the farmers of Nepal have limited access to such resources. Land and land based resources have served as the principal source of economic surplus generated by the ruling class. Concentration of land and exploitation of the peasantry through excessive expropriation of labour and land revenue has increased the wretched condition of peasantry (SEEEPOR 2000). Unless these problems are addressed comprehensively, conflict in the agriculture area particularly land grabbing, illegal settlers, eviction of people occupying forest areas, and issues of resettlement and displacement could easily become an inseparable part of the violent movement going on in the country (Oli, 2006).

### 6.7.1 Flood Hazard in Nepal

Each year Nepal faces destructive floods often triggered by rapid melting of snow and ice in the high mountain regions, outburst of the Glacier lakes in High Himalayas, torrential rainfall, landslides and debris flow dams in the rugged mountain regions, and infrastructures and their failures. The list below is the destructive floods that Nepal experienced in the past few decades and its causes. Following are the types and number of flood events occurred in the country.

**Table VI.V**  
**Destructive Floods in Nepal**

<b>Types of flood</b>	<b>No. of events</b>	<b>Year and names of the River</b>
Extreme weather event	4	Lele in 1981; Kulekhani in 1993; Larcha in 1996, and Syangja and Butwal in 1998
Outburst of landslide dams	11	Budhigandaki in 1967 and 68; Tinau in 1970; Phalangku in 1971; Banglung in 1976; Balephi in 1982; Trishuli in 1985; Tadi in 1986; Sunkoshi in 1987; Myagdi in 1988; Tarukhola (Bajhang) in 1989
Outburst of glacial lake	16	Taraco (Sunkoshi) in 1935; Gelhaipoci (Arun) in 1964; Longda (Trishuli) in 1964; ZhangZangbo (Sunkoshi) in 1964; Ayico (Arun) in 1968; Nare Dangka (Dudhkosi) in 1977; Phucan (Tamor) in 1980; Zhangzangbo (Sunkoshi) in 1981; Jinco (Arun) in 1985; Dig Tsho in 1985; Kaligandaki in 1987; Chubung (Tamakosi) in 1991 and Tamapokhari (Inkukhola) in 1998
Infrastructures and its failure	8	Kosi barrage almost every year; River embankment and dam construction near boarder area in Dhanus, Rautahat, Nepalgunj, Bardiya and Kailali almost every year; Irrigation dam (Bagmati) in 1993; Check dams in Rapti; Chitwan in 1990 and 1993; Check dams in Tinau near Butwal in 1970 and 1981

*Source: Thapa, K.B and Khanal, N.R (Icimod 2002)*

As mentioned in Table 6.4, torrential rainfall in Lele in 1981 killed 27 people and swept away 48 houses, 8 shops, and 7 water turbines (Manandhar and Khanal, 1988). In July 1993, Nepal experienced a worst natural disaster in record. Two days of torrential rainfall in central Nepal triggered disastrous landslides, and caused many debris flows and major flooding in main streams and the Terai plains. About 28,000 people in the mountain areas and 42,000 people in the lowlands were affected. About 160 people in the highlands and over 1000 people in the lowlands were killed due to the devastating flood and landslides in Bagmati, Kulekhani and Narayani basins. Infrastructures like Kulekhani hydroelectricity power plant, Bagmati Barrage in the plains, roads, bridges, irrigation canals and check dams were severely damaged.

According to the DPTC and Ministry of Home the rainfall on 19<sup>th</sup> July 1993 at Tistung (Makawanpur District) was recorded 540 mm with maximum intensity of 70 mm per hour and recurrence interval of less than 100 years. Such high intensity precipitation occurred over 530 sq km in the vicinity. On 20<sup>th</sup> July rainfall of 483 mm was recorded at Hariharपुरी Garhi (Sindhuli District). About 500 to 800 sq km of the central portion of Bagmati watershed received such high intensity precipitation (Dhital et al 1993). In 1998 in Syangja high intensity rainfall caused catastrophic flood with levels reaching up to 6.2 m and scouring of channels width from 10 m to 120 m. This had killed 55 people and destroyed 640 houses. The loss was estimated to be 336 million rupees. In the same year debris fell in Butwal and destroyed 98 houses along with arable lands amounting to 58 million rupees (Khanal N.R. 1999).

One of the major reasons for flood hazard in Nepal caused due to the outburst of the glacier lakes. As most of Nepal's rivers sources are the glacier lakes in Tibetan valleys, due to the increasing temperatures and outburst of these lakes caused severe damaged in the lower levels. In 1998 in Koshi, abrupt discharge of large volume of water with debris from glacier lakes causes glacier lake outburst floods in the valley downstream. Retreat of glaciers in this century resulted many glacier lakes in the Himalayas outburst. There are about 159 glacier lakes in Koshi basin alone (Khanal 1998).

In Arun Valley basin in Tibet, around 229 glacier lakes have been identified out of which 24 are potentially dangerous and among these nine are located in Nepal



(Manandhar and Khanal, 1988). According to one report, since 1935 more than 16 glacier lake outbursts flood (GLOF) had been reported which either occurred or extended into Nepal. Out of these, a few disastrous events occurred in Nepal. Outburst of Zhangzangbo Lake in 1981 killed 4 people and damaged Friendship Bridge in northern border, 7 other bridges, hydropower plant, Arniko Highway and 51 houses. The damage was estimated to be 3 million U.S. dollars. In 1985 outburst of Dig Tsho lake due to a large avalanche destroyed the hydroelectricity project, 14 bridges, 30 houses and arable lands. Damages amounted to 4 million US dollar. In September 1998, the outburst of Tam Pokhari in Solukhumbu District killed 2 people, destroyed more than 6 bridges and washed away heavy properties (Bajracharya & Mool, 2006).

The outburst of landslide dams is another common phenomenon that causes disastrous flood. According to Disastrous Prevention and Management Department of Ministry of Home Affairs in 1982 outburst of landslide dam in Balehi Khola swept away 97 people, and 15 houses. In 1986 Tadi river swept away 31 people, 173 animals, 24 houses and 4 bridges. Similarly in 1987 Sun Koshi damaged 2 gates of Sun Koshi hydropower dam, Arniko Highway, 229 houses and swept away 98 people and 309 animals (DPMD, MoHA 2004). High water level observed after 19 hours in the Koshi barrage near Indo-Nepal border in September 2000. The river reverted to its original discharge only after 3 days (Dwivedi, K. 2000). In 1999, Kali Gandaki was also affected by such event submerging houses and arable lands. One person was killed and 10 houses were destroyed. Loss of 5 million rupees was estimated. Flood due to melting snow and rice are rare in high mountain. However, the melt water can trigger avalanches and landslides that can cause temporary dams across rivers. Such event has occurred in 2000 in East Tibet, causing devastating floods in India (Jhu and Li, 2000).

The floods triggered by failure and construction of infrastructures are also becoming common. Barrages, ring dams and embankments constructed in the Terai regions near Indo-Nepal border have affected hundreds of families. In 1990, a failure of check dam in Rapti river in Chitwan swept away 26 people and 880 houses. In 1981, 41 people, 120 houses, 2 mills, 1 bridge and roads were swept away by Tinau river in Butwal due to failure of the embankment constructed after the flood of 1970. With statistics of past events it is observed that water induced disasters occur every year in small or

large scale in some areas of the country. In July 1993, Nepal experienced the worst recorded natural disaster in history due to two days of torrential rainfall in central Nepal (Ibid).

Losses from floods and landslides occur almost every year. Average annual losses from different types of environmental disasters from 1983 to 2000 in Nepal are presented in table 6.5.

**Table VI.VI**  
**Average Annual loss of life and properties**  
**from different types of disasters in Nepal (1983-2000)**

Type of disaster	Number of death	Number of families affected	Number of livestock killed	Number of houses damaged	Loss of agriculture land (ha)	Loss of properties (in million Rs )
Fire	61	4010	771	3323	0.0	205
Epidemics	656	1166	16	0	0.0	0.0
Earthquake	40	3799	784	5898	0.0	634.7
Flood, landslide and avalanche	330	32828	2371	7143	5712.6	748.9
Hailstorm, windstorm and thunderbolt	40	6012	127	980	0.0	157.9
Total	1127	47814	4069	17344	5712.6	1746.4

*Source: DPTC, and MoH*

About 6000 people have been reported killed and loss of properties worth about 13,500 million rupees. Nearly 29% of the total annual death of people and 43% of the total loss of properties from different types of disaster in Nepal had been caused by floods, landslides and avalanches during that period. Further more, on an average more than 23,00 lives stocks and more than 6,700 houses and 4,760 hectares of arable lands have been damaged by floods, landslides and avalanches between 1983 and

2000. Total loss of properties was estimated, ranged from 21.2 to 4,904 million rupees with an average of 749 million rupees per year. Nearly a four percent of the total gross domestic product at factors cost in 1997/98 was lost from water-induced disasters. Though there is a high fluctuation in losses, after 1993 these are quite substantial.

### **6.7.2 Impact of Koshi's devastation**

The Koshi River breached on the nose of spur 12.90 and 12.10 on the eastern embankment, 12 km north of the barrage near midnight on August 18, 2008. Immediately, five Village Development Committees (VDCs) — West Kushaha, Haripur, Sripur, Laukahi, and Bokraha of Sunsari District — of Nepal and 14 Districts in Bihar, India were inundated by severe flooding. About a dozen people were killed in Nepal and 42 in India as of now. There are several reports that many more are missing (Nepal News 2008). In the initial days, displaced persons were compelled to drink unsafe (Koshi flooded) water which resulted in 20 deaths due to cholera and other water borne illnesses. Many people have suffered eye disorders such as conjunctivitis. Children are suffering from pneumonia. About 60,000 inhabitants in 10,530 families of Sunsari district have been evacuated, whereas one million have been in Bihar. Koshi is also called Sapta Koshi – which includes seven major tributaries (Sun Koshi, Tama Koshi, Dudh Koshi, Indrawati, Likhu, Arun and Tamor) and 125 small tributaries in Nepal.

The full loss of lives, cattle and property is not yet known, but billions worth of property has already been spoiled. Most temporary homes along with their domestic animals have been washed away, whereas permanent homes are still inundated. The near complete discharge of the Koshi river is now flowing from the eastern collapsed embankment, changing from its earlier course through the barrage. The Koshi flood disaster swamped Nepal's breadbasket and disconnected the fundamental East-West Highway. The farmers of the Eastern Tarai, who provide rice and vegetables to other parts of the country, have been cut off. Food insecurity will likely ensue. The flooding also swept away underground optical fiber, resulting in intermittent telecommunications.

The 300 meter length of the August 18 breach has widened through erosion to over 2 km. There is still fear that the fragile embankment will break in more places. A Standing crop of 22,000 hectares (worth approx. US \$4 million) has been damaged by flood in Nepal, whereas 250,000 ha of crops were affected in Bihar (Nepal 2008). Flooding caused a blackout of the entire region and about 40,000 labors are without work. The governments of Nepal and India are now in a dilemma as to how to work with a river that has changed its course. The Koshi barrage and embankment was constructed by the Indian Government after the Koshi Treaty was signed between acting Prime Minister Gulzari Lal Nanda and Nepal's Bir Shumeshwar on April 25, 1954 during the premiership of Matrika Prasad Koirala in Nepal and Jawaharlal Nehru in India. King Mahendra inaugurated it five years later on April 30, 1959. The barrage's estimated lifespan of 30-years expired in 1986. The Proposed 269 m high dam near Chatara (45 km north from the Koshi barrage) is another ambitious project which is intended to generate 3,000 MW of hydro power (ICIMOD 2008).

Eight major floods occurred during the 55 years of Koshi treaty. Among them, western embankment Dabala in Nepal (1863) and eastern embankment, Joginia, Nepal (1991) including the eastern embankment, west Kushaha in Nepal in 2008. Remaining 5-breached were western embankment, Jamalpur, Darbhanga (1968); eastern embankment, Matania, Bihar (1971), eastern embankment, Hempur, Bihar (1984), and Gandoul and Samani, Bihar (1987) in India (Wiseearth).

***Koshi flood and its implications on Nepal-India relations:*** “Koshi is a sorrow of Bihar” it is a common say about Koshi river in Inida’s Bihar state particularly in the north-east Bihar. As each summer not only Nepali land but also northern Bihar’s land is inundated by the flood in Koshi river. On the one hand it brings destruction of huge areas of arable land like in 2008, but also generates fuss in Nepal-India’s bilateral relations. The devastation always generates blame games between two countries political leaderships. Like in the past, in 2008, also the State Government of Bihar pressurized Union Government in New Delhi to take immediate steps to curb such a flood again in future by taking initiative to build dams in Nepali side. Koshi dam was the first such dam that was agreed between Nepal and India after establishment of democratic regime in 1954 with an Independent India.

However, this dam had generated controversies in Nepal in sharing water resources between Nepal and India. The Koshi Dam agreement has been regarded as discriminatory which only serves India's interest in terms of utilization of water and to some extent controlling floods in the area. It is widely perceived in Nepal that due to the bad precedent that was established by Koshi and Gandaki (in 1959) agreements, both countries have not been able to effectively agree on other agreements since then. The issue such as floods, inundation and other environment related issues has become more important between Nepal and India than any time before. Dealing issues related with environment and climate change are the new issues in two country's relations and posing newer threats particularly on Nepal.

### **6.8 Government's efforts towards disaster management**

In the context of Nepal, before the advent of Natural Calamity (Relief) Act 1982 A.D. there was no well-structured disaster policy. Prior to 1982 A.D. relief and rescue work was carried out either on the basis of power base or as the ad hoc basis mainly as social work. Thus realizing the need one act, 1982 A.D. was formulated which has already been amended twice in 1989 A.D. and 1992 A.D. However, National disaster relief regulation could not yet be formulated which is very essential, due to which the act could not be fully effective. Duties and responsibilities of various other disaster management agencies have to be reflected in Natural Calamity (Relief) Act, as each and everything could not be stipulated in the act. Natural Calamity (Relief) Act 1982 does not describe the duties and responsibilities of all the disaster management related agencies other than the Ministry of Home Affairs. Furthermore, the provision of the relief and treatment committee, supply, shelter and rehabilitation sub-committee, Regional natural disaster relief committee and local disaster relief committees have been made but they could not be active enough. They are like a doormat agencies. Therefore, all the four committees should be made active. At present only central natural disaster relief committee and district disaster relief committee are very active.

At this juncture, a concrete, effective and practicable disaster management law is utmost importance. Political commitment and pragmatic policy formulation are of great importance in the context of Nepal. However, National disaster relief regulation could not yet be formulated, which is very essential, due to which the relief act could

not be fully effective. Duties and responsibilities of various other disaster management agencies have to be reflected in Natural Calamity (Relief) Act, as each and everything could not be stipulated in the act. Natural Calamity (Relief) Act 1982 does not describe the duties and responsibilities of all the disaster management related agencies other than the Ministry of Home Affairs.

### **6.8.1 Lessons from the disaster in Nepal**

From the past events, it is concluded that to save lives and properties particularly from the floods, warning stations are most essential. If there were warning systems to forecast the lead time for anticipated floods in the regions downstream perhaps technicians at the barrage as well as people downstream would have been more prepared for the flood. Monitoring watershed conditions and identifying potential hazard areas are very essential. Installation of warning system is very essential to reduce loss of lives and properties. Usually, it takes five to seven hours for the floods to hit many settlements area after the commencement of torrential rain the pockets in the upper reaches. The incredible amount and the size of uprooted trees and boulders will have to be considered while designing the infrastructures. Thus, protection and mitigation measures, quick warning systems for flood forecasting and safe areas to escape from such disaster prone areas are some aspects to be considered. Up to now not much has been achieved in these areas due to the financial and technical constraints.

## **6.9 Water Resources**

Nepal has more than 6000 rivers and streams. The sources of water are glaciers, rivers, rainfall, lakes, ponds, and groundwater. Among them, rivers are the most reliable and largest source. There are 6000 rivers in the country with an estimated total length of 45,000 km (DHM 1998). All large rivers are fed by snowmelt from the Himalayas and hence they are a renewable water resource. The country has 660 lakes of more than 1 ha. About 75% of the total annual rainfall (average 1,700 mm) falls during the summer monsoon season (June-September) during which major agricultural activities take place.

Surface water is the major source of drinking water in Nepal (WECS 2004). The major rivers of Nepal are the Koshi, the Gandaki, the Karnali, and the Mahakali, all of which originate in the Himalayas. The Babai, Bagmati, Kamala, Kankai, and West Rapti are medium-sized rivers originating from the Mahabharat range. The innumerable southern rivers originating from the Siwalik hill range are shallow and mostly dry up during the dry seasons. They often swell and overflow due to monsoon rains, destroying land and lives. Every year, flooding affects the Siwalik land including the forests. A study by the World Conservation Union (IUCN 2000) indicates that due to forest degradation, surface runoff rates have increased in areas exposed to intense weathering, and percolation rates have decreased. The Siwalik water areas are now impoverished and water recharge into the soil has been reduced. During the rainy season, the heavy rainfall couple with the soft rock results in maximum sediment loads to rivers and streams. A decline in the level of the groundwater table has been reported, and desertification has begun in the Terai due to deforestation in the Siwalik range. In the Siwalik area of eastern Nepal, forest coverage declined by nearly 13% between 1979 and 1999, and 68 ha of land was damaged as a result of landslides (Ibid).

According to the DHM report, the country has about 224 km<sup>3</sup> of annual renewal water, and the annual per capita water supply in 2001 was 9,600 m<sup>3</sup> down from 11,000 m<sup>3</sup> in 1995 (DHM 2001). In 1995, the total annual withdrawal of water for consumptive uses (domestic, agriculture, and industry) was 14 km<sup>3</sup> and per capita annual withdrawal of water was 690 m<sup>3</sup>. Although the total annual withdrawal of water increased in 2001, most of the increase went to agriculture, while the percentage used for domestic purposes decreased (UNEP 2001).

Current annual withdrawal of groundwater is about 0.756 cubic km for irrigation and 0.297 cubic km for domestic uses (WECS 2004). Groundwater is the best alternative source of water supply, particularly in the Terai region and Kathmandu Valley. The total ground water potential of the country is 12 cubic km, of which 5.8 to 11.5 cubic km can be extracted annually without any adverse effects. However, the level of ground water in Kathmandu is already dropping due to overexploitation. The Bhabar zone with dense forest cover a contiguous area of the Terai, is the recharge area for the Terai's groundwater. In addition to these uses, river water is also used for

generating hydropower. The country has 83,000 megawatts of potential hydropower generation, of which 42,000 megawatts are economically viable.

### **6.9.1 Conflicts related with Water Resources**

Nepal has been known as a second largest after Brazil in the world in terms of hydropower production potentiality, however, because of lack of proper management of hydel resources over 80% people live without access to the electricity and more than 75% of farmers have to rely on seasonal rainfall to farm their fields. Most of the people are the subsistence farmers and they have to rely on seasonal crops. Even such a very low level of harnessing water resources, however, the water related conflicts in the country has been increasing. The increasing demand and supply has not been smooth (Bailat 2004).

Conflicts have been identified at the local level regarding water rights and sharing of water between different user groups. Another major problem is the scarcity of drinking water in the urban areas. Likewise, the issue of water pollution, and rural-urban water linkages are sources of conflict. At the national level mega water projects have created much tension and conflict (Dixit 1994). Nepal is a country with substantial water resources and huge potential for developing them. While all agree about the untapped potential, there is increasing controversy about future development (Gyawali 1994; Dixit 1994). The position favored by the Government and private-sector developers is that large-scale projects offer multiple opportunities for flood control, irrigation development, and hydropower development. Many of these benefits accrue to downstream areas and urban centers, along with possibilities for export.

According to Dixit et al, global experience on dams and development has concluded that past projects have not been as economically, socially or environmentally sound as they were originally made out to be (Dixit et al 2005). In the mountain areas such as Nepal, large-scale projects and dams have (i) high unit costs, (ii) directly and indirectly displaced huge numbers of people (iii) have experienced high levels of sedimentation and large-scale dams in mountains may be risky because high seismic



activity, and (iv) have very often neglected to help the people in the project area itself (Bandhopadhyaya and Gyawali 1994). Furthermore, Paranjapaye states that in the case of Arun III project, “a juggernaut that will inevitably distort, undermine and prevent the process of planning and decision making.” Water projects used to be considered simple and straightforward engineering decisions. Today water projects are being screened carefully for their economic, social and environmental effects. Even those affected people who had been silent spectators in the past are taking leading roles in asserting their rights in project decision making and management, advocating for adequate compensations if affected adversely (Baskota 2003).

There are strong logic against the big dams, but that mode remains its advocates and on a case by case basis large dams may be warranted sometimes. The issues of scale are clearly relative based on what a country can afford and what is realistic in terms of socioeconomic and environmental conditions (Dixit and et al 2005).

### **6.9.2 Water problems in rural Nepal**

For the rural people, to sustain their farming, they need water and it is related with their land holdings. Within the landholding groups in the rural areas, water rights are not static and are changing due to various circumstances. The increasing fragmentation of landholding due to the increment of the populations, the distribution of water in the rural areas has also become quite complex. Another reason for increasing water demand is due to shifting nature of cultivation where farmer used to produce single cropping in a year now they have moved into multiple-cropping. So, they need more water. Now a day, conflicts among different groups are also quite common. Religious laws with their implies rules of cleanliness and untouchability regarding water, and resulting exclusion have created much difficulty for lower caste group and untouchable groups (Pradhan et al 2000).

Differences over water use, regulation, its transport, and landless between rich and poor farmers, and sometimes also between the community and the state are quite common. Although, local water user group have been an important innovation for managing local water resources, they are not free of conflicts. There are important

question of equity between members who have different status and resources. While benefits from the use of water are proportional to landholdings, cost and other contributions are generally equal among members. Even when smaller holders object to this, these systems are not easily altered (Martin and Yoder 1987).

Another aspect of conflict is between different water user groups when they share the same source. During peak demand for water, there are inevitable tensions as supply is never adequate. Other sources of tension are changes in cropping patterns and cropping intensity. Political groups have always been very willing to emphasize water issues during elections. Each time the political parties made promises and publish their plans to utilize the water resources. However, in practice, it never significantly materialized. Most of the parties criticized the past agreements like Koshi, Gandaki and Mahakali with India citing that all of those agreements were failed to protect Nepali interests. However, parties also lack proper future plans which could be implemented and helped to effectively utilize water resources for the larger interest of the country.

As of the provision in 1992 Water Resource Act asserts that all water resource belong to the state. Where historically water rights have rested with the community and local sharing rules, and have been modified by the community over time as a response to changing circumstances. It is argued that this is the opposite of what has happened in the land rights, which over time have moved from the state to the individual (Subedi, 1999).

### **6.9.3 Water problems in urban area**

Supplying enough water for daily consumption in the urban centers has become a major challenge to the concerned authority in Nepal. As the demand has steadily been increasing but supply is still not adequate. That led to a number of water-related conflicts have been begun to emerge in the urban centers. There are a number of acute problems relating to adequate and safe supply of water, pollution of existing water bodies, and finding ways to augment present supplies. Kathmandu's experience has been very mixed, and satisfactory solutions are still not in sight (MOPE 2000). The conflict here is more implicit-between rich and poor, present and future generation

urban and rural residents. Richer urban residents may be able to pay a higher price for water but may also succeed in making the nation pay for very costly projects (Shrestha, 2005).

To increase supply as per the demand is the main problem. Second is public drinking water supply has become so unreliable in both quantity and quality that many households have to purchase bottled water for drinking. Rural water sources are being leased to private companies who then sell the water in tankers. What conditions have been maintained for harvesting these water sources is not clear. In most cases, protection of water sources and priority access to local people has not even figured in the calculation except for payment of royalties. For all practical purposes, these public resources are being privatized. Due to the privatization move as well as the unavailability of water, people are getting disappointed with the authority. The successive regimes in the past had given priority to the big projects like Melamchi drinking water supply which is the largest projects funded by various donor agencies including Asian Development Bank. The past governments did not do enough works to look for other alternative source of water (Upreti, R. & et al, 1992).

Another water related problem is the pollution of existing rivers due to increasing population and lack of sanitation system in the urban areas. The water ponds in Kathmandu Valleys which were existed for many centuries in the past provided the basic water needs of the local populations had been turned into garbage collection places. We can find the similar situation of the public stone waterspouts. It were the very important traditional water in the past and now mixed with sewage (Paudel 1996). A significant aspect of water pollution in Kathmandu Valley has been the worsening condition of the Bagmati River, which runs through Kathmandu Valleys and receives a large part of the waste from the two cities Patan and Kathmandu.

To fulfill the growing demand of water in Kathmandu Valley, the Government had initiated a large project called Melamchi project under which water would diverted from Melamchi river through a tunnel under the Shivapuri mountain. However, even before starting construction works, the project has already embroiled into the conflicts (Chintan 2003). Local people complain that the project has adversely affected many areas of livelihood and food security. It does not address the dry-season water needs

of the people, and there are outstanding issues of compensation and resettlement (Dixit, 2000).

Another source that has been used to fulfill the water demand of Kathmandu Valley was using ground water mining. No bodies know about the long-term implications of pumping excessive groundwater in the Valley. Despite this, it has also not been able to meet the demands. On the one hand it requires substantial investment to set up it and the poor people cannot afford for it. On the other hand, the quality of water in different places of Kathmandu Valley is deteriorating and its affects on human health has been serious. Likewise, it is not properly regulated and done quality check. As stated earlier before serious problems occur, the Government must initiate appropriate actions about the above mentioned problems (Bailat, 2004).

The scarcity of water in the urban areas would pose two prongs threats on national security, on the one hand increasingly unavailability of water in the densely populated urban areas would dissatisfy the population and that could lead to urban dissent and sometimes riots which has been experienced in many urban cities in other countries and in a small scales in Nepal too. Like, frequently organized demonstrations particularly during the winter season by the local user groups in Lalitpur, Bhaktapur and Kathmandu could be a flash point for more intense and big protest actions which ultimately disturbed the national security environment.

Another reason that lack of sufficient water means less clean environment and very high possibility of spreading diseases. Particularly, cholera, typhoid and other contagious diseases could be broken out and reached into out of control. In that situation, country would have to bear high costs to save the lives of the people. Similarly, if such diseases go out of proportion, then it would have implications on other areas including education, travels, tourism, trade etc.

### **6.10 Water related controversy between Nepal and India relations**

Utilization of Nepal water resource has been one of the main controversial issues between Nepal and India's relations. The past treaties related with water had established bad precedent and this has also become impediment to agree on further

other treaties between the two countries. The British India government approached Nepal to harness a Mahakali river and in 1920, a Sharada Treaty was signed. It was the first treaty which an example of Nepal's lower riparian neighbor making plans for water resource development on its own and approaching Nepal for the minimum needed for the construction (Gyawali & Dixit, 2001). This is an illustration of the 'pathetic underrating' of Nepal's water resource value. With the independent of India in 1947 and democratization of Nepal in 1950, the development of Nepali and Indian shared rivers became a priority for the modernization and economic development of both countries. The first agreement after the changed of the regimes in both countries that was signed in 1954 to develop the Kosi barrage at the border point in Kosi river.

Likewise, another treaty was signed in 1959 to develop the Gandaki barrage at the border point of Gandak river. Both these agreements have been regarded as unequal and unfavourable to Nepal. In fact, immediate after signing these agreements, it had received criticisms in Nepal. As stated by many writers, these bilateral cooperative ventures provided neither dependable nor adequate supply of water to Nepal or India and have been unable to improve agricultural production (Dixit 1994, Gyawali and Dixit 1994). Another author points out that trust and understanding have been eroded, creating a major impediment to cooperative development (Kumar et al 1994). Both of these treaties have shaped current water relations between two countries and established wrong precedents in Nepal and it has become the main source of controversy in sharing water resources between Nepal and India. In both cases, the projects were designed according to India's benefits, realized through Indian expertise and financed Indian money. These two treaties have generated profound suspicions towards Indian establishments. These feelings have lot to do with the sensitivity of Nepalis people with regards to national sovereignty and resources (Ballot, 2004).

One of the main reasons for controversies on utilisation of water between India and Nepal has been India's unilateral construction of dams in border areas to prevent summer floods and to store water during the dry season has created problems on the Nepalese , side. Every year some dam is controversial; recent cases include the Mahalisagar dyke and the Khurdolotan dyke. During summer both of these have inundated large areas in Nepal (The Himalayan Times 2003).

India's interest basically on utilization of water resources is related with its industrial development and security environment in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Uttarakhand. As Mukund Untawale (1974) explains "India was particularly anxious regarding the possible vulnerability of Northern Indian industrial defense establishments which would have to depend upon power generated in Nepali territories – specially in the context of the perceived threat from China and Nepal's balancing role between India and China".

Likewise, the issue of Mahakali Project which was signed in 1996 in the midst of controversy to generate more than 8000 MW electricity and provide irrigation both Nepal and India, however, it was signed after a long and carefully proceeded negotiation processes still the project has even not been started. This project has generated hot political debate and discussion within Nepal and divided the country and political parties. Today, the Indian side argues that there are still numerous outstanding issues that need to be resolved before the project can move ahead (Gyawali and Dixit, 1999).

Observing the above mentioned situation, it can be argued that water and its utilization issue has been one of the major measurements in assessing Nepal India relations. The past precedents are not supportive to move towards future cooperations between these two countries. Therefore, it is necessary to resolve all those history-left over baggage and time has come to do fresh starting Dixit & et al, 2001).

Nepali perception of having been cheated by India and consistently higher valuation that Nepal places on its water resources have been significant obstacles in the cooperation over water between Nepal and India. As Bailat states that 'Nepal's hydroelectric potential might be huge indeed, but the country has neither the expertise nor the financial expertise to exploit it on its own. Moreover, the hydroelectricity market is distorted in disfavor of Nepal: India is the only buyer possible of Nepal's electricity (Bailat, 2004).

Nepal, as a mountainous country with a beautiful but fragile environment, it is critical that Nepal manages its environment by using its natural resources in a sustainable manner. The prevalence of conflict in all the major natural resource areas suggests that governance has been ineffective and in some areas even harmful, especially when

short-sighted policies and decisions promote wanton destruction of species and natural resources. Not only that the conflict in utilizing the natural resources particularly the forest and water has increasingly becoming source of conflicts both in rural and urban areas.

The most debated question is that whether fresh water is a source of conflict or cooperation. As Homer-Dixon hypothesises that 'conflict is most probable if when downstream riparian is highly dependent on river water is strong in comparison to upstream riparian' (Homer-Dixon, 1994). It could be argued that water relationships between the country often include elements of both cooperation and conflict. Geographical interdependencies, power relations in the river basins and domestic politics lead to particular situation where elements of both cooperation and conflict are tightly intertwined. And also utilization of Nepal's water resources has become an issue that has been shaping and will shape Nepal's future relations with India and to some extent with China. If Nepal and India would be able to negotiate on utilization of water resources of Nepal, this would be a win win situation for both countries. Failure to it would have multiple implications particularly on Nepal as one of the poorest countries in the world and country's abundant water resource is the only natural resources that could be harnessed to initiate much needed economic development of the country.

Due to the past bad precedents and the long conflictual water relationship with India, Nepal has not been able to exploit it for the benefit of people and country. Moreover, many times in Nepal, the water sharing agreements with India either in 1950s or in 1990s generated huge political debates and sharp political polarization among the political parties and sometimes it led to the split like in 1996 after signing of the Mahakali Pancheshwor Multi-purpose Treaty, the then largest party in the parliament, the Communist Party of Nepal (UML) was vertically split. There water issues have also had negative impacts on two countries' bilateral relationships. Since last five decades, the issue of water resource sharing between Nepal and India remains unresolved. Nepal today needs to focus issues on which will ultimately strengthen country's overall economy, generate employments and promote Nepal's prestige and image in the international arena. Proper utilization of water resource is the only area which it could enhance its much needed economic development. Only this way it can avoid the decades long controversies on water related issues with India and strengthen country's economic and security environment.

## Chapter VII

### Conclusion

Security is a very important issue not only for a state to survive and develop but for all the human beings to live and grow. However, there is no agreement about defining the concept of security among the academics, security experts and policy makers and analysts. The general meaning of security is defined as the freedom of threats. However, there is no common meaning of threats as it could be different from person to person and region to region. Therefore, it is right to say that the meaning of security is in fact, in the eye of a beholder.

This study has examined the dynamics of security in the context of various theoretical frameworks while at the same time arguing that the concept of security has always been changing as per the change of the context. Threat perceptions have never been static. The perceptions of security and insecurity arise to each state and individual as per the existing context as well as development of surrounding environments.

In international relations, each theory has its own interpretation and definition of security. For the Realist school of thought which had been the dominant theory in the past centuries, security of the state is central and their referent object had always been the state and military power. The classical Realists believe that as long as state is secured, everything within the state is also secured. According to the Realists, the international system is anarchic and to maintain the international system the role of balance of power system is vital. The Neo-realists which emerged during the height of Cold War basically agree the role of state, military and power in the international system. However, they question the classical realist by raising the question of why do states exhibit similar foreign policy behavior despite their different political systems and contrasting ideologies? Despite different political and social orders in the US and erstwhile Soviet Union and their behaviour during the period of Cold War, their conduct of respective foreign policy affairs were remarkably similar. They state that it is because of the systemic forces they had to homogenize foreign policy behaviour mainly by interposing themselves between states and their diplomatic behaviours.



For liberals, war is unnatural and peace is the normal state of affairs. According to liberals, the laws of nature dictated harmony and co-operation between people. Therefore, war is unnatural and irrational. Liberals have a belief in progress and the perfectibility of the human condition. Through their faith in the power of human reason and the capacity of human beings to realize their inner potential, they remain confident that the stain of war can be removed from human experiences. They do not deny the role of the state. However, they also believe that the state to state relations can be harmonized and peaceful environment could be created through the promotion of interactions and exchanges between the states and the people. The growing processes of globalizations and inter-states and inter-regions trades and commerce would enhance this process. Furthermore, for the constructivists and post modernists, individual, groups, NGOs and the emerging transnational civil society actors, the structural issues are vital in defining the security as well as maintaining the international order.

Collectivists' approach to security is that the destructive forces of international anarchy could only be brought to an end if the international system was regulated in the same way as domestic society. They opine that though military force remains an important characteristic of international life, there are nevertheless realistic opportunities to move beyond the self-help world of realism, especially after the end of the Cold War.

At the same time, the thinking and literature on non-traditional security has evolved over the years, from an early focus on incorporating individual and people centric approaches into the definition of 'security' to a new focus on how the social, economic and environmental change can be a cause or amplifier of violent conflict. There are several strands of thought with the non-traditional perspectives. (Lama, 2010)

Feminists, critical theorists, and postmodernists argue that in the existing order, the dominant groups in societies impose particular interpretations of 'security'. These have the effect of promoting interests of some sections of society at the expense of others, underpinning a fundamentally unjust political and economic order. They further argue that non-traditional security is not in opposition to the earlier trends of

redefining security. It is an outgrowth of these trends. Indeed, many early attempts to broaden the definition of “security” used language very similar to that found in today’s discussions on ‘human security’.

Despite such diverse perspectives at times heterogenous in the definition of nontraditional security threats, it still represents some strikingly common features. Firstly, it is not a state centric view and does not substantiate the state-centered theories. Rather it is a people's centered view and it does include those threats that are perceived as threats to the human beings and individual safety. It, at the same time does not eliminate the idea of state security. Secondly, the nontraditional security threats have no particular geography focus. As the issues are more human centric, nontraditional challenges represent those threats and dangers which are multidimensional and multidirectional. Therefore, it requires multilateral approach to deal with such diveres yet comlex threats and challenges. Thirdly, since the threats and dangers are diverse and more related with the development, democracy and environmental protection, these issues can not be managed by traditional defense policies alone or the military based strategies. Military organizations may have a role, especially where it is involved, but effective management requires a range of non-military approaches including state, civil society groups, NGOs, INGOs, UN, International Financial Institutions, regional organizations, international organizations etc.

As both the internal and external context of Nepal has gone through significant changes since Nepali state was founded in the mid-18<sup>th</sup> century, the perceptions of threats to the existence and sustainability of this state has also been changing. Since the time of its unification up to the late 20th century, the dominant security perceptions in Nepal have again been the military centric. It viewed traditional security perception as the central theme to protect the territory and believed that as long as geographical territory is secured, everything remained secure within the boundary. In Nepali context, national security concept was defined as early as during the unification period in the last quarter of the 18<sup>th</sup> Century by its founding father then King Prithivi Narayan Shaha. This remained a central focus in the management of security issue by all the subsequent ruling elites and is still considered as relevant.

This was also because of Nepal's geographical location. The security policy that was defined in the early period in 18<sup>th</sup> century was during the time when both of Nepal's closed neighbours India and China were engaged heavily in expanding their territories. The policy of expansion and annexation taken by the British government in India and also the Chinese government in Beijing extending its influences towards the west had posed a formidable challenge to the country. Nepal remained sandwiched between the two giants which was aptly described by King Prithivi Narayan Shaha as "yam between two boulders". The preservation and protection of its territorial integration and also national independence was the most critical task at a time when the country was facing numerous attacks from both of its neighbours in the past centuries. Despite frequent assaults it received from both north and south time and again, Nepal was able to maintain its territorial integration and national independence. Therefore, the national security policy adopted by the then ruling elites of the time had been based on tested past. This was reflected in its foreign policy and diplomatic actions.

However, with the changed state system and the steady development of international relations based on democratic norms and practices as well as numerous resolutions and conventions, protecting geographical boundary and maintaining territorial integration, Nepal gradually moved from isolation to a much more open system. This definitely had reflections in its thinking and action on security related parameters. With the promotion of human rights, cultural and social rights, freedom and democracy in the post World War II world where the citizens basic rights have taken prominence, it has become equally important for a state to protect its people from the security vulnerability, provide guaranteed livelihood and sufficient foods, clothes, shelters, health care, education. This also extended to other sraes where the State had to guarantee at least the basic rights like freedom of expression, organization, freedom from fear and violence etc. With the advancement of these basic rights and facilities, a state could reduce its vulnerability coming from all internal weaknesses and intricacies. This could inturn secure and sustain its territorial integration and national independence.

Nepal has been able to maintain its territorial integration and protect its international boundary since its inception. However it does continue to perceive threats from the

two immediate neighbouring countries. At the same time the country has become more vulnerable and its sustainability has been questioned in the recent years. It is mainly because of its failure in managing its internal order and its protracted inability to promote and deliver much needed social, cultural and economic development in the country. Its failure to provide good governance, protect citizens' basic rights and fulfill their basic needs have led the country into the chaos and instability in the past. The people's increasing aspirations and successive governments' failure to meet the general masses expectations has precipitated into violent conflicts, internal displacement, environmental crisis and gross underdevelopment. The experience of many other countries indicates that ethnicity, language and religion could represent other sources of insecurity. Nepal being a multi-ethnic nation and the geography based distribution of various ethnic groups, has also been fast falling victim to this problem. Unless appropriate interventions are made to assure adequate space to all disadvantaged communities these instabilities would continue thereby bringing new sources of national security threats. This clearly shows that Nepal has been steadily moving to a situation where the growing vulnerability is less triggered by external factors and more seriously by internal disorders.

To prove that a gradual shift is taking place in Nepal's traditional security approach to the non-traditional or human security approach, this study has taken three main components of non-traditional security threats viz., migration, armed conflict and environmental degradation apart from analyzing Nepal's evolving security dynamics. The study of each of these three human security components shows weakening of country's overall security strengths and sharp increase in its vulnerabilities. Such a situation not only poses serious challenges to its progress and advancement but if it persistently continue it will pose serious threats to the very existence of Nepal as an independent and sovereign country in future.

The end of Cold War and changed in bipolar character of global order also contributed in changing perceptions of security threats in Nepal. The confrontational and antagonistic international order during the Cold War has been shifted into more cooperative mode. This has had implications on Nepal's traditional view on security. to the steadily and remarkably changing relations between India and China from the competitive mode to cooperative mode further added to this changed security

perceptions in Nepal. The normalization of India-China relations and their growing economic interactions has had a deeper influence on Nepal's changing perceptions of security threats. Though, the underlying element of competition between the two emerging super powers can not be discarded and underplayed the growing interactions between the two economies, transfer of technology and expanding cooperation have changed the security dynamics in the region. The emergence of India and China as the new potential global powers displacing the old power players and the peaceful order they require to build in the region and especially in their immediate neighbourhood, have led to more openness and warmth in the South Asian countries. There are indicators that Nepal is a direct beneficiary of these changed attitudes of these two giant neighbours. At the same time for decades together India and China's paramount concern in Nepal has been related to security and stability as they believed that any disturbances in Nepal would have spill over impacts on both countries.

With the growing internal challenges and vulnerabilities and the changing external security environment of the country, many of Nepal's traditional military-centric security threat perceptions have been diluted. At the same time varieties of non-traditional and people-centric security concerns have emerged and are becoming more prominent. Though, the issue of national security is still important, its attainment is linked increasingly to human security. The concept that as long as territorial border is secure everything within it is secure is now becoming anachronistic. In today's world, the security of the border is not sufficient to guarantee the security and welfare of the people. The *Human Development Report, South Asia* says that national security cannot be achieved in a situation where people starve and arms accumulate; where social expenditure falls and military expenditure rises. South Asia today is the most militarized region of the world, but that does not make the region any more secure.

All these are very much prevalent in the context of Nepal today. The growing conflicts and with very meager employment opportunities, a large number of people particularly from the hilly and the terai regions have been migrating to urban areas. A significant number of Nepali youth workforce have also been leaving the country and going to India, Gulf countries, Malaysia, South Korea and other countries to secure employment. Most of the people who leave country have been facing numerous

problems. The increasing securitization of migration policies and practices in their respective host countries have not only impinged upon the rights and future of these large number of migrant workers from Nepal but has also become a formidable challenge to Nepal.

Not only the external migration, the internal migratory movements have also been generating number of problems. On the one hand, growing number of hill migrants to the plain Terai area has significantly reduced the absorbing capacity of Terai region. On the other hand, the growing communal polarization between *Madhesis* and *Pahadiya* and also between different ethnic groups has created serious ethnic tensions and unprecedented geographical polarizations in the country. Furthermore, expansion of the armed groups in Terai and their activities like killings, extortions, abduction, harassments and disturbance of law and order has become a serious threat to the political and social environment in Terai and national stability. Similarly, the dwindling resources and increasing population pressure in the region has further intensified the tensions. The demand for more resources and opportunities of the youth in both Terai and hill regions have become another challenge to the regime in Kathmandu.

Not only the hill to Terai migration, but the rural to urban migration has also become a major concern in Nepal. Such increasing migratory trend has created enormous problems in the cities. This has made urban cities over crowded and unavailability of basic services such as; drinking water, roads, sanitation, electricity and increasing social crimes have caused bickering and could even trigger conflicts. Furthermore, the increasing air pollution and lack of proper management of wastages have posed serious environment and health related problems in the cities.

. The increasing out country migration of rural youth force has also generated number of problems. The lack of coherent and comprehensive government policy and proper laws to address this issue despite the fact that over one million Nepali youth have been working in foreign lands.

For instance, it is invariably mentioned that the Nepali migrant workers are the least paid workers in the Gulf and Malaysia where the largest number of Nepali workers

are concentrated. They even do not receive minimum wages that has been fixed by the host government. It is because, most of them are unaware about policy of both the sending and host countries and many of them were also cheated by the agents or the employees. Some of them even do not receive the minimum amount that has been agreed upon before their departure. Their work place security and protection from the mal-treatment as well as harassment have become serious issues that could ultimately bring a new element of security threat to Nepal.

Another major concern in the migration and security is the increased incidence of HIV/AIDS among the large numbers of migrant population. This along with trafficking of women and children, increased number of commercial sex workers and intravenous drug users could emerge as a major internal problem that could eat into the very fundamentals of Nepali society and economy.

The internal migration has become another major issue related with the security in Nepal in recent years. Violent conflicts in the past ten years and the existence of large numbers of armed group in the Terai region have induced huge internal displacement. It is estimated that over 200,000 people have been internally displaced during the ten years of Maoists 'people' war. The displacements were caused by both sides; the Maoists and the Army's excessive use of forces and abuses. Affected people fled their own native villages and sought refuge either in the district headquarters or in the major cities like Kathmandu, Nepalgunj, Pokhara and Biratnagar. Large number of people particularly from the Mid-west and Far-west regions also fled to India which has been a popular migration destiny for Nepalese people since a long time.

Though, the last 10 years of Maoists 'People's War' has ended with the signing a Comprehensive Peace Agreement in November 2006 between the Government of Nepal and the CPN (Maoists), the return of the Internally Displaced People (IDPs) have not been resolved and threats, extortions and harassment and refusal to return the confiscated properties by the Maoists continue unabated. The protracted IDPs issue has seriously been disturbing the security environment in the cities and various district headquarters. The danger of these IDPs taking extreme steps such as joining extremist groups ominously pervade the Nepalese polity today.

Another issue that has been affecting the security environment of the country is the Bhutanese refugees in eastern Nepal. The two decades long Bhutanese refugees problem and failure to their repatriation has had greater effect on country's security. The resettlement of refugees in third countries like US is not considered as a durable solution. As the Bhutanese refugee issue is linked with the democratic movements inside Bhutan, the repatriation of the refugees in near future seem not possible. This has further increased the frustration and disappointment among the refugee community and they have already started taking extreme paths. The formation of the Communist Party of Bhutan – Maoists and its subsequent decision to launch armed rebellion against the Monarchical regime in Bhutan has been seen as part of their move towards this direction. Their movement for democracy and justice is likely to forge a new alliance within and outside the country. If the 110,000 of Bhutanese refugees who live in the congested camps in eastern Nepal take arms, it would have severe security implications not only for Bhutan but also to Nepal and India and whole north east region. The protracted refugee problems have in many countries including Afghans in Pakistan, Sri Lankan Tamils in India and Burmese in Thailand have generated serious internal security threats that ultimately spread over to the sending countries.

More people have lost their lives in intra-state violent conflicts than in the inter-states conflicts. The vulnerability of the state does not necessarily always emanate from the outsiders. This could be from within the state. Due to the growing internal disorder and breakdown of security environment, Nepal has been categorized as one of the weakest and most vulnerable states in this region. With the intensification of violent conflicts and the breakdown of the law and order and destruction of the state institutions, Nepal has been increasingly pushed into a failed state category. How has it become like this? Is it because Nepal has been attacked by outside forces or because of its small size or its location etc? Nepal's present vulnerability actually arises from internal problems – failure of the state, low level of development, widespread poverty situation, bad governance system, rampant corruption, erosion of political and state institutions, crisis of political leadership. In the midst of this situation, the extremist forces like Maoists waged armed struggle and created terror in the society which had caused a death of nearly 17000 people, thousands were injured and many more were displaced from their own native villages and towns. Apart from this, billion of dollars



the reason for present vulnerability of Nepali state lies more on internally emanated problems rather than the external factors. This is where one finds that the newer varieties of threat far away from the military-centric threats have now taken over as the prime factors in the nuances of security management in Nepal.

Furthermore, the contention of various minority, ethnic and oppressed groups with the state have increased significantly and some of these groups even began to take arms against the state. These groups assertion for power with violent means may represent other sources of insecurity and the country could fall victim to this problem. This could also pose challenge to the territorial integrity of Nepal. All these are happening for the first time in Nepal after the serious problems that the country faced during and after the war with British India government in 1814 to 1816.

Though the 12 years of multiparty democracy has made some achievements, it could not meet the expectations of Nepali people. After establishment of democracy, people were hopeful that democracy would deliver greatly to improve their socio-economic standards. However, their expectations were not met and they have found little difference between the democratically elected regime and the previous autocratic regime. Political leaders and people remain divided as rulers and the ruled, much in the same way it was during the autocratic Panchayat system. People's livelihood continued to be threatened. Some of the leaders of major political parties accumulated unlimited properties. Common men and women remained poor and the gap between the few rich and the general populace further widened.

Criminalization of politics and culture of impunity continued. All the culprits, the former *Panchas* (members of local governance) were made immune by the parties and leaders. Over the years, they even became the Members of Parliament in the multi-party system. This has meant that the legacy of the Panchayat system continued even after political change though with a new name and colour. The rule of law and constitutionalism was replaced by rule of arbitration which became so horrific that the people who did not align with the ruling party were systematically marginalized. To curtail the power of the opposition parties, the ruling party gathered ex-Panchas into its group and let them fight the opposition.

Because of the incomplete transformation of social and political system in 1990, complacency, corruption and arrogance continued, if not in the same pace in the Panchayat era. Instead of consulting people, major decisions were made at morning tea time at the leaders' house. The family members became the party within the party and they had the power to influence major decisions including the appointment, transformation and termination of civil servants. A large percentage of people from the rural areas felt insulted even with democratic rule as they were hardly consulted in decision making processes.

It is in this backdrop the violent CPN-Maoists emerged as an alternative. The marginalized groups believed that the political leaders did not work seriously for economic reform and social transformation. There was a search for alternatives. For the people mostly the youth started searching for alternatives and the CPN – Maoists decided to launch the 'people's war'. The Maoists promised equity and rights for all, especially those oppressed, marginalized and women. Such promised largely motivated huge number of rural youth to join the Maoists war which had crippled down most parts of state particularly in the rural Nepal during the conflict period.

It was only six years in 1996 after the restoration of democracy, the Maoist began armed struggle. It is this war that has pushed the country in a protracted crisis. With the passage of time, the war became a major national problem. With the growing magnitude of the war, the country was pushed to the state of emergency, House of Representatives was dissolved, people's fundamental rights were suspended, thousands of Nepalese lost their lives, and parliamentary elections were impossible to be held. The constitution became only a document and the earlier deposed reactionaries and revivalists unfurled their hat in the name of saving the state going worst. The much needed development activities were halted and government's delivery to the people had become impossible.

The war has diminished civil authority and simultaneously militarized the government system. The monarch deposed the democratic government and broke the constitutional balance, transgressed the letter and spirit of the constitutional monarch and activated himself in the politics and finally conducted a military-backed coup on 1 February 2005. Claiming to defend democracy, to save the Nepali people from the

Maoist insurgency, he declared a pre-planned state of emergency, suspended civil rights, muzzled the press, blocked telephone networks and jailed hundreds of party leaders and cadres. Instead of reconciling with the political parties to work for solving the Maoists problem, the King "exploited the differences between the parties to prepare the ground for his takeover". Seeking a purely military solution of the problem, he went about dismantling the achievements made by the people's movement in 1990. Such unfolding events have largely contributed in changing the threat perceptions of security among the people of Nepal.

Not only the social conflicts that deteriorated the Nepal's security strength and change the threat perceptions, the growing environmental degradation and increasing air pollution and threats to the rich yet already dwindling bio-diversity are other issues which have emerged as serious security concerns in Nepali state facing these days. The prevailing conflicts regarding natural resources particularly the increasing risk of losing bio-diversity and endangered species due to the continuously weakening of the state authority and increasing vulnerability in the protected zones and national parks could become a new source of threat to the nation. Conflicts appear to be fairly extensive regarding some natural resources like forests and water. Environmental destruction – even that resulting from 'development projects' lead to the loss of sources living, resulting in mass population movement and conflict arises.

A growing population is becoming vulnerable to trans-boundary global environmental degradation caused by developments originating outside the area in which they live. The impact of these trans-border environmental disruptions becomes more acute due to the growing pressure on the dwindling natural resources. What has been or can be the impacts on ecosystems and the economy because of the unresolved conflicts?

The issue of environment still is a new and less focused issue in Nepal. However, the non-governmental sector has been giving considerable focus to this new area of threat. There have been very few steps that were taken to address these threats. Even for such efforts, much of the credits go to the donor communities who have been pushing the agenda of environment and related conflicts within the government agencies as well as non-governmental organisations.

However, environmental related conflicts are still a new concept and relating it with the overall security environment of the country as well as human security threats at the very local community level has not been done at all. . If it is not addressed in a timely manner, it will inevitable invite various forms of conflicts and ultimately harm the security environment both at the local and national level of the country.

As the insecurity emanates from vulnerabilities and the vulnerabilities always need not necessarily only derived from the external factors but also caused by internal factors too. Nepal's vulnerabilities and its weakening positions today have not come from the external factors alone. Although in certain level the external roles could not be denied, it generally found that threats that Nepal today has been facing are more internal in nature. This has been heightened by the failure of the state machineries and governance system to deliver goods and services and their bringing elements of anarchy and chaotic environment in the management of the state. However, the role of external events in shaping the policies can not also be denied.

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