

ANALYSING IRREDENTISM IN WORLD POLITICS

*Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the
award of the degree of*

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

ZARINE KHAN



Diplomacy and Disarmament Division
Centre for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament
School of International Studies

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY

New Delhi 110067

2012



Date: 26th July 2012

DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled "*Analysing Irredentism in World Politics*" submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

ZARINE KHAN

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

PROFESSOR SWARAN SINGH
Chairperson, CIPOD

Chairperson
Centre for International Politics,
Organization & Disarmament
School of International Studies
J.N.U., New Delhi

DR J. MADHAN MOHAN
Supervisor

To an eternal yesterday...

Contents

Acknowledgement	ii
Chapter One	
Introduction	1
Chapter Two	
Transborder Ties	20
Chapter Three	
External Intervention	41
Chapter Four	
Strategic Choice	64
Chapter Five	
Conclusion	83
Appendix	87
References	96

Acknowledgement

To acknowledge is an important ritual that reminds us of our own inadequacies and need for constant support. I wish to thank my Supervisor Dr. J Madhan Mohan for his encouragement and guidance that paved the way for this research. His inputs have been critical and the autonomy that he granted refreshing. My sincere thanks to our Chairperson Prof. Swaran Singh and other faculty members of Diplomacy and Disarmament Division who have been instrumental in providing us the environment conducive to our efforts directed towards research. The support provided by the administrative staff of my centre and school has been crucial and I thank them for making the dealings with the institution smooth and personal. I wish to thank the staff of JNU library, Teen Murti library and IDSA library for their prompt assistance and help in times when I struggled to find the required books or information.

I remain indebted to Prof. Avijit Pathak, CSSS for his valuable insights that have remained with me throughout the writing of this work. I haven't thanked Irfan for sending me as many articles as I demanded when I did not have access to online database of academic journals; it is only apt that I do it here. My engagement with the academic world would have not been possible had it not been for my mother and father's unwavering belief, patience and love. My sisters Sana and Zoya stretch the limits of my possibilities. I remain conscious of my handicap, shortcomings, mistakes and certainty for many to be discovered and though it does no justice for the favours bestowed upon me, thank the Actual Cause, who makes it all happens.

Chapter 1

Introduction

*Hearken to the reed-flute, how it complains,
Lamenting its banishment from its home:
'Ever since they tore me from my osier bed,
My plaintive notes have moved men and women to tears.
I burst my breast, striving to give vent to sighs,
And to express the pangs of my yearning for my home'.
He who abides far away from his home
Is ever longing for the day he shall return.
~Rumi, Masnavi i Ma'navi*

This study is essentially about the relationship between land and people; homeland and its children; territory and nation. The present world is a world of political nations, divided into 'nation-states', each with its own trajectory of formation, its own myths, memories, history and destiny. 'Territorialization of memories'¹ has played an important part in the emergence of nations and for any state to exist juridical sovereignty over territory is the least requirement. The nation-state and the present system of modern nation-states emerged in a particular historical context. The present international system is situated in time and space and so are its units. To reject the realist view that sees state as ahistorical, implies a view that envisions a possibility of change in the conceptualisation of state that perhaps goes beyond its territoriality² without implying 'end of the state'³. Analysis of irredentism provides a window to study the changing relevance of territory in the

¹ The phrase has been used by Anthony D. Smith to explain the process of nation formation in Chapter 2, *Ethnic and Religious Roots* (Smith 2008).

² Ruggie (1993) has dealt in detail about the possibilities of evolution of a post-national state and diminishing role of territory in its conceptualisation.

³ This phrase is used by Mabee (2003). He attributes this line of thinking to Horsman and Marshall (1994) and Ohame (1990).

dominant conception of modern nation-state in the field of International Relations. The central pursuit of this study is driven by the inquiry – are states always driven by purely instrumental rationality in pursuance of their goals? The phenomenon of irredentism or more accurately change in irredentist policy of states provides us the opportunity to study state behaviour in the international realm that may not always be guided by instrumental rational calculations. The puzzle that this study deals with is twofold – why states do and do not give up irredentist claims? The first part of the puzzle focuses on the question that why do states give up irredentist claim after pursuing them for a long time without the realisation of their goals *i.e.* they agree on the status quo of territorial borders. The second part of this puzzle focuses on the following question: why are there states that continue to make irredentist claims despite non-realisation of their goal since a long time? The core of this research is the argument that focusing on transborder ties, international norms and internal processes of state provides a better answer for state behaviour in the case of irredentism rather than a focus on self interest and security maximisation. This does not suggest that irredentist goals are bereft of interest driven motivations. Given the nature of inquiry there are three major questions that this research seeks to inform:

1. Why do states make irredentist claims and after pursuing these claims why do some states give them up and some continue for decades?
2. Are states driven by strategic rational calculations in the pursuit of an aim that is driven by nationalist feelings and passion?
3. To what extent could we understand the changing nature of state by analysing changes in irredentist policies of the states?

This research seeks to answer these questions by conceptually analysing the phenomenon of irredentism in world politics. Irredentism is inextricably linked with the idea of nationalism that is traced to German Romantic thought with roots in Counter Enlightenment (Berlin 1982). Kedourie (1993) has traced the roots of nationalism to Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) who started a revolution in European philosophy by providing a revolutionary definition of freedom. Self determination became the supreme goal as Kant linked freedom with man's inner world, defining it in terms of obeying the laws of morality that one can find only within oneself and not in the external world

leading to the understanding ‘the good will, which is the free will, is also the autonomous will’ (Kedourie 1994: 16). Kant’s disciple Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) was instrumental in refining Kant’s ideas and setting the stage for ‘organic theory of state’.

Kedourie writes

‘Complete freedom means total absorption in the whole...From this metaphysics the post-Kantians deduced a theory of the state...The state therefore is not a collection of individuals who have come together in order to protect their own particular interests; the state is higher than the individual and comes before him. It is only when he and the state are one that the individual realizes his freedom’ (Kedourie 1993: 30).

Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) opposing the universalism of Enlightenment argued for diversity of cultures exemplified in their language with each community having its own language and ‘own mode of thought’ (Breuilly 1993: 57). Fichte joined Herder in arguing for primacy of language and ‘for him language mirrored the national soul, and to purge the language of alien impurities was to defend the national soul against the subversion of foreign values’ (Breuilly 1993: 60). In his poem *An die Deutschen* Herder invokes the need to elevate German that was felt in response to the growing influence of French in the continent.

And You German alone, returning from abroad,
Wouldst greet your mother in French?
O spew it out, before your door
Spew out the ugly slime of the Seine
Speak German, O you German.

(Cited in Kedourie 1993: 53)

The implication of these ideas in the realm of politics was the articulation of the idea of uniqueness of nation and its ability to decide its own destiny through self determination – the supreme political goal. The French political thinker Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-78) and his writings, it has been argued, played an important role in moulding the German Romantic thought (Halliday 1997). Rousseau emphasises on the distinction between man and citizen where men in order to protect themselves from the tyranny of other fellow men have to exchange their selfish will for the ‘general will’ (Barnard 1984). The political association that Rousseau envisages is the nation-state where there is no conflict between ‘citizen’ and ‘patriot’ and ‘sees in patriotism the most powerful sentiment

reinforcing citizenship’ but does ‘not constitute it’ (Barnard 1984: 249-251). It was with the French Revolution of 1789 that the idea of nation having its own politico-legal territory was first put in place. It triggered the age of nationalism in Europe, where nation was seen as the legitimate source of political power and thus began the domination of the idea of nation-state. Language was linked with nation in the nineteenth century Europe and justified for having a state of its own. That nation formation is a process and not an outcome or an event and there exists a gap – sometimes extending to centuries –between the national consciousness of elite and its extension to the masses (Connor 1990) points towards the role of elites and the state in creating national consciousness and ‘imagined communities’⁴(Anderson 1991). The very fact that they could mobilise large number of masses in the name of nation points towards pre-existing ethnic ties (Smith 2008). However, most of the nations and nationalism are a modern phenomenon. In most of the cases the state has preceded the nation (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983), but the willingness of people to die for the nation points that individual is located in the ‘emotion laden confines of the nation’⁵.

Irredentism is seen as an extension of nationalism directed outwards when its internal project is complete (Ben-Israel 1991). The following four major phases need to be highlighted to understand the trajectory of irredentism in world politics: (a) The first phase after the French revolution till the First World War, (b) the second between the First and the Second World War, (c) third phase began with Post Second World War marked by the process of decolonisation and Cold war till the end of Cold War and (d) the fourth phase from post Cold war period till present. In the first phase, irredentist claims were a phenomenon of the European world. As states scrambled to create congruence between nation and state, language was prominently the basis on which the nation was defined and many areas where co-linguists resided were claimed by two or

⁴ Anderson (1991 [1983]) argues that nationality and nationalism are cultural artefacts of a particular kind. He traces the origins of modern nation to the change in conception of time –homogeneous empty time –that is provided by simultaneous mass consumption of newspapers; the rise of print capitalism that laid bases for national consciousness by giving fixity to language and creating languages of power; official nationalisms that perpetuated themselves through museums and linear history writing. For a critique of Anderson see Chatterjee (1991) and (2003).

⁵ The phrase has been used by Emerson to describe the survival of the state where nationalism provides the ‘emotional cement which holds the members of the state together when disagreements threaten to pull them apart’ (Emerson 1960a: 17).

more states. The interwar period was marked by change of territories and treaties between powers that created new states after the fall of four major empires of German, Russian, Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian. The third phase saw dissolution of the British Empire and other imperial powers of Europe as the process of decolonisation mandated by the UN carved out new states on the world map. The European model of nation-state was exported to these new states, however, very few entities can be said to be existing as nation-states presently in the entire world state system. With the breakup of Soviet Union the next wave of state formation of politically conscious communities took place. The breakup of Yugoslavia fuelled some of the most costly and deadly irredentist ambitions of Serbia and Croatia. I argue that the dynamics of irredentist claims and their outcomes differ across time and space. The political transition at systemic level is seen as a major factor that enhances the potential for states to make irredentist claims (Chazan 1991; Horowitz 1991). However, nature of political transition is equally important when analysing irredentist claims. The French Revolution of 1789 ushered in an age of revolution in Europe where all the states tried to achieve the congruence of borders of a state and boundaries of a nation. Another political transition took place during the process of decolonisation and the artificiality of the borders led to speculations of ‘troublesome irredentas’ fighting for congruence of the nation and the state (Emerson 1960b). Africa has been likened with Europe when it comes to the existence of multiple nationalities within the same continent. Boundaries drawn by colonial powers in the continent were not based on the principle of nation-state and even after achieving independence most of the states have not strived towards redefining of boundaries. What explains this behaviour? There are studies that rely on vulnerability argument that each state is vulnerable to potential irredentist demand from another state and if one state begins to make claim, others will follow thereby leading to dangerous conflict that can continue for years without any potential solution. Hence, these states rely on regional organisations like the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to preserve the norm of territorial status quo (Touval 1972; Buchheit 1978; Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Herbst 1989). Immanuel Wallerstein (1967) argues that the discourse on African history is different from that of European nationalist history and it has been instrumental in giving rise to pan-African unity. Thus, it is important to situate every irredentist claim in its historical context and

only then a proper understanding of the phenomenon can be achieved. Kornprobst (2008) has argued that more states in Europe have been able to settle their irredentist conflicts⁶ peacefully in recent times than anywhere else in the world. This difference in the settlement and outcome of irredentist conflicts can again be related to different experiences of the region. Does this imply that there are no commonalities in factors that lead states to make irredentist claims and then later abandon them and agree on status quo? It is the purpose of this research to delineate conceptually some of the variables that deepen the understanding of the process of change in irredentist ambitions of states and groups.

The term irredentism has its genesis in the Italian word *irredenta* that means unredeemed. The political movement in Italy in the nineteenth century to redeem the territories where Italian speaking populations lived was termed *terra irredenta* implying territories to be redeemed. These populations mainly lived under the Swiss and Austro-Hungarian control and the newly formed Italian state aimed at unification of these territories with itself – the parent country. The present usage of the term is based on the claiming of territory by a state or group on the basis of ethnic, national, linguistic or historic grounds.

It needs to be taken into account that there are many facets of nationalism. Scholars are unanimous about the changing nature of nationalism and some usefulness of typologies of nationalism. Nonetheless it has to be acknowledged that no typology fully captures the phenomenon that seems to exist between different variants. Dichotomies like good nationalism/bad nationalism are seldom helpful. Distinction has been drawn between civic territorial nationalism of the West and ethnic nationalism of the East (Kohn 1967; Snyder 1968) has an evident Eurocentric bias. Another difference that has been argued is between nationalism of exclusion and nationalism of resistance (Feinberg 1997). What remains of significance is that nationalism is rooted in time and space and it has undergone change in its meaning and manifestation at different junctures of history.

⁶ I use the term irredentist conflict(s) instead of irredentist dispute throughout this research. This is informed by the distinction that disputes are based on needs that are more negotiable than conflicts that are based on values and ideologies that acquire a non-negotiable character and are much more difficult to resolve. Territorial issues are considered as disputes; irredentism – the fusion of territoriality and nationalism – is better understood as a conflict.



War memorial in Strasbourg, France that shows a mother holding her two sons who fought in the war between Germany and France over Alsace and Lorraine from opposing sides.

Irredentist claims too being linked with nationalism were driven by the kind of nationalist force behind the movement – is it driven by the state that mobilises its people or is it the people that lead the movement for redeeming land that converts into state policy. The case of Alsace and

Lorraine that changed hands between Germany and France more than once remains one of the informing

examples where state plays an important role in forming/evolving/altering national identities. Again we return to the question that even if the state leads the formation of a nation and national consciousness amongst its pupil, why are people ready to die for redemption of territories and kin that are not a part of the existing state. The role of emotion and affect in case of irredentism becomes of importance to our query.

The main problem in dealing with the phenomenon of irredentism at the conceptual level is to figure out the motive of the state making irredentist claim. Is the claim purely driven by a state's strategic choice, since the dominant discourse of realism in the field sees states as rational unitary actors in the international system trying to maximise their security. Any attempt by the state to increase its territory will be seen as an attempt by the state to maximise its resources and increase its security. The logic given by the state for territorial expansion will be seen as a cloak⁷ to hide its intention behind seeking revision of territorial status quo which is construed as driven by purely instrumental rationale. The possibility of state being driven by the affective attachment of its public is difficult to explore given that it is the foreign policy of the state that drives irredentist policies.

Here, I argue, that it is important to bring in the concept of rationality. Sen (2004) writes

⁷ Carr uses the word cloak to describe the language of justice used as a cloak by politicians to hide their particular interests or justify their own acts of aggression (Carr 2001 [1939]: 127).

‘Rationality is interpreted here, broadly, as the discipline of subjecting one’s choices –of actions as well as of objectives, values and priorities –to reasoned scrutiny...rationality is seen here in much general terms as the need to subject one’s choices to the demands of reason’ (Sen 2004: 4).

Nozick (1993) in his chapter *Instrumental Rationality and its Limits* highlights the central issue to be ‘whether instrumental rationality is the *whole* of rationality’ (Nozick 1993: 133). Instrumental rationality has been conceptualised as part of rationality⁸. Rational actions can be based on values too. This is what Weber called ‘value rationality’. In *Economy and Society*, Weber (1978: 25-26) distinguishes in following four major types of social action: (a) purposeful or goal oriented rational action *i.e.* purposeful rationality wherein both goals and means are rationally chosen; (b) rational action may be value oriented wherein the goal may not be rational but means to achieve it will be rational; (c) action from emotional or affective motivations wherein affective action is anchored in the emotional state of the actor rather than in the rational weighing of means and ends; and (d) traditional action that is guided by customary habits of thought by reliance on eternal yesterday. These four types of actions are guided by the following respectively: instrumental rationality; value rationality; affective reasons; norm orientations respectively.

Irredentism may be conceptualised as a mix of both ‘instrumental rationality’ and ‘value rationality’. Both of these rationalities are directed towards a goal but differ in their conception of cost. Instrumental rationality is based on cost-benefit calculations and when pursuing of goals becomes more costly than benefits, it calls for either adjustment in goals or in their total abandoning. Weber (1978) argues that in the case of value rationality, the goal is pursued even if the costs outweigh the benefits of pursuing such a goal. Actions driven by value rationality are ‘the actions of persons, who regardless of possible costs to themselves, act to put into practice their convictions of what seems to them to be required by duty, honor, the pursuit of beauty, a religious call, personal loyalty, or the importance of some “cause” no matter what it consists’ (Weber 1978: 25).

⁸ He argues for widening the notion of instrumental rationality where it becomes an extension of one’s identity and being, acquires an intrinsic value for itself –the nature of that rationality being wholly instrumental but not its value. Rationality is constituted of noninstrumentality – noninstrumental goals that mandate actions standing in noninstrumental relation to a goal. He argues that legitimate modes of rationality include symbolic and evidential modes along with instrumental (Nozick 1993: 138-139).

He also points out that from the instrumentalist perspective, the action driven by value rationality will always be seen as irrational (Weber 1978: 26).

Rational choice explanations of irredentist behaviour account for instrumental rationality. These theories are not capable of assessing the role of value rationality in decisions that a group or state will take. These explanations view irredentist claims based largely on elite political interest who manipulate mass sentiments (Carment and James 1995). It is important to understand support for an irredentist policy of the state or an irredentist movement of a group. The foundations of this support are rooted in the values and beliefs of the people. The very fact that the national leaders are able to exploit these sentiments shows the significance of values. However, value rationality is not sufficient for the groups to reach their goals. They need to strategise and take into account the role of opposition state and its strategies, the ties with co-nationals that are to be redeemed, the international conditions that either help in pursuing their goal or discourage them. There is a good chance that irredentist movement first begins with its base in emotion and value and is later used by some of the elites for purely strategic purposes or it is the state that begins the policy of irredentism first with strategic goals in mind and builds consciousness amongst its people whose support is then based on values, affect and emotion. The origin of irredentist movement can then both be value rational or instrumental rational depending upon its trajectory but its evolution primarily involves a lot of strategic calculations that would help the irredentist state in pursuit of its goal.

It is the tension between instrumental rationality and value rationality that informs the research design of this study. I look at three variables – transborder ties, external intervention and strategic choice of elites that incorporate different levels of value and instrumental rationality. The first one is predominantly a value rational variable that seeks to explain irredentist behaviour of states on the basis of ties that ethnic or national groups share across borders. The second variable of external intervention focuses on the structural constraints on the behaviour of states. I argue that these constraints are the norms that are prevalent in international society that influence state behaviour as they exist between international law and power politics. The third variable of strategic choice factors for both instrumental rationality and value rationality. The role of elites in

decision making regarding foreign policy of irredentism is seen to be driven by instrumental motivations. The role of masses on whose support their office depends can be seen in terms of both instrumental and value rational behaviour.

I am using a non-experimental research design to understand different state behaviour with respect to the phenomenon of irredentism. The nature of inquiry is explanatory and the logic used is deductive to arrive at relationships that help explain the puzzle. I test three hypotheses that seek to establish correlation between the variables and the outcome of an irredentist conflict.

- *Weaker the transborder ties, more likely an irredentist state is to accept territorial status quo.*
- *External intervention is guided by international norms and instrumentalist rationale in irredentist conflicts.*
- *Strategic choice guides national leaders to abandon irredentist claim and accept territorial status quo.*

The research is not empiricist; I do not rely on purely quantitative analysis where it is the empirical observations that drive the programme. In such an approach, the problem remains as to how many observations are necessary or should all the cases of irredentism be accounted for before arriving at any conclusion. I rely on empirical observations that are drawn across various cases that help explain the correlation between variables. These empirical observations are drawn from the study of secondary sources, works of authors on various territorial disputes and irredentist conflicts. Further research may be necessary involving larger empirical observations and data sets including all the irredentist claims ever made to rigorously test them. From these hypotheses emerge a new hypothesis that provide promising insights into the phenomenon of irredentism and they can be further incorporated in the research programme that seeks to explain change in irredentist claims.

Approaches and Explanations

Literature on irredentism can be categorised on the basis of explanations that they offer. Realist explanations focus on material capability of the states. Robert Gilpin (1983) argues that territorial expansion is a function of distribution of material capability in the

international system. This approach sees strong relation between military superiority of the state and its claim to expansion of territory. The realist scholarship will attribute the giving up of irredentist claim by a state to military weakness. This approach does not explain why weaker powers continue to make irredentist claims against the more powerful status quo power like in the case of Ireland versus the United Kingdom. Neither does it explain why weaker states continue to make their claims against powerful status quo states like in the case of Lithuania against Poland after the Second World War. Goertz and Diehl (1992a) argue that there is no definitive link between the distribution of capabilities (military superiority) and the claim to territory. They show that distribution of capabilities matter for the period before Second World War but not afterwards. Liberal theorists argue that it is the state preferences that influence state behaviour in the international system. State preferences are linked to 'societal ideas, interests and institutions' that may lead to a revisionist preference aimed at territorial conquest (Moravcsik 1997). Constructivists argue that a revolutionary event changes the environment that has an impact on identity, repertoire of commonplaces and episteme of a society that results in innovative argumentation by advocacy groups, and successful argumentation influence state behaviour in giving up an irredentist claim (Kornprobst 2008). Rational choice explanations applicable to irredentism can be divided into ethnic ties argument and demographic argument. The ethnic ties argument presents a strong relationship between the irredentist policy of a state and rational elite calculations. If the invoking of irredentist demands to retrieve ethnic kin from another state helps political leaders to stay in power then they will do so by appealing to the ethno nationalists (Saideman 1997). The demographic argument is based on the premise that ethnically homogeneous states are more likely to make irredentist claim because the government has full support of the entire group (Horowitz 1985).

Situating the debate: What is irredentism?

Irredentism by definition falls in the category of international. It involves wars, great power intervention and reinterpretation of identity. In the realm of theory, effort has been made to delineate factors that help in identifying, understanding and analysing irredentism. In conceptualising irredentism the essential tension exists between centrality

of the role of state and centrality of the role of people. It is seen as both a policy and a movement. Ben-Israel (1991) while acknowledging the problem in defining irredentism makes a case for the centrality of state in making the irredentist claim. She says

‘Irredentism is not just any claim for annexing territory or even adjacent territory with a kin population in it, although this is sometimes the case. Irredentism pertains in the first place to territory demanded by a state on the ground that it had been or should have been an integral part of the national heritage. Ethnic populations often come into it, but it is... territory more than population that is central in irredentist movements’ (Ben-Israel 1991: 24).

The position that highlights the centrality of state in irredentist movement sees irredentism as a policy pursued by nation-states in order to retrieve their co nationalists from neighbouring country along with the territory they inhabit (Chazan 1991; Neuberger 1991; Weinstein 1991; Ambrosio 2001; Kornprobst, 2008). Second view that gives primacy to the role of people defines irredentism to include the possibility of creation of new states along with the instances of states seeking to retrieve land and people on the basis of ethnic, religious and historic ties. Horowitz defines irredentism as ‘a movement by members of an ethnic group in one state to retrieve ethnically kindred people and their territory across borders’ (Horowitz 1991: 10). Landau broadens the understanding of irredentism and suggests to look at it as ‘extreme expressions, ideological or organizational, aiming at joining or uniting (i.e., annexing) territories that the ethnic or cultural minority group inhabits or has inhabited at some historical date’ (Landau 1991: 81). These two ways of defining highlight the tension between rational instrumental state drive for territorial expansion and affective cultural motivations of groups that lead to articulation of irredentist demands.

Another way to look at irredentism is provided by Reichman and Golan who turn around the perspective and write that irredentism ‘is a particular facet of nationalism, where national movement that is a minority in a given territory seeks to rejoin the mother country’ (Reichman and Golan 1991: 51). For the purpose of this study and for better analysis, I propose to create a typology of irredentism. Based on the above mentioned discourse on defining irredentism, I propose to broadly divide irredentism into two types.

It is clear that there are essentially two bases on which the scholars are divided – state centric approach and people centric approach. I propose to typify irredentism on these lines. The two types of irredentism can then be understood as *state-led irredentism* and *state-seeking irredentism*⁹. State-led irredentism is defined as policy of the state in quest of redeeming territory and its inhabitants on the basis of national ties from neighbouring state. The example of state led irredentism would be the irredentism of the Pakistan and Somalia. State-seeking irredentism is defined as a movement by a minority group in one or more country that aims to either join its mother country where it is in majority or aims at the formation of a new state. The example of state-seeking irredentism would be the Kurds divided between Iran, Iraq and Turkey who have articulated aspirations to unite in one country; Baluchs who are made up of three contiguous groups in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran; and demands by certain Armenians to unite their kin in Soviet Union, Turkey, Iran and Lebanon in a one state, although they do not inhabit contiguous regions.

Evident Eurocentrism in Research

That the European state project has come to dominate international relations is not to be contested. The idea of nation-state is a European export to the rest of the world. The roots of establishment of the sovereign state are traced to the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia and that of the nation-state to 1789 French Revolution that triggered the age of revolutions in Europe and consolidated the idea that political borders of a state and psycho-cultural boundaries of a nation should coincide. The European experience has been appropriated by the scholarship that sees international existence from the perspective of the ‘West’. The disciplinary narrative of the international existence is a partial recollection. The experience of the war in Europe or West is recognised to have impacted the structures, composition and political outcomes everywhere else in the world (read colonies) in complex ways. Post independence colonial entities had a choice to choose either from the model of ‘liberal West’ or the ‘totalitarian communist East’. The narrative has evolved in

⁹ I borrow this terminology from Charles Tilly. He has used it to define nationalism in Europe since eighteenth century to twentieth century (Tilly 1994).

such a way that it appears that the newly recognised states had little agency or imagination. The ‘truth’ of the ‘West’, the idea of Europe as metaphor for progress together with the aspirations that freedom brings shaped the destiny of many political communities that was realised in the form of nation-states or multi-national states and later formation of regional groupings. The nation-state doctrine emerged in Europe and so did the phenomenon of irredentism. Irredentism declined in the European world and the rest of the world was expected to follow suit. The narrative is not that simple. The Eurocentric bias is evident in such a view. The communities of the world did try to emulate the nation-state model of the West but the interaction of the system with society differed over time and space. It necessarily did not follow the telos prescribed by the ‘West’ and raised new questions on the rational project of Enlightenment. It is eradication of global pathologies that remains the final goal of such a project. Believers in this project that hold allegiance to principles of objective science, universal morality and law, inclusion, interdependence, pluralism and justice have exalted the position of liberal democratic states and instead of imagining new horizons where there is multiplicity of views, rely upon optimism – Francis Fukuyama’s prophecy of end of history and victory of liberal democracy (Fukuyama 1989), fear– Samuel Huntington’s prediction of clash of civilization (Huntington 1993) or fantasy– Michael Doyle’s thesis of a democratic peace (Doyle 1983)¹⁰ undermining the very values that they claim to stand for. Jurgen Habermas (1981) argues to salvage the emancipatory potential of enlightened reason and for a readjustment of the project’s trajectory.

Irredentism –claims, outcomes and preference for status quo

Irredentism can be located in a particular historical context. The rise of the nation-state saw the rise of irredentist claims. However, as Ben-Israel has argued that irredentism can be seen as preceding modern nation-state. She cites the example of Greece where it preceded the claims of Italy. The Great Dream or Megali Idea of Greece is seen as an irredentist urge that aimed at renewal of the Byzantine Empire and aimed at appropriation

¹⁰ The words, optimism, fear and fantasy have been used to describe these three works by Grovogui (2006).

of Constantinople. The Greek claims were not made on ethnic or linguistic grounds and were neither related to the populations but were solely directed towards territories that had historical and religious significance.

In order to analyse irredentism we need to divide the disputes broadly into two groups. First, irredentist claims made in Europe and second irredentist claims made in other regions of the world. The basis of such a division lie in the fact that it was in Europe that the doctrine of nation-state took birth and was accepted and wars were fought in order to achieve congruency between nation and state, around that time the rest of the world was either oblivious to the idea of nation-state or under colonial rule. It is important to point out here that irredentist disputes emerged and increased in other regions of the world post decolonisation. When under colonial rule, the same territories made demands over land of other states (they being under occupation of another foreign power) like in the case of Somalia where fascist Italy made irredentist claims over Ethiopian territory and launched aggression in 1934 and was defeated in 1941.

I use the data compiled by Markus Kornprobst (2008), his basis of case selection is attached as Appendix. Kornprobst in his inquiry is interested only in claims made by states over the territory of another nation state on the basis of national ties. Two defining features of his definition are that first the claimant has to be a state and second the motive behind claiming the territory is nation's identity; not every claim even cast in the rhetoric of ethnic ties or historical records is deemed to be irredentist. Taking from the typology above, then these cases that I now list are all state-led irredentism. This list does not include claims made by non-state actors. In Europe in the period of 1848-1913 there were twenty irredentist disputes, during 1919-1938 there were twenty nine irredentist disputes and 1946-2000 witnessed fifteen irredentist disputes. Claims in other parts of the world emerged with the process of decolonisation. Data for irredentist claims by the rest of the world is available for the period of 1946-2000; this can be seen in the light of the fact that it is only after the process of decolonisation that the newly emerged states started making irredentist claims in order to achieve congruency between the borders of the state and boundaries of the nation. Data for irredentist claims made in different regions for this period is as follows. In Central Asia, Far East and Pacific seventeen irredentist disputes existed. In the Near East, Middle East and North Africa thirteen irredentist disputes

existed. In sub-Saharan Africa eleven irredentist disputes existed and in Americas four irredentist disputes existed.

Outcome of irredentist claim

There are five possible outcomes to an irredentist dispute. These are given below:

- a) No settlement – The dispute continues and there is no settlement regarding the status of territory. Neither the irredentist state nor the anti-irredentist state changes its position *vis-a-vis* territory in dispute.
- b) Revoking of claim – This happens when the irredentist state revokes its claim over the territory in the immediate aftermath of the anti-irredentist state's use of force or threat of use of force and there is no transfer of sovereignty over territory from irredentist to anti-irredentist state.
- c) Territorial change by force – Irredentist claim ends when irredentist state succeeds in transfer of sovereignty over the territory from anti-irredentist state with successful use of force or successful threat of use of force.
- d) Peaceful territorial change – This change is brought about by the peaceful transfer of entire or partial territory claimed by irredentist state. This transfer may be brought about by successful diplomacy often backed by credible threat of military attack.
- e) Peaceful recognition of status-quo – An irredentist claim ends with the recognition of the existing territorial status quo by the irredentist state. The irredentist state withdraws its claim without the threat or actual use of force and without any transfer of sovereignty over territory.

Regarding settlement of disputes, Kornprobst (2008) in his study on irredentism posits the following data. Since 1946-2000, there are twenty-five irredentist disputes that have reached no settlement; five have been settled by territorial change by force; two cases where claim has been revoked by force; eleven irredentist claims have been resolved by peaceful territorial change and sixteen have been resolved by peaceful recognition of existing territorial status quo. Out of these sixteen cases settled through peaceful

recognition of territorial status quo, twelve have been settled in Europe. He points out in a separate data for irredentist claims made in Europe from 1848-2000, in the period from 1848-1913 no irredentist dispute was resolved through peaceful recognition of territorial status quo out of total twenty disputes; in the period from 1919-1938 only two claims were withdrawn by peaceful recognition of territorial status quo out of twenty-nine claims; and in the period from 1946-2000 twelve out of fourteen irredentist claims were resolved through peaceful recognition of territorial status quo. The post war pattern of settlement of irredentist disputes in Europe is different from previous eras and different from the rest of the regions of the world. The dominant pattern has been peaceful recognition of territorial status quo in post second world war Europe.

He has argued that the dominant episteme of Idea of Europe replaced old episteme that focused on congruence of national and state boundaries in the states that made irredentist claims. This change in repertoire of common ideas, identity and episteme followed due to the occurring of a revolutionary event like building of wall in Berlin in Germany and 'Troubles' that began in Northern Ireland as it changed the environment in respective states. What remains puzzling as Kornprobst admits is that why Germany withdrew its irredentist claim two decades before Ireland. The revolutionary event followed by a change in environment is an important factor but it cannot explain the difference in the amount of time states take to withdraw their irredentist claims. The rise in the occurrence of irredentist strife has been attributed to political reordering or system transition (Horowitz 1991). Political reordering or system transition has occurred when empires disintegrated to form nation-states, revolutions changed the character of state, major wars brought about change in borders of states or led to demise of some states or formation of new states or events like break-up of state as was the case in disintegration of Soviet Union that brought about system transition. Partition is an important revolutionary event that was witnessed by the colonies of the imperial powers during the process of decolonisation. Partition did give rise to irredentist claims. So a revolutionary event can provide the basis on which a state can make an irredentist claim. Why is it that in the case of Europe a revolutionary event such as construction of Berlin wall not result in an increase in the intensity of irredentist claim is a valid question. Irredentism is a function

of regional conditions. Regional geo-political environment plays an important role in the initiation, process and consequence of irredentist claim.

My argument here is that, a state's decision to give up its irredentist claim by recognition of territorial status quo needs to be further understood with respect to its relationship with and role of transborder ethnic kin, outside intervention and strategic choice of the state. By focusing on these variables, we will be able to understand the relationship between regional integration and irredentist claim; understand the cases in different regions that may not have same level of regional integration but have been able to achieve a peaceful solution through recognition of status quo and most importantly these variables will help us see the role of value rationality and instrumental rationality in state behaviour regarding irredentist conflicts.

The following three chapters systematically deal with these three variables and establish links with change in irredentist policies of states.

Organisation of the Study

This study is organised into five chapters. The current chapter is the introduction, where I have traced the roots of irredentism; situated the debates around its conceptualisation and delineated the variables that will help explain the puzzle –why states do and do not give up irredentist claims. This chapter also deals with the evidence that points towards a pattern of settlement of irredentist conflicts in favour of a status quo outcome. The three subsequent chapters deal with the three variables. The first variable primarily focuses on the role of anti-irredentist state in impacting irredentist state's policy towards it; the second variable looks at the role of external actors when they intervene in an irredentist conflict and how they impact irredentist state's policy; the third variable explains the internal processes of the irredentist state itself that help explain why it gives up a claim after pursuing it for a long time and also, why some states continue to pursue the claim despite increasing costs.

Chapter two inquires into the role of transborder ties in determining the outcome of an irredentist conflict. I argue that the strength of transborder ties has an impact on the outcome of an irredentist conflict. The basis of change in transborder ties lie in the nature

of ties that ethnic/national groups share. These ties are impacted by social and economic processes. The role of the anti-irredentist state is of prime importance here that pursues policies that impacts the identity of ethnic/sub-national groups demanding unification with the parent country.

Chapter Three analyses the role of external intervention on the outcome of an irredentist conflict. In this chapter I argue that the role of third party intervention in irredentist conflicts is favoured in support of maintenance of status quo. This is due to the prevalence of norm of territorial status quo. I look into the motives of intervention of third party in an irredentist conflict, the role it adopts and inquire into the pattern of settlement of such conflicts.

Chapter Four looks into the variable of strategic choice of elites in pursuance of irredentist conflict. Domestic politics of a state impacts its policy of irredentism. In this chapter I look at various explanations of interaction between elite and their mass support. I argue that it is the change in the preferences of the groups who support the political leaders that result in state's abandoning of irredentist policy. This in turn I argue is due to the situation of hurting stalemate that is perceived by the groups who see themselves trapped in a costly deadlock and are thus willing to agree on the status quo.

Chapter 5 concludes the findings of the study and sets the course for further research.

Chapter 2

Transborder Ties

Every divided country or partitioned people is unhappy.

~ Leo Tolstoy

We have made Italy, now we have to make Italians.

~ Massimo d'Azeglio

This chapter essentially tests the first hypothesis that *weaker the transborder ties, more likely an irredentist state is to accept territorial status quo*. To begin with, it is important to first list the nature of transborder ties that may exist between groups across the border. It can be of two types – transborder ties between groups that see themselves as belonging to the same group or nation (divided by political boundaries) and transborder ties between groups that do not identify or see each other as belonging to the same nation. In the first category, there is another subdivision. First, there are groups that see themselves as forming a nation and nurture a demand to get united under single political authority and second are the groups that see themselves as belonging to the same nation but have no desire to be united under one political authority. The bases for group identification can be ethnicity, religion, historical affinity, language or geography.

For the purpose of this study, we are interested in the transborder ties between groups that see themselves as forming one nation and demand to be united under one political authority. In this context, I propose to refine the term as *transborder co-national ties*.

Two important concepts underpin this terminology – transborder ties and nation. Before moving onto the concepts, it is important to look into the two major questions that inform the hypothesis:

1. What is the meaning, causes and process of weakening transborder co-national ties?
2. Why do groups or states agree on status quo?

This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section deals with the concepts and theories related to transborder ties and nation. The next two divisions are based on the two questions that systematically look into the answers qualified by various theoretical concepts and empirical evidence. The last section summarises the findings.

Transborder ties and Nation

Transborder ties between groups making irredentist claim can be defined on the basis of two components – accessibility and affective bond. First, accessibility is understood as the extent to which groups are able to interact and communicate with each other across the border at economic and cultural level. Indicators of such interaction are intra-group communication, porousness of borders, trade and travel ties and familial ties across border. Stronger transborder ties mean that there is a high level of intra-group communication, the borders between the two states are porous and allow free movement of people from one state to another. It also indicates that trade between the two states in that region is normal or growing and travel data too shows growth or at least no decline from previous years. Familial ties are reflected by practice of inter-marriage between groups divided by borders. The second component – of affective bond between the groups is based on shared perspective of identity, religion, principle, a degree of inchoate racial- cultural affinity, historic injustice, and humanitarian consideration (Heraclides 1990). In this case, the affective ties are formed around the nation that may be based on ethnicity, religion, language, ancient history or geography.

Nation is a psycho cultural category that has been defined as

‘a named and self defined human community whose members cultivate shared myths, memories, symbols, values and traditions, reside in and identify with a historic homeland, create and disseminate a distinctive public culture, and observe shared customs and common laws’ (Smith 2008).

It is clear that there is an overlap of concepts when we talk about transborder ties and nation. Nation has been described as a ‘felt’ community (Connor 1990) and the ties that are formed around it are affective ties. Are these ties constructed or natural? Are they susceptible to change? How do groups define themselves and decide their boundaries?

These are some of the questions that need to be answered in order to understand the nature of transborder co-national ties and variance in them. Here we are probing the possibility whether a decline in the affective ties between the groups points towards a sub group differentiation, where with changing social and economic conditions a group may choose to redefine its boundaries and no longer seek redemption of the co-nationals across the border or vice-versa. In order to make sense of the above mentioned questions we need to engage with the theoretical debates on nation and national and ethnic ties.

Constructed or Natural

One of the most important inquiries in the study of nation and national and ethnic ties¹¹ has been about the nature of these ties. Are these ties given or constructed.

Primordialists¹² with the exception of culturalists¹³ believe in the 'givenness' of ethnic and national ties. They believe that the strong attachments based on common language, religion, kinship etc. are given by nature.

Since these ties are seen as given by nature, then they are also seen as fixed or rigid or unchanging. This view then implies that the nature of ties essentially remains the same and is passed on from one generation to another. This view has been challenged by various studies that argue that it denies any agency to individual. It has been argued that

¹¹ I use both the terms ethnic groups and nations to signify the distinction between them (similarly differentiate between ethnic ties and national ties; ethnicity and nationality/nationalism). The terms have many overlaps as both ethnic groups and nations are defined in terms of who they are not. Geertz identifies ethnic groups 'as possible self-standing, maximal social units, as candidates for nationhood' (Geertz 1963: 111). Ethnic groups have been seen as potential nationalities (Enloe 1973: 12-13). Hastings sees ethnicity as 'a group of people with a shared cultural identity and spoken language' and nation as a 'far more self-conscious community than an ethnicity. Formed from one or more ethnicities, and normally identified by a literature of its own, it possesses or claims the right to political identity and autonomy as a people' (Hastings 1997: 3). Young articulates the distinction between the two as 'Ethnicity in the great majority of instances in the developing world differs from nationalism in its lack of ideological elaboration and in the absence of any serious aspiration to the total autonomy required by nationalism' (Young 1976: 72). For the purpose of our study, where ethnic groups support irredentist policies, they are closer to be identified as potential nationalities.

¹² Primordialist is one of the earlier paradigms in the study of nation and nationalism. The term was first used by Edward Shils in his 1957 article where he has argued that the strength of attachments that one feels for her/his family can be described only as 'primordial'. Geertz (1993 [1973]) used the term to explain the origins and strength of ethnic identities.

¹³ Umut Ozkirimli (2000) has argued that primordialists are not a monolithic category and has classified them as 'naturalist', 'sociobiological' and 'culturalist'. The naturalist approach is characterised in the writings of nationalists; perennialists argue that nations have always existed; sociobiologists argue that origins of ethnic and national ties lie in genetic mechanisms and instincts; culturalists give importance to the perceptions and beliefs of individuals who see strong attachments as sacred.

the role of an individual is important in the construction of ethnic identity as her/his choice plays an important role in determining what will constitute the ethnic identity markers and ties. Ethnic identities are then not rigid or fixed but fluid. Their boundaries are susceptible to change and so are the markers that constitute them. In contrast, the instrumentalist approach argues for variance in primordial attachments.

Ethnosymbolists¹⁴ also argue that ethnic ties are subject to change just as other social bonds.

The instrumentalist approach of Paul Brass questions the source of emotional attachment like language, religion, place of birth, kinship. With regards to language, Brass points out that there are many people who speak more than one language, dialect or code in multilingual developing societies and there are illiterate people in these societies who are unaware even of the name of their mother tongues (Brass 1991: 70). There are also cases where groups chose to change their language in order to provide better opportunities for their children or people who never attach any emotional significance to language (Brass 1991: 70). In the case of religion, it has been noted that it has been subjected to many changes over the centuries. He points out that ‘shifts in religious practices brought about under the influence of religious reformers are common occurrences in pre-modern, modernizing, and even in post-industrial societies’ (Brass1991: 71). Alternate spiritual quests are also emerging as an option for people in many cosmopolitan settings. Homeland or place of birth is important for many people but Brass points out the case of many people who have chosen to migrate from their native places and have acquired new identities in their effort to get assimilated in the new societies where they migrated to and for some this has lead to complete dissociation from any sense of identification with the homeland (Brass 1991: 71). With respect to kinship ties, Brass discounts their political significance as they are limited to a very small range. Over a long range these ties acquire a ‘fictive’ character and thus become variable by definition as meanings of such

¹⁴ Ethnosymbolism is another paradigm in the study of nation and nationalism. It challenges the arguments of the Modernists that see nation and national ties as ‘constructed’ or ‘invented’ on the basis of evidence of pre existing ethnic ties and sentiments based on earlier myths, symbols, values and memories in many parts of the world that lead to formation of modern nations.

relationships vary from person to person (Brass 1991: 71). The ties are then more 'imagined' and vary over time and space.

Ethnosymbolist, Anthony D. Smith argues that 'ethnic ties like other social bonds are subject to economic, social and political forces, and therefore fluctuate and change according to circumstances' (Smith 1995: 33). He questions as to why primordialism 'fails to explain why particular ethnic communities emerge, change and dissolve. Or why so many people choose to emigrate and assimilate to other ethnies. Nor can it explain why in some cases we witness a fierce xenophobic ethnic nationalism and in others a more tolerant, multicultural national identity' (Smith 1996: 446)

Ethnic and national ties in the light of present debate are clearly not natural. They are susceptible to change with social interaction.

Affect and Emotion

Affect and emotion in this context can be understood in two relationships that reinforce each other, one between people, and two between land and people. Primordialists argue that affect and emotion are central to ethnic and national ties. Eller and Coughlan (1993) object to this view and argue that they have mystified these ties. This objection is based on the contention that these ties are understood as just being there without the possibility of them arising out of social interaction. Tilley (1997) reviews extract from Geertz's *Interpretation of Cultures* that Eller and Coughlan cite

'By primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the "givens"- or, more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed "givens"- of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of language, and following particular social practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering coerciveness in and of themselves (1973, p.259; emphasis added)' (Tilley 1997).

Tilley then points out that Geertz

'argues not that the 'givens' of social existence are 'natural' or ultimate 'givens' but that such principles are 'assumed' to be 'given' by individuals. He also specifies the social (not 'natural') character of such 'givens': kin, ties, religion, language and customs...For Geertz, such perceived primordality is not 'mystical'

or 'sacred' ...Instead, Geertz observes that people's perception of kin ties seem to them to reflect 'natural' rather than culturally or cognitively constructed relations, and that some people define such fundamental relations as sacred' (Tilley 1997).

Tilley then suggests that 'the 'primordial' elements of culture are not affect but the cognitive framework which shapes and informs affect. Certain assumptions or knowledge systems form a kind of cognitive substratum not only for affect but for most conscious thought, they might be said to be primordial' (Tilley 1997: 503).

Ozkirimli (2000) argues that the relevance of primordialism lies beyond its relevance to understanding of ethnic groups with long and rich cultural heritages as argued by Brass(1991) or even beyond its enabling perspective that helps in understanding of 'enduring power and hold of ethnic ties' as argued by Smith (1995: 34). He says that

'primordialism, as defined by Geertz and elaborated by Tilley, that is in the sense of webs of meaning spun by individuals and the strong emotions these meanings generate, enables us to explore how these meanings are produced and reproduced...The concept underlines the importance of perceptions and beliefs in guiding human action' (Ozkirimli 2000: 83).

Affect and emotion are an important component of ethnic and national ties. Primordialist offer a perspective that does not see affect as independent of social interaction but rather are interested in the meaning that individuals assign to such ties which assumes emotion or affect to be 'given'. There is then a possibility that the meaning of ties will undergo change when the assumptions that underpin the meaning, change.

There is another tie – that between people and land that acquires enduring character because of affect. It may have been constructed or real, that is irrelevant. What is more important is to understand its continuation. It is one of the features that are important in the persistence of nations. The idea of homeland drives affection and cultivation of attachment to particular historic territories within identified borders. This attachment to homeland is related to the idea of sacred. The territory is sanctified. Smith argues that 'the long term process of the "territorialization of memories"' is related to the idea of 'sacred territory' (Smith 2008: 43). He says that the land acquires a holy character and distinction from rest of the surrounding landscape if that land 'has "seen" the footsteps of the prophet, sage, and saint and "heard" their preaching' (Smith 2008: 43). He says this

process of attachment is a cultural resource that makes land a part of national identity. He further points out that

‘This process of sanctification may be extended to the example and deeds of ethnic heroes, heroines, and geniuses, evoking reverence and emulation on the part of their descendants. And not just heroes, but the whole people may be deemed to be holy, and hence set apart, as was the case in ancient Israel, where the land became not just the promised land, but itself an object of devotion and piety as a result of the people’s sanctity...These holy sites can be rivers and mountains, cities, temples and battlefields, as well as excavations and museums, but they are their most potent in the graveyards of “our ancestors” and at the tombs of fallen patriots; for their last resting place bid us reflect on the sacredness of “our past” and “our homeland”’ (Smith 2008: 43).

Since land acquires a shared attachment based on its sacredness, it generates powerful emotions and the need to defend it and make sacrifice in the name of community and homeland.

Boundaries of ethnic groups and nations

This section deals with the issue of boundaries of ethnic groups and nations. Fredrik Barth in his work *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* (1969) deals with the issue of boundaries and their persistence among ethnic groups. He argues that ‘boundaries persist despite the flow of personnel across them’ and that ‘stable, persisting, and often vitally important social relations are maintained across such boundaries and are frequently based precisely on the dichotomized ethnic statuses’ (Barth 1969:10). This view implies that the absence of social interaction does not entail ethnic distinctions but on the contrary, it is often based on ‘the very foundations on which embracing social systems are built’ (Barth 1969: 10). He argues that

‘it is inadequate to regard overt institutional forms as constituting the cultural features which at any time distinguish an ethnic group – these overt forms are transmitted by ecology as well as transmitted by culture. Nor can it be claimed that every such diversification within a group represents the first step in the direction of subdivision and multiplication of units’ (Barth 1969: 13).

Barth makes a case for a viewpoint that ‘does not confuse the effects of ecologic circumstances on behaviour with those of cultural tradition but which makes it possible to separate these factors and investigate the nonecological cultural and social components

creating diversity' (Barth 1969: 13). He does not however deal with the case wherein overt differences lead to a mistaken assumption of value differences.

Barth emphasises on analysing socially relevant factors. For this he proposes to see ethnic group as an organisation and points out that it is ascription – by self and by others that is the critical feature of an ethnic group. It classifies person on the most basic terms – his origin and background. He argues that the

‘cultural features that signal the boundary may change and the cultural characteristics of the members may likewise be transformed...yet the fact of continuing dichotomization between members and outsiders allows us to specify the nature of continuity and investigate the changing cultural form and content’ (Barth 1969: 14).

According to Barth it is the ethnic boundary that defines the group – social boundary though it may have territorial counterpart. The occupation of exclusive territory need not always be the basis for identity of an ethnic group. Following from the above, it is clear that an ethnic boundary is not drawn on the basis of differences in cultural elements.

There are cases where there are much cultural similarities between groups and differentiation within groups. There are only very specific items of culture significant for ascription to ethnic group. These specific cultural features may change but separation of ethnic group will be maintained as long as there are ways of dichotomising between members and outsiders.

The nation too defines itself on the basis of difference, real or perceived with the ‘other’ (Smith 1986). Cohen to distinguish British national identity argues that ‘one only knows who one is by who one is not’ (Cohen 1994:198). To define themselves as unique nations and ethnic community rely on their cultural heritage which is the creation and cultivation of shared memories, symbols, myths, values and traditions (Smith 2008: 34). Territory is important in the formation of a nation and even in case of ethnic groups where ‘territorialization of memories’ leads to creation of *ethnoscapes* and emergence of nations (Smith 2008: 35). Smith points out two processes ‘by which the memories and histories of a community are linked to specific places, namely, “the naturalization of community” and the “historicization of nature”’ (Smith 2008: 35). In the first process, ‘historic environments are perceived as “natural outgrowths” and their monuments become

“fixtures” of their landscapes’ and in the second process, ‘nature itself becomes historicized: the territory and habitat of the community become inseparable from its history and culture’ (Smith 2008: 35-36). It thus follows that for a nation, territorial boundary becomes more important feature than it is for ethnic groups. As nations solidify these territorial boundaries, they transform into borders.

Borders and Boundaries

Not all borders emerge from the boundaries that nations use to define themselves as distinct from the ‘other’. Some borders are forced politically by outside powers. This has especially been the case during colonialism and the political borders demarcated by colonial masters were later imposed or sometimes willingly accepted by the newly independent states. To understand the relationship between politically conscious communities and borders, one needs to look into the relationship between ethnicity, nationalism and politics. The approach is broadly divided into two paradigms. The first view sees ethnic divisions and nation formation as a function of politics. This view held by modernists and instrumentalists focuses on the impact of politics on ethnic and national identity. It analyses the role of elites, political leaders and parties in using ethnicity and nationalism as a means in their power struggles or the role of state in the creation of ethnic groups and nations and clashes between them. It sees nations and nationalisms as modern phenomenon and product of modern conditions of legal rational bureaucratic state and capitalism.

The other view reverses this approach. It analyses the impact of ethnicity and nationalism on politics. It studies the impact of ethnic groups and nationalist movement as pressure groups that influence politics or the impact of culture and ethnicity. Smith argues that modernists are unable to account why so many people are ready to lay down their lives in the name of nation and only tell recent half of the story of nation and nationalism and, they miss the other half ‘the fact that so many modern nations have been built on the foundations of pre-existing ethnies’ (Smith 1996: 446). In his case for analysis of relationship between culture and politics, Smith identifies

‘three major trends : the purification of culture through authentication, which can lead to cultural and social exclusion; the universalization of ethnic chosenness

through nationalist ideology, which engenders national solidarity and self-assertion; and the territorialization of shared memory, which inspires historical claims to historic homelands and sacred sites'(Smith 1996: 445).

Smith has argued that eighteenth century Romanticism played a very important role in creating a collective consciousness about the national landscapes. This process of attachment was due to

'Romanticism's cult of Nature, and of the appropriate expression of emotions in its presence, as with the growing fascination with the Alps. The Romantics turned the territory into poetic landscapes, and made it a key component of the very conception of a nation. For nationalists, the nation is nothing if not a community of territory, where land and landscape provide both the "objective" and "subjective" bases – the very groundwork – of a genuine national community'(Smith 2008: 36).

It is important to clarify here that Smith points out the role of Romantics in the process of nation formation and stresses upon the cultural processes like sanctification of territory for the continued persistence of nations enunciated in the section on affect and emotion.

The state centric approach held by scholars like Mann (1993, 1994, 1996), Tilly (1975, 1990), Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983), Giddens (1985) and Brueilly (1993) argues that it is the state whether ancient or modern that plays a primary role in creating ethnic groups and nations. They argue that nationalism is a modern construct that has been used by the elites to legitimise their political goals. Nationalism acts as a powerful force that is purely political in nature with no solid links to culture or identity. It only uses the historicist idea of an organic nation fictive and specious to demand legitimacy for the existence of the state. Nationalism helps in the formation of a nation that is led by the state for its own foundations and continuation.

In case of ethnic communities when their organisation is political, one of the ways that they maintain the boundary is through demands of formation of political borders. Barth has argued that the mode of organisation of ethnic group varies and contemporary forms of such organisation are political in character. To further this point he says

'Such political movement constitute new ways of making cultural differences organizationally relevant and new ways of articulating the dichotomized ethnic groups. The proliferation of ethnically based pressure groups, political parties, and visions of independent statehood, as well as the multitude of subpolitical

advancement associations show the importance of these new forms' (Barth 1969: 26).

He argues that these new forms of poly-ethnic system based on 'revocable political affiliation and sanctioned by the use of force and political fiat' are more turbulent and unstable than older traditional poly-ethnic systems that were based on articulation in the economic sector, 'through occupational differentiation and articulation at the market place in many regions of Asia and Middle America, or most elaborately, through agrarian production in South Asia' (Barth 1969: 26).

Weaker ties – meaning, process and causes

Most of the nations and nationalisms are modern. The ideology of nationalism appeared in eighteenth century. Different paradigms in the study of nation and nationalism differ about the emergence of nation- whether they are modern or primordial or historical but immemorial. We need not get into this debate here. We are concerned here with the concept of irredentism that is inherently linked with the concept of nation-state, and that this particular variant of political organisation of communities emerged with the French revolution makes it modern. Thus, the nation-state is a modern concept based on the modern conception of civic territorial state where the legitimation of authority is derived from ideology of nationalism and formation and existence of nation. As seen in earlier sections, the modernist conception of nation is largely instrumental. It adopts a state centric approach and argues that it is the politics that impact the ethnic and national groups. Another position articulated most strongly by Anthony D. Smith accepts that most of the nations and nationalism as an ideology and movement are modern, but point out that the modernists fail to explain why are groups easy to mobilise in the name of ethnicity or nation to the extent that they are willing to sacrifice their lives in its name. To explain this, he argues that we need to look into the pre-existing ethnic ties, existence of *ethnies* that are the link between pre-modern organisation of societies and modern emergence of the present nations. It is these ties that still bind the people and they are ready to die for them.

The meaning of weaker ties then implies that individuals are no longer willing to sacrifice their lives for the national group's irredentist demand. For the purpose of this study, we

do not define it in terms of accessibility of groups to each other. It may be high or it may be low but that does not help as an indicator as the phenomenon under study is violent in nature. Anti-irredentist state's response to an irredentist claim is to revoke all ties especially in the region that is being claimed and lock it down. The ties may remain strong even in the absence of accessibility of groups to each other and they may not be strong even when there is high accessibility. So weaker ties in terms of transborder conational ties is defined as when groups or individuals belonging to that group are no longer willing to sacrifice their lives for the irredentist claim. Now we look at the process and causes of the weakening of these ties.

In order to understand our puzzle, I propose a synthesis of these two views (modernist and ethnosymbolist). It is important to see the relationship between politics and ethnic communities and nations as reflexive. They both interact and impact each other. Irredentism is a phenomenon that allows us to study this reflexive process. This view implies that state led policies impact ethnic groups and nations and at the same time these groups organised politically act as pressure groups and impact the policies of the state. This reflexive relationship in some cases results in redefining state borders and in some cases redefining the boundaries of nation and ethnic groups.

It is important to see that this reflexive process is undergoing in both the states – irredentist and anti-irredentist and in turn they both have an impact on each other's policies. An anti-irredentist state, in order to counter irredentist claims of neighbouring state promote policies that aim at altering the demographics of the territory through promotion of settlement of other ethnic groups or through constructing new identities by promoting certain language or denying space to certain language. By providing better socio-economic conditions and flexible minority rights, a state may be able to change the attitude of groups that have ties across border and may not desire to merge with the mother country. A change in the attitude of kin group, the group that the mother country wants to redeem will weaken the irredentist claim of the mother country. An anti-irredentist state may not always respond by welfare measures towards the irredentist demands of the group, it may respond by increased securitisation and locking down of the group, by restricting access of people across border, and constructing new barriers to

trade and travel. In practice, the anti-irredentist state responds by mixing the two approaches in different degrees. It increases securitisation and restricts cross border ties and at the same time pursues welfare policies bordering on appeasement of the group. Changing socio-economic conditions may lead the group to prefer to stay in a more prosperous country where its occupation and access to power helps in creating new boundaries that differentiates it from the 'other'. This '*mutation of identities*' can be a result of repressive policies of the state over the time, where a new national identity corresponding to the anti-irredentist state's national identity replaces the ethnic identity of the group pursuing irredentist claims. Language policies and change in demographics by settlement of other majority group in the area against which claims are made are popular policies pursued by states.

In the case of irredentism across Laos-Cambodia border, the policies of the Cambodian government in the late 1950s were largely directed against the Lao language and education was an important part of the government's strategy and schools and important site. Ian Baird (2010) in his study recounts

'A number of ethnic Lao former students recalled to me how, in the 1960s, speaking even a word of Lao in school was a punishable offence, whereas both Lao and Khmer were taught to ethnic Lao students during the latter years of the French colonial period. One former student told me that he had to stand in a sunny corner of the school for hours when he made the mistake of uttering a Lao word. Another former student remembered that students were fined if they spoke Lao in school. In some places a special book existed. The first student each day who spoke Lao would be given the book, and if someone else did so later in the day, the book would be passed to that student, and so on. By the end of the day, whoever was holding the book would be fined' (Baird 2010: 196).

In the 1960s in the Stung Treng Town anyone caught speaking Lao at the market would be fined 25 Riel. Sangkhum's government also tried

'encouraging 600 Khmer families from central Cambodian provinces to move to the northeast. As part of the scheme, each family received 2 pairs of buffaloes, 1 pair of cows, 1 wagon, 1 ox-cart, land, wood to construct a house, and rice supplies for 3 years. Three hundred Khmer families were also moved to Siem Pang District along the Sekong River in 1957, of which only about 100 ended up staying' (Baird 2010: 196).

In his study Baird points out that there are ethnic Lao people who prefer to call themselves as Khmer as they see it as *sia nayobai* (betray government policy). He further points out that the government has

‘altered the discourses regarding the Lao population by officially labelling many of the ethnic Lao people born in Cambodia as Khmer, whereas only those actually born in Laos and who then immigrated to Cambodia are consistently referred to as Lao, even if they are already Cambodian citizens. Many ethnic Lao people born in Cambodia are classified as Khmer if they are Cambodian citizens, even if their first language is Lao. Some ethnic Lao citizens of Cambodia have also voluntarily adopted the Khmer identity’ (Baird 2010: 209).

In his study of the grade 12 social studies book of Khmer language, Baird observes that the lack of mention of Laos in the section about ethnic groups of Cambodia shows that Laos are ‘subjects of a discourse of silence’ and there is a ‘discursive erasing of their presence from the country’ (Baird 2010: 211).

Baird notes that irredentist feelings in north-eastern Cambodia are subtle and with time (it has been over 100 years since the Stung Treng Town was taken from Laos and given to Cambodia) most of the people of ethnic Lao origin now see themselves as citizens of Cambodia. At the same time they do see their culture and language as an important heritage. Their identity at the national level belongs to Cambodia and at the level of ethnicity it belongs to the Laos. In terms of accessibility, ethnic Lao freely and frequently travel to Laos to meet friends and relatives and for business purposes and thus they are able to exhibit different identities in multiple spaces. He gives the example that they are Cambodian in the spaces of the government and Khmer dominated areas, while in their homes and places dominated by Lao and in Laos their Lao identity is what represents them. He notes that ‘there are Lao and Khmer spaces in Cambodia’ (Baird 2010: 213).

Another case is that of peaceful recognition of South Tyrol region as part of Italy by Austria after pursuing irredentist demand for twenty years. Austria despite historical justification gave up its irredentist demand. South Tyrol was given to Italy in 1919 by the alliance powers as ‘spoils of war’. Tyrol was since 500 years part of Austria and almost totally German speaking. The province of Tyrol was divided and the south was given to Italy. On 6 September 1919, the National Assembly in Vienna agreed to make South

Tyrol a part of Italy by the vote of ninety seven to twenty three. Eduard Reut-Nicolussi, South Tyrolean lawyer and politician in his speech to the Assembly said

‘In the face of this treaty, we say with every fiber of our being, with rage and pain: No! An eternal, irrevocable No! [Thunderous applause throughout the chamber, with spectators in the packed galleries joining in]...In South Tyrol, a desperate struggle will now begin for each farm, each townhouse, each vineyard. This will be a struggle utilizing all the weapons of the mind and all the means of politics. And it will be a desperate struggle because we – a quarter of a million Germans – are being pitted against 40 million Italians in what is truly not a battle of equals’ (Reproduced as quoted by Steininger 2003: 5-6).

Following the First World War, the majority in the South Tyrol which now became minority was subjected to fascist policies. This was done through language policies where German, resettlement of Italians from other parts in the region to gain Italian majority. Weigend (1950) in his study conducted after three decades since the new boundary in South Tyrol was imposed writes that

‘On both sides settlement types, language, customs, and farm organization were similar or alike. Many farmers owned land on the opposite side, and in normal times difficulties of crossing were not great; farmers in the north- eastern South Tyrol were still able to send their herds to their mountain pastures in Austria. In view of the many centuries of the South Tyrol's political unity with, and ethnic relationship to, the Austrian Tyrol, the close ties with friends and relatives on the other side of the border are not surprising, though contacts became weaker as time passed. During and after World War II visiting permits were curtailed, and contacts were, and still are, very few’ (Weigend1990: 364).

It is obvious that a region that was German dominated and since centuries under Austrian rule would not have a sizeable Italian population. Weigend gives the data that before 1919, ninety per cent of population of South Tyrol was German and only 2 per cent was Italian. By 1943 the German population comprised sixty per cent and the Italian population increased to thirty-six per cent. The fascist government followed the policy of Italianisation of the region and gave financial subsidies to people to settle in the area. The rural settlement programme was largely a failure but the urban settlement was a success. He gives the demographic data of the town of Bolzano that witnessed establishment of new industries and businesses which was 5 per cent Italian in 1910 and between seventy-five to eighty per cent Italian in 1948. The change in demographics was also caused by the Hitler-Mussolini pact that allowed Germans to choose either German or Italian citizenship. About seventy-seven per cent chose to accept German citizenship and

emigrate to Germany by 1942. War broke out shortly and only 75,000 Germans could move from the province to Germany. In 1943, the movement was completely stopped. After the war was over, Austria's demand to return South Tyrol were rejected, though the British pressure resulted in an agreement between Austria and Italy in 1946 granting autonomy for South Tyrol. However, there was little in the name of autonomy that Italy granted to the region. The demands for autonomy and self determination increased, and in 1960 Austria placed the issue before the United Nations. Negotiations failed and it was only in 1969 that negotiations resulted in a new plan for autonomy that came to be known as the 'package'. In 1992 Austria and Italy officially ended their dispute.

Weigend concludes his findings in 1950 on the basis of economic integration that has taken place of South Tyrol with Italy, which was also the basis of Italy's argument against the transfer of South Tyrol to Austria after the World War II negotiations as

'Since establishment of the new boundary in 1919, South Tyrolese economy has become adjusted to, and integrated with, the economy of Italy. The German-speaking inhabitants, even though culturally bound to their neighbors in the north, in general feel that economic adjustment and integration have gone so far that a revision of the boundary would be a shattering blow. There are a few who agitate actively for annexation to Austria, but they are mainly those who remember the South Tyrol as part of the glorious Austro-Hungarian Empire and think that their position could become as favorable again. Most of the Germans, and also the Ladins, are satisfied with their present political and economic status. They have a regional autonomy, which mean that they have a voice in their local government and that their cultural heritage is being respected. Some of the younger people interviewed stressed the futility of irredentist movements from within or without the South Tyrol and mostly they are from without' (Weigend1950: 375).

In Alsace Lorraine an end to irredentism is related to continuous mutation of identities that has largely been shaped by the policies of the French government. Language has been the basis of identity in this region. Alsatian dialect is a mix of two Germanic languages – Alemanian and Franconian each of which is divided into the two regions of Alsace and Lorraine. The attachment to language is exemplified in this slogan 'Unsri Sproch isch unsri Seel' – 'our language is our soul'.¹⁵ The government has followed a policy of strengthening and spreading the French language. This is accompanied by the gradual elimination of German language and decay and decline of the dialects (Gutmann

¹⁵ Reproduced as mentioned in Emanuel Gutmann's (1991) essay 'Concealed or Conjured Irredentism: The Case of Alsace'.

1991). The process of active ‘francization’ of the region is understood by the changing use of language among the inhabitants of the region. Gutmann (1991) points out that Andre Ulrich wrote after one hundred years of French takeover of most of Alsatian lands that for every single person who knows French in the region, there are three hundred who do not. Tracing the growth of French language, Gutmann informs that by 1870, French became a language of social and administrative elites, but in 1918 after fifty years of incorporation in Germany and back, only 2 per cent of population spoke French with fluency and only 8 per cent had relatively good knowledge of it. After thirteen years French became the second language for almost fifty to sixty per cent of population. From then onwards, he points out that the number of French speakers is nearing hundred per cent most of whom have reading and writing skills and French is increasingly acquiring the status of first language. The increase in the use of French has been accompanied by the decline in the usage of German. By the estimates given by Gutmann by 1964, eighty per cent of Alsatians were unable to write or read German although they spoke their dialects, and by mid 1980’s one fourth of Alsatians had little or no knowledge of the German language.

Alsace has had an inextricable link with Germany in social, political and cultural sense. It has been the centre of German language, philosophy and theology. Many links of Alsace were broken off once its incorporation into French state began in 1648. Bilingualism became a central characteristic of the Alsatian identity. In 1793, as Gutmann mentions, citizens unable to speak French were threatened to be shot and many were. In 1853, French was introduced as the language of primary education. Germany annexed Alsace and Moselle department of Lorraine after it defeated France in Franco-Prussian war, 1871. The Germans were able to significantly reverse the ‘previous process of francization and re-established the ascendancy of the German language and culture to the almost complete elimination of French...closely tied the politics and economy of Alsace to those of Germany’ (Gutmann 1991: 44). At the same time there were segments of the population that were alienated. The division amongst the people is indicated by the conscription in the army during First World War, where quarter of a million joined Kaiser’s army and 20,000 fought from the French side. This shows the impact of a state’s policy on the identity of its people. In case of inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine, the

policies of both the states of France and Germany influenced their identities. Post Second World War the French again regained the region and introduced policies that outlawed the learning of German language. In 1950's the Deixonne Law provided for learning of regional languages with the exception of three languages – Corse, Flemish and German. It was after 1970 that German was gradually introduced in primary schools. Ernest Renan's most famous lines from his lecture on nationalism in 1882 fits the case of Alsace-Lorraine about nation being 'a daily plebiscite' and to add to it that it is so due to the state led policies aimed at building new identities.

In 2011, the Rangarajan committee set up by the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh recommended a job plan for the Kashmiri youth that would provide them with market based skills and train 100,000 of them to get jobs in the next five years. The Indian government has been following a policy of politically and economically integrating Kashmir with the rest of India as it continues to reject Pakistani claims over the Indian Administered Kashmir and at the same time it remains one of the most heavily militarised zones in the world. Kashmiri identity has undergone multiple changes since the time the British left the subcontinent divided. Ethnic mobilisation in Kashmir is primarily along three lines – sections in Indian administered Kashmir that wish to join Pakistan, there are some in Pakistan administered Kashmir that wish to join India, and there are many in both the areas that wish to form a new state altogether. Kashmir remains an important artefact for both Indian and Pakistani nationalism. The Pakistani claim on the Indian administered Kashmir is stronger and voiced more frequently than the Indian claim on Pakistan administered Kashmir. India's position regarding the status of Pakistan administered Kashmir (or Pakistan occupied Kashmir as India refers to it) has not changed since 1948 as being an integral part of India. Indian claims on Pakistan administered Kashmir can be interpreted as irredentist and so do the Pakistani claims over Indian administered Kashmir. Indian state responding as an anti-irredentist state since 1948 has responded to the aspirations of the Kashmiris by a strong intervention by the centre in state politics. It did not pursue language policies or settlement of other groups in order to change the demographics of the area but largely responded to the crisis in 1989 as a security problem. It heavily militarised the region and actively sought to manage the insurgency. The political and social aspirations of the region have largely

been muffled. The Kashmiri identity has undergone mutation from the earlier conception of *Kashmiriyat* – as articulated by Sheikh Abdullah of it being a secular concept – to it slowly becoming a religious identity (Hewitt 2002). India hardened its position with respect to plebiscite in Kashmir and its Parliament in 1956 voted Jammu and Kashmir to be an integral part of India. Deep seated suspicion on Kashmiri loyalty led to heavy intrusion of the Centre first by Indira Gandhi and then by Rajiv Gandhi that further amplified the political aspirations of the Kashmiris. These interventions were not followed by any policy that would aim at improving the socio-economic conditions of the people (Hewitt 2002). Kashmiris have managed to keep strong links across the border, the Line of Control, and their positions have reified over a period of time. Sheikh Abdullah was actively associated with – Plebiscite Front – an organisation that demanded the conduct of plebiscite in Kashmir and was in constant negotiations with Kashmiri leaders across the Line of Control. These ties still remain, and I argue that it is the persistence of these ties that fuels Pakistani claim over Indian administered Kashmir. There is another tie, that of religious affinity that provides explanation. It is important to inquire what explains the support of the people from different ethnic groups and their willingness to die for the accession of Kashmir. I argue that there is an element of affect that drives the Pakistani population to support the irredentist demand of the Pakistani state that is primarily based on religious affinity and that in turn can be associated with the Islamisation of the Pakistani population. The Pakistani state embarked on the process of Islamisation under the Zia regime where the state deepened and entrenched the religious identity of the people and made it the primary marker of identity that coincided or became synonymous with identity of a Pakistani citizen.

Why Status quo

Transborder co-national ties are susceptible to change and there occurs a mutation of identities that is state led. Still what remains to be explained is the irredentist state's acceptance of the status quo. Why does the irredentist state accept territorial status quo? An anti-irredentist state pursues policies to maintain the status quo and the aim of irredentist state is to revise it.

As transborder co-national ties change due to the formation of new identities or rather a mutation of identities that is the result of policies of the state, these new changes in the identity form around the state borders. The borders of the state get redefined as the boundary of the group. The group that earlier sought reunification with the parent country no longer defines itself purely in terms of its ethnicity. The nationality or more correctly the citizenship of the group is accepted as primary identity. The dialectics that takes place between the loyalty to the nation (or ethnic group) and loyalty to the state result in the formation of a new identity. This new identity embraces the both – ethnic/national identity (minority group ascription) and identity of that of the citizen of the particular state (majority group ascription). This happens in cases where anti-irredentist state's policies have been successful in altering the political aspirations of the minority residing within its borders.

I argue that it is this new boundary which is formed between the groups – that earlier perceived each other to belong to the same nation and were ready to sacrifice their lives for it – results in altering of their loyalties, where they no longer see each other as belonging to the same group and are thus no longer willing to sacrifice their lives to reunite. The groups residing in the anti-irredentist state that earlier nurtured irredentist demands, become status-quoist and are in favour of the resolution of conflict that does not involve changes in the borders of the state. This change in the ties between the groups influences the irredentist state's policies that make it more likely to accept the territorial status quo.

New identities emerge along the border that divide the two states and then divides the homogeneous groups. The anti-irredentist state when successful in altering the demography of the region makes its case stronger for the status quo. It becomes successful in altering the language and culture and evolving new socio political linkages with the rest of the country. The border becomes the boundary mainly due to the policies of the anti-irredentist state.

Conclusion

This chapter tested the hypothesis that weaker transborder ties results in the irredentist states acceptance of status quo. Weaker ties are largely result of the policies of the anti-irredentist state. Ethnic or national ties are not rigid and are capable of changing over time. The fusion of modernist and ethnosymbolist view that explains change in the ties that define a group help explain this change in irredentist behaviour of groups and state. From the modernist view we borrow the centrality of state that is largely instrumental in shaping the identities of the groups. This view however, does not explain why the groups are willing to fight and die for each other. The answer is found in the ethnosymbolist view that explains the ties to be based on previously existing 'ethnies' around which it is easier to mobilise people. The fact that nations and nationalism and the concept of nation state being modern does not preclude the fact that national ties cannot be formed by a state if there are no previous existing ties. The state can play a role in either strengthening these ties or weakening them. In cases where the anti-irredentist state is successful in weakening these ties, it leads to '*mutation of identities*' where the group that earlier sought incorporation in the parent country no longer nourishes that demand.

It is important to point out here that this hypothesis when tested accounts mostly for the behaviour of the anti-irredentist state. It helps explain the policies of anti-irredentist state in successfully influencing the outcome. The role played by the irredentist state in the weakening of the ties remains a conceptual challenge. The acceptance of status quo and changes in the policy of the irredentist state is better accounted for by the variable of external intervention. I argue in the next chapter that external intervention or third party intervention in irredentist conflict is tilted in the favour of a status quo solution and that has an impact on the claim being made by the irredentist state.

Chapter 3

External Intervention

*If you want government to intervene domestically,
you're a liberal.*

*If you want government to intervene overseas,
you're a conservative.*

*If you want government to intervene everywhere,
you're a moderate.*

*If you don't want government to intervene anywhere,
you're an extremist.*

~ Joseph Sobran

This chapter tests the hypothesis that *external intervention is guided by international norms and instrumentalist rationale in irredentist conflicts*. External intervention is defined as response from international actors that are not party to the conflict. Their response can vary in the form of mediation, arbitration or negotiations or by issuing warnings to states to not to attempt to wage war or participate in war from the side of its ally. This hypothesis is informed by the increasing trend of acceptance of territorial status quo in outcome of irredentist conflicts (Kornprobst 2008). I argue that external intervention in irredentist conflict is guided by the norm of territorial integrity of states. The decision of the states to promote status quo outcome is driven by instrumentalist concerns as the norm of territorial status quo is a hegemonic norm (Goertz and Diehl 1992b) that enjoys support from maximum states. The norm is not in conflict with the interest of most of the states and it is the challenger states that see the norm in conflict with their self-interest. Instrumentalist rationale is defined as the logic of action that has no link or is unrelated to ethnic ties.

It is important to clarify here that international norms regarding territory have undergone change since the birth of the modern nation state. The present international norm

promotes the outcome of an irredentist conflict as acceptance of territorial status quo. During the eighteenth and nineteenth century the accepted international norm recognised the legitimacy of conquest of territory for congruence of boundaries and borders of nation and state.

This chapter essentially looks at the following three major questions

1. What motivates third party to intervene in an irredentist conflict?
2. What are the types of intervention and actions that follow once the third party decides to intervene?
3. Is there a pattern in the outcome of irredentist conflict and what guides such behaviour?

The chapter is divided into four sections. The first three are divided on the basis of the three questions posed above. The first section looks at theories that try to establish a link between the nature of conflict and the probability of third party intervention. I look at explanations at various levels that try to explain why states in the first place decide to intervene in a conflict. I look at the affective-instrumental dichotomy and the domestic-international divide that explains third party intervention. In the second section I look at the various methods and forms of intervention. Intervention can be done by a state, a group of states allied together, by an international organisation like the UN or a regional organisation like OAU (Organisation for African Unity). Depending upon the actor, forms of intervention may vary. In the third section I look at the explanations that guide state behaviour in support of an outcome. I look at system level explanation and two competing accounts of power politics and international norms. I argue that it is international norms that guide third party support status quo as an outcome of an irredentist conflict. The final section summarises the findings.

External Intervention – to intervene or not

External intervention in conflicts has been under academic scrutiny for many years. The nature of conflict has changed in the twentieth century from interstate conflict that was majorly influenced by control over territory and conquests to the high incidence of intrastate conflict based on ethnic lines in the post Cold War world (Gurr 1993, 1994;

Wallensteen and Sollenberg 2001). Non-state actors have become important actors in the internal conflict (Holsti 1996). The changing nature of conflict altered the focus of the discipline too and broadened it from interstate conflict to intrastate conflict. Earlier studies were more focused on interstate war and its cause; it is later that intrastate conflict acquired importance in academic circles. The dichotomy of the interstate and intrastate is linked with the chasm between the fields of international relations and comparative politics and it is only later that studies have tried to bridge this gap (Sarkees et al. 2003). In their comprehensive analysis of incidence of war from 1816-1997, Sarkees, Wayman and Singer point out that more wars have been fought in twentieth century as compared to nineteenth century. They inform that the decade of 1970s has had the most onsets of wars of all types and they claim 1990s to be another most war prone decade since the Congress of Vienna.

‘Ironically, analysts in Europe, the source of much of this nineteenth-century imperial savagery, were writing then about the unprecedented era of peace from 1870 to 1914. Perhaps then, as in our time, the scholars were optimistic about peace because war had been displaced away from the rich and into the poor nations... the main reason for the recent surge in overall amounts of war is that civil wars are breaking out at an all-time record rate... In particular, there has been a marked increase in the number of civil wars that are internationalized civil wars (involving interventions by outside system members)’ (Sarkees et al. 2003: 60-62).

Depending upon the war which is being studied, different contradictory trends have emerged that predict the patterns of prevalent forms of war. Intrastate conflicts sometimes acquire international or regional dimension when there is a spill over (a significant case is of Rwanda where Hutu refugees destabilised the then neighbouring Zaire government) and the neighbouring country intervenes (for example the case of Bangladesh secession from Pakistan where India intervened on the premise of its own internal security that would have been threatened by the huge inflow of refugees). Sometimes the intervention is by the international community under an alliance, or regional organisation or international organisation like the UN (for example in case of Somali civil war, UN mandated intervention under Security Council Resolution 794 (1992), but its intervention was unsuccessful, US led multilateral intervention followed UN but it too was short lived or in the case of Bosnia the intervention by UN peacekeeping forces was unsuccessful and US backed NATO intervention helped parties

come to agreement). There is another dimension to the spill over that is visible in the case of Somalia. The spill over of conflict in Somalia has resulted in refugee and small arms flow from Somalia into the neighbouring state of Kenya, where the refugees have raised serious concerns of the Nairobi government regarding long standing Somali irredentism of the population and sees refugees as a potential security threat. It has been argued that regionalisation of intrastate conflict is very common in the Global South due to vulnerability and weakness of the neighbouring states (Ayoob 1995; Buzan 1992). There is a flourishing debate regarding the usefulness of the dichotomy of ‘new wars’ and ‘old wars’ and whether there has been a decrease in the military casualties in war and increase in the civilian casualties due to the changing nature of conflict (Kaldor 1999, 2002; Holsti 1996; Kalyvas 2001; Newman 2004). The burgeoning literature on external intervention can be broadly divided along two lines – intrastate and interstate. The puzzles surrounding third party intervention dealt with queries like why do states intervene in interstate conflicts? Why do some states intervene and others do not? Why do states intervene in ethnic conflicts? What determines which side will they take in an ethnic conflict? Why do certain ethnic conflicts attract attention and others do not? What is the role of domestic politics in determining state intervention? What are the motives that drive states to intervene?

Inquiries into the motivation of third party intervention in a conflict are divided along the lines of interstate and intrastate conflict. The nature of conflict seems to influence the reasons and explanations why third party would choose to intervene in a conflict whether between states or within the state. Interstate conflict is seen to be motivated by strategic interests of the states and states are seen to be driven by purely instrumental *rationale*. Intervention in interstate conflict is seen to be guided by the factors of *realpolitik* like strategic interest, economic gain, and maintenance of regional status quo. Intrastate conflicts are theorised as identity conflicts and the non state actors are seen to be motivated by affective/ethnic/religious ties that can be understood to be value rational. This dichotomy needs to be transcended in the case of study of irredentist conflict. The conflict is interstate by definition, and premised on national ties or affective motivation or value rationality again by definition. Some states may use the language of affective ties to pursue their strategic aims. However, analysing their true intentions and motivations

behind making an irredentist claim are beyond the scope of this study. An example of such behaviour by states includes the claim on Spratly Islands by China and Philippines on the basis of historical homeland argument. They made this claim only after oil was discovered in the area. Coming back to the nature of irredentist phenomenon, we need to look into explanations that look into conflicts that are driven by identity, values, affect as well as those where state policies are seen in pursuit of self maximising goals.

In the case of intervention in ethnic conflict or intrastate conflict there is literature that dichotomises the motivations into two – instrumental and affective. Suhrke and Noble (1977) first used this dichotomy to explain external involvement in ethnic conflict explaining it as

‘where intervention is motivated primarily by ethnic ties (that is, where it would be classified as affective), the timing and magnitude of external partisan support appear directly related to the vulnerability of the local protagonist. For the external kin, the worst possible contingency is the extermination of local kin’ (Suhrke and Noble 1977: 16).

Another reason for third parties to intervene in an ethnic conflict that they point out is

‘a continuously convenient opening for outside parties that wish to intervene for their own “instrumental” reasons- to weaken a rival state, to build up bargaining chips for use in other matters and so on. Ethnic ties are irrelevant or secondary in these cases, and the form and magnitude of intervention vary according to a different dynamic’ (Suhrke and Noble 1977: 17-18).

An important point to be noted here is that in intrastate conflicts, the third party that is driven to intervene on the basis of affective ties is often the neighbouring state where the ethnic group present in the state exerts pressure on the state to intervene in the conflict owing to its ties with the kin. An example of this behaviour is the Indian intervention in Sri Lankan conflict where the Indian state first supported the Tamil militant groups (that had developed ties and were supported by the Tamils of India) that demanded secession to form a separate Tamil state and later signed the peace accord with the Government of Sri Lanka in 1987. The government of Sri Lanka guaranteed concessions to Tamil demands including devolution of power (Muni 1993). This argument fails to explain India’s behaviour thereafter where it sent its peacekeeping forces and later got embroiled in full scale military conflict against the LTTE which it had earlier supported. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi who succeeded his mother Indira Gandhi followed her footsteps

and had ensured training of Tamil militias including LTTE in various parts of India (Muni 1993). Affective motivations cannot fully explain a state's behaviour as third party in an intrastate conflict. Instrumental motivations account for most part of the state's behaviour. Heraclides (1990) argues that the dominant assumption in the studies on intervention in ethnic conflict

'is twofold: (a) States that end up supporting secessionist movements do so either primarily or exclusively for economic, political, and other instrumental motives—that is, for "gains on the cheap". They rarely if ever do so for affective reasons such as ideological, ethnic, or religious affinity; and in any case, affective considerations cannot stand on their own as reasons for involvement (b) High-level material support, particularly of the kind that can sustain an armed struggle (funds, arms, training, and the like), is initiated only if there are obvious gains to be made' (Heraclides 1990: 343).

Heraclides (1990) in his finding partially agrees with the assumption. He argues that affective motives are equally important as instrumental motives. He concedes that the transfer of arms and funds is clearly motivated by instrumental concerns. However, he points out that small states are more likely to intervene for affective reasons, while medium, regional and superpowers are likely to intervene for instrumental reasons. It is important to note here that we have still not engaged with who is intervening in the conflict—whether it is a single state (relative power of the state), a coalition of states, a regional organisation or an international organisation. Different actors have different motivations for intervention. This shall be dealt with in the next section dealing with forms of intervention.

In the case of irredentist conflict it can then be argued that it is the mix of affective and instrumental concern that guides third party behaviour, often instrumental concerns overriding the other and different actors will have different mix of these two concerns. Cooper and Berdal (1993) point out that the motives for third party intervention in ethnic conflicts are varied that include 'hegemonic ambitions; concerns about regional stability; ethnic sympathy for oppressed groups; a sense of international responsibility, perhaps allied to some notion of world order or regional order; and humanitarian concerns' (Cooper and Berdal 1993: 134). In their study, they highlight that most of the cases of external intervention in ethnic conflicts had 'mixed motives'. This implies that outside parties were motivated by both altruist ambitions and self interest. They argue that it is

useful to distinguish between ‘two broad types of intervention: those in which the dominant motive is one of interest or *Realpolitik*; and those that are primarily of a peacekeeping nature’ (Cooper and Berdal 1993: 134). Carment (1994) also argues through conflict extension theories that it is the mix of affect and instrumental rationale that guides states when they intervene in ethnic conflict. Affect is seen as ‘additional enabling condition in shaping foreign policy decisions within ethnic conflict settings’ (Carment and James 2000: 176). What needs to be explored here is the usefulness of trying to ascertain the motives behind third party intervention in terms of affective and instrumental motives in case of irredentist conflicts. In the case of ethnic conflict, such a distinction helps in explaining why some states intervene in some conflicts and not in all conflicts. I argue that this distinction remains helpful in the case of irredentist conflicts too. To assume all states to be always driven by instrumental calculations may not explain states’ support for a particular state in an irredentist conflict. There is a possibility of the national/religious/ethnic group to be divided in more than one state (which it usually is) and states may support one of the two states in an irredentist conflict on the basis of these ties. Just because a state is driven by affective motive does not make it irrational. Also, all rational behaviour does not necessarily lead to pacific settlement of disputes or conflicts and exclude war and violence. Saideman (2001) transcends this dichotomy in his work where he uses affective component of ethnic ties that plays an important role in rational calculation of the elite who use the ties for their own political interest and formulate their foreign policy accordingly.

In case of irredentist conflicts, it is likely that states may intervene on the basis of ethnic ties or affective reasons. Groups that share links across borders, or share religious ties are likely to support the state with which they have affinity against the other state. Catholics are more likely to identify with their co-religionists in other states as was the case when Austria and Italy supported Croatia against Serbian irredentist aggression (Saideman 2002: 95). Saideman (2002) arguing that ethnic ties in irredentist crises are instrumental writes

‘Religion played a central role in the disintegration of Yugoslavia, influencing outsiders’ reactions to the conflict. Just as Catholics were concerned with the plight

of the Croats, Orthodox nations tended to support the Serbs, and Muslims wanted their states to support Bosnia against the other two' (Saideman 2002: 95).

Saideman's argument about ethnic ties being instrumental is better conceptualised as the value based ties that are based on affect. The means that the groups employ where these considerations (based on affection and values) manifest themselves are instrumentally rational in this case using politics and leaders to influence foreign policy of their states towards other states involved in irredentist conflict. I deal with this issue in detail in the next chapter.

Continuing with the role of third parties in conflict in former Yugoslavia, the Serbian irredentist demands were then forced to be given up by the US led coalition and bombings by NATO troops. The position of US can clearly be argued to be based on instrumental rationale.

Here it is important to clarify that the hypothesis states that instrumental rationale promotes status quo; it does not imply that external intervention is always guided by instrumental rationale only. There could also be an affective component but an intervention based completely on affective motivation is highly unlikely. Either it will be purely instrumental or a mix of both. It then implies that instrumental rational that has no link with ethnic ties will promote a status quo outcome. Where affective component is involved, further research needs to be done.

Explanations for third party intervention in an interstate conflict do not subscribe to this dichotomy. The motivations are seen to be guided by the instrumentalist rationale and power politics. At the structural level, third party intervention in interstate conflict has been linked to alliances (Singer and Small 1966; Siverson and King 1980; Kim 1991; Smith 1996; Leeds 2003). Intervention in a conflict, especially war has been linked by the third party's allegiance to an alliance. Czechoslovakia had to give into Germany's irredentist demand over Sudetenland in 1938 as its ally France made clear that it won't support Czechoslovakia in case of German aggression that Hitler threatened; French position was determined by the lack of British support (Leeds 2005). Smith (1996) argues that the third party which, is in an alliance is more likely to intervene than the party that is not part of any alliance with the parties to the conflict. He also observes that about one

nation in four observes its alliance commitments. Alliances affect the probability of third party intervention. Leeds (2003) comments

‘alliances provide information about the likelihood that others will intervene in a potential conflict. Yet, different agreements provide different information. Alliance commitments that would require allies to intervene on behalf of potential target states reduce the probability that a militarized dispute will emerge, but alliance commitments promising offensive support to a potential challenger and alliances that promise non intervention by outside powers increase the likelihood that a challenger will initiate a crisis’ (Leeds 2003: 427).

Kim (1991) argues that ‘a third party is more likely to join the war in support of a friend than in opposition to a foe’. System theories emphasise the interplay of three major variables – the distribution of power, the number of poles and the tightness of poles (Mesquita and Lalman 1988). Systemic factors play a role in the formation of the alliance along with the preference of the state. States choose the sides with whom they want to form an alliance. The Soviet Union was allied with Somalia and provided it arms from 1950s to 1970s while the United States armed Ethiopia. It was the arming of Somalia that helped its military in the occupation of Ogaden region in Ethiopia in 1977-78. Ethiopia had lost its strategic significance for United States and it refused to offer help. In the absence of United State, Ethiopia turned to Soviet Union and it obliged as it saw Ethiopia more important to its regional interest than Somalia. Soviet Union switched sides and helped Ethiopia launch an offensive that pushed the Somali forces back. The international community had warned the Ethiopian forces to not to cross into Somalia and maintain previous boundaries (Kendie 2003). The case of Soviet Union switching alliance provides a vital example that shows how power politics and strategic calculations are decisive in third party intervention. Different theories of international relations offer different explanations either based on self-interest that can lead to both cooperation and conflict while others highlight the historical roots that inform state behaviour. State behaviour it can be argued is constrained by systemic factors and its capabilities but that remains half the story. The remaining half is provided by the internal processes of the state. However, to understand state’s preference to intervene, we need to probe whether this dichotomy of international and domestic is helpful or not.

Scholars have tried to deal with this dichotomy of international and domestic by trying to understand international conflicts through 'linkage politics' (Rosenau 1969, 1973) between the two; by paying attention to regional integration and formation of supranational institutions (Deutsch 1957; Haas 1958); by emphasising growing interdependence and transnationalism (Keohane and Nye 1977); the international political economy tried to link the foreign economic policy with domestic determinants (Katzenstein 1978; Krasner 1978) or by perceiving international negotiations as two level games at the national level and international level where the central decision makers appear on each game board (Putnam 1988). Huth (1998) emphasises the role of domestic politics in foreign policy decisions of major powers to intervene in situations of international crises. He highlights two sets of factors that influence the policy makers' decision to intervene – (a) the likely military and political costs and risks of intervention and (b) the domestic and international security benefits associated with supporting a country threatened with attack' (Huth 1998: 747). The American position in the irredentist conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh where Armenia successfully launched a military aggression and continues to occupy Azeri territory is influenced by its domestic politics. Armenian Americans have been successful in lobbying against Azerbaijan through section 907 of the Freedom Support Act of 1992 that banned US assistance to Azerbaijan (Saideman 2002).

Terris and Maoz (2005) link the nature of conflict with the possibility of third party intervention in the form of mediation. They argue that 'versatility of the conflict' increases or decreases the likelihood of third party mediation in a militarised dispute. By 'versatility of conflict' they imply the extent to which the conflict game between parties can be transformed into a cooperation game. They argue that greater the versatility of conflict more likely it is for outside parties to offer mediation. Territorial disputes are considered as zero-sum game; in the case of irredentism, it is likely that the conflict will be less versatile. Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille (1991) contend that the nature of conflict that is relatively of low intensity which is measured in terms of fatalities is more amenable to mediation. They also point out in their research that 'disputes involving territory and security are far more amenable to mediation than those over issues of ideology or independence' (Bercovitch et al. 1991: 14). Irredentist claim involves

territory and ideology. Argentina settled its dispute with Uruguay over the oil rich international boundary along the Rio de la Plata River, yet fought Britain over the Falkland Islands.

The link between territorial disputes and mediation by third party is important to be linked with political and economic interests of the third party. It has been argued that 'territorial disputes actually receive more attempts at mediation by third parties only when they intersect with either of these two attributes of potential mediators: major power status and/or trade ties with the disputing dyad' (Frazier 2007: 281). Since, irredentist policies change, this points that there are situations where actors do not perceive the negotiations over irredentism as distributive bargaining but rather as integrative bargaining. This argument requires further research where versatility of irredentist conflict and its link with likelihood of third party intervention can be assessed.

Another explanation for third party intervention is that it wants to enhance its image at the regional/international level. Nigeria's role of mediator in African conflicts is explained as its quest for the 'status of sub regional leader' (Fasehun 1982: 184). It has played the role as a 'status quo mediator'¹⁶ reflecting the key norm of maintenance of integrity of African borders accepted by most of the African states. In the irredentist conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia it played the role of status quo mediator, essentially siding with the Ethiopian side and not supporting revision of borders (Fasehun 1982). Another continuing irredentist conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh was intervened by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) during 1992-1994. It has been argued that CSCE did so 'to establish itself as an effective regional conflict prevention/ settlement organization' (Mooradian and Druckman 1999: 710).

Higher level of violence has been linked with third party intervention (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997). However, this does not explain the non intervention of the international community in Rwandan genocide in 1994 where an estimated 800,000

¹⁶ Fasehun (1982) defines status quo mediator as 'a state which seeks to contain conflicts between and within African states without requiring a fundamental change in the factors that cause such a conflict. A status quo mediator prefers borders and territories to remain the way they were as at independence. And it is firmly committed to maintaining incumbent governments in power', p 183.

Rwandans were systematically killed. The decision to not to intervene is as important as to intervene. States enter into neutrality pacts where states agree not to participate in a conflict on the side of the adversary (Leeds 2003). Non intervention by a state is usually understood in terms of interests of the state. If the state has no self interest involved, it will prefer to follow a policy of non-intervention that is considered the other side of the norm of respect for state sovereignty.

Forms of Intervention

Irredentism by definition is the problem of the international. It scarcely remains the problem between two parties. Third parties are involved often in direct or indirect support to either parties and often have stakes in the conflict. Many interstate conflicts have been resolved after third parties intervened. Third party involvement is usually in the form of mediation. Mediation remains one of the forms of intervention but it should not be seen as a single process but as a 'continuous set of related activities involving actors, decisions and situations. Mediation encompasses a spectrum of behaviour that ranges from the very passive (e.g. providing good offices) to highly active (e.g. putting pressure on the disputants)' (Bercovitch et al. 1991: 8). Powell and Wiegand (2010) have linked the choice of dispute resolution method in territorial disputes with domestic legal systems of parties to the dispute. Its process and success depends upon the third party's power and involvement and their motive and behaviour. 'Conflict managers' play an important role in interstate disputes and resolution and management of conflict (Butterworth 1978). The role of third party is prominent and most of the times a matter of necessity as the relations between conflicting parties in an irredentist conflict are marked by a low level of trust between the two states or parties. The position and strategies used by the states that brought them to the level of escalated tension also warrants third party intervention. Touval and Zartman (1985) point out the role of third party as balancing power between the two involved states. There are many definitions of third party mediation all having in common the idea of a mediator that facilitates a mutually accepted outcome that is negotiated between the parties in dispute over the core issue; in this case territory being claimed on the basis of ethnic/national ties. Fisher (2001) defines mediation as

‘Mediation is a pacific, non-coercive and non-binding approach to conflict management that is entered into freely by the concerned parties, who at the same time maintain control over the substance of the agreement. Thus, mediation is primarily a task-orientated method directed toward solving a shared problem of the parties; it is not directly concerned with the nature of the relationship between the parties. Mediation can be directed toward disputes between two parties in its bilateral form, but can also involve multiple parties when it is called upon to assist in complex multilateral negotiations’ (Fisher 2001: 159).

Third party involvement or intervention is seen as an effort to resolve the conflict between the parties and is thus associated with finding, proposing, negotiating or forcing a settlement of the conflict. Often, when the parties are unable to find a solution on their own, third party mediation is seen as instrumental in facilitating or imposing a settlement on them. There are different levels at which third party mediation may take place. Here we are concerned with the mediation at the level of the state, region and international. Mediators may be representatives of states perceived as impartial by both the parties or representatives of international organisations. For example the United Nations, the European Union, Commonwealth of Independent States and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE; formerly CSCE). Third party involvement works at different levels simultaneously; usually in interstate conflict it works at the level of Track One diplomacy.

Formal efforts at mediation are often accompanied by informal ones. Fisher and Keashly (1991) developed a taxonomy of primary methods of third party intervention and proposed six fold typology of third party intervention at the international level comprising six processes – conciliation, consultation, pure mediation, power mediation, arbitration and peacekeeping. Of these six processes, the following four are more relevant when it comes to the role of third party in interstate conflict of irredentist nature and they are defined by Fisher and Keashly (1991) as –

- *Consultation*, in which the third party works to facilitate creative problem-solving through communication and analysis, making use of human relations skills and social-scientific understanding of conflict etiology and dynamics.
- *Pure Mediation*, in which the third party works to facilitate a negotiated settlement on substantive issues through the use of reasoning, persuasion, effective control of information and the suggestion of alternatives.

- *Power Mediation*, which encompasses pure mediation but also moves beyond it to include the use of leverage or coercion on the part of the mediator in the form of promised rewards or threatened punishments and may also involve the third party as monitor and guarantor of the agreement.
- *Arbitration*, in which the third party renders a binding judgment arrived at through consideration of the individual merits of the opposing positions and then imposes a settlement that is deemed to be fair and just (Fisher and Keashly 1991)

Every irredentist claim is different from each other as the elements of strategic and affective motivations are in different proportions in different cases. The stage to which a conflict between the parties has escalated determines the level of intervention of the third party in the conflict apart from other factors. Zartman (1985) has developed the concept of ‘ripe moment’ which implies that there is a certain moment or stage in a conflict between the two parties where it becomes possible for third parties to intervene and facilitate a settlement. This stage or moment is that of a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ he argues, when both the states or parties to a conflict realise that continuing violence and position *vis-a-vis* conflict will bring more damage than gain to themselves and see themselves trapped in a costly deadlock with no exit. It is at this moment Zartman has argued that the mediators should intervene and bring the conflicting parties to negotiating table and facilitate or impose a settlement. Bercovitch (1986) argues that it is some middle point in conflict that the mediation has greatest effect. He points out that

‘Mediation, it seems, is more effective when it follows, rather than precedes, some ‘test of strength’ between parties. The point in time following either some minimum duration (here defined as 12-36 months), a stalemate, or mutual exhaustion seems to be the ideal phase in the dispute to initiate mediation. Protracted and intense international disputes are particularly amenable to mediation or other forms of third party intervention’ (Bercovitch 1986:161).

The problem remains that how to identify a middle of a conflict. There are others who propose an early intervention in the conflict even before the onset of violence and highlight the importance of early warning (Carment 1994).

The irredentist conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan considered the most violent conflict between post-Soviet states continues despite 20 years of mediation efforts. There are arguments that the mediators have missed the ripe

moments in the conflict (Mooradian and Druckman 1999). The position of mediators is also undermined by parties believing that the conflict can be resolved through force.¹⁷ Armenia continues to control around 20 per cent of Azerbaijan's territory that it occupied in 1992. The demographics of the area have changed as most of the Azeri's have left the region. The co-chairs of OSCE Minsk Group- Russia, France and United States are currently involved in mediation process. The process most likely seems to be tilted in favour of the maintenance of status quo of present borders.

States have different motives to be involved in the interstate conflict. Their motives may be humanitarian concern, interest in regional stability, or strategic ambitions in the region. Concern for their own security and threat to their regional interests may also motivate states to intervene in a conflict. Fisher points out that Touval and Zartman have argued that 'that the motives of the mediator in international conflict are best described in the context of power politics, and that mediators almost always have their own interests, so that they are very seldom truly indifferent to the issues and terms being negotiated' (Fisher 2001: 173). Therefore, it is the institutional role that guides the mediation efforts of regional and international organisations and it is rational calculations of expected benefits and costs that informs state behaviour in acting as a third party mediator (Fisher 2001).

The choice of strategy employed by the mediator is a function of its influence over the conflicting parties. Third party mediator can have different degrees of influence over the parties. The degree of influence of the mediator is linked with the strategy that will be used; low influence favours consultation and pure mediation whereas high influence favours power mediation. The outcome of the crisis has been linked with the process of mediation, favouring facilitative mediation over formulative and manipulative mediation when it comes to resolve commitment problems and reduction in tensions (Beardsley et al. 2006).

¹⁷ In 2005 Azerbaijan announced to increase its defence budget by 70 per cent, citing one of the reasons that a strong army would help in resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Peuch, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty 2005).

Argentina in February 2012 accepted UN mediation offer on the issue of Falkland Islands.¹⁸ Peaceful resolution of conflict is one of the designated functions of the UN. Chapter 6 of the UN charter deals with the mechanisms to mitigate conflict and promote long term stability and durable peace. UN role is seen as neutral with the exception of collective security provisions and economic sanctions led by powerful states in the Security Council, and this neutrality supports its intervention and ability to facilitate a settlement in the interest of the parties to conflict and international community. This however has not been the case. UN neutrality has severely hampered its mediation success in most of the situations (Touval 1994). The forum of the UN is seen as a better guarantee that the interest of the parties to the conflict will be respected. The results of UN intervention are also seen to carry greater legitimacy than any of the alternatives. Diehl, Reifschneider and Hensel (1996) in their study point out that in practice it has been seen that UN has been ineffective in solving conflicts in the long run

‘with UN intervention apparently having no effect on the occurrence, timing, or severity of future conflict...UN has not been able to forge compromise agreements that help mitigate future conflict in various trouble spots around the world, such as Bosnia and Somalia. Thus our analysis suggests no dramatic increase in UN effectiveness after the end of the superpower rivalry’ (Diehl et al. 1996: 697-698).

Austria took the issue of South Tyrol to United Nations in 1960 in the hope that it would be resolved in its favour. The United Nations proved to be a disappointing platform for South Tyrol as it supported the status quo which was in favour of Italy. In 1969, Italy and Austria signed an agreement that came to be known as ‘package’ that granted autonomy to the region of South Tyrol. In 1992, Italy and Austria reported to the United Nations that they have resolved the issue bilaterally. Clearly, United Nations has served to be a status quo preserving organisation when it comes to irredentist conflicts. In case of India and Pakistan, India approached the UN Council in 1948 to invoke Article 35 of the UN Charter. The UN representatives that it appointed after the cessation of hostilities remained unsuccessful at mediation efforts and holding a plebiscite in the region. The UN has insisted on the preservation of Line of Control between the two sides until a

¹⁸ As reported by Merco Press, South Atlantic News Agency (2012).

resolution of the conflict is in sight (United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan observes the ceasefire line between India and Pakistan since 1949 till present).

The mediation process in case of Northern Ireland was complex. Key players in the process were the British Government, the Government of Ireland, various parties of Northern Ireland that participated in the process, United States and the European Union. Paul Arthur (1999) argues that mediation resulted in Good Friday agreement as the conflict has reached the stage of 'hurting stalemate' that began with 'the troubles'. Track two diplomacy played a very important role in bringing the parties to agreement and maintenance of territorial status quo with new political structure for Northern Ireland as the deal. Kornprobst (2008) has argued that the Idea of Europe worked as an important norm that influenced Ireland to give up its irredentist claim on Northern Ireland.

Role of Norms

The first inquiry is into international norms and military conflicts between states. The purpose is to determine whether international norms influence state behaviour in military conflicts. Since the end of World War II the norm of fixed borders has gained increasing acceptance in world politics. This implies that increasingly the norm against conquest of foreign territory or against aggression directed at redeeming the homeland territory has acquired salience. Territorial issues have historically been major cause of war (Vasquez 1993; Holsti 1991). Commenting upon the explosive nature of territorial issues, Vasquez wrote 'Of all the issues over which wars could logically be fought, territorial issues seem to be the ones most often associated with wars. Few interstate wars are fought without any territorial issue being involved in one way or another' (Vasquez 1993:151). By fixing the territorial borders and acceptance of territorial status quo, international conflict over territory can be ameliorated. Zacher (2001) writes that the significance of boundaries is decreasing due to the increasing acceptance of the 'territorial integrity norm'.¹⁹ He points out that international boundaries did not exist during the seventeenth century as they do

¹⁹ This is the term used by Zacher to describe the increased salience of fixed borders in world politics. He uses the definition provided by Finnemore and Sikkink (1999:251) for norm as 'a standard of appropriate behavior for actors of a given identity' and points out that for an international regulatory norm to be strong requires that it is respected and considered legally binding by majority of the states.

today. The present state marked by exclusive authority over its territory evolved over time, as he points out that it is in the eighteenth century that ‘precisely surveyed national borders’ emerged as ‘a basic rule of co-existence’,²⁰ (Zacher 2001: 216). The norm until the middle of twentieth century since the formation of modern state that is traced to the treaty of Westphalia was that of legitimacy of conquest. Zacher (2001) argues that the territorial integrity norm developed in three stages in the twentieth century – *emergence* of the norm post First World War, *acceptance* of the norm with the formation of UN and *institutionalisation* of the norm beginning from the period of 1976 to present as no successful territorial aggrandizement occurred during this period.²¹ The age of nationalism in the nineteenth century legitimised the wars that sought to create congruency between the nation and the state. Zacher (2001) shows that post First World War territorial integrity norm gained significant support in several multilateral declarations and treaties. President Woodrow Wilson’s ‘Fourteenth Point’ that was articulated in Article 10 of League of Nations Covenant and ‘whose approval really constituted the beginning of states’ formal support for the territorial integrity norm. It read: “The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League” (Zacher 2001: 219).

Right to self determination emerged as another norm during this phase though it remained weak; tension existed between the two norms of territorial integrity and the right to national self-determination. Despite the norm of territorial integrity acquiring acceptance it was not as strong as it is now, post First World War, the Italians were given South Tyrol formerly part of Austro- Hungarian Empire where few Italians lived as reward for Italy’s entrance into war on the side of allies. This led to demands for return of the territory to Austria and fuelled its irredentist claim that was later resolved in the acceptance of territorial status quo by Austria. Zacher (2001) points out that at the end of Second World War, the ‘Western Allied Powers exhibited very strong support for the integrity of interstate boundaries...all countries at the 1945 San Francisco conference

²⁰ Hedley Bull (1977) quoted by Zacher (2001).

²¹ These stages as mentioned by Zacher in footnote 79 are taken from the work of Finnemore and Sikkink, 1999, 254-261.

acceded to the obligation to respect existing boundaries in the UN Charter: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state” (Zacher 2001: 220-221).

The normative statements issued by UN called for respect of juridical borders of entities that was followed largely even during the process of decolonization. Regional organisations too accepted and strongly advocated the sanctity of territorial borders (The Arab League, Organisation of American States, Organisation of African Unity and Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE since 1995) adopted support for territorial integrity).

Highlighting the change in patterns of territorial conflict, Zacher notes ‘that the number of territorial redistributions per country-year was more than twice as high in the nineteenth century than it was in the last half of the twentieth century. Also, it was almost five times higher in the first half of the twentieth century than in the second half’ (Zacher 2001: 224).

The collapse of Yugoslavia fuelled irredentist claims of Serbia and Croatia. Serbia attempted to detach Serb dominated territories from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to create a Greater Serbia and Croatia aimed at annexing Croat dominated territories in order to create a Greater Croatia. Both the states later renounced their irredentist claims with the signing of Dayton Peace Accords. The European states and United States supported the boundaries of Croatia and Bosnia when they declared their independence in 1991 and 1992 and in 1995 the states in conflict over the territories accepted them. The US Secretary of State James Baker in a meeting with President Milosevic in 1991 is quoted by Zacher to have said: “The United States and the rest of the international community will reject any Serbian claims to territory beyond its borders.” He also quotes the position of the chief US negotiator at Dayton, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, who substantiated Baker’s judgment: “There was a moral issue: the United States and its European allies could not be party to . . . legitimising the Serb aggression.” (Zacher 2001: 228).

Argentina's irredentist claim based on historic homeland over Falkland Islands led it to war with Britain in 1982. Most of the Latin American states supported Argentina but majority states in the UN called for withdrawal of Argentina and eventually Britain reoccupied the island and territorial status quo was established. Despite the strong influence of the US to observe territorial integrity norm, Argentina continues its irredentist claim over the islands.

In 1964, Somalia launched an offensive in Ethiopia to claim Ogaden for the realisation of Greater Somalia. The Ethiopian counter-offensive and Organisation of African Unity (OAU) backed by the two superpowers forced it to withdraw its troops from the Ethiopian soil. The territorial status quo was restored. From 1976-1980, Somalia again unsuccessfully tried to gain control over the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and was opposed by OAU and the West. Somalia continues its policy of irredentist claim over Ogaden in Ethiopia.

Link between norm and intervention

To understand the link between norm and external intervention in an irredentist conflict, we need to look at the question of how international norms influence state behaviour. Theories of International Organisation and International Political Economy give prominence to the role of norms in understanding state behaviour in the framework of regimes. Goertz and Diehl (1992b) argue that this is not the case when it comes to issues of conflict between the states; the role of norms is not seen as influencing the behaviour of states in cases of conflict and explanation is sought in 'realpolitik factors such as power distributions, alliances, and arms races to explain and predict state behaviour' (Goertz and Diehl 1992b: 635). To understand how norms influence state behaviour it is important to look into different types of norms. They conceptualise three types of norms based on three variables that are seen as important component of any norm and are present in relative degrees. These are self interest, sanctions and deontology. The first norm is labelled as 'cooperative norm' having three main characteristics: '(a) it corresponds to the self-interest of the actors, (b) no sanctions are necessary as the norms are self-enforcing, and (c) the deontological component is minimal' (Goertz and Diehl 1992b: 640). They point out that Keohane in his work *The demand for international*

regimes refers to this kind of norm, where self interest and norm coincide and thus it is only rational that the states follow the norm. There is no need to strengthen the role of sanction in such a norm as there is little or no incentive for states to violate the norm. This they argue explains why most of the states observe international law most of the time. State reputation is another factor that influences states to adhere to the norm as violation may cause damage to its reputation. Since, self interest coincides with the norm, they argue, the international organisation need not be extremely powerful as its role is aimed more at ‘coordination than to punish’ (Goertz and Diehl 1992b: 640). The second type of norm, they argue is the ‘hegemonic norm’ and it is characterised by: ‘(a) at least partial conflict between self-interest and the norm, (b) sanctions are in the hands of a central actor – government or hegemon and play an important role, and (c) there needs to be at least a moderate level of support for the norm on the part of the actors affected’ (Goertz and Diehl 1992b: 640). They point out this is the case when ‘norm-making power is concentrated in few hands’ and norms related to Bretton Woods system fall under this category (Goertz and Diehl 1992b: 640). Here the sanctions become important as there is not complete coincidence or there is a conflict between self interest and norms. Sanctions alone, however, they remind cannot ensure compliance and such norms rely on popular support in order to be effective. The third type of norm in their typology is ‘decentralized norm’ characterised by: ‘(a) conflict between norms and self-interest, (b) sanctioning power is diffused and based on the willingness of individual actors to ‘pay’ for sanctions (i.e., no central sanctioning body), and (c) the deontological aspect is important’ (Goertz and Diehl 1992b: 640). The situation under consideration is where there exist strong temptations to defect along with basis for cooperation. The central authority or hegemon is missing and the norm has to be enforced by the actors involved. Sanctioning power in this case, they argue is diffused as it can come from the ‘powerful as well as the relatively powerless and can be motivated by self interest’ (Goertz and Diehl 1992b: 641).

Taking from the typology developed by Goertz and Diehl, territorial integrity norm can be described as the ‘hegemonic norm’. The evolution of this norm as seen in the previous section from the stage of emergence to acceptance to institutionalisation has been accompanied by a remarkable increase in the number of sovereign states in the world. Post Second World War, the international system was characterised by decolonisation.

The right to self-determination of nationalities was the recognised norm; at the same time interstate conduct came to be increasingly associated with territorial integrity and non-interference. The United Nations was formed in 1945 with membership of fifty-one states, the process of decolonisation and self determination of nationalities that followed increased the number of member states to 193 at present, an increase of more than two hundred and seventy per cent. Irredentist demands surfaced in these newly formed states but given the multinational character of the states in Asia and Africa where the political boundaries hardly coincide with national boundaries the frequency of such claims has been very low (Horowitz 1991). This low frequency can be interpreted as acceptance of the norm of territorial integrity by majority of the states. At the same time, there exist basis for some states whose self interest conflicted with the norm to pursue irredentist policies and at times launch offensive to gain territory. The response of the international community, as seen in the above mentioned section and the later sections to follow was to support the territorial status quo. The serious nature of international commitment to this norm was demonstrated when NATO forces bombed Serbia to bring it to the negotiating table and accept the borders of 1991 and 1992 for Croatia and Bosnia respectively.

It can then be argued that the 'hegemonic norm' of territorial integrity guides third party intervention in irredentist conflicts between states.

Conclusion

The link between external intervention and international norms appears to be strong. In case of settlement of irredentist conflicts, the present international norm of territorial integrity of states plays an important role. Third parties that try to mediate the conflict usually prefer to take the stance of preserving the territorial status quo. It is important to note here that the irredentist conflict involves both territory and ideology and the acceptance of territorial status quo comes when the anti-irredentist state provides guarantees of access to power to the minorities that earlier wished to be joined with their parent country. This chapter posits the link between third party behaviour and the outcome of irredentist conflicts. The hypothesis is helpful in directing further research of an exhaustive list of irredentist conflicts that have taken place to date and reveals further patterns that guide external intervention. It has been argued that norms in themselves do

not guide state behaviour but 'norms are what states make of them' arguing for the agency of the states in determining when they violate norms and exploit their fuzzy nature (Shannon 2000). The role of state leaders then acquires importance as they are instrumental in making foreign policy choices of the states. Despite the prevalence of the territorial integrity norm, there are states that continue to challenge the status quo. To explain this deviance, we turn to the variable of strategic choice that state leaders make when they decide to pursue or abandon their irredentist claims in the next chapter.

Chapter 4

Strategic Choice

Be it thy course, to busy giddy minds/ With foreign quarrels

~ Henry IV, Shakespeare

Confronted by the buzzing confusion of the world in which they live, decision-makers regularly seize upon the threat of violence as “the real factor”...The key moral fact about it is the virtual absence within ourselves of opposition to this world reality, to the elites’ strategy and policies.

~ C. Wright Mills

This chapter tests the hypothesis that *strategic choice guides national leaders to abandon irredentist claims and accept territorial status quo*. This hypothesis is essentially related to domestic politics. I look at two explanations that account for behaviour of the political leaders. The first explanation sees leaders or politics to influence mass behaviour. It accounts for leaders’ choice to abandon the irredentist claim by seeking answers in the diversionary theory of international relations. I explore the possibility of application of this theory to a state’s irredentist demand as a diversion from the domestic issues and to increase in group cohesion to help the politician to maintain office. Then I inquire into the explanatory power of this theory to explain change in irredentist policy of a state that is defined as acceptance of territorial status quo and abandoning of the irredentist claim.

The second explanation sees the ethnic or national groups as an influence on the political leader. The office of the political leader depends upon their support, so they act as pressure groups that influence foreign policy. Their support for the retrieval of ethnic kin

leads the states to make irredentist claims and change in their support for such policy leads states to abandon irredentist claim, supporting status quo. This explanation sees ethnic groups as rational groups who are willing to give up their support for irredentist policy when costs to pursue such a claim outweigh the benefits. The cost-benefit perception can be understood by introducing the antecedent variable of hurting stalemate. Hurting stalemate as a condition can exist long before the state and groups begin to perceive it (that is why it is an antecedent variable). It comes into play only when the groups see themselves in the position of hurting stalemate. Theories of international conflict explain that a hurting stalemate is reached after many a times a conflict has reached a stage of escalation and then de-escalation and is trapped in that spiral. Both the explanations see the leaders as rational instrumental individuals who seek to maximise their self interest.

This chapter is divided into two broad sections based on the above mentioned distinction of the two explanations. The final section is the conclusion where both the explanations are compared and their applicability to irredentist outcomes assessed.

Irredentist claim: A diversion

Diversionsary theory explains international military crisis initiated by a state as an attempt to divert domestic discontent. This domestic discontent is caused by internal problems. This theory posits that political leaders seek to deal with their domestic turmoil, either related to social unrest or decline of national leaders or economic problems, by launching a war abroad. This is based on the assumption that external threat leads to cohesion within the country. This in turn is based on in-group/out-group hypothesis given by Simmel (1955) and Coser (1956) in their sociological research.

Recent research has extended diversionsary theory to domestic level where it is argued to be less risky than external diversion and a connection is shown to exist between domestic problems faced by a leader and use of force against the minorities (Tir and Jasinski 2008). Regime type is another factor that is under scrutiny to understand which state will engage in diversionsary behaviour (Miller 1999). Miller (1999) argues that democratic regimes are less likely to use diversionsary foreign policies than autocratic regime. He

extends the role of leaders and their willingness to engage in conflict and accounts for strategic interaction opportunities where would be adversaries in democracies limit the behaviour of politicians in democracies towards diversionary foreign policy. Recent research in diversionary theories has found the initial assumptions lacking and proposed to look beyond powerful democracies and support further research in establishing link between diversionary behaviour and regime type (Pickering and Kisangani 2005).

Here we are concerned with the query – Whether irredentist claims are seen as diversionary foreign policy? Is it possible that leaders raise the issue only to increase their popularity at home?

In case of Somali irredentism, it has been argued that it has used irredentist claims over Ogaden to divert attention from internal strife. Some politicians it has been argued have used the idea of ‘Greater Somalia’ just to win votes (Kendie 2003). It was in 1956 that the US Department of State report on the basis of economic, social and political conditions concluded that Somali leaders were likely to engage in irredentism to divert attention from domestic problems (Lefebvre 1992). The same reason has been applied to Pakistan’s irredentist claim over Kashmir. It has been argued that Pakistani state uses Kashmir to divert attention from domestic failures (Singh 2005). Pakistan is able to divert attention as it is able to receive support from all quarters on this issue and its Kashmir policy is tied with internal politics (Ganguly and MacDuff 2003). Pakistan like India is divided along ethnic lines, with specific groups dominating the state machinery. Religious unity as argued seems to fuel this demand that sees the population as a monolith.

Empirical studies looking into the relationship between domestic turmoil and international strife have found little evidence to link the two. Rummel (1963) finds no correlation between domestic conflict and foreign conflict. Levy (1989) in a persuasive argument shows that incongruity exists between theoretical arguments and empirical research due to incorrect specification of theory as well as inaccurate testing of theory by statistical analyses. He points out that the sociological literature (Simmel 1955; Coser 1956) on which diversionary theory is based argues that external threat increases cohesiveness of a small group. His criticism is pointed at the applicability of a theory for

a small group to that of a complex and large group as that of the nation-state. In the case of Somalia the population is divided amongst four major clans which are divided into further sub clans. The majority of the population belongs to the nomadic group followed by the agro-pastoral groups. There exist several minority groups within the country and it seems problematic to ascertain that irredentist claims will lead to cohesion amongst various clans which are deeply divided. The same remains true about Pakistan that has groups divided along various ethnic lines and divisions within the Islamic fold. It is possible that differentiated groups are unanimous in their support for a certain policy but that does not imply that states use this as a means to divert attention from domestic woes. States involved in international crisis may face internal problems but the link between the two although very convenient remains inconclusive.

In order to apply this theory to irredentist foreign policy or initiation of international strife generally there is a need for certain correction in the assumptions of the theory. Morgan and Bickers (1992) argue that the criticisms against the diversionary theory should not lead to the total discrediting of theory. As noted with the examples of Somalia and Pakistan few changes in the key assumptions of the theory can make it compatible with observations. Three key issues need attention. A government needs majority support and not support from all quarters to survive. This offers the first corrective in the theory that applies theory for small groups to groups as large as the nation state. Diversionary tactics may not rally support of all domestic opposition, and it is important theoretically to delineate groups in domestic opposition for whom the diversionary theory will be useful (Morgan and Bickers 1992). To use diversionary hypothesis as a universal explanation for initiation of international strife leads to incorrect assessment of the theory. A state behaviour need not always be guided by the domestic problems in the international arena. The major handicap in such research or inquiries is that they are guided by the logic of causality and concentrate on monocausal explanations. Diversionary theory provides partial explanation for foreign policy behaviour of the state. It is important to understand that domestic problem is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a state to initiate international crisis. It becomes important to identify the conditions under which a particular state is successful in converting domestic woes into an international conflict. Thus, while using diversionary theory to explain state behaviour

in foreign conflict, it is important that ‘theoretical argument specifies the contingencies under which an elite will resort to foreign aggression as a means of dealing with domestic political problems, it will be difficult to interpret any empirical findings’ (Morgan and Bickers 1992: 29). As has been noted earlier, the elites in power may use diversion within the country to distract from their failures by targeting the minority within the country; in this I argue that composition of the states too matters in successful conversion of domestic problems to problems of security whether internal or external. I argue that this also helps in further identification of the types of domestic issues that are susceptible to diversion. The criticism of inappropriate operationalisation of variables in empirical studies (Levy 1989) can be done away with by developing conceptual tools that identify

‘type and degree of domestic strife that leads to diversionary behaviour and to specify clearly the kinds of actions that constitute such behaviour... Our empirical analyses must be designed to capture the theoretical specifications regarding the types of actions that are expected to lead to diversionary behavior and the types of actions that will be used as diversionary tactics’ (Morgan and Bickers 1992: 29).

To use diversionary theory as a universal explanation not only is a monocausal explanation but is also unidirectional. The possibility exists that the causal relationship between domestic turmoil and foreign conflict may be reverse (Levy 1989). It has been argued that states with domestic problems are involved in foreign wars not because their leaders seek external enemy but this is so as they are an easy target for other states to attack to take advantage of their domestic weakness (Blainey 1973). The logical method to deal with this discrepancy would be to ascertain the relationship of time with the conflicts. What begins first, the domestic strife or initiation of international strife and the difference between the two? So far the empirical studies that have used diversionary theory have not considered the time lag between the domestic turmoil and foreign conflict and a research design sensitive to causal relationship and that accounts for variation in time lags across cases will solve the problem (Morgan and Bickers 1992). Morgan and Bickers (1992) propose three changes in the assumption of the diversionary theory. First, they argue that the assumption that leaders facing domestic turmoil will choose to initiate war needs to be modified with the assumption that ‘lower levels of hostile actions, such as threats to use force, shows of force, and uses of force short of

war, may be adequate to create the perception of a foreign threat, are less costly and less risky, and may actually be more effective at increasing domestic cohesion' (Morgan and Bickers 1992: 32). Thus, they argue that lower levels of aggression to increase cohesiveness maybe preferred and they may or may not lead to war. Second, they argue it is important to take into account the relationship between various domestic groups, if they are engaged in hostility towards each other, external threat may not increase cohesion. Nation-states comprise various groups and some of them may be engaged in competing relationships. Third, they posit that it is important to take into consideration that the rule of leaders is not dependent upon every member of society. Their office is supported by a coalition of groups that is sufficient to defeat their challengers. Following from these assumptions they suggest that only certain types of domestic turmoil will lead to diversionary tactics. They extend the in-group/out-group argument to groups that support the coalition and the rest and posit that diversionary tactics are useful to increase the cohesion within the supporters of the coalition. Thus 'only certain types of domestic problems, those associated with a loss of support for the political leadership from within the groups constituting the ruling coalition, can be expected to lead to diversionary behaviour' (Morgan and Bickers 1992: 34).

An important lacuna in the research on diversionary theory and its evolved forms remains that they only insist on identifying the types of domestic strife that would lead to use of diversionary tactics and not on the types of diversionary tactics. I argue that further research needs to be done to identify the types of diversionary behaviour of a state. There is a possibility of some international strife being more effective than other in rallying domestic support and diversion. An inquiry into this realm has to take into account the international conditions prevalent during that time that constrain state behaviour. These structural conditions, I argue can deter a state from initiation of any international crisis. The conceptual problem that remains to be solved is that since the conflict with the outside will not be initiated, then there is no tool to measure whether a state would have created an international crisis had the structural constraints not been present. The irredentist policy of a state has been linked with the role of international community (Ambrosio 2001). This points us in the direction that the role of international community and international norms that may permit certain kind of diversionary behaviour (by this I

mean initiation of certain kind of international conflict) by a state and inhibit the other kind. Also, they may permit a particular kind of diversionary behaviour at one point in time but not at other times. The structural factors provide an important corrective in understanding whether a state is involved in an international conflict as a diversionary tactic or it is genuinely pursuing its policy as it sees its values or needs being threatened.

In the case of irredentism, it needs to be understood that national consciousness is a mass not an elite phenomenon (Connor 1991). Irredentist claim is inextricably tied to the idea of national consciousness and the redemption of the co-nationals that are a significant part of the whole. The possibility of elites exploiting the mass sentiments exists.

However, structural constraints also determine whether a state will pursue its policy of irredentism or will be able to use it successfully to increase internal cohesion – that in case of irredentism may be valid for a small but powerful group that supports the government or majority of the groups and exception being few minorities that have no interest in the irredentist project of the state.

Irredentism can be seen as a diversionary tactic to promote in-group cohesion of the coalition that supports the ruling elite. One needs to draw a distinction here that there is a difference between making an irredentist claim and pursuing a policy of irredentism and launching an offensive to redeem the territory. Irredentist claims and policy can be seen as low levels of conflict that leaders promote that may or may not lead to war. It has been argued that Somalia's offensive in Ogaden based on irredentist demand was a diversionary war to increase cohesion of the groups affected by the domestic turmoil.

There are other counter arguments that reveal the weakness of this argument that we shall engage in the following section. For now, we need to look at the reasoning that if irredentism is a diversionary tactic, then why do states that earlier made irredentist claim abandon them. This theory provides no clear answer to this query. It can argue why irredentist claim can be seen as a type of conflict that increases in-group cohesiveness but cannot explain the change in the policy of irredentism.

A response to diversionary theory explaining external conflict of states assessing the role of political elites in influencing mass behaviour looks at within the group dynamics.

Gagnon (1995) argues that elites make ethnicity the only politically dominant identity by

fostering conflict along ethnic lines. They use this strategy in response to changes in domestic political and economic structures. He writes 'by constructing individual interest in terms of the threat to the group, endangered elites can fend off domestic challengers who seek to mobilise the population against the status quo, and can better position themselves to deal with future challenges' (Gagnon 1995 : 132). The prevalent discourse in the field of international relations is that of realism and it is predicated upon focusing on external security concerns. This approach sees ethnic nationalism as a response to external threats to the state or group. Such an approach ignores the intragroup dynamics and only focuses on outside factors to explain group behaviour. It is important to look into Gagnon's argument in detail here as he tests it against the breakup of Yugoslavia and Serbian irredentism. He points out that the Serbian leadership instead of responding to external threats actually created them by 'purposefully provoking and fostering the outbreak of conflict along ethnic lines, especially in regions of Yugoslavia with histories of good inter-ethnic relations' (Gagnon 1995). He also rejects the 'ethnic hatred' argument that is based on historical enmity that Gagnon argues are spurious to explain the Yugoslavia conflict. Gagnon's hypotheses that link ethnicity and international conflict provide arguments that can be assessed whether they help explain change in irredentist policy of a state. His hypotheses state that the ruling elites facing challenges at their home will be willing to engage in international conflict (a) if the net benefit of provoking hostilities with the outside to threatened elites is positive, despite the strategy proving costly for the society, (b) by redefining group interest in terms of ethnic identity and images of threatening outside world help in shifting the debate from the issues that threaten the ruling elite, such a strategy can range from citing an alleged threat to provoking conflict to create the image of threat, (c) if the dominant faction within the military is part of the status quo coalition that will increase the chances of use of military force against other states, (d) if external costs to the position of the elites in the status quo position are minimal, a higher cost that could lead to removal of the elites from power at the hand of external power is more devastating than losing to domestic challenger elites.

The within-group dynamics approach used by Gagnon is similar to the diversionary theory in its assumption that political leaders want to stay in office above everything else. It differs on the account that it does take into consideration the impact of competing rival

elites for power. It does not see the nation-state as one group. By recognising competing nature of groups within the nation-state the application of diversion or shifting of the debate from domestic turmoil to external conflict gets restricted to certain types of cases.

The within-group approach like diversionary theory provides explanation why leaders would engage in irredentist claim on purely instrumental reason so as to garner support to stay in power. This approach too fails to explain why states would give up irredentist claim. What is irresolvable in this approach is that why the leaders would change the policy that had helped them stay in power previously.

In case of irredentist conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the position of Armenia and Karabakh Armenians in negotiations has been that there has to be a 'complete package' that includes the political status of Karabakh while the position of Azerbaijan has been to seek 'step by step' solution to the conflict that will be incremental and create a momentum towards peace. In September 1997 a peace plan negotiated by international mediators laid down a settlement of the plan in phases putting on hold the status of Karabakh region. President Levon Ter Petrossian of Armenia shifted his support from a 'package' to a 'step-by-step' solution and sought a compromise to the conflict. He lost support from the voters and was forced to resign in February 1998. Robert Kocharian replaced him as the next President advocating a tough stance and returning to the position of a 'package' solution to the conflict. The diversionary approach or the within group approach does not explain this behaviour where the politician would risk office to change a policy that enjoys mass support.

Another aspect that this approach fails to explain is that since leaders change their policies towards irredentist claim does it imply that invoking irredentist feeling no longer works in mobilisation of the coalition support group of the ruling elites and helps them stay in power? The above mentioned example of position taken by the Armenian President tells the opposite story and the way events unfolded his decision appears a political suicide. The basic drawback of this approach is that they only account for conflictual behaviour of states and leaders and not for the behaviour that aims at resolution of a conflict.

The diversionary theory and the within-group analysis do not account for the change in the group preference that may influence the leader; the explanation is top down where the leader is always seen to manipulate ethnic identity of the groups to meet their goals. Diversionary approach does not give any agency to groups to change their preferences. The within-group approach fixes the groups engaged in rival goals; the possibility of change in the goals is not explored. This becomes feasible when the focus shifts to the ethnic groups and how they bargain their position in a conflict and *vis-a-vis* conflictual policy.

Irredentist claim: choice of groups

Ethnic politics offers an explanation for the choices that the leaders make in conducting their foreign policy. The ethnic ties argument (Saideman 1997) given to explain why states support secessionist movements can be extended to why states follow irredentist policies. The ethnic ties argument is informed by three assumptions. The first one is regarding the motivation of the politicians. The leaders are seen as self maximising individuals whose sole aim is to maintain their office. The second assumption is about the preferences and interests of their supporters. The role of supporters is important in enabling the politician to maintain office. How this support comes depends on the regime type. In democracies, the support comes from voting and from coalition partners that is made up of smaller group of leaders. In authoritarian regime, support comes from military and security apparatus. The third assumption that is made in this argument is about the ability of supporters to influence the foreign policy. Ethnic identities influence the preferences of the politicians in office; there exist multiple identities and it is the political context that determines the importance of a particular identity. Based on these assumptions Saideman argues that if ethnic identities influence domestic politics, same identities can influence foreign policy for two reasons:

‘First, ethnic identity, by its nature, creates loyalty, interest, and fear of extinction. International boundaries do not cause members of ethnic groups to ignore the condition of those who are similar to themselves-their ethnic kin. Constituents will care most about those with whom they share ethnic ties or those with whom a history of ethnic enmity exists. Ethnic enmity matters almost as much as ethnic ties, because ethnicity is partially an attempt to define who one is by who one is not. Second, ethnic ties influence foreign policymaking, because

support for ethnic kin abroad can be a litmus test for a politician's sincerity on ethnic issues at home' (Saideman 1997: 727).

Ethnic ties across the border motivate the groups to mobilise politically for reunification of people and territory. The politicians whose office depends upon these groups adopt the policy of irredentism to realise their demands. Here we bring in the alternative explanation to diversionary one for Somalia's aggression in Ogaden region in 1977-78. The authoritarian regime of Siyad Barre was dependent upon three clans for support – his own clan of Marehan, the presidential guard was entirely recruited from this clan; his son-in-law's clan Dolbohanta that was dominant in the secret police and his mother's clan, the Ogaden who dominated the officer corps of the army. The Ogaden clan members reside on the Eastern border of Ethiopia and share ties with the Somali side. Barre became increasingly dependent upon the Ogaden tribe for their political support and its members were therefore able to successfully lobby for aggression towards Ethiopia in order to retrieve the co-nationals or more aptly ethnic kin (Saideman 2002).

When states abandon these demands it can then be argued that it is the result of changing preferences of the group. This I argue happens because ethnic/national groups though motivated by affect and values adopt rational means to achieve their goals. Their strategies involve an analysis of costs and benefits of pursuing certain ambitions in the political arena. When the groups perceive that the potential costs of pursuing irredentist demands outweigh their benefits, they are likely to give up their claim for reunification with co-nationals. This I argue happens at the stage of 'hurting stalemate'. The concept is used in conflict resolution theory to indicate the 'ripeness' of the conflict for resolution (Zartman 1985). This concept is based on the premise that when parties to a conflict find themselves locked in a conflict and reach a stage of deadlock where they see that victory cannot be achieved they seek resolution to the conflict. Hurting stalemate has been linked to the concept of catastrophe – either impending from past or recently avoided in the works of Zartman and Berman (1982), Zartman (1983), Touval and Zartman (1985) and Zartman (1985). Catastrophe serves as a reminder to seek a resolution within a deadline so as to minimise pain or face greater violence or costs of continued conflict. It has been pointed out that catastrophe does not serve as a necessary condition though for the

existence or definition of a hurting stalemate (Zartman 2001). Zartman (2001) points out that the concept of hurting stalemate is rooted in the cost benefit analysis that is consistent with the literature on public choice notions and rationality and studies of public choice and war termination and negotiation. He points out that these theories argue that groups pick the alternatives according to their preference and a 'decision to change is induced by increasing pain associated with the (present) conflictual course' (Zartman 2001). The change in the preferences of the parties or groups in a conflict is seen as a function of transformation in their situation. As Wright (1965) points out that the conditions that can lead states to de-escalate conflict and look for resolution include

'comparative equality and great capability for destruction; high costs in proportion to state's economy; and particularly a strong world opinion, manifested in international organization, demanding a ceasefire, negotiation or renunciation of its cause by one party' (Wright 1965: 442).

Kornprobst (2008) argues on similar lines that a revolutionary event leads to a change in environment that in turn results in the change in the irredentist policies of the states that they have been pursuing for a long time. This is the result of new advocacy groups that successfully argue to change the position of leaders and masses with respect to irredentist claims. In case of Ireland the revolutionary event, he argues, is 'the troubles' that began in Northern Ireland. Although he does not argue the change in policy and perception of the public in terms of cost benefit analysis, by linking change with revolutionary event in case of Ireland, it is clear that the violence and the loss associated with it proved to provide an impetus to agree on status quo of the borders.

Zartman (2001) articulates this change in situation of the parties in game theoretic terms as a change in

'parties' perception from a prisoners' dilemma (PDG) into a chicken dilemma game (CDG) (Brams 1985; Goldstein 1998), or, in other terms, the realization that the status quo or no negotiation (DD, the southeast corner) is a negative-sum situation, and that to avoid the zero-sum outcomes now considered impossible (CD and DC, the northeast and southwest corners) the positive-sum outcome (CC, the northwest corner) must be explored' (Zartman 2001: 9).

Of importance is particularly the point that it is the perception of the objective situation of conflict that is instrumental in a hurting stalemate. The condition itself does not necessarily lead to a hurting stalemate. It is possible that the parties have been in a condition that entails more cost than benefit in pursuit of a goal, but since the parties do not recognise it, hurting stalemate cannot be said to exist. Another possibility is that the parties perceive the situation as lot worse than it actually is and their estimates of future costs of pursuit of goal maybe exaggerated. This perception can result in the situation of hurting stalemate and bring the parties to negotiating table. The evidence of a mutually hurting stalemate may be very strong and yet the parties may fail to recognise it and fail to perceive the situation of costly deadlock or the evidence may be weak or insubstantial and the parties may perceive themselves to be locked in a costly conflict where victory is not certain and decide to act upon its basis. A hurting stalemate is dependent upon the perception of the parties to a conflict. It is a necessary but not sufficient condition that leads parties involved in a conflict to search a solution. Similarly, it can be argued that hurting stalemate is a necessary but not sufficient condition that leads the group backing irredentist demand of the state to reconsider its position. It is also important to note that until now we have been dealing with the change in preferences of the groups making /supporting irredentist demand of the state.

It is important to inquire whether hurting stalemate as a condition is possible to be recognised by only one party to the conflict. It is possible that only one party to the conflict sees itself to be involved in a hurting stalemate (Stedman 1991). It can be recognised by more than one party as well. For our purposes, it is important to note that hurting stalemate can be recognised as a condition by the group that has to be retrieved and by the anti-irredentist state as well. The puzzle that we are concerned here is that why do states give up irredentist claim after pursuing them for a long time and also, why do states not give up claims and keep pursuing them. Since, the puzzle entails giving up of irredentist claim; it is unlikely that the perception of hurting stalemate exist in anti-irredentist state. For the outcome under study here, it is more likely to exist for the groups making irredentist claim and for the groups that are to be retrieved. The strategy for the anti-irredentist state would involve strategies that would keep on increasing the costs for

escalation of the conflict for the irredentist state as well as the group demanding unification with the parent country.

There are different sections of society that support an irredentist claim. The politicians as we have argued rely upon them considerably for their support to maintain their office. One such component is the military of the country. As noted in the case of Somalia, the dominance of Ogaden clan in military was successful in exerting pressure to retrieve ethnic kin from neighbouring state Ethiopia. It follows that hurting stalemate perception has to be shared by the military and its leadership (Stedman 1991). As in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh there still remains a perception that the conflict can be resolved by military aggression, so the parties to the conflict have not engaged in the mediation processes with any mediator beyond a certain period of time (examples include Russian mediation efforts, Iran's initiative, OSCE's (formerly CSCE) initial mediation process that resulted in failure). The exception being the one underway currently that is backed by US that is influenced by the Armenian Diaspora and seen with suspicion by the Azeri population.

Change in leadership associated with the increased chances in the ability of the leadership to identify the situation. The role of change in leadership becomes an important variable, as change in leadership may help the parties see the prevailing objective condition as that constituting a deadlock and costs being more than benefits (Stedman 1991). Domestic rivals, instead of external rivals may lead the incumbent leadership to realise the hurting stalemate and work towards a resolution of the impasse.

What remains a significant inquiry here is that whether hurting stalemate always leads group or party in the direction of a resolution. Is there only one linear path that the group when suffers losses will take. There exists another possibility that losses would aggravate and reify a party's resolve to continue the conflict. The basis of such behaviour is found in prospect theory (Kanheman and Tversky 1979).

Zartman (2001) agrees that there is a problem with the notion of hurting stalemate which is that it is possible that the increase in pain causes an increase in resistance rather than reducing it. He writes

‘Reinforcement is the normal response to opposition: ‘don't give up without a fight’, ‘no gain without pain’, ‘hold the course, whatever the cost’, ‘when the going gets tough, the tough get going’, and ‘if at first you don't succeed, try, try again. The imposition of pain to a present course in conflict is not likely to lead to a search for alternative measures without first being tested’ (Zartman 2001: 12).

It is likely that the increased perception of pain may lead to renewed struggle and spark a fresh spiral in violence and lead to escalation of conflict. I argue that this hypothesis when applied to states that continue to make irredentist claim even after a long period helps explain their behaviour. I further extend this argument to building further hypothesis that needs further testing in future research that irredentist claims where the value or affective component is dominant, refuse to acknowledge the hurting stalemate stage and instead respond to increased pain with renewed struggle.

Kanheman and Tversky (1979) in their analysis of behaviour in insurance and gambling suggested that ‘a person who has not made peace with his losses is likely to accept gambles that would be unacceptable to him otherwise... a failure to adapt to losses or to attain an expected gain induces risk seeking’ (Kanheman and Tversky 1979: 287). This can be applied to state behaviour where states seem to be engaged in prolonged conflicts where the costs outweigh the benefits with ‘a desperate hope that they might recover their sunken costs’ (Levy 1992: 286). Jervis (2004) writes in his analysis of implications of prospect theory

‘Subjective well-being is a topic that social science has been reluctant to discuss in recent years, but it is central to much of our lives. A loss inflicts more harm than a comparable gain produces pleasure; this fact and the related endowment effect are important parts of our psychological makeup. The importance of change rather than absolute value position, and the related significance of the reference point and how it can be altered, can be seen as integral to human nature’ (Jervis 2004: 163).

Prospect theory in international relations can be applied under coercive bargaining scenario. Butler (2007) analyses the situation that for our purposes here can be likened to the situation when a state makes irredentist claim. He takes variants of status quo as reference points. He comments that ‘the most interesting situation in this vein is for one actor to cling to a status quo ante, while the other holds to the current status quo’ (Butler 2007 : 242). He cites the reason for which an actor may cling to a status quo ante as her

reference point. He further writes ‘she may be trying to return to some historical high point, trying to right some perceived injustice (recent or historical), or dealing with the aftermath of a recent *fait accompli*’ (Butler 2007: 243). He uses Levy’s argument in a *fait accompli* situation in which one state has made a ‘tangible gain’ at the expense of other. Austria’s irredentist claim after Tyrol was divided and given to Italy as war spoils falls under this category of behaviour. The implications of prospect theory for this situation is

‘the endowment effect suggests that [B] will accommodate to its gains much more quickly than [A] will accommodate to its losses. Consequently, [A] will attempt to recover its losses and restore the old status quo, and [B] will attempt to maintain the new status quo against [A]’s encroachments. Each will accept larger than normal risks to maintain its version of the status quo’ (Levy quoted by Butler 2007: 243).

Italy’s behaviour too fits this description, as soon as it took control of the region, it began massive urbanisation of the area and installed major electricity projects that made detachment of the South Tyrol region economically unfeasible for Italy and provide it strong basis to go to war if the status quo is reversed.

This situation according to Levy and Jervis leads to an increase in likelihood of conflict. This situation in where ‘B “accommodates to its gains much more quickly” than A “accommodates to its losses”’ the bargaining behaviour is ‘largely determined by A’s probability of winning a contest’ (Butler 2007: 244). There are three scenarios. First, if A faces no costs for a contest, then A will not ‘accept than normal risks to return to her version of status quo ‘because she knows that B is prepared to take “larger than normal risks”’ (Butler 2007: 244). Second, when both actors have zero costs for a contest, the possibility of which is very small, then contest becomes the equilibrium of the bargaining game. Butler points out that higher loss aversion will remove contest as an equilibrium possibility. Third, ‘A has a credible threat and an equilibrium demand that satisfies A and B will accept. Because B knows that A is willing to take the risk of a contest, he himself is unwilling to take "larger than normal risks". In this range, B will end up accepting new division that is worse than the status quo ante’ (Butler 2007: 245). The second scenario fits the South Tyrol case, where Italy was ready to take more than normal costs to continue the status quo.

Prospect theory and politics are linked to find support to ‘the contention that individuals’ orientation toward risk influences their political perspectives and behavior’ (Peterson and Lawson 1989: 335). They further point out that since Kahneman and Tversky’s ‘formulation is that people tend normally to be risk-averse in gain situations and risk-seekers in loss situations’ they study ‘normal’ as independent variable creating an index ‘representing the extent to which people are, in fact, risk-averse in gain and risk-seeking in loss situations’ (Peterson and Lawson 1989: 332). Their results argue that ‘such normal persons – under prospect theory – are expected to be biased in favor of the status quo’ (Peterson and Lawson 1989: 332). The possibility that the populations of the irredentist and anti-irredentist states start perceiving the ‘irredentist project’ as ‘normal’ as it has continued for a long time and accept status quo needs to be further explored. A situation where clash of status quo and status quo ante becomes a new status quo.

Zartman (2001) points out that as explained by prospect theory, an attractive outcome can bring both the parties to the negotiating table and resolve the dispute for mutual gains. The prospect for gain makes them less risk acceptant and more risk averse. He says that examples of such situations and behaviour are rare though. He particularly points out two cases where the situation as described by prospect theory is applicable. The first one is the Madrid Peace Process on the Middle East in 1992 and the second Jordan Israel peace treaty of October 1994. He cites Nordquist’s work on ‘boundary disputes which are overcome by the prospects of mutual development in the region’ as another promising avenue where prospects of gain help explain behaviour of parties to a conflict (Zartman 2001: 13).

Another explanation that is given to account for state behaviour where it continues its policy despite costs outweighing the benefits is that states do that to maintain their reputation (Walter 2003). This is applicable in case of territorial disputes more than in any other case. Extending it to irredentist cases it explains why anti-irredentist states may not agree with revision of status quo and would be willing to go to war over it. A state that is susceptible to multiple territorial claims knows that once it makes a concession it is likely that it will have to make further concessions. This argument is applicable in case of India as an anti-irredentist state.

Of our interest is then to see the situations that existed when parties engaged in an irredentist conflict agreed on status quo *i.e.* the irredentist state agreed to abandon its claim over the territory that it earlier justified and pursued aggressive foreign policy to realise its goal. Is the decision to agree on status quo motivated by hurting stalemate or by prospect of gain remains one of the questions.

I argue that in the case of irredentist conflicts it is a mix of both that guides irredentist states to agree upon status quo. In case the of Ireland one sees that violence that began with ‘the troubles’ and lead to further escalation of tensions within Northern Ireland and later involved Ireland to lead to a situation of hurting stalemate where the British for a very long time treated the matter as an internal problem and it was only after large scale violence that lead to increased pressure by the Irish Americans that the issue became international and conditions were made suitable for negotiations. The idea of Europe provided the prospect of gain to the Government of Ireland to abandon hostilities and accept the territorial status quo and reap the benefits of European economic integration. Both these situations altered the opinion of the public who supported their leaders to opt for territorial status quo and abandon the policy of irredentism.

Conclusion

This chapter looked at two competing accounts for behaviour of states in accepting territorial status quo. Both the accounts emphasise the rational instrumental behaviour of the politicians in office who seek to maximise their terms. The first explanation provided by diversionary theory could only account for the conflictual behaviour of the actors and not for their behaviour that was aimed towards conflict resolution. It also denied any agency to the groups who were seen as to be exploited by the politicians for their own gains. The second approach reverses the logic and sees the groups as guiding the behaviour of the politician. This approach is based on the ethnic ties argument and argues that groups exert pressure on politicians to adopt certain kinds of policies *vis-a-vis* their kin abroad, in our case, irredentist policy. The change in irredentist behaviour is seen as change in the group’s demand that is triggered by a hurting stalemate as well as in some cases by a prospect of gain that accompanies the situation of perceived hurting stalemate. This chapters suggests for research into new hypothesis that emerges from our inquiry –it

posits that states where value or affect component of irredentist claims is strong, groups do not perceive the situation of hurting stalemate and respond to loss with renewed struggle.

Conclusion

We shall not cease from exploration

And the end of all our exploring

Will be to arrive where we started

And know the place for the first time

~ T.S. Eliot

This study essentially dealt with the puzzle of change, change in irredentist policies of states. Is this change driven by instrumental rationality or is there a mix of instrumental and value rational behaviour? The tension that exists in its conceptualisation between instrumental rationality and value rationality was the point of departure for this research. The decision taken by a state to give up an irredentist claim after pursuing it after a long time made us look beyond the instrumentalist explanations of state behaviour that tell us nothing about the socio-political processes that shape a society. Irredentism is both a policy and a movement. It then becomes important to look at changes that occurred within the groups that once shared a goal for common destiny but decided to fulfil it separately. The role of kin groups who are to be retrieved then becomes important. If the group that is to be retrieved no longer wishes to be united with the parent country, I argued, then the state making irredentist claim is more likely to give up its pursuit. This, I argue, happens due to the policies of the anti-irredentist state. Clearly, this process points towards the reflexive relationship between the state and groups residing within it. In order to counter the demands of ethnic/sub-national groups, the anti-irredentist state pursues policies that in the longer term change the character of the region and impacts the identities of the people, there occurs *mutation of identities* where groups no longer nurture the demand to be reunited with the parent country. Not only the policies of anti-irredentist states play a role in impacting the policy of irredentist state but third parties that intervene in the conflict also exert influence on both the states. The role of

international actors as third party to resolve a conflict then becomes crucial in understanding the change in behaviour of the irredentist state. The external intervention in irredentist conflict, I have argued, is tilted in favour of the status quo. This I have argued is due to the acceptance of the norm of territorial status quo by most of the countries. These countries are then guided by this norm when intervening in irredentist conflicts. The state making irredentist claim obviously exhibits deviant behaviour from the prevalent norm. This happens as states are able to exercise some agency when dealing with international norms and are not bound to follow it if they see a possibility to take advantage of its fuzzy nature. Another explanation for states not following international norm is when it is not in their national interest, but this does not explain the process how states come to accept the norm.

The above mentioned explanations mostly account for the behaviour of change in the policy of the irredentist state. The internal process of an irredentist state also becomes important and the role of elite decision making too plays a role in a state's decision to abandon its irredentist policy. This explanation helps us understand the role of various politically conscious groups who influence their foreign policy by exercising pressure on the leaders who wish to maintain their office position. The change in the preferences of the groups is contingent upon their perception of the situation. I have argued that groups no longer support the demand of retrieval of land and kin from neighbouring country when they perceive themselves to be involved in a costly deadlock. This situation implies that they do not see a favourable outcome of the conflict and perceive that the costs of continuing the conflict outweigh the benefits. Another possibility is explored where loss can act as a catalyst for renewed struggle. This is a trait of the value rational behaviour where the goal sometimes is perceived more important and the means employed to reach the goal do not follow the cost-benefit logic. This is consistent with prospect theory (Kanheman and Tversky 1979) that posits that loss induces risk seeking behaviour whereas gain makes actors risk averse. Different states have had different trajectories when it comes to the pursuit of their irredentist claims. Some have given up the claim by force and some after pursuing it for decades and some continue to make the claim after decades. It can be argued the prospects for gain combined with the perception of hurting stalemate has led states to settle their irredentist conflict by acceptance of the status quo.

The states that continue to pursue irredentist claim despite increasing costs highlights that they are driven by value rationality. However, this does not mean that states that gave up the claim were not driven by value rational component. The change in the policy highlights the limits of costs that can be endured in case of value rational goals. The goals are not non-negotiable, but not as easily negotiable as is the case of goals that are instrumental in nature and their pursuance rely on strict cost-benefit calculations.

From the above mentioned discussion we can conclude that when a state or a group pursues an irredentist claim there occur simultaneous events that are driven by value rationality, instrumental rationality or a mix of both. I propose here that the process of irredentism and change can be further refined by developing a taxonomy of irredentism. This implies that we view the events as occurring at the same time and not one after the other. Such an approach, I argue helps in analysing irredentist movements as it goes beyond the logic of causality, where it is asserted that when A occurs, B will occur, this approach asserts when A occurs then B occurs also, implying that B is an extension of A (where A and B simultaneously interact) rather than A being a cause for B to occur. For example, the emotional ties that individuals share are manifested in their actions towards each other, it is more appropriate to see their actions as an extension of the values and bond they share rather than as a cause. In turn the actions too impact the ties or bond that was there implying a reflexive relationship. Irredentism then can be seen as a process that is based upon value rationality and instrumental rationality; strategic motivations and affective motivations. At different levels of analysis different motivations prevail; this is not to say that in case of irredentism, these two motivations exist independent of or mutually exclusive of each other. When states make claims or when they withdraw them both affective motivations and strategic motivations are at play. In order to better understand the dynamics, processes and outcomes of an irredentist phenomenon we can then employ the taxonomy of *strategic irredentism* and *affective irredentism*. Strategic irredentism is in play when a state's claim and action are driven by strategic calculations and there is no affective component involved with respect to either population or territory. Strategic irredentism also, includes cases where irredentist claims are used by politicians only to divert attention from internal problems that they are facing at that moment. Affective irredentism is the policy that a state or group pursues based on

affective ties with the land and/or people inhabiting it. It is important to clarify here, that affective motivations need not only be with respect to kin groups on the other side of the border but can also be towards the territory with indifference towards the populations inhabiting it. Such a claim is usually based on ancient historical ties of the people with the land they now seek to retrieve. This taxonomy helps us in understanding the decisions by different states at different points of time. This also explains sometimes self defeating behaviour of states that pursue irredentist claims and wage war despite military weakness, as was the case with Somalia that was defeated by Ethiopia when it waged war in order to retrieve Ogaden in 1964.

An important factor that impacts the outcome of any conflict in international system now is the presence of nuclear weapons. This study does not deal with its dynamics and how it changes the game. India and Pakistan, both nuclear powers, are involved in an irredentist conflict. The presence of nuclear weapons makes the conflict more dangerous. There are two sides of it –one that escalation in the tension between the two states can lead to a nuclear flashpoint and other, the presence of nuclear weapon will lead both the states to deter from escalating the conflict and look for resolution of the conflict. However, the role of population that is driven by affect and values and strong ties that adopts a risk acceptant behaviour cannot be explained by the stabilising effect of nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, they remain an important factor in state's calculation of its strategy towards materialisation of its goal.

We then return to the central point, whether states are always driven by instrumental motivations in pursuit of their foreign policy. This study concludes that it remains one of the explanations of state behaviour. States policies are based on strategic interaction and instrumental calculations. However, an inquiry into the phenomenon of irredentism reveals that a state may be driven by value rationality where emotions, affect, values and ideology form the deeper foundations of state behaviour. That a preference for pursuing a policy is rooted in values, the means adopted to pursue the policy are not.

Appendix

*Source: Kornprobst, Markus (2008), *Irredentism in European Politics: Argumentation, Compromise and Norms*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Year	Challenger	Defender	Contested area(s)	Outcome
<i>Irredentist cases in Europe 1848-1913</i>				
1908-	Bulgaria	Ottoman Empire	Thrace, Macedonia	-
1913-	Bulgaria	Greece	Macedonia	-
1913-	Bulgaria	Serbia	Macedonia	-
1848-	Denmark	Prussia	Schleswig-Holstein	-
1848-1860	France	Piedmont-Sardinia	Nice, Savoy	Peaceful territorial change
1871-	France	Germany	Alsace-Lorraine	-
1843-	Greece	United Kingdom	Ionian Islands, Cyprus	-
1843-	Greece	Ottoman Empire	Thessaly, Crete&Aegean Islands, Epirus, Thrace, Macedonia	-
1912	Greece	Albania	Northern Epirus	-
1848-	Piedmont-Sardinia	Austria	Lombardy, Venice, Istria south of Brennero	-
1848-1860	Piedmont-Sardinia	Two Sicilies	Two Sicilies	Territorial change by force
1848-1870	Piedmont-Sardinia	Papal States	Umbria, Marches, Rome	Territorial change by force
1848-	Prussia (German Conf.)	Denmark	Schleswig-Holstein	-
1878-	Romania	Austria-Hungary	Transylvania, Bukovina	-

Year	Challenger	Defender	Contested area(s)	Outcome
1912-	Serbia	Ottoman Empire	Macedonia, Thrace	-
1908-	Serbia	Austria-Hungary	Bosnia-Herzegovina	-
1878-	Romania	Russia/Soviet Union	Bessarabia	-
1913	Serbia	Bulgaria	Macedonia	Territorial change by force
1713-	Spain	Great Britain	Gibraltar	-
1806-	Sweden	Finland	Aland Islands	-
<i>Irredentist cases in Europe, 1919-1938</i>				
1919-	Austria	Italy	South Tyrol	-
1919-1924	Czechoslovakia	Poland	Cieszyn, Spiza, Oriva Jaworzina	Peaceful territorial change
1919-1920	Denmark	Germany	North & Central Schleswig	Peaceful territorial change
1919-	Finland	Soviet Union	East Karelia	-
1933-1939	Germany	Austria	Austria	Territorial change by force
1933	Germany	Czechoslovakia	Sudetenland	Territorial change by force

Year	Challenger	Defender	Contested area(s)	Outcome
1922-1936	Germany	France	Rhineland and Saar	Territorial change by force
1933-	Germany	Lithuania	Memelland	-
1933-	Germany	Poland	Danzig and Polish Corridor	-
1919-1923	Greece	Turkey	Epirus, Thrace, Smyrna & offshore islands	Revoked by force
1919-1928	Greece	Italy	Dodecanese Islands	Peaceful recognition
1919-	Greece	United Kingdom	Cyprus	-
1919-1921	Hungary	Austria	Burgenland	Peaceful territorial change
1938-1939	Hungary	Czechoslovakia	parts of Slovakia Ruthenis, Subcarpathia	Territorial change by force
1926-	Hungary	Romania	Transylvania	-
1926-	Hungary	Yugoslavia	Banat	-
1922-	Ireland	United Kingdom	Northern Ireland	-
1919-1924	Italy	Yugoslavia	Istrian Peninsula, Fiume Dalmatian coastline	Peaceful territorial change

Year	Challenger	Defender	Contested area(s)	Outcome
1919-1921	Poland	Soviet Union	Sections of Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine	Territorial change by force
1919-1923	Poland	Lithuania	Vilnus	Territorial change by force
1923-1938	Lithuania	Poland	Vilnus	Revoked by force
1919-1923	Poland	Germany	Danzig, E & W Prussia Upper Silesia	Peaceful territorial change
1919-1924	Poland	Czechoslovakia	Cieszyn, Spiza, Oriva Jaworzina	Peaceful territorial Change
1919-1938	Poland	Czechoslovakia	Cieszyn and parts of Silesia	Territorial change by force
1919-	Romania	Soviet Union	Bessarabia	-
1919-1922	Romania	Yugoslavia	Banat	Peaceful territorial change
1919-	Spain	United Kingdom	Gibraltar	-
1919-1921	Sweden	Finland	Aland Islands	Peaceful recognition
1919-1924	Yugoslavia	Italy	Parts of Istrian Peninsula and Dalmatian Coastline, Fiume	Peaceful territorial change

Year	Challenger	Defender	Contested area(s)	Outcome
------	------------	----------	-------------------	---------

Irredentist cases in Europe, 1946-2000

1949-1969	Austria	Italy	South Tyrol	Peaceful recognition
1949-1973	E. Germany	W. Germany (France, UK, US)	West Berlin	Peaceful recognition
1991-1996	Estonia	Russia	Pechory district	Peaceful recognition
1949-1973	FRG	GDR	GDR	Peaceful recognition
1949-1970	FRG	Poland	Pomerania, Upper Silesia	Peaceful recognition
1949-1970	FRG	Soviet Union	East Prussia	Peaceful recognition
1946-1982	Greece	Cyprus	Cyprus	Peaceful recognition
1946-1985	Greece	Albania	Northern Epirus	Peaceful recognition
1946-1998	Ireland	United Kingdom	Northern Ireland	Peaceful recognition
1946-1975	Italy	Yugoslavia	Trieste	Peaceful recognition
1991-1997	Latvia	Russia	Abrene-Pitalovo district	Peaceful recognition
1946-1947	Romania	Hungary	Transylvania	Peaceful recognition

Year	Challenger	Defender	Contested area(s)	Outcome
1991-1995	Serbia	Croatia	Krajina	Revoked by force
1992-1995	Serbia	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Serb inhabited areas	Revoked by force
1946-	Spain	United Kingdom	Gibraltar	-

Irredentist cases in Central Asia, Far East and Pacific, 1946-2000

1947-	Afghanistan	Pakistan	Pathan-inhabited areas	-
1956-1983	Cambodia	Vietnam	Khmer populated areas	Peaceful recognition
1919-1984	China	United Kingdom	Hong-Kong	Peaceful territorial change
1919-1975	China	Portugal	Macau	Peaceful territorial change
1946-1955	China	Soviet Union	Port Arthur	Peaceful territorial change
1950-	China	Taiwan	Taiwan	-
1947	India	Pakistan	Kashmir	-
1948-1954	India	France	Chandernagor, Pondicherry, Karikal Mahe, Yanam	Peaceful territorial change

Year	Challenger	Defender	Contested area(s)	Outcome
1950-1961	India	Portugal	Goa, Damao,Diu	Territorial change by force
1952-1971	Japan	United States	Okinawa	Peaceful territorial change
1951-	Japan	Soviet Union/Russia	Kurile Islands	-
1950-	North Korea	South Korea	South Korea	-
1950-	South Korea	North Korea	North Korea	-
1950-	Taiwan	China	China	-
1947-	Pakistan	India	Kashmir	-
1962-	Philippines	Malaysia	Sabah	-
1958-1975	Vietnam	South Vietnam	South Vietnam	Territorial change by force
<i>Irredentist cases in the Near East, Middle East and North Africa, 1946-2000</i>				
1991-	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Nagorno-Karabakh	-
1950-1956	Egypt	United Kingdom	Suez Canal Zone	Territorial change by force
1967-1989	Egypt	Israel	Sinai	Peaceful territorial change

Year	Challenger	Defender	Contested area(s)	Outcome
1979-	Iraq	Iran	Sunni areas of Khuzestan	-
1932-	Iraq	Kuwait	Kuwait	-
1948-1967	Israel	Jordan	East Jerusalem	Territorial change by force
1960-1975	Mauritania	Spain	Western Sahara	Peaceful territorial change
1956-	Morocco	Spain	Ifni, Tarfaya, Melilla, Ceuta, Western Sahara	-
1957-1970	Morocco	France/Mauritania	Mauritania	Peaceful territorial change
1919-1990	North Yemen	South Yemen	South Yemen	Peaceful territorial change
1967-	Syria	Israel	Golan Heights	-
1956-1962	Tunisia	France	Bizerte	Territorial change by force

Irredentist cases in sub-Saharan Africa, 1946-2000

1960-1961	Cameroun	United Kingdom	Southern Cameroons	Peaceful territorial change
1961-	Cameroun	Nigeria	Bakassi	-
1975-	Comoros	France	Mayotte	-

Year	Challenger	Defender	Contested area(s)	Outcome
1959-1989	Ghana	Ivory Coast	Sanwi District	Peaceful recognition
1966-	Lesotho	South Africa	Parts of Free state, KwaZulu-Natal and Eastern Cape	-
1960-	Somalia	Ethiopia	Haud and Ogaden	-
1960-1981	Somalia	United Kingdom	Somali inhabited areas	Peaceful recognition
1960-1981	Somalia	Kenya	Somali inhabited areas	Peaceful recognition
1960-1977	Somalia	France	Djibouti	Peaceful recognition
1968-	Swaziland	South Africa	Parts of Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal	-
1960-	Togo	Ghana	Ewe-inhabited areas	-
<i>Irredentist cases in the Americas, 1946-2000</i>				
1919-	Argentina	United Kingdom	Islas Malvinas/Falkland Islands	-
1959-	Cuba	United States	Guantanamo Bay	-
1936-	Guatemala	United Kingdom/ Belize	British Honduras/ Belize	-
1950-1977	Panama	United States	Panama Canal Zone	Peaceful territorial change

References

(*indicates a primary source)

Ambrosio, Thomas (2001), *Irredentism: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics*, London: Praeger.

Anderson, Benedict (1991 [1983]), *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso.

Arthur, Paul (1999), "Multiparty Mediation in Northern Ireland" in Chester A. Crocker et al. (eds.) *Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World*, Washington DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press.

Ayoob, Mohammed (1995), *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict and the International System*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Baird, Ian (2010), "Different Views of History: Shades of Irredentism along the Laos-Cambodia Border", *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 41(2): 187-213.

Barnard, Frederick M. (1984), "Patriotism and Citizenship in Rousseau: A Dual Theory of Public Willing?", *The Review of Politics*, 46(2): 244-265.

Barth, Fredrik (1969), "Introduction", in Fredrick Barth (ed.) *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*, Boston: Little Brown and Co.

Beardsley, Kyle C. et al. (2006), "Mediation Styles and Crisis Outcomes", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 50(1): 58-86.

Ben-Israel, Hedva (1991), "Irredentism: Nationalism Reexamined", in Naomi Chazan (ed.) *Irredentism and International Politics*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Bercovitch, Jacob (1986), "International Mediation: A Study of Incidence, Strategies and Conditions of Successful Outcomes", *Cooperation and Conflict*, 21(3): 155–168.

Bercovitch, Jacob et al. (1991), "Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in International Relations", *Journal of Peace Research*, 28(1): 7-17.

Berlin, Isaiah (1982), *Against the Current: Essays in the History of Ideas*, New York: Penguin.

Blainey, Geoffrey (1973), *The Causes of War*, New York: Free Press.

Brass, Paul (1991), *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison*, New Delhi: Sage.

Brecher, Michael and Jonathan Wilkenfeld (1997), *A Study of Crisis*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Breuilly, John (1993), *Nationalism and the State*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Buchheit, Lee C. (1978), *Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination*, New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.

Bull, Hedley (1977), *The Anarchical Society*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Butler, Christopher K. (2007), "Prospect Theory and Coercive Bargaining", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 51(2): 227-250.

Butterworth, Robert Lyle (1978), "Do Conflict Managers Matter?: An Empirical Assessment of Interstate Security Disputes and Resolution Efforts, 1945-1974", *International Studies Quarterly*, 22(2): 195-214.

Buzan, Barry (1992), "Third World Regional Security in Structural and Historical Perspective", in Brian Job (ed.) *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Carment, David (1994), "The Ethnic Dimension in World Politics: Theory, Policy and Early Warning", *Third World Quarterly*, 15(4): 551-582.

Carment, David and Patrick James (1995), "Internal Constraints and Interstate Ethnic Conflict: Towards a Crisis-based Assessment of Irredentism", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 39(1): 82-109.

----- (2000), "Explaining Third Party Intervention in Ethnic Conflict: Theory and Evidence", *Nations and Nationalism*, 6(2): 173-202.

Carr, E.H. (2001 [1939]), *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939, An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, New York: Palgrave.

Chatterjee, Partha (1991), "Whose imagined community?", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 20(3): 521-525.

----- (2003), "The Nation in Heterogeneous Time", in Umut Ozkirimli (ed.) *Nationalism and its Futures*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Chazan, Naomi (1991), "Introduction", in Naomi Chazan (ed.) *Irredentism and International Politics*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Cohen, Robin (1994), *Frontiers of Identity: The British and the Others*, London: Longman.

Connor, Walker (1990), "When is a nation", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 13(1): 92-103.

Cooper, Robert and Matts Berdal (1993), "Outside Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts", *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, 35(1): 118-142.

Coser, Lewis (1956), *The Function of Social Conflict*, New York: Free Press.

Deutsch Karl W. et al. (1957), *Political Community in the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Diehl, Paul et al. (1996), "United Nations Intervention and Recurring Conflict", *International Organization*, 50(4): 683-700.

Doyle, Michael (1983), "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs", *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 12(3): 205-235.

Eller, Jack David and Reed M. Coughlan (1993), "The Poverty of Primordialism: The Demystification of Ethnic Attachments", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 16(2): 183-201.

Emerson, Rupert (1960a), "Nationalism and Political Development", *The Journal of Politics*, 22(1): 3-28.

----- (1960b), *From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self Assertion of Asian and African Peoples*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Enloe, Cynthia H. (1973), *Ethnic Conflict and Political Development*, Boston: Little Brown.

Fasehun, Orobola (1982), "Nigeria and the Ethiopia-Somalia Conflict: A Case Study of Continuity in Nigerian Foreign Policy", *Africa Spectrum*, 17(2): 183-193.

Feinberg, Walter (1997), "Nationalism in a comparative mode: A response to Charles Taylor", in Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan (eds.) *The Morality of Nationalism*, New York; Oxford University Press.

Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink (1999), "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change" in Peter J. Katzenstein et al. (eds.) *Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics*, Cambridge: MIT Press.

Fisher, Ronald J. (2001), "Methods of Third-Party Intervention", *Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation*.

Fisher, Ronald J. and Loreleigh Keashly (1991), "The Potential Complimentary of Mediation and Consultation within a Contingency Model of Third Party Intervention" *Journal of Peace Research*, 28(1): 29-42.

Frazier, Derrick V. (2007), "Third Party Characteristics, Territory and the Mediation of Militarized Interstate Disputes", *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 23(4): 267-284.

Fukuyama, Francis (1989), "The End of History?", *National Interest*, 16: 3-18.

Gagnon, P.V., Jr. (1995), "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia", *International Security*, 19(3): 130-166.

Ganguly, Rajat and Ian MacDuff (2003), *Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism in South and Southeast Asia: Causes, Dynamics, Solutions*, New Delhi: Sage.

Geertz, Clifford (1963), "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States" in Clifford Geertz (ed.) *Old Societies and New States*, New York: Free Press.

----- (1993 [1973]), *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*, London: Fontana.

Giddens, Anthony (1985), *The Nation-State and Violence*, Cambridge: Polity.

Gilpin, Robert (1983), *War and Change in World Politics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press

Goertz, Gary and Paul Diehl (1992a), *Territorial Changes and International Conflict*, London: Routledge.

----- (1992b), "Toward a Theory of International Norms: Some Conceptual and Measurement Issues", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 36(4): 634-664.

Grovogui, Siba N. (2006), *Beyond Eurocentrism and Anarchy- Memories of International Order and Institutions*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Gurr, Ted Robert (1993), *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts*, Washington DC: US institute of Peace Press.

----- (1994), "Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System: 1994 Presidential Address", *International Studies Quarterly*, 38(3): 347-377.

Gutmann, Emanuel (1991), "Concealed or Conjured Irredentism: The Case of Alsace", in Naomi Chazan (ed.) *Irredentism and International Politics*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Haas, Ernst B. (1958), *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957*, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

Habermas, Jurgen and Seyla Ben-Habib (1981), "Modernity versus Postmodernity", *New German Critique*, 22: 3-14.

Halliday, Fred (1997), "Nationalism", in Johan Baylis and Steve Smith (eds.) *The Globalisation of World Politics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hastings, Adrian (1997), *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Heraclides, Alexis (1990), "Secessionist Minorities and External Involvement", *International Organization*, 44(3): 341-378.

Herbst, Jeffrey (1989), "The Creation and Maintenance of National Boundaries in Africa", *International Organization*, 43(4): 673-92.

Hewitt, Vernon (2002), "An Area of Darkness, Still? The Political Evolution of Ethnic Identities in Jammu and Kashmir, 1947-2001", in Steve Fenton and Stephen May (eds.) *Ethnonational Identities*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hobsbawm, Eric J. and Terence Ranger (eds.) (1983), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Holsti, Kalevi J. (1991), *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

----- (1996), *The State, War, and the State of War*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Horowitz, Donald L. (1985), *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

----- (1991), “Irredentas and Secessions: Adjacent Phenomenon, Neglected Connections”, in Naomi Chazan (ed.) *Irredentism and International Politics*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Horsman, Mathew and Andrew Marshall (1994), *After the Nation State*, New York: Harper Collins

Huntington, Samuel P. (1993), “The Clash of Civilizations?”, *Foreign Affairs*, 72(3): 22-49.

Huth, Paul K. (1998), “Major Power Intervention in International Crises, 1918-1988”, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42(6): 744-770.

Jackson, Robert H. and Carl G. Rosberg (1982), “Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood”, *World Politics*, 35(1): 1-24.

Jervis, Robert (2004), “The Implication of Prospect Theory for Human Nature and Values”, *Political Psychology*, 25(2): 163-176.

Kaldor, Mary (1999), *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.

----- (2002), *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, Cambridge: Polity.

Kalyvas, Stathis N. (2001), ““New” and “Old” Civil Wars – A Valid Distinction?”, *World Politics*, 54(1): 99-108.

Kahneman, Daniel and Amos Tversky (1979), “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk”, *Econometrica*, 47(2): 263-292.

Katzenstein, Peter J. (ed.) (1978), *Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press

Kedourie, Elie (1993), *Nationalism*, Oxford: Blackwell.

Kendie, Daniel D. (2003), "Toward Northeast African Cooperation: Resolving the Ethiopia- Somalia Disputes", *Northeast African Studies*, 10(2): 67-109.

Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye (1977), *Power and Interdependence*, Boston: Little Brown.

Kim, Chae-Han (1991), "Third-Party Participation in Wars", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 35(4): 659-677.

Kohn, Hans (1967), *The Idea of Nationalism*, New York: Collier.

Kornprobst, Markus (2008), *Irredentism in European Politics: Argumentation, Compromise and Norms*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Krasner, Stephen D. (1978), "United States Commercial and Monetary Policy: Unravelling the Paradox of External Strength and Internal Weakness" in Katzenstein (ed.) *Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Landau, Jacob M. (1991), "The Ups and Downs of Irredentism: The Case of Turkey", in Naomi Chazan (ed.) *Irredentism and International Politics*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers and London: Adamantine Press Limited.

Leeds, Bret Ashley (2003), "Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes", *American Journal of Political Science*, 47(3): 427-439.

----- (2005), “Alliances and the Expansion and Escalation of Militarized Interstate Disputes” in Alex Mintz and Bruce Russett (eds.) *New Directions for International Relations – Confronting the method of analysis problem*, Maryland: Lexington Books.

Lefebvre, Jeffrey A. (1992), *Arms for the Horn: U.S. Security Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia, 1953-1991*, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Levy, Jack S. (1989), “The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique”, in Manus I. Midlarsky (ed.) *Handbook of War Studies*, Boston: Unwin Hymen.

----- (1992), “Prospect Theory and International Relations: Theoretical Applications and Analytical Problems”, *Political Psychology*, 13(2): 283-310.

Mabee, Bryan (2003), “Security Studies and the ‘Security State’: Security Provision in Historical Context”, *International Relations*, 17(2): 135-151.

Mann, Michael (1993), *The Sources of Social Power, Vol. II: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

----- (1994), “A Political Theory of Nationalism and its Excesses”, in S. Perival (ed.), *Notions of Nationalism*, Budapest: Central European University Press.

----- (1996), “The Emergence of Modern European Nationalism”, in John A. Hall and Ian Jarvie (eds.) *The Social Philosophy of Ernest Gellner*, Atlanta, Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Mercopress, South Atlantic News Agency (2012), “Argentina confirms it has accepted UN mediation offer for the Malvinas dispute”, *Mercopress, South Atlantic News Agency*, 14 Feb 2012 [Online: web] Accessed 2 Apr 2012 URL:
<http://en.mercopress.com/2012/02/14/argentina-confirms-it-has-accepted-un-mediation-offer-for-the-malvinas-dispute>

Mesquita and Lalman (1988), "Empirical Support for Systemic and Dyadic Explanations of International Conflict", *World Politics*, 41(1): 1-20.

Miller, Ross A. (1999), "Regime Type, Strategic Interaction, and the Diversionary Use of Force", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 43(3): 388-402.

Morgan, T. Clifton and Kenneth N. Bickers (1992), "Domestic Discontent and the External Use of Force", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 36(1): 25-52.

Mooradian, Moorad and Daniel Druckman (1999), "Hurting Stalemate or Mediation? The Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, 1990-95", *Journal of Peace Research*, 36(6): 709-727.

Moravcsik, Andrew (1997), "Taking Preference Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics", *International Organization*, 51(4): 513-53.

Muni, S. D. (1993), *Pangs of Proximity: India and Sri Lanka's Ethnic Crisis*, New Delhi: Sage.

Neuberger, Benyamin (1991), "Irredentism and Politics in Africa", in Naomi Chazan (ed.) *Irredentism and International Politics*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Newman, Edward (2004), "The 'New Wars' Debate: A Historical Perspective is Needed", *Security Dialogue*, 35(2): 173-189.

Nozick, Robert (1993), *The Nature of Rationality*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Ohame, Kenichi (1990), *The Borderless World*, London: Fontana.

Ozkirimli, Umut (2000), *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*, New York: St.Martin's Press.

Peterson, Steven A. and Robert Lawson (1989), "Risky Business: Prospect Theory and Politics", *Political Psychology*, 10(2): 325-339.

Peuch, Jean-Christophe (2005), "Caucasus: Top Armenian General Slams Azerbaijan Over Defense Spending", *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, Prague, 29 June 2005, [Online: web] Accessed 20 April 2012 URL: <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1059579.html>

Pickering, Jeffery and Emizet F. Kisangani (2005), "Democracy and Diversionary Military Intervention: Reassessing Regime Type and the Diversionary Hypothesis", *International Studies Quarterly*, 49(1): 23-43.

Powell, Emilia Justyna and Krista E. Weigand (2010), "Legal Systems and Peaceful Attempts to Resolve Territorial Disputes", *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 27(2): 129-151.

Putnam, Robert D. (1988), "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games", *International Organization*, 42(3): 427-460.

Reichman, Shalom and Arnon Golan (1991), "Irredentism and Boundary Adjustments in Post-World War I Europe", in Naomi Chazan (ed.) *Irredentism and International Politics*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Renan, Ernest (1996 [1882]), "What is a Nation?", in Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny (eds.) *Becoming National : A Reader*, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

**Resolution 794* (1992), UN Doc. S/RES/794.

Rosenau, James (1969), "Toward the Study of National-International Linkages", *Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems*, New York: Free Press.

----- (1973), "Theorizing Across Systems: Linkage Politics Revisited", in Jonathan Wilkenfeld (ed.) *Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics*, New York: David McKay.

Ruggie, John (1993), "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations", *International Organization*, 47(1): 139-174.

Rummel, Rudolph (1963), "Dimensions of conflict behaviour within and between nations", *Yearbook of the Society for General Systems*, 8: 1-50.

Saideman, Stephen M. (1997), "Explaining the International Relations of Secessionist Conflicts: Vulnerability Versus Ethnic Ties", *International Organization*, 51(4): 721-53.

----- (2001), *The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy, and International Conflict*, New York: Columbia University Press.

----- (2002), "The Power of the Small: The Impact of Ethnic Minorities on Foreign Policy", *SAIS Review*, 22(2): 93-105.

Sarkees, Meredith Reed et al. (2003), "Inter-State. Intra-State and Extra-State Wars: A Comprehensive Look at Their Distribution over Time, 1816-1997", *International Studies Quarterly*, 47(1): 49-70.

Sen, Amartya (2004), *Rationality and Freedom*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Shanon, Vaughn P. (2000), "Norms Are What States Make of Them: The Political Psychology of Norm Violation", *International Studies Quarterly*, 44(2): 293-316.

Shils, Edward (1957), "Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties", *British Journal of Sociology*, 8(2): 130-145.

Simmel, George (1955), *Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations*, Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press.

Singer, David J. and Melvin Small (1966), "Formal Alliances, 1815-1939: A Quantitative Description", *Journal of Peace Research*, 1: 1-32.

Singh, Mahendra Prasad (2005), *Democracy, Development and Security Issues*, New Delhi: Sage.

Siverson, Randolph M. and Joel King (1980), "Attributes of National Alliance Membership and War Participation", *American Journal of Political Science*, 24: 1-15.

Smith, Alastair (1996), "To Intervene or Not to Intervene: A Biased Decision", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 40(1): 16-40.

Smith, Anthony D. (1986), *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Oxford: Blackwell.

----- (1995), *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

----- (1996), "Culture, Community and Territory: The Politics of Ethnicity and Nationalism", *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, 72(3): 445-458.

----- (2008), *Cultural Foundations of Nations- Hierarchy, Covenant and Republic*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Snyder, Louis Leo (1968), *The New Nationalism*, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

Stedman, S.J. (1991), *Peacemaking in Civil War*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Steininger, Rolf (2003), *South Tyrol: A Minority Conflict of the Twentieth Century*, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.

Suhrke, Astri and Lela Garner Noble (1977), *Ethnic Conflict in International Relations*, New York: Praeger.

Terris, Lesley G. and Zeev Maoz (2005), "Rational Mediation: A Theory and a Test", *Journal of Peace Research*, 42(5): 563-583.

Tilley, Virginia (1997), "The Terms of the Debate: Untangling Language about Ethnicity and Ethnic Movements", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 20(3): 497-522.

Tilly, Charles (1975), "Reflections on the History of European State Making" in Charles Tilly (ed.) *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

----- (1990), *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1990*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell.

----- (1994), "States and Nationalism in Europe 1492-1992", *Theory and Society*, 23(1): 131-146.

Tir, Jaroslav and Michael Jasinski (2008), "Domestic-Level Diversionary Theory of War: Targeting Ethnic Minorities", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 52(5): 641-664.

Touval, Saadia (1972), *The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

----- (1994), "Why the U.N. Fails", *Foreign Affairs*, 73(5): 44-57.

Touval, Saadia and William I. Zartman (1985), *International Mediation in Theory and Practice*, Boulder: Westview.

Vasquez, John A. (1993), *The War Puzzle*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wallensteen, Peter and Margareta Sollenberg (2001), "Armed Conflict, 1989-2000", *Journal of Peace Research*, 38(5): 629-644.

Wallerstein, Immanuel (1967), *Africa: The Politics of Unity*, New York: Random House.

Walter, Barbara F. (2003), "Explaining the Intractability of Territorial Conflict", *International Studies Review*, 5(4): 137-153.

Weber, Max (1978), *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, eds. Claus Wittich and Guenther Roth, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Weigend, Guido G. (1950), "Effects of Boundary Changes in the South Tyrol", *Geographical Review*, 40(3): 364-375.

Weinstein, Brian (1991), "Language Planning as an Aid and a Barrier to Irredentism", in Naomi Chazan (ed.) *Irredentism and International Politics*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Wright, Quincy (1965), "The Escalation of International Conflicts", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 9(4): 434-449.

Young, Crawford (1976), *Politics of Cultural Pluralism*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Zacher, Mark W. (2001), "The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force", *International Organization*, 55(2): 215-250.

Zartman, William I. (1983), "The Strategy of Preventive Diplomacy in Third World Conflicts", in A. George (ed.) *Managing US-Soviet Rivalry*, Boulder: Westview.

----- (1985), *Ripe for Resolution*, New York: Oxford University Press.

----- (2001), "The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments", *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics*, 1(1): 8-18.

Zartman, William I. and Maureen R. Berman (1982), *The Practical Negotiator*, New Haven: Yale University Press.